buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
athāpi syāt satyapi liṅgatrayayogitve sarvavastūnāṃ yadeva rūpaṃ vaktumiṣṭaṃ pratipādakena tanmātrāvabhāsānyeva vivakṣāvaśāccetāṃsi bhaviṣyantīti na śabalābhāsānītyata āha vivakṣānugatatve vetyādi /	under that whim, the cognitions should be of one form, and yet the thing is not of one form. The following might be urged: “Even though all things may have three genders, yet the cognitions of things would appear exactly as envisaging that form alone which the speaker may desire to speak of;
tadvaśādekarūpāṇi naikarūpaṃ ca vastu tat //	hence they could not be of variegated character.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1124 above]
vivakṣānugatatve vā cetasām iti śeṣaḥ /	‘If they, etc.’ i.e. if the cognitions were dependent upon the whim.
yadi hi vivakṣāvaśād ekarūpāṇi cetāṃsi bhavantītyaṅgīkriyate, tadā tānicetāṃsi tryātmakavastuviṣayāṇi na prāpnuvanti, tadākāraśūnyatvāt, cakṣur vijñānavacchabdaviṣayam /	If, through the Speaker’s whim, the Cognitions be of one form, then the Cognitions in question could not envisage things of three kinds (as having three Genders); because no single thing has that (mixed) form; and it would thus be as objectless as the visual cognition of sound!
tadvaśād iti / vivakṣāvaśāt //	‘Tadvaśāt’, i.e. through the speaker’s whim, (1124)
yo 'pi manyate saṃstyānaprasavasthitiṣu yathoktastrīpunnapuṃsakatvavyavastheti, tasyāpi na yuktam ityādarśayann āha sthitītyādi / sthitiprasavasaṃstyānasaṃśrayā liṅgasaṃsthitiḥ / yadi syādavibhāgena viliṅgatvaṃ prasajyate //	If the application of the genders were based upon the states of continuance, appearance and destruction, then, all the three genders would become applicable to all things. Some people think that “the three genders in the case of the words cited may be explained as pertaining to the three states of the thing concerned (River-bank), the three states being those of destruction, appearance and continuance”. That this also cannot be right is shown in the following [see verse 1125 above]
liṅgasaṃsthitir yadi syād ityatra chedaḥ /	There is a hiatus after ‘syāt’ (the conditional clause ending there).
yadi hi sthityādyāśrayā liṅgasthitir liṅgavyavasthā, tadā taṭaśṛṅkhalādivat sarvapadārtheṣvavibhāgena trīṇi liṅgāni prāpnuvanti, sarvatra taṭādivat sthityāder vidyamānatvāt /	If the ‘application’ regulation of genders were based upon the states of continuance and the rest, then all the three genders would he applicable to all things, like the River-bank, the Chain and so forth. Because, as in the case of the River-bank, so elsewhere also, all the three states of continuance and the rest would be there.
anyathā taṭastaṭītaṭamityādāvapi liṅgatrayaṃ na syāt, viśeṣābhāvāt /	Otherwise, there should not be three genders in the case of the three words ‘tataḥ’, ‘taṭī’ and ‘taṭam’ also; as there is no difference between the two cases.
tasmād ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣaḥ //	Thus the definition proposed becomes too wide.
[p.347] vyabhicāradarśanāccāvyāpiteti darśayann āha abhāva ityādi /	The definition is ‘too narrow’ also, because it is not true in all cases; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 1126 next]
abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchateti yaducyate /	There are three words used (in connection with non-entities) ‘abhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nirupākhyam’ (neuter) and ‘tucchatā’ (feminine);
tatra sthityādisambandhaḥ ko 'sastu parikalpyate //	what sort of connection with the states of continuance, etc. could be assumed in regard to the nonentities (spoken of by these words)? (1126)
asatyapi hi sthityādike śaśaviṣāṇādiṣvasadrūpeṣvabhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādibhiḥ śabdair liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanād avyāpinīyaṃ liṅgavyavasthā //	Even in the case of non-entities, such as the Hare’s Horn and the lake, the states of continuance, etc. are not there; and yet in regard to them words of all three genders are applied in the shape of ‘abhāvaḥ’ (Masculine, Non-existent), ‘Nirupākhyam’ (Neuter, Featureless) and ‘Tucchatā (Feminine, Insignificant).
utpādaḥ prasavaścaiṣāṃ nāśaḥ saṃstyānamiṣyate /	So that the proposed regulation of genders cannot include such cases;
ātmarūpaṃ tu bhāvānāṃ sthitirityabhidhīyate //	Of things, ‘appearance’ is birth; ‘destruction’ is perishing; and ‘continuance’ is the thing in its own form.
tatrotpāde na nāśo 'sti tatkimutpattirucyate / nātmākārā sthitiścāsti tat kathaṃ janam gīyate //	now in birth there is no perishing; why then is it spoken of as ‘utpattiḥ’ (feminine)? Nor is there existence in its own form;
saṃstyāne na dvayaṃ cānyat tatkathaṃ vyapadiśyate /	why then is it spoken of as ‘janma’ (neuter)? In destruction also, the other two states are not there;
tirobhāvaś ca nāśaś ca tirobhāvanam ityapi // sthitau sthitiḥ svabhāvaś ca hetunā kena vocyate / athāvibhaktamevaiṣāṃ rūpaṃ syād ekaliṅgatā //	why then is it spoken of as ‘tirobhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nāśaḥ’ (masculine) and ‘tirobhavanam’ (neuter)? As regards continuance also, on what ground is it spoken of as ‘sthitiḥ’ (feminine) and ‘svabhāvaḥ’ (masculine)? If the form of these is not differentiated, then they should always be in one and the same gender.
itaścāvyāpinī, teṣveva sthityādiṣu pratyekaṃ liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛttidarśanāt /	Because in connection with the same said states of Continuance and the rest, it is found that to each of these, words of all the three genders are applied. For instance, Appearance is spoken of as ‘utpādaḥ’ (Birth, Masculine);
tathā hi prasava utpāda ucyate saṃstyānaṃ vināśaḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ tu sthitiḥ /	Continuance is spoken of as ‘ātmasvarūpam’ (its own form, Neuter). Now as regards Appearance, there can be no ‘continuance’ or ‘destruction’ in it;
tatra prasave sthitisaṃstyānayor abhāvāt katham utpāde utpattir jametyādeḥ strīnapuṃsakaliṅgasya pravṛttir bhavet / tathā saṃstyāne sthitiprasavayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tirobhāvo vināśastirobhāvanam ityādibhiḥ śabdair vyapadiśyeta /	how then could such words as ‘utpattiḥ’ (Feminine) and ‘janma’ (Neuter) foe applied to it? Similarly as regards Destruction, there can foe no ‘continuance’ or ‘appearance’ in it; how then could it foe spoken of by such terms as ‘tirobhāvaḥ’ (Masculine), ‘vināśaḥ’ (Masculine) and ‘tirobhavanam’ (Neuter)? The particle ‘api’ in the Text serves to show that Destruction itself could not foe spoken of by that same word.
tathā sthitau saṃstyānaprasavayor asambhavāt sthitisvabhāvaścetyādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ sā sthitiḥ kena hetunocyata iti vācyam /	Similarly, as regards Continuance, Destruction and Appearance being impossible therein, it has to foe explained on what grounds it is spoken of as ‘sthitiḥ’ (Feminine) and ‘Svabhāvaḥ’ (Masculine).
athāpi syādeṣāṃ sthityādīnāṃ parasparamavibhaktarūpatvāt pratyekam eṣu	It might be said that “inasmuch as these, Continuance and the rest, are not differentiated among themselves, each of them may be capable of taking all the three Genders”.
liṅgatrayayogyatā bhaviṣyatītyata āha athāvibhaktam ityādi /	The answer to this is stated in the words ‘If the form of these, etc. etc.’;
yadi hyeṣāṃ parasparamavibhaktaṃ rūpaṃ syāt tadaikam eva paramārthato liṅgaṃ syān na liṅgatrayam //	that is, if the form of these is not differentiated from each other, then there should, in reality, foe only one, not three, Genders.
anyastvāha sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ strītvādayo gotvādaya iveti, taṃ pratyāha	The other party says: “The Feminine, Masculine and Neuter are so many different Universals, like the Universal ‘Cow’, and the like.”
gotvādaya ivetyādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1131 next]
gotvādaya ivaite 'pi yadi strītvādayo matāḥ / sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛ4āḥ //	If the feminine and the rest be held to be so many different universals, then all such should be regarded as discarded by the rejection of the ‘universal’ itself.
[p.348] pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ nirastatvāt, tadrūpāṇāṃ	On a previous occasion, in course of the Examination of the ‘Universal’, all particular Universals also have been discarded;
strītvādīnām asambhavād asambhavīlakṣaṇam //	hence there can be no such particular Universals as ‘Feminine’ and the rest.
kiṃ ca teṣveva sāmānyaviśeṣeṣvantareṇāpyaparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ jātirbhāvaḥsāmānyamityādi strīpunnampusakaliṅgasya śabdasya pravṛttidarśanād avyāpitā ca lakṣaṇasyeti darśayati jātirbhāva ityādi /	Hence the definition provided is an ‘impossible’ one. Then again, in connection with the particular Universals, we find, even without any other Universal, the application of such words as ‘jātiḥ’ (Feminine), ‘bhāvaḥ’ (Masculine), ‘sāmānyam’ (Neuter); hence the definition provided turns out to be ‘too narrow This is what is shown in the following: [see verses 1132 next]
jātirbhāvaś ca sāmānyamiti vā teṣu saṃmatam /	Such words are applied to particular universals, as ‘jātiḥ’ (feminine), ‘bhāvaḥ’ (masculine) and ‘sāmānyam’ (neuter).
na sāmānyāni yujyante sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi hi //	nor is it possible for universals to subsist in other universals themselves.
niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti siddhāntāt /	Because the doctrine (of the other party) is that Universals are devoid of Universals.
etac ca vaiśeṣikasiddhāntāśrayeṇoktam /	This has been said on the basis of the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.
yadā tu sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi sāmānyanīṣyante vaiyākaraṇaiḥ, yathoktam "arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ"//	The Vaiyākaraṇas, Grammarians, however regard Universals as subsisting in Universals also; as declared in the following passage ‘Even when the object and the Universal are denoted, all words are denotative of the Universal, inasmuch as all things exist in the form of their functions (Vākyapadīya, 3.16).
nahi śāstrāntaraparidṛṣṭā jātivyavasthā niyogato vaiyākaraṇair abhyupetavyā /	What these people mean is as follows: The theories laid down in regard to Universals by other philosophers need not necessarily be accepted by Grammarians;
pratyayābhidhānānvayavyāpārakāryonnīyamānarūpā hi jātayo nahi tāsāmiyattā kācit /	as a matter of fact, Universals are inferred from the effects of the functions of the connection between the word and the resultant cognition; and there can he no limit placed upon such Universals.
ato yaccoditakāryadarśanāt sāmānyādhārā jātiḥ satī jātaya ityasyāḥ śruter nibandhanam iti /	Hence the basis of the term ‘Universals’ consists in that Universal which has a common substratum as inferred from the perception of the effects of the said functions.
vyāpāralakṣaṇā iti abhidhānapratyayavyāpārato vyavasthitalakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ /	What is meant by the Universal ‘existing in the form of their functions’ is that their special character is restricted by the functions of the word and the resultant Idea.
tadānantaroktam eva dūṣaṇaṃ "sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśā" iti //	This theory should be taken as rejected by what has been said (under Text 1131, second line) that ‘all such Universals should be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Universal itself (in the chapter on Universals).’ (1132)
idaṃ ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha abhāva ityādi / abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādi vā katham / sāmāyikyeva tenaiṣā liṅgatritayasaṃsthitiḥ //	How too can there be such words as ‘abhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nirupākhyam’ (neuter) and ‘tucchatā’ (feminine)? From all this it follows that the entire scheme of three genders is purely conventional. The following Text states the objection that is equally applicable to all: [see verse 1133 above]
nahyasatsu śaśaviṣāṇādiṣu jātirasti, vastudharmatvāt tasyetyatas teṣvabhāvādiśabdaprayogo na prāpnoti /	There is no Universal in non-entities like the Hare’s Horns; because it is a property of entities; consequently the application of the words ‘abhāva’ and the rest to non-entities should be impossible.
tasmād avyāpinī liṅgavyavasthā /	Consequently the said rule regarding Genders is ‘too narrow
tenecchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvinyeveyaṃ liṅgatritayavyavastheti siddham //	Thus it follows that the entire scheme of the three Genders is based solely upon Conventions made according to the whim of speakers.
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeṣu kalpyate hi vivakṣayā /	Number also is purely conventional, and is assumed through the whim of the speaker, even when there is discrimination between difference and non-difference;
bhedābhedavivekepi dārādivipinādivat //	as is found in the case of words like ‘dārā’ (wife), etc. and ‘vipina’ (forest), etc.
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeva, na vāstavī /	Number also is purely conventional, not real.
dārādiṣvasatyapi vāstave bhede vivakṣāvaśe [p.349] nopakalpitatvāt /	In the case of words like ‘dārā’ (which stands for wife, and is yet treated as Masculine, and always Plural), though there is no difference (in what is denoted by this word and that denoted by other words like ‘patnī’, etc.), yet its peculiar gender (and number) has been determined by mere whim.
ato nāsiddho hetuḥ / tathā hi bahutvaikatvādisaṅkhyā na vastugatabhedābhedalakṣaṇā, dārāḥ sikatā varṣā ityādāvasatyapi vastuto bhede bahutvasaṅkhyā parivartate /	Thus the Reason put forward by us cannot be said to be ‘Unproven For instance, the Plural or the Singular Number of words is not always based upon the real multiplicity and singularity of things; e.g. in the case of such words as ‘dārāḥ’, ‘sikatā’, ‘varṣā’, etc. even though there is no real multiplicity, yet they are used in the Plural Number.
tathā vanaṃ tribhuvanaṃ jagat ṣaṇṇagarītyādiṣvasatyapyabhede 'rthasyaikatvasaṅkhyā vyapadiśyata iti /	Similarly in the case of such words as ‘Vana’, ‘Tribhuvana’, ‘Jagat’, ‘Ṣaṇṇagarī’, even though there is no singularity, yet they are used in the Singular Number.
ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ /	Hence our Reason cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’.
nāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvadharmatvaprasaṅgāt /	Nor is our Reason ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were so, then everything would belong to everything.
sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhaḥ // nanvityādinā kumārilamatena hetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate nanu vyaktau ca jātau ca dārādiścetyaprayujyate /	Lastly, because our Reason subsists in things where the Probandum is known to be present, therefore it cannot be said to be ‘Contradictory’. “If words like ‘dārāḥ’ are used in reference to the individual as well as the universal, it is so applicable on the basis of the number of either individuals or the components.
vyakteravayavānāṃ vā saṃkhyāmādāya vartate // vanaśabdaḥ punar vyaktīrjātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitaḥ /	The word ‘vana’ denotes either individuals as qualified by the number of the universal, or the universal as subsisting in a plurality of individuals.” [Ślokavārtika-Vanavāda 92-94] (1135-1136)
jātigataikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt / athavā dhavādivyaktisamāśritā jātir eva vanaśabdenocyate, tenaikavacanaṃ	In the following Texts the Author urges the fallacy of ‘being unproven’ against the Buddhist’s Reason from Kumārila’s point of view: [see verse 1135-1136 above]
nanvityādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 1137 next]
nanu caitena vidhinā sarvam ekaṃ vaco hatam /	In this way all words in the singular number become doomed.
nānyatrāsti vivakṣā cetsaivāstvasya nibandhanam //	If it be argued that “in the case of other words (in the singular number) the speaker’s wish does not lie that way”, then that wish itself might be the basis in the cases in question also.
etena yathoktena vidhinā sarvam vṛkṣa ityādyekavacanam hatam utsannaṃ	In the way described above, all words in the Singular Number, like ‘vṛkṣaḥ’ become doomed, discarded;
syāt, sarvatraivāsya nyāyasya tulyatvāt /	as the said reasoning would apply everywhere.
tathā hyatrāpi śakyam evaṃ vaktum tatra vyaktau ca jātau ca vṛkṣādiścet prayujyata ityādi /	As in regard to every word in the Singular Number, it might be said that “if the word is used in reference to the Individual, etc.”, (Kumārila’s words in the preceding Text.)
atha matam anyatra vṛkṣādau, vyakter avayavānāṃ ca saṅkhyāvivakṣā nāstīti, yadyevaṃ na tarhi vastugatānvayādyanuvidhāyinī saṅkhyā, vivakṣāyā evānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt /	It might be argued that in the case of other words, like ‘vṛkṣaḥ’ the Speaker’s wish does not lie towards speaking of the Individuals and the Universals”. In that case, Number (in words) would not be in accordance with the number of things, on the contrary, the presence and absence that would determine the Number (in words) would be the Speaker’s wish itself.
tataś ca saiva vivakṣā dārā ityādiṣvasya bahuvacanasya nibandhanam astu bhedābhāvepyekam api vastu bahutvena vivakṣyata ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ //	In that case, in the case of words like ‘dārāḥ’ also, that same wish may very well form the determining factor; the idea being that, even when there is no diversity (multiplicity) in the thing, the Plural Number is used because there is the Speaker’s wish to speak of it as many. Thus our Reason is not ‘unproven’.
jāterapi na saṅkhyāsti bhāve vā tadviśeṣitāḥ / kathaṃ sambaddhasambandhādyadi sambandhato 'pi vā //	There can be no number in the universal at all. Even if the number were there in the universal, how could the individuals be qualified by that number? “[They could be so qualified] through the connection of what is connected (indirectly), or through direct connection itself”.
nahi jāteḥ saṅkhyāsti dravyasamāśritatvāt tasyāḥ /	There can be no Number in the Universal; as it subsists in substance only.
atheyaṃ vaiśeṣikaprakriyā nāśrīyate, tadā bhāve vā saṅkhyāyāstayā kathaṃ vā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣitāḥ siddhyanti /	In case that doctrine is not accepted, and it is held that Number does belong to the Universal, then, in what way could it be established that the Individuals, Dhava and other trees, are qualified by that Number (of the Universal)?
syād etat sambandhasambandhāt tat sambandhād vā siddhyanti /	The following explanation might be offered: “It could be so established either (indirectly) through the connection of the connected, or through direct Connection itself;
tathā hi yadā jāter vyatirekiṇī saṅkhyā tadaikatvasaṅkhyāsambaddhayā jātyā dhavādivyaktīnāṃ sambandhāt pāramparyeṇa tayā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣyante, yadā tu jāter vyatiriktaiva saṅkhyā tadā sākṣād eva sambandhāt tayā viśeshanta ityato jātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitāḥ sidhyanti //	that is, if the Number is something different from the Universal, then the Universal would be connected with the Singular Number, and without Universal there would be connection of the Individuals, trees, Dhava and the rest; thus the qualifying of the Dhava and other Individual Trees would be done indirectly; if, on the other hand, the Number is not something different from the Universal, then that would be directly connected with the Individual Trees, which would thus become qualified by that Number. In this way it would be established that the Individuals are ‘qualified by the Number of the Universal (1138)
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte	The following Text supplies the answer to the explanation given (in the latter part of the preceding Text): [see verse 1139 next]
yadyevam abhidhīyeta vanam eko 'pi pādapaḥ /	If it be so, then even a single tree could be spoken of as ‘vana’ (forest);
bahavo 'pi hi kathyante sambandhād eva so 'sti ca //	several trees also are spoken of as such only through connection, and that is present in the single tree also.
yadi sambandhasambandhātsambandhato vā dhavādivyaktiṣu vanaśabdasya pravṛttistadaiko 'pi pādapo vanam ityevamucyeta, pravṛttinimittasya vidyamānatvāt /	If the application of the word ‘vana’ to Individual Trees, Dhava and the rest, be due only to the presence of the connection of the Connected, or of Connection itself, then even a single tree could be spoken of as ‘Vana’; as the basis of the application would be present there.
tathā hi bahavo 'pi dhavādayo jātisaṅkhyāsambandhād eva vanam ityucyante	For instance, even the several trees Dhava and the rest are spoken of as ‘Vana’, only through the connection of the Number of the Universal, and not through anything else;
nānyataḥ, sa ca sambandha ekamasminnapi pādape 'stīti kimiti na tathocyeta //	and this connection is present in the single Tree also; why then should this also not be spoken of as ‘vana’? (1139)
bahuvyaktyāśritā yā ca saivaikastyām api sthitā /	That (universal) which subsists in the many individual trees is the same that subsists in the single individual (tree), the basis thereof being the same in both oases;
tannimittasya tulyatvāt tatrāpi vanadhīr bhavet //	consequently, the idea of ‘vana’ (forest) should be there in connection with the single tree also.
asminn api hi pakṣe ekasyāpi taror vanam ityabhidhānaṃ syāt / tathā hi yenāsau vanaśabdena jātir bahuvyaktyāśritābhidhīyate /	Under the said view also, a single Tree could be spoken of as ‘Vana’, Because what the word ‘vana’ denotes is the Universal as subsisting in the many Individuals; and that same Universal subsists in the single Individual tree, Dhava also;
saivaikasyām api dhavādivyaktau vyavasthitā, tataś ca tasyā vanadhiyo nimittasya sarvatra tulyatvād tatraikatrāpi pādape kimiti vanadhīr na bhavet // anvayavyatirekābhyām ityādinā hetutvam upasaṃharati / anvayavyatirekābhyām ekādivacasas tataḥ /	thus the basis of the notion of ‘vana’ being the same in all cases, why should the notion of ‘vana’ not appear in connection with the single tree also? (1140) Thus the use of words in the singular and other numbers should be regarded through concomitance and non-concomitance, as depending entirely upon the speaker’s whim, not upon the real state of things;
niyamo 'yaṃ vivakṣāto nārthāt tadvyabhicārataḥ //	as it is not always in accordance with this latter. In the following Text, the Author sums up his Reasoning: [see verse 1141 above]
tadvyabhicārata iti /	‘As it is, etc. etc.’;
tasyārthasya vyabhicārāt //	because the real state of things is not exactly as expressed by the words.
kriyākālādiyogo 'pi pūrvam eva nirākṛtaḥ /	The connection of action, time, etc. has been already rejected before.
tasmāt sāṅketikā ete na vyaktiṣvapi bhāvinaḥ //	Hence all these also are purely conventional, and do not really subsist in individuals also.
pūrvam eva karmakālādipadārthaniṣedhe kriyādiyogasya nirākṛtatvād ayuktameṣām api vastudharmatvam /	‘Before’, i.e. in course of the rejection of such concepts as Action, Time and so forth, the connection also of Action, etc. has been discarded; hence these also cannot belong to things.
saṅkete bhavāḥ sāṅketikāḥ //	‘Conventional’ created by Convention.
bhavatu vā vastudharmatvam eṣām, tathāpi pratibimbalakṣaṇasyāpohasya bhrāntair bāhyavyaktirūpatvenāvasitatvād adhyavasāyavaśād vyaktidvārako liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho bhaviṣyati, tena, yaduktam ---"vyakteścāvyapadeśatvāt taddvūreṇāpi sāstyasau"iti tadanaikāntikaṃ saṃvṛtipakṣe cāsiddham iti darśayati vyaktirūpāvasāyenetyādi /	In fact, the Apoha is denoted as apprehended in the form of the individual; and the Apoha therefore is connected with gender, etc. through that individual. Even granting that these (Gender, Number, Action, etc.) belong to things, inasmuch as the Apoha in the form of the ‘Reflected Image’ is apprehended by deluded persons as something external, through this apprehension, connection with Gender, Number and the rest would be there through the Individual, Hence what has been asserted (by Kumārila, under 973) to the effect that “the Individual being something that cannot be spoken of by words, the connection cannot be through that either”, is ‘Inconclusive’.
vyaktirūpāvasāyena yadi vāpoha ucyate /	It is also ‘unproven’, ‘unadmitted’, under the theory that all this is purely ‘illusory’;
śabdeneti śeṣaḥ /	‘Apoha is denoted’ by the Word.
taditi tasmāt /	‘Tat’ Therefore.
asyeti apohasya //	‘Asya’ of the Apoha.
"ākhyāteṣu na cānyasya" ityādāvāha abhiprete niveśārtham ityādi / abhiprete niveśārthaṃ buddheḥ śabdaḥ prayujyate /	The word is used only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the thing intended; hence the ‘exclusion of what is not-intended’ becomes apprehended by implication. It has been argued (under 974, by Rumania) that “in the case of Verbs, ‘the exclusion of other things’ is not apprehended”.
ākhyāteṣvanyanivṛttir na sampratīyata ityasiddham tathā hi jijñāsite kasmiṃścidarthe śrotur buddher niveśāya śabdaḥ prayujyate vyavahartṛbhir na vyasanitayā, tenābhīṣṭārthapratipattau sāmarthyād anabhīṣṭavyavacchedaḥ pratīyata eva /	That “in the case of Verbs the exclusion of other things is not apprehended” cannot be admitted. Because when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition, in the person hearing the word in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion of the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication;
abhīṣṭānabhīṣṭayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt //	as the ‘desired’ and the ‘undesired’ are mutually exclusive.
sarvam eva nacābhīṣṭaṃ sarvārthāniyamāptitaḥ /	All things cannot be desired; as, in that case, there would be no restriction regarding any denotations.
tat pacatyādiśabdānāṃ vinivartyaṃ parisphuṭam //	Hence in the case of words like ‘cooks’ and the like, there is clearly ‘something excluded’.
yadi sarvamevābhīṣṭaṃ syāt tadā pratiniyataḥ śabdārtho na prāpnoti, tataś ca yā kasyacid arthaparihāreṇa śrotuḥ kvacid arthe śabdāt pravṛttiḥ sā na prāpnoti, tasmāt sarvam evābhīṣṭam ityetad ayuktam /	It might be argued that “all things are desired The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1145 above] If all things were ‘desired’ (to be expressed), then there could be no restriction regarding the denotation of words; in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to undertake any activity that might be called for on the hearing of the word; consequently it cannot be right that all things are desired (to be expressed).
tasmāt pacatītyādiśabdānām anabhīṣṭavyavacchedaḥ sāmarthyāt tatsphuṭataram avagamyata eva //	From all this it follows that in the ease of words like ‘cooks’ (Verbs) there is ‘exclusion of the undesired’, by implication; and it is quite clearly apprehended.
tathā hi pacatītyukte nodāsīno 'vatiṣṭate / bhuṅkte dīvyati vā neti gamyate 'nyanivartanam // audāsīnyamataścaivam astyanyac ca kriyāntaram /	When the verb ‘pacati’ (‘cooks’) is uttered, what is understood is that ‘he is not doing nothing, nor is he eating or gambling’ where the ‘exclusion of other acts’ is clearly apprehended. Thus, whatever is intended (to be spoken), there is always something ‘excluded’ by the ‘relative negation’, this something being ‘doing nothing’ and also other acts (than the one meant to be spoken of by the verb used).

athāpi syāt satyapi liṅgatrayayogitve sarvavastūnāṃ yadeva rūpaṃ vaktumiṣṭaṃ pratipādakena tanmātrāvabhāsānyeva vivakṣāvaśāccetāṃsi bhaviṣyantīti na śabalābhāsānītyata āha vivakṣānugatatve vetyādi /

under that whim, the cognitions should be of one form, and yet the thing is not of one form. The following might be urged: “Even though all things may have three genders, yet the cognitions of things would appear exactly as envisaging that form alone which the speaker may desire to speak of;

tadvaśādekarūpāṇi naikarūpaṃ ca vastu tat //

hence they could not be of variegated character.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1124 above]

vivakṣānugatatve vā cetasām iti śeṣaḥ /

‘If they, etc.’ i.e. if the cognitions were dependent upon the whim.

yadi hi vivakṣāvaśād ekarūpāṇi cetāṃsi bhavantītyaṅgīkriyate, tadā tānicetāṃsi tryātmakavastuviṣayāṇi na prāpnuvanti, tadākāraśūnyatvāt, cakṣur vijñānavacchabdaviṣayam /

If, through the Speaker’s whim, the Cognitions be of one form, then the Cognitions in question could not envisage things of three kinds (as having three Genders); because no single thing has that (mixed) form; and it would thus be as objectless as the visual cognition of sound!

tadvaśād iti / vivakṣāvaśāt //

‘Tadvaśāt’, i.e. through the speaker’s whim, (1124)

yo 'pi manyate saṃstyānaprasavasthitiṣu yathoktastrīpunnapuṃsakatvavyavastheti, tasyāpi na yuktam ityādarśayann āha sthitītyādi / sthitiprasavasaṃstyānasaṃśrayā liṅgasaṃsthitiḥ / yadi syādavibhāgena viliṅgatvaṃ prasajyate //

If the application of the genders were based upon the states of continuance, appearance and destruction, then, all the three genders would become applicable to all things. Some people think that “the three genders in the case of the words cited may be explained as pertaining to the three states of the thing concerned (River-bank), the three states being those of destruction, appearance and continuance”. That this also cannot be right is shown in the following [see verse 1125 above]

liṅgasaṃsthitir yadi syād ityatra chedaḥ /

There is a hiatus after ‘syāt’ (the conditional clause ending there).

yadi hi sthityādyāśrayā liṅgasthitir liṅgavyavasthā, tadā taṭaśṛṅkhalādivat sarvapadārtheṣvavibhāgena trīṇi liṅgāni prāpnuvanti, sarvatra taṭādivat sthityāder vidyamānatvāt /

If the ‘application’ regulation of genders were based upon the states of continuance and the rest, then all the three genders would he applicable to all things, like the River-bank, the Chain and so forth. Because, as in the case of the River-bank, so elsewhere also, all the three states of continuance and the rest would be there.

anyathā taṭastaṭītaṭamityādāvapi liṅgatrayaṃ na syāt, viśeṣābhāvāt /

Otherwise, there should not be three genders in the case of the three words ‘tataḥ’, ‘taṭī’ and ‘taṭam’ also; as there is no difference between the two cases.

tasmād ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣaḥ //

Thus the definition proposed becomes too wide.

[p.347] vyabhicāradarśanāccāvyāpiteti darśayann āha abhāva ityādi /

The definition is ‘too narrow’ also, because it is not true in all cases; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 1126 next]

abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchateti yaducyate /

There are three words used (in connection with non-entities) ‘abhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nirupākhyam’ (neuter) and ‘tucchatā’ (feminine);

tatra sthityādisambandhaḥ ko 'sastu parikalpyate //

what sort of connection with the states of continuance, etc. could be assumed in regard to the nonentities (spoken of by these words)? (1126)

asatyapi hi sthityādike śaśaviṣāṇādiṣvasadrūpeṣvabhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādibhiḥ śabdair liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanād avyāpinīyaṃ liṅgavyavasthā //

Even in the case of non-entities, such as the Hare’s Horn and the lake, the states of continuance, etc. are not there; and yet in regard to them words of all three genders are applied in the shape of ‘abhāvaḥ’ (Masculine, Non-existent), ‘Nirupākhyam’ (Neuter, Featureless) and ‘Tucchatā (Feminine, Insignificant).

utpādaḥ prasavaścaiṣāṃ nāśaḥ saṃstyānamiṣyate /

So that the proposed regulation of genders cannot include such cases;

ātmarūpaṃ tu bhāvānāṃ sthitirityabhidhīyate //

Of things, ‘appearance’ is birth; ‘destruction’ is perishing; and ‘continuance’ is the thing in its own form.

tatrotpāde na nāśo 'sti tatkimutpattirucyate / nātmākārā sthitiścāsti tat kathaṃ janam gīyate //

now in birth there is no perishing; why then is it spoken of as ‘utpattiḥ’ (feminine)? Nor is there existence in its own form;

saṃstyāne na dvayaṃ cānyat tatkathaṃ vyapadiśyate /

why then is it spoken of as ‘janma’ (neuter)? In destruction also, the other two states are not there;

tirobhāvaś ca nāśaś ca tirobhāvanam ityapi // sthitau sthitiḥ svabhāvaś ca hetunā kena vocyate / athāvibhaktamevaiṣāṃ rūpaṃ syād ekaliṅgatā //

why then is it spoken of as ‘tirobhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nāśaḥ’ (masculine) and ‘tirobhavanam’ (neuter)? As regards continuance also, on what ground is it spoken of as ‘sthitiḥ’ (feminine) and ‘svabhāvaḥ’ (masculine)? If the form of these is not differentiated, then they should always be in one and the same gender.

itaścāvyāpinī, teṣveva sthityādiṣu pratyekaṃ liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛttidarśanāt /

Because in connection with the same said states of Continuance and the rest, it is found that to each of these, words of all the three genders are applied. For instance, Appearance is spoken of as ‘utpādaḥ’ (Birth, Masculine);

tathā hi prasava utpāda ucyate saṃstyānaṃ vināśaḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ tu sthitiḥ /

Continuance is spoken of as ‘ātmasvarūpam’ (its own form, Neuter). Now as regards Appearance, there can be no ‘continuance’ or ‘destruction’ in it;

tatra prasave sthitisaṃstyānayor abhāvāt katham utpāde utpattir jametyādeḥ strīnapuṃsakaliṅgasya pravṛttir bhavet / tathā saṃstyāne sthitiprasavayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tirobhāvo vināśastirobhāvanam ityādibhiḥ śabdair vyapadiśyeta /

how then could such words as ‘utpattiḥ’ (Feminine) and ‘janma’ (Neuter) foe applied to it? Similarly as regards Destruction, there can foe no ‘continuance’ or ‘appearance’ in it; how then could it foe spoken of by such terms as ‘tirobhāvaḥ’ (Masculine), ‘vināśaḥ’ (Masculine) and ‘tirobhavanam’ (Neuter)? The particle ‘api’ in the Text serves to show that Destruction itself could not foe spoken of by that same word.

tathā sthitau saṃstyānaprasavayor asambhavāt sthitisvabhāvaścetyādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ sā sthitiḥ kena hetunocyata iti vācyam /

Similarly, as regards Continuance, Destruction and Appearance being impossible therein, it has to foe explained on what grounds it is spoken of as ‘sthitiḥ’ (Feminine) and ‘Svabhāvaḥ’ (Masculine).

athāpi syādeṣāṃ sthityādīnāṃ parasparamavibhaktarūpatvāt pratyekam eṣu

It might be said that “inasmuch as these, Continuance and the rest, are not differentiated among themselves, each of them may be capable of taking all the three Genders”.

liṅgatrayayogyatā bhaviṣyatītyata āha athāvibhaktam ityādi /

The answer to this is stated in the words ‘If the form of these, etc. etc.’;

yadi hyeṣāṃ parasparamavibhaktaṃ rūpaṃ syāt tadaikam eva paramārthato liṅgaṃ syān na liṅgatrayam //

that is, if the form of these is not differentiated from each other, then there should, in reality, foe only one, not three, Genders.

anyastvāha sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ strītvādayo gotvādaya iveti, taṃ pratyāha

The other party says: “The Feminine, Masculine and Neuter are so many different Universals, like the Universal ‘Cow’, and the like.”

gotvādaya ivetyādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1131 next]

gotvādaya ivaite 'pi yadi strītvādayo matāḥ / sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛ4āḥ //

If the feminine and the rest be held to be so many different universals, then all such should be regarded as discarded by the rejection of the ‘universal’ itself.

[p.348] pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ nirastatvāt, tadrūpāṇāṃ

On a previous occasion, in course of the Examination of the ‘Universal’, all particular Universals also have been discarded;

strītvādīnām asambhavād asambhavīlakṣaṇam //

hence there can be no such particular Universals as ‘Feminine’ and the rest.

kiṃ ca teṣveva sāmānyaviśeṣeṣvantareṇāpyaparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ jātirbhāvaḥsāmānyamityādi strīpunnampusakaliṅgasya śabdasya pravṛttidarśanād avyāpitā ca lakṣaṇasyeti darśayati jātirbhāva ityādi /

Hence the definition provided is an ‘impossible’ one. Then again, in connection with the particular Universals, we find, even without any other Universal, the application of such words as ‘jātiḥ’ (Feminine), ‘bhāvaḥ’ (Masculine), ‘sāmānyam’ (Neuter); hence the definition provided turns out to be ‘too narrow This is what is shown in the following: [see verses 1132 next]

jātirbhāvaś ca sāmānyamiti vā teṣu saṃmatam /

Such words are applied to particular universals, as ‘jātiḥ’ (feminine), ‘bhāvaḥ’ (masculine) and ‘sāmānyam’ (neuter).

na sāmānyāni yujyante sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi hi //

nor is it possible for universals to subsist in other universals themselves.

niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti siddhāntāt /

Because the doctrine (of the other party) is that Universals are devoid of Universals.

etac ca vaiśeṣikasiddhāntāśrayeṇoktam /

This has been said on the basis of the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.

yadā tu sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi sāmānyanīṣyante vaiyākaraṇaiḥ, yathoktam "arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ"//

The Vaiyākaraṇas, Grammarians, however regard Universals as subsisting in Universals also; as declared in the following passage ‘Even when the object and the Universal are denoted, all words are denotative of the Universal, inasmuch as all things exist in the form of their functions (Vākyapadīya, 3.16).

nahi śāstrāntaraparidṛṣṭā jātivyavasthā niyogato vaiyākaraṇair abhyupetavyā /

What these people mean is as follows: The theories laid down in regard to Universals by other philosophers need not necessarily be accepted by Grammarians;

pratyayābhidhānānvayavyāpārakāryonnīyamānarūpā hi jātayo nahi tāsāmiyattā kācit /

as a matter of fact, Universals are inferred from the effects of the functions of the connection between the word and the resultant cognition; and there can he no limit placed upon such Universals.

ato yaccoditakāryadarśanāt sāmānyādhārā jātiḥ satī jātaya ityasyāḥ śruter nibandhanam iti /

Hence the basis of the term ‘Universals’ consists in that Universal which has a common substratum as inferred from the perception of the effects of the said functions.

vyāpāralakṣaṇā iti abhidhānapratyayavyāpārato vyavasthitalakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ /

What is meant by the Universal ‘existing in the form of their functions’ is that their special character is restricted by the functions of the word and the resultant Idea.

tadānantaroktam eva dūṣaṇaṃ "sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśā" iti //

This theory should be taken as rejected by what has been said (under Text 1131, second line) that ‘all such Universals should be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Universal itself (in the chapter on Universals).’ (1132)

idaṃ ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha abhāva ityādi / abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādi vā katham / sāmāyikyeva tenaiṣā liṅgatritayasaṃsthitiḥ //

How too can there be such words as ‘abhāvaḥ’ (masculine), ‘nirupākhyam’ (neuter) and ‘tucchatā’ (feminine)? From all this it follows that the entire scheme of three genders is purely conventional. The following Text states the objection that is equally applicable to all: [see verse 1133 above]

nahyasatsu śaśaviṣāṇādiṣu jātirasti, vastudharmatvāt tasyetyatas teṣvabhāvādiśabdaprayogo na prāpnoti /

There is no Universal in non-entities like the Hare’s Horns; because it is a property of entities; consequently the application of the words ‘abhāva’ and the rest to non-entities should be impossible.

tasmād avyāpinī liṅgavyavasthā /

Consequently the said rule regarding Genders is ‘too narrow

tenecchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvinyeveyaṃ liṅgatritayavyavastheti siddham //

Thus it follows that the entire scheme of the three Genders is based solely upon Conventions made according to the whim of speakers.

saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeṣu kalpyate hi vivakṣayā /

Number also is purely conventional, and is assumed through the whim of the speaker, even when there is discrimination between difference and non-difference;

bhedābhedavivekepi dārādivipinādivat //

as is found in the case of words like ‘dārā’ (wife), etc. and ‘vipina’ (forest), etc.

saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeva, na vāstavī /

Number also is purely conventional, not real.

dārādiṣvasatyapi vāstave bhede vivakṣāvaśe [p.349] nopakalpitatvāt /

In the case of words like ‘dārā’ (which stands for wife, and is yet treated as Masculine, and always Plural), though there is no difference (in what is denoted by this word and that denoted by other words like ‘patnī’, etc.), yet its peculiar gender (and number) has been determined by mere whim.

ato nāsiddho hetuḥ / tathā hi bahutvaikatvādisaṅkhyā na vastugatabhedābhedalakṣaṇā, dārāḥ sikatā varṣā ityādāvasatyapi vastuto bhede bahutvasaṅkhyā parivartate /

Thus the Reason put forward by us cannot be said to be ‘Unproven For instance, the Plural or the Singular Number of words is not always based upon the real multiplicity and singularity of things; e.g. in the case of such words as ‘dārāḥ’, ‘sikatā’, ‘varṣā’, etc. even though there is no real multiplicity, yet they are used in the Plural Number.

tathā vanaṃ tribhuvanaṃ jagat ṣaṇṇagarītyādiṣvasatyapyabhede 'rthasyaikatvasaṅkhyā vyapadiśyata iti /

Similarly in the case of such words as ‘Vana’, ‘Tribhuvana’, ‘Jagat’, ‘Ṣaṇṇagarī’, even though there is no singularity, yet they are used in the Singular Number.

ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ /

Hence our Reason cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’.

nāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvadharmatvaprasaṅgāt /

Nor is our Reason ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were so, then everything would belong to everything.

sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhaḥ // nanvityādinā kumārilamatena hetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate nanu vyaktau ca jātau ca dārādiścetyaprayujyate /

Lastly, because our Reason subsists in things where the Probandum is known to be present, therefore it cannot be said to be ‘Contradictory’. “If words like ‘dārāḥ’ are used in reference to the individual as well as the universal, it is so applicable on the basis of the number of either individuals or the components.

vyakteravayavānāṃ vā saṃkhyāmādāya vartate // vanaśabdaḥ punar vyaktīrjātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitaḥ /

The word ‘vana’ denotes either individuals as qualified by the number of the universal, or the universal as subsisting in a plurality of individuals.” [Ślokavārtika-Vanavāda 92-94] (1135-1136)

jātigataikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt / athavā dhavādivyaktisamāśritā jātir eva vanaśabdenocyate, tenaikavacanaṃ

In the following Texts the Author urges the fallacy of ‘being unproven’ against the Buddhist’s Reason from Kumārila’s point of view: [see verse 1135-1136 above]

nanvityādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 1137 next]

nanu caitena vidhinā sarvam ekaṃ vaco hatam /

In this way all words in the singular number become doomed.

nānyatrāsti vivakṣā cetsaivāstvasya nibandhanam //

If it be argued that “in the case of other words (in the singular number) the speaker’s wish does not lie that way”, then that wish itself might be the basis in the cases in question also.

etena yathoktena vidhinā sarvam vṛkṣa ityādyekavacanam hatam utsannaṃ

In the way described above, all words in the Singular Number, like ‘vṛkṣaḥ’ become doomed, discarded;

syāt, sarvatraivāsya nyāyasya tulyatvāt /

as the said reasoning would apply everywhere.

tathā hyatrāpi śakyam evaṃ vaktum tatra vyaktau ca jātau ca vṛkṣādiścet prayujyata ityādi /

As in regard to every word in the Singular Number, it might be said that “if the word is used in reference to the Individual, etc.”, (Kumārila’s words in the preceding Text.)

atha matam anyatra vṛkṣādau, vyakter avayavānāṃ ca saṅkhyāvivakṣā nāstīti, yadyevaṃ na tarhi vastugatānvayādyanuvidhāyinī saṅkhyā, vivakṣāyā evānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt /

It might be argued that in the case of other words, like ‘vṛkṣaḥ’ the Speaker’s wish does not lie towards speaking of the Individuals and the Universals”. In that case, Number (in words) would not be in accordance with the number of things, on the contrary, the presence and absence that would determine the Number (in words) would be the Speaker’s wish itself.

tataś ca saiva vivakṣā dārā ityādiṣvasya bahuvacanasya nibandhanam astu bhedābhāvepyekam api vastu bahutvena vivakṣyata ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ //

In that case, in the case of words like ‘dārāḥ’ also, that same wish may very well form the determining factor; the idea being that, even when there is no diversity (multiplicity) in the thing, the Plural Number is used because there is the Speaker’s wish to speak of it as many. Thus our Reason is not ‘unproven’.

jāterapi na saṅkhyāsti bhāve vā tadviśeṣitāḥ / kathaṃ sambaddhasambandhādyadi sambandhato 'pi vā //

There can be no number in the universal at all. Even if the number were there in the universal, how could the individuals be qualified by that number? “[They could be so qualified] through the connection of what is connected (indirectly), or through direct connection itself”.

nahi jāteḥ saṅkhyāsti dravyasamāśritatvāt tasyāḥ /

There can be no Number in the Universal; as it subsists in substance only.

atheyaṃ vaiśeṣikaprakriyā nāśrīyate, tadā bhāve vā saṅkhyāyāstayā kathaṃ vā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣitāḥ siddhyanti /

In case that doctrine is not accepted, and it is held that Number does belong to the Universal, then, in what way could it be established that the Individuals, Dhava and other trees, are qualified by that Number (of the Universal)?

syād etat sambandhasambandhāt tat sambandhād vā siddhyanti /

The following explanation might be offered: “It could be so established either (indirectly) through the connection of the connected, or through direct Connection itself;

tathā hi yadā jāter vyatirekiṇī saṅkhyā tadaikatvasaṅkhyāsambaddhayā jātyā dhavādivyaktīnāṃ sambandhāt pāramparyeṇa tayā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣyante, yadā tu jāter vyatiriktaiva saṅkhyā tadā sākṣād eva sambandhāt tayā viśeshanta ityato jātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitāḥ sidhyanti //

that is, if the Number is something different from the Universal, then the Universal would be connected with the Singular Number, and without Universal there would be connection of the Individuals, trees, Dhava and the rest; thus the qualifying of the Dhava and other Individual Trees would be done indirectly; if, on the other hand, the Number is not something different from the Universal, then that would be directly connected with the Individual Trees, which would thus become qualified by that Number. In this way it would be established that the Individuals are ‘qualified by the Number of the Universal (1138)

yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte

The following Text supplies the answer to the explanation given (in the latter part of the preceding Text): [see verse 1139 next]

yadyevam abhidhīyeta vanam eko 'pi pādapaḥ /

If it be so, then even a single tree could be spoken of as ‘vana’ (forest);

bahavo 'pi hi kathyante sambandhād eva so 'sti ca //

several trees also are spoken of as such only through connection, and that is present in the single tree also.

yadi sambandhasambandhātsambandhato vā dhavādivyaktiṣu vanaśabdasya pravṛttistadaiko 'pi pādapo vanam ityevamucyeta, pravṛttinimittasya vidyamānatvāt /

If the application of the word ‘vana’ to Individual Trees, Dhava and the rest, be due only to the presence of the connection of the Connected, or of Connection itself, then even a single tree could be spoken of as ‘Vana’; as the basis of the application would be present there.

tathā hi bahavo 'pi dhavādayo jātisaṅkhyāsambandhād eva vanam ityucyante

For instance, even the several trees Dhava and the rest are spoken of as ‘Vana’, only through the connection of the Number of the Universal, and not through anything else;

nānyataḥ, sa ca sambandha ekamasminnapi pādape 'stīti kimiti na tathocyeta //

and this connection is present in the single Tree also; why then should this also not be spoken of as ‘vana’? (1139)

bahuvyaktyāśritā yā ca saivaikastyām api sthitā /

That (universal) which subsists in the many individual trees is the same that subsists in the single individual (tree), the basis thereof being the same in both oases;

tannimittasya tulyatvāt tatrāpi vanadhīr bhavet //

consequently, the idea of ‘vana’ (forest) should be there in connection with the single tree also.

asminn api hi pakṣe ekasyāpi taror vanam ityabhidhānaṃ syāt / tathā hi yenāsau vanaśabdena jātir bahuvyaktyāśritābhidhīyate /

Under the said view also, a single Tree could be spoken of as ‘Vana’, Because what the word ‘vana’ denotes is the Universal as subsisting in the many Individuals; and that same Universal subsists in the single Individual tree, Dhava also;

saivaikasyām api dhavādivyaktau vyavasthitā, tataś ca tasyā vanadhiyo nimittasya sarvatra tulyatvād tatraikatrāpi pādape kimiti vanadhīr na bhavet // anvayavyatirekābhyām ityādinā hetutvam upasaṃharati / anvayavyatirekābhyām ekādivacasas tataḥ /

thus the basis of the notion of ‘vana’ being the same in all cases, why should the notion of ‘vana’ not appear in connection with the single tree also? (1140) Thus the use of words in the singular and other numbers should be regarded through concomitance and non-concomitance, as depending entirely upon the speaker’s whim, not upon the real state of things;

niyamo 'yaṃ vivakṣāto nārthāt tadvyabhicārataḥ //

as it is not always in accordance with this latter. In the following Text, the Author sums up his Reasoning: [see verse 1141 above]

tadvyabhicārata iti /

‘As it is, etc. etc.’;

tasyārthasya vyabhicārāt //

because the real state of things is not exactly as expressed by the words.

kriyākālādiyogo 'pi pūrvam eva nirākṛtaḥ /

The connection of action, time, etc. has been already rejected before.

tasmāt sāṅketikā ete na vyaktiṣvapi bhāvinaḥ //

Hence all these also are purely conventional, and do not really subsist in individuals also.

pūrvam eva karmakālādipadārthaniṣedhe kriyādiyogasya nirākṛtatvād ayuktameṣām api vastudharmatvam /

‘Before’, i.e. in course of the rejection of such concepts as Action, Time and so forth, the connection also of Action, etc. has been discarded; hence these also cannot belong to things.

saṅkete bhavāḥ sāṅketikāḥ //

‘Conventional’ created by Convention.

bhavatu vā vastudharmatvam eṣām, tathāpi pratibimbalakṣaṇasyāpohasya bhrāntair bāhyavyaktirūpatvenāvasitatvād adhyavasāyavaśād vyaktidvārako liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho bhaviṣyati, tena, yaduktam ---"vyakteścāvyapadeśatvāt taddvūreṇāpi sāstyasau"iti tadanaikāntikaṃ saṃvṛtipakṣe cāsiddham iti darśayati vyaktirūpāvasāyenetyādi /

In fact, the Apoha is denoted as apprehended in the form of the individual; and the Apoha therefore is connected with gender, etc. through that individual. Even granting that these (Gender, Number, Action, etc.) belong to things, inasmuch as the Apoha in the form of the ‘Reflected Image’ is apprehended by deluded persons as something external, through this apprehension, connection with Gender, Number and the rest would be there through the Individual, Hence what has been asserted (by Kumārila, under 973) to the effect that “the Individual being something that cannot be spoken of by words, the connection cannot be through that either”, is ‘Inconclusive’.

vyaktirūpāvasāyena yadi vāpoha ucyate /

It is also ‘unproven’, ‘unadmitted’, under the theory that all this is purely ‘illusory’;

śabdeneti śeṣaḥ /

‘Apoha is denoted’ by the Word.

taditi tasmāt /

‘Tat’ Therefore.

asyeti apohasya //

‘Asya’ of the Apoha.

"ākhyāteṣu na cānyasya" ityādāvāha abhiprete niveśārtham ityādi / abhiprete niveśārthaṃ buddheḥ śabdaḥ prayujyate /

The word is used only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the thing intended; hence the ‘exclusion of what is not-intended’ becomes apprehended by implication. It has been argued (under 974, by Rumania) that “in the case of Verbs, ‘the exclusion of other things’ is not apprehended”.

ākhyāteṣvanyanivṛttir na sampratīyata ityasiddham tathā hi jijñāsite kasmiṃścidarthe śrotur buddher niveśāya śabdaḥ prayujyate vyavahartṛbhir na vyasanitayā, tenābhīṣṭārthapratipattau sāmarthyād anabhīṣṭavyavacchedaḥ pratīyata eva /

That “in the case of Verbs the exclusion of other things is not apprehended” cannot be admitted. Because when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition, in the person hearing the word in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion of the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication;

abhīṣṭānabhīṣṭayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt //

as the ‘desired’ and the ‘undesired’ are mutually exclusive.

sarvam eva nacābhīṣṭaṃ sarvārthāniyamāptitaḥ /

All things cannot be desired; as, in that case, there would be no restriction regarding any denotations.

tat pacatyādiśabdānāṃ vinivartyaṃ parisphuṭam //

Hence in the case of words like ‘cooks’ and the like, there is clearly ‘something excluded’.

yadi sarvamevābhīṣṭaṃ syāt tadā pratiniyataḥ śabdārtho na prāpnoti, tataś ca yā kasyacid arthaparihāreṇa śrotuḥ kvacid arthe śabdāt pravṛttiḥ sā na prāpnoti, tasmāt sarvam evābhīṣṭam ityetad ayuktam /

It might be argued that “all things are desired The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1145 above] If all things were ‘desired’ (to be expressed), then there could be no restriction regarding the denotation of words; in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to undertake any activity that might be called for on the hearing of the word; consequently it cannot be right that all things are desired (to be expressed).

tasmāt pacatītyādiśabdānām anabhīṣṭavyavacchedaḥ sāmarthyāt tatsphuṭataram avagamyata eva //

From all this it follows that in the ease of words like ‘cooks’ (Verbs) there is ‘exclusion of the undesired’, by implication; and it is quite clearly apprehended.

tathā hi pacatītyukte nodāsīno 'vatiṣṭate / bhuṅkte dīvyati vā neti gamyate 'nyanivartanam // audāsīnyamataścaivam astyanyac ca kriyāntaram /

When the verb ‘pacati’ (‘cooks’) is uttered, what is understood is that ‘he is not doing nothing, nor is he eating or gambling’ where the ‘exclusion of other acts’ is clearly apprehended. Thus, whatever is intended (to be spoken), there is always something ‘excluded’ by the ‘relative negation’, this something being ‘doing nothing’ and also other acts (than the one meant to be spoken of by the verb used).