buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tena tat pratītau sāmarthyād avivakṣitasyākṣepo vyāvṛttiravagamyata eveti	hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the ‘Exclusion’ of what is not meant to be spoken of;
nāvyāpinī śabdārthavyavasthā /	so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any case.
yadeva ca mūḍhamaterāśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadevādhikṛtyoktam ācāryeṇa "ajñeyaṃ kalpitam kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numāna"miti //	In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dull-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement: ‘Having assumed the non-cognisable, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the cognisable’.
jñānākāraniṣedhas tu svavedyatvān na śakyate /	As for the denial of the idealistic form of things, such denial is impossible because the fact is self-evident;
vidyate hi nirālambamāropakamanekadhā //	as actually there are several impositions without any basic reality.
jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścinniyataḥ pratigocaram / avaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ svabhāvaś ca sa eva ca //	It has to be admitted that there must be something in the idea (or cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it; and that is precisely its ‘nature’;
asmābhirukta ākāraḥ pratibimbaṃ tadābhatā / ullekhaḥ pratibhāsaś ca saṃjñābhedastvakāraṇam //	and this same ‘nature’ of the idea has been spoken of by us as ‘form ‘reflected image’, ‘appearance’, ‘figuring’, ‘manifestation so that there is only a difference in the name, without any real difference.
na śakyata iti /	‘Impossible’ to make.
kathaṃ svasaṃvedyatvaṃ siddhaṃ jñānākārasyetyāha vidyate hītyādi /	Question: “In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident?” Answer: ‘As actually there are, etc, etc.’.
svapnādiṣvarthamantareṇāpi nirālambanamāgṛhītārthākāramāropakaṃ jñānamāgopālam atisphuṭam eva svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddham /	In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd, and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience.
naca deśakālāntarāvasthito 'rthastena rūpeṇa saṃvedyata iti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ, tasya tadrūpābhāvāt /	It cannot be right to say that “in these cases what is cognised is the realng as existing at other places and at other times”; because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form;
na cānyena rūpeṇānyasya saṃvedanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing;
kiñcāvaśyaṃ tadbhavadbhir jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścid viśeṣo 'rthakṛto 'bhyupagantavyo yena bodharūpatāsāmpye 'pi prativiṣayaṃ nīlasyaiva saṃvedanaṃ na pītyasyeti vibhāgena vibhajyate jñānam /	Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object, by virtue of which, even though as Cognition, every Cognition is the same, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the Blue, not of the Yellow colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition.
tadabhyupagame ca sāmarthyāt sākāram eva jñānamabhyupagataṃ syāt /	And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has form.
ākāravyatirekeṇānyasya svabhāvaviśeṣatvenāvadhārayitum aśakyatvāt /	Because without such form it would be impossible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition.
ato bhavatā svabhāvaviśeṣa iti sa eva śabdāntareṇokteḥ, asmābhistvākāra ullekha ityādinā śabdeneti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ //	Hence what you speak of as the ‘nature’ of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as ‘Form’, ‘Figuring’ and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names. In the case of the word ‘evam’ (thus), there is ‘naivam’ (not thus) which is clearly ‘excluded’;
evam ityādiśabdānām ityādāvāha evam ityādiśabdānām ityādi /	It has been argued (under Text 981, by Kumārila) that “Nothing excluded is noticed in the case of such words as ‘evam’ and the like”.
[p.360]	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1184 above]
evam ityādiśabdānāṃ naivam ityādi vidyate / apohyam iti vispaṣṭaṃ prakārāntaralakṣaṇam //	‘It is thus and not thus’, in this way there is the idea of ‘another manner’ which is what is ‘excluded’ differentiated by the word ‘evam’, ‘Thus’;
evam etannaivam iti prakārāntaram āropitam evam ityādiśabdair vyavacchidyamānaṃ sphuṭataram avasīyata eveti nāvyāpitā śabdārthavyavasthāyāḥ //	So that our theory of Verbal Denotation does not fail to apply to this case also. In the case of the word ‘all’ also, as presented in actual usage, there is something ‘excluded’; and what is regarded as meant to be spoken of here also is the ‘exclusion of others (1185)
evaṃ kumārilenoktaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ prativihitam, idānīm udyotakaroktaṃ pratividhīyate /	In this way the criticisms urged by Kumārila have been answered. The Author now proceeds to answer those urged by Uddyotakara.
tatra yaduktaṃ "sarvaśabdasya kaścārtho vyavacchedyaḥ prakalpyate" iti /	It has been argued (under Text 982, by Uddyotakara) “What is it that is assumed to be excluded in the case of the word ‘sarva’, ‘all’?”
tatrā vyavahāropanīte cetyādi /	The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1185 above]
atrāpi jñāyādipadavat kevalasya sarvaśabdasyāprayogād vākyasthasyaiva nityaṃ prayoga iti yadeva mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadeva nivartyamasti /	Here also, as in the case of words like ‘knowable’, the word ‘all’ is never used alone by itself; it is always used in a sentence; hence what is ‘excluded’ by it would be just that in regard to which there may be doubt in the mind of dull-witted persons.
abhidhitsita iti / abhidhātum iṣtaḥ //	‘Abhidhitsitaḥ’ meant to be spoken of.
ko 'sāvartho 'bhidhātum iṣṭa ity āha sarve dharmā ityādi / sarva dharmā nirātmānaḥ sarve vā puruṣā gatāḥ /	Question: “What is it that is meant to be spoken of?” Answer: [see verses 1186-1187 next] ‘All things are soulless’, ‘all men are gone’, in such sentences, what is apprehended is entirety, and what is ‘excluded’ is a certain factor.
kecid eva nirātmano bāhyā dṛṣṭā ghaṭādayaḥ /	There are such misconceptions as ‘only external things like, the jar are soulless’, ‘only some men can go’;
gamanaṃ kasyaciccaivaṃ bhrāntis tadvinivartate //	and it is these that are ‘excluded’. Question; “What is the factor that is excluded?”
ekādyasarvam iti cedityādāvāha sarvāṅgapratiṣedhaścetyādi /	Answer: [see verse 1187 above] In the case of the word ‘all’, the negation of all parts is not what is meant to be spoken of;
svārthāpohaprasaṅgo 'yaṃ tasmād ajñatayocyate //	hence the incongruity of the ‘exclusion of its own meaning’ that has been urged has been so under ignorance.
yadi hi sarvasyāṅgasya pratiṣedhaḥ tasmin vyavahāropanīte vākyasthe sarvaśabde vivakṣitaḥ syāt tadā svārthāpohaḥ prasajyate /	If it were meant that when the word ‘all’ is used in a sentence in the course of usage, there is negation of all parts, then there might be ‘exclusion of its own meaning As a matter of fact however, what is held to be negatived is only that which is open to doubt by the dull-witted person;
yāvatā yadeva mūḍhadhiyā śaṅkitaṃ tadeva niṣidhyata iti kutaḥ svārthāpavāditvadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ /	how then can there be any ‘exclusion of its own meaning’?
evaṃ hyādiśabdeṣvapi vācyam //	The same reasoning applies to the ease of such words as ‘ādi’ and the like.
na bhāvo nāpi cābhāvo 'pṛthagekatvalakṣaṇaḥ / nāśritānāśrito 'poho naikānekaś ca vastutaḥ //	It is neither positive nor negative; it is neither diverse nor same; it is neither subsistent, nor non-subsistent; it is neither one nor many.
[p.361] kasmād bhāvo na bhavatītyāha tathāsau nāstītyādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1189 above] Question: “Why is it not positive?”
tathāsau nāsti tattvena yathāsau vyavasīyate / tan na bhāvo na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyataḥ //	In reality, it does not exist in the form in which it is apprehended; hence it cannot be positive. nor is it negative, as it is apprehended as an entity.
bāhyarūpatayāsau bhrāntair avasīyate na, cāsau tathāvasthita ityato bāhyarūpatvābhāvān na bhāvaḥ /	By deluded people it is apprehended as something external, and yet it does not exist in that form; and as having no external form, it is not Positive.
athābhāvaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyata iti /	Question: “Why cannot it be negative?” Answer: ‘Nor is it negative, became it is apprehended as an entity’;
atha pṛthaktvaikatvādilakṣaṇaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha bhedābhedādaya ityādi /	and yet, as it presents itself as something external, it cannot be said to be entirely negative. Question: “Why cannot Apoha be of the nature of ‘diversity’ or of ‘sameness’?”
bhedābhedādayaḥ sarve vastusatpariniṣṭhitāḥ /	‘Diversity’ (difference) and ‘sameness’ (non-difference), etc. are resident in entities;
niḥsvabhāvaśca śabdārthas tasmād ete nirāspadāḥ //	while the ‘denotation of words’ is entirely featureless; hence the said characters have no place here.
bhedābhedādayaḥ vyatirekāvyatirekādayaḥ /	‘Diversity and sameness, etc.’ i.e. Difference and Non-difference, etc.
ādiśabdenāśritatvādayo gṛhyante nahi vastugatā eva dharmās tat katham apohekalpanāśilpighaṭitavigrahe pratiṣṭhāṃ labheran /	the ‘etc.’ including ‘being subsistent’ and ‘non-subsistent’ and so forth. All these are properties residing in Entities only; how could they reside in the Apoha which has its body created only by the artist of Conceptual Thought?
yaccoktam ---"kriyārūpatvād apohasya viṣayo vaktavya" iti, tadasiddham, śabdavācyasyāpohasya pratibimbātmakatvāt /	It has been argued that “Apoha being of the nature of Action, its objective has to be pointed out”. The reason put forward is not admitted; because the Apoha denoted by the Word is of the nature of a ‘Reflected Image’;
tac ca pratibimbakamadhyavasitabāhyavasturūpatvān na pratiṣedhamātram / ata eva kiṃ goviṣayo 'thāgoviṣaya ityasya vikalpadvayasyānupapattiḥ, goviṣayatvenaiva tasya vidhirūpatayāpyavasīyamānatvāt //	and this Reflected Image, being in the form of the apprehended external object, cannot be a mere negation, For the same reason there is no room for the optional alternatives set forth (by Uddyotakara) as to whether it has, for its objective, the Cow, or the Non-Cow; as it is always apprehended as something positive, appertaining to the Cow [hence the question of its pertaining to the Non-Cow does not arise’, (1191)
anyārthavinivṛttiṃ ca sākṣācchabdaḥ karoti naḥ /	For us the word does the ‘negativing of other things’ directly;
kṛte svārthābhidhāne tu sāmarthyāt sāvagamyate // na tadātmā parātmeti vistareṇopapāditam /	and after the negativing has been done by the word, it becomes apprehended through its own force, in the form ‘its nature is not the nature of anything else’, as has been explained in detail (under text 1013);
parapakṣānabhijñena tasmād etad ihocyate // kena hyagotvam āsaktaṃ goryenaitadapohyate /	hence what is urged on the present occasion ‘who has attributed the character of the non-cow to the cow, that it has to be negatived? Is through ignorance of the view of the other party.
iti naivābhimukhyena śabdenaitad apohyate //	As a matter of fact, this is not what is held to be ‘negatived’ by the word directly.
yadi hi pradhānenānyanivṛttimevaśabdaḥ pratipādayet tadaitat syāt, yāvatārthapratibimbakam eva yathoktaṃ prathamataraḥ karoti, tadgatau ca sāmarthyād eva nivartanaṃ gamyata iti siddhāntānabhijñatayā yatkiñcidabhihitam etad itisaṃkṣepārthaḥ /	What has been urged would have been true only if the Word had expressed ‘the negation of others’ primarily; as a matter of fact, however, what the Word produces, first of all, is only the Reflected Image of the Thing (spoken of); and it is only after that has been comprehended that, through the force of its implication, the said ‘negation’ (exclusion) becomes comprehended. Apparently this doctrine of ours is not known to the other party, and what he has urged is something insignificant, beneath notice. Such is the upshot of the Text.
śeṣaḥ subodham //	The rest is easy.
yaduktam ---"kimayam apoho vācya" ityādi, tatrāha katam enetyādi / katham ena ca śabdena vācyatvaṃ paripṛcchyate / apohasya kimetena yadi vā kiṃ ghaṭādinā // śabdārthaḥ kimapoho vā vidhirveti nirūpaṇe /	The ‘denotability’ that you ask about is ‘denotability’ by which word? Is it ‘denotability’ by the word ‘Apoha’? Or by the wobd ‘jar’ and the best? As regards the question whether the Apoha that is denoted is itself of the nature of Apoha (negation, exclusion) or it is something positive, when we come to think of it, what is cognised is the apoha that figures in the cognition.
apoha iti bhātyetadyat tadevaṃ pratīyate // pratibimbaṃ hi śabdārtha iti sākṣād iyaṃ matiḥ //	Our view is that what is denoted by the word directly is the reflected image, and as regards ‘the negation of other things’, like the universal etc., That is comprehended only indirectly, through implication.
ghaṭavṛkṣādiśabdāś ca tadeva pratibimbakam / bruvanti jananāt sākṣād arthād anyatkṣipanti tu //	What all such words as ‘jar’, ‘tree’ and the like denote is the said reflected image, as it is the cognition of this that they produce directly; and anything else, they imply only indirectly.
tasmān na vidhidoṣo 'sti nāniṣṭā ca prasajyate / avācyapakṣadoṣas tu tadanaṅgīkṛter na naḥ //	Thus then, there is no incongruity regarding the positive character; nor is there anything undesirable for us. As regards the alternative of Apoha not being ‘denotable’, that we do not accept; and hence that is not our view.
tatrānyāpohavācyatvavikalpo yadyanyopohaśabdamadhikṛtyādhikriyate tadā vidhirūpeṇaivāsau tena śabdena vācya ityabhyupagamān nāniṣṭāpattir yuktā / tathā hi kiṃ vidhiḥ śabdārtha āhosvid anyāpoha iti prastāve 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha ityukte pratipattur yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇānyapohādhyavasāyī pratyayaḥ samupajāyate /	As regards the alternatives set forth regarding the denotability of ‘the exclusion of others’, if it is urged in regard to the term ‘exclusion of others?’ then, inasmuch as it is held by us that what is denoted by this term is something positive, that should not have been urged against us as an undesirable contingency. That is to say, when the question is raised, as to whether what is denoted by the word is something positive, or the ‘exclusion or negation of others’ and it is said that ‘it is the negation of others that is denoted by the word’, there appears in the listener the idea envisaging the ‘negation of others’, in the form of a Reflected Image;
arthāt tu vidhirūpaśabdārthaniṣedhaḥ / atha ghaṭādiśabdam adhikṛtya tatrāpi yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇāpohaḥ sākṣād ghaṭādiśabdair upajanyamānatvād vidhirūpeṇa ca taiḥ pratipādyate, sāmarthyāt tvanyanivṛtter adhigama iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ /	and if there is an idea of the negation of positive entities as forming the denotation of the word, that comes only by implication. If what is urged is with reference to the words ‘Jar’ and the like, then, what these words bring about directly is the Apoha in the shape of the Reflected Image, which is denoted by those words in the positive form, and the idea of the ‘negation of others’ is obtained by implication;
na cāpyavyavasthādoṣaḥ /	so that there is no undesirable contingency for us.
sāmarthyād anyanivṛtter gamyamānatvād anuvācyatayāvācyapakṣasyānaṅgīkṛtatvād eva na tat pakṣabhāvidoṣodayāvakāśa iti darśayati avācyapakṣadoṣastviti //	Nor is our view open to the objection that there would be no resting ground or finality (in the assumption of Apoha after Apoha); because the ‘negation of others’ is held to be comprehended only by implication, and hence to be only an appendage to actual Denotation the view that it is not expressed is not accepted by us;
api caikatvanityatvetyādāvāha ekatvetyādi /	This is what is indicated by the words ‘As regards the alternative, etc. etc.’, (1195-1199)
ekatvanityatādiś ca kalpito na tu tāttvikaḥ /	The ideas of ‘one-ness’, ‘eternality’ and the like are purely imaginary, not real.
tadatra hāsakaraṇaṃ mahāvidvatsūcakam //	hence your laughter at us on this point is indicative of a very high grade of learning (on your part)!
yadi hi pāramārthikamekatvādyupavarṇanaṃ kṛtaṃ syāt tadā hāsyakāraṇam evasyād bhavataḥ yadāhi bhrāntipratipattyanurodhena kālpanikametad ācāryeṇopavarṇitaṃ tadā katham iva hā [p.363] syakāraṇam avatarati viduṣaḥ /	It has been urged (under Text 1001) that “Singularity, eternality, etc. cannot be attributed to Apoha”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1200 above] if ‘one-ness’ and the rest had been mentioned by us. as real, then there might have been some cause for your laughing at us. As a matter of fact, however, it has been mentioned by our Teacher only as something purely imaginary (subjective, conceptual), and he has mentioned it only in view of common misconceived notions.
kiṃtu bhavāneva vivakṣitam artham avijñāya dūṣayan viduṣām atīva hāsyāspadamupajāyate //	Under the circumstances, how can a learned person find any cause for laughter in this? On the contrary, you yourself, by criticising what you have not understood, have become an object of derisive laughter.
tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga ityādāvāha avadhāraṇasāmarthyād ityādi / avadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyate /	It has been asserted (under Text 1002, by Kumārila) that “for these reasons, the element of the negation of others could be there only in the case of words that are associated with the negative particle, etc. etc.”.
svātmaiva gamyate yatra viphalo niyamo 'nyathā //	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1201 above]
na kevalaṃ yatra naṭyogas tatrānyanivṛttyaṃśo 'vagamyate, yatrāpi hi naṭyogo nāsti tatrāpi gamyata eveti svavācaivaitad bhavatā pratipāditaṃ svātmaiva gamyata ityavadhāraṇaṃ kurvatā /	The factor of the ‘exclusion of other things’ is cognised, not only in cases where the negative term is present; also where the negative term is not present, the same is cognised. This has been made clear by yourself when you said that ‘the Thing itself is apprehended’, where you have emphasised the ‘itself’.
anyathā cāvadhāraṇavaiyarthyam eva syāt /	If this is not what you mean, then that emphasising word is useless.
yasmād yatra svātmaiva gamyate tatrāvadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyata iti sphuṭataram evāvasīyate //	Thus when it is said that ‘the thing itself is cognised’, it is all the more clearly implied that the ‘exclusion of others’ is also cognised.
yasya tarhītyādinā paro 'pohaśabdārthavyavasthāyā avyāpitām evodbhāvayati / yasya tarhi na bāhyo 'rtho 'pyanyathāvṛtta iṣyate /	“In the case of such terms as ‘son of the barren woman where there is no external object which would be the ‘contrary’ (excluded), wherein would the Apoha subsist which is said to be denoted by it?” (1202) In the following Text, the other Party proceeds to show that the Buddhist theory of Apoha cannot apply to all cases.
vandhyāsutādiśabdasya tena kvāpoha ucyate //	[see verse 1202 above]
tathā hi yasya vandhyāsutādiśabdasya bāhyasutādikaṃ vastvanyavyāvṛttam apohāśrayo nāstyeva, tasya kimadhiṣṭhāno 'paho vācya ucyate, avaśyaṃ hi vastunādhiṣṭhānabhūtenāpohasya bhavitavyam, tasyānyāpoḍhapadārthāvyatirekāt //	“In the case of the term ‘son of the Barren Woman’, there is no such thing as the external son, which would be the contrary, and hence the object of the exclusion; then wherein would that Apoha rest which is said to be denoted by that term? It is essential that there should be an entity which is the substratum or object of the Apoha; as such substratum would be non-different from ‘what is excluded by another’,” (1202)
rūpābhāvād ityādinā pratividhatte /	The above is answered in the following [see verse 1203 next]
rūpābhāvād abhāvānāṃ śabdā jātyādivācakāḥ /	As non-entities have no form, words appertaining to those cannot be even suspected of being denotative of the universal and such things.
nāśaṅkyā eva siddhās te nirbhāsasyaiva sūcakāḥ //	in fact, it has been fully established that they are only indicators of the reflection.
vandhyāsutādīnām abhāvānāṃ rūpasya kasyacit svabhāvasyābhāvān na tadviṣayāḥ śabdā jātyādivācakatvenāśaṅkyāḥ, vastuvṛttīnāṃ hi śabdānāṃ kiṃrūpamabhidheyamāhosvit pratibimbakam iti śaṅkā syāt, abhāvaś ca vastuvivekalakṣaṇa eveti tadvṛttīnāṃ śabdānāṃ katham iva vastuviṣayatvāśaṅkā bhavet /	Such non-entities as the ‘son of the Barren Woman’ have no form, no character; hence words relating to those cannot even be suspected of being denotative of the Universal, etc. It is only in the case of words relating to entities that there could be any question as to whether what is denoted by them is some form or only a Redaction. As regards non-entities (or Negations) they are entirely different from Entities, hence how could words applied to them be even suspected of pertaining to entities? From this it is clear that the words in question have no object (denotation at all); all that they produce is the mere Reflection of things;
ato nirviṣayatvaṃ sphuṭataram eva /	Thus there is no room for the objection that has been urged.
etad eva darśayati arthetyādi /	The same is further explained: [see verse 1204 next]
arthaśūnyābhijalpotthavāsanāmātranirmitam / pratibimbaṃ yadābhāti tacchabdaiḥ pratipādyate //	What is expressed by words is only the reflection that appears, as created solely by impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions.
vandhyāsutādiśabdaiḥ //	‘Words’ like ‘Son of the Barren Woman’.
[p.364] ye punar vastuviṣayāḥ śabdās teṣāṃ pratibimbakamātravācakatvasiddhau pramāṇayann āha tanmātretyādi /	Those words however that relate to entities, denote only the Reflection; the formal proof for this is stated in the following [see verse 1205 next]
saṅketasavyapekṣatvāt kalpitārthābhidhānavat // ye saṅketasavyapekṣās te 'rthaśūnyābhijalpāhitavāsanāmātranirmitavikalpapratibimbakamātrāvadyotakāḥ, yathā vandhyāputrādiśabdāḥ kalpitārthābhidhāyinaḥ, saṅketasavyapekṣāś ca sasaṃśayā vivādāspadībhūtā ghaṭādayaḥ śabdā iti svabhāvahetuḥ //	The words in question are directly expressive of that (reflection) alone, because they are dependent upon convention, like words expressing imaginary things. [The argument may be formulated thus] Words that are dependent upon Convention are expressive of only the Reflection of the Conceptual Content produced by the impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions, as for instance, words like ‘the son of the Barren Woman’; the words in question i.e. words like ‘Jar’ and the like, which form the subject of the present discussion, are dependent upon Convention;
evaṃ svapakṣaṃ prasādhya parapakṣaniṣedhāya pramāṇayann āha paropagatetyādi / paropagatabhedādividhānapratipādakāḥ /	and this is a natural reason (for holding that they are expressive only of the Reflection, etc. etc.). These words are not denotative of the ‘specific individuality’ and the rest, that have been assumed by others.
na caite dhvanayas tasmāt tadvadeveti gamyatām //	Hence these should be understood to be like those just mentioned.
bhedaḥ svalakṣaṇam, ādiśabdena jātyādiparigrahaḥ /	Having established his own position, the Author next proceeds to adduce arguments for rejecting the views of the other party: [see verse 1206 above] ‘Bheda’ stands for ‘Specific Individuality’.
tasmād iti / saṅketasāpekṣatvāt /	‘And the rest’ includes the Universal, etc. ‘Hence’, i.e. on account of their being dependent on Convention.
tadvadeveti / kalpitārthābhidhānavat //	‘Like those’, like words speaking of imaginary things.
dvayor api hetvor anaikāntikatāṃ pariharann āha saṅketāsambhava ityādi /	The Author shows that the two Reasons adduced are not ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1207 next]
saṅketāsambhavo hyatra bhedādau sādhitaḥ purā /	That there can be no convention in regard toé specific individuality’ and the rest has been already -proved before.
vaiphalyaṃ ca na taddhetutvoḥ sandigdhavyatirekitā //	hence the reasons adduced are neither ‘doubtful’ nor ‘concomitant with the contrary of the probandum (1207)
aśakyasamayatvād ananyabhāktvācceti pūrvaṃ svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavasya saṅketavaiphalyasya ca prasādhitatvāt /	It has been already proved before on the ground of the ‘Impossibility of Conventions’ (under Text 876 et seq.) and on that of its ‘not bearing upon anything else’, that Convention is impossible and also useless.
tat tasmāt /	‘Tat’ Hence, therefore.
hetvor dvayor na sandigdhavipakṣavyatirekiteti //	The two Reasons are not Doubtful or Concomitant with the Contrary of the Probandum.
nanvityādinā paraḥ prathame hetāvanaikāntikatām udbhāvayati	In the following Texts, the Opponent argues that the first of the two Reasons adduced is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verses 1208-1209 above]
nanu cāpohapakṣe 'pi kathaṃ saṅketasambhavaḥ / sāphalyaṃ ca kathaṃ tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati //	“Under the theory of Apoha also, how is convention possible? How too is it fruitful? When it cannot be known to both, the speaker and the listener;
vaktṛuśrotror na hi jñānaṃ vedyate tat parasparam /	as the idea of one cannot be known to the other.
saṅkete na ca taddṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāre samīkṣyate //	what too was seen at the time of the making of the convention is not seen at the time of the use of the word.” (1208-1209)
yathāhi svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavo vaiphalyaṃ ca tathāpohapakṣe 'pi samānam, tataścākṛtasamayatvāt tanmātradyotakatvam api śabdānāṃ na yuktam ityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ /	“Just as, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of Apoha; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the Apoha alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.
sāphalyaṃ ca katham iti / sambhavatīti śeṣaḥ /	“How too is it fruitful? That is, how is fruitfulness possible ‘Tasya’ stands for the Convention.
kathaṃ punas tatra saṅketāsambhava ity āha na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyatīti /	Question: Why is Convention not possible in this case? “Answer: Because it cannot be known to both.

tena tat pratītau sāmarthyād avivakṣitasyākṣepo vyāvṛttiravagamyata eveti

hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the ‘Exclusion’ of what is not meant to be spoken of;

nāvyāpinī śabdārthavyavasthā /

so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any case.

yadeva ca mūḍhamaterāśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadevādhikṛtyoktam ācāryeṇa "ajñeyaṃ kalpitam kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numāna"miti //

In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dull-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement: ‘Having assumed the non-cognisable, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the cognisable’.

jñānākāraniṣedhas tu svavedyatvān na śakyate /

As for the denial of the idealistic form of things, such denial is impossible because the fact is self-evident;

vidyate hi nirālambamāropakamanekadhā //

as actually there are several impositions without any basic reality.

jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścinniyataḥ pratigocaram / avaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ svabhāvaś ca sa eva ca //

It has to be admitted that there must be something in the idea (or cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it; and that is precisely its ‘nature’;

asmābhirukta ākāraḥ pratibimbaṃ tadābhatā / ullekhaḥ pratibhāsaś ca saṃjñābhedastvakāraṇam //

and this same ‘nature’ of the idea has been spoken of by us as ‘form ‘reflected image’, ‘appearance’, ‘figuring’, ‘manifestation so that there is only a difference in the name, without any real difference.

na śakyata iti /

‘Impossible’ to make.

kathaṃ svasaṃvedyatvaṃ siddhaṃ jñānākārasyetyāha vidyate hītyādi /

Question: “In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident?” Answer: ‘As actually there are, etc, etc.’.

svapnādiṣvarthamantareṇāpi nirālambanamāgṛhītārthākāramāropakaṃ jñānamāgopālam atisphuṭam eva svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddham /

In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd, and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience.

naca deśakālāntarāvasthito 'rthastena rūpeṇa saṃvedyata iti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ, tasya tadrūpābhāvāt /

It cannot be right to say that “in these cases what is cognised is the realng as existing at other places and at other times”; because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form;

na cānyena rūpeṇānyasya saṃvedanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing;

kiñcāvaśyaṃ tadbhavadbhir jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścid viśeṣo 'rthakṛto 'bhyupagantavyo yena bodharūpatāsāmpye 'pi prativiṣayaṃ nīlasyaiva saṃvedanaṃ na pītyasyeti vibhāgena vibhajyate jñānam /

Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object, by virtue of which, even though as Cognition, every Cognition is the same, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the Blue, not of the Yellow colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition.

tadabhyupagame ca sāmarthyāt sākāram eva jñānamabhyupagataṃ syāt /

And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has form.

ākāravyatirekeṇānyasya svabhāvaviśeṣatvenāvadhārayitum aśakyatvāt /

Because without such form it would be impossible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition.

ato bhavatā svabhāvaviśeṣa iti sa eva śabdāntareṇokteḥ, asmābhistvākāra ullekha ityādinā śabdeneti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ //

Hence what you speak of as the ‘nature’ of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as ‘Form’, ‘Figuring’ and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names. In the case of the word ‘evam’ (thus), there is ‘naivam’ (not thus) which is clearly ‘excluded’;

evam ityādiśabdānām ityādāvāha evam ityādiśabdānām ityādi /

It has been argued (under Text 981, by Kumārila) that “Nothing excluded is noticed in the case of such words as ‘evam’ and the like”.

[p.360]

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1184 above]

evam ityādiśabdānāṃ naivam ityādi vidyate / apohyam iti vispaṣṭaṃ prakārāntaralakṣaṇam //

‘It is thus and not thus’, in this way there is the idea of ‘another manner’ which is what is ‘excluded’ differentiated by the word ‘evam’, ‘Thus’;

evam etannaivam iti prakārāntaram āropitam evam ityādiśabdair vyavacchidyamānaṃ sphuṭataram avasīyata eveti nāvyāpitā śabdārthavyavasthāyāḥ //

So that our theory of Verbal Denotation does not fail to apply to this case also. In the case of the word ‘all’ also, as presented in actual usage, there is something ‘excluded’; and what is regarded as meant to be spoken of here also is the ‘exclusion of others (1185)

evaṃ kumārilenoktaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ prativihitam, idānīm udyotakaroktaṃ pratividhīyate /

In this way the criticisms urged by Kumārila have been answered. The Author now proceeds to answer those urged by Uddyotakara.

tatra yaduktaṃ "sarvaśabdasya kaścārtho vyavacchedyaḥ prakalpyate" iti /

It has been argued (under Text 982, by Uddyotakara) “What is it that is assumed to be excluded in the case of the word ‘sarva’, ‘all’?”

tatrā vyavahāropanīte cetyādi /

The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1185 above]

atrāpi jñāyādipadavat kevalasya sarvaśabdasyāprayogād vākyasthasyaiva nityaṃ prayoga iti yadeva mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadeva nivartyamasti /

Here also, as in the case of words like ‘knowable’, the word ‘all’ is never used alone by itself; it is always used in a sentence; hence what is ‘excluded’ by it would be just that in regard to which there may be doubt in the mind of dull-witted persons.

abhidhitsita iti / abhidhātum iṣtaḥ //

‘Abhidhitsitaḥ’ meant to be spoken of.

ko 'sāvartho 'bhidhātum iṣṭa ity āha sarve dharmā ityādi / sarva dharmā nirātmānaḥ sarve vā puruṣā gatāḥ /

Question: “What is it that is meant to be spoken of?” Answer: [see verses 1186-1187 next] ‘All things are soulless’, ‘all men are gone’, in such sentences, what is apprehended is entirety, and what is ‘excluded’ is a certain factor.

kecid eva nirātmano bāhyā dṛṣṭā ghaṭādayaḥ /

There are such misconceptions as ‘only external things like, the jar are soulless’, ‘only some men can go’;

gamanaṃ kasyaciccaivaṃ bhrāntis tadvinivartate //

and it is these that are ‘excluded’. Question; “What is the factor that is excluded?”

ekādyasarvam iti cedityādāvāha sarvāṅgapratiṣedhaścetyādi /

Answer: [see verse 1187 above] In the case of the word ‘all’, the negation of all parts is not what is meant to be spoken of;

svārthāpohaprasaṅgo 'yaṃ tasmād ajñatayocyate //

hence the incongruity of the ‘exclusion of its own meaning’ that has been urged has been so under ignorance.

yadi hi sarvasyāṅgasya pratiṣedhaḥ tasmin vyavahāropanīte vākyasthe sarvaśabde vivakṣitaḥ syāt tadā svārthāpohaḥ prasajyate /

If it were meant that when the word ‘all’ is used in a sentence in the course of usage, there is negation of all parts, then there might be ‘exclusion of its own meaning As a matter of fact however, what is held to be negatived is only that which is open to doubt by the dull-witted person;

yāvatā yadeva mūḍhadhiyā śaṅkitaṃ tadeva niṣidhyata iti kutaḥ svārthāpavāditvadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ /

how then can there be any ‘exclusion of its own meaning’?

evaṃ hyādiśabdeṣvapi vācyam //

The same reasoning applies to the ease of such words as ‘ādi’ and the like.

na bhāvo nāpi cābhāvo 'pṛthagekatvalakṣaṇaḥ / nāśritānāśrito 'poho naikānekaś ca vastutaḥ //

It is neither positive nor negative; it is neither diverse nor same; it is neither subsistent, nor non-subsistent; it is neither one nor many.

[p.361] kasmād bhāvo na bhavatītyāha tathāsau nāstītyādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1189 above] Question: “Why is it not positive?”

tathāsau nāsti tattvena yathāsau vyavasīyate / tan na bhāvo na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyataḥ //

In reality, it does not exist in the form in which it is apprehended; hence it cannot be positive. nor is it negative, as it is apprehended as an entity.

bāhyarūpatayāsau bhrāntair avasīyate na, cāsau tathāvasthita ityato bāhyarūpatvābhāvān na bhāvaḥ /

By deluded people it is apprehended as something external, and yet it does not exist in that form; and as having no external form, it is not Positive.

athābhāvaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyata iti /

Question: “Why cannot it be negative?” Answer: ‘Nor is it negative, became it is apprehended as an entity’;

atha pṛthaktvaikatvādilakṣaṇaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha bhedābhedādaya ityādi /

and yet, as it presents itself as something external, it cannot be said to be entirely negative. Question: “Why cannot Apoha be of the nature of ‘diversity’ or of ‘sameness’?”

bhedābhedādayaḥ sarve vastusatpariniṣṭhitāḥ /

‘Diversity’ (difference) and ‘sameness’ (non-difference), etc. are resident in entities;

niḥsvabhāvaśca śabdārthas tasmād ete nirāspadāḥ //

while the ‘denotation of words’ is entirely featureless; hence the said characters have no place here.

bhedābhedādayaḥ vyatirekāvyatirekādayaḥ /

‘Diversity and sameness, etc.’ i.e. Difference and Non-difference, etc.

ādiśabdenāśritatvādayo gṛhyante nahi vastugatā eva dharmās tat katham apohekalpanāśilpighaṭitavigrahe pratiṣṭhāṃ labheran /

the ‘etc.’ including ‘being subsistent’ and ‘non-subsistent’ and so forth. All these are properties residing in Entities only; how could they reside in the Apoha which has its body created only by the artist of Conceptual Thought?

yaccoktam ---"kriyārūpatvād apohasya viṣayo vaktavya" iti, tadasiddham, śabdavācyasyāpohasya pratibimbātmakatvāt /

It has been argued that “Apoha being of the nature of Action, its objective has to be pointed out”. The reason put forward is not admitted; because the Apoha denoted by the Word is of the nature of a ‘Reflected Image’;

tac ca pratibimbakamadhyavasitabāhyavasturūpatvān na pratiṣedhamātram / ata eva kiṃ goviṣayo 'thāgoviṣaya ityasya vikalpadvayasyānupapattiḥ, goviṣayatvenaiva tasya vidhirūpatayāpyavasīyamānatvāt //

and this Reflected Image, being in the form of the apprehended external object, cannot be a mere negation, For the same reason there is no room for the optional alternatives set forth (by Uddyotakara) as to whether it has, for its objective, the Cow, or the Non-Cow; as it is always apprehended as something positive, appertaining to the Cow [hence the question of its pertaining to the Non-Cow does not arise’, (1191)

anyārthavinivṛttiṃ ca sākṣācchabdaḥ karoti naḥ /

For us the word does the ‘negativing of other things’ directly;

kṛte svārthābhidhāne tu sāmarthyāt sāvagamyate // na tadātmā parātmeti vistareṇopapāditam /

and after the negativing has been done by the word, it becomes apprehended through its own force, in the form ‘its nature is not the nature of anything else’, as has been explained in detail (under text 1013);

parapakṣānabhijñena tasmād etad ihocyate // kena hyagotvam āsaktaṃ goryenaitadapohyate /

hence what is urged on the present occasion ‘who has attributed the character of the non-cow to the cow, that it has to be negatived? Is through ignorance of the view of the other party.

iti naivābhimukhyena śabdenaitad apohyate //

As a matter of fact, this is not what is held to be ‘negatived’ by the word directly.

yadi hi pradhānenānyanivṛttimevaśabdaḥ pratipādayet tadaitat syāt, yāvatārthapratibimbakam eva yathoktaṃ prathamataraḥ karoti, tadgatau ca sāmarthyād eva nivartanaṃ gamyata iti siddhāntānabhijñatayā yatkiñcidabhihitam etad itisaṃkṣepārthaḥ /

What has been urged would have been true only if the Word had expressed ‘the negation of others’ primarily; as a matter of fact, however, what the Word produces, first of all, is only the Reflected Image of the Thing (spoken of); and it is only after that has been comprehended that, through the force of its implication, the said ‘negation’ (exclusion) becomes comprehended. Apparently this doctrine of ours is not known to the other party, and what he has urged is something insignificant, beneath notice. Such is the upshot of the Text.

śeṣaḥ subodham //

The rest is easy.

yaduktam ---"kimayam apoho vācya" ityādi, tatrāha katam enetyādi / katham ena ca śabdena vācyatvaṃ paripṛcchyate / apohasya kimetena yadi vā kiṃ ghaṭādinā // śabdārthaḥ kimapoho vā vidhirveti nirūpaṇe /

The ‘denotability’ that you ask about is ‘denotability’ by which word? Is it ‘denotability’ by the word ‘Apoha’? Or by the wobd ‘jar’ and the best? As regards the question whether the Apoha that is denoted is itself of the nature of Apoha (negation, exclusion) or it is something positive, when we come to think of it, what is cognised is the apoha that figures in the cognition.

apoha iti bhātyetadyat tadevaṃ pratīyate // pratibimbaṃ hi śabdārtha iti sākṣād iyaṃ matiḥ //

Our view is that what is denoted by the word directly is the reflected image, and as regards ‘the negation of other things’, like the universal etc., That is comprehended only indirectly, through implication.

ghaṭavṛkṣādiśabdāś ca tadeva pratibimbakam / bruvanti jananāt sākṣād arthād anyatkṣipanti tu //

What all such words as ‘jar’, ‘tree’ and the like denote is the said reflected image, as it is the cognition of this that they produce directly; and anything else, they imply only indirectly.

tasmān na vidhidoṣo 'sti nāniṣṭā ca prasajyate / avācyapakṣadoṣas tu tadanaṅgīkṛter na naḥ //

Thus then, there is no incongruity regarding the positive character; nor is there anything undesirable for us. As regards the alternative of Apoha not being ‘denotable’, that we do not accept; and hence that is not our view.

tatrānyāpohavācyatvavikalpo yadyanyopohaśabdamadhikṛtyādhikriyate tadā vidhirūpeṇaivāsau tena śabdena vācya ityabhyupagamān nāniṣṭāpattir yuktā / tathā hi kiṃ vidhiḥ śabdārtha āhosvid anyāpoha iti prastāve 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha ityukte pratipattur yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇānyapohādhyavasāyī pratyayaḥ samupajāyate /

As regards the alternatives set forth regarding the denotability of ‘the exclusion of others’, if it is urged in regard to the term ‘exclusion of others?’ then, inasmuch as it is held by us that what is denoted by this term is something positive, that should not have been urged against us as an undesirable contingency. That is to say, when the question is raised, as to whether what is denoted by the word is something positive, or the ‘exclusion or negation of others’ and it is said that ‘it is the negation of others that is denoted by the word’, there appears in the listener the idea envisaging the ‘negation of others’, in the form of a Reflected Image;

arthāt tu vidhirūpaśabdārthaniṣedhaḥ / atha ghaṭādiśabdam adhikṛtya tatrāpi yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇāpohaḥ sākṣād ghaṭādiśabdair upajanyamānatvād vidhirūpeṇa ca taiḥ pratipādyate, sāmarthyāt tvanyanivṛtter adhigama iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ /

and if there is an idea of the negation of positive entities as forming the denotation of the word, that comes only by implication. If what is urged is with reference to the words ‘Jar’ and the like, then, what these words bring about directly is the Apoha in the shape of the Reflected Image, which is denoted by those words in the positive form, and the idea of the ‘negation of others’ is obtained by implication;

na cāpyavyavasthādoṣaḥ /

so that there is no undesirable contingency for us.

sāmarthyād anyanivṛtter gamyamānatvād anuvācyatayāvācyapakṣasyānaṅgīkṛtatvād eva na tat pakṣabhāvidoṣodayāvakāśa iti darśayati avācyapakṣadoṣastviti //

Nor is our view open to the objection that there would be no resting ground or finality (in the assumption of Apoha after Apoha); because the ‘negation of others’ is held to be comprehended only by implication, and hence to be only an appendage to actual Denotation the view that it is not expressed is not accepted by us;

api caikatvanityatvetyādāvāha ekatvetyādi /

This is what is indicated by the words ‘As regards the alternative, etc. etc.’, (1195-1199)

ekatvanityatādiś ca kalpito na tu tāttvikaḥ /

The ideas of ‘one-ness’, ‘eternality’ and the like are purely imaginary, not real.

tadatra hāsakaraṇaṃ mahāvidvatsūcakam //

hence your laughter at us on this point is indicative of a very high grade of learning (on your part)!

yadi hi pāramārthikamekatvādyupavarṇanaṃ kṛtaṃ syāt tadā hāsyakāraṇam evasyād bhavataḥ yadāhi bhrāntipratipattyanurodhena kālpanikametad ācāryeṇopavarṇitaṃ tadā katham iva hā [p.363] syakāraṇam avatarati viduṣaḥ /

It has been urged (under Text 1001) that “Singularity, eternality, etc. cannot be attributed to Apoha”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1200 above] if ‘one-ness’ and the rest had been mentioned by us. as real, then there might have been some cause for your laughing at us. As a matter of fact, however, it has been mentioned by our Teacher only as something purely imaginary (subjective, conceptual), and he has mentioned it only in view of common misconceived notions.

kiṃtu bhavāneva vivakṣitam artham avijñāya dūṣayan viduṣām atīva hāsyāspadamupajāyate //

Under the circumstances, how can a learned person find any cause for laughter in this? On the contrary, you yourself, by criticising what you have not understood, have become an object of derisive laughter.

tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga ityādāvāha avadhāraṇasāmarthyād ityādi / avadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyate /

It has been asserted (under Text 1002, by Kumārila) that “for these reasons, the element of the negation of others could be there only in the case of words that are associated with the negative particle, etc. etc.”.

svātmaiva gamyate yatra viphalo niyamo 'nyathā //

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1201 above]

na kevalaṃ yatra naṭyogas tatrānyanivṛttyaṃśo 'vagamyate, yatrāpi hi naṭyogo nāsti tatrāpi gamyata eveti svavācaivaitad bhavatā pratipāditaṃ svātmaiva gamyata ityavadhāraṇaṃ kurvatā /

The factor of the ‘exclusion of other things’ is cognised, not only in cases where the negative term is present; also where the negative term is not present, the same is cognised. This has been made clear by yourself when you said that ‘the Thing itself is apprehended’, where you have emphasised the ‘itself’.

anyathā cāvadhāraṇavaiyarthyam eva syāt /

If this is not what you mean, then that emphasising word is useless.

yasmād yatra svātmaiva gamyate tatrāvadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyata iti sphuṭataram evāvasīyate //

Thus when it is said that ‘the thing itself is cognised’, it is all the more clearly implied that the ‘exclusion of others’ is also cognised.

yasya tarhītyādinā paro 'pohaśabdārthavyavasthāyā avyāpitām evodbhāvayati / yasya tarhi na bāhyo 'rtho 'pyanyathāvṛtta iṣyate /

“In the case of such terms as ‘son of the barren woman where there is no external object which would be the ‘contrary’ (excluded), wherein would the Apoha subsist which is said to be denoted by it?” (1202) In the following Text, the other Party proceeds to show that the Buddhist theory of Apoha cannot apply to all cases.

vandhyāsutādiśabdasya tena kvāpoha ucyate //

[see verse 1202 above]

tathā hi yasya vandhyāsutādiśabdasya bāhyasutādikaṃ vastvanyavyāvṛttam apohāśrayo nāstyeva, tasya kimadhiṣṭhāno 'paho vācya ucyate, avaśyaṃ hi vastunādhiṣṭhānabhūtenāpohasya bhavitavyam, tasyānyāpoḍhapadārthāvyatirekāt //

“In the case of the term ‘son of the Barren Woman’, there is no such thing as the external son, which would be the contrary, and hence the object of the exclusion; then wherein would that Apoha rest which is said to be denoted by that term? It is essential that there should be an entity which is the substratum or object of the Apoha; as such substratum would be non-different from ‘what is excluded by another’,” (1202)

rūpābhāvād ityādinā pratividhatte /

The above is answered in the following [see verse 1203 next]

rūpābhāvād abhāvānāṃ śabdā jātyādivācakāḥ /

As non-entities have no form, words appertaining to those cannot be even suspected of being denotative of the universal and such things.

nāśaṅkyā eva siddhās te nirbhāsasyaiva sūcakāḥ //

in fact, it has been fully established that they are only indicators of the reflection.

vandhyāsutādīnām abhāvānāṃ rūpasya kasyacit svabhāvasyābhāvān na tadviṣayāḥ śabdā jātyādivācakatvenāśaṅkyāḥ, vastuvṛttīnāṃ hi śabdānāṃ kiṃrūpamabhidheyamāhosvit pratibimbakam iti śaṅkā syāt, abhāvaś ca vastuvivekalakṣaṇa eveti tadvṛttīnāṃ śabdānāṃ katham iva vastuviṣayatvāśaṅkā bhavet /

Such non-entities as the ‘son of the Barren Woman’ have no form, no character; hence words relating to those cannot even be suspected of being denotative of the Universal, etc. It is only in the case of words relating to entities that there could be any question as to whether what is denoted by them is some form or only a Redaction. As regards non-entities (or Negations) they are entirely different from Entities, hence how could words applied to them be even suspected of pertaining to entities? From this it is clear that the words in question have no object (denotation at all); all that they produce is the mere Reflection of things;

ato nirviṣayatvaṃ sphuṭataram eva /

Thus there is no room for the objection that has been urged.

etad eva darśayati arthetyādi /

The same is further explained: [see verse 1204 next]

arthaśūnyābhijalpotthavāsanāmātranirmitam / pratibimbaṃ yadābhāti tacchabdaiḥ pratipādyate //

What is expressed by words is only the reflection that appears, as created solely by impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions.

vandhyāsutādiśabdaiḥ //

‘Words’ like ‘Son of the Barren Woman’.

[p.364] ye punar vastuviṣayāḥ śabdās teṣāṃ pratibimbakamātravācakatvasiddhau pramāṇayann āha tanmātretyādi /

Those words however that relate to entities, denote only the Reflection; the formal proof for this is stated in the following [see verse 1205 next]

saṅketasavyapekṣatvāt kalpitārthābhidhānavat // ye saṅketasavyapekṣās te 'rthaśūnyābhijalpāhitavāsanāmātranirmitavikalpapratibimbakamātrāvadyotakāḥ, yathā vandhyāputrādiśabdāḥ kalpitārthābhidhāyinaḥ, saṅketasavyapekṣāś ca sasaṃśayā vivādāspadībhūtā ghaṭādayaḥ śabdā iti svabhāvahetuḥ //

The words in question are directly expressive of that (reflection) alone, because they are dependent upon convention, like words expressing imaginary things. [The argument may be formulated thus] Words that are dependent upon Convention are expressive of only the Reflection of the Conceptual Content produced by the impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions, as for instance, words like ‘the son of the Barren Woman’; the words in question i.e. words like ‘Jar’ and the like, which form the subject of the present discussion, are dependent upon Convention;

evaṃ svapakṣaṃ prasādhya parapakṣaniṣedhāya pramāṇayann āha paropagatetyādi / paropagatabhedādividhānapratipādakāḥ /

and this is a natural reason (for holding that they are expressive only of the Reflection, etc. etc.). These words are not denotative of the ‘specific individuality’ and the rest, that have been assumed by others.

na caite dhvanayas tasmāt tadvadeveti gamyatām //

Hence these should be understood to be like those just mentioned.

bhedaḥ svalakṣaṇam, ādiśabdena jātyādiparigrahaḥ /

Having established his own position, the Author next proceeds to adduce arguments for rejecting the views of the other party: [see verse 1206 above] ‘Bheda’ stands for ‘Specific Individuality’.

tasmād iti / saṅketasāpekṣatvāt /

‘And the rest’ includes the Universal, etc. ‘Hence’, i.e. on account of their being dependent on Convention.

tadvadeveti / kalpitārthābhidhānavat //

‘Like those’, like words speaking of imaginary things.

dvayor api hetvor anaikāntikatāṃ pariharann āha saṅketāsambhava ityādi /

The Author shows that the two Reasons adduced are not ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1207 next]

saṅketāsambhavo hyatra bhedādau sādhitaḥ purā /

That there can be no convention in regard toé specific individuality’ and the rest has been already -proved before.

vaiphalyaṃ ca na taddhetutvoḥ sandigdhavyatirekitā //

hence the reasons adduced are neither ‘doubtful’ nor ‘concomitant with the contrary of the probandum (1207)

aśakyasamayatvād ananyabhāktvācceti pūrvaṃ svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavasya saṅketavaiphalyasya ca prasādhitatvāt /

It has been already proved before on the ground of the ‘Impossibility of Conventions’ (under Text 876 et seq.) and on that of its ‘not bearing upon anything else’, that Convention is impossible and also useless.

tat tasmāt /

‘Tat’ Hence, therefore.

hetvor dvayor na sandigdhavipakṣavyatirekiteti //

The two Reasons are not Doubtful or Concomitant with the Contrary of the Probandum.

nanvityādinā paraḥ prathame hetāvanaikāntikatām udbhāvayati

In the following Texts, the Opponent argues that the first of the two Reasons adduced is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verses 1208-1209 above]

nanu cāpohapakṣe 'pi kathaṃ saṅketasambhavaḥ / sāphalyaṃ ca kathaṃ tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati //

“Under the theory of Apoha also, how is convention possible? How too is it fruitful? When it cannot be known to both, the speaker and the listener;

vaktṛuśrotror na hi jñānaṃ vedyate tat parasparam /

as the idea of one cannot be known to the other.

saṅkete na ca taddṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāre samīkṣyate //

what too was seen at the time of the making of the convention is not seen at the time of the use of the word.” (1208-1209)

yathāhi svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavo vaiphalyaṃ ca tathāpohapakṣe 'pi samānam, tataścākṛtasamayatvāt tanmātradyotakatvam api śabdānāṃ na yuktam ityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ /

“Just as, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of Apoha; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the Apoha alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.

sāphalyaṃ ca katham iti / sambhavatīti śeṣaḥ /

“How too is it fruitful? That is, how is fruitfulness possible ‘Tasya’ stands for the Convention.

kathaṃ punas tatra saṅketāsambhava ity āha na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyatīti /

Question: Why is Convention not possible in this case? “Answer: Because it cannot be known to both.