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yadyevaṃ, nāmajātyādiyojanetyatra sūtre kathaṃ sambandhaḥ kārya ity āha nāmno jātyādibhir iti yojaneti śeṣaḥ /	Question: “If that is so, then how are the words (of Diṅnāga) ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’ to be construed?” Answer: ‘It is through these, etc. etc.’, That is the words are to be construed as ‘nāmnaḥ jātyādibhiḥ yojanā’, [‘connection with the Universal, etc,, of the Name’].
jātyādibhir yojanā jātyādiyojanā, nāmno jātyādiyojanā seyaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanetyeyaṃ samāsārtho 'dhyavatiṣṭhata iti yāvat // yadyevaṃ yadṛcchāśabdeṣu jātyādīnāṃ pravṛttinimittānām abhāvād avyāpinī vyavasthā bhaved ityāśaṅkyāha yadṛcchāśabdavācyāyā iti /	‘Seyam’ This stands for the Conceptual Content itself, which is implied by the force of the compound, which is to be explained as follows: ‘Jātyādiyojanā’ means ‘jātyādibhiḥ yojanā’, ‘connection with the Universal, etc.’; ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’ means ‘nāmnaḥ jātyadiyojanā’, ‘connection with the Universal, etc., of the Name (1225) Objection: “If that is so, then in the case of Proper Names, there would be nothing to denote the Universal, etc., and hence the said explanation cannot apply to their case.”
yadṛcchāśabdavācyāyā jāteḥ sadbhāvato na ca /	Inasmuch as there is the universal expressed by the proper name, the explanation should not be regarded as not applicable to it.
avyāptir asya mantavyā prasiddhes tu pṛthakśrutiḥ //	It has been mentioned separately only in view of popular usage.
etad uktaṃ bhavati ye 'pyete ḍitthādayaḥ śabdā yadṛcchāśabdatvena pratītāste 'pi janmanaḥ prabhṛtyāmaraṇakṣaṇādanuvartamānāḥ pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnamasādharaṇabhedena vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ kālaprakarṣamaryādāvacchinnavastusamavetāṃ jātimabhidheyatvenopādadate /	What is meant is as follows: Such words as ‘Dittha’ which are known as Proper Names, also take up a ‘Universal’ as their denotation, which Universal subsists in an entity restricted within a limited period of time; they denote such a Universal because they are incapable of denoting any object marked by a momentarily fluctuating character, while each of these (Proper Names) continues to remain attached to one entity from birth to death.
anyathā hi bālādyavasthābhedaparicchinnavastubhāgaviṣayatayā nirūḍhāḥ kathaṃ vṛdddhādyavasthopahitabhedam api vastu pratipādayeyuḥ / yeṣām api na kṣaṇiko dehaḥ kiṃ tarhikālāntarāvasthāyīti darśanam, teṣām api yathākālapacīyamānāvayavasambandhādavayavāpacayād vānyadanyaddravyamavasthābhedeṣviti siddham /	If the Proper Name did not denote such a Universal, then, having been applied to the individual in his childhood, how could it denote that same individual in his old age, who would have become a different individuality? Even for those persons who hold the view that the body is not momentary, but lasts for some time, it- is admitted that in course of time, the component parts of the body go on deteriorating, by reason of which deterioration, or by reason of its connection with such deterioration of the components, the body in a later age is different from that in the earlier age.
pariṇatidarśane 'pi yadavasthābhedasambaddhaṃ vastu tacchabdavācyatayā pratijñātaṃ tataścāvasthāntaraṃ samāśrayeta tadeva vastu tena śabdena nābhidhīyeta, yathā payasi viniścitābhidhānaśaktiḥ kṣīraśabdo na dadhni pravartate, tathā śarīre 'pi nāvasthāntare pravarteteti jātiravaśyābhyupagantavyā /	Even under the view that it remains the same body undergoing developments and changes, the Name that has been associated with a certain thing at one stage of its development, could not denote the same thing when it has reached a further stage of development; e.g. the name ‘milk’ which has been associated with the Milk in the first stage, is not applicable to the Curd, which is only a later stage in the development of milk. In the same way in the case of the Body also, the name applied to it in childhood could not be applied to it in youth or old age.
athavā mā bhūd vastubhūtā jātis tathāpi nāvyāpinī vyavasthā /	Or, even if there be no such entity as the Universal (in this case), even so, our explanation does not cease to apply to the case of Proper Names.
tathā hi ta eva bhedā avi [p.371] vakṣitabhedāḥ sāmānyamiti sarvatra jātiśabdair upādīyanta iti yadṛcchāśabdā jātiśabdebhyaḥ pṛthaglakṣaṇakāreṇa nirdiṣṭā ity āha prasiddhestviti /	Because it is only the diverse Individuals that are conceived of as common when their distinct individualities are not meant to be emphasised, when they become included under Common names denotative of the ‘Universal Consequently the Teacher propounding the definition under question has mentioned the Proper Names separately from Common names. This is what is explained by the words ‘It has been mentioned separately, etc. etc.’.
gavādayo hi śabdā loke jātiśabdatayā pratītāḥ, citrāṅgadādayastu saṃjñāśabdatveneti pṛthagvacanam //	In common parlance, the word ‘Cow’ is known as a Common name (denoting a Universal) while the word ‘Citrāṅgada’ is known as a Proper Name (applied to a single Individual); that is why the two have been mentioned separately.
nanvityādinā paraścodayati	The Opponent raises the following objection: [see verse 1227 next]
nanvanyāpohavācyatvāj jātiśabdastu kevalaḥ / vivakṣāparatantratvād vivakṣāśabda eva vā //	“Inasmuch as the ‘exclusion (Apoha) of others’ is the only denotation of words, all words should be ‘common’ only. or, inasmuch as they are dependent upon the speaker’s whim, they should all be ‘proper’ only.” (1227)
satyamityādinā pratividhatte / satyaṃ lokānuvṛttyedam uktaṃ nyāyavidedṛśam /	The answer to this is given in the following [see verse 1228 next] It is true that what the professor of the science of reasoning has said is in accordance with the popular idea of things;
iyāneva hi śabdo 'smin vyavahārapathaṃ gataḥ //	as it is only on these lines that verbal usage actually proceeds.
iyāneva hīti /	‘On these lines’;
pañcaprakāraḥ saṃjñājātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdabhedena //	i.e. under the fivefold division of Proper Name, Universal. Quality, Action and Substantive.
nanu yadi svamatasiddhaiva kalpanābhipretā kimarthaṃ tarhi "anye tvarthaśūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate" ityanena granthena pṛthaksvamatasiddhā kalpanā paścād upavarṇitācāryeṇetyāha te tu jātyādaya iti / te tu jātyādayo neha lokavadvyatirekiṇaḥ /	The said ‘universal’ and the rest are nothing different from what is known by these words among people:it was with a view to emphasise this fact, that the statement ‘others etc.’ has been made. Says the Opponent “If what is meant by Diṅnāga, is the ‘Kalpanā’, Conceptual Content, as understood by the Buddhists themselves, then how is it that, having asserted that ‘others have held that things are denoted by words which have no corresponding objects’, he has, later on, stated his own view of ‘Kalpanā’?”
ityetat pratipattyartham anye tvityādivarṇitam //	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1229 above]
etad uktaṃ bhavati na sāvaleyādivyaktivyatiriktā jātyādayaḥ pāramārthikāḥ santi sāṃvṛtās ta ityasyārthasya pratipādanārtham uktam idaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa, natu pṛthagaparāṃ kalpanāṃ darśayitum iti /	What is meant is as follows: As a matter of fact, anything in the shape of the Universal, as apart from the ‘Individuals ‘spotted cow’ and the like has no real existence, it is all purely illusory; it is with a view to emphasise this fact that the Teacher has made the assertion in question, and not with a view to indicate a separate kind of ‘Kalpanā
anya iti bauddhāḥ /	‘Others’ other Buddhists.
arthaśūnyair iti / jātyādinirapekṣair apohamātragocaraiḥ śabdaiḥ /	‘Words which have no corresponding objects’, i.e. words which denote only Apoha, independently of any such things as ‘Universal’ and the rest.
ityācāryagranthasyārthaḥ //	Such is the meaning of the passage quoted from the Teacher’s work.
jātyādiyojanāṃ ye 'pi kalpanāṃ samupāśritāḥ / tairabhyupeyā niyataṃ pratītir abhilāpinī //	Even those who are wedded to the notion that conceptual content consists in ‘connection with the universal and the rest’, have to admit that it is ‘idea associated with words’.
anyathā yojanābhāvād yuktayoriva bhāvayoḥ / svātantryeṇa paricchedāt kalpanā naiva kalpyate // evaṃ vā vyavahāryaṃ syāt sarvaṃ viśvam idaṃ tataḥ /	Otherwise, just as the two connected things are non-existent, so their connection also would be non-existent, all things being conceived severally each by itself; and there would be no need for postulating the ‘conceptual content and the result of this would be that there would be no usage in the world;
jātyādirūpasaṃsṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāryamidaṃ matam // [p.372] jātyādiyojanā śabdayojanāvyabhicāriṇī /	because usage has been regarded as associated with the universal and the rest, and association with the universal and the rest is inseparable from association with words.
evaṃ cocyata ityetat phalavaj jāyate vacaḥ //	thus alone could the expression ‘spoken of’ used by the teacher be fruitful.
jātiguṇakriyādravyayojanāyām api kalpanāyāṃ parair abhyupagatāyāṃ nāmayojanaiva kalpanā /	Even when Conceptual Content is regarded by others as ‘association with Universal, Quality, Action and Substance’, in reality ‘association’ with Name alone constitutes the Conceptual Content.
tathā hi tatra jātyādivyavacchinnaṃ vastu nāmnaiva viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyate, anyathā hi svātantryeṇānekapadārthagrahaṇavadyojanābhāvāt kathaṃ kalpanā bhavet, tataś ca mūkam eva jagat syāt /	Because as a matter of fact, whenever a thing is apprehended as distinguished by the Universal, etc. it is so only through the Name; if it were not so, then like the apprehension of several distinct things, there being connection independently by itself, how could there be any ‘Conceptual Content’? And the result of this would be that the world would become dumb.
ata eva ca daṇḍayuktaṃ puruṣaṃ paśyannapi na tāvad daṇḍīti yojayati yāvan na nāmabhedaṃ smarati /	It is for this reason that even on seeing the man with the stick, one does not connect the various factors implied in the notion of the ‘stick-holder’, until he recalls the particular Name.
yata eva śabdayojanayā sarvā yojanāvyāptā, ---ata eva cācāryīyaṃ "jātyā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur ityādiṣu yaducyata" iti vacanaṃ tat saphalaṃ bhavet /	Just because all such connection is invariably concomitant with the association of words, the words of the Teacher to the effect that ‘what is spoken of in the case of words like ‘Cow’ is the thing qualified by the Universal’ become fruitful (have some sense).
anyathā vinā nāmnā katham ucyata iti syāt / abhidhānakriyāyāḥ śabdadharmatvāt //	Otherwise, without the Name, how could the (passive) term ‘is spoken of’ be used? As the action of speaking (expressing) belongs to the word.
tasmāt samastasiddhāntasaṃsthitānāṃ pravādinām / avivādādayatnena sādhyeyaṃ kalpanā mayā //	Thus ‘conceptual content’ is something that can be easily proved without effort, as there is no dispute regarding it among teachers who take their stand upon all true doctrines.
lakṣaṇakārasya kalpanāṃ siddhirūpāṃ nirdiśato 'bhiprāyam āha etad āgūryeti /	The following Text sums up the arguments in favour of the notion of the Conceptual Content: [see verse 1234 above]
etadāgūrya sakalaṃ nāmajātyādivarṇanam /	It was in view of all this that the assertion of ‘name, universal and the rest’ was made;
matayoḥ svānyayor ittham upādānamihākarot // tebhyo 'smākam iyāneva bheda ityevam abruvan / anye tvityādikaṃ vākyam anantaramado jagau //	and herein the teacher made mention of his own view as also the view of others; without indicating the difference by actually saying that ‘my own view is so and so’, it was for this reason that he subsequently added the statement that ‘others have held, etc.’.
heyopādeyaviṣayakathanaṃ jātyādiyojanāṃ vinā nāmayojanāṃ vinā bhāvinītyādi pūrvopavarṇitam /	The following Text explains what Diṅnāga really means by asserting the Conceptual Content in two forms.
nāmajātyādivarṇanam iti / akarod iti sambandhaḥ /	‘The assertion of Name, etc.’ this is to be construed with ‘akarot’, ‘made’ (in the second line).
svānyayos tu matayorupādānaṃ heyopādeyaviṣayakanāya //	The assertion of his own view as also the view of others has been made for the purpose of showing which is to be accepted and which to be rejected.
nyāyamukhagranthas tarhi kathaṃneya ity āha evam ityādi /	Question: “How then are the words of Diṅnāga in his Nyāyamukha to be construed?” Answer: [see verse 1237 next]
evaṃ nyāyamukhagrantho vyākhyātavyo diśānayā / jñānam ityabhisambandhāt pratītis tatra coditā //	Thus in this way is the passage from the nyāyamukha to be explained, by mentioning the ‘cognition it is the ‘idea associated with words’ that has been indicated.
tatrāyaṃ nyāyamukhagranthaḥ ---"yat jñānamartharūpādau viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpaka tadakṣamakṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam" viśeṣaṇaṃ jātyādi, abhidhāyakaṃ nāma, tayor abhedopacāro jātyādimadbhiḥ saṃjñinā ca /	The relevant passage from the Nyāyamukha is as follows: ‘That Cognition of the form of things which, through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts, appears as non-determinate, in connection with each of the sense-organs, is Sense-perception’. Here the ‘qualifying adjunct’ stands for the Universal, etc, and the ‘denotative adjunct’ for the Name; the ‘imposition of the identity of these two’ with the things possessing the Universal, etc. and also with the thing hearing the Name.
abhedopacāragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam [p.373] yatrāpi bhedena grahaṇam asti gotvam asyedaṃ nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpaneṣyata eva /	in some cases where the adjuncts are apprehended as distinct e.g. when it is said ‘the Universal Cow subsists in this’, ‘the name of this is so and so’, there also the presence of the Conceptual Content is admitted.
nanu cānupratītiḥ kalpaneti noktaṃ, tat kathaṃ yathoktakalpanā labhyata ity āha jñānamityabhisambandhād iti /	Objection: “It has nowhere been said that the subsequent resultant Idea constitutes the Conceptual Content; how then do you get at the idea of the said Conceptual Content (from the words of the passage cited)?”
etad uktaṃ bhavati kalpanāvaiparītyena jñānam eva pratyakṣatvena darśayatā jñānadharmatvaṃ kalpanāyā darśitam / tathācāyam artho bhavati yajjñānaṃ nāmādyabhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tat prathyakṣaṃ, yat tu jñānaṃ tathāvikalpakaṃ tat kalpanātmakatvān na pratyakṣam iti sāmarthyād abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti pratyakṣavaiparītyena sidhyati evaṃ parāparamataṅgraho darśita iti //	‘By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc.’ That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as ‘Sense-perception’, it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this: That Cognition, wliich, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as non-determinate, is Sense-perception; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is determinate is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not Sense-perception; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the Idea associated with words as contradistinguished from Sense-perception.
yadvā svamatopavarṇanam eva kevalamācāryeṇa kṛtam ityādarśayati yadvetyādi /	In this way the passage has presented the Teacher’s own as also other people’s views. Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher has stated only his own view.
yadvā viśeṣaṇaṃ bhedo yenānyāpohakṛcchrutiḥ /	Or, the term ‘viśeṣaṇa’ [‘qualifying adjunct’, as occurring in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamukha, on p.
jātyādīnāṃ vyavacchedamanena ca karotyayam //	[it is called ‘differentiation’] because it does the differentiating (or excluding) of the universal, etc.
bhedo viśeṣaṇaṃ vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ / tasyābhidhāyakaṃ, na jātyādīnāṃ, tasyābhedopacāra iti vigrahaḥ //	In the compound ‘viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāra’ (in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamukha, in the commentary of Text 1237), the term ‘viśeṣaṇa’ stands for differentiation, i.e. exclusion;
tathā yadi pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham, kathaṃ{tvaṃ---} tat pratyakṣaśabdenocyata	and the Word is the ‘abhidhāyaka’, denoter, of this Exclusion, not of Universal, etc.;
etac ca sarvaṃ parihṛtam eveti yojanayann āha evaṃ pratītirūpā cetyādi / evaṃ pratītirūpā ca yadevaṃ kalpanā matā / tādātmyapratiṣedhaś ca pratyakṣasyopavarṇyate //	and there is ‘imposition of the identity’ of this; in this way is the compound to be explained. Conceptual content being held to be as actually understood and described above, it is the denial of the sameness of this with sense-perception that has been asserted;
tadādhyakṣādiśabdena vācyatve 'pi na bādhyate /	and this is not inconsistent with the fact of its being spoken of by such words as ‘adhyakṣa’ (‘pratyakṣa’) and the like.
kalpanāviraho 'dhyakṣe na hi sā śabdavācyatā // anyathā rūpagandhādeḥ sāvikalpakatā bhavet /	In sense-perception there is absence of conceptual content, but ‘conceptual content’ is not the same as ‘expressed by words otherwise, colour, odour and the rest would become determinate (as they are ‘expressed by words’).
ato nāspadamevedaṃ yadāhuḥ kudhiyaḥ pare //	Thus there is no room for what the dull-witted persons have urged.
yadi pratyakṣaśabdena pratyakṣam abhidhīyate / kathaṃ tat kalpanāpoḍham ayuktaṃ gamyate katham //	If the word ‘sense-perception’ actually denotes sense-perception, then how can its being said to be ‘free from conceptual content’ be held to be improper? (1239-1242)
tādātmyapratiṣedha iti /	hence what is asserted is most incoherent.
yatraiṣā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣamityanena granthena lakṣaṇakāras tādātmyapratiṣedhaṃ karoti / evambhūtaṃ kalpanātmakaṃ yajjñānaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ /	Thus if Sense-perception is ‘free from conceptual content’, then how is it spoken of by the word ‘Sense-perception’?” This is the objection that is urged by Bharga, Bhāradvāja and others, who think that the term ‘free from Conceptual Content’ is synonymous with ‘inexpressible by words’,
[p.374] natvādheyaniṣedham iti prathamaṃ tāvad acodyam /	The Author says that this objection has been answered already: [see verses 1239-1242 above] ‘Denial of the sameness’;
dvitīyamapyacodyam eva, yato nānabhidheyārthaḥ kalpanāpoḍhārtho varṇitaḥ /	when Diṅnāga says that ‘where there is no Conceptual Content, that is Sense-perception’ what he does is to deny the sameness of the two;
kiṃ tarhiavikalpakārthaḥ /	The second objection also is not proper;
avikalpakam api jñānaṃ yadyapyabhidhīyate śabdenādhyavasāyānurodhāt /	because ‘freedom from Conceptual Content’ is not ‘inexpressibility by words’, it is only ‘freedom determining concepts Even though the Cognition is non-determinate, yet it is regarded as expressed by words, by reason of its being actually found to be so expressed;
tathāpi rūpādivan na vikalpakatāṃ yāsyastīti yatkiñcid etat //	and yet it does not become ‘determinate, being, in this respect, like Colour and other, things (which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate on that account).
syād etat bhavatvevaṃ yathopavarṇitā kalpanā /	The following might be urged: “Conceptual Content may be as described.
kalpanāpoḍhaṃ tu kathaṃ siddham ity āha pratyakṣam ityādi /	But how does Sense-perception become proved to be ‘free from Conceptual Content’?” Answer: [see verse 1243 above]
anena svasaṃvittyā pratyakṣataḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ siddha ityādarśayati //	This shows that the absence of Conceptual Content is clearly perceived in one’s own experience.
nāsāveva vikalpo hi tamarthaṃ pratipadyate /	This same conceptual content does not apprehend the said object;
atītādyabhidhātyāgāt tannāmaghaṭanāptitaḥ //	because if it did, it would abandon the expressing of the ‘past’, etc. and there would be the incongruity of its being connected with the name of that object.
yadi hi sa eva vikalpas tamarthaṃ pratipadyeta tadātītādyarthābhidhānatyāgena tasyaiva nīlāder nāma yojayet /	If that same Conceptual Content apprehended the said object (Blue Colour, etc.), then it would abandon the signifying of past and other things, and would contain within itself the name of the ‘Blue’ itself.
ekatrābhilāpadvayasaṃsargāpratīter atītādyabhidhātyāgādityuktam /	The ‘abandoning of the signifying of the past and other things’ has been asserted, because the Conceptual Content cannot be associated with two sets of words.
tasyābhimukhībhūtasya nāma, tannāma, tasya ghaṭanā yojanā, tasyā āptiḥ prātiḥ / prasaṅga iti yāvat //	The Compound ‘tannāma, etc.’ is to be explained as ‘There would the incongruity of the connection of the name of the object before the perceiver’. At the particular time, there is no other conceptual content which is associated with the name of that object;
syān matam anya eva tarhi vikalpas tadā tamarthaṃ pratipadyata ityevaṃ kasmān na vijñāyata ity āha tadā tannāmetyādi / tadā tannāmasaṃsargī vikalpo 'styaparo na ca /	because there is no recognition of any such perceptible conceptual content, and the simultaneous presence of both cannot be desirable. It might be argued that “In that case, there may be some other Conceptual Content that would apprehend the object; why is not this view accepted?” Answer;
dṛśyasyāpratisaṃvitter aniṣṭeś ca dvayoḥ sakṛt // anena yathākramaṃ, pratyakṣavirodham abhyupagamavirodhaṃ ca sakṛdvikalpadvayapratijñāyām āha dvayor iti /	[see verse 1245 above] There are two answers pointed out in due sequence (1) the opponent’s idea being contrary to perceived facts, and (2) its being contrary to his own doctrines; inasmuch as it involves the presence of two Conceptual Contents at the same time. ‘Both’ i.e. the two Conceptual Contents.
vikalpayetyādinopasaṃharati / vikalpakamato jñānasahabhāvyanubhūyate /	As a matter of fact, what makes the cognition determinate appears along with the cognition itself;
tasmād indriyavijñānamakalpanamidaṃ sphuṭam //	hence the cognition brought about by the senses is clearly non-determinate (free from conceptual content).
[p.375]	The following Text sums up the subject: [see verse 1246 above]
krameṇaivopajāyante vijñānānīti cen matam /	If it be held that “cognitions appear in succession (never simultaneously), and the idea of simultaneous appearance is due to the quickness of the succession;
sakṛdbhāvābhimānas tu śīghravṛtter alātavat //	as in the case of the whirling fire-brand” [then the answer is as stated in the following text].
yadi krameṇopajayante kathaṃ yugapat pravedyanta ity āha sakṛdbhāvābhimānastviti /	The question being raised as to why the Cognitions are perceived as appearing simultaneously, if, in reality, they appear in succession, the answer given is that ‘the idea of simultaneous, etc. etc.’;
alāta ivālātavat /	as in the case of the whirling fire-brand.
yathālāte śīghrabhramaṇāt sakṛccakrākārā pratītis taddarśanānāṃ ghaṭānādevaṃ jñānāṃ śīghrotpattitaḥ sakṛdbhāvābhimāna iti / athavā alātaśabdena viṣayiṇī jñāne viṣayopacārāt tadviṣayāṇi jñānānyucyante /	That is, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, it is found that when the whirling is done very quickly, the idea produced is that of a single flaming circle; all the several perceptions being mixed up as one; in the same manner, cognitions appearing very quickly one after the other, there is the idea of their appearing together as one. Or, the term ‘alāta’ may be taken as standing for the perceptions of the fire-brand, the cognition being spoken of figuratively as the object;
pūrvavadvatiḥ // neti pūrvapakṣaṃ pratikṣipati /	the sense of the affix ‘vati’ remains the same as before, in this interpretation also.
na tadābhimukhībhūtabhāvanām ānuṣaṅgavān / vikalpo vidyate dṛśya ityevoktaṃ n.ṇā //	What has been asserted is that there is no perceptible conceptual content which is associated with the name of the object before the man’s eyes.
evaṃ manyate na sakṛdbhāvaprasādhanamatra prakṛtam, kiṃ tarhidhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ /	What is meant is as follows: What is being dealt with is not the fact of the two appearing together, but the absence of Conceptual Content in the Perception;
sa cānyatra gatacittasyāpyabhimukhībhūtapadārthānubhavakāle tannāmasaṃsargiṇo vikalpasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhyā sidhyatīti nātra kiñciddūṣaṇam uktam /	and this absence is proved by the fact that even when a man has his mind elsewhere at the time of the apprehension of the object before bis eyes, he does not apprehend the otherwise apprehensible Conceptual Content associated with the name of that object. And the Opponent has urged no criticism against this.
tathā hi yadi nāma krameṇa jñāne saṃvedyeta natu vikalpaḥ saṃvedyata iti na prakṛtasya vyāghātaḥ //1248/	Because, even if the two cognitions are actually apprehended in succession, the Conceptual Content is not apprehended;
na cāyaṃ sakṛdbhāvābhimāno 'pi bhrānta ityādarśayann āha bhrāntirityādi /	so that the attack does not affect our main position. That the said idea (of the simultaneity or the other conceptual content and the cognition) [cannot] be wrong has just been made clear.
bhrāntis tadabhimānaś ca tadvyaktaṃ ca nirantaram / tadeva cārthavijṇyānayaugapadyamataḥ sphuṭam // bhranatir neti prakṛtaṃ sambandhanīyam /	and this same simultaneity between the object and the cognition is also quite clear for that same reason. The following Text shows that the idea of the simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions is entirely mistaken: [see verse 1249 above]
tadabhimāna iti /	‘It cannot be wrong’ such is to be the construction along with what has gone before.
tasya sakṛdbhāvasyābhimāna iti vigrahaḥ /	Its idea i.e. the idea of the two appearing at one and the same time.
bādhakapramāṇavaśād vibhrāntivyavasthānaṃ, nacātra bādhakam asti, yena bhrāntiḥ syāt /	As a matter of fact, an idea is regarded as wrong when it is annulled by a valid cognition to the contrary; in the present case there is no such cognition to the contrary, by virtue of which the idea in question could be regarded as wrong.
kathaṃ nāstītyāha tadvyaktaṃ ca nirantaram iti /	“How do you know that there is no such cognition to the contrary?” Answer: This has just been made clear;
tadityabhimukhībhūtārthasaṃvedanaṃ nirantaraviṣayāntarāsaktacittasamakālaṃspaṣṭam ānubhūyate /	that the cognition of the object before the man’s eyes appears at the same time as the mind is attracted by something else is clearly perceived;
tadeva cidṛśamarthavijñānaṃ pratyakṣamucyata iti kuto bhrāntiḥ //	and it is this cognition that is called ‘Sense-perception’; wherefore then is there anything wrong in this? (1249)
na kevalaṃ sakṛdbhāvaś ca bhrāntatvavyavasthāṃ prati na kiñcitsādhakam asti, pratyuta bādhakam astīti darśayann āha nartakītyādi /	It is not only that there is nothing to prove that the idea of the said simultaneity is wrong, in fact, there is proof to the contrary (to show that it is not wrong). This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1250-1253 next]
nartakīdṛṣṭyavasthādāvakhilaṃ vedyate sakṛt / bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi bhrāntiḥ sā cā{ścodā---}śuvṛttitaḥ //	In the state of things attending upon the watching of the dancing girl, the whole lot sensations is apprehended at one and the same time, even though there are many intervening factors.
latātālādibuddhīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvarttanam /	If this also were regarded as a mistake due to the quick succession in which the sensations appear, then (the answer is that) there is still quicker succession in the case of cognitions produced by the two words ‘latā’ and ‘tāla’ when pronounced together;
sakṛdbhāvābhimāno 'taḥ kimatrāpi na vartate // [p.376] śuddhe ca mānase kalpe vyavasīyeta na kramaḥ / alpā ca sarvabuddhīnām āśuvṛttiścirāsthiteḥ //	why then is there no idea of simultaneity in this case? Then in a case where the operations of the mind alone are concerned, no succession should be perceived, because all cognitions (mental operations) occur in quick succession and do not stay for any length of time.
ataḥ sarvatra viṣaye na kramagrahaṇaṃ bhavet /	So that in all these oases (of quick succession), no succession could be perceived.
sakṛdgrahaṇabhāsas tu bhavecchabdādibodhavat //	The notion of simultaneous cognition however would be there, just as in the case of perception of sound, etc. (in the case of the dancing girl).
ekaikā dhīḥ pañcabhir dhībhir vyavadhīyamānāpi nartakīdarśanādyavasthāyām avyavahiteva pratibhāti /	Under such conditions as the witnessing of the dancing girl, we find that each single sensation, even though intervened by five other sensations, appears to be close to, and unseparated from, the other;
tathā hi yadaiva nartakīmutpaśyati tadaiva gītādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, karpūrādirasamāsvādayati, nāsikāpuṭavinyastakusumāmodaṃ jighrati, vyajanānīlādisparśaṃ, ca spṛśati vastrābharaṇādidānādi ca cintayati /	for instance, at the same time that one sees the girl dancing, he also hears the song and its accompaniments, goes on tasting the camphor and other spices, smells the sweet fragrance of flowers placed before the nostrils, touches the air proceeding from the fans and thinks of making presents of clothes and ornaments.

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