buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
taditi tasmāt /	‘Tat’ ‘tasmāt’ Hence.
viśuddhādhiyācāryādiṅnāgena prokte 'pohalakṣaṇe śabdārthe /	‘Avadātam, etc. etc.’ i.e. to the ‘denotation of words’ as expounded by the Teacher Dīṅnāga, with the purest conviction.
atra kāraṇamāha apṛthaktvata iti /	The grounds for this inapplicability are next stated ‘Because there is no difference, etc. etc.’.
tasyānyāpohalakṣaṇasya śabdārthasyānyāpoḍhāt padārthād apṛthaktvād avyatirekād iti yāvat /	That is, there the Denotation of words in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of other things’ is not different from, not anything other than that which is excluded from others.
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyetyādi /	‘Qualification and qualified, etc. etc.’.
subodham //	This is easily understood.
yathā ca na virudhyate sāmānādhikaraṇyādi tathā darśayann āha kevalād ityādi / kevalānnīlaśabdāder viśiṣṭaṃ pratibimbakam /	When the word ‘blue’ is uttered alone, the particular ‘reflection’ that appears is one that scintillates through all blue things such as the cuckoo, the lotus, the blue bee and the like.
kokilotpalabhṛṅgādau plavamānaṃ pravartate // pikāñjanādyapohena viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ punaḥ / tadindīvaraśabdena sthāpyate pariniścitam //	When the word ‘lotus’ is added to it, then the cuckoo, the collyrium and other blue things become ‘excluded’, and the resultant reflection is one that is further particularised and becomes definitely applied to one blue thing only.
sāmānādhikaraṇyādirevam asmin na bādhitaḥ /	Thus the necessary co-ordination is not rendered impossible.
parapakṣe tu sarveṣāṃ tadvyavasthātidurghaṭā //	All this explanation is absolutely impossible under the theory of the other party.
tathā hi nīlam ityukte pītādivyāvṛttānyapadārthavyavasāyibhramarakokilāñjanādiṣu saṃśayyamānarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakamudeti / taccotpalaśabdena kikilādibhyo [p.341] vyavacchedyānutpalavyāvṛttavastuviṣaye vyavasthāpyamānaṃ pariniścitātmakaṃ pratīyate /	That is to say, when the word ‘blue’ is pronounced, there appears the Conceptual Reflection (the Image) of a doubtful form, inasmuch as it serves to exclude the ‘yellow’ and other colours and things having these colours, and envisages all blue things, such as the Blue Bee, the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and so forth. When the word ‘lotus’ is added (to the word ‘blue’), the same Reflection becomes apprehended as differentiated from the Cuckoo and the rest, and particularly restricted to the thing excluded from the Non-lotus.
tena parasparaṃ yathoktabuddhipratibimbakāpekṣayā vyavacchedyavyavacchekabhāvānnīlotpalaśabdayor viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo na virudhyate / dvābhyāṃ vānīlānutpalavyāvṛttaikapratibimbātmakavastupratipādanādekārthavṛttitayā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca bhavatīti samudāyārthaḥ /	Thus in relation to the said Conceptual Reflection, there is a mutual relation of differentiation and differentiated between the two words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’; and hence there is nothing incongruous in their being related to each other as qualification and qualified. Or (another explanation possible is that) both the words together express the thing in the form of a single Reflected Image excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’; so that both pertaining to the same thing, there is co-ordination between them.
avayavārthastūcyate plavamānam iti / alabhamānapratiṣṭhaṃ saṃśayarūpamiti yāvat /	The meaning of the words is as follows: ‘Scintillating’, i.e. not restricted to any particular thing, doubtful.
pikaśabdaḥ kokilaparyāyaḥ /	The word ‘pika’ here stands for the Cuckoo.
śeṣaṃ subodham /	The rest is easy.
syād etad asmatpakṣe 'pi sāmānādhikaraṇyādiraviruddha evetyata āha parapakṣe tvityādi /	It might be argued (by the Opponent) that “under our theory also, the co-ordination would be all right”. The answer to this is ‘All this explanation is, etc. etc.’;
tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyāder vyavasthā tadvyavasthā //	that is, the above described explanation of ‘co-ordination’, etc.
kathaṃ durghaṭetyāha tathāhītyādi /	Question: “Why should it be impossible under our theory?”
tathāhyekena śabdena sarvathoktaṃ svalakṣaṇam /	By the single word, the specific individuality becomes expressed in its entirety;
tathācābhihite tasmin kasmād bhedāntare 'matiḥ // yadarthamaparaḥ śabdaḥ prayujyetātra vastutaḥ / sarvathābhihite no cet tadanekaṃ prasajyate //	and when that has been denoted, why should there be non-cognition of other things, for the sake of which another word would be pronounced, when, in reality, the thing has been denoted in its entirety? If not, then it becomes more than one.
vidhiśabdārthavādipakṣe nīlādiśabdenaivaikenotpalādisvalakṣaṇe 'bhihite kimutpalamāhosvidañjanam ityevam ajñānaṃ viśeṣāntare na prāpnoti, sarvātmanātasya vastunaḥ pratipāditatvāt / ekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā jñātājñātatvavirodhāt /	Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word ‘blue’ expresses the Specific Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things, why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium, since the Blue Thing has been denoted in its entirety? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction.
taddarśayati kasmād bhedāntare 'matiriti /	This is what is pointed out in the text by the words ‘Why should there, etc. etc.’.
amatirajñānam / kutsitā yā matir amatiḥ /	‘Non-Cognition’ stands for bad cognition, i.e. doubtful and wrong cognition.
tataś ca saṃśayaviparyāsābhāvād utpalādiśabdāntaraprayogākāṅkṣā prayoktuś ca na prāpnotīti darśayati yadarthamityādi /	Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as ‘Lotus’ and the like.
yadartham iti / yasyā amater nivṛttyartham ity arthaḥ /	This is shown by the words ‘for the sake of which, etc. etc.’: ‘For the sake of which’, i.e. for the purpose of removing which noncognition.
athāpi syāt tadvastvekadeśenābhihitaṃ na sarvātmanā, tena svabhāvāntarābhidhānāyāparaḥ śabdo 'nveṣyata evetyata āha sarvathetyādi /	It might be argued that “when the Blue thing has been denoted by the single word ‘blue’, it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after”.
na hyekasya vastuna ekadeśāḥ santi yenaikadeśenābhidhānaṃ syāt, ekatvānekatvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt /	There are no parts in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation in part; because the one (whole) and the many (parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other;
tataś ca yāvantaścaikadeśās tāvantyeva kevalaṃ bhavatā vastūni pratipāditānīti naikamanekaṃ siddhyet //	so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts; and hence there would be no such concepts as ‘one’ and ‘many’.
syād etan na nīlaśabdena dravyamabhidhīyate kiṃ tarhinīlākhyo guṇas tatsamavetā vā nīlatvajātiḥ utpalaśabdenāpyutpalajātirevocyate, na dravyaṃ, tena bhinnārthābhidhānād utpalaśabdāntarākāṅkṣā yujyata evetyata āha nīlajātir ityādi /	If the universal ‘blue’, or the quality blue, is denoted by the word ‘blue’, then the word ‘lotus’ (pronounced with that word) should denote another universal ‘lotus’; such being the case, there would be difference between the two words, just as there is between the words ‘bakula’ (a kind of flower) and ‘utpala’ (lotus); so that any co-ordination, etc. between them will be all the more impossible. The following might be urged by the other party: “The word ‘blue’ does not denote a particular substance;
nīlajātir guṇo vāpi nīlaśabdena cedgataḥ / anyendīvarajātis tu vyavaseyotpalaśruteḥ //	it denotes either the quality called ‘Blue’ or the Universal ‘Blue’ inhering in that quality; the word ‘lotus’ also denotes the Universal ‘Lotus’, not any particular substance;
evaṃ sati tayor bhedād bakulotpalaśabdavat / sāmānādhikaraṇyādi sutarāṃ nipapadyate //	hence, as the two words denote two different things, it is only right that there should be a need for the word ‘lotus’ (after the utterance of the word ‘blue’).” The answer to this is as follows [see verses 1107-1108 above]
anyendīvarajātiristviti / anyā cāsāvindīvarajātiśceti samāsaḥ /	The compound ‘anyendīvarajāti’ is to be taken as a Karmādhāraya, ‘anyā’ qualifying ‘indīvarajātiḥ’.
vyavasātavyā / utpalaśruter iti pañcamyantam /	‘Vyavaseyā’ i.e. should be denoted. ‘Utpalaśruteḥ’ has the Ablative ending.
asmin pakṣe sutarāmeva sāmānādhikaraṇyamanupapannaṃ bakulotpalaśabdayor ivaikasminnarthe nīlotpalaśabdayor vṛttyabhāvāt /	Thus under this theory co-ordination would be all the more impossible; since, like the words ‘bakula’ and ‘utpala’, the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ would not be applicable to the same thing.
nahi bhavati bakulamutpalam iti //	There can be no such expression as ‘bakulam utpalam (1107-1108)
syād etat nīlaśabdo yadyapi jātiguṇaviśeṣavacanaḥ, tathāpi taddvāreṇa nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ dravyam api tenābhidhīyate tathotpalaśabdenāpi jātidvāreṇa tadeva dravyamabhidhīyata iti /	If it is the substance related to the quality and the universal that is denoted by the word ‘blue’, then the word ‘lotus’ would be useless. as what is related to the said two factors (quality and universal) is exactly what is equipped with the universal ‘lotus’;
atas tayor ekārthavṛttisambhavāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati, na bakulotpalaśabdayor ityata āha guṇatajjātītyādi / guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ cet pratipādyate / nīlaśabdena yadyevaṃ vyarthā syād utpalaśrutiḥ //	and as this will have been already expressed by the word ‘blue’, the word ‘lotus’ would be useless. The following might be urged by the other party: “Though the word ‘blue’ denotes a particular Universal and a particular Quality, yet, through those, it also denotes the substance related to the Blue Quality and the ‘Blue’ Universal; similarly the word ‘lotus’, through the Universal ‘Lotus’, denotes the substance;
tābhyāṃ yadeva sambaddhaṃ tadevotpalajātimat /	in this way their application to the same thing being possible, there would be co-ordination between them;
nīlaśrutyaiva tatroktaṃ vyarthā nīlotpalaśrutiḥ //	which would not be possible in the case of the words ‘bakula’ and ‘utpala’.”
guṇaś ca nīlākhyaḥ, tajjātiś ca nīlatvākhyeti guṇatajjātī, tābhyāṃ sambaddham iti vigrahaḥ /	‘The Quality’ called ‘blue’; the ‘Universal’ as the Universal ‘blue’; that which is related to these is ‘Guṇatajjātisambaddham’,
vyarthā syād utpalaśrutir iti / nīlaśabdenaiva tasya dravyasya pratipāditatvāt /	‘The word Lotus would be useless’, as the substance will have been already expressed by the word ‘blue’.
etad eva darśayati tābhyām ityādi /	This is explained by the words ‘As what is related, etc. etc.’;
tābhyām iti / guṇatajjātibhyā /	‘the two factors’ are the Quality and the Universal.
syād etat yadyapi nīlaśabdena guṇatajjātimaddravyamabhidhīyate, tathāpi tasya nīlaśabdasyānekārthavṛttidarśanāt pratipattur utpalārthe, niścitarūpāna buddhir upajāyate kikilāder api nīlatvāt /	The following might be urged (by the other party) “Even though the word ‘blue’ denotes the substance possessing that quality and belonging to that Uni versa’, yet, inasmuch as the word ‘blue’ has been found to be applicable to several substances, the man who hears the word pronounced does not obtain any definite idea of the Lotus, specifically;
ato 'rthāntarasaṃśayavyavacchedād utpalaśruteḥ, prayogaḥ sārthaka eveti /	hence, the use of the word ‘lotus’ becomes useful, in that it serves to dispel the suspicion that other substances might be meant”.
tadasamyak prakṛtarthānabhijñātayābhidhānāt /	as this assertion is made because the person making it does not know the subject under consideration.
vidhiśabdārthapakṣe hi sāmānādhikaraṇyādi nopapadyata ityetad atra prakṛtam / yadi cotpalaśabdaḥ saṃśayavyavacchedāyaiva vyāpriyate na dravyapratipattaye natarhi vidhiḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt, utpalaśabdena bhrāntisamāropitākāravyavacchedamātrasyaiva pratipādanāt /	The subject under discussion is that under the theory that words denote positive things, there can be no co-ordination, etc. If then, the word ‘lotus’ is used only for the dispelling of the said suspicion, and not for the denoting of a substance, then, in that case, a positive entity would not form the denotation of the word; as all that the word ‘lotus’ will have done would be the dispelling of the form wrongly imposed upon it.
parasparaviruddhaṃ cedamabhidhīyate nīlaśabdenotpalādikaṃ dravyamabhidhīyate atha ca pratipattus tatra niścayo na jāyata iti /	Then again, it is a self-contradictory statement that is made, when it is asserted that “the word ‘blue’ denotes the substance Lotus” and yet “there is no certainty produced in the mind of the hearer”.
[p.343] nahi yatra saṃśayo jāyate sa śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	That cannot form the denotation of a word, in regard to which no certainty is produced. If it did, that would lead to absurdities.
nāpi niścayena viṣayīkṛte vastuni saṃśayo 'vakāśaṃ labhate /	Nor again is there any room for suspicion in what has been cognised with certainty as ‘Certain Cognition’ and ‘Uncertain Cognition’ are mutually destructive.
syād etat yadyapi nīlotpalaśabdayor ekasminnarthe vṛttir nāsti, tadarthayostu guṇajātyorekasmin dravye vṛttir astīti /	It might be said that “Even though the words Blue and Lotus are not applicable to the same thing, yet what are denoted by them viz. the Quality and the Universal do subsist in the same substance, and hence through their denotations, there would be co-ordination between them.”
ato 'rthadvārakamanayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyatīti tadetad ayuktamatiprasaṅgāt /	as it would lead to absurd contingencies.
evaṃ hi rūparasaśabdayor api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syāt, tadarthayo rūparasayorekasmin pṛthivyādidravye vṛtteḥ /	In the manner stated, there would be co-ordination between the words ‘Colour’ and ‘Taste’ also; as what are denoted by them i.e. Colour and Taste subsist in the same substance, Earth.
kiṃ ca nīlamutpalamityekārthaviṣayā buddhir na prāpnoti, ekadravyasamavetayorguṇajātyor dvābhyāṃ pṛthakpṛthagabdhidhānāt, na caikārthaviṣayajñānānutpāde śabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyamastītyalaṃ bahunā //	Further (under the explanation offered) there would be no possibility of the expression ‘blue lotus’ bringing about the cognition of a single thing; as the two words would be separately denoting the Quality and the Universal subsisting in the single substance; and unless the words bring about the cognition of the same thing, there can be no co-ordination between them.
syād etat na yadeva nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ vastu tadevotpalaśabdenocyate, kiṃ tarhianyadeva, tenotpalaśrutir vyarthā na bhaviṣyatītyata āha guṇatajjātisambaddhādityādi /	If what belongs to the universal ‘lotus’ is different from what is related to the quality and universal (blue), then the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ cannot be co-substrate (co-ordinated). The following might be urged: “The word ‘lotus’ does not denote exactly the same thing that is related to the quality Blue and the Universal ‘Blue’;
yadītyavacchedaḥ /	it denotes something different.
bhinnāśraye syātām iti / vyadhikaraṇe syātāsmity arthaḥ //	There is a hiatus after the particle ‘yadi’ (‘if’). ‘They cannot be co-substrate’; i.e. they cannot be co-ordinated.
athāpi syāt yadyapi tadeva dravyaṃ nīlaśabdenocyate, utpalaśabdenāpi tadeva / tathāpi nīlaśabdo notpalajātisambandhirūpeṇa dravyamabhidhatte, kiṃ tarhinīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpeṇaiva, tenotpalajātisambandhirūpatvamasyābhidhātumutpalaśrutiḥ pravartamānā nānarthikā bhaviṣyatīti tadetad āśaṅkya pariharati athotpalatvetyādi /	If the word ‘blue’ does not denote the substance related to the quality and the universal (blue) as related to the universal ‘lotus’, then the substance as related to the universal ‘lotus’ should be something totally different; as a matter of fact, what is related to the universal ‘lotus’ is that same substance that is related to the other two (quality and universal ‘blue’); and that substance has already been expressed, in its entirety not in part, by the word ‘blue’, and has also been apprehended by the verbal cognition brought about by that word;
athotpalatvasambandhirūpatvena na codayet /	so that the word ‘lotus’ would be entirely useless.
atha nīlam iti dhvanirutpalatvasambandhirūpatvena guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ na codayed iti sambandhaḥ // syānnāmotpalatāyogirūpatvamatadātmakam / utpalatvena sambaddhaṃ tvābhyāṃ sambaddham eva tat //	The following might be urged: “Though the same Substance is denoted by the word ‘blue’, and also by the word ‘Lotus’, yet the word ‘blue’ denotes the Substance, not as something related to the Universal ‘Lotus’, but as related to the Quality Blue and the Universal ‘Blue’; consequently, the word ‘Lotus’ is used for the purpose of expressing the fact of the substance being related to the Universal ‘Lotus’; and as such it cannot be useless.”
nīlaśrutyā ca tat proktaṃ śābdyātra viṣayīkṛtam /	This argument is raised and answered in the following: [see verses 1112-1114 above]
na hi nīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyadevotpalajātisambandhirūpaṃ, yena nīlotpalādisambandhirūpatvābhidhāne dravyasyotpalajātisambandhirūpatvābhidhānaṃ na bhavet / yāvataikasmāt dravyādayor api sambandharūpatvayor avyatirekatadvāttayorapyekatvamevetyayuktamekarūpābhidhāne pararūpānabhidhānaṃ kiñcābhyupagamyocyate bhavatu nāmotpalatva sambandhirūpatvam nīlavajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyato, yathāpyutpalaśrutiranarthaka eva /	If the word ‘blue’ does not denote the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal ‘Blue’, as related to the Universal ‘Lotus’, then (there is the following incongruity). The substance as related to the Universal ‘Lotus’ is not something entirely different from the substance as related to the Quality and Universal ‘Blue’, on the basis whereof on the denotation of the Substance related to the Quality and Universal ‘Blue’, there might be no denotation of the Substance as related to the Universal ‘Lotus As a matter of fact, however, there is no difference between the correlatives in the two cases; and hence the two substances must also be the same; and hence it cannot be right that on the denotation of one there should be no denotation of the other.
tathā hi yattadanaṃśaṃ vastūtpalajātyā sambaddhaṃ tadevābhyāṃ nīlaguṇatā jātibhyāṃ sambaddhyate nānyat /	Because that impartiteng which is related to the Universal ‘Lotus’ is exactly what is related to the two factors of the Quality and the Universal ‘Blue’, it is not anything different from it;
taccāṃśatvāt sarvātmanā nīlaśrutyaivābhihitaṃ śābdyā ca buddhyā vyavasāyātmikayā viṣayīkṛtā iti kimaparamanabhihitamasya svarūpamasti yadabhidhānāyotpala śrutiḥ sārthikā bhavet // udyotakarastvāha niraṃśevastuni sarvātmanā viṣayīkṛtaṃ nāṃśenetyeṣa vikalpo nāvatārati, sarvaśabdasyānekārthaviṣayatvāt, ekaśabdasya cāvayave vṛttitvāt iti /	and as that thing is impartite, it must have been denoted in its entirety, by the word ‘blue’; and it would also have figured in the Verbal Cognition brought about by that word hence what would be left there undenoted in the denoting of which the word ‘Lotus’ would have its use? (1112-1114) If (it be said that), in regard to a thing devoid of plurality, the assumption of the alternatives of ‘entirety’ and ‘severality’ (‘plurality’) is not possible, bitch an assertion could only proceed from ignorance of the meaning of the sentence (used by us), what we made clear was that the first word ‘blue’ itself expressed all that had to be expressed, and no part of itself was left (unexpressed).
tadetad āśaṃkya pariharati na cet ityādi	Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “The assumption (made by the Buddhist) that ‘the object being impartite, whenever it is cognised, it is in its entirety, not in part’ is not possible;
na cedbhedavinirmukte kārtsnyabhedavikalpanam /	because the word ‘sarva’, (‘entire ‘whole’), is applied to things not-one (several), while the word ‘eka’ is applicable to the part.”
na vākyārthaparijñānā idam hyatra vivakṣitaṃ //	Anticipating this argument, the Author provides the following answer to it: [see verses 1115-1116 above]
bhedavinirmukta iti /	‘Devoid of plurality’ i.e, the thing without parts.
kārtsnya bhedavikalpanam iti / sarvātmanā viṣayīkṛtam vyaikadeśenetyevaṃ kārstnyabhedābhyāṃ vikalpanaṃ /	‘The assumption, etc. etc.’, the assumption of the alternatives viz.: whether what figures as the object of the cognition is the thing in its entirety, or in parts.
tadetat vākyārthā parijñānāt uktam /	This assertion proceeds from ignorance of what our statement means.
tathā hi prathamenaiva nīlaśabdena sarvātmanā tatprakāśitamityasyāyamartho vivakṣitaḥ, yādṛśaṃ tadvastu tādṛśamevābhihitaṃ , na tasya kaścitsvabhāvastyakto yadabhidhānāyotpalaśrutirvyāpriyeta, niraṃśatvāt tasya vastuna ityato vākchalametat //1115 //	For instance, what is meant by our statement that ‘by the very first word ‘blue’ the thing has been expressed in its entirety’ is as follows: What has been expressed is the thing exactly as it stands, and no aspect of it has been left out, for the denoting of which the word ‘lotus’ would be required; because the thing has no parts. Such being our meaning, the argument urged by Uddyotakara is in the nature of Verbal Casuistry (attributing a meaning to our statement never intended by us).
evaṃ yathācotpalaśrutiranarthiko tathānyeṣāmapyanityādiśabdānāṃ prayogo 'narthakaḥ prāpnoti, sati prayoge paryāyatvam eva syāt tarupādapādiśabdavadityatideśaṃ kurvannāha etenaivetyādi /	In this same way, the tittering of other words also would be fruitless. in fact, the utterance of such words would only mean so many synonyms. Thus, just as the word ‘lotus’ would be useless, so also the use of such words as ‘non-eternal’ would be useless; or if they were used, they would be only synonyms, like the words ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both of which stand for tree).
etenaiva prakāreṇa nānyeṣāmapyudīraṇam /	This is the application of the said reasoning to other cases indicated in the following [see verse 1117 above]
[p.345] udīraṇamiti /	‘Udīraṇam’ i.e. úse, utterance.
uktāviti / uccāraṇe /	‘Uktau’ i.e. in the uttering.
taduktam "anyathaikena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni / buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti paryāyatā bhave"diti //	This idea has been expressed in the following statement: ‘A certain thing having been entirely taken up by a word or by an idea, there remains nothing else that could be expressed by another word or Idea;
asmākāṃ tu na śabdena bāhyārthaḥ pratipādyate /	For us, no external thing is expressed by the word;
yataḥ sarvātmanā tābhyāṃ viṣayīkaraṇātparam / śabdajñānāntaraṃ tatra paryāyatvaṃ prayāsyati //	nor is any idea of external things held to proceed from words, by virtue of which, the thing in its entirety having been taken up by these two, any subsequent word would be a mere synonym of that word.
tābhyām iti /	Answer: [see verses 1118-1119 above]
śabdajñānābhyām / param iti /	‘These two’ i.e. the said word and the said Idea.
uttarakālam //1118 //	‘Subsequent’, coming later on.
pratibimbaṃ tu śabdena krameṇaivopajanyate /	What is produced by the word, in due course, is only the reflection;
ekatvena ca tadbhāti bāhyatvena ca vibhramāt //	and it is through delusion that this appears as one and as external.
sāmānādhikaraṇyādi pratibimbānurodhataḥ /	The co-ordination and other relations are due to the reflection.
paramārthena śabdās tu matā nirviṣayā ime //	In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.
nīlaśabdena hi prathamataramanīlapadārthavyāvṛttamutpalādiṣu plavamānarūpatayā teṣām apratikṣepakamadhyavasitabāhyarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyate, punar utpalaśrutyā tadevānutpalavyāvṛttamāropitabāhyaikavastusvarūpamupajanyate, tadevaṃ krameṇānīlānutpalavyāvṛttamadhyavasitabāhyaikarūpaṃ bhrāntaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyata iti tadanurodhāt sāṃvṛtaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyādi yujyata eva /	When the word ‘blue’ is uttered, what it brings about first of all is the conceptual Reflection, excluded (differentiated) from all non-blue things, and scintillating over the Lotus and other (blue) things and hence not excluding these latter, and conceived (objectively) in the external form; then when subsequently, the word ‘Lotus’ is uttered, what it brings about is the conceptual Reflection, excluded from all that is non-lotus, and with the form of only one externalng superimposed upon it; in this way, in due course, there is brought about an illusory (conjunct) conceptual Reflection, excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’, with the one external form imposed upon it; and it is in consequence of this that an illusory co-ordination becomes possible.
paramārthatas tu kasmān na yujyata ity āha paramārthenetyādi //	“Why is it not so, in reality?” Answer: In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.
yaduktam ---"liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho na cāpohasya vidyata" iti, atrāha liṅgasaṅkhyādītyādi /	As for the connection of gender and number, it is not present in individuals also; in fact, such connection is based entirely upon conventions set up by the whims of people;
liṅgasaṅkhyādiyogas tu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam / icchāracitasaṅketanimitto nahi vāstavaḥ //	it is nothing real. It has been argued (under Text 973, by Kumārila) that “there can be no connection between the Apoha and Gender, Number, etc”.
vastudharmatvameṣāṃ liṅgasaṅkhyādīnām asiddham /	The fact of Gender, Number, etc. belonging to things is not admitted.
svatantrecchāviracitasaṅketamātrabhā [p.346] vitvāt /	In fact it is due entirely to Conventions set up at whim.
vyaktīnām apītyāpiśabdādapohasyāpi /	‘In Individuals also’ the term ‘also’ is meant to include the Apoha.
prayogaḥ yo yadanvayavyatirekau nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ, yathā śītatvamagneḥ, nānuvidhatte ca liṅgasaṅkhyādi vastuto 'nvayavyatirekāviti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //	The argument may be formulated thus: When one thing does not follow the presence and absence of another thing, then it cannot belong to it; e.g. Coolness and Fire; Gender and Number do not follow the presence and absence of individual things, hence there is non-perception of the wider term (which implies the non-existence of the narrower).
taṭastaṭī taṭaṃ ceti nairūpyaṃ na ca vastunaḥ /	There are three words (denoting the same thing) ‘taṭaḥ’ (masculine) ‘taṭam’ (neuter) and ‘taṭī’ (feminine); and yet any one thing cannot have three forms;
śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām //	for if it did, then, all cognitions would have to be variegated in character.
yadi hi liṅgaṃ vastugato dharmaḥ syāt, tadaikasmiṃs taṭākhye vastuni taṭastaṭī taṭamiti liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛtter ekasya vastunastrairūpyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	If Gender really belonged to things, then, on account of the three words ‘taṭaḥ’, ‘taṭam’ and ‘taṭī in three genders, being applicable to the sameng (Rank of rivers); the thing would have three forms;
nacaikasya strīpunnapuṃsakākhyaṃ svabhāvatrayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt /	and it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the three forms Masculine, Neuter and Feminine;
viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve sarvaṃ viśvamekameva vastu syāt /	if it did, it would cease to be oneng. If, even in the presence of mutually incompatible properties, things were to be one, then the entire universe would become a single thing;
tataś ca sahotpattivināśaprasaṅgaḥ /	and in that case it would all be produced and destroyed at one and the same time.
kiṃ ca sarvasyaivaikaśabdena śabdāntareṇa vā liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanāt tadviṣayāṇāṃ sarvacetasāṃ mecakādiratnavacchabalābhāsatāprasaṅgaḥ //	Then again, on account of all things being expressed, by either one word or by another, as having the three genders, all cognitions relating to them would have to be variegated in character. If they were dependent upon the speaker’s whim, then the cognitions would not envisage the things at all.

taditi tasmāt /

‘Tat’ ‘tasmāt’ Hence.

viśuddhādhiyācāryādiṅnāgena prokte 'pohalakṣaṇe śabdārthe /

‘Avadātam, etc. etc.’ i.e. to the ‘denotation of words’ as expounded by the Teacher Dīṅnāga, with the purest conviction.

atra kāraṇamāha apṛthaktvata iti /

The grounds for this inapplicability are next stated ‘Because there is no difference, etc. etc.’.

tasyānyāpohalakṣaṇasya śabdārthasyānyāpoḍhāt padārthād apṛthaktvād avyatirekād iti yāvat /

That is, there the Denotation of words in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of other things’ is not different from, not anything other than that which is excluded from others.

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyetyādi /

‘Qualification and qualified, etc. etc.’.

subodham //

This is easily understood.

yathā ca na virudhyate sāmānādhikaraṇyādi tathā darśayann āha kevalād ityādi / kevalānnīlaśabdāder viśiṣṭaṃ pratibimbakam /

When the word ‘blue’ is uttered alone, the particular ‘reflection’ that appears is one that scintillates through all blue things such as the cuckoo, the lotus, the blue bee and the like.

kokilotpalabhṛṅgādau plavamānaṃ pravartate // pikāñjanādyapohena viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ punaḥ / tadindīvaraśabdena sthāpyate pariniścitam //

When the word ‘lotus’ is added to it, then the cuckoo, the collyrium and other blue things become ‘excluded’, and the resultant reflection is one that is further particularised and becomes definitely applied to one blue thing only.

sāmānādhikaraṇyādirevam asmin na bādhitaḥ /

Thus the necessary co-ordination is not rendered impossible.

parapakṣe tu sarveṣāṃ tadvyavasthātidurghaṭā //

All this explanation is absolutely impossible under the theory of the other party.

tathā hi nīlam ityukte pītādivyāvṛttānyapadārthavyavasāyibhramarakokilāñjanādiṣu saṃśayyamānarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakamudeti / taccotpalaśabdena kikilādibhyo [p.341] vyavacchedyānutpalavyāvṛttavastuviṣaye vyavasthāpyamānaṃ pariniścitātmakaṃ pratīyate /

That is to say, when the word ‘blue’ is pronounced, there appears the Conceptual Reflection (the Image) of a doubtful form, inasmuch as it serves to exclude the ‘yellow’ and other colours and things having these colours, and envisages all blue things, such as the Blue Bee, the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and so forth. When the word ‘lotus’ is added (to the word ‘blue’), the same Reflection becomes apprehended as differentiated from the Cuckoo and the rest, and particularly restricted to the thing excluded from the Non-lotus.

tena parasparaṃ yathoktabuddhipratibimbakāpekṣayā vyavacchedyavyavacchekabhāvānnīlotpalaśabdayor viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo na virudhyate / dvābhyāṃ vānīlānutpalavyāvṛttaikapratibimbātmakavastupratipādanādekārthavṛttitayā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca bhavatīti samudāyārthaḥ /

Thus in relation to the said Conceptual Reflection, there is a mutual relation of differentiation and differentiated between the two words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’; and hence there is nothing incongruous in their being related to each other as qualification and qualified. Or (another explanation possible is that) both the words together express the thing in the form of a single Reflected Image excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’; so that both pertaining to the same thing, there is co-ordination between them.

avayavārthastūcyate plavamānam iti / alabhamānapratiṣṭhaṃ saṃśayarūpamiti yāvat /

The meaning of the words is as follows: ‘Scintillating’, i.e. not restricted to any particular thing, doubtful.

pikaśabdaḥ kokilaparyāyaḥ /

The word ‘pika’ here stands for the Cuckoo.

śeṣaṃ subodham /

The rest is easy.

syād etad asmatpakṣe 'pi sāmānādhikaraṇyādiraviruddha evetyata āha parapakṣe tvityādi /

It might be argued (by the Opponent) that “under our theory also, the co-ordination would be all right”. The answer to this is ‘All this explanation is, etc. etc.’;

tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyāder vyavasthā tadvyavasthā //

that is, the above described explanation of ‘co-ordination’, etc.

kathaṃ durghaṭetyāha tathāhītyādi /

Question: “Why should it be impossible under our theory?”

tathāhyekena śabdena sarvathoktaṃ svalakṣaṇam /

By the single word, the specific individuality becomes expressed in its entirety;

tathācābhihite tasmin kasmād bhedāntare 'matiḥ // yadarthamaparaḥ śabdaḥ prayujyetātra vastutaḥ / sarvathābhihite no cet tadanekaṃ prasajyate //

and when that has been denoted, why should there be non-cognition of other things, for the sake of which another word would be pronounced, when, in reality, the thing has been denoted in its entirety? If not, then it becomes more than one.

vidhiśabdārthavādipakṣe nīlādiśabdenaivaikenotpalādisvalakṣaṇe 'bhihite kimutpalamāhosvidañjanam ityevam ajñānaṃ viśeṣāntare na prāpnoti, sarvātmanātasya vastunaḥ pratipāditatvāt / ekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā jñātājñātatvavirodhāt /

Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word ‘blue’ expresses the Specific Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things, why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium, since the Blue Thing has been denoted in its entirety? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction.

taddarśayati kasmād bhedāntare 'matiriti /

This is what is pointed out in the text by the words ‘Why should there, etc. etc.’.

amatirajñānam / kutsitā yā matir amatiḥ /

‘Non-Cognition’ stands for bad cognition, i.e. doubtful and wrong cognition.

tataś ca saṃśayaviparyāsābhāvād utpalādiśabdāntaraprayogākāṅkṣā prayoktuś ca na prāpnotīti darśayati yadarthamityādi /

Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as ‘Lotus’ and the like.

yadartham iti / yasyā amater nivṛttyartham ity arthaḥ /

This is shown by the words ‘for the sake of which, etc. etc.’: ‘For the sake of which’, i.e. for the purpose of removing which noncognition.

athāpi syāt tadvastvekadeśenābhihitaṃ na sarvātmanā, tena svabhāvāntarābhidhānāyāparaḥ śabdo 'nveṣyata evetyata āha sarvathetyādi /

It might be argued that “when the Blue thing has been denoted by the single word ‘blue’, it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after”.

na hyekasya vastuna ekadeśāḥ santi yenaikadeśenābhidhānaṃ syāt, ekatvānekatvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt /

There are no parts in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation in part; because the one (whole) and the many (parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other;

tataś ca yāvantaścaikadeśās tāvantyeva kevalaṃ bhavatā vastūni pratipāditānīti naikamanekaṃ siddhyet //

so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts; and hence there would be no such concepts as ‘one’ and ‘many’.

syād etan na nīlaśabdena dravyamabhidhīyate kiṃ tarhinīlākhyo guṇas tatsamavetā vā nīlatvajātiḥ utpalaśabdenāpyutpalajātirevocyate, na dravyaṃ, tena bhinnārthābhidhānād utpalaśabdāntarākāṅkṣā yujyata evetyata āha nīlajātir ityādi /

If the universal ‘blue’, or the quality blue, is denoted by the word ‘blue’, then the word ‘lotus’ (pronounced with that word) should denote another universal ‘lotus’; such being the case, there would be difference between the two words, just as there is between the words ‘bakula’ (a kind of flower) and ‘utpala’ (lotus); so that any co-ordination, etc. between them will be all the more impossible. The following might be urged by the other party: “The word ‘blue’ does not denote a particular substance;

nīlajātir guṇo vāpi nīlaśabdena cedgataḥ / anyendīvarajātis tu vyavaseyotpalaśruteḥ //

it denotes either the quality called ‘Blue’ or the Universal ‘Blue’ inhering in that quality; the word ‘lotus’ also denotes the Universal ‘Lotus’, not any particular substance;

evaṃ sati tayor bhedād bakulotpalaśabdavat / sāmānādhikaraṇyādi sutarāṃ nipapadyate //

hence, as the two words denote two different things, it is only right that there should be a need for the word ‘lotus’ (after the utterance of the word ‘blue’).” The answer to this is as follows [see verses 1107-1108 above]

anyendīvarajātiristviti / anyā cāsāvindīvarajātiśceti samāsaḥ /

The compound ‘anyendīvarajāti’ is to be taken as a Karmādhāraya, ‘anyā’ qualifying ‘indīvarajātiḥ’.

vyavasātavyā / utpalaśruter iti pañcamyantam /

‘Vyavaseyā’ i.e. should be denoted. ‘Utpalaśruteḥ’ has the Ablative ending.

asmin pakṣe sutarāmeva sāmānādhikaraṇyamanupapannaṃ bakulotpalaśabdayor ivaikasminnarthe nīlotpalaśabdayor vṛttyabhāvāt /

Thus under this theory co-ordination would be all the more impossible; since, like the words ‘bakula’ and ‘utpala’, the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ would not be applicable to the same thing.

nahi bhavati bakulamutpalam iti //

There can be no such expression as ‘bakulam utpalam (1107-1108)

syād etat nīlaśabdo yadyapi jātiguṇaviśeṣavacanaḥ, tathāpi taddvāreṇa nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ dravyam api tenābhidhīyate tathotpalaśabdenāpi jātidvāreṇa tadeva dravyamabhidhīyata iti /

If it is the substance related to the quality and the universal that is denoted by the word ‘blue’, then the word ‘lotus’ would be useless. as what is related to the said two factors (quality and universal) is exactly what is equipped with the universal ‘lotus’;

atas tayor ekārthavṛttisambhavāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati, na bakulotpalaśabdayor ityata āha guṇatajjātītyādi / guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ cet pratipādyate / nīlaśabdena yadyevaṃ vyarthā syād utpalaśrutiḥ //

and as this will have been already expressed by the word ‘blue’, the word ‘lotus’ would be useless. The following might be urged by the other party: “Though the word ‘blue’ denotes a particular Universal and a particular Quality, yet, through those, it also denotes the substance related to the Blue Quality and the ‘Blue’ Universal; similarly the word ‘lotus’, through the Universal ‘Lotus’, denotes the substance;

tābhyāṃ yadeva sambaddhaṃ tadevotpalajātimat /

in this way their application to the same thing being possible, there would be co-ordination between them;

nīlaśrutyaiva tatroktaṃ vyarthā nīlotpalaśrutiḥ //

which would not be possible in the case of the words ‘bakula’ and ‘utpala’.”

guṇaś ca nīlākhyaḥ, tajjātiś ca nīlatvākhyeti guṇatajjātī, tābhyāṃ sambaddham iti vigrahaḥ /

‘The Quality’ called ‘blue’; the ‘Universal’ as the Universal ‘blue’; that which is related to these is ‘Guṇatajjātisambaddham’,

vyarthā syād utpalaśrutir iti / nīlaśabdenaiva tasya dravyasya pratipāditatvāt /

‘The word Lotus would be useless’, as the substance will have been already expressed by the word ‘blue’.

etad eva darśayati tābhyām ityādi /

This is explained by the words ‘As what is related, etc. etc.’;

tābhyām iti / guṇatajjātibhyā /

‘the two factors’ are the Quality and the Universal.

syād etat yadyapi nīlaśabdena guṇatajjātimaddravyamabhidhīyate, tathāpi tasya nīlaśabdasyānekārthavṛttidarśanāt pratipattur utpalārthe, niścitarūpāna buddhir upajāyate kikilāder api nīlatvāt /

The following might be urged (by the other party) “Even though the word ‘blue’ denotes the substance possessing that quality and belonging to that Uni versa’, yet, inasmuch as the word ‘blue’ has been found to be applicable to several substances, the man who hears the word pronounced does not obtain any definite idea of the Lotus, specifically;

ato 'rthāntarasaṃśayavyavacchedād utpalaśruteḥ, prayogaḥ sārthaka eveti /

hence, the use of the word ‘lotus’ becomes useful, in that it serves to dispel the suspicion that other substances might be meant”.

tadasamyak prakṛtarthānabhijñātayābhidhānāt /

as this assertion is made because the person making it does not know the subject under consideration.

vidhiśabdārthapakṣe hi sāmānādhikaraṇyādi nopapadyata ityetad atra prakṛtam / yadi cotpalaśabdaḥ saṃśayavyavacchedāyaiva vyāpriyate na dravyapratipattaye natarhi vidhiḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt, utpalaśabdena bhrāntisamāropitākāravyavacchedamātrasyaiva pratipādanāt /

The subject under discussion is that under the theory that words denote positive things, there can be no co-ordination, etc. If then, the word ‘lotus’ is used only for the dispelling of the said suspicion, and not for the denoting of a substance, then, in that case, a positive entity would not form the denotation of the word; as all that the word ‘lotus’ will have done would be the dispelling of the form wrongly imposed upon it.

parasparaviruddhaṃ cedamabhidhīyate nīlaśabdenotpalādikaṃ dravyamabhidhīyate atha ca pratipattus tatra niścayo na jāyata iti /

Then again, it is a self-contradictory statement that is made, when it is asserted that “the word ‘blue’ denotes the substance Lotus” and yet “there is no certainty produced in the mind of the hearer”.

[p.343] nahi yatra saṃśayo jāyate sa śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

That cannot form the denotation of a word, in regard to which no certainty is produced. If it did, that would lead to absurdities.

nāpi niścayena viṣayīkṛte vastuni saṃśayo 'vakāśaṃ labhate /

Nor again is there any room for suspicion in what has been cognised with certainty as ‘Certain Cognition’ and ‘Uncertain Cognition’ are mutually destructive.

syād etat yadyapi nīlotpalaśabdayor ekasminnarthe vṛttir nāsti, tadarthayostu guṇajātyorekasmin dravye vṛttir astīti /

It might be said that “Even though the words Blue and Lotus are not applicable to the same thing, yet what are denoted by them viz. the Quality and the Universal do subsist in the same substance, and hence through their denotations, there would be co-ordination between them.”

ato 'rthadvārakamanayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyatīti tadetad ayuktamatiprasaṅgāt /

as it would lead to absurd contingencies.

evaṃ hi rūparasaśabdayor api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syāt, tadarthayo rūparasayorekasmin pṛthivyādidravye vṛtteḥ /

In the manner stated, there would be co-ordination between the words ‘Colour’ and ‘Taste’ also; as what are denoted by them i.e. Colour and Taste subsist in the same substance, Earth.

kiṃ ca nīlamutpalamityekārthaviṣayā buddhir na prāpnoti, ekadravyasamavetayorguṇajātyor dvābhyāṃ pṛthakpṛthagabdhidhānāt, na caikārthaviṣayajñānānutpāde śabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyamastītyalaṃ bahunā //

Further (under the explanation offered) there would be no possibility of the expression ‘blue lotus’ bringing about the cognition of a single thing; as the two words would be separately denoting the Quality and the Universal subsisting in the single substance; and unless the words bring about the cognition of the same thing, there can be no co-ordination between them.

syād etat na yadeva nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ vastu tadevotpalaśabdenocyate, kiṃ tarhianyadeva, tenotpalaśrutir vyarthā na bhaviṣyatītyata āha guṇatajjātisambaddhādityādi /

If what belongs to the universal ‘lotus’ is different from what is related to the quality and universal (blue), then the words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’ cannot be co-substrate (co-ordinated). The following might be urged: “The word ‘lotus’ does not denote exactly the same thing that is related to the quality Blue and the Universal ‘Blue’;

yadītyavacchedaḥ /

it denotes something different.

bhinnāśraye syātām iti / vyadhikaraṇe syātāsmity arthaḥ //

There is a hiatus after the particle ‘yadi’ (‘if’). ‘They cannot be co-substrate’; i.e. they cannot be co-ordinated.

athāpi syāt yadyapi tadeva dravyaṃ nīlaśabdenocyate, utpalaśabdenāpi tadeva / tathāpi nīlaśabdo notpalajātisambandhirūpeṇa dravyamabhidhatte, kiṃ tarhinīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpeṇaiva, tenotpalajātisambandhirūpatvamasyābhidhātumutpalaśrutiḥ pravartamānā nānarthikā bhaviṣyatīti tadetad āśaṅkya pariharati athotpalatvetyādi /

If the word ‘blue’ does not denote the substance related to the quality and the universal (blue) as related to the universal ‘lotus’, then the substance as related to the universal ‘lotus’ should be something totally different; as a matter of fact, what is related to the universal ‘lotus’ is that same substance that is related to the other two (quality and universal ‘blue’); and that substance has already been expressed, in its entirety not in part, by the word ‘blue’, and has also been apprehended by the verbal cognition brought about by that word;

athotpalatvasambandhirūpatvena na codayet /

so that the word ‘lotus’ would be entirely useless.

atha nīlam iti dhvanirutpalatvasambandhirūpatvena guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ na codayed iti sambandhaḥ // syānnāmotpalatāyogirūpatvamatadātmakam / utpalatvena sambaddhaṃ tvābhyāṃ sambaddham eva tat //

The following might be urged: “Though the same Substance is denoted by the word ‘blue’, and also by the word ‘Lotus’, yet the word ‘blue’ denotes the Substance, not as something related to the Universal ‘Lotus’, but as related to the Quality Blue and the Universal ‘Blue’; consequently, the word ‘Lotus’ is used for the purpose of expressing the fact of the substance being related to the Universal ‘Lotus’; and as such it cannot be useless.”

nīlaśrutyā ca tat proktaṃ śābdyātra viṣayīkṛtam /

This argument is raised and answered in the following: [see verses 1112-1114 above]

na hi nīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyadevotpalajātisambandhirūpaṃ, yena nīlotpalādisambandhirūpatvābhidhāne dravyasyotpalajātisambandhirūpatvābhidhānaṃ na bhavet / yāvataikasmāt dravyādayor api sambandharūpatvayor avyatirekatadvāttayorapyekatvamevetyayuktamekarūpābhidhāne pararūpānabhidhānaṃ kiñcābhyupagamyocyate bhavatu nāmotpalatva sambandhirūpatvam nīlavajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyato, yathāpyutpalaśrutiranarthaka eva /

If the word ‘blue’ does not denote the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal ‘Blue’, as related to the Universal ‘Lotus’, then (there is the following incongruity). The substance as related to the Universal ‘Lotus’ is not something entirely different from the substance as related to the Quality and Universal ‘Blue’, on the basis whereof on the denotation of the Substance related to the Quality and Universal ‘Blue’, there might be no denotation of the Substance as related to the Universal ‘Lotus As a matter of fact, however, there is no difference between the correlatives in the two cases; and hence the two substances must also be the same; and hence it cannot be right that on the denotation of one there should be no denotation of the other.

tathā hi yattadanaṃśaṃ vastūtpalajātyā sambaddhaṃ tadevābhyāṃ nīlaguṇatā jātibhyāṃ sambaddhyate nānyat /

Because that impartiteng which is related to the Universal ‘Lotus’ is exactly what is related to the two factors of the Quality and the Universal ‘Blue’, it is not anything different from it;

taccāṃśatvāt sarvātmanā nīlaśrutyaivābhihitaṃ śābdyā ca buddhyā vyavasāyātmikayā viṣayīkṛtā iti kimaparamanabhihitamasya svarūpamasti yadabhidhānāyotpala śrutiḥ sārthikā bhavet // udyotakarastvāha niraṃśevastuni sarvātmanā viṣayīkṛtaṃ nāṃśenetyeṣa vikalpo nāvatārati, sarvaśabdasyānekārthaviṣayatvāt, ekaśabdasya cāvayave vṛttitvāt iti /

and as that thing is impartite, it must have been denoted in its entirety, by the word ‘blue’; and it would also have figured in the Verbal Cognition brought about by that word hence what would be left there undenoted in the denoting of which the word ‘Lotus’ would have its use? (1112-1114) If (it be said that), in regard to a thing devoid of plurality, the assumption of the alternatives of ‘entirety’ and ‘severality’ (‘plurality’) is not possible, bitch an assertion could only proceed from ignorance of the meaning of the sentence (used by us), what we made clear was that the first word ‘blue’ itself expressed all that had to be expressed, and no part of itself was left (unexpressed).

tadetad āśaṃkya pariharati na cet ityādi

Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “The assumption (made by the Buddhist) that ‘the object being impartite, whenever it is cognised, it is in its entirety, not in part’ is not possible;

na cedbhedavinirmukte kārtsnyabhedavikalpanam /

because the word ‘sarva’, (‘entire ‘whole’), is applied to things not-one (several), while the word ‘eka’ is applicable to the part.”

na vākyārthaparijñānā idam hyatra vivakṣitaṃ //

Anticipating this argument, the Author provides the following answer to it: [see verses 1115-1116 above]

bhedavinirmukta iti /

‘Devoid of plurality’ i.e, the thing without parts.

kārtsnya bhedavikalpanam iti / sarvātmanā viṣayīkṛtam vyaikadeśenetyevaṃ kārstnyabhedābhyāṃ vikalpanaṃ /

‘The assumption, etc. etc.’, the assumption of the alternatives viz.: whether what figures as the object of the cognition is the thing in its entirety, or in parts.

tadetat vākyārthā parijñānāt uktam /

This assertion proceeds from ignorance of what our statement means.

tathā hi prathamenaiva nīlaśabdena sarvātmanā tatprakāśitamityasyāyamartho vivakṣitaḥ, yādṛśaṃ tadvastu tādṛśamevābhihitaṃ , na tasya kaścitsvabhāvastyakto yadabhidhānāyotpalaśrutirvyāpriyeta, niraṃśatvāt tasya vastuna ityato vākchalametat //1115 //

For instance, what is meant by our statement that ‘by the very first word ‘blue’ the thing has been expressed in its entirety’ is as follows: What has been expressed is the thing exactly as it stands, and no aspect of it has been left out, for the denoting of which the word ‘lotus’ would be required; because the thing has no parts. Such being our meaning, the argument urged by Uddyotakara is in the nature of Verbal Casuistry (attributing a meaning to our statement never intended by us).

evaṃ yathācotpalaśrutiranarthiko tathānyeṣāmapyanityādiśabdānāṃ prayogo 'narthakaḥ prāpnoti, sati prayoge paryāyatvam eva syāt tarupādapādiśabdavadityatideśaṃ kurvannāha etenaivetyādi /

In this same way, the tittering of other words also would be fruitless. in fact, the utterance of such words would only mean so many synonyms. Thus, just as the word ‘lotus’ would be useless, so also the use of such words as ‘non-eternal’ would be useless; or if they were used, they would be only synonyms, like the words ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both of which stand for tree).

etenaiva prakāreṇa nānyeṣāmapyudīraṇam /

This is the application of the said reasoning to other cases indicated in the following [see verse 1117 above]

[p.345] udīraṇamiti /

‘Udīraṇam’ i.e. úse, utterance.

uktāviti / uccāraṇe /

‘Uktau’ i.e. in the uttering.

taduktam "anyathaikena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni / buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti paryāyatā bhave"diti //

This idea has been expressed in the following statement: ‘A certain thing having been entirely taken up by a word or by an idea, there remains nothing else that could be expressed by another word or Idea;

asmākāṃ tu na śabdena bāhyārthaḥ pratipādyate /

For us, no external thing is expressed by the word;

yataḥ sarvātmanā tābhyāṃ viṣayīkaraṇātparam / śabdajñānāntaraṃ tatra paryāyatvaṃ prayāsyati //

nor is any idea of external things held to proceed from words, by virtue of which, the thing in its entirety having been taken up by these two, any subsequent word would be a mere synonym of that word.

tābhyām iti /

Answer: [see verses 1118-1119 above]

śabdajñānābhyām / param iti /

‘These two’ i.e. the said word and the said Idea.

uttarakālam //1118 //

‘Subsequent’, coming later on.

pratibimbaṃ tu śabdena krameṇaivopajanyate /

What is produced by the word, in due course, is only the reflection;

ekatvena ca tadbhāti bāhyatvena ca vibhramāt //

and it is through delusion that this appears as one and as external.

sāmānādhikaraṇyādi pratibimbānurodhataḥ /

The co-ordination and other relations are due to the reflection.

paramārthena śabdās tu matā nirviṣayā ime //

In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.

nīlaśabdena hi prathamataramanīlapadārthavyāvṛttamutpalādiṣu plavamānarūpatayā teṣām apratikṣepakamadhyavasitabāhyarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyate, punar utpalaśrutyā tadevānutpalavyāvṛttamāropitabāhyaikavastusvarūpamupajanyate, tadevaṃ krameṇānīlānutpalavyāvṛttamadhyavasitabāhyaikarūpaṃ bhrāntaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyata iti tadanurodhāt sāṃvṛtaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyādi yujyata eva /

When the word ‘blue’ is uttered, what it brings about first of all is the conceptual Reflection, excluded (differentiated) from all non-blue things, and scintillating over the Lotus and other (blue) things and hence not excluding these latter, and conceived (objectively) in the external form; then when subsequently, the word ‘Lotus’ is uttered, what it brings about is the conceptual Reflection, excluded from all that is non-lotus, and with the form of only one externalng superimposed upon it; in this way, in due course, there is brought about an illusory (conjunct) conceptual Reflection, excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’, with the one external form imposed upon it; and it is in consequence of this that an illusory co-ordination becomes possible.

paramārthatas tu kasmān na yujyata ity āha paramārthenetyādi //

“Why is it not so, in reality?” Answer: In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.

yaduktam ---"liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho na cāpohasya vidyata" iti, atrāha liṅgasaṅkhyādītyādi /

As for the connection of gender and number, it is not present in individuals also; in fact, such connection is based entirely upon conventions set up by the whims of people;

liṅgasaṅkhyādiyogas tu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam / icchāracitasaṅketanimitto nahi vāstavaḥ //

it is nothing real. It has been argued (under Text 973, by Kumārila) that “there can be no connection between the Apoha and Gender, Number, etc”.

vastudharmatvameṣāṃ liṅgasaṅkhyādīnām asiddham /

The fact of Gender, Number, etc. belonging to things is not admitted.

svatantrecchāviracitasaṅketamātrabhā [p.346] vitvāt /

In fact it is due entirely to Conventions set up at whim.

vyaktīnām apītyāpiśabdādapohasyāpi /

‘In Individuals also’ the term ‘also’ is meant to include the Apoha.

prayogaḥ yo yadanvayavyatirekau nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ, yathā śītatvamagneḥ, nānuvidhatte ca liṅgasaṅkhyādi vastuto 'nvayavyatirekāviti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //

The argument may be formulated thus: When one thing does not follow the presence and absence of another thing, then it cannot belong to it; e.g. Coolness and Fire; Gender and Number do not follow the presence and absence of individual things, hence there is non-perception of the wider term (which implies the non-existence of the narrower).

taṭastaṭī taṭaṃ ceti nairūpyaṃ na ca vastunaḥ /

There are three words (denoting the same thing) ‘taṭaḥ’ (masculine) ‘taṭam’ (neuter) and ‘taṭī’ (feminine); and yet any one thing cannot have three forms;

śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām //

for if it did, then, all cognitions would have to be variegated in character.

yadi hi liṅgaṃ vastugato dharmaḥ syāt, tadaikasmiṃs taṭākhye vastuni taṭastaṭī taṭamiti liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛtter ekasya vastunastrairūpyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

If Gender really belonged to things, then, on account of the three words ‘taṭaḥ’, ‘taṭam’ and ‘taṭī in three genders, being applicable to the sameng (Rank of rivers); the thing would have three forms;

nacaikasya strīpunnapuṃsakākhyaṃ svabhāvatrayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt /

and it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the three forms Masculine, Neuter and Feminine;

viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve sarvaṃ viśvamekameva vastu syāt /

if it did, it would cease to be oneng. If, even in the presence of mutually incompatible properties, things were to be one, then the entire universe would become a single thing;

tataś ca sahotpattivināśaprasaṅgaḥ /

and in that case it would all be produced and destroyed at one and the same time.

kiṃ ca sarvasyaivaikaśabdena śabdāntareṇa vā liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanāt tadviṣayāṇāṃ sarvacetasāṃ mecakādiratnavacchabalābhāsatāprasaṅgaḥ //

Then again, on account of all things being expressed, by either one word or by another, as having the three genders, all cognitions relating to them would have to be variegated in character. If they were dependent upon the speaker’s whim, then the cognitions would not envisage the things at all.