buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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pratibhākhyo jhaṭityeva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ //	and we readily regard this as the denotation of words.
yathaiva hi pratibimbātmakapratibhākhyo 'poho bāhyārtho 'smābhirupavarṇitas tathaiva padārthe 'pi /	It has been urged (under 923, by Kumārila) that “Even in the absence of the external thing, just as there is Intuition denoted by the Sentence so would it be in the case of the word also”,
yasmāt padādapi pratibimbātmako 'poha utpadyata eva tenāsmākam ayameva pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padārtho 'pi mato na kevalaṃ bāhyārtha ityapiśabdaḥ / tena vipratipatter bhāvānnopālambho yukta iti bhāvaḥ //	so also is the meaning of the word described. Because by the Word also, what is produced is the Apoha in the form of Reflection; so that for us the Apoha in the form of the Reflection is held to be the denotation of the Word also, not only of the Sentence. This is what is meant by the term ‘also’, Thus there being no difference of opinion between us, the complaint against us is not right.
"buddhyantarād vyavacchedo naca buddheḥ" pratīyata ityatrāha svarūpotpādamātrāddhītyādi / svarūpotpādamātrāddhi nānyamaṃśaṃ bibharti sā /	Owing to the fact of its not bearing any factor apart from the appearance of its own form, its ‘exclusion from another cognition’ becomes duly apprehended. It has been argued (under 924, by Kumārila) that “the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended”.
yata eva hi svarūpotpādamātād anyamaṃśaṃ sā buddhir na bibharti tata eva svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvād buddher buddhyantarādvyavacchedaḥ pratīyate, anyathā hyanyasya rūpaṃ bibhratī kathaṃ tato vyavacchinnā pratīyate /	It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor apart from the manifestation of its own form, that on account of its being restricted within its own form, the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another?
teneti svavyatiriktapadārthasvarūpānavadhāraṇena //	‘For that reason’ i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.
yathaivāvidyamānasya na bhedaḥ pāramārthikaḥ /	In the case of what does not exist, any difference that may be there cannot be real;
abhedo 'pi tathaiveti tena paryāyatā bhavet //	so also would be its non-difference; and hence the words would certainly be synonymous.
[p.324] yathaiva hyapohasya niḥsvabhāvatvād avidyamānarūpasya parasparato bhedo nāstītyucyate tathaivābhedo 'pīti tat katham abhinnārthābhāve paryāyatvaprasañjanaṃ kriyate //	This is answered as follows: [see verse 1030 above] Apoha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among Apohas; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing, how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us? (1030)
etad eva spaṣṭīkurvannāha abhedo hyekarūpatvād iti /	This same idea is explained more clearly in the following [see verse 1031 next]
abhedo hyekarūpatvaṃ nīrūpeṣu ca tat kutaḥ / ekatve 'rthasya paryāyāḥ prāpnuvanti ca vācakāḥ //	‘Non-difference’ consists in being of the same form; how can this be there in what are formless? Words become synonyms only when what is denoted by them is one and the same.
yadi nāma nīrūpeṣvekarūpatvaṃ nāsti tathāpi kimiti paryāyatā na bhaved	Question: “If there is no one form in formless things, why should words not be synonymous?”
iti cedāha ekatve 'rthasyetyādi //	Answer: ‘Words become synonyms, etc. etc.’ (1031)
rūpābhāve 'pi caikatvaṃ kalpanānirmitaṃ yathā /	Just as, even in the absence of form, there is imaginary unity (uniformity), in the same manner, difference also could be imaginary;
vibhedo 'pi tathaiveti kutaḥ paryāyatā tataḥ //	whence then could the words be synonymous? (1032)
rūpābhāve 'pīti / svabhāvābhāve 'pītyarthaḥ //	Answer: [see verse 1032 above] ‘In the absence of form’ i.e. in the absence of any characteristic features.
yadyevaṃ paryāyāparyāyavyavasthā kathaṃ śabdānām prasiddhetyāha bhāvatastvityādi /	Question: “If that is so, then how is there any such notion among people that these words are synonymous, and those others are not synonymous?”
bhāvatastu na paryāyā nāparyāyāś ca vācakāḥ /	Answer: [see verse 1033 next] In reality, words are neither synonymous nor not-synonymous;
nahyekaṃ bāhyameteṣām anekaṃ ceti varṇitam //	as it has been explained that what is denoted by them is neither one and the same nor diverse.
yadi hi paramārthato bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā kiñcid vācyaṃ vastu śabdānāṃ syāttadāparyāyatā paryāyatā vā bhavet / yāvatā svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimaṃstathetyādinā varṇitaṃ yathaiṣāṃna kiñcid vācyamastīti //	If what is denoted by words were really different or non-different, then they could be either synonymous or not-synonymous. As a matter of fact, however, it has been explained above (under Text, 871) that neither Specific Individuality, nor the Universal, nor what is possessed of the Universal, can be really denoted by words.
kathaṃ sā tarhi paryāyādivyavasthetyāha kiṃtvityādi /	“How then is there the restriction regarding words being synonymous and not-synonymous?” Answer: [see verse 1034 next]
kiṃtvaneko 'pi yadyekakaryakārī ya īkṣyate / tatraikadharmāropeṇa śrutirekā niveśyate // tatrāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ sāmānyaśabdatvavyavasthāyā idaṃ nibandhanam, yadbahūnām ekārthakriyākāritvam /	But whenever more than one thing is seen to be performing one and the same function, the property of ‘oneness’ is imposed on them and the same word is applied to them. Even without there being any Commonalty (or Universal), there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a number of things, and the basis of such application lies in the fact of several things performing the same fruitful function.
prakṛtyaiva hi kecid bhāvā bahavo 'pyekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti /	By their very nature, some things, even though many, perform the same fruitful function;
teṣām ekārthakriyāsāmarthyapratipādanāya vyavahartṛbhir lāghavārthamekarūpādhyāropeṇaikā śrutir niveśyate /	and for the purpose of expressing the fact of their performing the same fruitful function, people speaking of them, for the sake of brevity impose upon them a common form, and apply to them a common name.
yathā bahuṣu rūpādiṣu madhūdakādyāharaṇalakṣaṇaikārthakriyāsamartheṣu ghaṭa ityeṣā śrutir niveśyate //	For instance, when the various things Colour, etc. are found to perform the same function of containing Honey, Water and other things, the name ‘Jar’ is applied to them.
kathaṃ punar ekenānugāminā vinā bahuṣvekā śrutir yujyata ity āha locanādāvityādi /	Question: “Without a single comprehensive (all-embracing) factor, how can a single word be rightly applied to several things?”
[p.325]	Answer: [see verse 1035 above]
locanādau yathā rūpavijñānaikaphale kvacit /	For instance, the Eye, Colour, Light and Mind, all tend to bring about the single effect of Colour-cognition;
kaścidyadi śrutiṃ kuryād vinaikenānugāminā // icchāmātrapratibaddho hi śabdānām artheṣu niyogaḥ, tathā hi cakṣurūpālokamanaskāreṣu rūpavijñānaikaphaleṣu yadi kaścid icchāvaśād vināpyekenānugāmitā sāmānyena ityādikāṃ śrutiṃ niveśayet, tat kiṃ tasya kaścit pratiroddhā bhavet /	if some one, through sheer whim, even without there being a common element, were to apply a single word (name) to them, would there be any one to prevent him from doing so? Among all these things, the Eye and the rest, there is no Common Element, in the form of ‘being productive of visual perception’;
yataḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api bhavadbhiścakṣur vijñānajanakā iṣyante /	specially because you regard the Universal, the Ultimate Differentia and Inherence also to be productive of visual perception’;
teṣu na sāmānyasamavāyo 'sti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyasya, samavāyasya ca dvitīyasamavāyābhāvāt //	and in thengs in question, there is no Universal or Inherence either; because the Universal cannot belong to a Universal, and in Inherence also there cannot be a second Inherence.
nanu ca ghaṭādierkakāryakārī katham ucyate / yāvatā tat kāryamudakadhāraṇādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca vijñānaṃ svalakṣaṇabhedād bhidyata evetyata āha ghaṭādīnāṃ cetyādi /	Says the Opponent: “How can the Jar and such things be spoken of as performing the same function when, their actions, in the shape of holding water and the rest, as also the Cognitions apprehending them, differ from one another, on the ground of the difference among their ‘Specific Individualities’?”
ghaṭādīnāṃ ca yat kāryaṃ jalāder dhāraṇādikam /	Answer: [see verses 1036-1037 above]
ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād ekamucyate / jñānaṃ tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinaḥ // yadyapi svalakṣaṇabhedāt tat kāryaṃ bhidyate /	Even though the effects differ on account of the difference in their ‘Specific Individualities’, yet, the effect in the form of Cognition, inasmuch as it serves as the basis of the single comprehensive conception, is spoken of as one;
tathāpi jñānākhyaṃ tāvat kāryamekārthādhyavasāyhiparāmarśajñānaheutayaikamity ucyate tasya ca jñānasya hetubhāvād arthā api madhūdakādyāharaṇādilakṣaṇā ghaṭādivyaktilakṣaṇāścābhedina ityucyante, tad darśayati tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinā iti /	and on account of this one Cognition being the basis, the things, in the shape of the Holding of Honey, Water, etc,, and in the shape of the individual Jar, etc., also are spoken of as one. This is what is meant by the text ‘And as this cognition, etc. etc.’.
ucyata iti prakṛtaṃ vacanapariṇāmād bahuvacanāntaṃ sambadhyate /	The previous singular form ‘ucyate’ has, in construing, to be changed into the plural form ‘ucyante’.
apiśabdo bhinnakramo 'rthā ityanantaraṃ sambadhyate /	The particle ‘api’ is to be construed after ‘arthāḥ’.
tenaikārthakriyākāritvam upapadyata eva /	In the way shown, it is quite reasonable to regard these as ‘performing the same fruitful function’,
nanu caivam anavasthā prāpnoti /	Objection: “But in this way there would be infinite regress.
tathā hi yo 'sau pratyavamarśapratyayastasyāpi svalakṣaṇabhedena bhidyamānatvād ekatvam asiddham /	The said Conception also would be diverse on account of the diversity of the Specific Individualities; so that that also could not be accepted as one;
tataś ca tasyāpyekatvasiddhaye paramekākārapratyavamarśakāryamanusarato 'navasthā syāt / tataścānavasthitaikakāryatayā na kvacid ekaśrutiniveśaḥ siddhyet /	hence for establishing the oneness of that, it would be necessary to postulate a further comprehensive conception, and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress, So that there being no single effect or action, it would not be possible to apply a single name to several things,”
naitad asti /	Answer: It is not so;
svata eva sarveṣāṃ pratyavamarśapratyayānām ekārthādhyavasāyitvasya siddhatvāt /	the oneness of the comprehensive conception is not attributed to the performance of a single function; it is based upon the fact of its apprehending the same thing.
tenāyam artho bhavati /	So that there will be no infinite regress.
ekākārapratyavamarśahetutvāt jñānākhyaṃ kāryamekamity ucyate taddhetubhāvāccārthā api ghaṭādaya ekatvavyavapadeśabhāja iti //	Because all comprehensive conceptions by their very nature apprehend one and the same thing. The meaning of this therefore comes to be this Inasmuch as it is the basis of one uniform comprehensive conception, the effect in the shape of Cognition is spoken of as one;
[p.326] tena vināpi sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyavacanā ghaṭādayaḥ siddhyantīti nigamayannāha tatretyādi /	and because of its being the basis again, the things Jar, etc.
tatra sāmānyavacanā uktāḥ śabdā ghaṭādayaḥ / vijātīyavyavacchinnapratibimbaikahetavaḥ //	Of these, words like ‘jar’ have been said to be common denotatives, on the single basis of the reflection distinguished (excluded) from unlike things (1038)
ekasminnapi vastunyantareṇāpi sāmānyaviśeṣamasaṅkīrṇānekaśabdapravṛttir bhavatyeveti darśayann āha tathetyādi / tathānekārthakāritvād eko naika ivcoyate / atatkāryaparāvṛttibāhulyaparikalpitaḥ //	Similarly, when performing several fruitful functions, even a single thing is spoken of as if it were many, by virtue of the multiplicity of the exclusions of things not performing those functions. The following text shows that even with regard to one and the same thing, even without a positive ‘Universal’ or ‘Particular’, there is application of several words independently of one another: [see verses 1039 above]
kaścid eko 'pi samprakṛtyaiva sāmagryantarāntaḥpātavaśād anekārthakriyākārī bhavati /	Sometimes, even while only one, by its nature, a thing comes to perform several functions, through the intervention of other accessories;
tatrāntareṇāpi vastubhūtasāmānyādidharmabhedamatat kāryapadārthabhedabāhulyād anekadharmasamāropād anekā śritir niveśyate //	and in such cases, even without any diverse elements in the shape of positive commonalties and the like, several characters are imposed upon it on account of the multiplicity of ‘exclusions’ of things not performing those functions; and as a consequence of this, several words come to be applied to that thing.
atrodāharaṇam āha yathetyādi /	An example of this is cited in the following [see verse 1040 next]
yathā sapratighaṃ rūpaṃ sanidarśanam ityapi /	For instance, colour is spoken of as an ‘obstacle’ and also as ‘visible’;
prayatnānantarajñāto yathā vā śrāvaṇo dhvaniḥ //	and sound is spoken of as ‘cognised after effort’, and also as ‘auditory’ or ‘audible (1040)
svadeśe parasyotpattipratibandhakāritvād rūpaṃ sapratighamity ucyate /	Colour is spoken of as an ‘obstacle’ when it prevents the appearance of another colour in its own place;
nidarśanam cakṣur vijñānaṃ tajjanakatvāt saha tena vartata iti sanidarśanam /	and it is also spoken of as ‘visible’, because it serves to bring about visual perception.
dvitīyam apy udāharaṇam āha prayatnetyādi /	A second example is cited ‘And Sound, etc. etc?;
yathāhi dhvanireko 'pi sanprayatnāntarajñānaphalatayā prayatnānantaraṃ jñāta ity ucyate /	even though sound is a single entity, yet, on being the resultant of the cognition following upon effort (of the speaker), it is spoken of as ‘Cognised’;
śrotrajñānaphalatvāc ca śrāvaṇaḥ / śravaṇaṃ hi śrutiḥ, śrotrajñānamiti yāvat /	and as the resultant of auditory perception, it is spoken of as ‘auditory’; ‘śravaṇa’ stands for ‘śruti’, audition, i.e. Auditory Perception;
tat pratibhāsitayā tatra bhavaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ / yadvā śravaṇena gṛhyata iti śrāvaṇaḥ //	and what appears therein is ‘auditory’, Or the term ‘śrāvaṇa’ may be explained as ‘perceived by the auditory organ’, (1040)
atatkāraṇabhedena kvacicchabdo niveśyate /	In some cases, the word is applied, also on the basis of the diversity of other causes;
prayatnottho yathāśabdo bhrāmaraṃ vā yathā madhu //	e.g. sound arising from effort, and the honey produced by the large bees.
evam atatkāryakāraṇapadārthabhedād ekasmin vastuni śrutibhedo darśitaḥ /	It has thus been shown that several words are applied to a thing which, as performing a single function, is one only.
idānīṃ tat kāryakāraṇapadārthavyavacchedamātrapratipādanecchayāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ śruter bhedaniveśanaṃ darśayannāha tat kāryetyādi /	It is now shown that in some cases, words are applied even on the basis of the diversity of other causes: [see verse 1041 above]
tat kāryahetuviśleṣāt kvacicchrutirihocyate /	In some cases, the word is applied on the basis of the exclusion of the effect and cause of the thing;
aśrāvaṇaṃ yathā rūpaṃ vidyuddvāyatnajā yathā //	as for example, colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, or lightning is spoken of as ‘not produced by effort’.
tau pūrvoktau, kāryahetū yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ /	The term ‘Kāryahetu’ stands for the things of which the previously-mentioned factors are the Effect and Cause;
tebhyo viśleṣo vyāvṛttiḥ /	the ‘Viśleṣa’ of these is their exclusion (denial).
kā punar asau śrutir ity āha aśrāvaṇamityādi /	“What are the words like this?” ‘Inaudible, etc. etc.’;
śrotrajñānaphalaśabdavyavacchedenāśrāvaṇaṃ rūpam ity ucyate /	Colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, when what is meant is the exclusion of Sound which is the effect of Auditory Perception;
tathā prayatnakāraṇaghaṭādipadārthavyavacchedena vidyudaprayatnajetyabhidhīyate //	similarly, for the purpose of excluding things produced by effort, the term ‘not produced by effort’ is applied to Lightning.
ityādinā prabhedena vibhinnārthanibandhanāḥ /	Due to the said and other distinctions, ‘exclusions’ are postulated on the basis of differentiated things;
vyāvṛttayaḥ prakalpyante tanniṣṭhāḥ śrutayas tathā //	and so also are the words as applied to those things.
yathāsaṅketamevāto 'saṅkīrṇārthābhidhāyinaḥ /	thus words, as denoting distinct things in accordance with convention, are applied with due differentiation;
śabdā vivekato vṛttāḥ paryāyā na bhavanti naḥ //	and as such they are not synonymous under our view.
ādigrahaṇenāvasthāviśeṣavācakā bālādiśabdā nairātmyādiśabdāś ca gṛhyante /	The term ‘other’ includes words expressive of different ages such as ‘child’ and the like, and also such words as ‘nairātmya’, (‘absence of soul’, or ‘featurelessness’).
vibhinnārthanibandhanā iti /	‘On the basis of differentiated things’;
vibhinnas tatas tato vyāvṛtto 'rtho nibandhanaṃ yāsāṃ vyāvṛttīnāṃ tās tathoktāḥ /	i.e. exclusions, of which the basis consists in things differentiated from one another.
tatheti vyāvṛttivat /	‘So’ associated with ‘exclusion’,
tanniṣṭhā iti vyāvṛttārthaniṣṭhāḥ /	‘Applied to those things’; i.e. applied to the ‘excluded’ (i.e. differentiated) things.
praṇālikayā tathāvidhapadārthādhigatihetutvāt /	Because, indirectly, they are the cause of the apprehension of the said denotation of the word.
śrutaya iti śabdāḥ //	‘śrutayaḥ’ Words.
syād etat mābhūt paryāyatvam eṣām, arthabhedasya parikalpitatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣavācitvavyavasthā tu vinā sāmānyaviśeṣābhyāṃ katham eṣāṃ siddhyatītyata āha bahvalpetyādi / bahvalpaviṣayatvena tat saṅketānumānataḥ / sāmānyabhedavācyatvam apyeṣāṃ na virudhyate //	Nor is there any incongruity in universals and particulars being denoted by words, as appertaining to larger and smaller number of things, on the basis of the inference of the relevant convention. The following might be urged: “The words may not be synonymous, because a distinction is assumed in the things; but how can there be the difference between words denoting Universals and those denoting Particulars, unless there are Universals and Particulars?”
vṛkṣaśabdo hi sarveṣveva dhavakhadirapalāśādiṣvavṛkṣavyavacchedamātrānumānaṃ pratibimbakaṃ janayati /	For example, the word ‘Tree’ brings about the ‘Reflection’ inferred in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of non-trees’, in regard to all trees the Dhava, Khadira, Palāśa and so forth;
tenāsya bahu{viśa}yatvāt sāmānyaṃ vācyam ucyate /	hence, as appertaining to a larger number of things, what is denoted by the Word is spoken of as the ‘Universal’ (Commonalty).
dhavādiśabdasya tu khadirādivyāvṛttiḥ katipayapādapāvasāyivikalpotpādakatvād viśeṣo vācya ucyate // "nanu cāpohyabhedene"tyādāvāha tāścetyādi /	On the other hand, in the case of the word ‘Dhava’, there is ‘exclusion of the Khadira and other trees’, which brings about the conception of only a few of the trees (the Dhava ones only); hence what is denoted by it is said to be a ‘Particular’.
tāśca vyāvṛttayo 'rthānā kalpanāmātranirmitāḥ / nāpohyādhārabhedena bhidyante paramārthataḥ //	The said ‘exclusions’ of things, created by mere assumption, cannot really differ, through difference in the ‘excluded things’, or through that in the substratum.
yadi hi pāramārthiko 'pohyabhedenādhārabhedenāpohabhedo 'bhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadaitad dūṣaṇaṃ syāt, yāvatā kalpanayā sajātīyavijātīyapadārthabhedanibandhanā vyāvṛttayo bhinnāḥ kalpyante na paramārthataḥ //	If the diversity in the Apoha were held (by us) to be real and based upon the diversity of ‘excluded things’, or upon the diversity of the ‘substratum’, then the objection urged would have been applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ‘Exclusions’ are not real, but assumed on the basis of the diversity among like and unlike things.
tāsāṃ hi bāhyarūpatvaṃ kalpitaṃ tan na vāstavam /	The externality that is attributed to these exclusions is only assumed (imaginary), not real.
bhedābhedau ca tattvena vastunyeva vyavasthitau //	in reality, difference and non-difference subsist only in real things.
kasmād vāstavaṃ bhavatītyāha bhedābhedau cetyādi // paramārthatas tu vikalpā eva bhidyanta iti darśayati svabījāneketyādi /	The following Text shows that the said exclusions appear as distinct things, only on account of the said assumption, not in reality: [see verse 1047 above] Question: “Why is it not real?” Answer: ‘In reality, etc. etc.’.
svabījānekaviśliṣṭavastusaṅketaśaktitaḥ / vikalpās tu vibhidyante tadrūpādhyavasāyinaḥ //	What differ among themselves are the conceptual contents apprehending the said exclusions; and those differences are due to the influence of their root, the thing as differentiated from several things, and convention.
naikātmatāṃ prapadyante na bhidyante ca khaṇḍaśaḥ /	Things, consisting of ‘specific individualities’ do not become either unified or diversified in parts;
svalakṣaṇātmakā arthā vikalpaḥ plavate tvasau //	The following Texts proceed to show that in reality it is the assumptions (assumed conceptions) only that differ among themselves: [see verses 1048-1049 above]
svabījam vātādivikalpavāsanā, anekasmād viśliṣṭaṃ vastu ca saṅketaśceti vigrahaḥ, teṣāṃ śaktiḥ sāmarthyam, tato vijātīyānekapadārthavyāvṛttavatuvyavasāyino vikalpā bhidyante /	‘Their Root’, in the shape of Wind and other Humours, and the Tendency to conceptual thought; the thing as differentiated from severalngs, and the Convention; it is due to the ‘influence’ force of these that the Conceptual Contents, apprehending the thing as excluded from several unlike things, become diversified;
natvarthāḥ /	it is not the things that are diversified.
tathā hi vṛkṣatvādisāmanyarūpeṇa naikātmatāṃ dhavādayaḥ pratipadyante nāpi kṣaṇikātmakādidharmabhedena khaṇḍaśo bhidyante /	For instance, the Dhava and other trees do not become unified in the form of the Universal ‘Tree’; nor do they become diversified, in parts, in the form of the momentary individual trees;
kevalaṃ vikalpa eva tathā plavate natvarthaḥ /	all that varies is the conceptual content.
yathoktam "saṃsṛjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ /	This has been thus declared ‘Things by themselves do not become either aggregated or diversified, in reality;
rūpamekamanekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ" //	that their form is one or many is due to the fluctuations of the Cognition’, (1048-1049)
yaccoktam ---"navāprasiddhasārūpyāni"tyādi, tatrāha ekadharmānvayāsatve 'pītyādi / ekadharmānvayāsattve 'pyapohyāpohagocarāḥ / vailakṣaṇyena gamyante bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ //	Even though there is no common property, yet what are excluded and what are contained in the exclusion are apprehended as different, by reason of their appearing as diverse in the subsequent determinate judgment. It has been argued above (under Text 932) that “No one can be able to conceive, in regard to the Cow, the unknown similarity in the object of Apoha, etc. etc.”

pratibhākhyo jhaṭityeva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ //

and we readily regard this as the denotation of words.

yathaiva hi pratibimbātmakapratibhākhyo 'poho bāhyārtho 'smābhirupavarṇitas tathaiva padārthe 'pi /

It has been urged (under 923, by Kumārila) that “Even in the absence of the external thing, just as there is Intuition denoted by the Sentence so would it be in the case of the word also”,

yasmāt padādapi pratibimbātmako 'poha utpadyata eva tenāsmākam ayameva pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padārtho 'pi mato na kevalaṃ bāhyārtha ityapiśabdaḥ / tena vipratipatter bhāvānnopālambho yukta iti bhāvaḥ //

so also is the meaning of the word described. Because by the Word also, what is produced is the Apoha in the form of Reflection; so that for us the Apoha in the form of the Reflection is held to be the denotation of the Word also, not only of the Sentence. This is what is meant by the term ‘also’, Thus there being no difference of opinion between us, the complaint against us is not right.

"buddhyantarād vyavacchedo naca buddheḥ" pratīyata ityatrāha svarūpotpādamātrāddhītyādi / svarūpotpādamātrāddhi nānyamaṃśaṃ bibharti sā /

Owing to the fact of its not bearing any factor apart from the appearance of its own form, its ‘exclusion from another cognition’ becomes duly apprehended. It has been argued (under 924, by Kumārila) that “the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended”.

yata eva hi svarūpotpādamātād anyamaṃśaṃ sā buddhir na bibharti tata eva svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvād buddher buddhyantarādvyavacchedaḥ pratīyate, anyathā hyanyasya rūpaṃ bibhratī kathaṃ tato vyavacchinnā pratīyate /

It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor apart from the manifestation of its own form, that on account of its being restricted within its own form, the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another?

teneti svavyatiriktapadārthasvarūpānavadhāraṇena //

‘For that reason’ i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.

yathaivāvidyamānasya na bhedaḥ pāramārthikaḥ /

In the case of what does not exist, any difference that may be there cannot be real;

abhedo 'pi tathaiveti tena paryāyatā bhavet //

so also would be its non-difference; and hence the words would certainly be synonymous.

[p.324] yathaiva hyapohasya niḥsvabhāvatvād avidyamānarūpasya parasparato bhedo nāstītyucyate tathaivābhedo 'pīti tat katham abhinnārthābhāve paryāyatvaprasañjanaṃ kriyate //

This is answered as follows: [see verse 1030 above] Apoha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among Apohas; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing, how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us? (1030)

etad eva spaṣṭīkurvannāha abhedo hyekarūpatvād iti /

This same idea is explained more clearly in the following [see verse 1031 next]

abhedo hyekarūpatvaṃ nīrūpeṣu ca tat kutaḥ / ekatve 'rthasya paryāyāḥ prāpnuvanti ca vācakāḥ //

‘Non-difference’ consists in being of the same form; how can this be there in what are formless? Words become synonyms only when what is denoted by them is one and the same.

yadi nāma nīrūpeṣvekarūpatvaṃ nāsti tathāpi kimiti paryāyatā na bhaved

Question: “If there is no one form in formless things, why should words not be synonymous?”

iti cedāha ekatve 'rthasyetyādi //

Answer: ‘Words become synonyms, etc. etc.’ (1031)

rūpābhāve 'pi caikatvaṃ kalpanānirmitaṃ yathā /

Just as, even in the absence of form, there is imaginary unity (uniformity), in the same manner, difference also could be imaginary;

vibhedo 'pi tathaiveti kutaḥ paryāyatā tataḥ //

whence then could the words be synonymous? (1032)

rūpābhāve 'pīti / svabhāvābhāve 'pītyarthaḥ //

Answer: [see verse 1032 above] ‘In the absence of form’ i.e. in the absence of any characteristic features.

yadyevaṃ paryāyāparyāyavyavasthā kathaṃ śabdānām prasiddhetyāha bhāvatastvityādi /

Question: “If that is so, then how is there any such notion among people that these words are synonymous, and those others are not synonymous?”

bhāvatastu na paryāyā nāparyāyāś ca vācakāḥ /

Answer: [see verse 1033 next] In reality, words are neither synonymous nor not-synonymous;

nahyekaṃ bāhyameteṣām anekaṃ ceti varṇitam //

as it has been explained that what is denoted by them is neither one and the same nor diverse.

yadi hi paramārthato bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā kiñcid vācyaṃ vastu śabdānāṃ syāttadāparyāyatā paryāyatā vā bhavet / yāvatā svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimaṃstathetyādinā varṇitaṃ yathaiṣāṃna kiñcid vācyamastīti //

If what is denoted by words were really different or non-different, then they could be either synonymous or not-synonymous. As a matter of fact, however, it has been explained above (under Text, 871) that neither Specific Individuality, nor the Universal, nor what is possessed of the Universal, can be really denoted by words.

kathaṃ sā tarhi paryāyādivyavasthetyāha kiṃtvityādi /

“How then is there the restriction regarding words being synonymous and not-synonymous?” Answer: [see verse 1034 next]

kiṃtvaneko 'pi yadyekakaryakārī ya īkṣyate / tatraikadharmāropeṇa śrutirekā niveśyate // tatrāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ sāmānyaśabdatvavyavasthāyā idaṃ nibandhanam, yadbahūnām ekārthakriyākāritvam /

But whenever more than one thing is seen to be performing one and the same function, the property of ‘oneness’ is imposed on them and the same word is applied to them. Even without there being any Commonalty (or Universal), there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a number of things, and the basis of such application lies in the fact of several things performing the same fruitful function.

prakṛtyaiva hi kecid bhāvā bahavo 'pyekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti /

By their very nature, some things, even though many, perform the same fruitful function;

teṣām ekārthakriyāsāmarthyapratipādanāya vyavahartṛbhir lāghavārthamekarūpādhyāropeṇaikā śrutir niveśyate /

and for the purpose of expressing the fact of their performing the same fruitful function, people speaking of them, for the sake of brevity impose upon them a common form, and apply to them a common name.

yathā bahuṣu rūpādiṣu madhūdakādyāharaṇalakṣaṇaikārthakriyāsamartheṣu ghaṭa ityeṣā śrutir niveśyate //

For instance, when the various things Colour, etc. are found to perform the same function of containing Honey, Water and other things, the name ‘Jar’ is applied to them.

kathaṃ punar ekenānugāminā vinā bahuṣvekā śrutir yujyata ity āha locanādāvityādi /

Question: “Without a single comprehensive (all-embracing) factor, how can a single word be rightly applied to several things?”

[p.325]

Answer: [see verse 1035 above]

locanādau yathā rūpavijñānaikaphale kvacit /

For instance, the Eye, Colour, Light and Mind, all tend to bring about the single effect of Colour-cognition;

kaścidyadi śrutiṃ kuryād vinaikenānugāminā // icchāmātrapratibaddho hi śabdānām artheṣu niyogaḥ, tathā hi cakṣurūpālokamanaskāreṣu rūpavijñānaikaphaleṣu yadi kaścid icchāvaśād vināpyekenānugāmitā sāmānyena ityādikāṃ śrutiṃ niveśayet, tat kiṃ tasya kaścit pratiroddhā bhavet /

if some one, through sheer whim, even without there being a common element, were to apply a single word (name) to them, would there be any one to prevent him from doing so? Among all these things, the Eye and the rest, there is no Common Element, in the form of ‘being productive of visual perception’;

yataḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api bhavadbhiścakṣur vijñānajanakā iṣyante /

specially because you regard the Universal, the Ultimate Differentia and Inherence also to be productive of visual perception’;

teṣu na sāmānyasamavāyo 'sti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyasya, samavāyasya ca dvitīyasamavāyābhāvāt //

and in thengs in question, there is no Universal or Inherence either; because the Universal cannot belong to a Universal, and in Inherence also there cannot be a second Inherence.

nanu ca ghaṭādierkakāryakārī katham ucyate / yāvatā tat kāryamudakadhāraṇādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca vijñānaṃ svalakṣaṇabhedād bhidyata evetyata āha ghaṭādīnāṃ cetyādi /

Says the Opponent: “How can the Jar and such things be spoken of as performing the same function when, their actions, in the shape of holding water and the rest, as also the Cognitions apprehending them, differ from one another, on the ground of the difference among their ‘Specific Individualities’?”

ghaṭādīnāṃ ca yat kāryaṃ jalāder dhāraṇādikam /

Answer: [see verses 1036-1037 above]

ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād ekamucyate / jñānaṃ tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinaḥ // yadyapi svalakṣaṇabhedāt tat kāryaṃ bhidyate /

Even though the effects differ on account of the difference in their ‘Specific Individualities’, yet, the effect in the form of Cognition, inasmuch as it serves as the basis of the single comprehensive conception, is spoken of as one;

tathāpi jñānākhyaṃ tāvat kāryamekārthādhyavasāyhiparāmarśajñānaheutayaikamity ucyate tasya ca jñānasya hetubhāvād arthā api madhūdakādyāharaṇādilakṣaṇā ghaṭādivyaktilakṣaṇāścābhedina ityucyante, tad darśayati tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinā iti /

and on account of this one Cognition being the basis, the things, in the shape of the Holding of Honey, Water, etc,, and in the shape of the individual Jar, etc., also are spoken of as one. This is what is meant by the text ‘And as this cognition, etc. etc.’.

ucyata iti prakṛtaṃ vacanapariṇāmād bahuvacanāntaṃ sambadhyate /

The previous singular form ‘ucyate’ has, in construing, to be changed into the plural form ‘ucyante’.

apiśabdo bhinnakramo 'rthā ityanantaraṃ sambadhyate /

The particle ‘api’ is to be construed after ‘arthāḥ’.

tenaikārthakriyākāritvam upapadyata eva /

In the way shown, it is quite reasonable to regard these as ‘performing the same fruitful function’,

nanu caivam anavasthā prāpnoti /

Objection: “But in this way there would be infinite regress.

tathā hi yo 'sau pratyavamarśapratyayastasyāpi svalakṣaṇabhedena bhidyamānatvād ekatvam asiddham /

The said Conception also would be diverse on account of the diversity of the Specific Individualities; so that that also could not be accepted as one;

tataś ca tasyāpyekatvasiddhaye paramekākārapratyavamarśakāryamanusarato 'navasthā syāt / tataścānavasthitaikakāryatayā na kvacid ekaśrutiniveśaḥ siddhyet /

hence for establishing the oneness of that, it would be necessary to postulate a further comprehensive conception, and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress, So that there being no single effect or action, it would not be possible to apply a single name to several things,”

naitad asti /

Answer: It is not so;

svata eva sarveṣāṃ pratyavamarśapratyayānām ekārthādhyavasāyitvasya siddhatvāt /

the oneness of the comprehensive conception is not attributed to the performance of a single function; it is based upon the fact of its apprehending the same thing.

tenāyam artho bhavati /

So that there will be no infinite regress.

ekākārapratyavamarśahetutvāt jñānākhyaṃ kāryamekamity ucyate taddhetubhāvāccārthā api ghaṭādaya ekatvavyavapadeśabhāja iti //

Because all comprehensive conceptions by their very nature apprehend one and the same thing. The meaning of this therefore comes to be this Inasmuch as it is the basis of one uniform comprehensive conception, the effect in the shape of Cognition is spoken of as one;

[p.326] tena vināpi sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyavacanā ghaṭādayaḥ siddhyantīti nigamayannāha tatretyādi /

and because of its being the basis again, the things Jar, etc.

tatra sāmānyavacanā uktāḥ śabdā ghaṭādayaḥ / vijātīyavyavacchinnapratibimbaikahetavaḥ //

Of these, words like ‘jar’ have been said to be common denotatives, on the single basis of the reflection distinguished (excluded) from unlike things (1038)

ekasminnapi vastunyantareṇāpi sāmānyaviśeṣamasaṅkīrṇānekaśabdapravṛttir bhavatyeveti darśayann āha tathetyādi / tathānekārthakāritvād eko naika ivcoyate / atatkāryaparāvṛttibāhulyaparikalpitaḥ //

Similarly, when performing several fruitful functions, even a single thing is spoken of as if it were many, by virtue of the multiplicity of the exclusions of things not performing those functions. The following text shows that even with regard to one and the same thing, even without a positive ‘Universal’ or ‘Particular’, there is application of several words independently of one another: [see verses 1039 above]

kaścid eko 'pi samprakṛtyaiva sāmagryantarāntaḥpātavaśād anekārthakriyākārī bhavati /

Sometimes, even while only one, by its nature, a thing comes to perform several functions, through the intervention of other accessories;

tatrāntareṇāpi vastubhūtasāmānyādidharmabhedamatat kāryapadārthabhedabāhulyād anekadharmasamāropād anekā śritir niveśyate //

and in such cases, even without any diverse elements in the shape of positive commonalties and the like, several characters are imposed upon it on account of the multiplicity of ‘exclusions’ of things not performing those functions; and as a consequence of this, several words come to be applied to that thing.

atrodāharaṇam āha yathetyādi /

An example of this is cited in the following [see verse 1040 next]

yathā sapratighaṃ rūpaṃ sanidarśanam ityapi /

For instance, colour is spoken of as an ‘obstacle’ and also as ‘visible’;

prayatnānantarajñāto yathā vā śrāvaṇo dhvaniḥ //

and sound is spoken of as ‘cognised after effort’, and also as ‘auditory’ or ‘audible (1040)

svadeśe parasyotpattipratibandhakāritvād rūpaṃ sapratighamity ucyate /

Colour is spoken of as an ‘obstacle’ when it prevents the appearance of another colour in its own place;

nidarśanam cakṣur vijñānaṃ tajjanakatvāt saha tena vartata iti sanidarśanam /

and it is also spoken of as ‘visible’, because it serves to bring about visual perception.

dvitīyam apy udāharaṇam āha prayatnetyādi /

A second example is cited ‘And Sound, etc. etc?;

yathāhi dhvanireko 'pi sanprayatnāntarajñānaphalatayā prayatnānantaraṃ jñāta ity ucyate /

even though sound is a single entity, yet, on being the resultant of the cognition following upon effort (of the speaker), it is spoken of as ‘Cognised’;

śrotrajñānaphalatvāc ca śrāvaṇaḥ / śravaṇaṃ hi śrutiḥ, śrotrajñānamiti yāvat /

and as the resultant of auditory perception, it is spoken of as ‘auditory’; ‘śravaṇa’ stands for ‘śruti’, audition, i.e. Auditory Perception;

tat pratibhāsitayā tatra bhavaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ / yadvā śravaṇena gṛhyata iti śrāvaṇaḥ //

and what appears therein is ‘auditory’, Or the term ‘śrāvaṇa’ may be explained as ‘perceived by the auditory organ’, (1040)

atatkāraṇabhedena kvacicchabdo niveśyate /

In some cases, the word is applied, also on the basis of the diversity of other causes;

prayatnottho yathāśabdo bhrāmaraṃ vā yathā madhu //

e.g. sound arising from effort, and the honey produced by the large bees.

evam atatkāryakāraṇapadārthabhedād ekasmin vastuni śrutibhedo darśitaḥ /

It has thus been shown that several words are applied to a thing which, as performing a single function, is one only.

idānīṃ tat kāryakāraṇapadārthavyavacchedamātrapratipādanecchayāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ śruter bhedaniveśanaṃ darśayannāha tat kāryetyādi /

It is now shown that in some cases, words are applied even on the basis of the diversity of other causes: [see verse 1041 above]

tat kāryahetuviśleṣāt kvacicchrutirihocyate /

In some cases, the word is applied on the basis of the exclusion of the effect and cause of the thing;

aśrāvaṇaṃ yathā rūpaṃ vidyuddvāyatnajā yathā //

as for example, colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, or lightning is spoken of as ‘not produced by effort’.

tau pūrvoktau, kāryahetū yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ /

The term ‘Kāryahetu’ stands for the things of which the previously-mentioned factors are the Effect and Cause;

tebhyo viśleṣo vyāvṛttiḥ /

the ‘Viśleṣa’ of these is their exclusion (denial).

kā punar asau śrutir ity āha aśrāvaṇamityādi /

“What are the words like this?” ‘Inaudible, etc. etc.’;

śrotrajñānaphalaśabdavyavacchedenāśrāvaṇaṃ rūpam ity ucyate /

Colour is spoken of as ‘inaudible’, when what is meant is the exclusion of Sound which is the effect of Auditory Perception;

tathā prayatnakāraṇaghaṭādipadārthavyavacchedena vidyudaprayatnajetyabhidhīyate //

similarly, for the purpose of excluding things produced by effort, the term ‘not produced by effort’ is applied to Lightning.

ityādinā prabhedena vibhinnārthanibandhanāḥ /

Due to the said and other distinctions, ‘exclusions’ are postulated on the basis of differentiated things;

vyāvṛttayaḥ prakalpyante tanniṣṭhāḥ śrutayas tathā //

and so also are the words as applied to those things.

yathāsaṅketamevāto 'saṅkīrṇārthābhidhāyinaḥ /

thus words, as denoting distinct things in accordance with convention, are applied with due differentiation;

śabdā vivekato vṛttāḥ paryāyā na bhavanti naḥ //

and as such they are not synonymous under our view.

ādigrahaṇenāvasthāviśeṣavācakā bālādiśabdā nairātmyādiśabdāś ca gṛhyante /

The term ‘other’ includes words expressive of different ages such as ‘child’ and the like, and also such words as ‘nairātmya’, (‘absence of soul’, or ‘featurelessness’).

vibhinnārthanibandhanā iti /

‘On the basis of differentiated things’;

vibhinnas tatas tato vyāvṛtto 'rtho nibandhanaṃ yāsāṃ vyāvṛttīnāṃ tās tathoktāḥ /

i.e. exclusions, of which the basis consists in things differentiated from one another.

tatheti vyāvṛttivat /

‘So’ associated with ‘exclusion’,

tanniṣṭhā iti vyāvṛttārthaniṣṭhāḥ /

‘Applied to those things’; i.e. applied to the ‘excluded’ (i.e. differentiated) things.

praṇālikayā tathāvidhapadārthādhigatihetutvāt /

Because, indirectly, they are the cause of the apprehension of the said denotation of the word.

śrutaya iti śabdāḥ //

‘śrutayaḥ’ Words.

syād etat mābhūt paryāyatvam eṣām, arthabhedasya parikalpitatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣavācitvavyavasthā tu vinā sāmānyaviśeṣābhyāṃ katham eṣāṃ siddhyatītyata āha bahvalpetyādi / bahvalpaviṣayatvena tat saṅketānumānataḥ / sāmānyabhedavācyatvam apyeṣāṃ na virudhyate //

Nor is there any incongruity in universals and particulars being denoted by words, as appertaining to larger and smaller number of things, on the basis of the inference of the relevant convention. The following might be urged: “The words may not be synonymous, because a distinction is assumed in the things; but how can there be the difference between words denoting Universals and those denoting Particulars, unless there are Universals and Particulars?”

vṛkṣaśabdo hi sarveṣveva dhavakhadirapalāśādiṣvavṛkṣavyavacchedamātrānumānaṃ pratibimbakaṃ janayati /

For example, the word ‘Tree’ brings about the ‘Reflection’ inferred in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of non-trees’, in regard to all trees the Dhava, Khadira, Palāśa and so forth;

tenāsya bahu{viśa}yatvāt sāmānyaṃ vācyam ucyate /

hence, as appertaining to a larger number of things, what is denoted by the Word is spoken of as the ‘Universal’ (Commonalty).

dhavādiśabdasya tu khadirādivyāvṛttiḥ katipayapādapāvasāyivikalpotpādakatvād viśeṣo vācya ucyate // "nanu cāpohyabhedene"tyādāvāha tāścetyādi /

On the other hand, in the case of the word ‘Dhava’, there is ‘exclusion of the Khadira and other trees’, which brings about the conception of only a few of the trees (the Dhava ones only); hence what is denoted by it is said to be a ‘Particular’.

tāśca vyāvṛttayo 'rthānā kalpanāmātranirmitāḥ / nāpohyādhārabhedena bhidyante paramārthataḥ //

The said ‘exclusions’ of things, created by mere assumption, cannot really differ, through difference in the ‘excluded things’, or through that in the substratum.

yadi hi pāramārthiko 'pohyabhedenādhārabhedenāpohabhedo 'bhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadaitad dūṣaṇaṃ syāt, yāvatā kalpanayā sajātīyavijātīyapadārthabhedanibandhanā vyāvṛttayo bhinnāḥ kalpyante na paramārthataḥ //

If the diversity in the Apoha were held (by us) to be real and based upon the diversity of ‘excluded things’, or upon the diversity of the ‘substratum’, then the objection urged would have been applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ‘Exclusions’ are not real, but assumed on the basis of the diversity among like and unlike things.

tāsāṃ hi bāhyarūpatvaṃ kalpitaṃ tan na vāstavam /

The externality that is attributed to these exclusions is only assumed (imaginary), not real.

bhedābhedau ca tattvena vastunyeva vyavasthitau //

in reality, difference and non-difference subsist only in real things.

kasmād vāstavaṃ bhavatītyāha bhedābhedau cetyādi // paramārthatas tu vikalpā eva bhidyanta iti darśayati svabījāneketyādi /

The following Text shows that the said exclusions appear as distinct things, only on account of the said assumption, not in reality: [see verse 1047 above] Question: “Why is it not real?” Answer: ‘In reality, etc. etc.’.

svabījānekaviśliṣṭavastusaṅketaśaktitaḥ / vikalpās tu vibhidyante tadrūpādhyavasāyinaḥ //

What differ among themselves are the conceptual contents apprehending the said exclusions; and those differences are due to the influence of their root, the thing as differentiated from several things, and convention.

naikātmatāṃ prapadyante na bhidyante ca khaṇḍaśaḥ /

Things, consisting of ‘specific individualities’ do not become either unified or diversified in parts;

svalakṣaṇātmakā arthā vikalpaḥ plavate tvasau //

The following Texts proceed to show that in reality it is the assumptions (assumed conceptions) only that differ among themselves: [see verses 1048-1049 above]

svabījam vātādivikalpavāsanā, anekasmād viśliṣṭaṃ vastu ca saṅketaśceti vigrahaḥ, teṣāṃ śaktiḥ sāmarthyam, tato vijātīyānekapadārthavyāvṛttavatuvyavasāyino vikalpā bhidyante /

‘Their Root’, in the shape of Wind and other Humours, and the Tendency to conceptual thought; the thing as differentiated from severalngs, and the Convention; it is due to the ‘influence’ force of these that the Conceptual Contents, apprehending the thing as excluded from several unlike things, become diversified;

natvarthāḥ /

it is not the things that are diversified.

tathā hi vṛkṣatvādisāmanyarūpeṇa naikātmatāṃ dhavādayaḥ pratipadyante nāpi kṣaṇikātmakādidharmabhedena khaṇḍaśo bhidyante /

For instance, the Dhava and other trees do not become unified in the form of the Universal ‘Tree’; nor do they become diversified, in parts, in the form of the momentary individual trees;

kevalaṃ vikalpa eva tathā plavate natvarthaḥ /

all that varies is the conceptual content.

yathoktam "saṃsṛjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ /

This has been thus declared ‘Things by themselves do not become either aggregated or diversified, in reality;

rūpamekamanekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ" //

that their form is one or many is due to the fluctuations of the Cognition’, (1048-1049)

yaccoktam ---"navāprasiddhasārūpyāni"tyādi, tatrāha ekadharmānvayāsatve 'pītyādi / ekadharmānvayāsattve 'pyapohyāpohagocarāḥ / vailakṣaṇyena gamyante bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ //

Even though there is no common property, yet what are excluded and what are contained in the exclusion are apprehended as different, by reason of their appearing as diverse in the subsequent determinate judgment. It has been argued above (under Text 932) that “No one can be able to conceive, in regard to the Cow, the unknown similarity in the object of Apoha, etc. etc.”