buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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śabda evārtha ityevaṃ śabde 'rthasya niveśanaṃ so 'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ, tasmāt kāraṇād yadā śabdasyārthena sahaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati taṃ svīkṛtārthākāraṃ śabdam abhijalpyam ityāhuḥ //	When the character of the object is imposed upon the Word by such expressions as ‘Word is the Object’; on the basis of this imposition, when the form of the Word becomes identified with the Object, the Word in the state of this unification with the object is said to be ‘in the state of coalescence’.
anye tu buddhyārūḍham evākāraṃ bāhyavastuviṣayaṃ bāhyavastutayā gṛhītaṃ buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvitaṃ śabdārthamāhuḥ taddarśayati yo vetyādi /	this (mixture of idea object) has been regarded by some people as forming the ‘import of words’. (e) Others have held the following view: “When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea;
sa bāhyaṃ vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate //	and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words”. This is the view set forth in the following.
buddhiviṣaya iti /	[see verse 891 above]
buddhau viparivartamānaḥ, buddhistha iti yāvat /	‘Content of the Idea’, i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea.
bāhyavastunibandhana iti /	‘On the basis of an external object’;
sadasadbāhyaṃ vastu nibandhanamakṣaracihnasthānīyaṃ svarūpamupadarśayituṃ prakamyate yasya, sa bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ /	i.e. that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing, in the shape of the letter-symbols.
bāhyaṃ vastvitijñāta iti /	‘It comes to be cognised as an external object’;
buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvito bāhyatayādhyavasita ity arthaḥ /	i.e. manifested in the form of the Idea, but apprehended as something external.
tathā hi yāvad buddhirūpamartheṣvapratyastaṃ buddhirūpameveti tattvabhāvanayā gṛhyate, tāvat tasya śabdārthatvaṃ nāvasīyate tatra kriyāviśeṣasambandhābhāvāt /	That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself, it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity;
na hi gāmānaya dadhi khādetyādikāḥ kriyās tādṛśi buddhirūpe sambhavanti kriyāyogasambhavī cārthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate /	for instance, actions spoken of in such words as ‘Bring the Cow’, ‘Eat the Curd’, are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action;
ato buddhirūpatayā gṛhīto 'sau na śabdārthaḥ /	hence what is apprehended as an Idea cannot be denoted by words.
yadā tu bāhyavastuni pratyasto bhavati tadā tasmin pratipattā bāhyatayā viparyastaṃ kriyāsādhanasāmarthyaṃ tasya manyata iti bhavati śabdārthaḥ /	When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinged upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.
nanu cāpohavādipakṣādasya ko viśeṣaḥ---/ tathā hi apohavādināpi buddhyākāro bāhyarūpatayā gṛhītaḥ śabdārtha iti bhāṣyata eva /	Question: “What is the difference between this theory and the theory of ‘Apoha’? The upholder of ‘Apoha’ also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external: as has been declared in the following passage: ‘There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the exclusion of other things’.”
yathoktam	This is not right.
"tadrūpāropagatyānyavyāvṛttyadhigateḥ punaḥ / śabdārthp 'rthaḥ sa eveti vacane na virudhyate" //	The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a real existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are real, and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong;
naitadasti ayaṃ hi buddhyākāravādī bāhye vastunyabhrāntaṃ saviṣayaṃ dravyādiṣu pāramārthikeṣvadhyastaṃ buddhyākāraṃ paramārthataḥ śabdārthamicchati / nanu nirālambanaṃ bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntamitaretarabhedanibandhanam icchati / yadi tu yathāsmābhirucyate "sarvo mithyāvabhāso 'yam artheṣvekātmanā grahaḥ / itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ saṃjñā yadarthikā" //	and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon mutual exclusion among things [as held by the upholders of Apoha], If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration ‘all this apprehension of things as one is a false notion, its basis lies in mutual exclusion, which is what is expressed by the name’, then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us].
tathā ca vakṣyati "itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ" iti / na cāpohavādinā paramārthataḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ buddhyākāro 'nyo vā śabdānāmi [p.286] ṣyate /	This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passage ‘If the basis of this lies in mutual exclusion, then that is exactly our view’, As for the Apohist, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real.
tathā hi ya eva śābde pratyaye vyavasīyamānatayā pratibhāsate sa śabdārthaḥ /	Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition;
naca buddhyākāraḥ śābdapratyayena vyavasīyate, kiṃ tarhibāhyamevārthakriyākāri vastu / nacāpi tena bāhyaṃ paramārthato vyavasīyate, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt, yathāvyavasāyamatattvāt /	and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action, And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it, because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension;
ataḥ samāropita eva śabdārthaḥ /	so that the Import of words is something that is superimposed;
yacca samāropitaṃ tan na kiñcid iti na kiñcidbhāvato 'bhidhīyate śabdaiḥ /	and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, nothing is denoted by words.
yat punar uktam ---"śabdārtho 'rthaḥ saḥ eve"ti tat samāropitamevārtham abhisandhāya / buddhyākāravādinā tu buddhyākāraḥ paramārthato vācya iṣyata iti mahānviśeṣaḥ //	As for what has been said by the Apohist (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding ‘that being the denotation of words’, that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be really denoted by words.
abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ /	In short, all words are productive of intuition, through repeated usage;
bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane //	as is found in the case of making things known to children and animals.
śabdasya kvacid viṣaye punaḥ punaḥ pravṛttidarśanamabhyāsaḥ /	This view is set forth in the following [see verse 892 above] ‘Repeated usage’, finding the word applied to a certain object again and again.
niyatasādhanāvacchinnakriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā /	‘Intuition’, is a mental capacity which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause;
sā prayogadarśanāvṛttisahitena śabdena janyate /	this capacity is produced by the word as associated with frequent usage;
prativākyaṃ pratipuruṣaṃ ca sā bhidyate /	it varies with each sentence and with each person;
sa tu tasyā aparimāṇo bhedaḥ śabdavyavahārasyānantyān na śakyate vidhātumityata āha bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ cetyādi /	as its diversity is illimitable, on account of the usage of words being endless, it cannot be described; hence all that is said is that it is like making things known to children and animals;
yathaiva hyaṅkuśābhighātādayo hastyādīnām arthapratipattau kriyamāṇāyāṃ pratibhāmātropasaṃhārahetavo bhavanti na tvarthaṃ sākṣāt pratipādayanti /	the stroke of the driving Hook, used for making things known to the elephant, comes to produce an Intuition in the animal; in the same manner all expressive words, such as ‘tree’, etc. etc. through repeated usage, come ultimately to produce only an Intuition and they do not actually denote anything directly.
anyathā hi kathaṃ parasparaparāhatāḥ pravacanabhedā utpādyakathāprabandhāś ca svavikalpoparacitapadārthabhedadyotakāḥ syur iti //	Otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of Texts? How too could there be any imaginary stories and other compositions which speak of things created by the imagination of the writer? (892)
tatretyādinā pratividhatte	What is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ is said to be denoted by words;
tatrāstyartho 'bhidheyo 'yaṃ kiṃ svalakṣaṇamiṣyate / jātir yogo 'tha yadvānya{t} buddher vā pratibimbakam // ete svadoṣāḥ pūrvoktā astyarthe kevale 'pi ca /	is it meant to be the ‘specific individuality’ of things? or the ‘universal’? Or the contact? Or something else which reflects the cognition? The objections to everyone of these alternatives have been already set forth above.
pratipādye na bhedena vyavahāro 'vakalpate //	further, as for what is expressed by the verb ‘to be’, which has been held to form the import of words, there can be no diverse usage based upon that.
yadyastyarthaḥ pūrvoditasvalakṣaṇādisvabhāva iṣyate / tadā pūrvoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ /	If ‘what is expressed by the Verb to be’ is held to be of the nature of what has been expounded before, then it is open to the same objections that have been previously set forth.
kiñcānirdhāritarūpaviśeṣatvād astyarthasya tasmin kevale śabdaiḥ pratipadyamāne gaurgavayo gaja ityādibhedena vyavahāro na syāt tasya śabdair apratipāditatvāt //	Further, as no definite form can be conceived of in regard to ‘what is expressed by the verb to be’, if that alone were denoted by Words, there could be no such divergent usage of words as ‘Cow’, gavaya’, ‘Elephant’ and so forth; as these animals would not be denoted by the words at all.
[p.287] gotvetyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate	The following text anticipates the answer of the other party [see verse 895 next]
gotvaśabdaviśiṣṭārthasattāmātragater bhavet /	“It (usage) would be based upon the mere ‘being’ of things as qualified by the universal ‘cow’ and the word (‘cow’);
viṣāṇākṛtinīlādibhedākhyātestu tanmatam //	and the opinion that has been held is due to the fact that there are such diversities of form as the presence of horns, the particular shape, the particular colour ‘blue’ and so forth.” (895)
syād etat gotvaśabdābhyāṃ viśiṣṭasyārthasattāmātrasya sāvaleyatvādibhedarahitasya gośabdādgateḥ pratīteḥ kāranāt / bhedena vyavahāro bhaviṣyatīti /	The following may be the answer of the other party: “The diverse usage would proceed on the basis of the cognition of the mere ‘Being’ of the Thing concerned (which is what is expressed by the verb ‘to be’), as qualified by the Universal Cow and the word (‘Cow’, but devoid of such distinctions as being of variegated colour and so forth.
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi śabdārthatvamastyarthamātrasya mataṃ yāvatā gavādiviśeṣaḥ pratipādyo 'styevetyāśaṅkya paraḥ parihāram āha viṣāṇākṛtītyādi /	If that is so, then why is the denotation of the word said to consist in only what is expressed by the Verb ‘to be’, when such particulars as the ‘Cow’, etc. are also said to be denoted? The answer to this given by the other party is ‘The opinion, etc. etc.’;
viṣāṇāder viśeṣasya śabdākhyāter apratīteḥ kāraṇāt tadyuktam asti kaścid arthaḥ pratyāyya iti na tu gotvādigotvādiśabdayor viśeṣaṇabhūtayor apratīter ityadoṣaḥ //	that is, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Horn and other particulars does not proceed from the word; it is for tins reason that the opinion has been held that ‘what is denoted is what is expressed by the verb to be, and not the Universal Cow, etc.’; the reason for which opinion lies in the fact that the qualifying factors the Universal Cow and the word (name) ‘Cow’ are not cognised through the word.
nanvevam ityādinā pratividhatte	The above is refuted in the following [see verse 896 next]
nanvevaṃ tadvato 'rthasya bhedānāṃ cābhidhā bhavet /	If this be so, then there should be denotation of the thing as equipped with those, as also of the diverse particulars.
tadbhāve tatra doṣaś ca nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyate //	Apart from these, there is found nothing ‘expressed by the verb to be’.
yadā gotvādinā viśiṣṭārthamātram ucyate iti mataṃ, tadā tadvato 'rthasyābhidhānamaṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt / tatra ca jātes tat samavāyasya ca niṣedhāt tadvato 'rthasyāsambhava iti pūrvokto doṣaḥ /	If the view is that the object alone as qualified by the Universal ‘Cow’, etc. is denoted by the word, then it becomes admitted that there is denotation of the object as possessing that ‘Universal In that case, as the ‘Universal’ and also its ‘Inherence’ have been already rejected, there would be no possibility of there being any object equipped with these;
kiṃ ca tadvato 'rthasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvād aśakyasamayatvam anyavahāryatvamaspaṣṭāvabhāsaprasaṅgaś ca pūrvavadāpadyate eva /	Further, as the object equipped by these particulars would be of the nature of the ‘Specific Individuality’, there could be no Convention bearing upon it, and there could be no usage of words;
svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānya evāstyartha iti cedāha nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyata iti /	If it be said that What is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ is something different from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things, then the answer to that is that, apart from these, etc.
svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānyo 'styartho nirūpyamāṇo na buddher gocaratāmavatarati //	i.e. apart from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things, there is nothing ‘expressed by the verb to be’ which is within the range of our cognition.
samudāyābhidhāne 'pi jātibhedābhidā sphuṭā / tapojātikriyādīnāṃ sāmastyenābhidhānataḥ //	Under the view that what is denoted is the ‘aggregate’, there is clear conception of ‘universals’ and ‘particulars as what are denoted are austerity, caste, conduct and the rest collectively.
samudāyābhidhānapakṣe sphuṭataram eva jāter bhedānāṃ ca tapaḥprabhṛtīnāmabhidhānamaṅgīkṛtam iti pratyekābhidhānapakṣabhāvino doṣāḥ samudāyābhidhāne sarve yugapat prāpnuvanti // asatyo vāpītyādipakṣadvaye doṣamāha nirddhāritetyādi /	The following text sets forth the objections against the theory of the ‘Aggregate’ being denoted by Words (as expounded under Text 888): [see verse 897 above] Even under the view that what is denoted is the ‘Aggregate’, a much clearer conception of ‘Universals’ and ‘Particulars’, in the shape of Austerity and the rest, is admitted; hence all the objections that have been urged against the denotation of each of these singly, are all applicable to the view in question.
nirddhāritasvarūpāṇāṃ dravyādīnāṃ tu yogataḥ / sambandho yac ca sāmānyaṃ satyaṃ tadvāritaṃ purā //	Any sort of relation among substance and the rest, whose nature has been duly ascertained, as also any real ‘universal’, has been already discarded.
bhedajātyādirūpeṇa śabdārthānupapattitaḥ / arthenaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ na śabdasyopapadyate //	Inasmuch as the import of words cannot consist of particulars or universals, there can be no form of the word as coalesced (identified) with its denotation.
jalpo buddhistha evāyaṃ bāhyayogavibhedataḥ /	Then again, this ‘coalescence’ also must reside in the cognition itself, inasmuch as it is different from external relationship.
tataḥ ko bheda etasya truṭipakṣād anantarāt // buddhyākāro 'pi śabdārthaḥ prāgeva vinivāritaḥ / jñānādavyatiriktasya vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ //	Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the view that the cognition or idea itself constitutes the import of words? As regards the view that the form of the idea (or cognition) is what is denoted by words, that has been already rejected, on the ground that it would be nothing different from the idea and as such could not be pervasive.
pūrvaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ saṃyogasamavāyalakṣaṇasya vāritatvāt, sāmānyasya ca triguṇātmakasya satyasyāvyatiriktasya sāṅkhyaparīkṣāyāṃ, vyatiriktasyāpi ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ nirastatvān nāsatyasaṃyogo nāpyasatyopādhisāmānyaṃ vācyam /	In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected; under the examination of the Sāṃkhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the ‘Universal’ is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular Products); and the ‘Universal’ as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories; hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of ‘the conjunction of the Unreal’, or of ‘the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncts’.
abhijalpapakṣe 'pyāha yadi śabdasya kaścid arthaḥ sambhavet, tadā tena sahaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet, yāvatā svalakṣaṇādirūpasya śabdārthasyāsambhavaḥ pūrvaṃ pratipāditas tatkathaṃ tenaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet /	If there were such a thing as the ‘denotation’ of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no ‘denotation’ of the Word is possible, in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest, how could there be any ‘coalescing’ with it? Then again, the said ‘Coalescence’ also must reside in the Cognition only.
apicāyamabhijalpo buddhistha eva tathā hi bāhyayoḥ śabdārthayor bhinnendriyagrāhyatvādibhyo bhedasya siddhes tayor aikyāpādanamayuktam eva bhāvikam /	Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any real coalescence or identification of these cannot be right.
ato buddhisthayor eva śabdārthayor ekabuddhigatatvād ekīkaraṇaṃ yuktam /	The ‘Coalescence’, therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition.
tathāhyupagṛhītābhidheyākarastirobhūtaśabdasvabhāvo buddhau viparivartamānaḥ śabdātmā svarūpānugatamarthavibhāgenāntaḥsanniveśayannabhijalpa ucyate /	So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition, it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as ‘abhijalpa’, ‘Coalescence This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it;
sa ca buddher ātmagata evākāro yukto na bāhyas tasyaikāntena parasparaṃ viviktasvabhāvatvāt /	because what is exterior must be of an entirely distinct character.
tataś ca buddhiśabdārthapakṣādanantaroktād asya ko bhedaḥ --- naiva kaścit /	Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words? None at all.
ubhayatrāpi bauddha evārthaḥ /	In both cases the denotation would be purely subjective;
etāvanmātraṃ tu bhidyate, śabdārthāvekīkṛtāv iti /	the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.
doṣas tu samāna eva "jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vraje"diti / tadeva darśayati buddhyākāro 'pītyādi //898-	Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different? This is what is shown in the words ‘As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc.’.
pratibhāpi ca śabdārtho bāhyārthaviṣayā yadi / ekātmaniyate bāhye vicitrāḥ pratibhāḥ katham // atha nirviṣayā etā vāsanāmātrabhāvataḥ / pratipattiḥ pravṛttir vā bāhyārtheṣu kathaṃ bhavet // bāhyarūpādhimokṣeṇa svākāre yadi te mate /	As regards ‘intuition’, which has been regarded as the ‘import of words’, if it appertains to the external object, then, inasmuch as the external object has one particular character, how could there be various ‘intuitions’? If the ‘intuitions’ be held to be objectless, and existing only in the form of faculties, then how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external things? If it be held that these two (cognition and activity) abandon the external form and rest within themselves, then the import of words becomes unreal, false as proceeding through illusion.
nirbījā na ca sā yuktā sarvatraiva prasaṅgataḥ /	Nor can intuition be held to be baseless; as in that case, it should appear everywhere.
itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cetpakṣa eṣa naḥ //	If the basis of it be held to consist in the ‘mutual exclusion’ among things, then that is exactly our view.
[p.289] yadi pratibhā paramārthato bāhyārthaviṣayā tadaikatra vastuni śabdādau viruddhasamayāvasthāyināṃ vicitrāḥ pratibhā na prāpnuvanti, ekasyānekasvabhāvasambhavāt /	If ‘Intuition’ is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.
atha nirviṣayās tadārthe pravṛttipratipattī na prāpnutaḥ, atadviṣayatvācchabdasya /	If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible;
atha svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena bhrāntyā te pravṛttipratipattībhavatas tadā bhrāntaḥ śabdārthaḥ prāpnoti /	as the word would have no connection with objects. If it be held that “the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objectless”, then the Import of Words becomes illusory, mistaken;
tasyāś ca bhrānter bījaṃ kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam, anyathā nirbījā bhrāntir bhavantī sarvataḥ sarvadaiva syāt /	and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Illusion, it should appear everywhere and at all times.
atha bhāvānāṃ parasparato bheda eva bījamasyā abhyupagamyate tadāsmatpakṣameva bhavān sādhayatīti siddhasādhyatā //	If the mutual exclusion among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and as such your argument becomes superfluous.
yadi vā sarvamevedaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ syān na vā tathā / kṣaṇikatve 'nvayāyogaḥ kramijñānaṃ ca nānyathā //	Again, is all this momentary or not? If it is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination. if otherwise, there should be no successive cognition.
sarvam etat svalakṣaṇajātyādi kṣaṇikaṃ vāsyād akṣaṇikaṃ vā / tatrādye pakṣe saṅketakāladṛṣṭasya vyavahārakāle 'nvayāsambhavān na tatra samayaḥ /	All this ‘Specific Individuality’, ‘Universal’ and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words) is it momentary or not-momentary? In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exists at the time of Usage, no Convention could apply to the case at all.
akṣaṇikapakṣe ca nākramāt kramiṇo bhāva iti śabdārthaviṣayasya kramijñānasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ /	If, on the other hand, it be held that it is all not-momentary, then, inasmuch as what is successive cannot proceed from what is not-successive, there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import, as such cognition can only be successive.
anyatheti akṣaṇikatve //	‘Otherwise’ i.e. if it is not-momentary.
etenaiva vivakṣāpi śabdagamyā nirākṛtā /	This same argument serves to set aside the ‘desire to speak’ as (held to be) cognised through words.
śabdārthāsambhave hītthaṃ kva vivakṣā kva vā śrutiḥ //	when, as shown above, there can be no ‘denotation of words’, how could there be any ‘desire to speak’? Or even the word itself? (907)
yadi pāramārthato vivakṣā pāramārthikaśabdārthaviṣayeṣyate, tadasiddham, svalakṣaṇādeḥ, śabdārthasya kasyacid asambhavāt /	If the ‘desire to speak’ is really held to be appurtenant to the real ‘Import of Words’, then it is ‘unproven’; because there can be no ‘Import of Words’ in the shape of any such thing as ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest.
ato na kvacid arthe paramārthato vivakṣāsti, anvayino 'rthasyābhāvāt / nāpi tat pratipādakaḥ śabdo 'sti, tadāha kva vā śrutir iti /	Hence there can be no real ‘desire to speak’ of any object; as there is nothing to which the word may be related. Nor can there be a word denotative of the object; this is what is stated in the words ‘or even the word itself’.
śrutiḥ śabdaḥ /	‘Śruti’ stands for the Word.
vivakṣāyāṃ ca pratipādyāyāṃ śruteḥ śabdād bahirarthe pravṛttir na prāpnoti /	If the ‘desire to speak’, is what is expressed by the Word, then the Word cannot be applied to any external object;
tasyācoditatvād arthāntaravat //	as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.
atha mataṃ yo vivakṣāviparivartī rūpādir artho yaś ca bāhyas tayoḥ sārūpyamastyataḥ sārūpyādacodite bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati yamalakavad ityata āha sārūpyād iti / {sārūpyāc ca} śruter vṛttiḥ kathaṃ vā{ 'śabda}codite /	How can the word be applied, merely through similarity, to what is hot expressed by it? And the view that it is through similarity, as in the case of the names of twins, is also discarded by this same argument. The idea may be that “there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the ‘desire to speak’ and the external object, and on the basis of this similarity, the word may be applied to the external object, even though it may not be directly expressed;
sārūpyā{dyamalakava}nnāmādyetena dūṣitam //	as happens in the case of twins”. This is answered in the following [see verse 908 above]
[p.290] evaṃ sati sarvadā bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti kadācid vivakṣāparivartinyapicodite pravṛttir bhavet /	Such being the case, the application of words to external objects can never be possible; in fact it might be possible to apply the word to an object not figuring in the ‘desire to speak’ at all;
yathā yamalakyor iva /	as in the case of twins.
athavā eteneti / yathāsambhavaṃ svalakṣaṇādidūṣaṇena /	The Vaibhāṣika postulates, as mark of the object called ‘Name’ and ‘Basis’, a distinct faculty.
tathāhyatrāpyevaṃ vaktavyam	This theory also becomes discarded by this same argument.
"aśakyasamayo hyātmā nāmādīnām ananyabhāk /	Because if the said ‘Name’ is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination;
tathā mato na vācyatvaṃ kathañcidupapadyate" //	similarly what does not exist cannot be denoted by words’.
iti //	if this view be held, then that again is exactly our opinion.
yaduktaṃ vivakṣāsamārūḍhārthadyotakatve śabdānāṃ bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti /	It has been asserted above by the Author that if words denote things that figure in the ‘desire to speak’, then they cannot apply to external objects.
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkayann āha vivakṣetyādi /	The following Text anticipates the Opponent’s answer to this: [see verse 909 above]
vivakṣā ca vaktṛsantānavartinī, tasyā eva vivakṣāyā anumitiś ca śrotṛsantānagateti vivakṣānumitī tābhyāṃ śliṣṭaḥ ---sambaddhaḥ, tat pratibhāsītyarthaḥ /	“The ‘Desire to speak’ is present in the ‘Chain’ of the Speaker, and the Inference’ based upon that Desire is present in the ‘chain’ of the Hearer; the form that is connected with these two, i.e. which figures in these;
tamākāraṃ bāhyatayā vyavasyator vaktṛśrotroratra bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati /	when the two persons the Speaker and the Hearer think of the object as so figuring, then the Word comes to be applied to that external object.
etad uktaṃ bhavati paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānubhave 'pi vaktur evamadhyavasāyo bhavati, mayāsmai bāhya evārthaḥ pratipādyate /	That is to say, though in reality what the speaker is cognisant of is what is figuring in his own consciousness, yet he thinks that he is speaking to the other man of an external object;
śroturapyevaṃ bhavati, mamāyaṃ bāhyam eva pratipādayatīti /	and the Hearer also has the impression that ‘this man is speaking to me of an external object’;

śabda evārtha ityevaṃ śabde 'rthasya niveśanaṃ so 'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ, tasmāt kāraṇād yadā śabdasyārthena sahaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati taṃ svīkṛtārthākāraṃ śabdam abhijalpyam ityāhuḥ //

When the character of the object is imposed upon the Word by such expressions as ‘Word is the Object’; on the basis of this imposition, when the form of the Word becomes identified with the Object, the Word in the state of this unification with the object is said to be ‘in the state of coalescence’.

anye tu buddhyārūḍham evākāraṃ bāhyavastuviṣayaṃ bāhyavastutayā gṛhītaṃ buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvitaṃ śabdārthamāhuḥ taddarśayati yo vetyādi /

this (mixture of idea object) has been regarded by some people as forming the ‘import of words’. (e) Others have held the following view: “When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea;

sa bāhyaṃ vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate //

and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words”. This is the view set forth in the following.

buddhiviṣaya iti /

[see verse 891 above]

buddhau viparivartamānaḥ, buddhistha iti yāvat /

‘Content of the Idea’, i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea.

bāhyavastunibandhana iti /

‘On the basis of an external object’;

sadasadbāhyaṃ vastu nibandhanamakṣaracihnasthānīyaṃ svarūpamupadarśayituṃ prakamyate yasya, sa bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ /

i.e. that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing, in the shape of the letter-symbols.

bāhyaṃ vastvitijñāta iti /

‘It comes to be cognised as an external object’;

buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvito bāhyatayādhyavasita ity arthaḥ /

i.e. manifested in the form of the Idea, but apprehended as something external.

tathā hi yāvad buddhirūpamartheṣvapratyastaṃ buddhirūpameveti tattvabhāvanayā gṛhyate, tāvat tasya śabdārthatvaṃ nāvasīyate tatra kriyāviśeṣasambandhābhāvāt /

That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself, it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity;

na hi gāmānaya dadhi khādetyādikāḥ kriyās tādṛśi buddhirūpe sambhavanti kriyāyogasambhavī cārthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate /

for instance, actions spoken of in such words as ‘Bring the Cow’, ‘Eat the Curd’, are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action;

ato buddhirūpatayā gṛhīto 'sau na śabdārthaḥ /

hence what is apprehended as an Idea cannot be denoted by words.

yadā tu bāhyavastuni pratyasto bhavati tadā tasmin pratipattā bāhyatayā viparyastaṃ kriyāsādhanasāmarthyaṃ tasya manyata iti bhavati śabdārthaḥ /

When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinged upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.

nanu cāpohavādipakṣādasya ko viśeṣaḥ---/ tathā hi apohavādināpi buddhyākāro bāhyarūpatayā gṛhītaḥ śabdārtha iti bhāṣyata eva /

Question: “What is the difference between this theory and the theory of ‘Apoha’? The upholder of ‘Apoha’ also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external: as has been declared in the following passage: ‘There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the exclusion of other things’.”

yathoktam

This is not right.

"tadrūpāropagatyānyavyāvṛttyadhigateḥ punaḥ / śabdārthp 'rthaḥ sa eveti vacane na virudhyate" //

The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a real existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are real, and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong;

naitadasti ayaṃ hi buddhyākāravādī bāhye vastunyabhrāntaṃ saviṣayaṃ dravyādiṣu pāramārthikeṣvadhyastaṃ buddhyākāraṃ paramārthataḥ śabdārthamicchati / nanu nirālambanaṃ bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntamitaretarabhedanibandhanam icchati / yadi tu yathāsmābhirucyate "sarvo mithyāvabhāso 'yam artheṣvekātmanā grahaḥ / itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ saṃjñā yadarthikā" //

and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon mutual exclusion among things [as held by the upholders of Apoha], If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration ‘all this apprehension of things as one is a false notion, its basis lies in mutual exclusion, which is what is expressed by the name’, then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us].

tathā ca vakṣyati "itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ" iti / na cāpohavādinā paramārthataḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ buddhyākāro 'nyo vā śabdānāmi [p.286] ṣyate /

This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passage ‘If the basis of this lies in mutual exclusion, then that is exactly our view’, As for the Apohist, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real.

tathā hi ya eva śābde pratyaye vyavasīyamānatayā pratibhāsate sa śabdārthaḥ /

Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition;

naca buddhyākāraḥ śābdapratyayena vyavasīyate, kiṃ tarhibāhyamevārthakriyākāri vastu / nacāpi tena bāhyaṃ paramārthato vyavasīyate, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt, yathāvyavasāyamatattvāt /

and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action, And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it, because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension;

ataḥ samāropita eva śabdārthaḥ /

so that the Import of words is something that is superimposed;

yacca samāropitaṃ tan na kiñcid iti na kiñcidbhāvato 'bhidhīyate śabdaiḥ /

and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, nothing is denoted by words.

yat punar uktam ---"śabdārtho 'rthaḥ saḥ eve"ti tat samāropitamevārtham abhisandhāya / buddhyākāravādinā tu buddhyākāraḥ paramārthato vācya iṣyata iti mahānviśeṣaḥ //

As for what has been said by the Apohist (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding ‘that being the denotation of words’, that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be really denoted by words.

abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ /

In short, all words are productive of intuition, through repeated usage;

bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane //

as is found in the case of making things known to children and animals.

śabdasya kvacid viṣaye punaḥ punaḥ pravṛttidarśanamabhyāsaḥ /

This view is set forth in the following [see verse 892 above] ‘Repeated usage’, finding the word applied to a certain object again and again.

niyatasādhanāvacchinnakriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā /

‘Intuition’, is a mental capacity which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause;

sā prayogadarśanāvṛttisahitena śabdena janyate /

this capacity is produced by the word as associated with frequent usage;

prativākyaṃ pratipuruṣaṃ ca sā bhidyate /

it varies with each sentence and with each person;

sa tu tasyā aparimāṇo bhedaḥ śabdavyavahārasyānantyān na śakyate vidhātumityata āha bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ cetyādi /

as its diversity is illimitable, on account of the usage of words being endless, it cannot be described; hence all that is said is that it is like making things known to children and animals;

yathaiva hyaṅkuśābhighātādayo hastyādīnām arthapratipattau kriyamāṇāyāṃ pratibhāmātropasaṃhārahetavo bhavanti na tvarthaṃ sākṣāt pratipādayanti /

the stroke of the driving Hook, used for making things known to the elephant, comes to produce an Intuition in the animal; in the same manner all expressive words, such as ‘tree’, etc. etc. through repeated usage, come ultimately to produce only an Intuition and they do not actually denote anything directly.

anyathā hi kathaṃ parasparaparāhatāḥ pravacanabhedā utpādyakathāprabandhāś ca svavikalpoparacitapadārthabhedadyotakāḥ syur iti //

Otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of Texts? How too could there be any imaginary stories and other compositions which speak of things created by the imagination of the writer? (892)

tatretyādinā pratividhatte

What is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ is said to be denoted by words;

tatrāstyartho 'bhidheyo 'yaṃ kiṃ svalakṣaṇamiṣyate / jātir yogo 'tha yadvānya{t} buddher vā pratibimbakam // ete svadoṣāḥ pūrvoktā astyarthe kevale 'pi ca /

is it meant to be the ‘specific individuality’ of things? or the ‘universal’? Or the contact? Or something else which reflects the cognition? The objections to everyone of these alternatives have been already set forth above.

pratipādye na bhedena vyavahāro 'vakalpate //

further, as for what is expressed by the verb ‘to be’, which has been held to form the import of words, there can be no diverse usage based upon that.

yadyastyarthaḥ pūrvoditasvalakṣaṇādisvabhāva iṣyate / tadā pūrvoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ /

If ‘what is expressed by the Verb to be’ is held to be of the nature of what has been expounded before, then it is open to the same objections that have been previously set forth.

kiñcānirdhāritarūpaviśeṣatvād astyarthasya tasmin kevale śabdaiḥ pratipadyamāne gaurgavayo gaja ityādibhedena vyavahāro na syāt tasya śabdair apratipāditatvāt //

Further, as no definite form can be conceived of in regard to ‘what is expressed by the verb to be’, if that alone were denoted by Words, there could be no such divergent usage of words as ‘Cow’, gavaya’, ‘Elephant’ and so forth; as these animals would not be denoted by the words at all.

[p.287] gotvetyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate

The following text anticipates the answer of the other party [see verse 895 next]

gotvaśabdaviśiṣṭārthasattāmātragater bhavet /

“It (usage) would be based upon the mere ‘being’ of things as qualified by the universal ‘cow’ and the word (‘cow’);

viṣāṇākṛtinīlādibhedākhyātestu tanmatam //

and the opinion that has been held is due to the fact that there are such diversities of form as the presence of horns, the particular shape, the particular colour ‘blue’ and so forth.” (895)

syād etat gotvaśabdābhyāṃ viśiṣṭasyārthasattāmātrasya sāvaleyatvādibhedarahitasya gośabdādgateḥ pratīteḥ kāranāt / bhedena vyavahāro bhaviṣyatīti /

The following may be the answer of the other party: “The diverse usage would proceed on the basis of the cognition of the mere ‘Being’ of the Thing concerned (which is what is expressed by the verb ‘to be’), as qualified by the Universal Cow and the word (‘Cow’, but devoid of such distinctions as being of variegated colour and so forth.

yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi śabdārthatvamastyarthamātrasya mataṃ yāvatā gavādiviśeṣaḥ pratipādyo 'styevetyāśaṅkya paraḥ parihāram āha viṣāṇākṛtītyādi /

If that is so, then why is the denotation of the word said to consist in only what is expressed by the Verb ‘to be’, when such particulars as the ‘Cow’, etc. are also said to be denoted? The answer to this given by the other party is ‘The opinion, etc. etc.’;

viṣāṇāder viśeṣasya śabdākhyāter apratīteḥ kāraṇāt tadyuktam asti kaścid arthaḥ pratyāyya iti na tu gotvādigotvādiśabdayor viśeṣaṇabhūtayor apratīter ityadoṣaḥ //

that is, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Horn and other particulars does not proceed from the word; it is for tins reason that the opinion has been held that ‘what is denoted is what is expressed by the verb to be, and not the Universal Cow, etc.’; the reason for which opinion lies in the fact that the qualifying factors the Universal Cow and the word (name) ‘Cow’ are not cognised through the word.

nanvevam ityādinā pratividhatte

The above is refuted in the following [see verse 896 next]

nanvevaṃ tadvato 'rthasya bhedānāṃ cābhidhā bhavet /

If this be so, then there should be denotation of the thing as equipped with those, as also of the diverse particulars.

tadbhāve tatra doṣaś ca nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyate //

Apart from these, there is found nothing ‘expressed by the verb to be’.

yadā gotvādinā viśiṣṭārthamātram ucyate iti mataṃ, tadā tadvato 'rthasyābhidhānamaṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt / tatra ca jātes tat samavāyasya ca niṣedhāt tadvato 'rthasyāsambhava iti pūrvokto doṣaḥ /

If the view is that the object alone as qualified by the Universal ‘Cow’, etc. is denoted by the word, then it becomes admitted that there is denotation of the object as possessing that ‘Universal In that case, as the ‘Universal’ and also its ‘Inherence’ have been already rejected, there would be no possibility of there being any object equipped with these;

kiṃ ca tadvato 'rthasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvād aśakyasamayatvam anyavahāryatvamaspaṣṭāvabhāsaprasaṅgaś ca pūrvavadāpadyate eva /

Further, as the object equipped by these particulars would be of the nature of the ‘Specific Individuality’, there could be no Convention bearing upon it, and there could be no usage of words;

svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānya evāstyartha iti cedāha nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyata iti /

If it be said that What is expressed by the verb ‘to be’ is something different from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things, then the answer to that is that, apart from these, etc.

svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānyo 'styartho nirūpyamāṇo na buddher gocaratāmavatarati //

i.e. apart from ‘Specific Individuality’ and other things, there is nothing ‘expressed by the verb to be’ which is within the range of our cognition.

samudāyābhidhāne 'pi jātibhedābhidā sphuṭā / tapojātikriyādīnāṃ sāmastyenābhidhānataḥ //

Under the view that what is denoted is the ‘aggregate’, there is clear conception of ‘universals’ and ‘particulars as what are denoted are austerity, caste, conduct and the rest collectively.

samudāyābhidhānapakṣe sphuṭataram eva jāter bhedānāṃ ca tapaḥprabhṛtīnāmabhidhānamaṅgīkṛtam iti pratyekābhidhānapakṣabhāvino doṣāḥ samudāyābhidhāne sarve yugapat prāpnuvanti // asatyo vāpītyādipakṣadvaye doṣamāha nirddhāritetyādi /

The following text sets forth the objections against the theory of the ‘Aggregate’ being denoted by Words (as expounded under Text 888): [see verse 897 above] Even under the view that what is denoted is the ‘Aggregate’, a much clearer conception of ‘Universals’ and ‘Particulars’, in the shape of Austerity and the rest, is admitted; hence all the objections that have been urged against the denotation of each of these singly, are all applicable to the view in question.

nirddhāritasvarūpāṇāṃ dravyādīnāṃ tu yogataḥ / sambandho yac ca sāmānyaṃ satyaṃ tadvāritaṃ purā //

Any sort of relation among substance and the rest, whose nature has been duly ascertained, as also any real ‘universal’, has been already discarded.

bhedajātyādirūpeṇa śabdārthānupapattitaḥ / arthenaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ na śabdasyopapadyate //

Inasmuch as the import of words cannot consist of particulars or universals, there can be no form of the word as coalesced (identified) with its denotation.

jalpo buddhistha evāyaṃ bāhyayogavibhedataḥ /

Then again, this ‘coalescence’ also must reside in the cognition itself, inasmuch as it is different from external relationship.

tataḥ ko bheda etasya truṭipakṣād anantarāt // buddhyākāro 'pi śabdārthaḥ prāgeva vinivāritaḥ / jñānādavyatiriktasya vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ //

Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the view that the cognition or idea itself constitutes the import of words? As regards the view that the form of the idea (or cognition) is what is denoted by words, that has been already rejected, on the ground that it would be nothing different from the idea and as such could not be pervasive.

pūrvaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ saṃyogasamavāyalakṣaṇasya vāritatvāt, sāmānyasya ca triguṇātmakasya satyasyāvyatiriktasya sāṅkhyaparīkṣāyāṃ, vyatiriktasyāpi ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ nirastatvān nāsatyasaṃyogo nāpyasatyopādhisāmānyaṃ vācyam /

In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected; under the examination of the Sāṃkhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the ‘Universal’ is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular Products); and the ‘Universal’ as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories; hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of ‘the conjunction of the Unreal’, or of ‘the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncts’.

abhijalpapakṣe 'pyāha yadi śabdasya kaścid arthaḥ sambhavet, tadā tena sahaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet, yāvatā svalakṣaṇādirūpasya śabdārthasyāsambhavaḥ pūrvaṃ pratipāditas tatkathaṃ tenaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet /

If there were such a thing as the ‘denotation’ of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no ‘denotation’ of the Word is possible, in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest, how could there be any ‘coalescing’ with it? Then again, the said ‘Coalescence’ also must reside in the Cognition only.

apicāyamabhijalpo buddhistha eva tathā hi bāhyayoḥ śabdārthayor bhinnendriyagrāhyatvādibhyo bhedasya siddhes tayor aikyāpādanamayuktam eva bhāvikam /

Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any real coalescence or identification of these cannot be right.

ato buddhisthayor eva śabdārthayor ekabuddhigatatvād ekīkaraṇaṃ yuktam /

The ‘Coalescence’, therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition.

tathāhyupagṛhītābhidheyākarastirobhūtaśabdasvabhāvo buddhau viparivartamānaḥ śabdātmā svarūpānugatamarthavibhāgenāntaḥsanniveśayannabhijalpa ucyate /

So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition, it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as ‘abhijalpa’, ‘Coalescence This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it;

sa ca buddher ātmagata evākāro yukto na bāhyas tasyaikāntena parasparaṃ viviktasvabhāvatvāt /

because what is exterior must be of an entirely distinct character.

tataś ca buddhiśabdārthapakṣādanantaroktād asya ko bhedaḥ --- naiva kaścit /

Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words? None at all.

ubhayatrāpi bauddha evārthaḥ /

In both cases the denotation would be purely subjective;

etāvanmātraṃ tu bhidyate, śabdārthāvekīkṛtāv iti /

the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.

doṣas tu samāna eva "jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vraje"diti / tadeva darśayati buddhyākāro 'pītyādi //898-

Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different? This is what is shown in the words ‘As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc.’.

pratibhāpi ca śabdārtho bāhyārthaviṣayā yadi / ekātmaniyate bāhye vicitrāḥ pratibhāḥ katham // atha nirviṣayā etā vāsanāmātrabhāvataḥ / pratipattiḥ pravṛttir vā bāhyārtheṣu kathaṃ bhavet // bāhyarūpādhimokṣeṇa svākāre yadi te mate /

As regards ‘intuition’, which has been regarded as the ‘import of words’, if it appertains to the external object, then, inasmuch as the external object has one particular character, how could there be various ‘intuitions’? If the ‘intuitions’ be held to be objectless, and existing only in the form of faculties, then how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external things? If it be held that these two (cognition and activity) abandon the external form and rest within themselves, then the import of words becomes unreal, false as proceeding through illusion.

nirbījā na ca sā yuktā sarvatraiva prasaṅgataḥ /

Nor can intuition be held to be baseless; as in that case, it should appear everywhere.

itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cetpakṣa eṣa naḥ //

If the basis of it be held to consist in the ‘mutual exclusion’ among things, then that is exactly our view.

[p.289] yadi pratibhā paramārthato bāhyārthaviṣayā tadaikatra vastuni śabdādau viruddhasamayāvasthāyināṃ vicitrāḥ pratibhā na prāpnuvanti, ekasyānekasvabhāvasambhavāt /

If ‘Intuition’ is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.

atha nirviṣayās tadārthe pravṛttipratipattī na prāpnutaḥ, atadviṣayatvācchabdasya /

If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible;

atha svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena bhrāntyā te pravṛttipratipattībhavatas tadā bhrāntaḥ śabdārthaḥ prāpnoti /

as the word would have no connection with objects. If it be held that “the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objectless”, then the Import of Words becomes illusory, mistaken;

tasyāś ca bhrānter bījaṃ kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam, anyathā nirbījā bhrāntir bhavantī sarvataḥ sarvadaiva syāt /

and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Illusion, it should appear everywhere and at all times.

atha bhāvānāṃ parasparato bheda eva bījamasyā abhyupagamyate tadāsmatpakṣameva bhavān sādhayatīti siddhasādhyatā //

If the mutual exclusion among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and as such your argument becomes superfluous.

yadi vā sarvamevedaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ syān na vā tathā / kṣaṇikatve 'nvayāyogaḥ kramijñānaṃ ca nānyathā //

Again, is all this momentary or not? If it is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination. if otherwise, there should be no successive cognition.

sarvam etat svalakṣaṇajātyādi kṣaṇikaṃ vāsyād akṣaṇikaṃ vā / tatrādye pakṣe saṅketakāladṛṣṭasya vyavahārakāle 'nvayāsambhavān na tatra samayaḥ /

All this ‘Specific Individuality’, ‘Universal’ and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words) is it momentary or not-momentary? In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exists at the time of Usage, no Convention could apply to the case at all.

akṣaṇikapakṣe ca nākramāt kramiṇo bhāva iti śabdārthaviṣayasya kramijñānasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ /

If, on the other hand, it be held that it is all not-momentary, then, inasmuch as what is successive cannot proceed from what is not-successive, there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import, as such cognition can only be successive.

anyatheti akṣaṇikatve //

‘Otherwise’ i.e. if it is not-momentary.

etenaiva vivakṣāpi śabdagamyā nirākṛtā /

This same argument serves to set aside the ‘desire to speak’ as (held to be) cognised through words.

śabdārthāsambhave hītthaṃ kva vivakṣā kva vā śrutiḥ //

when, as shown above, there can be no ‘denotation of words’, how could there be any ‘desire to speak’? Or even the word itself? (907)

yadi pāramārthato vivakṣā pāramārthikaśabdārthaviṣayeṣyate, tadasiddham, svalakṣaṇādeḥ, śabdārthasya kasyacid asambhavāt /

If the ‘desire to speak’ is really held to be appurtenant to the real ‘Import of Words’, then it is ‘unproven’; because there can be no ‘Import of Words’ in the shape of any such thing as ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest.

ato na kvacid arthe paramārthato vivakṣāsti, anvayino 'rthasyābhāvāt / nāpi tat pratipādakaḥ śabdo 'sti, tadāha kva vā śrutir iti /

Hence there can be no real ‘desire to speak’ of any object; as there is nothing to which the word may be related. Nor can there be a word denotative of the object; this is what is stated in the words ‘or even the word itself’.

śrutiḥ śabdaḥ /

‘Śruti’ stands for the Word.

vivakṣāyāṃ ca pratipādyāyāṃ śruteḥ śabdād bahirarthe pravṛttir na prāpnoti /

If the ‘desire to speak’, is what is expressed by the Word, then the Word cannot be applied to any external object;

tasyācoditatvād arthāntaravat //

as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.

atha mataṃ yo vivakṣāviparivartī rūpādir artho yaś ca bāhyas tayoḥ sārūpyamastyataḥ sārūpyādacodite bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati yamalakavad ityata āha sārūpyād iti / {sārūpyāc ca} śruter vṛttiḥ kathaṃ vā{ 'śabda}codite /

How can the word be applied, merely through similarity, to what is hot expressed by it? And the view that it is through similarity, as in the case of the names of twins, is also discarded by this same argument. The idea may be that “there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the ‘desire to speak’ and the external object, and on the basis of this similarity, the word may be applied to the external object, even though it may not be directly expressed;

sārūpyā{dyamalakava}nnāmādyetena dūṣitam //

as happens in the case of twins”. This is answered in the following [see verse 908 above]

[p.290] evaṃ sati sarvadā bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti kadācid vivakṣāparivartinyapicodite pravṛttir bhavet /

Such being the case, the application of words to external objects can never be possible; in fact it might be possible to apply the word to an object not figuring in the ‘desire to speak’ at all;

yathā yamalakyor iva /

as in the case of twins.

athavā eteneti / yathāsambhavaṃ svalakṣaṇādidūṣaṇena /

The Vaibhāṣika postulates, as mark of the object called ‘Name’ and ‘Basis’, a distinct faculty.

tathāhyatrāpyevaṃ vaktavyam

This theory also becomes discarded by this same argument.

"aśakyasamayo hyātmā nāmādīnām ananyabhāk /

Because if the said ‘Name’ is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination;

tathā mato na vācyatvaṃ kathañcidupapadyate" //

similarly what does not exist cannot be denoted by words’.

iti //

if this view be held, then that again is exactly our opinion.

yaduktaṃ vivakṣāsamārūḍhārthadyotakatve śabdānāṃ bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti /

It has been asserted above by the Author that if words denote things that figure in the ‘desire to speak’, then they cannot apply to external objects.

atra parasyottaramāśaṅkayann āha vivakṣetyādi /

The following Text anticipates the Opponent’s answer to this: [see verse 909 above]

vivakṣā ca vaktṛsantānavartinī, tasyā eva vivakṣāyā anumitiś ca śrotṛsantānagateti vivakṣānumitī tābhyāṃ śliṣṭaḥ ---sambaddhaḥ, tat pratibhāsītyarthaḥ /

“The ‘Desire to speak’ is present in the ‘Chain’ of the Speaker, and the Inference’ based upon that Desire is present in the ‘chain’ of the Hearer; the form that is connected with these two, i.e. which figures in these;

tamākāraṃ bāhyatayā vyavasyator vaktṛśrotroratra bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati /

when the two persons the Speaker and the Hearer think of the object as so figuring, then the Word comes to be applied to that external object.

etad uktaṃ bhavati paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānubhave 'pi vaktur evamadhyavasāyo bhavati, mayāsmai bāhya evārthaḥ pratipādyate /

That is to say, though in reality what the speaker is cognisant of is what is figuring in his own consciousness, yet he thinks that he is speaking to the other man of an external object;

śroturapyevaṃ bhavati, mamāyaṃ bāhyam eva pratipādayatīti /

and the Hearer also has the impression that ‘this man is speaking to me of an external object’;