buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivartate // tadviśeṣaṇabhāve 'pi vastudhīr na vihīyate /	Even when the difference has been asserted, the thing itself does not entirely disappear. Thus even when it has the nature of the qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease.
kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede 'pi viśeṣaṇam //	even when there is non-difference, the qualification is there as a creation of fancy.
sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva /	That character, having been withdrawn therefrom, has been placed there as if different;
yena daṇḍādivat tasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam //	whereby it becomes its qualification, like the stick and other things.
yadi hyanyavyāvṛttir bhāvarūpā vastuno viśeṣaṇatvenābhipretā syāt tadaitat sarvaṃ dūṣaṇamupapadyate, yāvatā vastusvarūpaivānyanivṛttir viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyate, tena viśeṣaṇānurūpaiva viśeṣyabuddhir bhavatyeva /	If the ‘exclusion of other things’ were meant to be something positive qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ‘exclusion of other things’ which is held to be the qualification is in the form of the thing itself; so that the notion of the qualified is naturally in accord with that of the qualification.
tathā hi agonivṛttir yā gaor abhidhīyate sāśvādibhyo gor yadanyatvaṃ tatsvabhāvaiva nānyā / tataś ca yadyapyasau vyatirekeṇāgonivṛttir gorityabhidhīyate bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ, tathāpi paramārthatas tasya gorātmagataiva sā, yathānyatvam nahyanyatvaṃ nāmānyasmād vastuno 'nyat apitu tadeva /	For instance, when one speaks of the ‘exclusion’ of the Cow ‘from the non-Cow’, this ‘exclusion’ is only of the nature of the ‘difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things’, not anything else. Hence, even though the exclusion, of the Cow, from the non-Cow, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things, yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the Cow itself, just like the ‘difference’; that is, ‘difference’ is not anything different from the different thing, it is that same;
anyathā tad vastu tato 'nyasminna siddhyet /	otherwise that thing could not figure in the ‘difference’ at all.
tat tasmāt, viśeṣaṇabhāve 'pyanyavyāvṛtter viśeṣye vastudhīr bhavatyeva /	‘Tat’ i.e. thus even when the ‘exclusion of others’ is of the nature of the qualification, the idea of the ‘Thing’ itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.
syād etad vyatiriktam eva hi viśeṣyād viśeṣaṇaṃ loke prasiddham, yathā daṇḍaḥ puruṣasya, vyāvṛttiścāvyatiriktā vastunaḥ, tat katham asau tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ yujyata ity āha kalpanetyādi /	It might be argued as follows “In ordinary life the qualification is known to be something different from the qualified, as the stick of the Man (stick-holder); and ‘Exclusion’ is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing?” The answer is ‘Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc.’.
nahi paramārthena na kiñcit kasyacid viśeṣaṇaṃ yuktam, anupakārakasya viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt, upakārakatve cāṅgīkriyamāṇe kāryakāle kāraṇasyānavasthānādayugapatkālabhāvinor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo yuktaḥ yugapatkālabhāvitvetu	In reality, nothing can be qualified by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a qualification; if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two things not existing at the same time; while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help;
tat tasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ svasvabhāvasthitatvenāyaḥśalākākalpatvāt kevalaṃ kalpanāyāmīṣāṃ [p.335] miśrīkaraṇam /	and hence there could be no relation of qualification and qualified. Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars, yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.
tena paramārthato yadyapi vyāvṛttobhedas tathāpi kalpanāracitaṃ bhedamāśritya viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo bhaviṣyati //	Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the ‘Exclusion’ and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of qualification and qualified between them.
pratibhāsaśca śabdārtha ityāhus tattvacintakāḥ /	Discriminators of truth declare that what is denoted by the word is mere ‘reflection’.
dṛśyakalpāvibhāgajño loko bāhyaṃ tu manyate // tasyāto 'dhyavasāyena vyaktīnām eva vācyatā /	People, not knowing the distinction between what is ‘perceived’ and what is ‘fancied’ regard it to be something ‘external as that is what is apprehended (by words), individuals are denoted by words.
tattvataś ca na śabdānāṃ vācyamastīti sādhitam //	In reality however there is nothing that is denoted by words, as has been proved already.
vyaktīnām avācyatvādityasiddham /	The reason ‘because Individuals are not denoted’ is not-admitted.
tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvamasmābhir varṇitaṃ tatparamārthacintāyāmna punaḥ saṃvṛttyāpi, saṃvṛtyā tu vyaktīnām eva vācyatvam avicāraramaṇīyatayā prasiddhamtiyasiddho hetuḥ /	Because the ‘non-denotability’ of words that we have asserted is only in view of the real aspect of things, not in regard to the illusory aspect. Under the illusory aspect, it is only Individuals that are denoted, as is happily accepted by people wanting in true insight, and is well known; so that the Reason adduced is not-admitted.
dṛśyaḥ bāhyaḥ svalakṣaṇātmā, {kalpḥ} vikalpyo vikalpajñānaparivartī pratibhāsaḥ /	What is ‘perceived’ is the external thing, in the shape of Specific Individuality; what is ‘fancied’, imaginary is the ‘Reflection’ that figures in Determinate Conception.
atha pāramārthikamavācyatvaṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadāpohyatvam api vyaktīnāṃ paramārthato neṣṭam ityataḥ siddhasādhyateti darśayati tattvataścetyādi // itthamityādinā hetor asiddhatām eva nigamayati /	If the Reason adduced by you is the real ‘non-denotability of Individuals’, then we also do not admit of any real ‘exclusion’ of Individuals; so that in that ease your argument proves only what is already admitted by us, and is, as such, superfluous, futile. This is what is shown by the sentence ‘In reality, etc. etc.’.
itthaṃ ca śabdavācyatvād vyaktīnām astyapohyatā /	Thus, individuals being denoted by words, they are also capable of being ‘excluded’.
sāmānyasya tu nāpoho na cāpohe 'pi vastutā //	As regards the universal, there can be no ‘exclusion even if there were ‘exclusion’ of it, it could not have the character of the ‘entity’.
yaccoktam ---"tadāpohyo na sāmānyaṃ tasyāpohāc ca vastutā/" iti, tatrāpyapohyatvādityasya hetor asiddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti darśayati sāmānyasyetyādinā /	and the author now shows that the Reason ‘Because Individualities cannot be excluded’ is ‘not admitted’ and it is also ‘Inconclusive’ by the words ‘As regards the Universal etc. etc.’ there can be no exclusion of it;
vyaktīnām evāpohasya pratipāditatvāt /	because it has been shown that there can be exclusion of Individuals only.
na cāpohe 'pi vastuteti / sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ //	‘Even if there were, etc.’ that is to say, if the said Reason is put forward in support of the conclusion contrary to the Opponent’s, there would be nothing to set aside such a conclusion.
yaccoktam ---"nāpohyatvamabhāvānā"mityādi, tatrāha nābhāva ityādi / nābhāvo 'pohyate hyevaṃ nābhāvo 'bhāva ityayam /	Negation is not ‘excluded’ (denied) in the words ‘negation is not negation’; it is however clearly ‘excluded’ (denied) in such expressions as ‘the entity is not of the nature of negation’. It has been argued (under Text 956, by Kumārila) that “Negation cannot be subject to exclusion, etc. etc”.
abhāvo nābhāva ityevam abhāvo nāpohyate yenābhāvarūpatāyāstyāgaḥ syāt /	Negation is not ‘excluded’ in the words ‘Negation is not Negation’, by virtue of which it would abandon its negative character (as urged by Kumārila).
kiṃ tarhibhāvo yaḥ sa vidhirūpatvād abhāvarūpavivekenāvasthita iti sāmarthyād apohyatvaṃ tasyābhāvasyeṣṭam //	But, what is an Entity has the positive character, and as such remains distinct from the Negative; hence by implication, the Negation becomes subject to ‘Exclusion’;
[p.336] etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha yo nāmetyādi /	this is what is meant by us.
yo nāma na yadātmā hi sa tasyāpoha ucyate / na bhāvo 'bhāvarūpaś ca tadapohe na vastutā //	When one thing is not of the nature of another, it is called its ‘Apoha’ (exclusion, negation), and the entity is not of the nature of negation.
tasyābhāvasyaivamapohe sati na vastutā prāpnoti //	but even though there is ‘Apoha’ of negation, it does not acquire the character of the positive entity.
atrobhayapakṣaprasiddhodāharaṇopadarśanenānaikāntikatām eva sphuṭayann āha prakṛtīśādijanyatvam ityādi /	The author is going to cite an example which is accepted by both parties, and through that, is going to make it clear how the Reason of the Opponent is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1083 above]
tathā hi prakṛtīśvarakālādikṛtaṃ bhāvānāṃ bhavadbhir mīmāṃsakair api neṣyata eva /	You, Mīmāṃsakas, also do not admit the fact of Things having been created by Primordial Matter, or God, or Time and other Causes;
tasya ca pratiṣedhe satyapi yathā na vastutvamāpadyate tathāpohyatve 'pyabhāvasya vastutvāpattir na bhaviṣyatītyanekāntaḥ //	but the negation (denial) of this fact does not make it a positive entity; in the same manner, even though there is Apoha (negation, denial) of Negation, yet that does not make the Negation a positive entity.
nāto 'sato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo na kaścana /	Thus then there is no such calamity as that of the non-existent becoming a positive entity.
tasya siddhau ca sattāsti sā cāsattā prasidhyati //	In fact, even on the establishment of the negation, the existence remains there (in the entity), and the non-existence (of the negation) becomes established thereby.
"tadasiddhau na sattāsti nacāsatsa prasiddhyatī"tyatrāha tasya siddhau ca sattāstītyādi /	It has been argued (under the same Text 959) that “if Non-existence is not established, there can be no Existence; nor can Non-existence be established”.
tasyābhāvasya yathoktena prakāreṇa siddhau satyām api bhāvasya sattā siddhyatyeva tasya svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvāt /	The answer to tins is that even on the establishment of the Negation, in the above manner, the existence of the Positive Entity does become established; as that rests upon its own nature.
etac ca pratisamādhānasya samānatvād iti kṛtvātraiva prativihitam // idānīṃ yathānukramameva pratisamādhānam āha tatra yaduktam"abhāvasya cayo 'bhāva ityādi" tatrāha agota ityādi /	And the above-mentioned establishment of Negation also constitutes its non-existence. The answer to this argument has been made out of its turn (along with that to Kumārila’s argument put forward under 955 et seq.), because the same answer is applicable to both.
agoto vinivṛttiś ca gaur vilakṣaṇa iṣyate /	The cow, which is ‘the negation of the non-cow’ is held to be a positive entity, and of a character different from that of the non-cow;
bhāva eva tato nāyaṃ gaurgor me prasajyate //	but by this the non-cow does not become the cow, for me.
bhāva eva sa cedityetannāniṣṭatvāpādamiṣṭatvāt / tathā hi agorūpādeśvāder gorbhāvaviśeṣarūpa eva vilakṣaṇa iṣyate, nābhātmā, tena bhāva eva bhavet /	The Author now reverts to the order of sequence of the Opponent’s arguments, and takes up that put forward in Text 957, to the effect that “If the Negation of the Negation is different in character from the Negation itself, then it becomes a positive entity”.
agotaś ca gor vailakṣaṇyeṣṭatvād agor na gotvaprasaṅgaḥ // [p.337] yaccoktam ---"na hyavastuni sā matā" iti tadasiddhamanaikāntikaṃ ceti darśayannāha avastuviṣaye 'pyastītyādi /	Because the Cow is actually held by us to be a positive entity quite different in character from the ‘Noncow’ in the shape of the Horse and other animals, it is not held to be of the nature of Negation. So that it would be a positive entity. And as the difference of the Cow from the Non-cow is what is admitted by us, there is no such contingency as that of the Non-cow becoming the Cow.
avastuviṣaye 'pyasti cetomātravinirmitā / vicitrakalpanābhedaraciteṣviva vāsanā //	Even in regard to non-entities, there can be impressions, created only by the mind (cognitions), just as in the case of things of various kinds created by imagination.
tataś ca vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi ca / prakalpyate hyapohānāṃ kalpanāraciteṣviva //	This diversity among Apohas, as also their positive character, would be assumed on the basis of the diversity among impressions; just as in the case of creations of imagination.
avastuviṣayaṃ ceto nāstītyetad asiddham /	That the Mind (Cognition) does not operate upon non-entities cannot be admitted.
tathā hi utpādyakatva{lpa---}viṣayasamudbhūtavasvākārasamāropeṇa pravartataeva cetaḥ /	Because, the Mind (Cognition) does operate through the imposing of the form of things created by mere imagination;
tacānāgatasajātīyavikalpotpattaye 'nantaracetasi vāsanāmādhatta eva / yataḥ punar api santānaparipākavaśāt prabodhakaṃ pratyayamāsādya tathāvidham eva cetaḥ samupajāyate, tadvadapohānām api parasparato bhedaḥ sadrūpatā ca kalpanāvaśād bhaviṣyatītyanaikāntikatā /	and the Mind (Cognition) thus does create Impressions in the subsequent mind, which tends to bring about future homogeneous conceptual contents. Because, again, through the development of the ‘Chain’, it may get at an awakening cognition, Which brings about a similar Mind (Cognition). In the same manner, in the case of Apohas, there would be difference among themselves and also the positive character, due to the influence of assumptions and imagination. Thus the Reason adduced by Kumārila is ‘inconclusive’.
avayavārthastu subodhatvān na vibhaktaḥ //	The meaning of the words of the Text is clear; hence we have not explained them in detail.
yaccoktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ ---"śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyata"iti, tatrāha yādṛśa ityādi / yādṛśo 'rthāntarāpoho vācyo 'yaṃ pratipāditaḥ / śabdāntaravyapoho 'pi tādṛgevāvagamyatām //	Just as we have explained the fact of ‘the exclusion of other things’ being denoted by words, exactly in the same manner should be understood the ‘exclusion of other words’ also. It has been argued (under 961, by Kumārila) that “you cannot secure diversity among words also, on the basis of Impressions”.
yādṛśa iti / pratibibātmā /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1088 above]
tasya ca pratibimbāntarād bhedaḥ sphuṭataram eva saṃvedyata iti /	‘Just as, etc. etc.’: i.e. as being in the form of Reflection; of which the difference from other Reflections is clearly perceived.
ato vistareṇa yaduktaṃ tat sarvamasaṅgatam iti bhāvaḥ //	Hence what has been discussed in detail (by the Opponent) is entirely irrelevant. Such is the sense of the Text.
vastvityadhyavasāyatvān nāvastutvamapohayoḥ /	Inasmuch as the Apohas are apprehended as ‘things’ they cannot be regarded as non-entities;
prasiddhaṃ sāṃvṛte mārge tāttvike tviṣṭasādhanam //	this is well known and admitted as pertaining to the illusory aspect of things.
yadyavastutvād iti sāmānyenopādīyate tadā heturasiddhaḥ, yataḥ pratibimbātmanorvācyavācakāpohayor bāhyavastutvena bhrāntair adhyavasitatvāt sāṃvṛtaṃ vastutvamastyeva //	If by the reason adduced “Because they are non-entities” it is meant to be a general statement of fact, then that is not admitted; because the two Apohas in question. which are in the form of Reflections one of which is the denoter and the other is the denoted, are actually recognised by deluded persons as external things;
atha pāramārthikamavastutvam āśritya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyatā /	and hence they are endowed with illusory reality. If, on the other hand, the Reason adduced pertains to the Real Character of ‘Entity’, then the argument is superfluous.
nahi paramārthato 'smābhiḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ceṣyate /	Because in fact, we do not accept anything as being the denoter or denoted, in reality.
etad eva darśayati na vācyam ityādi /	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1090 next]
na vācyaṃ vācakaṃ vāpi paramārthena kiñcana / kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ //	In reality, there can be nothing that can be either denoter or denoted, as all things being in perpetual flux, no concomitance is possible.
[p.338] vyāpakatvaviyogata iti /	‘Because no concomitance is possible’;
kṣaṇikatvena saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvābhāvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyarthaḥ / syād etannāsmābhis tāttviko vācyavācakabhāvo niṣidhyate /	that is to say, the Specific Individuality cannot be concomitant with present at the time of the making of the Convention and that of the using of the word. If it is the illusory relation of denoter and denoted that is denied; on the basis of the real fact of the two exclusions being non-entities, even so, ‘falsity’ becomes unavoidable;
kiṃ tarhi---tāttvikīmapohayor avastutām āśritya sāṃvṛtam eva gamyagamakatvaṃ niṣidhyate, na bhāvikam, tena na hetor asiddhatā nāpi siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣo bhaviṣyati //	The following might be urged by the other party: “We are not denying the real relation of Denoted and Denoter; what we are denying is the illusory relation of Denoted and Denoter which is based upon the real fact of the two Apohas being non-entities; so that our Reason is not not-admitted; nor is our conclusion open to the defect of being superfluous”.
dvayor api sāṃvṛtatve tāttvikatve cāśrīyamāṇe syād etad doṣadvayam ityata āha tadgamyagamakatvaṃ cetyādi /	The following Texts proceed to show that, if both are regarded to be illusory and real, then the two objections do become applicable: [see verses 1091-1092 above]
tadgamyagamakatvaṃ cet sāṃvṛtaṃ pratiṣidhyate /	Under the circumstances, the Reason would be Inconclusive;
vikalpaparacitair arthaiḥ śabdais tadvācakair api // evaṃ sati hetor anaikāntikatā, kalpanāraciteṣu mahāśvetādiṣvartheṣu tadvācakeṣu ca śabdeṣu paramārthato vastutvābhāve 'pi sāṃvṛtasya vācyavācakabhāvasya darśanāt /	as in the ease of such creatures of imagination as Mahāśvetā and the like, and also words denoting these, even though they are non-entities in reality, yet the illusory Relation of Denoter and Denoted is actually present. As a matter of fact, there is ho ‘universal’ (commonalty) in the case of the things in question, which could be denoted; nor is there any universal word denotative of that universal; nor does the denotative character belong to the word, as specific individualities are all in perpetual flux.
syād etat tatrāpi mahāśvetādiṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca paramārthato 'styeva /	The following might be urged by the other party: “In the case of things like Mahāśvetā, the denotedng, in the shape of the Universal, is real, and also the word denoting them;
tato na tair vyabhicāra ityāśaṅkyāha na hītyādi /	and hence their case does not falsify our Premiss.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1093 above]
sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyasya vistareṇa nirastatvān na teṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ cāstītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ /	In course of our examination of the ‘Universal’, we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the ‘Universal’; hence the assertion that the ‘Universal’ is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason ‘false’ (Inconclusive).
tasyeti sāmānyasya /	‘Tasya’ of the Universal.
vācakam ityatrāpi sāmānyamiti prakṛtena sambadhyate /	The term ‘Universal’ has to be taken as understood after ‘denotative’ which connects it with the context.
syād etadyadyapi tatra vastubhūtaṃ nāsti vācyaṃ, vācakaṃ tu mahāśvetādiśabdasvalakṣaṇamastyevetyata āha na vācakatvaṃ śabdasyetyādi /	It might be argued that “Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word ‘Mahāśvetā.’ etc.”.
sarvapadārthavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya pratipāditatvān na śabdasvalakṣaṇasya vācakatvaṃ, kṣaṇabhaṅgitvena tasya saṅketāsambhavāt /	The answer to this is ‘Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.’ that is, it has been shown that the ‘Perpetual Flux’ embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention;
vyavahārakālānanvayācceti pratipāditam //	also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati /	The following Text sums up the argument: [see verse 1094 next]
tasmāt taddvayameṣṭavyaṃ pratibimbādi sāṃvṛtam /	Hence both of these should be held to consist in the illusory ‘reflection’ etc.
teṣu tadvyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāram avasthitam //	Thus in view of these, the ‘falsity’ remains unshaken.
dvayam iti / vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca /	‘Both’ i.e. the denoted thing as well as the denotative Word.
pratibimbādītyādiśabdena nirākārajñānābhyupa [p.339] game 'pi svagatamanyatkiñcit pratiniyatamanarthe 'rthādhyavasāyirūpasya vijñānasyāvaśyamaṅgīkartavyam iti darśayati teṣviti /	‘Reflection, etc.’ The ‘etcetera’ is meant to show that even under the view that Ideas (Cognitions) are formless, it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specific Idea in the form of the conception of ‘object’ where there is no real object. ‘In view of these’ i.e.ngs created by imagination.
taditi tasmāt /	‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘therefore’, ‘thus’.
tasya vā hetor vyabhicāritvam //	Or it may mean ‘of that’ i.e. of the Reason, the ‘falsity’ remains unshaken.
vidhirūpaś ca śabdārtho yena nābhyupagamyate / tadābhaṃ jāyate cetaḥ śabdād arthāvasāyi hi //	For the man by whom the denotation of words is not admitted to be anything positive, the mind (cognition) reflecting the thing is what is brought about by the word, and this cognition ultimately brings about the idea of the thing.
svārthābhidhāne śabdānām arthād anyanivartanam /	When words express their meanings, there is, by implication, the exclusion of other things;
tadyogo vyatireko 'pi mama tat pūrvako hyasau //	and through the presence of this there is negation also, as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.
na hyasmābhiḥ sarvathāvidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho nābhyupagamyate, yenaitad bhavatāniṣṭaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyate /	It is not that we absolutely do not admit the fact of words denoting positive things; by virtue of which you have urged the undesirable contingency against us.
yāvatā śabdād arthādhyavasāyinaścetasaḥ samutpādāt sāṃvṛto vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhīṣyata eva /	As a matter of fact, it is admitted by us that the word produces the ‘mental condition’ (Cognition) which ultimately provides the idea of the Thing; so that in our opinion also what is denoted by the word is a positive entity which is illusory in character.
tattvatas tu na kiñcid vācyam asti śabdānām iti vidhirūpas tāttviko niṣidhyate /	In reality however, there is nothing that is denoted by words; hence it is only the real positive character of things that is denied by us;
tena sāṃvṛtasya vidhirūpasya śabdārthasyeṣṭatvāt svārthābhidhāne vidhirūpe satyanyavyatirekasya sāmarthyād adhigater vidhipūrvako vyatireko yujyata eva //	so that the illusory positive character of theng denoted by words being accepted by us, whenever there is anything positive denoted by the word, the negation of other things becomes apprehended by implication; and hence it is quite possible to have this negation as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.
syād etad yadi vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhyupagamyate, kathaṃ tarhi hetumukhe lakṣaṇakāreṇāsambhavo vidher ityuktamityata āha asambhava ityādi / asambhavo vidher uktaḥ sāmānyāderasambhavāt /	The ‘impossibility of the positive’ has been averred oh the ground that such things as the ‘universal’ and the like cannot form the subject of words and determinate conceptions. The following might be urged by the other party: “If it is admitted that the Word does denote positive entities, then, how is it that in the Hetumukha, the Lakṣaṇakāra has spoken of the ‘impossibility of the positive’?”
sāmānyalakṣaṇāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato 'sambhavācchabdānāṃvikalpānāṃ ca vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavāt paramārthamāśritya vidher asambhava ukta ācāryeṇetyavirodhaḥ //	Inasmuch as there are no real ‘denoted things’ or ‘denotative words’ in the shape of the ‘Universal’ and the like, there can be no real subject for Words and Determinate Conceptions, it has been asserted by the great Teacher, in view of the real state of things, that ‘there is impossibility of the Positive’; hence there is no contradiction at all.
"apohamātravācyatva"mityādāvāha nīlotpalādītyādi / nīlotpalādiśabdebhya eka evāvasīyate / anīlānutpalādibhyo vyāvṛttaṃ pratibimbakam //	From the term ‘blue-lotus’, only one thing is cognised, and that is the reflection excluded (differentiated) from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’. It has been argued (under Texts 967, etc., by Kumārila) that “If it is held that it is mere Apoha that is denoted, etc. etc.”.
ekamevānīlānutpalavyāvṛttam arthākāramaubhayārūpaṃ pratibimbakaṃ nīlotpalaśabdo vadati nābhāvamātram ataḥ sabalārthābhidhāyitvamadhyavasāyavaśānnīlotpalādiśabdānām astyeveti tadanurodhāt sāmānādhikaraṇyamupapadyata	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1098 above] What the term ‘Blue-lotus’ expresses is, not mere negation, but the single Reflection of the object as excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’, partaking of the nature of both. Consequently, in the case of words like ‘Blue-lotus’, there certainly is the denotation of things of mixed character, which has to be admitted on the strength of actual cognitions appearing in that form;
eva //	and on the basis of this the necessary coordination becomes quite possible.
natvānyāpohavad vastu vācyamasmābhir iṣyate /	We do not hold that what the word denotes is the thing endowed with the ‘exclusion (Apoha) of other things’;
vyāvṛttād anyato 'bhāvān nānyād vyāvṛttirasti naḥ //	because for us, there is no ‘exclusion’ other than the thing excluded from something else.
tat pāratantryadoṣoyaṃ jātāviva na saṃgataḥ / avadātam iti prokte śabdasyārthe 'pṛthaktvataḥ //	Hence the objection that ‘it is dependent upon something else’ is not applicable to the ‘denotation of words’ as honestly explained, in the way that it is to the theory of the ‘universal’ (being denoted by words).
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ /	because there is no difference between the relation of qualification and qualified and ‘co-ordination’.
tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate //	Consequently there is no incongruity in the theory that it is Apoha that is denoted by words.
yadi hi vyāvṛttād vyāvṛttir nāmānyā bhavet tadā syāt tadvat pakṣoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ, yāvatānyato vyāvṛttād bhāvānnāsmākam anyā vyāvṛttirasti, api tu vyāvṛtta eva bhāvo bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathābhidhīyate /	If exclusion were something entirely different from the Thing excluded, then there would be the possibility of the incongruity that has been urged against the view that ‘what is denoted is the Thing as endowed with the Apoha’. As a matter of fact however, for us, exclusion is not something different from the Thing excluded from others; in fact, it is the excluded thing itself that is spoken of as ‘exclusion’, when what is meant to be stressed is the mere negation of other things.
tena yathājātau prādhānyena vācyāyāṃ pāratantryeṇa tadvato 'bhidhānāt tadgatabhedānākṣepāt tena saha sāmānādhikaraṇyāder abhāvaprasaṅga uktaḥtadvad apohapakṣe nāvatarati vyatiriktānyāpohavato 'nābhidhānāt /	Consequently, the incongruity that has been urged against the Denotation of Universals, in the form that, if the Universal is what is primarily denoted by words, the denotation of the Thing endowed with that Universal would be dependent upon that (Universal), and consequently there being no indication of the varieties of the said Thing, there is no possibility of co-ordination or any other relationship with it, does not apply to the theory of Apoha, as there is no denotation (under this theory) of anything equipped with the ‘Exclusion of other things’, as something different.
taddarśayati tat pāratantryadoṣoyam ityādi /	This is what is meant by the words ‘Hence the objection, etc. etc’.

bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivartate // tadviśeṣaṇabhāve 'pi vastudhīr na vihīyate /

Even when the difference has been asserted, the thing itself does not entirely disappear. Thus even when it has the nature of the qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease.

kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede 'pi viśeṣaṇam //

even when there is non-difference, the qualification is there as a creation of fancy.

sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva /

That character, having been withdrawn therefrom, has been placed there as if different;

yena daṇḍādivat tasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam //

whereby it becomes its qualification, like the stick and other things.

yadi hyanyavyāvṛttir bhāvarūpā vastuno viśeṣaṇatvenābhipretā syāt tadaitat sarvaṃ dūṣaṇamupapadyate, yāvatā vastusvarūpaivānyanivṛttir viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyate, tena viśeṣaṇānurūpaiva viśeṣyabuddhir bhavatyeva /

If the ‘exclusion of other things’ were meant to be something positive qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ‘exclusion of other things’ which is held to be the qualification is in the form of the thing itself; so that the notion of the qualified is naturally in accord with that of the qualification.

tathā hi agonivṛttir yā gaor abhidhīyate sāśvādibhyo gor yadanyatvaṃ tatsvabhāvaiva nānyā / tataś ca yadyapyasau vyatirekeṇāgonivṛttir gorityabhidhīyate bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ, tathāpi paramārthatas tasya gorātmagataiva sā, yathānyatvam nahyanyatvaṃ nāmānyasmād vastuno 'nyat apitu tadeva /

For instance, when one speaks of the ‘exclusion’ of the Cow ‘from the non-Cow’, this ‘exclusion’ is only of the nature of the ‘difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things’, not anything else. Hence, even though the exclusion, of the Cow, from the non-Cow, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things, yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the Cow itself, just like the ‘difference’; that is, ‘difference’ is not anything different from the different thing, it is that same;

anyathā tad vastu tato 'nyasminna siddhyet /

otherwise that thing could not figure in the ‘difference’ at all.

tat tasmāt, viśeṣaṇabhāve 'pyanyavyāvṛtter viśeṣye vastudhīr bhavatyeva /

‘Tat’ i.e. thus even when the ‘exclusion of others’ is of the nature of the qualification, the idea of the ‘Thing’ itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.

syād etad vyatiriktam eva hi viśeṣyād viśeṣaṇaṃ loke prasiddham, yathā daṇḍaḥ puruṣasya, vyāvṛttiścāvyatiriktā vastunaḥ, tat katham asau tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ yujyata ity āha kalpanetyādi /

It might be argued as follows “In ordinary life the qualification is known to be something different from the qualified, as the stick of the Man (stick-holder); and ‘Exclusion’ is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing?” The answer is ‘Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc.’.

nahi paramārthena na kiñcit kasyacid viśeṣaṇaṃ yuktam, anupakārakasya viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt, upakārakatve cāṅgīkriyamāṇe kāryakāle kāraṇasyānavasthānādayugapatkālabhāvinor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo yuktaḥ yugapatkālabhāvitvetu

In reality, nothing can be qualified by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a qualification; if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two things not existing at the same time; while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help;

tat tasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ svasvabhāvasthitatvenāyaḥśalākākalpatvāt kevalaṃ kalpanāyāmīṣāṃ [p.335] miśrīkaraṇam /

and hence there could be no relation of qualification and qualified. Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars, yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.

tena paramārthato yadyapi vyāvṛttobhedas tathāpi kalpanāracitaṃ bhedamāśritya viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo bhaviṣyati //

Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the ‘Exclusion’ and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of qualification and qualified between them.

pratibhāsaśca śabdārtha ityāhus tattvacintakāḥ /

Discriminators of truth declare that what is denoted by the word is mere ‘reflection’.

dṛśyakalpāvibhāgajño loko bāhyaṃ tu manyate // tasyāto 'dhyavasāyena vyaktīnām eva vācyatā /

People, not knowing the distinction between what is ‘perceived’ and what is ‘fancied’ regard it to be something ‘external as that is what is apprehended (by words), individuals are denoted by words.

tattvataś ca na śabdānāṃ vācyamastīti sādhitam //

In reality however there is nothing that is denoted by words, as has been proved already.

vyaktīnām avācyatvādityasiddham /

The reason ‘because Individuals are not denoted’ is not-admitted.

tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvamasmābhir varṇitaṃ tatparamārthacintāyāmna punaḥ saṃvṛttyāpi, saṃvṛtyā tu vyaktīnām eva vācyatvam avicāraramaṇīyatayā prasiddhamtiyasiddho hetuḥ /

Because the ‘non-denotability’ of words that we have asserted is only in view of the real aspect of things, not in regard to the illusory aspect. Under the illusory aspect, it is only Individuals that are denoted, as is happily accepted by people wanting in true insight, and is well known; so that the Reason adduced is not-admitted.

dṛśyaḥ bāhyaḥ svalakṣaṇātmā, {kalpḥ} vikalpyo vikalpajñānaparivartī pratibhāsaḥ /

What is ‘perceived’ is the external thing, in the shape of Specific Individuality; what is ‘fancied’, imaginary is the ‘Reflection’ that figures in Determinate Conception.

atha pāramārthikamavācyatvaṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadāpohyatvam api vyaktīnāṃ paramārthato neṣṭam ityataḥ siddhasādhyateti darśayati tattvataścetyādi // itthamityādinā hetor asiddhatām eva nigamayati /

If the Reason adduced by you is the real ‘non-denotability of Individuals’, then we also do not admit of any real ‘exclusion’ of Individuals; so that in that ease your argument proves only what is already admitted by us, and is, as such, superfluous, futile. This is what is shown by the sentence ‘In reality, etc. etc.’.

itthaṃ ca śabdavācyatvād vyaktīnām astyapohyatā /

Thus, individuals being denoted by words, they are also capable of being ‘excluded’.

sāmānyasya tu nāpoho na cāpohe 'pi vastutā //

As regards the universal, there can be no ‘exclusion even if there were ‘exclusion’ of it, it could not have the character of the ‘entity’.

yaccoktam ---"tadāpohyo na sāmānyaṃ tasyāpohāc ca vastutā/" iti, tatrāpyapohyatvādityasya hetor asiddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti darśayati sāmānyasyetyādinā /

and the author now shows that the Reason ‘Because Individualities cannot be excluded’ is ‘not admitted’ and it is also ‘Inconclusive’ by the words ‘As regards the Universal etc. etc.’ there can be no exclusion of it;

vyaktīnām evāpohasya pratipāditatvāt /

because it has been shown that there can be exclusion of Individuals only.

na cāpohe 'pi vastuteti / sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ //

‘Even if there were, etc.’ that is to say, if the said Reason is put forward in support of the conclusion contrary to the Opponent’s, there would be nothing to set aside such a conclusion.

yaccoktam ---"nāpohyatvamabhāvānā"mityādi, tatrāha nābhāva ityādi / nābhāvo 'pohyate hyevaṃ nābhāvo 'bhāva ityayam /

Negation is not ‘excluded’ (denied) in the words ‘negation is not negation’; it is however clearly ‘excluded’ (denied) in such expressions as ‘the entity is not of the nature of negation’. It has been argued (under Text 956, by Kumārila) that “Negation cannot be subject to exclusion, etc. etc”.

abhāvo nābhāva ityevam abhāvo nāpohyate yenābhāvarūpatāyāstyāgaḥ syāt /

Negation is not ‘excluded’ in the words ‘Negation is not Negation’, by virtue of which it would abandon its negative character (as urged by Kumārila).

kiṃ tarhibhāvo yaḥ sa vidhirūpatvād abhāvarūpavivekenāvasthita iti sāmarthyād apohyatvaṃ tasyābhāvasyeṣṭam //

But, what is an Entity has the positive character, and as such remains distinct from the Negative; hence by implication, the Negation becomes subject to ‘Exclusion’;

[p.336] etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha yo nāmetyādi /

this is what is meant by us.

yo nāma na yadātmā hi sa tasyāpoha ucyate / na bhāvo 'bhāvarūpaś ca tadapohe na vastutā //

When one thing is not of the nature of another, it is called its ‘Apoha’ (exclusion, negation), and the entity is not of the nature of negation.

tasyābhāvasyaivamapohe sati na vastutā prāpnoti //

but even though there is ‘Apoha’ of negation, it does not acquire the character of the positive entity.

atrobhayapakṣaprasiddhodāharaṇopadarśanenānaikāntikatām eva sphuṭayann āha prakṛtīśādijanyatvam ityādi /

The author is going to cite an example which is accepted by both parties, and through that, is going to make it clear how the Reason of the Opponent is ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1083 above]

tathā hi prakṛtīśvarakālādikṛtaṃ bhāvānāṃ bhavadbhir mīmāṃsakair api neṣyata eva /

You, Mīmāṃsakas, also do not admit the fact of Things having been created by Primordial Matter, or God, or Time and other Causes;

tasya ca pratiṣedhe satyapi yathā na vastutvamāpadyate tathāpohyatve 'pyabhāvasya vastutvāpattir na bhaviṣyatītyanekāntaḥ //

but the negation (denial) of this fact does not make it a positive entity; in the same manner, even though there is Apoha (negation, denial) of Negation, yet that does not make the Negation a positive entity.

nāto 'sato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo na kaścana /

Thus then there is no such calamity as that of the non-existent becoming a positive entity.

tasya siddhau ca sattāsti sā cāsattā prasidhyati //

In fact, even on the establishment of the negation, the existence remains there (in the entity), and the non-existence (of the negation) becomes established thereby.

"tadasiddhau na sattāsti nacāsatsa prasiddhyatī"tyatrāha tasya siddhau ca sattāstītyādi /

It has been argued (under the same Text 959) that “if Non-existence is not established, there can be no Existence; nor can Non-existence be established”.

tasyābhāvasya yathoktena prakāreṇa siddhau satyām api bhāvasya sattā siddhyatyeva tasya svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvāt /

The answer to tins is that even on the establishment of the Negation, in the above manner, the existence of the Positive Entity does become established; as that rests upon its own nature.

etac ca pratisamādhānasya samānatvād iti kṛtvātraiva prativihitam // idānīṃ yathānukramameva pratisamādhānam āha tatra yaduktam"abhāvasya cayo 'bhāva ityādi" tatrāha agota ityādi /

And the above-mentioned establishment of Negation also constitutes its non-existence. The answer to this argument has been made out of its turn (along with that to Kumārila’s argument put forward under 955 et seq.), because the same answer is applicable to both.

agoto vinivṛttiś ca gaur vilakṣaṇa iṣyate /

The cow, which is ‘the negation of the non-cow’ is held to be a positive entity, and of a character different from that of the non-cow;

bhāva eva tato nāyaṃ gaurgor me prasajyate //

but by this the non-cow does not become the cow, for me.

bhāva eva sa cedityetannāniṣṭatvāpādamiṣṭatvāt / tathā hi agorūpādeśvāder gorbhāvaviśeṣarūpa eva vilakṣaṇa iṣyate, nābhātmā, tena bhāva eva bhavet /

The Author now reverts to the order of sequence of the Opponent’s arguments, and takes up that put forward in Text 957, to the effect that “If the Negation of the Negation is different in character from the Negation itself, then it becomes a positive entity”.

agotaś ca gor vailakṣaṇyeṣṭatvād agor na gotvaprasaṅgaḥ // [p.337] yaccoktam ---"na hyavastuni sā matā" iti tadasiddhamanaikāntikaṃ ceti darśayannāha avastuviṣaye 'pyastītyādi /

Because the Cow is actually held by us to be a positive entity quite different in character from the ‘Noncow’ in the shape of the Horse and other animals, it is not held to be of the nature of Negation. So that it would be a positive entity. And as the difference of the Cow from the Non-cow is what is admitted by us, there is no such contingency as that of the Non-cow becoming the Cow.

avastuviṣaye 'pyasti cetomātravinirmitā / vicitrakalpanābhedaraciteṣviva vāsanā //

Even in regard to non-entities, there can be impressions, created only by the mind (cognitions), just as in the case of things of various kinds created by imagination.

tataś ca vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi ca / prakalpyate hyapohānāṃ kalpanāraciteṣviva //

This diversity among Apohas, as also their positive character, would be assumed on the basis of the diversity among impressions; just as in the case of creations of imagination.

avastuviṣayaṃ ceto nāstītyetad asiddham /

That the Mind (Cognition) does not operate upon non-entities cannot be admitted.

tathā hi utpādyakatva{lpa---}viṣayasamudbhūtavasvākārasamāropeṇa pravartataeva cetaḥ /

Because, the Mind (Cognition) does operate through the imposing of the form of things created by mere imagination;

tacānāgatasajātīyavikalpotpattaye 'nantaracetasi vāsanāmādhatta eva / yataḥ punar api santānaparipākavaśāt prabodhakaṃ pratyayamāsādya tathāvidham eva cetaḥ samupajāyate, tadvadapohānām api parasparato bhedaḥ sadrūpatā ca kalpanāvaśād bhaviṣyatītyanaikāntikatā /

and the Mind (Cognition) thus does create Impressions in the subsequent mind, which tends to bring about future homogeneous conceptual contents. Because, again, through the development of the ‘Chain’, it may get at an awakening cognition, Which brings about a similar Mind (Cognition). In the same manner, in the case of Apohas, there would be difference among themselves and also the positive character, due to the influence of assumptions and imagination. Thus the Reason adduced by Kumārila is ‘inconclusive’.

avayavārthastu subodhatvān na vibhaktaḥ //

The meaning of the words of the Text is clear; hence we have not explained them in detail.

yaccoktaṃ bhavadbhiḥ ---"śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyata"iti, tatrāha yādṛśa ityādi / yādṛśo 'rthāntarāpoho vācyo 'yaṃ pratipāditaḥ / śabdāntaravyapoho 'pi tādṛgevāvagamyatām //

Just as we have explained the fact of ‘the exclusion of other things’ being denoted by words, exactly in the same manner should be understood the ‘exclusion of other words’ also. It has been argued (under 961, by Kumārila) that “you cannot secure diversity among words also, on the basis of Impressions”.

yādṛśa iti / pratibibātmā /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1088 above]

tasya ca pratibimbāntarād bhedaḥ sphuṭataram eva saṃvedyata iti /

‘Just as, etc. etc.’: i.e. as being in the form of Reflection; of which the difference from other Reflections is clearly perceived.

ato vistareṇa yaduktaṃ tat sarvamasaṅgatam iti bhāvaḥ //

Hence what has been discussed in detail (by the Opponent) is entirely irrelevant. Such is the sense of the Text.

vastvityadhyavasāyatvān nāvastutvamapohayoḥ /

Inasmuch as the Apohas are apprehended as ‘things’ they cannot be regarded as non-entities;

prasiddhaṃ sāṃvṛte mārge tāttvike tviṣṭasādhanam //

this is well known and admitted as pertaining to the illusory aspect of things.

yadyavastutvād iti sāmānyenopādīyate tadā heturasiddhaḥ, yataḥ pratibimbātmanorvācyavācakāpohayor bāhyavastutvena bhrāntair adhyavasitatvāt sāṃvṛtaṃ vastutvamastyeva //

If by the reason adduced “Because they are non-entities” it is meant to be a general statement of fact, then that is not admitted; because the two Apohas in question. which are in the form of Reflections one of which is the denoter and the other is the denoted, are actually recognised by deluded persons as external things;

atha pāramārthikamavastutvam āśritya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyatā /

and hence they are endowed with illusory reality. If, on the other hand, the Reason adduced pertains to the Real Character of ‘Entity’, then the argument is superfluous.

nahi paramārthato 'smābhiḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ceṣyate /

Because in fact, we do not accept anything as being the denoter or denoted, in reality.

etad eva darśayati na vācyam ityādi /

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1090 next]

na vācyaṃ vācakaṃ vāpi paramārthena kiñcana / kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ //

In reality, there can be nothing that can be either denoter or denoted, as all things being in perpetual flux, no concomitance is possible.

[p.338] vyāpakatvaviyogata iti /

‘Because no concomitance is possible’;

kṣaṇikatvena saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvābhāvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyarthaḥ / syād etannāsmābhis tāttviko vācyavācakabhāvo niṣidhyate /

that is to say, the Specific Individuality cannot be concomitant with present at the time of the making of the Convention and that of the using of the word. If it is the illusory relation of denoter and denoted that is denied; on the basis of the real fact of the two exclusions being non-entities, even so, ‘falsity’ becomes unavoidable;

kiṃ tarhi---tāttvikīmapohayor avastutām āśritya sāṃvṛtam eva gamyagamakatvaṃ niṣidhyate, na bhāvikam, tena na hetor asiddhatā nāpi siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣo bhaviṣyati //

The following might be urged by the other party: “We are not denying the real relation of Denoted and Denoter; what we are denying is the illusory relation of Denoted and Denoter which is based upon the real fact of the two Apohas being non-entities; so that our Reason is not not-admitted; nor is our conclusion open to the defect of being superfluous”.

dvayor api sāṃvṛtatve tāttvikatve cāśrīyamāṇe syād etad doṣadvayam ityata āha tadgamyagamakatvaṃ cetyādi /

The following Texts proceed to show that, if both are regarded to be illusory and real, then the two objections do become applicable: [see verses 1091-1092 above]

tadgamyagamakatvaṃ cet sāṃvṛtaṃ pratiṣidhyate /

Under the circumstances, the Reason would be Inconclusive;

vikalpaparacitair arthaiḥ śabdais tadvācakair api // evaṃ sati hetor anaikāntikatā, kalpanāraciteṣu mahāśvetādiṣvartheṣu tadvācakeṣu ca śabdeṣu paramārthato vastutvābhāve 'pi sāṃvṛtasya vācyavācakabhāvasya darśanāt /

as in the ease of such creatures of imagination as Mahāśvetā and the like, and also words denoting these, even though they are non-entities in reality, yet the illusory Relation of Denoter and Denoted is actually present. As a matter of fact, there is ho ‘universal’ (commonalty) in the case of the things in question, which could be denoted; nor is there any universal word denotative of that universal; nor does the denotative character belong to the word, as specific individualities are all in perpetual flux.

syād etat tatrāpi mahāśvetādiṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca paramārthato 'styeva /

The following might be urged by the other party: “In the case of things like Mahāśvetā, the denotedng, in the shape of the Universal, is real, and also the word denoting them;

tato na tair vyabhicāra ityāśaṅkyāha na hītyādi /

and hence their case does not falsify our Premiss.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1093 above]

sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyasya vistareṇa nirastatvān na teṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ cāstītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ /

In course of our examination of the ‘Universal’, we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the ‘Universal’; hence the assertion that the ‘Universal’ is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason ‘false’ (Inconclusive).

tasyeti sāmānyasya /

‘Tasya’ of the Universal.

vācakam ityatrāpi sāmānyamiti prakṛtena sambadhyate /

The term ‘Universal’ has to be taken as understood after ‘denotative’ which connects it with the context.

syād etadyadyapi tatra vastubhūtaṃ nāsti vācyaṃ, vācakaṃ tu mahāśvetādiśabdasvalakṣaṇamastyevetyata āha na vācakatvaṃ śabdasyetyādi /

It might be argued that “Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word ‘Mahāśvetā.’ etc.”.

sarvapadārthavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya pratipāditatvān na śabdasvalakṣaṇasya vācakatvaṃ, kṣaṇabhaṅgitvena tasya saṅketāsambhavāt /

The answer to this is ‘Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.’ that is, it has been shown that the ‘Perpetual Flux’ embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention;

vyavahārakālānanvayācceti pratipāditam //

also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.

tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati /

The following Text sums up the argument: [see verse 1094 next]

tasmāt taddvayameṣṭavyaṃ pratibimbādi sāṃvṛtam /

Hence both of these should be held to consist in the illusory ‘reflection’ etc.

teṣu tadvyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāram avasthitam //

Thus in view of these, the ‘falsity’ remains unshaken.

dvayam iti / vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca /

‘Both’ i.e. the denoted thing as well as the denotative Word.

pratibimbādītyādiśabdena nirākārajñānābhyupa [p.339] game 'pi svagatamanyatkiñcit pratiniyatamanarthe 'rthādhyavasāyirūpasya vijñānasyāvaśyamaṅgīkartavyam iti darśayati teṣviti /

‘Reflection, etc.’ The ‘etcetera’ is meant to show that even under the view that Ideas (Cognitions) are formless, it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specific Idea in the form of the conception of ‘object’ where there is no real object. ‘In view of these’ i.e.ngs created by imagination.

taditi tasmāt /

‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘therefore’, ‘thus’.

tasya vā hetor vyabhicāritvam //

Or it may mean ‘of that’ i.e. of the Reason, the ‘falsity’ remains unshaken.

vidhirūpaś ca śabdārtho yena nābhyupagamyate / tadābhaṃ jāyate cetaḥ śabdād arthāvasāyi hi //

For the man by whom the denotation of words is not admitted to be anything positive, the mind (cognition) reflecting the thing is what is brought about by the word, and this cognition ultimately brings about the idea of the thing.

svārthābhidhāne śabdānām arthād anyanivartanam /

When words express their meanings, there is, by implication, the exclusion of other things;

tadyogo vyatireko 'pi mama tat pūrvako hyasau //

and through the presence of this there is negation also, as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.

na hyasmābhiḥ sarvathāvidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho nābhyupagamyate, yenaitad bhavatāniṣṭaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyate /

It is not that we absolutely do not admit the fact of words denoting positive things; by virtue of which you have urged the undesirable contingency against us.

yāvatā śabdād arthādhyavasāyinaścetasaḥ samutpādāt sāṃvṛto vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhīṣyata eva /

As a matter of fact, it is admitted by us that the word produces the ‘mental condition’ (Cognition) which ultimately provides the idea of the Thing; so that in our opinion also what is denoted by the word is a positive entity which is illusory in character.

tattvatas tu na kiñcid vācyam asti śabdānām iti vidhirūpas tāttviko niṣidhyate /

In reality however, there is nothing that is denoted by words; hence it is only the real positive character of things that is denied by us;

tena sāṃvṛtasya vidhirūpasya śabdārthasyeṣṭatvāt svārthābhidhāne vidhirūpe satyanyavyatirekasya sāmarthyād adhigater vidhipūrvako vyatireko yujyata eva //

so that the illusory positive character of theng denoted by words being accepted by us, whenever there is anything positive denoted by the word, the negation of other things becomes apprehended by implication; and hence it is quite possible to have this negation as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.

syād etad yadi vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhyupagamyate, kathaṃ tarhi hetumukhe lakṣaṇakāreṇāsambhavo vidher ityuktamityata āha asambhava ityādi / asambhavo vidher uktaḥ sāmānyāderasambhavāt /

The ‘impossibility of the positive’ has been averred oh the ground that such things as the ‘universal’ and the like cannot form the subject of words and determinate conceptions. The following might be urged by the other party: “If it is admitted that the Word does denote positive entities, then, how is it that in the Hetumukha, the Lakṣaṇakāra has spoken of the ‘impossibility of the positive’?”

sāmānyalakṣaṇāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato 'sambhavācchabdānāṃvikalpānāṃ ca vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavāt paramārthamāśritya vidher asambhava ukta ācāryeṇetyavirodhaḥ //

Inasmuch as there are no real ‘denoted things’ or ‘denotative words’ in the shape of the ‘Universal’ and the like, there can be no real subject for Words and Determinate Conceptions, it has been asserted by the great Teacher, in view of the real state of things, that ‘there is impossibility of the Positive’; hence there is no contradiction at all.

"apohamātravācyatva"mityādāvāha nīlotpalādītyādi / nīlotpalādiśabdebhya eka evāvasīyate / anīlānutpalādibhyo vyāvṛttaṃ pratibimbakam //

From the term ‘blue-lotus’, only one thing is cognised, and that is the reflection excluded (differentiated) from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’. It has been argued (under Texts 967, etc., by Kumārila) that “If it is held that it is mere Apoha that is denoted, etc. etc.”.

ekamevānīlānutpalavyāvṛttam arthākāramaubhayārūpaṃ pratibimbakaṃ nīlotpalaśabdo vadati nābhāvamātram ataḥ sabalārthābhidhāyitvamadhyavasāyavaśānnīlotpalādiśabdānām astyeveti tadanurodhāt sāmānādhikaraṇyamupapadyata

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1098 above] What the term ‘Blue-lotus’ expresses is, not mere negation, but the single Reflection of the object as excluded from the ‘non-blue’ and the ‘non-lotus’, partaking of the nature of both. Consequently, in the case of words like ‘Blue-lotus’, there certainly is the denotation of things of mixed character, which has to be admitted on the strength of actual cognitions appearing in that form;

eva //

and on the basis of this the necessary coordination becomes quite possible.

natvānyāpohavad vastu vācyamasmābhir iṣyate /

We do not hold that what the word denotes is the thing endowed with the ‘exclusion (Apoha) of other things’;

vyāvṛttād anyato 'bhāvān nānyād vyāvṛttirasti naḥ //

because for us, there is no ‘exclusion’ other than the thing excluded from something else.

tat pāratantryadoṣoyaṃ jātāviva na saṃgataḥ / avadātam iti prokte śabdasyārthe 'pṛthaktvataḥ //

Hence the objection that ‘it is dependent upon something else’ is not applicable to the ‘denotation of words’ as honestly explained, in the way that it is to the theory of the ‘universal’ (being denoted by words).

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ /

because there is no difference between the relation of qualification and qualified and ‘co-ordination’.

tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate //

Consequently there is no incongruity in the theory that it is Apoha that is denoted by words.

yadi hi vyāvṛttād vyāvṛttir nāmānyā bhavet tadā syāt tadvat pakṣoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ, yāvatānyato vyāvṛttād bhāvānnāsmākam anyā vyāvṛttirasti, api tu vyāvṛtta eva bhāvo bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathābhidhīyate /

If exclusion were something entirely different from the Thing excluded, then there would be the possibility of the incongruity that has been urged against the view that ‘what is denoted is the Thing as endowed with the Apoha’. As a matter of fact however, for us, exclusion is not something different from the Thing excluded from others; in fact, it is the excluded thing itself that is spoken of as ‘exclusion’, when what is meant to be stressed is the mere negation of other things.

tena yathājātau prādhānyena vācyāyāṃ pāratantryeṇa tadvato 'bhidhānāt tadgatabhedānākṣepāt tena saha sāmānādhikaraṇyāder abhāvaprasaṅga uktaḥtadvad apohapakṣe nāvatarati vyatiriktānyāpohavato 'nābhidhānāt /

Consequently, the incongruity that has been urged against the Denotation of Universals, in the form that, if the Universal is what is primarily denoted by words, the denotation of the Thing endowed with that Universal would be dependent upon that (Universal), and consequently there being no indication of the varieties of the said Thing, there is no possibility of co-ordination or any other relationship with it, does not apply to the theory of Apoha, as there is no denotation (under this theory) of anything equipped with the ‘Exclusion of other things’, as something different.

taddarśayati tat pāratantryadoṣoyam ityādi /

This is what is meant by the words ‘Hence the objection, etc. etc’.