buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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na ca nīlotpalayor anīlotpalavyavacchedarūpatvenābhāvarūpayor ādhārādheyādisambandhaḥ sambhavati nīrūpatvāt /	in the case of the Blue-Lotus however, inasmuch as the two are of the nature of the negation of Blue and negation of Lotus, which are mere negations, and hence devoid of any form, there cannot be any such relation between them as that of Container and Contained and the like.
ādigrahaṇena saṃyogasamavāyaikārthasamavāyādisambandhagrahaṇam /	The term ‘and the rest’, includes such relations as those of Conjunction, Inherence, Inherence in a common substratum and so forth.
na cāsati vāstave sambandhe tadviśiṣṭasya pratipattir yuktātiprasaṅgāt //	In the absence of any real relation, it is not right that there should be a notion of one being qualified by the other.
athāpi syānnaivāsmākam anīlādivyāvṛttyā viśiṣṭo 'nutpalādivyavacchedo 'bhimato yato 'yaṃ doṣaḥ syāt /	If it were so, then there would be an incongruity. “As a matter of fact, any thing uncommon (unique, specific) is never cognised as qualified by the Apoha.
kiṃ tarhianīlāntpalābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaṃ vastveva tathā vyavasthitam /	how too could any relationship be assumed between an entity and a non-entity? [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 86] (946)
tadarthāntaranivṛttyā viśiṣṭaṃ śabdenocyata ityayam artho 'trābhipreta ityata āha na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastvityādi /	hence the said objection cannot apply to us. What we mean is that there is an entity which is excluded from the non-blue and the non-lotus: and what is denoted by the word is that entity as qualified by the exclusion of otherngs
na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu gamyate 'pohavattayā /	Even if the uncommon entity be apprehended even so, it cannot be qualified by the exclusion of other things;
kathaṃ vā parikalpyeta sambandho vastvavastunoḥ //	this is what is shown by the words ‘How too, etc. etc.’;
avastu apohaḥ asādhāraṇaṃ tu vastu na cāvastuvastunoḥ sambandho yukto vastudvayādhāratvāt tasya //	the ‘non-entity’ is the Apoha, the ‘Entity’ is the uncommon thing; and there can be no connection between the entity and the non-entity; because connection always rests upon two entities.
api ca bhavatu nāma sambandhas tathāpi viśeṣaṇatvamapohasya na yuktam iti darśayati svarūpetyādi /	“Further, the connection may be there; even so, the Apoha cannot be regarded as the qualifying factor”; this is shown in the following [see verse 947 next]
svarūpasattvamātreṇa na syāt kiñcid viśeṣaṇam /	“In fact, nothing can serve as a qualification. by its mere existence;
svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam //	it is only when it colours the qualified with its own cognition that it becomes its qualification.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 87] (947)
nahi sattāmātreṇotpalādīnāṃ nīlādi viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati /	The Blue does not become a qualification of the Lotus by its mere existence;
kiṃ tarhijñātaṃ sadyatsvākārānuraktayā buddhyā viśeṣyaṃ rañjayati tadviśeṣaṇamucyate //	what then? When one thing, on being cognised, colours the qualified thing with the cognition tinged with its own form, then alone it is said to be the qualification of that thing.
nacāpohe 'yaṃ prakāraḥ sambhavatīti darśayati na cāpītyādi /	This process of qualification is not possible in the case of Apoha; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 948 next]
na cāpyaśvādiśabdebhyo jāyate 'pohabhodhanam /	“The terms ‘horse’ and the rest do not bring about the cognition of the Apoha;
viśeṣyabuddhiriṣṭeha na cājñātaviśeṣaṇā // na hyaśvādibuddhyāpoho vyavasīyate kiṃ tarhivastveva /	and the idea of the qualified that is held in this connection cannot be one in which the qualification is not cognised.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 88] (948) As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Horse and other non-cows does not apprehend the Apoha;
tataścāpohasya bodhāsa [p.302] mbhavān na tena svabuddhyā rajyate 'śvādiḥ /	and thus there being no possibility of the Apoha being cognised, it cannot colour the Horse, etc. with its own cognition.
syād etad ajñāto 'pyapoho viśeṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha viśeṣyetyādi /	It might be urged that “Even without being itself cognised, the Apoha could be the qualification”. The answer to this is that ‘the Idea of the qualified, etc. etc.’;
na jñātaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathoktā //	there can never be a cognition of the qualified thing of which the qualification is not apprehended.
na cānyarūpamanyādṛkkuryājjñānaṃ viśeṣaṇam /	“The qualification cannot bring about a cognition which is like something totally different;
kathaṃ cānyādṛśe jñāne taducyeta viśeṣaṇam //	for how can that be said to be the qualification in a cognition which is like something different?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 89] (949)
sarvam eva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ svākārānurūpaṃ viśeṣye buddhiṃ janayaddṛṣṭam /	Every qualification is found to bring about in regard to the qualified thing a cognition in keeping with its own form;
na tvanyādṛśaṃ viśeṣaṇamanyādṛśīṃ buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayati /	and one kind of qualification does not bring about a cognition like something else;
na hi nīlamutpale raktam iti pratyayamutpādayati, daṇḍo vā kuṇḍalīti / na cātrāśvādiṣvabhāvānuraktā śābdī buddhirupajāyate /	e.g. the Blue does not produce in regard to the Lotus the cognition of Red; nor does the stick bring about in regard to the Stick-holder, the idea of his wearing ear-rings. In the case in question also, the verbal cognition that appears in connection with the Horse„ etc. is not coloured by negative character;
kiṃ tarhibhāvākārādhyavasāyinī /	on the other hand, it partakes of the positive character.
syād etad anyādṛśam api jñānaṃ janayad viśeṣaṇam ucyata ity āha kathaṃ cānyādṛśa ityādi /	It might be argued that “Even when bringing about a cognition unlike itself, a qualification can be so called.” The answer to that is ‘How can, etc. etc.’ ‘Like something different’, i.e. unlike the qualification itself.
yadi syāt ko doṣa ity āha athānyathetyādi /	Question: “What would be the harm if it did?” Answer: [see verse 950 next]
athānyathā viśeṣe 'pi syād viśeṣaṇakalpanā / tathā sati hi yat kiñcit prapadyeta viśeṣaṇam //	“If a qualification be regarded as such even in regard to the qualified thing which is totally different, then, everything can serve as the qualification (of everything).” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 90] (950)
atha yadi bhavato viśeṣaṇānanurūpatayānyathā vyavasthite 'pi viśeṣe syād, viśeṣaṇakalpanā, tathā sati sarvam eva nīlādi sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ syāt tataścāvyavasthā syāt //	If, for you, there were an assumption of something being a qualification, even in regard to a Qualified thing, which is unlike, and not like, in accordance with the form of, that Qualification, then everything, Blue and the rest, could be the Qualification of everything; and there would be no restriction at all.
abhāvagamyarūpe ca na viśeṣye 'sti vastutā /	“If the qualified thing is cognisable in the form of negation, then it cannot be an entity;
viśeṣitamapohena vastu vācyaṃ na te 'styataḥ //	consequently for you, there can be no entity that could be denoted by words as qualified by Apoha.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 91] (951)
abhāvo 'pohaḥ, tenāpohena tādrūpyādgamyam abhāvagamyam, abhāvagamyaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya vastunas tat tathoktam /	It might be argued that ‘the Apoha does colour the Qualified Entity with its own Cognition (Idea)’. The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 951 above] ‘Negation’ i.e. the Apoha; ‘cognisable in the form’ i.e. cognised as being of the same form as;
yadyabhāvarūpeṇa vastunaḥ pratītiḥ syāt tadā tasya vastutvam eva na syāt, bhāvābhāvayor virodhāt /	if the Qualified thing has its character such that it is cognisable in the form of negation; i.e. if the thing is cognised in the form of Negation, then it ceases to be a positive Entity;
prakṛtamupasaṃharann āha viśeṣitamityādi //	The argument is summed up in the words ‘Consequently, for you, etc. etc.’.
syād etad anyavyāvṛtta eva vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttir dṛśyate, nāpoharahite, tenā [p.303] pohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ pratipādyata ityabhidhīyate natu prasajyamātrapratipādanāt, tena yathoktaḥ sarvaḥ pratītyādivirodho na bhaviṣyatītyāśaṅkyāha yadyapītyādi / yadyapyapohanirmukte na vṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ /	The following might be urged ‘As a matter of fact, Words and Inferential Indicatives are found to operate only in regard to things as excluded from others, and not as devoid of such exclusion (Apoha); and it is on that ground that it is asserted that the Apoha is established by Words and Indications; and it is not on the basis of the pointing out of what is excluded; so that all that has been urged regarding the theory being contrary to experience is not relevant at all’.
yadi nāma tadvastvanyato vyāvṛttaṃ, tathāpi tatrotpadyamānaḥ śabdaliṅgodbhavo bodho 'nyavyāvṛttiṃ satīm api nāvalambate, kiṃ tarhivastvaṃśamevābhidhāvati tatraivānurāgāt /	Even though the thing may be ‘excluded from others’, yet when Cognition arises in regard to it, through Words and Indicatives, it does not rest upon that ‘Exclusion of others’ which may be there, but upon the element of ‘Entity’;
ya evāṃśo vastunaḥ śābdena laiṅgikena vā pratyayenāvasīyate sa eva tasya	as it is to this latter that it is attached.
viṣayo nānavasīyamānaḥ sannapi, nahi mālatīśabdasya gandhādayo vidyamānatayā vācyā vyavasthāpyante // na cāpyetad yuktam, yadanyavyāvṛtte vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttirityetad darśayati na cetyādi /	That factor of the thing which is apprehended by the Verbal or Inferential Cognition is really the object of that Cognition, and not anything else which, even though present, is not apprehended. For instance, even though the smell and other properties of the flower are there, yet these are not held to be denoted by the word ‘Mālatī’.
na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu buddhau viparivartate /	“As a matter of fact, the uncommon thing never figures in the cognition;
na cāpi nirvikalpatvāt tasya yuktādhigamyatā //	nor again can it be rightly regarded as cognisable, because it is ‘indeterminate’.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 93] (953)
anyavyāvṛttaṃ hi vastu bhavadbhavatāṃ matena svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇameva bhavet, naca tacchabdaliṅgajāyāṃ buddhau viparivartata iti bhavatāṃ matam / tasya nirvikalpabuddhigrāhyatvāt /	When a thing is ‘excluded from others’, it can, under your doctrine, be only the Uncommon Specific Individuality, and yet it is your view that this latter does not figure in Cognition brought about by Words and Indicatives on the ground that it is apprehensible only by ‘indeterminate, non-conceptual cognition’, while Cognition born of Words and Indicatives appertains to commonalty.
śabdaliṅgajabuddheś ca sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt / athāpi svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvamasyā abhyupagamyate tadapi yuktyā na saṅgacchata iti darśayann āha na cāpītyādi /	If it he held that this latter Cognition does apprehend the Specific Individuality, then this cannot be in accordance with Reason; this is what is shown in the words ‘Nor again can it be rightly, etc. etc.’ that is to say, the Uncommon (Specific) Entity cannot be apprehended by Cognition born of Words and Indicatives;
na hyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu śabdaliṅgajapratyayādhigamyaṃ tatra sarvavikalpānāmpratyastamayāt /	because all conceptual ideas are absent in that Entity;
tathā hi vikalpo jātyādiviśeṣaṇasaṃsparśenaiva pravartate naca śuddhavastuparigraheṇa //	as Conceptual Thought operates only through the contact of the ‘Universal’ and such other qualifications and never through the pure Thing-in-itself.
athāpi syācchabdenāgamyamānamapyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu vyāvṛttyā viśiṣṭamity ucyata ity āha śabdenāgamyamānaṃ cetyādi / śabdenāgamyamānaṃ ca viśeṣyam iti sāhasam /	“The statement that ‘what is not apprehended by the word is yet qualified’ is too bold. for all these reasons the commonalty should be regarded as the object of words and indicatives.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 94] (954) It might be argued that ‘Even though the Uncommon Entity may not be apprehended by Words, it can be said to be qualified by Exclusion’.
tena sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ viṣayo buddhiśabdayoḥ //	and because of its ‘exclusion’, it must be an entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 95] (955)
prakārāntareṇa sāmānyasya vastutvaṃ sādhayann āha yadetyādi /	The author proceeds to prove, in another way, the fact of Commonalty (Universal) being a real entity: [see verse 955 above]
yadā cāśabdavācyatvaṃ na vyaktīnām apohyatā /	That is, the Uncommon (Specific) Entities cannot be expressed by words;
[p.304] vyaktīnām iti /	hence they cannot be regarded as ‘excluded’;
asādhāraṇavasturūpāṇām avācyatvānnāpohyatā, anuktasya nirākartumaśakyatvāt /	because what is not spoken of cannot be denied (or excluded).
apohyeta sāmānyam iti / tasya vācyatvād iti bhāvaḥ //	The Commonalty alone is what could be excluded, that is, because that alone is what is expressed by words.
syād etad yadi nāma sāmānyamapohyeta, tathāpi kathaṃ tasya vastutvaṃ sidhyatītyata āha nāpohyatvam ityādi /	It might be asked ‘if the Commonalty (or Universal) were excluded, even so, how could that establish it as an entity?’. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 956 above]
abhāvānām iti apohānāṃ /	‘Negations’ i.e. Apohas, Exclusions.
yadi bhaved vastutvam eva syāt /	If there were exclusions of these Exclusions, they would be positive entities.
abhāvānām abhāvarūpatyāgād ity arthaḥ / etad uktaṃ bhavati yadyapohānām apohyatvaṃ bhavet, tadaiṣāmabhāvarūpatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ bhavet, tat pratiṣedhe ca bhavatyabhāvairabhāvarūpatvaṃ tyaktaṃ syāt /	The reason for this is set forth ‘For if they were, etc. etc.’ That is, the negative character would be abandoned by those exclusions. What is meant is as follows If Exclusions were excluded, then their negative character would be denied; and when there is this denial, the Negations would abandon their negative character;
tataścābhāvānām apohalakṣaṇānām abhāvarūpatyāgād vastutvam eva bhaved ityeka /	and thence the Negations in the shape of the Exclusions having abandoned their negative character, they would become positive entities.
anye tvāhuḥ abhāvābhāvavarjanād iti / abhāvānām abhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ / na hyabhāvasvabhāvā apohā apohya yujyante /	Others explain the words of the text ‘abhāvābhāvavarjanāt’ to mean ‘because there can be no negation of negations’; i.e. it is not right that ‘Exclusions’ (Apohas) which are negative should be ‘excluded’;
vastuviṣayatvāt pratiṣedhasyeti yāvat /	because all ‘exclusion’ (denial) is of the positive entity.
tasmād vyaktaḥ sphuṭo 'pohāntare 'ścādāvapohāntarasya gavāder apoho bhavan sāmānyabhūtasyaiveti niścīyate /	From all this it is clear that when there is (exclusion) of one Apoha, the Cow, in another Apoha, the Horse, it could be an exclusion of the ‘Universal’ only.
ataḥ siddhamapohyatvād vastutvaṃ sāmānyasyeti //	It is established therefore that the Universal, being the object of ‘Exclusion’, must be a positive entity.
apicāpohānāṃ parasparato vailakṣaṇyaṃ vā syād availakṣaṇyaṃ vā, tatrādye	Then again, the Apohas could be either different or non-different among themselves. If they are held to be different, then there are objections to that view.
abhāvasya agośabdābhidheyasya abhāvo yo gośabdābhidheyo 'rthaḥ / sa cet tasmāt pūrvoktād abhāvād vilakṣaṇo 'nya ity arthaḥ /	If, ‘Of the negation’ i.e. of that negation which is denoted by the word ‘non-cow’, ‘the negation’ i.e. that which is denoted by the word ‘cow’, were different from the former Negation, i.e. something other than it, then it would be a Positive Entity;
tadānīṃ bhāva eva bhavet abhāvanivṛttimātrarūpatvād bhāvasya /	because the positive character consists only in the absence of negation.
no ced vilakṣaṇas tadā gaurapyagorbhavataḥ prasajyate tadavailakṣaṇyena tādātmyapratipatteḥ //	If it is not different from it, then, for you, the Cow also should be Non-Cow; because what is not-different must be understood to be the same.
syād etad gavāśvādiśabdaiḥ svalakṣaṇānyeva parasparato vyāvṛttānyapohyantenābhāvaḥ tenāpohyatvena teṣāṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāpādānaṃ nāniṣṭamityata āha yadyapītyādi / yadyapyanyeṣu śabdeṣu vastunaḥ syād apohyatā /	“Though in the case of other words, a positive entity may be what is ‘excluded’, yet in the case of the word ‘sat’ (‘being’), nothing apart from ‘negation’ is regarded as ‘excluded’. [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 98] (958) The following might he urged ‘What are excluded by the words Cow and Horse are only the Specific Individualities as excluded from one another; and it is not Negations that are excluded;
sacchabdasya tvabhāvākhyān nāpohyaṃ bhinnamiṣyate //	hence the contingency of their becoming positive entities cannot be unacceptable to us’.
[p.305] yadyapi sacchabdād anyeṣu gavādiṣabdeṣu vastunaḥ parvatāder apohyatā sidhyati, sacchabdasya svabhāvākhyād apohyānnānyadapohyam asti, abhāva evāpohya	In the case of words other than ‘Being’ e.g. such words as ‘Cow’ and the rest, it may be that what is excluded is an entity, in the form of the Hill and other things; but in the case of the word ‘Being’ itself, there is nothing that could be held to be excluded except that which is called ‘Negation’;
ity arthaḥ /	that is, Negation alone can be excluded;
asadvyavahāravyavacchedena sacchabdasya pravṛttatvāt //	because the word ‘Being’ is used only in the sense of excluding what is non-being, (Nonexistent).
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha tatrāsato 'pītyādi /	Question: ‘What is the harm if that is so?’ Answer: [see verse 959 next]
tatrāsato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo mahānbhavet /	“In that case, even the non-existent (non-being) would have a positive character; which would be a great calamity.
tadasiddho na sattāsti na vā sattā prasiddhyati //	And when there is no negation, there would be no existence (positive) at all;
pūrvavad abhāvābhāvavarjanād asato 'pohe vastutvam eva syāt /	As shown before (under 956, above) ‘Negations would abandon their negative character’, hence if there were exclusion of the non-existent, it would be a positive entity;
tataścāpohavādino 'bhyupagamādiviruddhamasato 'pi vastutvaṃ prasaktam api mahadbata kaṣṭam āpatitam /	and as this would involve the idea of the nonexistent also being a positive entity, which would be contrary to the Apohist’s doctrine, this would be a great calamity for him.
astvabhāvasyāpi vastutvam iti cedāha tadasiddhāv ityādi / tasyābhāvasyāsiddhau satyāṃ na sattā kasyacid bhāvasya siddhyet /	It might be said ‘The Negation may be an entity, what then?’ The answer is ‘When there is no Negation, etc. etc.’ When there would be no Negation, there would be no ‘existence’ of anything at all;
abhāvavyavacchedena tasya bhavan matena sthitalakṣaṇatvāt /	because, according to your view, existence is only the exclusion or negation of non-existence;
tasya cābhāvasyāpohyatve sati vastutvaprasaṅgena svarūpāsiddher asattāpi na siddhyati, tasyāḥ sattāvyavacchedarūpatvāt, sattāyāś ca yathoktena prakāreṇāyogāt //	as that also is only the exclusion or negation of existence, and existence does not exist, as shown above. “Either diversity or the positive character of Apohas cannot be assumed to be due to the diversity of impressions; because impression cannot be held to exist when there is no entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 100] (960)
yat pūrvamuktam ---"apohyaiḥ sa bahiḥsaṃsthair bhidyete"tyādi, yaccoktam ---"avastutvād apohānāṃ naiva bheda" ityādi /	It has been asserted before (a) that ‘they would be differentiated by the excludedngs’ (Text, 929), and (b) that ‘there can be no difference among Apohas because they are non-entities’ (Text, 926).
tatra kecid bauddhāḥ parihāramāhuḥ na khalvapohyabhedā{dā}dhārabhedād	These arguments have been thus answered by certain Bauddhas: ‘The difference among Apohas is due, not to the difference of substrata, nor to the difference among the excluded things;
vāpohānāṃ bhedo 'pi tvanādikālapravṛttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣvartheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinna ivārthātmāna ivāsvabhāvā apyapohāḥ samāropyante te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ	what happens is that on diverse external objects there are superimposed Apohas which are themselves featureless, and consist only in the form of those objects, and hence appearing as diverse; they are so superimposed by cognitions, which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse unreal objects, and are related to variegated conceptual Impressions extending over all time without beginning; and being thus superimposed, these Apohas appear as diverse and as existing; so that the diversity and positive character of Apohas would be due to the diversity of the said Impressions’.
bhaviṣyatītyatrāha na cāpītyādi /	This is answered in the following [see verse 960 above]
na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi vā /	As a matter of fact, no one holds the view that Impressions or Tendencies belong to the non-entity.
nirviṣayo na kaścit pratyayo 'stīti nirloḍitametad vijñānavādavicāre /	That there is no objectless Cognition has also been thoroughly discussed and proved in course of our examination of Idealism.
tataś ca vitathārthānāṃ vikalpānām ayogāt tadāhitāpi vāsanā kuto bhaviṣyati /	Hence there can be no conceptions based upon unreal objects; how then can there be any Impression resting upon such conception?
avastunīti ālambanabhūte vastunyasati nirviṣayavijñānāyogena vāsanādhāyakavijñānābhāvāt kuto vāsanetyarthaḥ / tataś ca vāsanābhāvāt kuto vāsanākṛto 'pohānāṃ bhedaḥ sadrūpatā vā bhaviṣyatīti bhāvaḥ //	‘Avastuni’, i.e. when there is no Entity which could be its substratum ; and when there can be no Cognition without objects, as there could be no cognition that could produce the Impression how could there be any Impression? And when there is no Impression, how could the diversity among Apohas or their positive character, be due to Impressions? (960)
bhavadbhiḥ śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyante / na hyāsādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāgadṛṣṭitaḥ //	“You cannot base the diversity among words also upon the said conditions. there can be no ‘uncommon’ denotative word, as no such could have been perceived before.
tatra śabdāntarāpohaṃ sāmānye parikalpite / tathaivāvasturūpatvācchabdabhedo na kalpyate //	Under the circumstances, if a ‘commonalty’ were assumed in the shape of the ‘Apoha (exclusion) of other words’, as it could only be a non-entity, as shown above, there could be no diversity among words.
vācakānāṃ yathā naiva vācyavācakayor mithaḥ /	Just as among denotative words, so between the ‘denoted’ and ‘denotative’ also there could be no difference.
na cāpyapohyabhedena bhedo 'stītyupapāditam //	That there can be no ‘difference’ based upon the difference in the ‘excluded things’ has already been explained.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 102, 104, 105] (961-963)
śabdānāṃ bhinnasāmānyavacanānāṃ viśeṣavacanānāṃ ca parasparato bhedaḥ śabdabhedaḥ /	The term ‘Śabdabhedaḥ’ stands for the mutual difference among words denotative of diverse Universals and those denotative of Particulars.
tannimitta iti sa vāsanābhedo vācyāpohabhedo vā nimittaṃ kāraṇamasyeti tannimittaḥ /	‘Upon the said conditions’, i.e. based upon the diversity of Impressions or on the diversity of the ‘Excluded Apohas’.
nanu pratyakṣata eva śabdānāṃ kāraṇabhedād viruddhadharmādhyāsāc ca bhedaḥ prasiddha evetyāha na hyasādhāraṇa ityādi /	Objection: ‘Among words, diversity is clearly perceived, as based upon their source and upon the imposition on them of mutually contradictory characters’. Answer: ‘There can be no uncommon word, etc. etc.’ What is said here is with reference to the denotative word;
vācakaṃ hi śabdam adhikṛtyaitaducyate na ca śrotrajñānāvaseyoḥ yaḥ svalakṣaṇātmāsādhāraṇaśabdo vācakaḥ /	and what is meant is that the uncommon word, which is apprehended in auditory Perception, as of the nature of a ‘Specific Individuality’, cannot be denotative.
kasmād ity āha prāgadṛṣṭita iti /	Why? Because no such could have been perceived before;
yo hi vyavahārakālāvasthāyī śabdaḥ sa vyavahārakālāt prāk saṅketakāle na dṛṣṭaḥ yo dṛṣṭas tasya ciraniruddhatvān na tena vyavahāraḥ na ca saṅketakāle yo na dṛṣṭas tena vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	that is, the Word that is there at the time of usage will not have been perceived before that usage, i.e. at the time of the making of the Convention relating to it; and the word that was perceived at that time will have long ceased to exist, so that there could be no usage of that word; nor is it right that there should be any usage based upon the word that was not perceived at the time of the Convention;
tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya vācakatvam /	From all this it follows that the Specific Individuality cannot be denotative.
bhavatām api cātra vivāda eva /	In fact, among you yourselves, there is a difference on this point;
yathoktam nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate / tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt sāmānyaṃ tūpadekṣyate //	as it has been stated (by one of yourselves) that ‘no particular thing can be denoted, and no particular word can be denotative, because it has not been perceived before;
tasmād vācakaṃ śabdamadhikṛtyābhidhānād adoṣaḥ / tatraivam avasthite sati śabdāntarāpohaḥ śabdasāmānyaṃ vācakaṃ yadi kalpyate yathārthāntarāpoho 'rthasāmānyaṃ tadā tathaiva pūrvoktena vidhinā saṃsṛṣṭaikatvanānātvetyādinoktena vācyāpohānām iva śabdāpohānām api parasparato bhedo na ghaṭate /	it is the Commonalty (Universal) that will be so, as is going to be explained Hence no objection can be taken to what we have said regarding the denotative word. Such being the case, ii it be held that what is denotative is the ‘Exclusion of other words,’ in the form of the ‘Word Universal’, in the same way as the ‘Exclusion of other things’ is of the form of the ‘Tiling Universal’, then, as shown above, under Text 926, as there can be no diversity among the denoted Apohas, so there can be no diversity among the denotative Apohas also;

na ca nīlotpalayor anīlotpalavyavacchedarūpatvenābhāvarūpayor ādhārādheyādisambandhaḥ sambhavati nīrūpatvāt /

in the case of the Blue-Lotus however, inasmuch as the two are of the nature of the negation of Blue and negation of Lotus, which are mere negations, and hence devoid of any form, there cannot be any such relation between them as that of Container and Contained and the like.

ādigrahaṇena saṃyogasamavāyaikārthasamavāyādisambandhagrahaṇam /

The term ‘and the rest’, includes such relations as those of Conjunction, Inherence, Inherence in a common substratum and so forth.

na cāsati vāstave sambandhe tadviśiṣṭasya pratipattir yuktātiprasaṅgāt //

In the absence of any real relation, it is not right that there should be a notion of one being qualified by the other.

athāpi syānnaivāsmākam anīlādivyāvṛttyā viśiṣṭo 'nutpalādivyavacchedo 'bhimato yato 'yaṃ doṣaḥ syāt /

If it were so, then there would be an incongruity. “As a matter of fact, any thing uncommon (unique, specific) is never cognised as qualified by the Apoha.

kiṃ tarhianīlāntpalābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaṃ vastveva tathā vyavasthitam /

how too could any relationship be assumed between an entity and a non-entity? [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 86] (946)

tadarthāntaranivṛttyā viśiṣṭaṃ śabdenocyata ityayam artho 'trābhipreta ityata āha na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastvityādi /

hence the said objection cannot apply to us. What we mean is that there is an entity which is excluded from the non-blue and the non-lotus: and what is denoted by the word is that entity as qualified by the exclusion of otherngs

na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu gamyate 'pohavattayā /

Even if the uncommon entity be apprehended even so, it cannot be qualified by the exclusion of other things;

kathaṃ vā parikalpyeta sambandho vastvavastunoḥ //

this is what is shown by the words ‘How too, etc. etc.’;

avastu apohaḥ asādhāraṇaṃ tu vastu na cāvastuvastunoḥ sambandho yukto vastudvayādhāratvāt tasya //

the ‘non-entity’ is the Apoha, the ‘Entity’ is the uncommon thing; and there can be no connection between the entity and the non-entity; because connection always rests upon two entities.

api ca bhavatu nāma sambandhas tathāpi viśeṣaṇatvamapohasya na yuktam iti darśayati svarūpetyādi /

“Further, the connection may be there; even so, the Apoha cannot be regarded as the qualifying factor”; this is shown in the following [see verse 947 next]

svarūpasattvamātreṇa na syāt kiñcid viśeṣaṇam /

“In fact, nothing can serve as a qualification. by its mere existence;

svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam //

it is only when it colours the qualified with its own cognition that it becomes its qualification.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 87] (947)

nahi sattāmātreṇotpalādīnāṃ nīlādi viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati /

The Blue does not become a qualification of the Lotus by its mere existence;

kiṃ tarhijñātaṃ sadyatsvākārānuraktayā buddhyā viśeṣyaṃ rañjayati tadviśeṣaṇamucyate //

what then? When one thing, on being cognised, colours the qualified thing with the cognition tinged with its own form, then alone it is said to be the qualification of that thing.

nacāpohe 'yaṃ prakāraḥ sambhavatīti darśayati na cāpītyādi /

This process of qualification is not possible in the case of Apoha; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 948 next]

na cāpyaśvādiśabdebhyo jāyate 'pohabhodhanam /

“The terms ‘horse’ and the rest do not bring about the cognition of the Apoha;

viśeṣyabuddhiriṣṭeha na cājñātaviśeṣaṇā // na hyaśvādibuddhyāpoho vyavasīyate kiṃ tarhivastveva /

and the idea of the qualified that is held in this connection cannot be one in which the qualification is not cognised.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 88] (948) As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Horse and other non-cows does not apprehend the Apoha;

tataścāpohasya bodhāsa [p.302] mbhavān na tena svabuddhyā rajyate 'śvādiḥ /

and thus there being no possibility of the Apoha being cognised, it cannot colour the Horse, etc. with its own cognition.

syād etad ajñāto 'pyapoho viśeṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha viśeṣyetyādi /

It might be urged that “Even without being itself cognised, the Apoha could be the qualification”. The answer to this is that ‘the Idea of the qualified, etc. etc.’;

na jñātaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathoktā //

there can never be a cognition of the qualified thing of which the qualification is not apprehended.

na cānyarūpamanyādṛkkuryājjñānaṃ viśeṣaṇam /

“The qualification cannot bring about a cognition which is like something totally different;

kathaṃ cānyādṛśe jñāne taducyeta viśeṣaṇam //

for how can that be said to be the qualification in a cognition which is like something different?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 89] (949)

sarvam eva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ svākārānurūpaṃ viśeṣye buddhiṃ janayaddṛṣṭam /

Every qualification is found to bring about in regard to the qualified thing a cognition in keeping with its own form;

na tvanyādṛśaṃ viśeṣaṇamanyādṛśīṃ buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayati /

and one kind of qualification does not bring about a cognition like something else;

na hi nīlamutpale raktam iti pratyayamutpādayati, daṇḍo vā kuṇḍalīti / na cātrāśvādiṣvabhāvānuraktā śābdī buddhirupajāyate /

e.g. the Blue does not produce in regard to the Lotus the cognition of Red; nor does the stick bring about in regard to the Stick-holder, the idea of his wearing ear-rings. In the case in question also, the verbal cognition that appears in connection with the Horse„ etc. is not coloured by negative character;

kiṃ tarhibhāvākārādhyavasāyinī /

on the other hand, it partakes of the positive character.

syād etad anyādṛśam api jñānaṃ janayad viśeṣaṇam ucyata ity āha kathaṃ cānyādṛśa ityādi /

It might be argued that “Even when bringing about a cognition unlike itself, a qualification can be so called.” The answer to that is ‘How can, etc. etc.’ ‘Like something different’, i.e. unlike the qualification itself.

yadi syāt ko doṣa ity āha athānyathetyādi /

Question: “What would be the harm if it did?” Answer: [see verse 950 next]

athānyathā viśeṣe 'pi syād viśeṣaṇakalpanā / tathā sati hi yat kiñcit prapadyeta viśeṣaṇam //

“If a qualification be regarded as such even in regard to the qualified thing which is totally different, then, everything can serve as the qualification (of everything).” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 90] (950)

atha yadi bhavato viśeṣaṇānanurūpatayānyathā vyavasthite 'pi viśeṣe syād, viśeṣaṇakalpanā, tathā sati sarvam eva nīlādi sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ syāt tataścāvyavasthā syāt //

If, for you, there were an assumption of something being a qualification, even in regard to a Qualified thing, which is unlike, and not like, in accordance with the form of, that Qualification, then everything, Blue and the rest, could be the Qualification of everything; and there would be no restriction at all.

abhāvagamyarūpe ca na viśeṣye 'sti vastutā /

“If the qualified thing is cognisable in the form of negation, then it cannot be an entity;

viśeṣitamapohena vastu vācyaṃ na te 'styataḥ //

consequently for you, there can be no entity that could be denoted by words as qualified by Apoha.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 91] (951)

abhāvo 'pohaḥ, tenāpohena tādrūpyādgamyam abhāvagamyam, abhāvagamyaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya vastunas tat tathoktam /

It might be argued that ‘the Apoha does colour the Qualified Entity with its own Cognition (Idea)’. The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 951 above] ‘Negation’ i.e. the Apoha; ‘cognisable in the form’ i.e. cognised as being of the same form as;

yadyabhāvarūpeṇa vastunaḥ pratītiḥ syāt tadā tasya vastutvam eva na syāt, bhāvābhāvayor virodhāt /

if the Qualified thing has its character such that it is cognisable in the form of negation; i.e. if the thing is cognised in the form of Negation, then it ceases to be a positive Entity;

prakṛtamupasaṃharann āha viśeṣitamityādi //

The argument is summed up in the words ‘Consequently, for you, etc. etc.’.

syād etad anyavyāvṛtta eva vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttir dṛśyate, nāpoharahite, tenā [p.303] pohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ pratipādyata ityabhidhīyate natu prasajyamātrapratipādanāt, tena yathoktaḥ sarvaḥ pratītyādivirodho na bhaviṣyatītyāśaṅkyāha yadyapītyādi / yadyapyapohanirmukte na vṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ /

The following might be urged ‘As a matter of fact, Words and Inferential Indicatives are found to operate only in regard to things as excluded from others, and not as devoid of such exclusion (Apoha); and it is on that ground that it is asserted that the Apoha is established by Words and Indications; and it is not on the basis of the pointing out of what is excluded; so that all that has been urged regarding the theory being contrary to experience is not relevant at all’.

yadi nāma tadvastvanyato vyāvṛttaṃ, tathāpi tatrotpadyamānaḥ śabdaliṅgodbhavo bodho 'nyavyāvṛttiṃ satīm api nāvalambate, kiṃ tarhivastvaṃśamevābhidhāvati tatraivānurāgāt /

Even though the thing may be ‘excluded from others’, yet when Cognition arises in regard to it, through Words and Indicatives, it does not rest upon that ‘Exclusion of others’ which may be there, but upon the element of ‘Entity’;

ya evāṃśo vastunaḥ śābdena laiṅgikena vā pratyayenāvasīyate sa eva tasya

as it is to this latter that it is attached.

viṣayo nānavasīyamānaḥ sannapi, nahi mālatīśabdasya gandhādayo vidyamānatayā vācyā vyavasthāpyante // na cāpyetad yuktam, yadanyavyāvṛtte vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttirityetad darśayati na cetyādi /

That factor of the thing which is apprehended by the Verbal or Inferential Cognition is really the object of that Cognition, and not anything else which, even though present, is not apprehended. For instance, even though the smell and other properties of the flower are there, yet these are not held to be denoted by the word ‘Mālatī’.

na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu buddhau viparivartate /

“As a matter of fact, the uncommon thing never figures in the cognition;

na cāpi nirvikalpatvāt tasya yuktādhigamyatā //

nor again can it be rightly regarded as cognisable, because it is ‘indeterminate’.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 93] (953)

anyavyāvṛttaṃ hi vastu bhavadbhavatāṃ matena svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇameva bhavet, naca tacchabdaliṅgajāyāṃ buddhau viparivartata iti bhavatāṃ matam / tasya nirvikalpabuddhigrāhyatvāt /

When a thing is ‘excluded from others’, it can, under your doctrine, be only the Uncommon Specific Individuality, and yet it is your view that this latter does not figure in Cognition brought about by Words and Indicatives on the ground that it is apprehensible only by ‘indeterminate, non-conceptual cognition’, while Cognition born of Words and Indicatives appertains to commonalty.

śabdaliṅgajabuddheś ca sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt / athāpi svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvamasyā abhyupagamyate tadapi yuktyā na saṅgacchata iti darśayann āha na cāpītyādi /

If it he held that this latter Cognition does apprehend the Specific Individuality, then this cannot be in accordance with Reason; this is what is shown in the words ‘Nor again can it be rightly, etc. etc.’ that is to say, the Uncommon (Specific) Entity cannot be apprehended by Cognition born of Words and Indicatives;

na hyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu śabdaliṅgajapratyayādhigamyaṃ tatra sarvavikalpānāmpratyastamayāt /

because all conceptual ideas are absent in that Entity;

tathā hi vikalpo jātyādiviśeṣaṇasaṃsparśenaiva pravartate naca śuddhavastuparigraheṇa //

as Conceptual Thought operates only through the contact of the ‘Universal’ and such other qualifications and never through the pure Thing-in-itself.

athāpi syācchabdenāgamyamānamapyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu vyāvṛttyā viśiṣṭamity ucyata ity āha śabdenāgamyamānaṃ cetyādi / śabdenāgamyamānaṃ ca viśeṣyam iti sāhasam /

“The statement that ‘what is not apprehended by the word is yet qualified’ is too bold. for all these reasons the commonalty should be regarded as the object of words and indicatives.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 94] (954) It might be argued that ‘Even though the Uncommon Entity may not be apprehended by Words, it can be said to be qualified by Exclusion’.

tena sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ viṣayo buddhiśabdayoḥ //

and because of its ‘exclusion’, it must be an entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 95] (955)

prakārāntareṇa sāmānyasya vastutvaṃ sādhayann āha yadetyādi /

The author proceeds to prove, in another way, the fact of Commonalty (Universal) being a real entity: [see verse 955 above]

yadā cāśabdavācyatvaṃ na vyaktīnām apohyatā /

That is, the Uncommon (Specific) Entities cannot be expressed by words;

[p.304] vyaktīnām iti /

hence they cannot be regarded as ‘excluded’;

asādhāraṇavasturūpāṇām avācyatvānnāpohyatā, anuktasya nirākartumaśakyatvāt /

because what is not spoken of cannot be denied (or excluded).

apohyeta sāmānyam iti / tasya vācyatvād iti bhāvaḥ //

The Commonalty alone is what could be excluded, that is, because that alone is what is expressed by words.

syād etad yadi nāma sāmānyamapohyeta, tathāpi kathaṃ tasya vastutvaṃ sidhyatītyata āha nāpohyatvam ityādi /

It might be asked ‘if the Commonalty (or Universal) were excluded, even so, how could that establish it as an entity?’. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 956 above]

abhāvānām iti apohānāṃ /

‘Negations’ i.e. Apohas, Exclusions.

yadi bhaved vastutvam eva syāt /

If there were exclusions of these Exclusions, they would be positive entities.

abhāvānām abhāvarūpatyāgād ity arthaḥ / etad uktaṃ bhavati yadyapohānām apohyatvaṃ bhavet, tadaiṣāmabhāvarūpatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ bhavet, tat pratiṣedhe ca bhavatyabhāvairabhāvarūpatvaṃ tyaktaṃ syāt /

The reason for this is set forth ‘For if they were, etc. etc.’ That is, the negative character would be abandoned by those exclusions. What is meant is as follows If Exclusions were excluded, then their negative character would be denied; and when there is this denial, the Negations would abandon their negative character;

tataścābhāvānām apohalakṣaṇānām abhāvarūpatyāgād vastutvam eva bhaved ityeka /

and thence the Negations in the shape of the Exclusions having abandoned their negative character, they would become positive entities.

anye tvāhuḥ abhāvābhāvavarjanād iti / abhāvānām abhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ / na hyabhāvasvabhāvā apohā apohya yujyante /

Others explain the words of the text ‘abhāvābhāvavarjanāt’ to mean ‘because there can be no negation of negations’; i.e. it is not right that ‘Exclusions’ (Apohas) which are negative should be ‘excluded’;

vastuviṣayatvāt pratiṣedhasyeti yāvat /

because all ‘exclusion’ (denial) is of the positive entity.

tasmād vyaktaḥ sphuṭo 'pohāntare 'ścādāvapohāntarasya gavāder apoho bhavan sāmānyabhūtasyaiveti niścīyate /

From all this it is clear that when there is (exclusion) of one Apoha, the Cow, in another Apoha, the Horse, it could be an exclusion of the ‘Universal’ only.

ataḥ siddhamapohyatvād vastutvaṃ sāmānyasyeti //

It is established therefore that the Universal, being the object of ‘Exclusion’, must be a positive entity.

apicāpohānāṃ parasparato vailakṣaṇyaṃ vā syād availakṣaṇyaṃ vā, tatrādye

Then again, the Apohas could be either different or non-different among themselves. If they are held to be different, then there are objections to that view.

abhāvasya agośabdābhidheyasya abhāvo yo gośabdābhidheyo 'rthaḥ / sa cet tasmāt pūrvoktād abhāvād vilakṣaṇo 'nya ity arthaḥ /

If, ‘Of the negation’ i.e. of that negation which is denoted by the word ‘non-cow’, ‘the negation’ i.e. that which is denoted by the word ‘cow’, were different from the former Negation, i.e. something other than it, then it would be a Positive Entity;

tadānīṃ bhāva eva bhavet abhāvanivṛttimātrarūpatvād bhāvasya /

because the positive character consists only in the absence of negation.

no ced vilakṣaṇas tadā gaurapyagorbhavataḥ prasajyate tadavailakṣaṇyena tādātmyapratipatteḥ //

If it is not different from it, then, for you, the Cow also should be Non-Cow; because what is not-different must be understood to be the same.

syād etad gavāśvādiśabdaiḥ svalakṣaṇānyeva parasparato vyāvṛttānyapohyantenābhāvaḥ tenāpohyatvena teṣāṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāpādānaṃ nāniṣṭamityata āha yadyapītyādi / yadyapyanyeṣu śabdeṣu vastunaḥ syād apohyatā /

“Though in the case of other words, a positive entity may be what is ‘excluded’, yet in the case of the word ‘sat’ (‘being’), nothing apart from ‘negation’ is regarded as ‘excluded’. [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 98] (958) The following might he urged ‘What are excluded by the words Cow and Horse are only the Specific Individualities as excluded from one another; and it is not Negations that are excluded;

sacchabdasya tvabhāvākhyān nāpohyaṃ bhinnamiṣyate //

hence the contingency of their becoming positive entities cannot be unacceptable to us’.

[p.305] yadyapi sacchabdād anyeṣu gavādiṣabdeṣu vastunaḥ parvatāder apohyatā sidhyati, sacchabdasya svabhāvākhyād apohyānnānyadapohyam asti, abhāva evāpohya

In the case of words other than ‘Being’ e.g. such words as ‘Cow’ and the rest, it may be that what is excluded is an entity, in the form of the Hill and other things; but in the case of the word ‘Being’ itself, there is nothing that could be held to be excluded except that which is called ‘Negation’;

ity arthaḥ /

that is, Negation alone can be excluded;

asadvyavahāravyavacchedena sacchabdasya pravṛttatvāt //

because the word ‘Being’ is used only in the sense of excluding what is non-being, (Nonexistent).

tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha tatrāsato 'pītyādi /

Question: ‘What is the harm if that is so?’ Answer: [see verse 959 next]

tatrāsato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo mahānbhavet /

“In that case, even the non-existent (non-being) would have a positive character; which would be a great calamity.

tadasiddho na sattāsti na vā sattā prasiddhyati //

And when there is no negation, there would be no existence (positive) at all;

pūrvavad abhāvābhāvavarjanād asato 'pohe vastutvam eva syāt /

As shown before (under 956, above) ‘Negations would abandon their negative character’, hence if there were exclusion of the non-existent, it would be a positive entity;

tataścāpohavādino 'bhyupagamādiviruddhamasato 'pi vastutvaṃ prasaktam api mahadbata kaṣṭam āpatitam /

and as this would involve the idea of the nonexistent also being a positive entity, which would be contrary to the Apohist’s doctrine, this would be a great calamity for him.

astvabhāvasyāpi vastutvam iti cedāha tadasiddhāv ityādi / tasyābhāvasyāsiddhau satyāṃ na sattā kasyacid bhāvasya siddhyet /

It might be said ‘The Negation may be an entity, what then?’ The answer is ‘When there is no Negation, etc. etc.’ When there would be no Negation, there would be no ‘existence’ of anything at all;

abhāvavyavacchedena tasya bhavan matena sthitalakṣaṇatvāt /

because, according to your view, existence is only the exclusion or negation of non-existence;

tasya cābhāvasyāpohyatve sati vastutvaprasaṅgena svarūpāsiddher asattāpi na siddhyati, tasyāḥ sattāvyavacchedarūpatvāt, sattāyāś ca yathoktena prakāreṇāyogāt //

as that also is only the exclusion or negation of existence, and existence does not exist, as shown above. “Either diversity or the positive character of Apohas cannot be assumed to be due to the diversity of impressions; because impression cannot be held to exist when there is no entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 100] (960)

yat pūrvamuktam ---"apohyaiḥ sa bahiḥsaṃsthair bhidyete"tyādi, yaccoktam ---"avastutvād apohānāṃ naiva bheda" ityādi /

It has been asserted before (a) that ‘they would be differentiated by the excludedngs’ (Text, 929), and (b) that ‘there can be no difference among Apohas because they are non-entities’ (Text, 926).

tatra kecid bauddhāḥ parihāramāhuḥ na khalvapohyabhedā{dā}dhārabhedād

These arguments have been thus answered by certain Bauddhas: ‘The difference among Apohas is due, not to the difference of substrata, nor to the difference among the excluded things;

vāpohānāṃ bhedo 'pi tvanādikālapravṛttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣvartheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinna ivārthātmāna ivāsvabhāvā apyapohāḥ samāropyante te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ

what happens is that on diverse external objects there are superimposed Apohas which are themselves featureless, and consist only in the form of those objects, and hence appearing as diverse; they are so superimposed by cognitions, which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse unreal objects, and are related to variegated conceptual Impressions extending over all time without beginning; and being thus superimposed, these Apohas appear as diverse and as existing; so that the diversity and positive character of Apohas would be due to the diversity of the said Impressions’.

bhaviṣyatītyatrāha na cāpītyādi /

This is answered in the following [see verse 960 above]

na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi vā /

As a matter of fact, no one holds the view that Impressions or Tendencies belong to the non-entity.

nirviṣayo na kaścit pratyayo 'stīti nirloḍitametad vijñānavādavicāre /

That there is no objectless Cognition has also been thoroughly discussed and proved in course of our examination of Idealism.

tataś ca vitathārthānāṃ vikalpānām ayogāt tadāhitāpi vāsanā kuto bhaviṣyati /

Hence there can be no conceptions based upon unreal objects; how then can there be any Impression resting upon such conception?

avastunīti ālambanabhūte vastunyasati nirviṣayavijñānāyogena vāsanādhāyakavijñānābhāvāt kuto vāsanetyarthaḥ / tataś ca vāsanābhāvāt kuto vāsanākṛto 'pohānāṃ bhedaḥ sadrūpatā vā bhaviṣyatīti bhāvaḥ //

‘Avastuni’, i.e. when there is no Entity which could be its substratum ; and when there can be no Cognition without objects, as there could be no cognition that could produce the Impression how could there be any Impression? And when there is no Impression, how could the diversity among Apohas or their positive character, be due to Impressions? (960)

bhavadbhiḥ śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyante / na hyāsādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāgadṛṣṭitaḥ //

“You cannot base the diversity among words also upon the said conditions. there can be no ‘uncommon’ denotative word, as no such could have been perceived before.

tatra śabdāntarāpohaṃ sāmānye parikalpite / tathaivāvasturūpatvācchabdabhedo na kalpyate //

Under the circumstances, if a ‘commonalty’ were assumed in the shape of the ‘Apoha (exclusion) of other words’, as it could only be a non-entity, as shown above, there could be no diversity among words.

vācakānāṃ yathā naiva vācyavācakayor mithaḥ /

Just as among denotative words, so between the ‘denoted’ and ‘denotative’ also there could be no difference.

na cāpyapohyabhedena bhedo 'stītyupapāditam //

That there can be no ‘difference’ based upon the difference in the ‘excluded things’ has already been explained.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 102, 104, 105] (961-963)

śabdānāṃ bhinnasāmānyavacanānāṃ viśeṣavacanānāṃ ca parasparato bhedaḥ śabdabhedaḥ /

The term ‘Śabdabhedaḥ’ stands for the mutual difference among words denotative of diverse Universals and those denotative of Particulars.

tannimitta iti sa vāsanābhedo vācyāpohabhedo vā nimittaṃ kāraṇamasyeti tannimittaḥ /

‘Upon the said conditions’, i.e. based upon the diversity of Impressions or on the diversity of the ‘Excluded Apohas’.

nanu pratyakṣata eva śabdānāṃ kāraṇabhedād viruddhadharmādhyāsāc ca bhedaḥ prasiddha evetyāha na hyasādhāraṇa ityādi /

Objection: ‘Among words, diversity is clearly perceived, as based upon their source and upon the imposition on them of mutually contradictory characters’. Answer: ‘There can be no uncommon word, etc. etc.’ What is said here is with reference to the denotative word;

vācakaṃ hi śabdam adhikṛtyaitaducyate na ca śrotrajñānāvaseyoḥ yaḥ svalakṣaṇātmāsādhāraṇaśabdo vācakaḥ /

and what is meant is that the uncommon word, which is apprehended in auditory Perception, as of the nature of a ‘Specific Individuality’, cannot be denotative.

kasmād ity āha prāgadṛṣṭita iti /

Why? Because no such could have been perceived before;

yo hi vyavahārakālāvasthāyī śabdaḥ sa vyavahārakālāt prāk saṅketakāle na dṛṣṭaḥ yo dṛṣṭas tasya ciraniruddhatvān na tena vyavahāraḥ na ca saṅketakāle yo na dṛṣṭas tena vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

that is, the Word that is there at the time of usage will not have been perceived before that usage, i.e. at the time of the making of the Convention relating to it; and the word that was perceived at that time will have long ceased to exist, so that there could be no usage of that word; nor is it right that there should be any usage based upon the word that was not perceived at the time of the Convention;

tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya vācakatvam /

From all this it follows that the Specific Individuality cannot be denotative.

bhavatām api cātra vivāda eva /

In fact, among you yourselves, there is a difference on this point;

yathoktam nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate / tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt sāmānyaṃ tūpadekṣyate //

as it has been stated (by one of yourselves) that ‘no particular thing can be denoted, and no particular word can be denotative, because it has not been perceived before;

tasmād vācakaṃ śabdamadhikṛtyābhidhānād adoṣaḥ / tatraivam avasthite sati śabdāntarāpohaḥ śabdasāmānyaṃ vācakaṃ yadi kalpyate yathārthāntarāpoho 'rthasāmānyaṃ tadā tathaiva pūrvoktena vidhinā saṃsṛṣṭaikatvanānātvetyādinoktena vācyāpohānām iva śabdāpohānām api parasparato bhedo na ghaṭate /

it is the Commonalty (Universal) that will be so, as is going to be explained Hence no objection can be taken to what we have said regarding the denotative word. Such being the case, ii it be held that what is denotative is the ‘Exclusion of other words,’ in the form of the ‘Word Universal’, in the same way as the ‘Exclusion of other things’ is of the form of the ‘Tiling Universal’, then, as shown above, under Text 926, as there can be no diversity among the denoted Apohas, so there can be no diversity among the denotative Apohas also;