buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
paryudāsātmakāpohyaṃ niyataṃ yadyadiṣyate //	The following Texts also proceed to show how the said ‘exclusion of the unintended’ is expressed by implication: [see verses 1146-1147 above]
tasmāt pacatītyetasyaudāsīnyamanyac ca bhuṅte dīvyati cetyādikriyāntaraparyudāsātmakramapohyamasti, tena, yaduktam paryudāsarūpaṃ hi niṣedhyaṃ tana na vidyata iti tadasiddham /	From the above it is clear that the verb ‘pacati’ (cooks) excludes ‘doing nothing’, and also other acts like Eating, Gambling and the like, which thus are the ‘excluded’, through ‘Relative Negation’, Hence the assertion that “there is nothing that is denied in the form of Relative Negation” (Text 974) is not true.
paryudāsātmakāpohyam iti / paryudāsātmakaṃ ca tadapohyaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ /	In the compound ‘Paryudāsātmakāpohyam’, ‘paryadāsatmakam’ is to be taken as qualifying ‘apohyam’.
niyataṃ yadyadīṣyata iti / tasya tasyaudāsīnyādiparyudāsātmakamapohyam astīti sambandhaḥ //	‘Whatever is intended to be spoken of’, by that, there is something to be ‘excluded’ through Relative Negation, in the shape of ‘doing nothing’ and the rest.
yaccoktaṃ "pacatītyaniṣiddhaṃ tu svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatī"ti / tatra svavacanavyāghātaṃ parasya pratipādayann āha pacatītyādi /	Your assertion that “the cooking remains un-negatived in its own form” involves self-contradiction; because the words ‘in its own form’ can only mean that ‘there is negativing of the form of other acts’;
ityetac ca bhavadvākyaṃ parasparaparāhatam //	otherwise the emphasising would be meaningless.
anyarūpaniṣedho 'yaṃ svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhati /	It has been asserted (in Text 975, by Kumārila) that “the ‘cooking’ remains un-negatived in its own form”.
ityanyathā nirarthaṃ syāt prayuktamavadhāraṇam //	The following Text shows that this assertion involves self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila: [see verses 1148-1149 above]
kathaṃ punar etat parasparāhatam ity āha anyarūpaniṣedho 'yam ityādi / pacatītyetasyārthasvarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatītyanenāvadhāraṇenācaritarūpaṃ darśayatā pacatītyetasyānyarūpaniṣedhenātmasthitir iti darśitaṃ bhavati /	Question: “In what way is there self-contradiction?” Answer: ‘Because what the words, etc. etc.’, That is, when it is asserted that ‘the Cooking remains un-negatived in its own form’, the emphasis laid upon the last phrase indicates that.the Cooking remains itself by negativing the forms of other acts.
anyathā svarūpeṇaivetyetad evāvadhāraṇaṃ bhavatprayuktamanarthakaṃ syāt vyavacchedyābhāvāt //	If that were not the meaning, then the emphasis that you have laid upon the phrase ‘in its own form’ would be meaningless, as there would be nothing that would be precluded by that emphasis.
niṣpannatvamapohasya nirupākhyasya kīdṛśam / gaganendrīvarādīnāṃ niṣpattir nahi kācana //	Apoha being featureless, what sort of ‘accomplishment’ could there be of it? Certainly there is no ‘accomplishment’ of the ‘sky-lotus’ etc.
vastvityadhyavasāyāccet sopākhyātvena bhātyasau / tataḥ kiṃ tulyadharmatvaṃ vastubhiścāsya gamyate //	If it be urged that “inasmuch as it is apprehended as a thing, it appears as with features”, then (we ask) what if it is so? [It may be said that] “From this it would follow that it has the same properties as entities.” (1150-1151)
bāhyavasturūpatayā vyavasitatvād asāvapohaḥ sopākhyatvena bhātīti /	It has been argued (under Text 976, by Kumārila) that “the idea of something to be accomplished, as also the idea of the Past, etc. would be baseless”.
atrāha tataḥ kimiti /	This is answered in the following [see verses 1150-1151 above]
yadi nāmāsau sopākhyatvena bhāti tathāpi kimatra prakṛtārthānukūlaṃ jātam iti /	If the Apoha has been apprehended by you as featureless, then how can you say “because it is accomplished”? Certainly there is no accomplishment of such things as the ‘sky-flower’;
atra para āha tulyadharmatvaṃ vastubhiścāsya gamyata iti /	The other party replies “In that case, etc. etc.;
tena, yathā vastu niṣpannarūpaṃ pratīyate tathāpoho 'pi vastubhistulyadharmatayā khyāto niṣpanna iva pratīyata iti siddhaṃ niṣpannatvād iti vacanam //	that is, what follows from it is that, just as the positive entity is apprehended in accomplished form, so Apoha also, being cognised as having the same properties as positive entities, is apprehended as something accomplished; hence the assertion that ‘it is accomplished’ is quite right”.
yadyevaṃ bhavataiva sādhyatvapratyayasya bhūtādipratyayasya ca nimittamupadarśitam iti, naca vaktavyam etannirnimittaṃ prasajyata iti tadetad darśayann āhasādhyatvapratyayas tasmād ityādi /	The answer to the above argument of the opponent is that, if it is as just explained, then you yourself have shown the basis of the notion of ‘being accomplished’ and of that of ‘past’ and so forth, and consequently you should not say that all this becomes baseless.
sādhyatvapratyayastasmāt tathābhūtādirūpaṇam / vastubhis tulyarūpatvāt tannimittaṃ prasajyate //	Thus then, the notion of ‘being accomplished’, as also the conception of the ‘past’ etc., being of the same form as positive entities comes to be based upon that same.
tannimittam iti /	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1152 above]
vastubhistulyadharmatvāvasāyanimittam //	‘Based upon that same’, i.e. based upon the apprehension of the fact that they are of the same character as Positive entities.
yaduktam ---"vidhyādāvartharāśau ca nānyāpohanirūpaṇam"iti, tatrāha vidhyādāvityādi / vidhyādāvartharāśau ca nāstitādi niṣidhyate / sāmarthyān na tu śabdena yadeva na vivakṣitam //	In the case of all such denotations as the injunction and the like, what is ‘excluded’ (negatived) is ‘non-existence’, etc., exactly that which is not meant to be spoken of; but this is done by implication, not directly by the word. It has been argued (under Text 977, by Kumārila) that “In the case of all such denotations as Injunction and the rest, there is no idea of the exclusion of other things”.
vidhyāderarthasya niṣedhādivyāvṛttatayāvasthitatvāt tatpratipattau sāmarthyād avivakṣitaṃ nāstitādi niṣidhyata ityastyevātrāpyanyāpohanirūpaṇam // "naṭaścāpi naṭā yuktā"vityatrāha naṭaścāpītyādi /	All such Denotations as the Injunction and the like are always differentiated from ‘Negation’ and the rest, and are apprehended as such; so that what is ‘excluded’ and negatived in their case is ‘non-existence’, which is what is not meant to be spoken of by the word concerned. Thus there is here also the apprehension of the ‘exclusion of other things (1153)
naṭaścāpi naṭā yuktāv apohas tādṛśo bhavet /	Of similar kind would be the Apoha, when a negative is joined with another negative;
taccatuṣṭayasadbhāve yādṛśaḥ sampratīyate //	just as it is apprehended when there are four negatives.
naṭā yoge naṭo hyartho gamyate kasyacid vidhiḥ /	in some cases, when a negative is associated with another negative, what is apprehended from it is something positive;
tṛtīyena naṭā tasya virahaḥ pratipādyate //	the third negative expresses the negation (absence) of that positive thing;
niṣedhāyāparas tasya turīyoḥ yaḥ prayujyate / tasmin vivakṣite tena jñāpyate 'nyanivartanam //	and when for the negativing of that again a fourth negative is used, if that is meant to be spoken of, what is denoted by it is the ‘exclusion of another’.
taccatuṣṭayasadbhāva iti / nañcatuṣṭayasadbhāve /	[see verses 1154-1156 above] ‘Taccatuṣṭaya, etc.’ where there are four negatives.
kīdṛśo 'sau pratīyata ity āha naṭā yoga ityādi / arthaśabdo vidhiśabdena sambandhanīyaḥ /	Question: “In what form is it apprehended?” Answer: ‘When a negative, etc. etc,’, The word ‘arthaḥ’ is to be taken as co-ordinated with the word ‘vidhiḥ’,
tasya viraha iti / [p.354] tasya vidher niṣedhaḥ /	‘Negation of that’, i.e. the negation of the said positive thing.
niṣedhāyāparastasyeti / tṛtīyānaṭpratipāditasya vidhirahitasya niṣedhāyetyarthaḥ /	‘For the negativing of that’, i.e. for the negativing of what has been expressed by the third negative (by itself), as apart from the positive factor.
turīya iti / caturthaḥ /	‘Turīyaḥ’ is fourth;
caturasthayatāvādyakṣaralopaścetyanena pūraṇārthaṃ yatpratyayavidhānāt /	the form being due to the rule which lays down the addition of the affix ‘yat’ in the sense of making up, to the term ‘catur’, and the elision of the first letter.
tasmiṃścaturthe naṭi prayukte ity arthaḥ / teneti caturthena naṭā /	‘If that is meant to be spoken of’, i.e. on the use of the fourth negative. ‘By it’ i.e. by the fourth negative.
jñāpyate 'nyanivartanam iti /	‘The exclusion of another is denoted’;
tṛtīyanaṭpratipāditaniṣedhavivekena vidhirūpasyārthapratibimbakasya pratipādanāt //	i.e. it expresses the Reflection, in the positive form, as differentiated from the negation expressed by the third negative.
nāsau na pacatītyukte gamyate pacatīti hi /	When it is said ‘nāsau na pacati’ (‘it is not that he does not cook’) what is understood is that ‘he cooks’;
audāsīnyādiyogaś ca tṛtīyena hi gamyate //	if a third negative is added, what is understood is either that ‘he is doing nothing’ or that ‘he is doing something other than cooking’;
turye tu tadvivikto 'sau pacatītyavasīyate /	So that here the ‘exclusion of another’ is similar to that in the case of the affirmative sentence.
tenātra vidhivākyena samamanyanivartanam //	The Author makes this same idea clear by means of an Example: [see verses 1157-1158 above]
tadvivikto 'sāviti / audāsinyādiviviktaḥ /	‘Differentiated, etc.’ i.e. from the idea of his doing nothing, or of his doing something other than cooking.
vidhivākyena samamanyanivartanam iti /	‘Exclusion of another is similar to that in the case, etc. etc.’;
yathā pacatītyādau vidhivākye sāmarthyādaudāsīnyavinivṛttir iṣyate tathā dvitīye 'pi naṭīti siddhamatrāpyasya nivartanam / sparṣṭārthaṃ tu nañcatuṣṭayodāharaṇam //	Just as in the case of the affirmative sentence ‘He is cooking’, what is expressed by implication is the negation of his doing nothing or doing something else, so also in the case of the second negative, it is seen that it expresses the negation of the same doing nothing, etc. It is only for the purpose of making things clearer that the use of four negatives has been cited.
samuccayādir yaścārthaḥ kaściccāder abhīpsitaḥ /	Of particles like ‘ca’ the meaning intended is something like ‘combination’;
tadanyasya vikalpāder bhavet tena vyapohanam //	and thus there would be ‘exclusion’ by that, of things other than that, in the shape of ‘option’ and the like.
ādiśabdena vāśabdasya vikalpo 'rthaḥ apiśabdasya, padārthasambhāvanānvavasargādayaḥ, tuśabdasya viśeṣaṇam, ekakārasyāvadhāraṇam ityāder grahaṇam /	The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include such terms as ‘vā’, which denote option, the term ‘api’, which denotes probability, connection, etc., the term. ‘tu’ which denotes qualification, and the term ‘eva’ which denotes emphasis.
tadanyasyeti / tasmāt samuccayāder anyasya / tena cādinā //	‘Other than that’, i.e. other than Combination, etc. ‘By that’ i.e. by the term ‘ca’.
"vākyārthe 'nyanivṛttiś ca vyapadeṣṭuṃ na śakyata" ity atrāha vākyārtha ityādi / vākyārthe 'nyanivṛttiś ca sujñātaiva tathā hyasau / padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyate //	‘The exclusion of others’ is clearly understood in the case of the meaning of a sentence. it is only the denotations of certain words construed together that is spoken of as ‘the meaning of the sentence’; what would be ‘excluded’ by these words would clearly be the things different from those denoted by these words;
vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi //	Because the meaning of the sentence is nothing apart from the meanings of the words (composing it).
parasparaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvena sambaddhā ity arthaḥ /	It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumārila) that “In the case of the meaning of the Sentence, ‘exclusion of other things’ cannot be indicated”.
teṣām iti padārthānāṃ /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1160-1161 above]
caitra gāmānayetyādivākyārthe 'dhigate sati /	‘Construed together’ Related, as cause and effect.
nahyasmin vākye caitrādipadārthavyatirekeṇa buddhāvanyo 'rthaḥ prativartate /	‘Things excluded’ by the words. Objection: “The denotation of words is one thing, and totally different from that is the meaning of the Sentence;
ananyāpohaśabdādau vācyaṃ na ca nirūpyata ityatrāha ananyāpohetyādi / ananyapohaśabdādau na vidhir vyavasīyate /	why then is it said that what are ‘excluded’ by the denotation of the words would also be ‘excluded’ by the meaning of the sentence?”
asaṃvādaka iti /	Answer: ‘It is nothing apart from that’;
na saṃvadatītyasaṃvādakaḥ, na vidyata vā samvādo 'styetyasaṃvādakaḥ, /	the meaning of the sentence is not anything different from the denotations of the words, in the shape of something of a mixed character, like the colour of the Kalmāṣa;
vastusambandhahānitaḥ tathābhūtavastusambandhābhāvāt /	because such a thing, if it existed, would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived.
pūrvaṃ hi jātyādilakṣaṇasya śabdārthasya vastuno niṣiddhatvāt /	This same idea is made clearer by means of an Example: [see verse 1162 next]
yaduktaṃ "prameyajñeyaśabdāde"rityādi, tatrāha prameyetyādi /	What is regarded by dull-witted persons as open to doubt is what is ‘excluded’ by the word in question;
kevala iti anyaśabdarahitaḥ /	otherwise, the utterance of the word would be useless.
kasyaciditi śrotuḥ / kvacid iti arthe / tadvinivṛttyartham iti tayor ārekaviparyāsayor vinivṛttyartham / teneti jñeyādipadena /	If he does not regard anything as open to doubt, then why does he ask (another person) about it? If one utters a word that does not bring about embellishment (enlightenment), how can he be regarded as a sane-minded person? (1169-1170)
atha vākyastham eva jñeyādiśabdamadhikṛtyocyate, tadasiddham iti darśayati ---yattatreti	If what the opponent has said is with reference to the words in question as occurring in a sentence, then what is said cannot be admitted.
tadeva kṣipyate tena viphaloccāraṇānyathā //	This is shown in the following [see verses 1169-1170 above]
[p.357] tatra hi vākyasthena prameyādiśabdena yadeva jaḍacetobhiḥ mandamatibhir āśaṅkyate tadeva nivartyata ityato 'siddhametat prameyādiśabdānāṃ nivarttya nāstīti /	What is ‘excluded’ by the word ‘knowable’ occurring in a sentence is just that which is regarded by dull-witted persons persons with dull intelligence, as open to doubt. Hence it cannot be admitted that in the case of words like ‘knowable’, there is nothing that can be ‘excluded
anyatheti /	‘Otherwise’;
yadi jaḍadhībhir āśaṅkitaṃ na nivartayed ity arthaḥ /	if it does not ‘exclude’ what is doubted by dull-witted persons.
syād etat na hi śrotrā kiñcicchaṅkitam ity āha kiñciddhītyādi /	It might be argued that “The listener may have not doubted anything”. The answer to that is ‘If he does not regard, etc. etc.
yadi hi śrotā na kvacid arthe saṃśete tat kimiti parasmād upadeśamapekṣate niścayārthaṃ hi paraṃ pṛcchati, anyathonmattaḥ syāt /	If the listener has no doubts regarding anything, then why does he seek for advice from another person? It is only for ascertaining things that one questions another person;
syād etat yadi nāma śrotur āśaṅkāsthānam asti, tathāpi tacchabdena na nivarttyata evetyāha atat saṃskārakam ityādi /	It might be argued that “Even if the listener has any doubts regarding anything, that doubt cannot be removed by the word in question.” The answer to this is ‘If one utters a word, etc. etc.’;
tat saṃskāro yasmin śabda iti tadatat saṃskārakaṃ /	the word that has this embellishment is one that brings about the said reynoval;
śeṣād vibhāṣeti kap /	the affix ‘kap’ is added according to Pāṇini’s Sūtra ‘Śeṣād vibhāṣā’.
bruvanniti pratipādakaḥ /	‘Bruvan’, the explainer using the word.
svasthadhīḥ katham iti unmattaka eva syād ity arthaḥ /	‘How can he, etc. etc.’ That is, he would be insane.
śrotṛsaṃskārāyaiva śabdānāṃ prayogāt //	Because it is only for the embellishment (enlightenment) of listeners that words are used.
atra kasmin vākye kiṃ tanmūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ yannivartyata ity āha cakṣur jñānādivijñeyam ityādi / cakṣurjñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādīti yaduycate /	When it is asserted that ‘colour is cognisable by visual perception’ this certainly serves to ‘exclude’ (deny) something supposed by some person. Question: “What, and in what sentence, is that which is open to doubt in the mind of the dull-witted person, which is ‘excluded’ by the word in question?”
teneti cakṣur jñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādītyanena vākyena //	Answer: [see verse 1171 above] ‘This’ i.e. the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by Visual Perception (1171)
kiṃ tadāropitam ity āha na cakṣurāśritenaivetyādi /	Question: “What is it that is supposed?” Answer: [see verse 1172 next]
na cakṣurāśritenaiva rūpaṃ nīlādi vedyate / kintu śrotrāśritenāpi nityenaikena cetasā //	[The supposition is] “It is not by the cognition through the eye alone that the blue and other colours are cognisable, but also by the one eternal cognition, through the ear also.” (1172)
śrotrāśritenāpi nityena cetasā nīlādirūpaṃ vedyata ityevaṃ yanmandadhiyā....	The dull-witted man might suppose that Colour is cognisable also by the Eternal Cognition through the Ear;
samāropitaṃ taccakṣur vijñānavijñeyaṃ rūpam ityanena vākyena niṣidhyate /	and it is this supposition that is ‘excluded’ (negatived) by the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by the
cakṣurāśritavijñānavijñeyam eva rūpaṃ na śrotrādivijñānavijñeyam ity arthaḥ //	Cognition through the Eye’; the meaning being that ‘Colour is cognisable by Cognition through the Eye only, not by Cognition through the Ear and other organs’.
sarvajñajñānavijñeyā dharmāścaite bhavanti kim // abhāvā api kiṃ jñeyā na jñānaṃ janayanti ye / ityādivibhramodbhūtau vijñeyapadamucyate // evaṃ sarvadharmāḥ kiṃ kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa vijñeyā, /	That words like ‘knowable’, ‘cognisable’ serve as the means of producing cognitions (ideas) having been perceived only when they appear in a sentence, if, at some other time? They are found to be used alone by themselves, the idea that is produced by them, in regard to things that are nebulous, is in accordance with what has been found in the case of their use in a sentence.
āhosvin na, /	In fact, in the case of words like ‘jar’ also, it is the same;
atra yadakṣaṇikatvādinā jñeyatvādirūpamāropitaṃ dharmeṣu tannivartyate //	so that the words ‘knowable’ and the like are just like the words ‘jar’ and the rest.
kathaṃ tadvacanamātreṇa nivartayituṃ śakyata ityetad āha tādṛgityādi /	Says the Opponent: “Are Words cognisable as evanescent (non-eternal), or not? When this doubt is raised, and the answer is ‘cognisable’;
jñeyo 'bhāve 'pi saṃvṛttyā sthāpanādamunātmanā // tādṛgiti kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa tasya pramāṇasiddhatvāt /	if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word ‘cognisable’ has been uttered, hears only the word ‘cognisable’, there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.
athābhāvasya kathaṃ jñeyatvaṃ siddham ityata āha jñeya ityādi / amunātmaneti /	If then the word cognisable’ by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it?”
abhāvarūpeṇa /	Answer: [see verses 1176-1178 above]
kevalasyopalambhe yā pratītirupajāyate /	What the whole of this means is as follows;
ayamatra samudāyārthaḥ naiva kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattir asti, kiṃtu vākyeṣūpalabdhasyārthavataḥ śabdasya sādṛśyenāpahṛtabuddheḥ kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattyabhimānaḥ / tathā hi yeṣveva vākyeṣu prameyaśabdamupalabdhavān śrotā tadartheṣveva sā buddhir apratiṣṭitārthā plavamānarūpā samupajāyate /	As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word (‘cognisable’) by itself; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning, so that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he has his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences.
tac ca ghaṭādiśabdānām api tulyam /	This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like ‘Jar’.
tathā hi kiṃ ghaṭenodakamānayānyutāñjalineti prastāve ghaṭeneti prayoge	For instance, the question having been put ‘Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands? The answer is ‘In the Jar’;
prastāvānabhijñasya yāvatsu vākyeṣu ghaṭeneti prayogo dṛṣṭas tāvatāmartheṣvākāṅkṣāvatī pūrvavākyānusārād eva pratipattir bhavati /	if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered, the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word ‘Jar’ that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.
tasmād yathārthavādiśabdā viśiṣṭārthavacanās tathā prameyādiśabdā apīti darśayati tasmād ityādi //	Thus then it follows that words like ‘cognisable’ are just as denotative of particularngs as other denotative words. This is what is pointed out in the Text by the words ‘So that, etc. etc.’, (1176-1178)
[p.359] yaduktam apohyakalpanāyāṃ cetyādi tatrāha apohyetyādi apohyakalpanāyāṃ ca varaṃ vastveva kalpitam /	The statement that, “rather than assume the ‘excluded’ thing it is far better to assume the thing itself”, is self-contradictory;
ityetad vyāhataṃ proktaṃ niyamenānyavarjanāt // vastveva kalpyate tatra yadeva hi vivakṣitam /	as in every case there is ‘exclusion of some other thing’, that thing alone is assumed which is meant to be spoken of; hence there is implication of that which is meant to be spoken of;
kṣepo vivakṣitasyāto na tu sarvaṃ vivakṣitam //	but all things are not meant to be spoken of.
vastvetyādi /	This is answered in the following [see verses 1179-1180 above]
vastveva hyadhyavasāyavaśācchabdārthatvena kalpitamasmābhir yadeva hi vivakṣitaṃ, nāvastu /	‘Thing itself, etc, etc.’, It is an Entity, not not a non-entity meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by us, on the basis of actual cognition, to be ‘denoted’ by the word;

paryudāsātmakāpohyaṃ niyataṃ yadyadiṣyate //

The following Texts also proceed to show how the said ‘exclusion of the unintended’ is expressed by implication: [see verses 1146-1147 above]

tasmāt pacatītyetasyaudāsīnyamanyac ca bhuṅte dīvyati cetyādikriyāntaraparyudāsātmakramapohyamasti, tena, yaduktam paryudāsarūpaṃ hi niṣedhyaṃ tana na vidyata iti tadasiddham /

From the above it is clear that the verb ‘pacati’ (cooks) excludes ‘doing nothing’, and also other acts like Eating, Gambling and the like, which thus are the ‘excluded’, through ‘Relative Negation’, Hence the assertion that “there is nothing that is denied in the form of Relative Negation” (Text 974) is not true.

paryudāsātmakāpohyam iti / paryudāsātmakaṃ ca tadapohyaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ /

In the compound ‘Paryudāsātmakāpohyam’, ‘paryadāsatmakam’ is to be taken as qualifying ‘apohyam’.

niyataṃ yadyadīṣyata iti / tasya tasyaudāsīnyādiparyudāsātmakamapohyam astīti sambandhaḥ //

‘Whatever is intended to be spoken of’, by that, there is something to be ‘excluded’ through Relative Negation, in the shape of ‘doing nothing’ and the rest.

yaccoktaṃ "pacatītyaniṣiddhaṃ tu svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatī"ti / tatra svavacanavyāghātaṃ parasya pratipādayann āha pacatītyādi /

Your assertion that “the cooking remains un-negatived in its own form” involves self-contradiction; because the words ‘in its own form’ can only mean that ‘there is negativing of the form of other acts’;

ityetac ca bhavadvākyaṃ parasparaparāhatam //

otherwise the emphasising would be meaningless.

anyarūpaniṣedho 'yaṃ svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhati /

It has been asserted (in Text 975, by Kumārila) that “the ‘cooking’ remains un-negatived in its own form”.

ityanyathā nirarthaṃ syāt prayuktamavadhāraṇam //

The following Text shows that this assertion involves self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila: [see verses 1148-1149 above]

kathaṃ punar etat parasparāhatam ity āha anyarūpaniṣedho 'yam ityādi / pacatītyetasyārthasvarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatītyanenāvadhāraṇenācaritarūpaṃ darśayatā pacatītyetasyānyarūpaniṣedhenātmasthitir iti darśitaṃ bhavati /

Question: “In what way is there self-contradiction?” Answer: ‘Because what the words, etc. etc.’, That is, when it is asserted that ‘the Cooking remains un-negatived in its own form’, the emphasis laid upon the last phrase indicates that.the Cooking remains itself by negativing the forms of other acts.

anyathā svarūpeṇaivetyetad evāvadhāraṇaṃ bhavatprayuktamanarthakaṃ syāt vyavacchedyābhāvāt //

If that were not the meaning, then the emphasis that you have laid upon the phrase ‘in its own form’ would be meaningless, as there would be nothing that would be precluded by that emphasis.

niṣpannatvamapohasya nirupākhyasya kīdṛśam / gaganendrīvarādīnāṃ niṣpattir nahi kācana //

Apoha being featureless, what sort of ‘accomplishment’ could there be of it? Certainly there is no ‘accomplishment’ of the ‘sky-lotus’ etc.

vastvityadhyavasāyāccet sopākhyātvena bhātyasau / tataḥ kiṃ tulyadharmatvaṃ vastubhiścāsya gamyate //

If it be urged that “inasmuch as it is apprehended as a thing, it appears as with features”, then (we ask) what if it is so? [It may be said that] “From this it would follow that it has the same properties as entities.” (1150-1151)

bāhyavasturūpatayā vyavasitatvād asāvapohaḥ sopākhyatvena bhātīti /

It has been argued (under Text 976, by Kumārila) that “the idea of something to be accomplished, as also the idea of the Past, etc. would be baseless”.

atrāha tataḥ kimiti /

This is answered in the following [see verses 1150-1151 above]

yadi nāmāsau sopākhyatvena bhāti tathāpi kimatra prakṛtārthānukūlaṃ jātam iti /

If the Apoha has been apprehended by you as featureless, then how can you say “because it is accomplished”? Certainly there is no accomplishment of such things as the ‘sky-flower’;

atra para āha tulyadharmatvaṃ vastubhiścāsya gamyata iti /

The other party replies “In that case, etc. etc.;

tena, yathā vastu niṣpannarūpaṃ pratīyate tathāpoho 'pi vastubhistulyadharmatayā khyāto niṣpanna iva pratīyata iti siddhaṃ niṣpannatvād iti vacanam //

that is, what follows from it is that, just as the positive entity is apprehended in accomplished form, so Apoha also, being cognised as having the same properties as positive entities, is apprehended as something accomplished; hence the assertion that ‘it is accomplished’ is quite right”.

yadyevaṃ bhavataiva sādhyatvapratyayasya bhūtādipratyayasya ca nimittamupadarśitam iti, naca vaktavyam etannirnimittaṃ prasajyata iti tadetad darśayann āhasādhyatvapratyayas tasmād ityādi /

The answer to the above argument of the opponent is that, if it is as just explained, then you yourself have shown the basis of the notion of ‘being accomplished’ and of that of ‘past’ and so forth, and consequently you should not say that all this becomes baseless.

sādhyatvapratyayastasmāt tathābhūtādirūpaṇam / vastubhis tulyarūpatvāt tannimittaṃ prasajyate //

Thus then, the notion of ‘being accomplished’, as also the conception of the ‘past’ etc., being of the same form as positive entities comes to be based upon that same.

tannimittam iti /

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1152 above]

vastubhistulyadharmatvāvasāyanimittam //

‘Based upon that same’, i.e. based upon the apprehension of the fact that they are of the same character as Positive entities.

yaduktam ---"vidhyādāvartharāśau ca nānyāpohanirūpaṇam"iti, tatrāha vidhyādāvityādi / vidhyādāvartharāśau ca nāstitādi niṣidhyate / sāmarthyān na tu śabdena yadeva na vivakṣitam //

In the case of all such denotations as the injunction and the like, what is ‘excluded’ (negatived) is ‘non-existence’, etc., exactly that which is not meant to be spoken of; but this is done by implication, not directly by the word. It has been argued (under Text 977, by Kumārila) that “In the case of all such denotations as Injunction and the rest, there is no idea of the exclusion of other things”.

vidhyāderarthasya niṣedhādivyāvṛttatayāvasthitatvāt tatpratipattau sāmarthyād avivakṣitaṃ nāstitādi niṣidhyata ityastyevātrāpyanyāpohanirūpaṇam // "naṭaścāpi naṭā yuktā"vityatrāha naṭaścāpītyādi /

All such Denotations as the Injunction and the like are always differentiated from ‘Negation’ and the rest, and are apprehended as such; so that what is ‘excluded’ and negatived in their case is ‘non-existence’, which is what is not meant to be spoken of by the word concerned. Thus there is here also the apprehension of the ‘exclusion of other things (1153)

naṭaścāpi naṭā yuktāv apohas tādṛśo bhavet /

Of similar kind would be the Apoha, when a negative is joined with another negative;

taccatuṣṭayasadbhāve yādṛśaḥ sampratīyate //

just as it is apprehended when there are four negatives.

naṭā yoge naṭo hyartho gamyate kasyacid vidhiḥ /

in some cases, when a negative is associated with another negative, what is apprehended from it is something positive;

tṛtīyena naṭā tasya virahaḥ pratipādyate //

the third negative expresses the negation (absence) of that positive thing;

niṣedhāyāparas tasya turīyoḥ yaḥ prayujyate / tasmin vivakṣite tena jñāpyate 'nyanivartanam //

and when for the negativing of that again a fourth negative is used, if that is meant to be spoken of, what is denoted by it is the ‘exclusion of another’.

taccatuṣṭayasadbhāva iti / nañcatuṣṭayasadbhāve /

[see verses 1154-1156 above] ‘Taccatuṣṭaya, etc.’ where there are four negatives.

kīdṛśo 'sau pratīyata ity āha naṭā yoga ityādi / arthaśabdo vidhiśabdena sambandhanīyaḥ /

Question: “In what form is it apprehended?” Answer: ‘When a negative, etc. etc,’, The word ‘arthaḥ’ is to be taken as co-ordinated with the word ‘vidhiḥ’,

tasya viraha iti / [p.354] tasya vidher niṣedhaḥ /

‘Negation of that’, i.e. the negation of the said positive thing.

niṣedhāyāparastasyeti / tṛtīyānaṭpratipāditasya vidhirahitasya niṣedhāyetyarthaḥ /

‘For the negativing of that’, i.e. for the negativing of what has been expressed by the third negative (by itself), as apart from the positive factor.

turīya iti / caturthaḥ /

‘Turīyaḥ’ is fourth;

caturasthayatāvādyakṣaralopaścetyanena pūraṇārthaṃ yatpratyayavidhānāt /

the form being due to the rule which lays down the addition of the affix ‘yat’ in the sense of making up, to the term ‘catur’, and the elision of the first letter.

tasmiṃścaturthe naṭi prayukte ity arthaḥ / teneti caturthena naṭā /

‘If that is meant to be spoken of’, i.e. on the use of the fourth negative. ‘By it’ i.e. by the fourth negative.

jñāpyate 'nyanivartanam iti /

‘The exclusion of another is denoted’;

tṛtīyanaṭpratipāditaniṣedhavivekena vidhirūpasyārthapratibimbakasya pratipādanāt //

i.e. it expresses the Reflection, in the positive form, as differentiated from the negation expressed by the third negative.

nāsau na pacatītyukte gamyate pacatīti hi /

When it is said ‘nāsau na pacati’ (‘it is not that he does not cook’) what is understood is that ‘he cooks’;

audāsīnyādiyogaś ca tṛtīyena hi gamyate //

if a third negative is added, what is understood is either that ‘he is doing nothing’ or that ‘he is doing something other than cooking’;

turye tu tadvivikto 'sau pacatītyavasīyate /

So that here the ‘exclusion of another’ is similar to that in the case of the affirmative sentence.

tenātra vidhivākyena samamanyanivartanam //

The Author makes this same idea clear by means of an Example: [see verses 1157-1158 above]

tadvivikto 'sāviti / audāsinyādiviviktaḥ /

‘Differentiated, etc.’ i.e. from the idea of his doing nothing, or of his doing something other than cooking.

vidhivākyena samamanyanivartanam iti /

‘Exclusion of another is similar to that in the case, etc. etc.’;

yathā pacatītyādau vidhivākye sāmarthyādaudāsīnyavinivṛttir iṣyate tathā dvitīye 'pi naṭīti siddhamatrāpyasya nivartanam / sparṣṭārthaṃ tu nañcatuṣṭayodāharaṇam //

Just as in the case of the affirmative sentence ‘He is cooking’, what is expressed by implication is the negation of his doing nothing or doing something else, so also in the case of the second negative, it is seen that it expresses the negation of the same doing nothing, etc. It is only for the purpose of making things clearer that the use of four negatives has been cited.

samuccayādir yaścārthaḥ kaściccāder abhīpsitaḥ /

Of particles like ‘ca’ the meaning intended is something like ‘combination’;

tadanyasya vikalpāder bhavet tena vyapohanam //

and thus there would be ‘exclusion’ by that, of things other than that, in the shape of ‘option’ and the like.

ādiśabdena vāśabdasya vikalpo 'rthaḥ apiśabdasya, padārthasambhāvanānvavasargādayaḥ, tuśabdasya viśeṣaṇam, ekakārasyāvadhāraṇam ityāder grahaṇam /

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include such terms as ‘vā’, which denote option, the term ‘api’, which denotes probability, connection, etc., the term. ‘tu’ which denotes qualification, and the term ‘eva’ which denotes emphasis.

tadanyasyeti / tasmāt samuccayāder anyasya / tena cādinā //

‘Other than that’, i.e. other than Combination, etc. ‘By that’ i.e. by the term ‘ca’.

"vākyārthe 'nyanivṛttiś ca vyapadeṣṭuṃ na śakyata" ity atrāha vākyārtha ityādi / vākyārthe 'nyanivṛttiś ca sujñātaiva tathā hyasau / padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyate //

‘The exclusion of others’ is clearly understood in the case of the meaning of a sentence. it is only the denotations of certain words construed together that is spoken of as ‘the meaning of the sentence’; what would be ‘excluded’ by these words would clearly be the things different from those denoted by these words;

vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi //

Because the meaning of the sentence is nothing apart from the meanings of the words (composing it).

parasparaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvena sambaddhā ity arthaḥ /

It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumārila) that “In the case of the meaning of the Sentence, ‘exclusion of other things’ cannot be indicated”.

teṣām iti padārthānāṃ /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1160-1161 above]

caitra gāmānayetyādivākyārthe 'dhigate sati /

‘Construed together’ Related, as cause and effect.

nahyasmin vākye caitrādipadārthavyatirekeṇa buddhāvanyo 'rthaḥ prativartate /

‘Things excluded’ by the words. Objection: “The denotation of words is one thing, and totally different from that is the meaning of the Sentence;

ananyāpohaśabdādau vācyaṃ na ca nirūpyata ityatrāha ananyāpohetyādi / ananyapohaśabdādau na vidhir vyavasīyate /

why then is it said that what are ‘excluded’ by the denotation of the words would also be ‘excluded’ by the meaning of the sentence?”

asaṃvādaka iti /

Answer: ‘It is nothing apart from that’;

na saṃvadatītyasaṃvādakaḥ, na vidyata vā samvādo 'styetyasaṃvādakaḥ, /

the meaning of the sentence is not anything different from the denotations of the words, in the shape of something of a mixed character, like the colour of the Kalmāṣa;

vastusambandhahānitaḥ tathābhūtavastusambandhābhāvāt /

because such a thing, if it existed, would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived.

pūrvaṃ hi jātyādilakṣaṇasya śabdārthasya vastuno niṣiddhatvāt /

This same idea is made clearer by means of an Example: [see verse 1162 next]

yaduktaṃ "prameyajñeyaśabdāde"rityādi, tatrāha prameyetyādi /

What is regarded by dull-witted persons as open to doubt is what is ‘excluded’ by the word in question;

kevala iti anyaśabdarahitaḥ /

otherwise, the utterance of the word would be useless.

kasyaciditi śrotuḥ / kvacid iti arthe / tadvinivṛttyartham iti tayor ārekaviparyāsayor vinivṛttyartham / teneti jñeyādipadena /

If he does not regard anything as open to doubt, then why does he ask (another person) about it? If one utters a word that does not bring about embellishment (enlightenment), how can he be regarded as a sane-minded person? (1169-1170)

atha vākyastham eva jñeyādiśabdamadhikṛtyocyate, tadasiddham iti darśayati ---yattatreti

If what the opponent has said is with reference to the words in question as occurring in a sentence, then what is said cannot be admitted.

tadeva kṣipyate tena viphaloccāraṇānyathā //

This is shown in the following [see verses 1169-1170 above]

[p.357] tatra hi vākyasthena prameyādiśabdena yadeva jaḍacetobhiḥ mandamatibhir āśaṅkyate tadeva nivartyata ityato 'siddhametat prameyādiśabdānāṃ nivarttya nāstīti /

What is ‘excluded’ by the word ‘knowable’ occurring in a sentence is just that which is regarded by dull-witted persons persons with dull intelligence, as open to doubt. Hence it cannot be admitted that in the case of words like ‘knowable’, there is nothing that can be ‘excluded

anyatheti /

‘Otherwise’;

yadi jaḍadhībhir āśaṅkitaṃ na nivartayed ity arthaḥ /

if it does not ‘exclude’ what is doubted by dull-witted persons.

syād etat na hi śrotrā kiñcicchaṅkitam ity āha kiñciddhītyādi /

It might be argued that “The listener may have not doubted anything”. The answer to that is ‘If he does not regard, etc. etc.

yadi hi śrotā na kvacid arthe saṃśete tat kimiti parasmād upadeśamapekṣate niścayārthaṃ hi paraṃ pṛcchati, anyathonmattaḥ syāt /

If the listener has no doubts regarding anything, then why does he seek for advice from another person? It is only for ascertaining things that one questions another person;

syād etat yadi nāma śrotur āśaṅkāsthānam asti, tathāpi tacchabdena na nivarttyata evetyāha atat saṃskārakam ityādi /

It might be argued that “Even if the listener has any doubts regarding anything, that doubt cannot be removed by the word in question.” The answer to this is ‘If one utters a word, etc. etc.’;

tat saṃskāro yasmin śabda iti tadatat saṃskārakaṃ /

the word that has this embellishment is one that brings about the said reynoval;

śeṣād vibhāṣeti kap /

the affix ‘kap’ is added according to Pāṇini’s Sūtra ‘Śeṣād vibhāṣā’.

bruvanniti pratipādakaḥ /

‘Bruvan’, the explainer using the word.

svasthadhīḥ katham iti unmattaka eva syād ity arthaḥ /

‘How can he, etc. etc.’ That is, he would be insane.

śrotṛsaṃskārāyaiva śabdānāṃ prayogāt //

Because it is only for the embellishment (enlightenment) of listeners that words are used.

atra kasmin vākye kiṃ tanmūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ yannivartyata ity āha cakṣur jñānādivijñeyam ityādi / cakṣurjñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādīti yaduycate /

When it is asserted that ‘colour is cognisable by visual perception’ this certainly serves to ‘exclude’ (deny) something supposed by some person. Question: “What, and in what sentence, is that which is open to doubt in the mind of the dull-witted person, which is ‘excluded’ by the word in question?”

teneti cakṣur jñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādītyanena vākyena //

Answer: [see verse 1171 above] ‘This’ i.e. the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by Visual Perception (1171)

kiṃ tadāropitam ity āha na cakṣurāśritenaivetyādi /

Question: “What is it that is supposed?” Answer: [see verse 1172 next]

na cakṣurāśritenaiva rūpaṃ nīlādi vedyate / kintu śrotrāśritenāpi nityenaikena cetasā //

[The supposition is] “It is not by the cognition through the eye alone that the blue and other colours are cognisable, but also by the one eternal cognition, through the ear also.” (1172)

śrotrāśritenāpi nityena cetasā nīlādirūpaṃ vedyata ityevaṃ yanmandadhiyā....

The dull-witted man might suppose that Colour is cognisable also by the Eternal Cognition through the Ear;

samāropitaṃ taccakṣur vijñānavijñeyaṃ rūpam ityanena vākyena niṣidhyate /

and it is this supposition that is ‘excluded’ (negatived) by the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable by the

cakṣurāśritavijñānavijñeyam eva rūpaṃ na śrotrādivijñānavijñeyam ity arthaḥ //

Cognition through the Eye’; the meaning being that ‘Colour is cognisable by Cognition through the Eye only, not by Cognition through the Ear and other organs’.

sarvajñajñānavijñeyā dharmāścaite bhavanti kim // abhāvā api kiṃ jñeyā na jñānaṃ janayanti ye / ityādivibhramodbhūtau vijñeyapadamucyate // evaṃ sarvadharmāḥ kiṃ kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa vijñeyā, /

That words like ‘knowable’, ‘cognisable’ serve as the means of producing cognitions (ideas) having been perceived only when they appear in a sentence, if, at some other time? They are found to be used alone by themselves, the idea that is produced by them, in regard to things that are nebulous, is in accordance with what has been found in the case of their use in a sentence.

āhosvin na, /

In fact, in the case of words like ‘jar’ also, it is the same;

atra yadakṣaṇikatvādinā jñeyatvādirūpamāropitaṃ dharmeṣu tannivartyate //

so that the words ‘knowable’ and the like are just like the words ‘jar’ and the rest.

kathaṃ tadvacanamātreṇa nivartayituṃ śakyata ityetad āha tādṛgityādi /

Says the Opponent: “Are Words cognisable as evanescent (non-eternal), or not? When this doubt is raised, and the answer is ‘cognisable’;

jñeyo 'bhāve 'pi saṃvṛttyā sthāpanādamunātmanā // tādṛgiti kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa tasya pramāṇasiddhatvāt /

if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word ‘cognisable’ has been uttered, hears only the word ‘cognisable’, there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.

athābhāvasya kathaṃ jñeyatvaṃ siddham ityata āha jñeya ityādi / amunātmaneti /

If then the word cognisable’ by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it?”

abhāvarūpeṇa /

Answer: [see verses 1176-1178 above]

kevalasyopalambhe yā pratītirupajāyate /

What the whole of this means is as follows;

ayamatra samudāyārthaḥ naiva kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattir asti, kiṃtu vākyeṣūpalabdhasyārthavataḥ śabdasya sādṛśyenāpahṛtabuddheḥ kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattyabhimānaḥ / tathā hi yeṣveva vākyeṣu prameyaśabdamupalabdhavān śrotā tadartheṣveva sā buddhir apratiṣṭitārthā plavamānarūpā samupajāyate /

As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word (‘cognisable’) by itself; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning, so that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he has his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences.

tac ca ghaṭādiśabdānām api tulyam /

This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like ‘Jar’.

tathā hi kiṃ ghaṭenodakamānayānyutāñjalineti prastāve ghaṭeneti prayoge

For instance, the question having been put ‘Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands? The answer is ‘In the Jar’;

prastāvānabhijñasya yāvatsu vākyeṣu ghaṭeneti prayogo dṛṣṭas tāvatāmartheṣvākāṅkṣāvatī pūrvavākyānusārād eva pratipattir bhavati /

if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered, the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word ‘Jar’ that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.

tasmād yathārthavādiśabdā viśiṣṭārthavacanās tathā prameyādiśabdā apīti darśayati tasmād ityādi //

Thus then it follows that words like ‘cognisable’ are just as denotative of particularngs as other denotative words. This is what is pointed out in the Text by the words ‘So that, etc. etc.’, (1176-1178)

[p.359] yaduktam apohyakalpanāyāṃ cetyādi tatrāha apohyetyādi apohyakalpanāyāṃ ca varaṃ vastveva kalpitam /

The statement that, “rather than assume the ‘excluded’ thing it is far better to assume the thing itself”, is self-contradictory;

ityetad vyāhataṃ proktaṃ niyamenānyavarjanāt // vastveva kalpyate tatra yadeva hi vivakṣitam /

as in every case there is ‘exclusion of some other thing’, that thing alone is assumed which is meant to be spoken of; hence there is implication of that which is meant to be spoken of;

kṣepo vivakṣitasyāto na tu sarvaṃ vivakṣitam //

but all things are not meant to be spoken of.

vastvetyādi /

This is answered in the following [see verses 1179-1180 above]

vastveva hyadhyavasāyavaśācchabdārthatvena kalpitamasmābhir yadeva hi vivakṣitaṃ, nāvastu /

‘Thing itself, etc, etc.’, It is an Entity, not not a non-entity meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by us, on the basis of actual cognition, to be ‘denoted’ by the word;