buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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etena cānumānabādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā uktaṃ bhavati /	Tins means that the Proposition of the Apohist is annulled by Inferential Reasoning.
athāvastutvamabhyupagamyate 'pohānāṃ tadā nānātvābhāvāt pūrvavat paryāyatvaprasaṅga ityekānta eṣaḥ //	On the other hand, if Apohas be held to be non-entities, then, there can be no plurality among them; and under the circumstances, it is certain that they are synonymous.
atra paro bauddhasya parihāramāśaṅkate nanu cetyādi /	The following text anticipates the Bauddha’s answer to the above: [see verse 928 next]
[p.296] nanu cāśvādibhedena bhedo 'pohasya setsyati /	“In fact, there can be no distinction among Apohas either by themselves, or through others.” [ibid.] (928b)
yathoktam ---"apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍā" iti /	This argument has been thus stated: ‘They are diverse, through the diversity of the things excluded;
tataś ca svato bhedābhāve 'pyapohyasyāśvāder bhedādapohasyāgavādivyāvṛttirūpasya bhede siddhe na paryāyatvaṃ bhaviṣyati / na viśeṣa ityādinā paro dūṣaṇam āha na viśeṣaḥ svatas tasya parataścopajāyate //	but they are absolutely inert in the matter of difference among themselves’, So that, even though there is no difference among the Apohas themselves, yet, as there is difference in the Horse and other things excluded (by the Apoha denoted by the word ‘Cow’), there would be difference among the Apohas also, which are of the form of the exclusion of non-cows (and non-cows are many and diverse); thus they could not all be synonymous.
svato na tasyāpohasya viśeṣo nānātvam asti abhāvaikarasatvāt /	There can be no diversity or plurality in the Apoha itself, because it is of the essence of mere negation.
parato 'pyasau bhavan kālpanikaḥ syān na pāramārthikaḥ /	If it were diverse through others, then this could be only imaginary, not real.
na hi svato 'sato bhedasya parataḥ sambhavo yuktaḥ //	Because it is not right that a nature that does not belong to a thing by itself should come to it through others.
kasmān na yukta ity āha saṃsargiṇa ityādi /	Why should not this be right? Answer: [see verse 929 next]
saṃsargiṇo 'pi hyādhārā yaṃ na bhindanti rūpataḥ / apohyai{rbahiraṅgais sa bhidyetetya}tikalpanā //	“When even the substrata to which they are related do not make any difference in the form of the Apohas, that they would be differentiated by the excluded things, which are exterior to them, would be an assumption that is too far-fetched.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 52] (929)
tathā hi saṃsargiṇaḥ sambandhinaḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, ādhārā antaraṅgā api santo, yam apohaṃ rūpataḥ svabhāvato bhettumaśaktāḥ, bahuṣvapi śābaleyādiṣvekasyāgovyavacchedalakṣaṇasyāpohasya pravṛtter iṣṭatvāt, sa kathaṃ bahiraṅgabhūtair apohyairaśvādibhir bhidyeta /	That is to say, when the things to which they are related, the vanegated and other Cows which are their substrata enter into their very constitution, are unable to produce any difference in the essence of the Apohas, inasmuch as even among the several cows, variegated and the rest, the Apoha, in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of the non-cow’, is held to be one only, then how could this Apoha be rendered diverse by the objects excluded such as the Horse, etc.
na hi yasyāntaraṅgo 'pyartho na bhedakas tasya bahiraṅgo bhaviṣyati / bahiraṅgatvahāniprasaṅgāt /	which are exterior to it? A thing that cannot be diversified by that which enters into its very constitution cannot certainly be diversified by what is exterior to it; as in that case the latter would cease to he exterior.
tasmād atiśayavatī kalpaneyam ityupahasati //	For this reason, what has been suggested is too much of an assumption.
tathaivādhārabhedenāpyasya bhedo na yujyate /	“In the same manner, its diversity cannot be due to the diversity of its substratum;
na ih sambandhibhedena bhedo vastunyapīṣyate //	diversity in the relative of a thing does not justify the assumption of diversity in the thing also.
kimutāvastvasaṃsṛṣṭamavyāvṛttaṃ nivartate / a{ta evā}viśeṣāṃśaṃ ya{ddhima}tyanirūpitam //	How much less there is exclusion possible for that which is a non-entity, unrelated, undifferentiated, unspecified, vague and undetermined?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 48-49] (930-931)
asyeti apohasya /	‘Its’ of Apoha.
kasmān na yujyata ity āha na hītyādi /	Why is it not possible? Answer ‘Diversity in the relative, etc. etc.’;
āstāṃ tāvadyadavastu sambandhibhedān na bhidyata iti tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt /	the idea that the nonentity cannot be diversified by the diversity of its relative because it has no character at all, may rest for a while;
vastunyapi hi yāvat sambandhibhedād bhedo nopalabhyata eva /	as regards entities also, no diversity is ever found to be due to the diversity in relatives;
tathā hi devadattādikam ekaṃ vastu yugapat krameṇa vānekairāsanādibhiḥ sambandhyamānamanāsāditabhedamevopalabhyate kiṃ punar yadanyavyāvṛtti [p.297] rūpamavastu / avastutvād eva ca kvacid asaṃsṛṣṭam asambadhām, anyataś ca vijātīyād avyāvṛttamavastutvād eva /	for instance, when Devadatta, who is a single entity, occupies, either simultaneously or successively, different seats, he continues to be perceived as the same without having become diverse. How much more so is this then in the case of the ‘exclusion of others’, which is a pure non-entity? Because it is a nonentity, therefore it is ‘unrelated’ not connected with anything, ‘undifferentiated’ not distinguished from anything heterogeneous, simply because it is a non-entity;
ata evānadhigataviśeṣāṃśaṃ tat tādṛśaṃ sambandhibhedādapi katham iva bhedam aśnuvīta //	for the same reason, it is also ‘unspecified’; how can such a non-entity acquire diversity merely through diversity in its relatives? (930-931)
kiñca bhavatu nāma sambandhibhedād bhedas tathāpi vastubhūtasāmānyānabhyupagame bhavatāṃ sa evāpohāśrayaḥ sambandhī na siddhyati /	“Further, it may be granted that diversity is due to diversity in relatives; even so, as you do not admit of the ‘Universal’ as an entity, it is not possible for your Apoha to have the relative, in the shape of its substratum;
yasya bhedāt tadbhedo 'vakalpyata iti darśayati na cāprasiddhetyādi /	the diversity of which could account for the diversity in the Apoha”, This is what is shown in the following [see verse 932 above]
yadi hi gavādīnāṃ vastubhūtaṃ sārūpyaṃ prasiddhaṃ bhavet tadāśvādyapohāśrayatvameṣām aviśeṣeṇa siddhyennānyathā, tataścāpohaviṣayatvam eṣāmicchatāvaśyaṃ sārūpyamaṅgīkartavyam, tadeva sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ śabdavācyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyapohakalpanā nirarthakaiveti bhāvaḥ /	If a real similarity among Cows were admitted, then they could be accepted as the substratum of the Apoha, of Horse and other things, on the basis of that common similarity; not otherwise; hence one who desires to have these Cows as the substratum of Apoha, must admit of the similarity; and in that case, that similarity as the ‘Universal’ would form the Import of the Word, and there would be no use for the assuming of Apoha.
viṣayaśabdo 'trāśrayavacanaḥ, jalaviṣayā matsyā iti yathā //	The term ‘Viṣaya’ in this Text, stands for substratum or receptacle; just as in such expressions as ‘Jalaviṣayā matsyāḥ (932)
yairapohyabhedena bhedaḥ kalpyate, teṣāṃ so 'pi vastubhūtasāmānyamantareṇa na siddhyatīti darśayati apohyānapītyādi /	For those people also who assume the diversity of Apoha to be based upon what is excluded (by it), even that diversity is not possible without an entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’. This is shown in the following [see verse 933 above]
yadi hyaśvādīnām ekaḥ kaścit sarvavyaktisādhāraṇo dharmo 'nugāmī syāt tadā te sarve gavādiśabdair aviśeṣeṇāpohyeran, nānyathā, viśeṣāparijñānāt /	If there were some property common to the Horse and all other non-Cows, then they could all be ‘excluded’ by the word ‘Cow’; not otherwise; as no other ground for distinction is perceptible. If such a common property is admitted, then the postulating of the Apoha becomes useless.
sādhāraṇadharmābhyupagame cāpohakalpanāvaiyarthyam, tat tasmāt, apoho na siddhyati //	Thus, for this reason, there can be no Apoha. “Of the word and the indicative, no operation is possible without concomitance; and without these (word and the indicative), there can be no Apoha;
api cāpohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyata iti bhavadbhiriṣyate /	Further, it is held by you that the Apoha is indicated by the Word and by the Inferential Indicative;
tayoś ca śabdaliṅgayor vastubhūtasāmānyamantareṇa pravṛttir na yuktā /	now both these, Word and Indicative, cannot be operative in the absence of a positive ‘Universal’;
tataś ca kenāpohaḥ pratipādyatām ityetad darśayati na cānvayetyādi /	hence (for you) how is the Apoha indicated?” This argument is set forth in the following [see verse 934 above]
na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ /	‘Anvayavinirmuktā’ i.e. without co-ordination. ‘These’ i.e. the Word and the Indicative.
tābhyāṃ ca na vināpoho na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvayaḥ // anvayavinirmukteti /	Without these, the Apoha ‘cannot be apprehended’, this has to be taken as understood.
śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ vinā nāpohaḥ / gamyata iti śeṣaḥ / svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaṃ kṛtvā śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiḥ kariṣyata iti cedāha	It might be said that “the Word and the Indicative may operate on the basis of concomitance with the Specific Individuality”. The answer to this is that ‘there can be, etc. etc.’, That is, the Specific Individuality is something uncommon, not partaking of anything else;
na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvaya iti / svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇamananya [p.298] bhāk, tat kathaṃ tenānvayo bhavet / tadevam appohakalpanāyāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttireva na prāpnoti //	how can there be any concomitance with it? Thus Word and Indicative can have no bearing on the assumption of ‘Apoha’. “While the Apoha itself has not become accomplished, where could the concomitance be asserted (which is necessary for the proper functioning of all indicatives)? And if the concomitance is not perceived, there would be no validity in these (word and indicative).” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 74] (935)
bhavatu vā pravṛttis tathāpyanayoḥ prāmāṇyamabhyupagataṃ hīyata iti darśayati apohaścetyādi /	“Even if there be operation of Word and Indicative, the authority or validity attached to these (by the Apohist) becomes shaken.”
tasminnadṛśyamāne ca na tayoḥ syāt pramāṇatā //	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 935 above]
pratipādyārthāvyabhicāre sati śabdaliṅgayoḥ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, pratipādyaścārtho 'pohastvayeṣyate, sa cābhāvarūpatvādaniṣpanno niḥsvabhāvataḥ /	As a matter of fact, Word and Indicative can be valid only when there is no absence of concomitance of what is to be affirmed; in the case in question, Apoha is what is meant to be affirmed; now, as it is of the form of mere Negation, and hence devoid of any (positive) character, it cannot be an accomplished entity;
tataś ca sāhacaryamavyabhicāritvaṃ kva kasmin viṣaye kathyatāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ / kiṃ tena kathiteneti cedāha tasminnityādi /	under the circumstances, wherein could the ‘concomitance’, or ‘absence of non-concomitance’ of the Word and Indicative be asserted 7 What would be the use of asserting the concomitance?
tayor iti śabdaliṅgayoḥ /	Answer: If the concomitance is not perceived, etc. etc. ‘In these’ in Word and Indicative.
avisaṃvādalakṣaṇatvāt prāmāṇyasyeti bhāvaḥ //	Because validity consists in absence of non-conco?nitance.
na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanaṃ bhavet /	“They could not signify anything by mere non-perception;
sarvatraiva hyadṛṣṭatvāt pratyayo na viśiṣyate //	because non-perception being common in all cases, there could be no distinction.
mātragrahaṇamanvayadṛṣṭivyavacchedārtham /	‘Mere’; this serves to exclude the perception of concomitance.
kasmān na bhaved ity āha sarvatraivetyādi / sarvatra sajātīye vijātīye svārthe ca /	Question: Why could not they signify it? Answer: ‘Because non-perception, etc. etc.’ ‘In all cases’ i.e. in regard to heterogeneous things, to homogeneous things, and also to the particular thing concerned.
tataścāyaṃ svārtho 'yaṃ parārtha ityevaṃ pratyayo jñānaṃ na viśiṣyeta /	Hence there could be no such distinctive cognitions as ‘this is the thing itself’, and ‘that is something else’;
svārtham api na gamayet, tatrāpyadṛṣṭatvāt parārthavad iti yāvat /	in fact, the word could not indicate its own objective; as the concomitance would be not-apprehended there also, just as in any other thing.
kvacitpratyāyya iti pāṭhaḥ /	In some places the reading is ‘pratyāyyo’ (in place of ‘pratyayo’);
tatra pratyāyyo 'bhidheyo 'rtho na viśiṣyate na bhidyata ity arthaḥ /	in which case the meaning is that there could be no distinction in the thing indicated; i.e. it could not differ.
tadevaṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiprāmāṇyābhyupagamahāniprasaṅgānnāpohaḥ śabdārtho yuktaḥ //	In this way, there being a possibility of the loss of validity of the operation of Words and Indicatives, it cannot be right to regard the Apoha as the Import of Words.
athāsatyapi sārūpye syād apohasya kalpanā /	“It might be argued that Even in the absence of similarity of form, there could be assumption of Apoha;
gavāśvayor ayaṃ kasmādago 'poho na kalpyate //	then why is the Apoha of the ‘non-cow’ not assumed in the case of the cow and the horse?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 76] (937)
yadi sārūpyamantareṇa śābaleyādiṣvagopohasya kalpanā syāt tadā gavāśvayor api kasmān na prakalpyeta, aviśeṣāt /	If, even in the absence of similarity, the apoha of the non-Cow be assumed in the case of the Variegated and other Cows, then why can it not be assumed in the case of the Cow and the Horse also? The absence of similarity would be common to both cases.
gavāśvaprabhṛtīni cetyasya lakṣaṇasya vismṛtatvād vipreṇa gavāśvayor ityuktam //	The Author has used the form ‘gavāśvayoḥ’, evidently forgetting the rule embodied in the Sutra ‘Gavāśvaprabhṛtīni ca saṃjñāyām (937)
[p.299] tamevāviśeṣaṃ darśayati śābaleyāccetyādi /	The said presence of common conditions in the two cases is further explained: [see verse 938 next]
śābaleyāc ca bhinnatvaṃ bāhuleyāśvayoḥ samam /	“Difference from the spotted cow is the same in the black cow and in the horse.
sāmānyaṃ nānyadiṣṭaṃ cetkvāgo 'pohaḥ pravartatām // kvāgo 'pohaḥ pravartatām iti /	so that if no other ‘commonalty’ is admitted, whereto would, the Apoha of the non-cow apply?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 77] (938)
yathaiva śābaleyād vailakṣaṇyādaśve na pravartate, tathā bāhuleyasyāpi tatovailakṣaṇyam astīti tatrāpi na pravarteta /	‘Whereto, etc. etc.’ Just as the ‘Apoha of the non-Cow’ is not applied to the Horse, on the basis of its difference from the Spotted Cow, so, inasmuch as the Black Cow also is different from the Spotted Cow, the said ‘Apoha of the non-Cow’ should not apply to the Black Cow also.
evaṃ śābaleyādiṣvapi yojyam, sarvatra vailakṣaṇyāviśeṣāt //	So also to the spotted and other Cows; ‘difference’ being equally present in all cases.
indriyair nāpyago 'pohaḥ prathamaṃ vyavasīyate /	“As a matter of fact, the Apoha of the non-cow has never been previously perceived by the sense-organs;
nānyatra śabdavṛttiś ca kiṃ dṛṣṭvā sa prayujyatām //	and the operation of words does not lie anywhere else. On the perception of what then would the word be used?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 78] (939)
svayaṃ niścitārtho hi samayakṛtsamayaṃ karoti, nacāpohaḥ kenacid indriyair vyavasīyate /	The Convention-maker sets up the Convention on the basis of his firm conviction regarding the denotation of the word; the Apoha however is never perceived by the Sense-organs;
prathamam vyavahārakālāt pūrvam, saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhakāla ity arthaḥ /	‘previously’ i.e. prior to the using of the word, at the time of fixing up the relation between the name and the named.
tasyāvastutvād indriyāṇāṃ ca vastuviṣayatvāditi bhāvaḥ /	It cannot be perceived, because it is a non-entity, and Sense-organs operate only upon entities.
syād etad anyavyāvṛtta svalakṣaṇamupalabhya śabdaḥ prayokṣyata ityata āha nānyatretyādi /	It might be argued that the Word could be used on the apprehension of the Specific Individuality as differentiated from other things. The answer to that is that ‘the operation of words, etc. etc.’;
anyāpohād anyatra svalakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ //	‘anywhere else’, i.e. in anything other than ‘the Apoha of others’, in the shape of the Specific Individuality.
pūrvoktena prabandhena nānumāpyatra vidyate /	“by what has gone before, there can be no inference either, in this case;
sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya tena naivopapadyate //	and for the same reason there can be no conception of any connection of this.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 79] (940)
tatra pūrvoktaḥ prabandhaḥ ---"na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayor"ityādiḥ /	It might be argued that “the Apoha may not be apprehended by the Sense-organs;
sambandhānubhavo 'pīti /	it could be apprehended by means of Inference”.
śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ / na kevalaṃ pūrvoktāśva{śca---}vailakṣaṇyādir nopapadyata ityapiśabdena darśayati /	‘What has gone before’, under Text 934, above. ‘There can be no, etc. etc.’; connection of this i.e. with the Word. The particle ‘api’ is meant to imply that the said absence of diversity is not the only reason.
teneti tasmāt /	‘Tena’ for the same reason.
tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam /	Thus it has been shown that the Reason adduced by the Bauddha (against the denotation of Words) ‘because no Convention can be made’ is ‘inconclusive’;
akṛtasamayatve 'pyapohe śabdapravṛttyabhyupagamāt //	inasmuch as the application of words to the Apoha is admitted, even though no Convention can be made in regard to it.
agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ {bhava}tāṃ ca kathaṃ punaḥ / na dṛṣṭo yatra gośabdaḥ sambandhānubhavakṣaṇe //	How could one apprehend the fact of something not being denoted by the word ‘cow’ ‘It could be learnt from the fact that the word cow was not found to be applied to it at the moment of the apprehension of the connection of that word’.
idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati /	[This is what the Bauddha may say.]” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 81] (941)
katham aśvādīnām agośabdābhidheyatvam gośabdānabhi [p.300] dheyatvaṃ bhavadbhir avagamyata iti /	It behoves you to explain this: How do you know that the Horse and other non-Cows are denoted by the word ‘non-Cow’ i.e. they are not denoted by the word ‘Cow’?
bauddha āha na dṛṣṭo yatretyādi sambandhānubhavakṣaṇa iti / saṅketapratipattivelāyām ity arthaḥ //	The Bauddha answers ‘It could be learnt, etc. etc.’ ‘at the moment, etc. etc.’, i.e. at the time of the comprehension of the Convention.
ekasmād ityādinā paro dūṣaṇamāha	The Opponent (Kumārila) rejects this explanation (provided by the Bauddha): [see verse 942 next]
ekasmān na hi gopiṇḍādyadanyat sarvameva tat /	“In that case, all things, with the sole exception of the single individual cow, would become excluded by the Apoha;
bhaved apohyamityetan na sāmānyasya vācyatā //	and in that case it would not be proved that any commonalty constitutes the import of words.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 82] (942)
yadi hi yadeva saṅketānubhavavelāyām upalabdhaṃ tato 'nyatra gośabdapravṛttirneṣyate, tadaikasmāt saṅketena viṣayīkṛtācchābaleyādikād gopiṇḍātsakāśād yadanyad bāhuleyādi tadapi gośabdenāpohyaṃ bhavet /	If it is your opinion that the word ‘Cow’ cannot apply to anything except the one that was perceived at the time of the apprehension of the Convention, then, with the exception of the one Spotted Cow which has been the object of the Convention, every thing else, even the Black and other Cows, would have to be excluded by the word ‘Cow’;
tataś ca sāmānyaṃ vācyam ityetan na siddhyet //	and in that case, it could not be established that any Commonalty is denoted by the Word.
siddhaścāgaurapohyeta goniṣedhātmakaś ca saḥ /	It is only a well-established entity in the shape of the non-cow that could be excluded by the Apoha (denoted by the word ‘cow’); and the non-cow is of the nature of the negation of the cow;
tatra gaureva vaktavyo naṭā yaḥ pratiṣidhyate //	hence it has to be explained what this cow is which is negatived (in the non-cow).
sa cedagonivṛttyātmā bhaved anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ /	If this cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-cow, then there is mutual interdependence.
agovyavacchedena gopratipattiḥ, sacāgaur goniṣedhātmā, tataścāgaur ityatrottarapadārtho vaktavyo yo na gaurgaurityatra naṭā pratiṣidhyeta /	The Cow is apprehended through the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’; the ‘non-Cow’ is of the nature of the negation of the Cow; hence the second term in the word ‘non-Cow’ has got to be explained, which is negatived by the negative particle in the word ‘non-Cow’;
na hyanirjñātasvarūpasya niṣedhaḥ śakyate kartum /	there can be no negation of anything, the exact nature of which is not known.
athāpi syāt kimatra vaktavyam agonivṛttyātmāsau gaurityata āha sa cetyādi /	It might he argued that ‘what is it that has to be explained? It is already known that the Cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow.’ The answer to that is ‘If this Cow, etc. etc.’;
sa iti / gauḥ /	‘this’ stands for the Cow.
tathāhyagonivṛttisvabhāvatvād goragopratipattidvāreṇaiva pratītiḥ agoś ca	Thus then, the Cow being of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the non-Cow;
gopratiṣedhātmakatvād gopratipattidvārikaiva pratītir iti sphuṭataramavataratītaretarāśrayatvam / athāpi syād agośabdena yo gaur niṣedhyate sa vidhirūpa eva siddho 'pohārtham agovyavacchedalakṣaṇāpohasiddhyarthaṃ, tenetarāśrayatvaṃ na bhaviṣyatītyatāaha siddhaścedityādi /	and the non-Cow being of the nature of the negation of the Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the Cow; thus this would be a clear case of mutual interdependence. It might be argued that ‘The Cow that is negatived by the word non-cow is a well-established positive entity, for the sake of Apoha, i.e. for the fulfilment of the Apoha in the shape of the exclusion of the non-cow, so that there would be no interdependence. The answer to this is ‘If the cow is an established entity, etc. etc.’;
yadyevaṃ, sarvasya śabdasyāpoho 'rtha ityevam apohakalpanaṃ vṛthā, vidhirūpasya śabdārthasya bhāvāt /	That is, if that be so, then it is useless to assume that Apoha forms the denotation of all words; inasmuch as you admit the import of words to consist of a positive entity.
tasmān na kaścid vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ siddho 'ṅgīkartavyas tadanaṅgīkaraṇe cetaretarāśrayadoṣo durnivāraḥ //	Consequently (to be consistent) you should not admit of any positive entity to be denoted by a word; and if you do not admit it, then the objectionable ‘interdependence’ becomes inevitable.
gavyasiddhe tvagaur nāsti tadabhāve tu gauḥ kutaḥ / nādhārādheyavṛttyādisambandhaścāpyabhāvayoḥ //	and if there is no non-cow, how can the cow be there? Between two negations, there can be no such relation as that of the container and the contained and the like.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 85] (945)
ācāryadiṅnāgena viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvasamarthanārtham uktam "nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhu"rityādi /	The following Text sums up the same mutual Interdependence: [see verse 945 above] For the purpose of proving the relation of qualification and qualified (between the two), the Teacher Diṅnāga has declared as follows: ‘Such terms as Blue Lotus and the like signify things qualified by the negation of other things’.
tadetadayuktam iti darśayann āha nādhārādheyatyādi /	The Opponent shows the impropriety of this view, in the words
yasya hi yena saha kaścid vāstavaḥ sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tat tena viśiṣṭam iti yuktaṃ vaktum /	‘Between two negations, etc. etc.’ When between two things, a real relationship is known to exist, then it may be correct to say that one is qualified by the other;

etena cānumānabādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā uktaṃ bhavati /

Tins means that the Proposition of the Apohist is annulled by Inferential Reasoning.

athāvastutvamabhyupagamyate 'pohānāṃ tadā nānātvābhāvāt pūrvavat paryāyatvaprasaṅga ityekānta eṣaḥ //

On the other hand, if Apohas be held to be non-entities, then, there can be no plurality among them; and under the circumstances, it is certain that they are synonymous.

atra paro bauddhasya parihāramāśaṅkate nanu cetyādi /

The following text anticipates the Bauddha’s answer to the above: [see verse 928 next]

[p.296] nanu cāśvādibhedena bhedo 'pohasya setsyati /

“In fact, there can be no distinction among Apohas either by themselves, or through others.” [ibid.] (928b)

yathoktam ---"apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍā" iti /

This argument has been thus stated: ‘They are diverse, through the diversity of the things excluded;

tataś ca svato bhedābhāve 'pyapohyasyāśvāder bhedādapohasyāgavādivyāvṛttirūpasya bhede siddhe na paryāyatvaṃ bhaviṣyati / na viśeṣa ityādinā paro dūṣaṇam āha na viśeṣaḥ svatas tasya parataścopajāyate //

but they are absolutely inert in the matter of difference among themselves’, So that, even though there is no difference among the Apohas themselves, yet, as there is difference in the Horse and other things excluded (by the Apoha denoted by the word ‘Cow’), there would be difference among the Apohas also, which are of the form of the exclusion of non-cows (and non-cows are many and diverse); thus they could not all be synonymous.

svato na tasyāpohasya viśeṣo nānātvam asti abhāvaikarasatvāt /

There can be no diversity or plurality in the Apoha itself, because it is of the essence of mere negation.

parato 'pyasau bhavan kālpanikaḥ syān na pāramārthikaḥ /

If it were diverse through others, then this could be only imaginary, not real.

na hi svato 'sato bhedasya parataḥ sambhavo yuktaḥ //

Because it is not right that a nature that does not belong to a thing by itself should come to it through others.

kasmān na yukta ity āha saṃsargiṇa ityādi /

Why should not this be right? Answer: [see verse 929 next]

saṃsargiṇo 'pi hyādhārā yaṃ na bhindanti rūpataḥ / apohyai{rbahiraṅgais sa bhidyetetya}tikalpanā //

“When even the substrata to which they are related do not make any difference in the form of the Apohas, that they would be differentiated by the excluded things, which are exterior to them, would be an assumption that is too far-fetched.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 52] (929)

tathā hi saṃsargiṇaḥ sambandhinaḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, ādhārā antaraṅgā api santo, yam apohaṃ rūpataḥ svabhāvato bhettumaśaktāḥ, bahuṣvapi śābaleyādiṣvekasyāgovyavacchedalakṣaṇasyāpohasya pravṛtter iṣṭatvāt, sa kathaṃ bahiraṅgabhūtair apohyairaśvādibhir bhidyeta /

That is to say, when the things to which they are related, the vanegated and other Cows which are their substrata enter into their very constitution, are unable to produce any difference in the essence of the Apohas, inasmuch as even among the several cows, variegated and the rest, the Apoha, in the shape of the ‘Exclusion of the non-cow’, is held to be one only, then how could this Apoha be rendered diverse by the objects excluded such as the Horse, etc.

na hi yasyāntaraṅgo 'pyartho na bhedakas tasya bahiraṅgo bhaviṣyati / bahiraṅgatvahāniprasaṅgāt /

which are exterior to it? A thing that cannot be diversified by that which enters into its very constitution cannot certainly be diversified by what is exterior to it; as in that case the latter would cease to he exterior.

tasmād atiśayavatī kalpaneyam ityupahasati //

For this reason, what has been suggested is too much of an assumption.

tathaivādhārabhedenāpyasya bhedo na yujyate /

“In the same manner, its diversity cannot be due to the diversity of its substratum;

na ih sambandhibhedena bhedo vastunyapīṣyate //

diversity in the relative of a thing does not justify the assumption of diversity in the thing also.

kimutāvastvasaṃsṛṣṭamavyāvṛttaṃ nivartate / a{ta evā}viśeṣāṃśaṃ ya{ddhima}tyanirūpitam //

How much less there is exclusion possible for that which is a non-entity, unrelated, undifferentiated, unspecified, vague and undetermined?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 48-49] (930-931)

asyeti apohasya /

‘Its’ of Apoha.

kasmān na yujyata ity āha na hītyādi /

Why is it not possible? Answer ‘Diversity in the relative, etc. etc.’;

āstāṃ tāvadyadavastu sambandhibhedān na bhidyata iti tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt /

the idea that the nonentity cannot be diversified by the diversity of its relative because it has no character at all, may rest for a while;

vastunyapi hi yāvat sambandhibhedād bhedo nopalabhyata eva /

as regards entities also, no diversity is ever found to be due to the diversity in relatives;

tathā hi devadattādikam ekaṃ vastu yugapat krameṇa vānekairāsanādibhiḥ sambandhyamānamanāsāditabhedamevopalabhyate kiṃ punar yadanyavyāvṛtti [p.297] rūpamavastu / avastutvād eva ca kvacid asaṃsṛṣṭam asambadhām, anyataś ca vijātīyād avyāvṛttamavastutvād eva /

for instance, when Devadatta, who is a single entity, occupies, either simultaneously or successively, different seats, he continues to be perceived as the same without having become diverse. How much more so is this then in the case of the ‘exclusion of others’, which is a pure non-entity? Because it is a nonentity, therefore it is ‘unrelated’ not connected with anything, ‘undifferentiated’ not distinguished from anything heterogeneous, simply because it is a non-entity;

ata evānadhigataviśeṣāṃśaṃ tat tādṛśaṃ sambandhibhedādapi katham iva bhedam aśnuvīta //

for the same reason, it is also ‘unspecified’; how can such a non-entity acquire diversity merely through diversity in its relatives? (930-931)

kiñca bhavatu nāma sambandhibhedād bhedas tathāpi vastubhūtasāmānyānabhyupagame bhavatāṃ sa evāpohāśrayaḥ sambandhī na siddhyati /

“Further, it may be granted that diversity is due to diversity in relatives; even so, as you do not admit of the ‘Universal’ as an entity, it is not possible for your Apoha to have the relative, in the shape of its substratum;

yasya bhedāt tadbhedo 'vakalpyata iti darśayati na cāprasiddhetyādi /

the diversity of which could account for the diversity in the Apoha”, This is what is shown in the following [see verse 932 above]

yadi hi gavādīnāṃ vastubhūtaṃ sārūpyaṃ prasiddhaṃ bhavet tadāśvādyapohāśrayatvameṣām aviśeṣeṇa siddhyennānyathā, tataścāpohaviṣayatvam eṣāmicchatāvaśyaṃ sārūpyamaṅgīkartavyam, tadeva sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ śabdavācyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyapohakalpanā nirarthakaiveti bhāvaḥ /

If a real similarity among Cows were admitted, then they could be accepted as the substratum of the Apoha, of Horse and other things, on the basis of that common similarity; not otherwise; hence one who desires to have these Cows as the substratum of Apoha, must admit of the similarity; and in that case, that similarity as the ‘Universal’ would form the Import of the Word, and there would be no use for the assuming of Apoha.

viṣayaśabdo 'trāśrayavacanaḥ, jalaviṣayā matsyā iti yathā //

The term ‘Viṣaya’ in this Text, stands for substratum or receptacle; just as in such expressions as ‘Jalaviṣayā matsyāḥ (932)

yairapohyabhedena bhedaḥ kalpyate, teṣāṃ so 'pi vastubhūtasāmānyamantareṇa na siddhyatīti darśayati apohyānapītyādi /

For those people also who assume the diversity of Apoha to be based upon what is excluded (by it), even that diversity is not possible without an entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’. This is shown in the following [see verse 933 above]

yadi hyaśvādīnām ekaḥ kaścit sarvavyaktisādhāraṇo dharmo 'nugāmī syāt tadā te sarve gavādiśabdair aviśeṣeṇāpohyeran, nānyathā, viśeṣāparijñānāt /

If there were some property common to the Horse and all other non-Cows, then they could all be ‘excluded’ by the word ‘Cow’; not otherwise; as no other ground for distinction is perceptible. If such a common property is admitted, then the postulating of the Apoha becomes useless.

sādhāraṇadharmābhyupagame cāpohakalpanāvaiyarthyam, tat tasmāt, apoho na siddhyati //

Thus, for this reason, there can be no Apoha. “Of the word and the indicative, no operation is possible without concomitance; and without these (word and the indicative), there can be no Apoha;

api cāpohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyata iti bhavadbhiriṣyate /

Further, it is held by you that the Apoha is indicated by the Word and by the Inferential Indicative;

tayoś ca śabdaliṅgayor vastubhūtasāmānyamantareṇa pravṛttir na yuktā /

now both these, Word and Indicative, cannot be operative in the absence of a positive ‘Universal’;

tataś ca kenāpohaḥ pratipādyatām ityetad darśayati na cānvayetyādi /

hence (for you) how is the Apoha indicated?” This argument is set forth in the following [see verse 934 above]

na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ /

‘Anvayavinirmuktā’ i.e. without co-ordination. ‘These’ i.e. the Word and the Indicative.

tābhyāṃ ca na vināpoho na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvayaḥ // anvayavinirmukteti /

Without these, the Apoha ‘cannot be apprehended’, this has to be taken as understood.

śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ vinā nāpohaḥ / gamyata iti śeṣaḥ / svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaṃ kṛtvā śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiḥ kariṣyata iti cedāha

It might be said that “the Word and the Indicative may operate on the basis of concomitance with the Specific Individuality”. The answer to this is that ‘there can be, etc. etc.’, That is, the Specific Individuality is something uncommon, not partaking of anything else;

na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvaya iti / svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇamananya [p.298] bhāk, tat kathaṃ tenānvayo bhavet / tadevam appohakalpanāyāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttireva na prāpnoti //

how can there be any concomitance with it? Thus Word and Indicative can have no bearing on the assumption of ‘Apoha’. “While the Apoha itself has not become accomplished, where could the concomitance be asserted (which is necessary for the proper functioning of all indicatives)? And if the concomitance is not perceived, there would be no validity in these (word and indicative).” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 74] (935)

bhavatu vā pravṛttis tathāpyanayoḥ prāmāṇyamabhyupagataṃ hīyata iti darśayati apohaścetyādi /

“Even if there be operation of Word and Indicative, the authority or validity attached to these (by the Apohist) becomes shaken.”

tasminnadṛśyamāne ca na tayoḥ syāt pramāṇatā //

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 935 above]

pratipādyārthāvyabhicāre sati śabdaliṅgayoḥ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, pratipādyaścārtho 'pohastvayeṣyate, sa cābhāvarūpatvādaniṣpanno niḥsvabhāvataḥ /

As a matter of fact, Word and Indicative can be valid only when there is no absence of concomitance of what is to be affirmed; in the case in question, Apoha is what is meant to be affirmed; now, as it is of the form of mere Negation, and hence devoid of any (positive) character, it cannot be an accomplished entity;

tataś ca sāhacaryamavyabhicāritvaṃ kva kasmin viṣaye kathyatāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ / kiṃ tena kathiteneti cedāha tasminnityādi /

under the circumstances, wherein could the ‘concomitance’, or ‘absence of non-concomitance’ of the Word and Indicative be asserted 7 What would be the use of asserting the concomitance?

tayor iti śabdaliṅgayoḥ /

Answer: If the concomitance is not perceived, etc. etc. ‘In these’ in Word and Indicative.

avisaṃvādalakṣaṇatvāt prāmāṇyasyeti bhāvaḥ //

Because validity consists in absence of non-conco?nitance.

na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanaṃ bhavet /

“They could not signify anything by mere non-perception;

sarvatraiva hyadṛṣṭatvāt pratyayo na viśiṣyate //

because non-perception being common in all cases, there could be no distinction.

mātragrahaṇamanvayadṛṣṭivyavacchedārtham /

‘Mere’; this serves to exclude the perception of concomitance.

kasmān na bhaved ity āha sarvatraivetyādi / sarvatra sajātīye vijātīye svārthe ca /

Question: Why could not they signify it? Answer: ‘Because non-perception, etc. etc.’ ‘In all cases’ i.e. in regard to heterogeneous things, to homogeneous things, and also to the particular thing concerned.

tataścāyaṃ svārtho 'yaṃ parārtha ityevaṃ pratyayo jñānaṃ na viśiṣyeta /

Hence there could be no such distinctive cognitions as ‘this is the thing itself’, and ‘that is something else’;

svārtham api na gamayet, tatrāpyadṛṣṭatvāt parārthavad iti yāvat /

in fact, the word could not indicate its own objective; as the concomitance would be not-apprehended there also, just as in any other thing.

kvacitpratyāyya iti pāṭhaḥ /

In some places the reading is ‘pratyāyyo’ (in place of ‘pratyayo’);

tatra pratyāyyo 'bhidheyo 'rtho na viśiṣyate na bhidyata ity arthaḥ /

in which case the meaning is that there could be no distinction in the thing indicated; i.e. it could not differ.

tadevaṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiprāmāṇyābhyupagamahāniprasaṅgānnāpohaḥ śabdārtho yuktaḥ //

In this way, there being a possibility of the loss of validity of the operation of Words and Indicatives, it cannot be right to regard the Apoha as the Import of Words.

athāsatyapi sārūpye syād apohasya kalpanā /

“It might be argued that Even in the absence of similarity of form, there could be assumption of Apoha;

gavāśvayor ayaṃ kasmādago 'poho na kalpyate //

then why is the Apoha of the ‘non-cow’ not assumed in the case of the cow and the horse?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 76] (937)

yadi sārūpyamantareṇa śābaleyādiṣvagopohasya kalpanā syāt tadā gavāśvayor api kasmān na prakalpyeta, aviśeṣāt /

If, even in the absence of similarity, the apoha of the non-Cow be assumed in the case of the Variegated and other Cows, then why can it not be assumed in the case of the Cow and the Horse also? The absence of similarity would be common to both cases.

gavāśvaprabhṛtīni cetyasya lakṣaṇasya vismṛtatvād vipreṇa gavāśvayor ityuktam //

The Author has used the form ‘gavāśvayoḥ’, evidently forgetting the rule embodied in the Sutra ‘Gavāśvaprabhṛtīni ca saṃjñāyām (937)

[p.299] tamevāviśeṣaṃ darśayati śābaleyāccetyādi /

The said presence of common conditions in the two cases is further explained: [see verse 938 next]

śābaleyāc ca bhinnatvaṃ bāhuleyāśvayoḥ samam /

“Difference from the spotted cow is the same in the black cow and in the horse.

sāmānyaṃ nānyadiṣṭaṃ cetkvāgo 'pohaḥ pravartatām // kvāgo 'pohaḥ pravartatām iti /

so that if no other ‘commonalty’ is admitted, whereto would, the Apoha of the non-cow apply?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 77] (938)

yathaiva śābaleyād vailakṣaṇyādaśve na pravartate, tathā bāhuleyasyāpi tatovailakṣaṇyam astīti tatrāpi na pravarteta /

‘Whereto, etc. etc.’ Just as the ‘Apoha of the non-Cow’ is not applied to the Horse, on the basis of its difference from the Spotted Cow, so, inasmuch as the Black Cow also is different from the Spotted Cow, the said ‘Apoha of the non-Cow’ should not apply to the Black Cow also.

evaṃ śābaleyādiṣvapi yojyam, sarvatra vailakṣaṇyāviśeṣāt //

So also to the spotted and other Cows; ‘difference’ being equally present in all cases.

indriyair nāpyago 'pohaḥ prathamaṃ vyavasīyate /

“As a matter of fact, the Apoha of the non-cow has never been previously perceived by the sense-organs;

nānyatra śabdavṛttiś ca kiṃ dṛṣṭvā sa prayujyatām //

and the operation of words does not lie anywhere else. On the perception of what then would the word be used?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 78] (939)

svayaṃ niścitārtho hi samayakṛtsamayaṃ karoti, nacāpohaḥ kenacid indriyair vyavasīyate /

The Convention-maker sets up the Convention on the basis of his firm conviction regarding the denotation of the word; the Apoha however is never perceived by the Sense-organs;

prathamam vyavahārakālāt pūrvam, saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhakāla ity arthaḥ /

‘previously’ i.e. prior to the using of the word, at the time of fixing up the relation between the name and the named.

tasyāvastutvād indriyāṇāṃ ca vastuviṣayatvāditi bhāvaḥ /

It cannot be perceived, because it is a non-entity, and Sense-organs operate only upon entities.

syād etad anyavyāvṛtta svalakṣaṇamupalabhya śabdaḥ prayokṣyata ityata āha nānyatretyādi /

It might be argued that the Word could be used on the apprehension of the Specific Individuality as differentiated from other things. The answer to that is that ‘the operation of words, etc. etc.’;

anyāpohād anyatra svalakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ //

‘anywhere else’, i.e. in anything other than ‘the Apoha of others’, in the shape of the Specific Individuality.

pūrvoktena prabandhena nānumāpyatra vidyate /

“by what has gone before, there can be no inference either, in this case;

sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya tena naivopapadyate //

and for the same reason there can be no conception of any connection of this.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 79] (940)

tatra pūrvoktaḥ prabandhaḥ ---"na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayor"ityādiḥ /

It might be argued that “the Apoha may not be apprehended by the Sense-organs;

sambandhānubhavo 'pīti /

it could be apprehended by means of Inference”.

śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ / na kevalaṃ pūrvoktāśva{śca---}vailakṣaṇyādir nopapadyata ityapiśabdena darśayati /

‘What has gone before’, under Text 934, above. ‘There can be no, etc. etc.’; connection of this i.e. with the Word. The particle ‘api’ is meant to imply that the said absence of diversity is not the only reason.

teneti tasmāt /

‘Tena’ for the same reason.

tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam /

Thus it has been shown that the Reason adduced by the Bauddha (against the denotation of Words) ‘because no Convention can be made’ is ‘inconclusive’;

akṛtasamayatve 'pyapohe śabdapravṛttyabhyupagamāt //

inasmuch as the application of words to the Apoha is admitted, even though no Convention can be made in regard to it.

agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ {bhava}tāṃ ca kathaṃ punaḥ / na dṛṣṭo yatra gośabdaḥ sambandhānubhavakṣaṇe //

How could one apprehend the fact of something not being denoted by the word ‘cow’ ‘It could be learnt from the fact that the word cow was not found to be applied to it at the moment of the apprehension of the connection of that word’.

idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati /

[This is what the Bauddha may say.]” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 81] (941)

katham aśvādīnām agośabdābhidheyatvam gośabdānabhi [p.300] dheyatvaṃ bhavadbhir avagamyata iti /

It behoves you to explain this: How do you know that the Horse and other non-Cows are denoted by the word ‘non-Cow’ i.e. they are not denoted by the word ‘Cow’?

bauddha āha na dṛṣṭo yatretyādi sambandhānubhavakṣaṇa iti / saṅketapratipattivelāyām ity arthaḥ //

The Bauddha answers ‘It could be learnt, etc. etc.’ ‘at the moment, etc. etc.’, i.e. at the time of the comprehension of the Convention.

ekasmād ityādinā paro dūṣaṇamāha

The Opponent (Kumārila) rejects this explanation (provided by the Bauddha): [see verse 942 next]

ekasmān na hi gopiṇḍādyadanyat sarvameva tat /

“In that case, all things, with the sole exception of the single individual cow, would become excluded by the Apoha;

bhaved apohyamityetan na sāmānyasya vācyatā //

and in that case it would not be proved that any commonalty constitutes the import of words.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 82] (942)

yadi hi yadeva saṅketānubhavavelāyām upalabdhaṃ tato 'nyatra gośabdapravṛttirneṣyate, tadaikasmāt saṅketena viṣayīkṛtācchābaleyādikād gopiṇḍātsakāśād yadanyad bāhuleyādi tadapi gośabdenāpohyaṃ bhavet /

If it is your opinion that the word ‘Cow’ cannot apply to anything except the one that was perceived at the time of the apprehension of the Convention, then, with the exception of the one Spotted Cow which has been the object of the Convention, every thing else, even the Black and other Cows, would have to be excluded by the word ‘Cow’;

tataś ca sāmānyaṃ vācyam ityetan na siddhyet //

and in that case, it could not be established that any Commonalty is denoted by the Word.

siddhaścāgaurapohyeta goniṣedhātmakaś ca saḥ /

It is only a well-established entity in the shape of the non-cow that could be excluded by the Apoha (denoted by the word ‘cow’); and the non-cow is of the nature of the negation of the cow;

tatra gaureva vaktavyo naṭā yaḥ pratiṣidhyate //

hence it has to be explained what this cow is which is negatived (in the non-cow).

sa cedagonivṛttyātmā bhaved anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ /

If this cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-cow, then there is mutual interdependence.

agovyavacchedena gopratipattiḥ, sacāgaur goniṣedhātmā, tataścāgaur ityatrottarapadārtho vaktavyo yo na gaurgaurityatra naṭā pratiṣidhyeta /

The Cow is apprehended through the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’; the ‘non-Cow’ is of the nature of the negation of the Cow; hence the second term in the word ‘non-Cow’ has got to be explained, which is negatived by the negative particle in the word ‘non-Cow’;

na hyanirjñātasvarūpasya niṣedhaḥ śakyate kartum /

there can be no negation of anything, the exact nature of which is not known.

athāpi syāt kimatra vaktavyam agonivṛttyātmāsau gaurityata āha sa cetyādi /

It might he argued that ‘what is it that has to be explained? It is already known that the Cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow.’ The answer to that is ‘If this Cow, etc. etc.’;

sa iti / gauḥ /

‘this’ stands for the Cow.

tathāhyagonivṛttisvabhāvatvād goragopratipattidvāreṇaiva pratītiḥ agoś ca

Thus then, the Cow being of the nature of the negation of the non-Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the non-Cow;

gopratiṣedhātmakatvād gopratipattidvārikaiva pratītir iti sphuṭataramavataratītaretarāśrayatvam / athāpi syād agośabdena yo gaur niṣedhyate sa vidhirūpa eva siddho 'pohārtham agovyavacchedalakṣaṇāpohasiddhyarthaṃ, tenetarāśrayatvaṃ na bhaviṣyatītyatāaha siddhaścedityādi /

and the non-Cow being of the nature of the negation of the Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the Cow; thus this would be a clear case of mutual interdependence. It might be argued that ‘The Cow that is negatived by the word non-cow is a well-established positive entity, for the sake of Apoha, i.e. for the fulfilment of the Apoha in the shape of the exclusion of the non-cow, so that there would be no interdependence. The answer to this is ‘If the cow is an established entity, etc. etc.’;

yadyevaṃ, sarvasya śabdasyāpoho 'rtha ityevam apohakalpanaṃ vṛthā, vidhirūpasya śabdārthasya bhāvāt /

That is, if that be so, then it is useless to assume that Apoha forms the denotation of all words; inasmuch as you admit the import of words to consist of a positive entity.

tasmān na kaścid vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ siddho 'ṅgīkartavyas tadanaṅgīkaraṇe cetaretarāśrayadoṣo durnivāraḥ //

Consequently (to be consistent) you should not admit of any positive entity to be denoted by a word; and if you do not admit it, then the objectionable ‘interdependence’ becomes inevitable.

gavyasiddhe tvagaur nāsti tadabhāve tu gauḥ kutaḥ / nādhārādheyavṛttyādisambandhaścāpyabhāvayoḥ //

and if there is no non-cow, how can the cow be there? Between two negations, there can be no such relation as that of the container and the contained and the like.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 85] (945)

ācāryadiṅnāgena viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvasamarthanārtham uktam "nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhu"rityādi /

The following Text sums up the same mutual Interdependence: [see verse 945 above] For the purpose of proving the relation of qualification and qualified (between the two), the Teacher Diṅnāga has declared as follows: ‘Such terms as Blue Lotus and the like signify things qualified by the negation of other things’.

tadetadayuktam iti darśayann āha nādhārādheyatyādi /

The Opponent shows the impropriety of this view, in the words

yasya hi yena saha kaścid vāstavaḥ sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tat tena viśiṣṭam iti yuktaṃ vaktum /

‘Between two negations, etc. etc.’ When between two things, a real relationship is known to exist, then it may be correct to say that one is qualified by the other;