buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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api ca nānyāpoho 'nanyāpoha ityādau śabde vidhirūpādanyadvācyaṃ na nirūpyate nopalabhyata ity arthaḥ /	Then again, in the case of such expressions as ‘Na anyāpohaḥ Ananyapokaḥ’, there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something positive, Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the Apoha;
tathā hi nāpoharūpamātraṃ vācyaṃ gamyate pratiṣedhadvayena vidher evāvasayāt /	as the double negative always expresses the positive.
ādiśabdenānanyavyāvṛttirananyavyavaccheda ityādiparyāyagrahaṇam /	The particle ‘ādi’ (in the compound ‘ananyāpohaśabdādau’) stands for such synonyms as ‘ananyavyāvṛtti’, ‘ananyavyavaccheda’ and so forth.
nanu ca naṭāścāpi naṭā yuktāvityanenaiva gatatvāt punar uktam etat /	Objection: “What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words ‘Nañaścāpi nañā, etc.’; so that there is needless repetition”.
satyam etat /	True.
kiṃtvanyāpohaḥ śabdārtha ityevaṃ vādinā svavacanenaiva vidhiriṣṭa iti jñāpanārthaṃ punar ucyate /	But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself that ‘the denotation of words consists in the Exclusion of Others’ show that he regards the denotation to be positive.
tathā hyanyāpohaśabdasyānanyāpohaśabdārtho vyavacchedyaḥ sa ca vidher nānyo lakṣyate /	Because what the term ‘anyāpoha’, ‘Exclusion of Others’, excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term ‘ananyāpoha’, ‘Non-exclusion of Others’;
ye ca prameyajñeyābhidheyādayaḥ śabdās teṣāṃ na kiñcidapohyam asti /	Then there are such words as ‘cognisable’, ‘knowable’, ‘predicable’ and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these;
sarvasyaiva prameyatvādisvabhāvatvāt /	as all things are ‘cognisable’, etc. by their very nature.
tathā hi yannāma kiñcid vyavacchedyameṣāṃ kalpyate tat sarvaṃ vyavacchedākāreṇālambyamānaṃ jñeyādisvabhāvamevāvatiṣṭhate nahyaviṣayīkṛtaṃ vyavacchettuṃ śakyate /	If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely cognised in the form of ‘exclusion’; and as such would remain ‘cognisable’;
nanu hetumukhe nirdiṣṭam ajñeyaṃ kalpitaṃ kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam iti / tat katham avyāpitvaṃ śabdārthavyavasthāyā ity āha apohyetyādi /	because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true. “Rather than assume the thing to be excluded, it is ear better to assume the entity itself.
jñānākāraniṣedhāc ca nāntarārtho 'bhidhīyate // nacāpyapohyatā tasmān nāpohasteṣu siddhyati /	As the idea of things being of the form of cognitions has been rejected, what is denoted cannot be anything internal (subjective); nor is it possible for any subjective thing to be ‘excluded’.
evam ityādiśabdānāṃ na cāpohyaṃ nirūpyate //	Thus there can be no Apoha in the case of the words in question.
yadi jñeyam api sarvaṃ jñeyatvenāpohyam asya kalpyate tadā varaṃ vastveva vidhirūpam eva [p.313] śabdārthatvena vikalpitaṃ bhavedyadadhyavasīyate lokena /	Answer: [see verses 980-981 above] If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as ‘cognisable’, then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men.
evaṃ hyadṛṣṭāropo dṛṣṭārthāpalāpaś ca na kṛtaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ /	That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseen, nor the denial of the Seen.
ata eva varam ityuktam /	That is why it is spoken of as ‘far better’.
ye tvāhur vikalpapratibimbakam eva sarvaśabdānām arthas tadeva cābhidhīyatevyavacchidyata iti cocyata iti /	Some (Buddhists) have held the view that ‘what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed’.
tān pratīdamāha jñānākāraniṣedhāccetyādi /	The answer to this is As the idea of things, etc. etc. That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions;
nirākārā buddhir ākāravān bāhye 'rthaḥ sa ca bahirdeśasambandho vispaṣṭamupalabhyata ityevam asmābhir jñānākāro niṣiddhaḥ tasmād āntarasya buddhyārūḍhasyākārasyāsattvāt tadabhidhāyakatvaṃ śabdānām ayuktam /	and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.
nāpi tasyāntarasyārthasyāpohyatvaṃ yuktam asattvād eva /	Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected, for the same reason that no such thing exists.
teṣviti prameyādiśabdeṣu /	In the case of the words in question i.e. words like ‘Cognisable’.
ye ca evam ittham ityādayaḥ śabdās teṣām api na kiñcid apohyamupalabhyate, kasyacit pratiyoginaḥ paryudāsarūpasyābhāvāt /	Then again, there are such words as ‘evam’ (‘thus’, ‘ittham’ (‘in this way’, and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is found that can be ‘excluded’; as there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.
athāpi syāt naivam ityādi prasajyarūpaṃ niṣedhyaṃ bhavatīti /	It might be argued that ‘in such expressions as ‘na evam’ (‘not thus’, there is something probable that could be regarded as ‘excluded’.
naitad astyuktam atra /	This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out.
tathā hi atrāpi na naivam iti nirdeśe niṣedhasya niṣedhanam, evam ityaniṣiddhaṃ tu svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatīti saiva pūrvoktā nītiravatarati //	Because here also, in the expression ‘na naivam’, there is negation of negation; and the ‘evam' remains in its own unnegatived positive form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.
etat sarvaṃ kumāriloktam upanyastam, sāmprataṃ sarvaśabdasyetyādinodyotakāroktam apohadūṣaṇam āśaṅkate	All the above has been set forth as put forward by Kumārila. With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by Uddyotakara against Apoha [In Nyāyavārtika on 2. 63, pp.
sarvaśabdasya kaścārtho vyavacchedyaḥ prakalpyate / nāsarvanāma kiñciddhi bhavedyasya nirākriyā //	332-333]: [see verses 982-988] “In the case of the word ‘all’ (‘sarva’) what is it that is assumed to be the ‘excluded’? There is no such thing as the non-all, which could be excluded.
ekādyasarvamiti cedarthāpohaḥ prasajyate / aṅgānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvād aniṣṭeścāṅginaḥ pṛthak //	If it be urged that ‘one and the rest’ are the non-all, then it comes to be the exclusion of the denotation itself; as the parts would be excluded, and no whole is admitted.
evaṃ samūhaśabdārthe samudāyivyapohataḥ /	Similarly, in regard to the denotation of the word ‘group’ (‘samūha’), the constituents would be excluded;
anyāniṣṭeś ca sarve 'pi prāpnuvanti nirarthakāḥ //	and nothing apart from this is admitted; hence all such words become deprived of their meaning.
dvyādiśabdā iheṣṭāś ca ye samuccayagocarāḥ / ekādipratiṣedhena na bhaveyus tathāvidhāḥ //	As regards the words ‘two’ and the rest, which also are applied to groups, as the ‘one’ and other constituents would be excluded, they could no longer be so applicable.
nāgaur iti ca yo 'pohā gośabdasyārtha ucyate /	Then again, the denotation of the word ‘cow’ is said to be the ‘non-non-cow’;
sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thavābhāvo bhāvo gaurvāthavāpyagauḥ //	now is this positive or negative? If it is positive, is it the cow or the non-cow? If it is the cow, then there is no dispute;
gauścennāsti vivādo 'yam arthastu vidhilakṣaṇaḥ / agaurgośabdavācyaścedatiśabdārthakauśalam //	as the denotation turns out to be of the positive character. On the other hand, if it is the non-cow that is denoted by the word ‘cow’, that would exhibit a wonderful insight into the meanings of words indeed!
abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yaṃ praiṣādīnām asambhavāt /	Nor can it be negative; as, in that case injunction and the rest would not be possible.
na hi gośabdataḥ kaścid abhāvaṃ pratipadyate //	Nor does any one ever comprehend a negation from the word ‘cow’.” (982-988)
[p.314] sa hyāha apohaḥ śabdārtha ityayuktam etat avyāpakatvāt /	Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “It cannot be right to say that words denote the Apoha of other things; because this explanation cannot apply to all words;
yatra dvairāśyaṃ bhavati tadetarapratiṣedhāditaratpratīyate yathā gaur itipade gauḥ pratīyamāno 'gaur niṣedhyamānaḥ /	that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word ‘Cow’ is heard, the Cow is affirmed and the non-Cow is denied.
na punaḥ sarvapade etad asti / na hyasarvaṃ nāma kiñcid asti yat sarvaśabdena nivartyeta /	But this is not possible in the case of the word ‘Sarva’ (‘all’), as there is no suchng as non-all, which could be denied by the word ‘all’.
atha manyase ekādyasarvaṃ tatsarvaśabdena nivartyata iti /	so that our explanation takes in this case also You mean that one and the rest are the contradictories of all, the non-all which are excluded by the word ‘all’.
tan na svārthāpavādadoṣaprasaṅgāt /	But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of words abandoning their own meaning.
evaṃ hyekādivyudāsena pravartamānaḥ sarvaśabdo 'ṅgapratiṣedhādaṅgavyatiriktasyāṅgino 'nabhyupagamād anarthakaḥ syāt /	If the word ‘all’ excludes one and the rest, inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the All, and (for the Buddhist) the whole has no existence apart from its constituents, the exclusion of one and the rest would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the All, and there would be nothing left for the word ‘all’ to denote: and this word would thus become meaningless.
aṅgaśabdenaikadeśa ucyate /	[The word ‘aṅga’ stands for part].
evaṃ sarve samudāyaśabdā ekadeśapratiṣedharūpeṇa pravartamānāḥ samudāyivyatiriktasyānyasya samudāyasyānabhyupagamād anarthakāḥ prāpnuvanti /	Similarly all collective words, like ‘group’ and the rest, would become meaningless, if they were used for the exclusion of their own constituents; as it is held that the group has no existence apart from the members that make up that group.
dvyādiśabdānāṃ ca viṣayasamuccayatvād ekādipratiṣedhe pratiṣidhyamānānamārthānām asamuccayatvād anarthakatvam taddarśayati na bhaveyus tathāvidhāiti /	As for the words ‘two’ and the rest, they also pertain to groups (of Two, Three, etc.); so that, if they denoted the exclusion of one and the rest, as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless.”
iṣṭās te samuccayagocarās tathāvidhā na bhaveyur ity arthaḥ /	This is the argument that is indicated by the words ‘They would not be so applicable’ (Text 985).
yaścāyam ago 'poho gaur na bhavatīti gośabdasyārthaḥ sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thābhāvaḥ / yadi bhāvaḥ sa kiṃ gaurarthāgauriti / yadi gauḥ nāsti vivādaḥ /	“Further, when it is asserted that what the word ‘Cow’ denotes is the ‘Apoha of other things’, i.e. something that is ‘not non-Cow’, is this something (A) Positive or (B) Negative? (A) If it is Positive, is it the Cow or the non-Cow? If it is the Cow, then there is no quarrel between us.
athāgauḥ gośabdasyāgaurartha ityatiśabdārthakauśalam /	If it is the non-Cow that is held to be denoted by the word ‘Cow’, this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words!
athābhāvaḥ tan na yuktam praiṣasampratipattyoraviṣayatvāt /	(B) Nor can it be something Negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction or comprehension thereof;
na hi śabdaśravaṇād abhāve praiṣaḥ sampratipattiś ca bhavet /	as a matter of fact, when one hears the word ‘Cow’, neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative.”
tadetad darśayati abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yam ityādi /	This is the argument that is indicated in the words ‘Nor can it be negative, etc., etc.’ ‘Praiṣa’ stands for Praiṣaṇa, Injunction;
praiṣaṇaṃ praiṣaḥ pratipādakena śroturarthe viniyogaḥ so 'yaṃ pratipādakadharmaḥ /	that is, the urging of the hearer by the Speaker to something; this belongs to the Speaker;
sampratipattiḥ śrotṛdharmaḥ /	while ‘Comprehension’ belongs to the hearer.
ādiśabdena bhāvadharmāḥ sarve vāhadohādayo gṛhyante /	The term ‘and the rest’ is meant to include such nouns as ‘carrier’, ‘milker’ and the like.
api ca śabdārthaḥ pratītyā pratīyate na ca gośabdādabhāvaṃ kaścit pratipadyate //	Lastly, it is by actual experience that the meaning of words is comprehended; and as a matter of fact, no one ever comprehends negation from the word ‘Cow’, (982-988)
nāgaur gaur iti śabdārthaḥ kasmāccāpoha iṣyate / kena hyagotvamāsaktaṃ gaur yenaitadapohyate // agaurapoho yaścāyaṃ gavi śabdārtha ucyate / sa kiṃ gorvyatirikto vāvyatirikta upeyate //	“Why is the denotation of the word (‘cow’) held to be the Apoha in the form ‘the cow is not non-cow’? Who has ever attributed the character of the non-cow to the cow that it is denied here? It is held that it is the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’ in the cow, which forms the denotation of the word;
vibhinno 'pyāśrito vā syād athavā syād anāśritaḥ / āśritatve guṇaḥ prāpto na dravyavacanaṃ tataḥ //	is this held to be something different from the cow? Or non-different? If it is different, does it abide or not abide anywhere? If it does abide, then it becomes a quality, and the word cannot be denotative of the substance;
ato gaur itiśabdena guṇamātrābhidhānataḥ / sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syān na gaurgacchati tiṣṭhati //	and thus as the word ‘cow’ would denote only a quality, there would be no co-ordination in such expressions as ‘the cow moves’, ‘the cow stands if it does not abide in any thing, then what would be the sense in which it could be mentioned, for the purpose of exclusion, by the term ‘agoḥ’, ‘of the non-cow’? If, lastly, the ‘Apoha’, ‘exclusion of others’ is held by you to be non-different (from the cow), then it comes to be the same as cow;
athānāśrita evāyaṃ yadyarthas tasya ko bhavet /	what more would, in that case, be expressed (by the term ‘Apoha’)?” (989-994)
yenāsau pratiṣedhāya gaur iti vyapadiśyate //	That is to say, you explain ‘Apoha’ as ‘not being the non-Cow’;
atha cāvyatirikto 'yam anyāpohastvayeṣyate / gaurevāyam ataḥ prāptaḥ kimuktam adhikaṃ tataḥ //	Further, if the phrase ‘the Cow is not the non-Cow’ is explained as the negation, in the Cow, of the non-Cow, then you should explain who has ever conceived of the Cow as the non-Cow, which conception would be negatived by the said Apoha?”
caśabdaḥ samuccaye /	The particle ‘ca’ (in Text, 989) has the collective sense;
kasmān na bhavatā gaur ityetasya nāgaurityeṣo 'pohalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārtha ucyata iti vākyārthaḥ /	what is meant by the sentence is why do you assert the denotation of the word ‘Cow’ to be the Apoha in the form of ‘Not non-Cow’?
kasmāt punar na vaktavyā ity āha kenetyādi /	‘Why should it not be so asserted’? (asks the Buddhist).
itaścāyukto 'poho vikalpānupapatteḥ / tathā hi yo 'yam agorapoho gavi sa kiṃ govyatiriktaḥāhosvidavyatiriktaḥyadyatiriktaḥ sa kimāśrito 'thānāśritaḥ /	The answer is ‘Who has, etc. etc.’ “For the following reason also Apoha cannot be accepted: Because none of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible: The Apoha, or Exclusion, of the non-Cow in the Cow, is this (A) Different, or (B) Non-different (from the Cow)? (A) If it is different;
yadyaśritas tadāśritatvād guṇaḥ prāptaḥ, tataś ca gośabdena guṇa evābhidhīyate nāgaur iti gaus tiṣṭhati gaur gacchatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti / athānāśritas tadā kenārthenāgorapoha iti ṣaṣṭhī syāt / athāvyatiritas tadā gaurevāsāviti na kiñcit kṛtaṃ bhavati //	(a) does it abide (in the Cow)? Or (6) does it not abide in it? (a) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a Quality; that is, the word ‘Cow’ denotes a Quality, and not the Substance, the animal, Cow; and tinder the circumstances, there can be no such Co-ordination as that expressed in the words ‘the Cow is standing’, ‘the Cow is moving’, (b) If, on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase ‘agoḥ apohaḥ’ (‘the Apoha of the non-Cow’)? (B) If, lastly, the Apoha is non-different from the Cow, then it is the same as the Cow, and the postulating of it is entirely futile.” (989-994)
pratibhāvamapoho 'yam eko 'neko 'pivā bhavet / yadyeko 'nekagoyukto gotvameva bhavedasau // anekatve 'pi cānantyaṃ piṇḍavatsamprayujyate /	“Is this Apoha one and the same in connection with all things? or is it several? If one, then, being related to several cows, it would be the same as the universal ‘cow’ if it is several, then it would be endless, like so many individual objects.
tena bhedavadevāsya vācyatā nopayujyate //	consequently, just like the diverse individuals, this also could not be ‘denoted’.
ayaṃ cāpohaḥ prativastveko 'neko veti vaktavyam / yadyekas tadānekagodravyasambandhī gotvam evāsau bhavet /	[Uddyotakara continues] “You should explain whether this Apoha is one and the same in regard to allngs? Or is it different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then it is the same as the Universal ‘Cow’.
athānekas tataḥ piṇḍavadānantyādākhyānānupapatter avācya eva syāt //	If on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual cow), then it is as endless as the individual objects themselves; so that no conception of it would be possible;
anyāpohaś ca kiṃ vācyaḥ kiṃ vāvācyo 'yam iṣyate / vācyo 'pi vidhirūpeṇa yadi vānyaniṣedhataḥ // vidhyātmanāsya vācyatve tyājyamekāntadarśanam / sarvatrānyanirāso 'yaṃ śabdārtha iti varṇitam //	which means that it cannot be denoted (995-996) “This Apoha, ‘exclusion of other things’ is it itself denoted or not-denoted? Even if it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or only as the ‘negation of other things’? If it is denoted as something positive, then you should abandon your extremist view, whereby it has been asserted that ‘in every case it is the exclusion of other things that is denoted by words.’ If, on the other hand, the said ‘exclusion’ (Apoha) is denoted in the form of the ‘exclusion of other things’, then such a view would involve an infinite regress.
athāpyavācya evāyaṃ yadyapohastvayeṣyate / tenānyāpohakṛcchabda iti bhādhyeta te vacaḥ //	If then it be held by you that the said Apoha (exclusion of other things) is not denoted, then your assertion, that ‘the word always brings about the exclusion of other things’, would become annulled.” (997-1000)
kiñcedaṃ tāvat praṣṭavyo bhavati bhavān, kimapoho vācyo 'thāvācya iti / vācyatve vidhirūpeṇa vā vācyaḥ syād anyavyāvṛttyā vā / tatra yadi vidhirūpeṇa tadā naikāntikaḥ śabdārtho 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti /	“You have to be questioned is this Apoha denoted or not denoted? If it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or as the ‘exclusion of other things’? If it is denoted as something positive, then the assertion that ‘The denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things’ is not universally true.
athānyavyāvṛttyeti pakṣas tadā tasyāpyanyavyavacchedasyāpareṇānyavyavacchedarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ tasyāpyapareṇetyavyavasthā syāt /	If it is denoted as the ‘exclusion of other things’, then that ‘exclusion of others’ would itself have to be denoted as another ‘exclusion of other things’; and so on and on, there would be no end to it.
athāvācyas tadānyaśabdārthāpohaṃ śabdaḥ karotīti vyāhanyeta //	If then the Apoha is held to be not-denoted, then that would contradict the statement that ‘the word brings about the exclusion of what is denoted by other words’.” (997-1000)
etat sarvamudyotakareṇoktam, upanyastam, tatrācāryadignāgenoktam ---"sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmāekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhate, tasmād guṇotkarṣādāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhu"riti /	All this has been set forth by Uddyotakara. In answer to this, the revered Diṅnāga has declared as follows: “In all cases, the substratum being the same, there is no disruption, and all that is desired is duly accomplished; hence in due course, all characteristics of the ‘Universal’, such as one-ness, eternality, complete subsistence in every component subsist in the Apoha itself. Consequently, on account of the superiority of its excellence, the only theory that is right is that ‘the denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things’.”
etadāśaṅkya kumārila upasaṃharannāha api caikatvetyādi /	In reference to this, Kumārila argues as follows, thereby summing up the arguments against the doctrine of Apoha: [see verses 1001-1002]
api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyinaḥ / nirupākhyeṣvapoheṣu kurvatostatra kaḥ paraḥ //	“Further, one-ness, eternality and subsistence in every individual, ore who would attribute these to Apohas which are peatureless, would be making cloth without yarns.
tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyogas teṣu kevalam /	From all this it follows that the element of ‘exclusion of others’ could be present only in the denotation of those words wherein the negative term is present;
bhaved anyanivṛttyaṃśaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate //	in all other cases the thing itself is what is denoted.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 163-164] (1001-1002)
yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga iti / abhakṣyo grāmasūka ityādiṣu / svātmaiveti / svarūpam eva vidhilakṣaṇam /	‘In those words alone where the negative term is present’, e.g. in such expressions as ‘abhakṣyo grāmasūkaraḥ’, ‘the tame hog is not-to-be-eaten ‘The thing itself’ in the positive form.
anyatreti naṭrahite //	‘In all other cases’ where the negative term is not present.
anyāpohāparijñānād evam ete kudṛṣṭayaḥ /	All these are wrong views based upon ignorance of what is meant by the ‘apoha, negation, of other things’.
svayaṃ tuṣṭā durātmāno nāśayanti parānapi //	People who are themselves damned damn others also.
tathā hi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ /	As a matter of fact, Apoha is of two kinds due to difference between (1) Paryudāsa (relative negation, contradistinction, exclusion) and (2) niṣedha (absolute negation, denial, prohibition).
dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmārthātmabhedataḥ //	Paryudāsa again is of two kinds (a) due to difference of conception (idea), and (b) due to difference of concept (object).
paryudāsaniṣedhata iti /	‘Due to difference, etc. etc.’;
paryudāsānniṣedhāc ca paryudāsalakṣaṇaḥ prasajyapratiṣedhaśceti [p.317] yāvat / buddhyātmārthātmabhedata iti /	i.e. because there is Relative Negation and Absolute Negation, there are two kinds of Apoha, Negation. ‘Due to difference in Conception, etc. etc.’ i.e. due to difference of the nature of the Conception, and due to difference of the nature of the Concept.
tatra buddhyātmā buddhipratibhāso 'rtheṣvanugataikarūpatvenādhyavasitaḥ arthātmā arthasvabhāvo vijātīyavyāvṛttyarthasvalakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ /	Of these ‘the nature of Conception’ consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form; and ‘the nature of Concept’ consists in the nature of the object, as contradistinguished from unlike objects, i.e. in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’;
anayor bhedo vibhāga iti samāsaḥ //	such is the sense of the compound.
ekapratyavamarśasya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā / abhayādisamā arthāḥ prakṛtyaivānyabhedinaḥ //	It has been explained on a previous occasion (text 723) that things like the Harītakī and other things, though distinct from one another, become the basis of unitary conception.
tānupāśritya yajjñāte bhātyarthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthātmatābhāve 'pyarthā ityeva niścitam //	on the basis of such things, there appears a reflection in the determinate cognition, which reflection is definitely apprehended (conceived of) as ‘objects’, even though the objective character is absent in it.
pureti pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ "yathā dhātryabhayādīnā"mtiyādinoktāḥ /	The following Text points out the form of Negation (Paryudāsa, Exclusion) in the form of Conception [see verses 1005-1006 above] ‘On a previous occasion’ i.e. in the chapter on the examination of the ‘Universal’, under Text 723 et seq.
tatroktam yathā harītakyādayo bahavo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekaṃ jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti / tathā sāvaleyādayo 'pyarthāḥ satyapi bhede prakṛtyaikākārapratyavamarśasya hetavo bhaviṣyantyantareṇāpi vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyam iti /	It has been explained there that, many such things as the Harītakī and the rest, without any commonalty among them, perform the same function of allaying fever and other diseases, and exactly in the same manner the Black and other Cows, even though different among themselves, become, by their very nature, the basis of the unitary conception, even without any such entity as the Commonalty or the Universal.
abhayādisamā iti / harītakyāditulyāḥ /	‘Abhayādisamāḥ’, i.e. like the Harītakī, etc.
ekārthakāritayā sāmyam /	the similarity consisting in fulfilling the same purpose.
tānupāśrityeti /	‘On the basis of such things, etc. etc.’;
tānabhayādisamānarthānāśritya hetukṛtya tadanubhavabalena yadutpannaṃ vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ tatra yadarthākāratayārthapratibimbakam arthābhāso bhāti	on the basis of consisting in objects like the Harītakī and the rest, brought about by the apprehension of the action of such causes, is the determinate Cognition; in this cognition there is the reflection, reflected image of the objects, i.e. there appears a reflection which is apprehended as the same as the objects;
tādātmyena tatrānyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñokteti sambandhaḥ /	and it is to this apprehension that the name ‘Apoha’ has been applied.
etac ca jñāna ityanena samānādhikaraṇam /	‘Determinate’, this is an adjective qualifying ‘cognition’.

api ca nānyāpoho 'nanyāpoha ityādau śabde vidhirūpādanyadvācyaṃ na nirūpyate nopalabhyata ity arthaḥ /

Then again, in the case of such expressions as ‘Na anyāpohaḥ Ananyapokaḥ’, there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something positive, Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the Apoha;

tathā hi nāpoharūpamātraṃ vācyaṃ gamyate pratiṣedhadvayena vidher evāvasayāt /

as the double negative always expresses the positive.

ādiśabdenānanyavyāvṛttirananyavyavaccheda ityādiparyāyagrahaṇam /

The particle ‘ādi’ (in the compound ‘ananyāpohaśabdādau’) stands for such synonyms as ‘ananyavyāvṛtti’, ‘ananyavyavaccheda’ and so forth.

nanu ca naṭāścāpi naṭā yuktāvityanenaiva gatatvāt punar uktam etat /

Objection: “What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words ‘Nañaścāpi nañā, etc.’; so that there is needless repetition”.

satyam etat /

True.

kiṃtvanyāpohaḥ śabdārtha ityevaṃ vādinā svavacanenaiva vidhiriṣṭa iti jñāpanārthaṃ punar ucyate /

But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself that ‘the denotation of words consists in the Exclusion of Others’ show that he regards the denotation to be positive.

tathā hyanyāpohaśabdasyānanyāpohaśabdārtho vyavacchedyaḥ sa ca vidher nānyo lakṣyate /

Because what the term ‘anyāpoha’, ‘Exclusion of Others’, excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term ‘ananyāpoha’, ‘Non-exclusion of Others’;

ye ca prameyajñeyābhidheyādayaḥ śabdās teṣāṃ na kiñcidapohyam asti /

Then there are such words as ‘cognisable’, ‘knowable’, ‘predicable’ and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these;

sarvasyaiva prameyatvādisvabhāvatvāt /

as all things are ‘cognisable’, etc. by their very nature.

tathā hi yannāma kiñcid vyavacchedyameṣāṃ kalpyate tat sarvaṃ vyavacchedākāreṇālambyamānaṃ jñeyādisvabhāvamevāvatiṣṭhate nahyaviṣayīkṛtaṃ vyavacchettuṃ śakyate /

If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely cognised in the form of ‘exclusion’; and as such would remain ‘cognisable’;

nanu hetumukhe nirdiṣṭam ajñeyaṃ kalpitaṃ kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam iti / tat katham avyāpitvaṃ śabdārthavyavasthāyā ity āha apohyetyādi /

because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true. “Rather than assume the thing to be excluded, it is ear better to assume the entity itself.

jñānākāraniṣedhāc ca nāntarārtho 'bhidhīyate // nacāpyapohyatā tasmān nāpohasteṣu siddhyati /

As the idea of things being of the form of cognitions has been rejected, what is denoted cannot be anything internal (subjective); nor is it possible for any subjective thing to be ‘excluded’.

evam ityādiśabdānāṃ na cāpohyaṃ nirūpyate //

Thus there can be no Apoha in the case of the words in question.

yadi jñeyam api sarvaṃ jñeyatvenāpohyam asya kalpyate tadā varaṃ vastveva vidhirūpam eva [p.313] śabdārthatvena vikalpitaṃ bhavedyadadhyavasīyate lokena /

Answer: [see verses 980-981 above] If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as ‘cognisable’, then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men.

evaṃ hyadṛṣṭāropo dṛṣṭārthāpalāpaś ca na kṛtaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ /

That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseen, nor the denial of the Seen.

ata eva varam ityuktam /

That is why it is spoken of as ‘far better’.

ye tvāhur vikalpapratibimbakam eva sarvaśabdānām arthas tadeva cābhidhīyatevyavacchidyata iti cocyata iti /

Some (Buddhists) have held the view that ‘what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed’.

tān pratīdamāha jñānākāraniṣedhāccetyādi /

The answer to this is As the idea of things, etc. etc. That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions;

nirākārā buddhir ākāravān bāhye 'rthaḥ sa ca bahirdeśasambandho vispaṣṭamupalabhyata ityevam asmābhir jñānākāro niṣiddhaḥ tasmād āntarasya buddhyārūḍhasyākārasyāsattvāt tadabhidhāyakatvaṃ śabdānām ayuktam /

and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.

nāpi tasyāntarasyārthasyāpohyatvaṃ yuktam asattvād eva /

Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected, for the same reason that no such thing exists.

teṣviti prameyādiśabdeṣu /

In the case of the words in question i.e. words like ‘Cognisable’.

ye ca evam ittham ityādayaḥ śabdās teṣām api na kiñcid apohyamupalabhyate, kasyacit pratiyoginaḥ paryudāsarūpasyābhāvāt /

Then again, there are such words as ‘evam’ (‘thus’, ‘ittham’ (‘in this way’, and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is found that can be ‘excluded’; as there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.

athāpi syāt naivam ityādi prasajyarūpaṃ niṣedhyaṃ bhavatīti /

It might be argued that ‘in such expressions as ‘na evam’ (‘not thus’, there is something probable that could be regarded as ‘excluded’.

naitad astyuktam atra /

This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out.

tathā hi atrāpi na naivam iti nirdeśe niṣedhasya niṣedhanam, evam ityaniṣiddhaṃ tu svarūpeṇaiva tiṣṭhatīti saiva pūrvoktā nītiravatarati //

Because here also, in the expression ‘na naivam’, there is negation of negation; and the ‘evam' remains in its own unnegatived positive form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.

etat sarvaṃ kumāriloktam upanyastam, sāmprataṃ sarvaśabdasyetyādinodyotakāroktam apohadūṣaṇam āśaṅkate

All the above has been set forth as put forward by Kumārila. With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by Uddyotakara against Apoha [In Nyāyavārtika on 2. 63, pp.

sarvaśabdasya kaścārtho vyavacchedyaḥ prakalpyate / nāsarvanāma kiñciddhi bhavedyasya nirākriyā //

332-333]: [see verses 982-988] “In the case of the word ‘all’ (‘sarva’) what is it that is assumed to be the ‘excluded’? There is no such thing as the non-all, which could be excluded.

ekādyasarvamiti cedarthāpohaḥ prasajyate / aṅgānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvād aniṣṭeścāṅginaḥ pṛthak //

If it be urged that ‘one and the rest’ are the non-all, then it comes to be the exclusion of the denotation itself; as the parts would be excluded, and no whole is admitted.

evaṃ samūhaśabdārthe samudāyivyapohataḥ /

Similarly, in regard to the denotation of the word ‘group’ (‘samūha’), the constituents would be excluded;

anyāniṣṭeś ca sarve 'pi prāpnuvanti nirarthakāḥ //

and nothing apart from this is admitted; hence all such words become deprived of their meaning.

dvyādiśabdā iheṣṭāś ca ye samuccayagocarāḥ / ekādipratiṣedhena na bhaveyus tathāvidhāḥ //

As regards the words ‘two’ and the rest, which also are applied to groups, as the ‘one’ and other constituents would be excluded, they could no longer be so applicable.

nāgaur iti ca yo 'pohā gośabdasyārtha ucyate /

Then again, the denotation of the word ‘cow’ is said to be the ‘non-non-cow’;

sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thavābhāvo bhāvo gaurvāthavāpyagauḥ //

now is this positive or negative? If it is positive, is it the cow or the non-cow? If it is the cow, then there is no dispute;

gauścennāsti vivādo 'yam arthastu vidhilakṣaṇaḥ / agaurgośabdavācyaścedatiśabdārthakauśalam //

as the denotation turns out to be of the positive character. On the other hand, if it is the non-cow that is denoted by the word ‘cow’, that would exhibit a wonderful insight into the meanings of words indeed!

abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yaṃ praiṣādīnām asambhavāt /

Nor can it be negative; as, in that case injunction and the rest would not be possible.

na hi gośabdataḥ kaścid abhāvaṃ pratipadyate //

Nor does any one ever comprehend a negation from the word ‘cow’.” (982-988)

[p.314] sa hyāha apohaḥ śabdārtha ityayuktam etat avyāpakatvāt /

Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “It cannot be right to say that words denote the Apoha of other things; because this explanation cannot apply to all words;

yatra dvairāśyaṃ bhavati tadetarapratiṣedhāditaratpratīyate yathā gaur itipade gauḥ pratīyamāno 'gaur niṣedhyamānaḥ /

that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word ‘Cow’ is heard, the Cow is affirmed and the non-Cow is denied.

na punaḥ sarvapade etad asti / na hyasarvaṃ nāma kiñcid asti yat sarvaśabdena nivartyeta /

But this is not possible in the case of the word ‘Sarva’ (‘all’), as there is no suchng as non-all, which could be denied by the word ‘all’.

atha manyase ekādyasarvaṃ tatsarvaśabdena nivartyata iti /

so that our explanation takes in this case also You mean that one and the rest are the contradictories of all, the non-all which are excluded by the word ‘all’.

tan na svārthāpavādadoṣaprasaṅgāt /

But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of words abandoning their own meaning.

evaṃ hyekādivyudāsena pravartamānaḥ sarvaśabdo 'ṅgapratiṣedhādaṅgavyatiriktasyāṅgino 'nabhyupagamād anarthakaḥ syāt /

If the word ‘all’ excludes one and the rest, inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the All, and (for the Buddhist) the whole has no existence apart from its constituents, the exclusion of one and the rest would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the All, and there would be nothing left for the word ‘all’ to denote: and this word would thus become meaningless.

aṅgaśabdenaikadeśa ucyate /

[The word ‘aṅga’ stands for part].

evaṃ sarve samudāyaśabdā ekadeśapratiṣedharūpeṇa pravartamānāḥ samudāyivyatiriktasyānyasya samudāyasyānabhyupagamād anarthakāḥ prāpnuvanti /

Similarly all collective words, like ‘group’ and the rest, would become meaningless, if they were used for the exclusion of their own constituents; as it is held that the group has no existence apart from the members that make up that group.

dvyādiśabdānāṃ ca viṣayasamuccayatvād ekādipratiṣedhe pratiṣidhyamānānamārthānām asamuccayatvād anarthakatvam taddarśayati na bhaveyus tathāvidhāiti /

As for the words ‘two’ and the rest, they also pertain to groups (of Two, Three, etc.); so that, if they denoted the exclusion of one and the rest, as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless.”

iṣṭās te samuccayagocarās tathāvidhā na bhaveyur ity arthaḥ /

This is the argument that is indicated by the words ‘They would not be so applicable’ (Text 985).

yaścāyam ago 'poho gaur na bhavatīti gośabdasyārthaḥ sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thābhāvaḥ / yadi bhāvaḥ sa kiṃ gaurarthāgauriti / yadi gauḥ nāsti vivādaḥ /

“Further, when it is asserted that what the word ‘Cow’ denotes is the ‘Apoha of other things’, i.e. something that is ‘not non-Cow’, is this something (A) Positive or (B) Negative? (A) If it is Positive, is it the Cow or the non-Cow? If it is the Cow, then there is no quarrel between us.

athāgauḥ gośabdasyāgaurartha ityatiśabdārthakauśalam /

If it is the non-Cow that is held to be denoted by the word ‘Cow’, this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words!

athābhāvaḥ tan na yuktam praiṣasampratipattyoraviṣayatvāt /

(B) Nor can it be something Negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction or comprehension thereof;

na hi śabdaśravaṇād abhāve praiṣaḥ sampratipattiś ca bhavet /

as a matter of fact, when one hears the word ‘Cow’, neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative.”

tadetad darśayati abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yam ityādi /

This is the argument that is indicated in the words ‘Nor can it be negative, etc., etc.’ ‘Praiṣa’ stands for Praiṣaṇa, Injunction;

praiṣaṇaṃ praiṣaḥ pratipādakena śroturarthe viniyogaḥ so 'yaṃ pratipādakadharmaḥ /

that is, the urging of the hearer by the Speaker to something; this belongs to the Speaker;

sampratipattiḥ śrotṛdharmaḥ /

while ‘Comprehension’ belongs to the hearer.

ādiśabdena bhāvadharmāḥ sarve vāhadohādayo gṛhyante /

The term ‘and the rest’ is meant to include such nouns as ‘carrier’, ‘milker’ and the like.

api ca śabdārthaḥ pratītyā pratīyate na ca gośabdādabhāvaṃ kaścit pratipadyate //

Lastly, it is by actual experience that the meaning of words is comprehended; and as a matter of fact, no one ever comprehends negation from the word ‘Cow’, (982-988)

nāgaur gaur iti śabdārthaḥ kasmāccāpoha iṣyate / kena hyagotvamāsaktaṃ gaur yenaitadapohyate // agaurapoho yaścāyaṃ gavi śabdārtha ucyate / sa kiṃ gorvyatirikto vāvyatirikta upeyate //

“Why is the denotation of the word (‘cow’) held to be the Apoha in the form ‘the cow is not non-cow’? Who has ever attributed the character of the non-cow to the cow that it is denied here? It is held that it is the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’ in the cow, which forms the denotation of the word;

vibhinno 'pyāśrito vā syād athavā syād anāśritaḥ / āśritatve guṇaḥ prāpto na dravyavacanaṃ tataḥ //

is this held to be something different from the cow? Or non-different? If it is different, does it abide or not abide anywhere? If it does abide, then it becomes a quality, and the word cannot be denotative of the substance;

ato gaur itiśabdena guṇamātrābhidhānataḥ / sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syān na gaurgacchati tiṣṭhati //

and thus as the word ‘cow’ would denote only a quality, there would be no co-ordination in such expressions as ‘the cow moves’, ‘the cow stands if it does not abide in any thing, then what would be the sense in which it could be mentioned, for the purpose of exclusion, by the term ‘agoḥ’, ‘of the non-cow’? If, lastly, the ‘Apoha’, ‘exclusion of others’ is held by you to be non-different (from the cow), then it comes to be the same as cow;

athānāśrita evāyaṃ yadyarthas tasya ko bhavet /

what more would, in that case, be expressed (by the term ‘Apoha’)?” (989-994)

yenāsau pratiṣedhāya gaur iti vyapadiśyate //

That is to say, you explain ‘Apoha’ as ‘not being the non-Cow’;

atha cāvyatirikto 'yam anyāpohastvayeṣyate / gaurevāyam ataḥ prāptaḥ kimuktam adhikaṃ tataḥ //

Further, if the phrase ‘the Cow is not the non-Cow’ is explained as the negation, in the Cow, of the non-Cow, then you should explain who has ever conceived of the Cow as the non-Cow, which conception would be negatived by the said Apoha?”

caśabdaḥ samuccaye /

The particle ‘ca’ (in Text, 989) has the collective sense;

kasmān na bhavatā gaur ityetasya nāgaurityeṣo 'pohalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārtha ucyata iti vākyārthaḥ /

what is meant by the sentence is why do you assert the denotation of the word ‘Cow’ to be the Apoha in the form of ‘Not non-Cow’?

kasmāt punar na vaktavyā ity āha kenetyādi /

‘Why should it not be so asserted’? (asks the Buddhist).

itaścāyukto 'poho vikalpānupapatteḥ / tathā hi yo 'yam agorapoho gavi sa kiṃ govyatiriktaḥāhosvidavyatiriktaḥyadyatiriktaḥ sa kimāśrito 'thānāśritaḥ /

The answer is ‘Who has, etc. etc.’ “For the following reason also Apoha cannot be accepted: Because none of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible: The Apoha, or Exclusion, of the non-Cow in the Cow, is this (A) Different, or (B) Non-different (from the Cow)? (A) If it is different;

yadyaśritas tadāśritatvād guṇaḥ prāptaḥ, tataś ca gośabdena guṇa evābhidhīyate nāgaur iti gaus tiṣṭhati gaur gacchatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti / athānāśritas tadā kenārthenāgorapoha iti ṣaṣṭhī syāt / athāvyatiritas tadā gaurevāsāviti na kiñcit kṛtaṃ bhavati //

(a) does it abide (in the Cow)? Or (6) does it not abide in it? (a) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a Quality; that is, the word ‘Cow’ denotes a Quality, and not the Substance, the animal, Cow; and tinder the circumstances, there can be no such Co-ordination as that expressed in the words ‘the Cow is standing’, ‘the Cow is moving’, (b) If, on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase ‘agoḥ apohaḥ’ (‘the Apoha of the non-Cow’)? (B) If, lastly, the Apoha is non-different from the Cow, then it is the same as the Cow, and the postulating of it is entirely futile.” (989-994)

pratibhāvamapoho 'yam eko 'neko 'pivā bhavet / yadyeko 'nekagoyukto gotvameva bhavedasau // anekatve 'pi cānantyaṃ piṇḍavatsamprayujyate /

“Is this Apoha one and the same in connection with all things? or is it several? If one, then, being related to several cows, it would be the same as the universal ‘cow’ if it is several, then it would be endless, like so many individual objects.

tena bhedavadevāsya vācyatā nopayujyate //

consequently, just like the diverse individuals, this also could not be ‘denoted’.

ayaṃ cāpohaḥ prativastveko 'neko veti vaktavyam / yadyekas tadānekagodravyasambandhī gotvam evāsau bhavet /

[Uddyotakara continues] “You should explain whether this Apoha is one and the same in regard to allngs? Or is it different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then it is the same as the Universal ‘Cow’.

athānekas tataḥ piṇḍavadānantyādākhyānānupapatter avācya eva syāt //

If on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual cow), then it is as endless as the individual objects themselves; so that no conception of it would be possible;

anyāpohaś ca kiṃ vācyaḥ kiṃ vāvācyo 'yam iṣyate / vācyo 'pi vidhirūpeṇa yadi vānyaniṣedhataḥ // vidhyātmanāsya vācyatve tyājyamekāntadarśanam / sarvatrānyanirāso 'yaṃ śabdārtha iti varṇitam //

which means that it cannot be denoted (995-996) “This Apoha, ‘exclusion of other things’ is it itself denoted or not-denoted? Even if it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or only as the ‘negation of other things’? If it is denoted as something positive, then you should abandon your extremist view, whereby it has been asserted that ‘in every case it is the exclusion of other things that is denoted by words.’ If, on the other hand, the said ‘exclusion’ (Apoha) is denoted in the form of the ‘exclusion of other things’, then such a view would involve an infinite regress.

athāpyavācya evāyaṃ yadyapohastvayeṣyate / tenānyāpohakṛcchabda iti bhādhyeta te vacaḥ //

If then it be held by you that the said Apoha (exclusion of other things) is not denoted, then your assertion, that ‘the word always brings about the exclusion of other things’, would become annulled.” (997-1000)

kiñcedaṃ tāvat praṣṭavyo bhavati bhavān, kimapoho vācyo 'thāvācya iti / vācyatve vidhirūpeṇa vā vācyaḥ syād anyavyāvṛttyā vā / tatra yadi vidhirūpeṇa tadā naikāntikaḥ śabdārtho 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti /

“You have to be questioned is this Apoha denoted or not denoted? If it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or as the ‘exclusion of other things’? If it is denoted as something positive, then the assertion that ‘The denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things’ is not universally true.

athānyavyāvṛttyeti pakṣas tadā tasyāpyanyavyavacchedasyāpareṇānyavyavacchedarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ tasyāpyapareṇetyavyavasthā syāt /

If it is denoted as the ‘exclusion of other things’, then that ‘exclusion of others’ would itself have to be denoted as another ‘exclusion of other things’; and so on and on, there would be no end to it.

athāvācyas tadānyaśabdārthāpohaṃ śabdaḥ karotīti vyāhanyeta //

If then the Apoha is held to be not-denoted, then that would contradict the statement that ‘the word brings about the exclusion of what is denoted by other words’.” (997-1000)

etat sarvamudyotakareṇoktam, upanyastam, tatrācāryadignāgenoktam ---"sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmāekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhate, tasmād guṇotkarṣādāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhu"riti /

All this has been set forth by Uddyotakara. In answer to this, the revered Diṅnāga has declared as follows: “In all cases, the substratum being the same, there is no disruption, and all that is desired is duly accomplished; hence in due course, all characteristics of the ‘Universal’, such as one-ness, eternality, complete subsistence in every component subsist in the Apoha itself. Consequently, on account of the superiority of its excellence, the only theory that is right is that ‘the denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things’.”

etadāśaṅkya kumārila upasaṃharannāha api caikatvetyādi /

In reference to this, Kumārila argues as follows, thereby summing up the arguments against the doctrine of Apoha: [see verses 1001-1002]

api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyinaḥ / nirupākhyeṣvapoheṣu kurvatostatra kaḥ paraḥ //

“Further, one-ness, eternality and subsistence in every individual, ore who would attribute these to Apohas which are peatureless, would be making cloth without yarns.

tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyogas teṣu kevalam /

From all this it follows that the element of ‘exclusion of others’ could be present only in the denotation of those words wherein the negative term is present;

bhaved anyanivṛttyaṃśaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate //

in all other cases the thing itself is what is denoted.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 163-164] (1001-1002)

yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga iti / abhakṣyo grāmasūka ityādiṣu / svātmaiveti / svarūpam eva vidhilakṣaṇam /

‘In those words alone where the negative term is present’, e.g. in such expressions as ‘abhakṣyo grāmasūkaraḥ’, ‘the tame hog is not-to-be-eaten ‘The thing itself’ in the positive form.

anyatreti naṭrahite //

‘In all other cases’ where the negative term is not present.

anyāpohāparijñānād evam ete kudṛṣṭayaḥ /

All these are wrong views based upon ignorance of what is meant by the ‘apoha, negation, of other things’.

svayaṃ tuṣṭā durātmāno nāśayanti parānapi //

People who are themselves damned damn others also.

tathā hi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ /

As a matter of fact, Apoha is of two kinds due to difference between (1) Paryudāsa (relative negation, contradistinction, exclusion) and (2) niṣedha (absolute negation, denial, prohibition).

dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmārthātmabhedataḥ //

Paryudāsa again is of two kinds (a) due to difference of conception (idea), and (b) due to difference of concept (object).

paryudāsaniṣedhata iti /

‘Due to difference, etc. etc.’;

paryudāsānniṣedhāc ca paryudāsalakṣaṇaḥ prasajyapratiṣedhaśceti [p.317] yāvat / buddhyātmārthātmabhedata iti /

i.e. because there is Relative Negation and Absolute Negation, there are two kinds of Apoha, Negation. ‘Due to difference in Conception, etc. etc.’ i.e. due to difference of the nature of the Conception, and due to difference of the nature of the Concept.

tatra buddhyātmā buddhipratibhāso 'rtheṣvanugataikarūpatvenādhyavasitaḥ arthātmā arthasvabhāvo vijātīyavyāvṛttyarthasvalakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ /

Of these ‘the nature of Conception’ consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form; and ‘the nature of Concept’ consists in the nature of the object, as contradistinguished from unlike objects, i.e. in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’;

anayor bhedo vibhāga iti samāsaḥ //

such is the sense of the compound.

ekapratyavamarśasya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā / abhayādisamā arthāḥ prakṛtyaivānyabhedinaḥ //

It has been explained on a previous occasion (text 723) that things like the Harītakī and other things, though distinct from one another, become the basis of unitary conception.

tānupāśritya yajjñāte bhātyarthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthātmatābhāve 'pyarthā ityeva niścitam //

on the basis of such things, there appears a reflection in the determinate cognition, which reflection is definitely apprehended (conceived of) as ‘objects’, even though the objective character is absent in it.

pureti pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ "yathā dhātryabhayādīnā"mtiyādinoktāḥ /

The following Text points out the form of Negation (Paryudāsa, Exclusion) in the form of Conception [see verses 1005-1006 above] ‘On a previous occasion’ i.e. in the chapter on the examination of the ‘Universal’, under Text 723 et seq.

tatroktam yathā harītakyādayo bahavo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekaṃ jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti / tathā sāvaleyādayo 'pyarthāḥ satyapi bhede prakṛtyaikākārapratyavamarśasya hetavo bhaviṣyantyantareṇāpi vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyam iti /

It has been explained there that, many such things as the Harītakī and the rest, without any commonalty among them, perform the same function of allaying fever and other diseases, and exactly in the same manner the Black and other Cows, even though different among themselves, become, by their very nature, the basis of the unitary conception, even without any such entity as the Commonalty or the Universal.

abhayādisamā iti / harītakyāditulyāḥ /

‘Abhayādisamāḥ’, i.e. like the Harītakī, etc.

ekārthakāritayā sāmyam /

the similarity consisting in fulfilling the same purpose.

tānupāśrityeti /

‘On the basis of such things, etc. etc.’;

tānabhayādisamānarthānāśritya hetukṛtya tadanubhavabalena yadutpannaṃ vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ tatra yadarthākāratayārthapratibimbakam arthābhāso bhāti

on the basis of consisting in objects like the Harītakī and the rest, brought about by the apprehension of the action of such causes, is the determinate Cognition; in this cognition there is the reflection, reflected image of the objects, i.e. there appears a reflection which is apprehended as the same as the objects;

tādātmyena tatrānyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñokteti sambandhaḥ /

and it is to this apprehension that the name ‘Apoha’ has been applied.

etac ca jñāna ityanena samānādhikaraṇam /

‘Determinate’, this is an adjective qualifying ‘cognition’.