buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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atastaimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavad ayaṃ sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāra iti /	hence, just as two men suffering from defective vision see two moons, so also is all this use of words.”
yadyevam asmatpakṣa eva patito 'sīti siddhasādhyatā /	If this is so, then, you have fallen on our side;
pūrvaṃ pratibhādvāreṇāgatatvād ityataḥ punar ity āha tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor nāsiddhateti pratipāditam / anaikāntikatvaviruddhatve tu pūrvam eva niraste /	‘Again’, i.e. once you had come to our side when you postulated the ‘Intuition’ as the ‘Import of words’, It is thus established that the Reason (put forward by the Author) ‘because no Convention can be made’, cannot be regarded as ‘unproven’, The idea that it may be ‘Inconclusive’ or ‘Contradictory’ has been already rejected before.
tasmāt siddhā yathoktāpohakṛtaḥ śabdā iti //	From all this it follows that all that is brought about by words is the ‘Apoha’, ‘Exclusion of others’, (909)
nanvanyāpohakṛcchabdo yuṣmābhiḥ katham ucyate / niṣedhamātraṃ naiveha pratibhāse 'vagamyate //	“Why do you say that the word brings about the ‘exclusion of others’? as a matter of fact mere negation is not apprehended in the idea brought about by the word;
kiṃtu gaurgavayo hastī vṛkṣaśce{tyā}diśabdataḥ / vidhirūpāvasāyena matiḥ śābdī pravartate //	on the contrary, in the case of all such words as ‘cow’, ‘gavaya’, ‘elephant’, ‘tree’ and so forth, the verbal cognition that results is always in the positive form.” (910-911)
[p.291] anyāpohakṛcchabda ityatretiśabdo 'dhyāhāryaḥ / anyāpohakṛcchabda ityevaṃ katham abhidhīyata ity arthaḥ /	The particle ‘iti’ is to be taken as understood after ‘anyāpohakṛt’, The meaning is “Why do you say that what is brought about by the word is the exclusion of others?”
kasmānnābhidheyamityāha niṣedhamātram ityādi /	Why should not this be asserted? “Because, as a matter of fact, mere negation, etc. etc.;
niṣedhamātram eva kilānyāpoho 'bhipretaḥ, naceha śābde pratibhāse niṣedhamātraṃ gamyate /	that is, ‘the exclusion of others’ is intended to be a mere negation; and mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition;
kiṃ tarhi vasturūpādhyavasāyenaiva śābdī dhīḥ pravartamānā samālakṣyate /	on the contrary, Verbal Cognition is always found to apprehend the positive form of things;
naca śābde jñāne yo na pratyavabhāsate sa śabdānāṃ yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	and what does not figure in Verbal Cognition cannot be rightly regarded as the ‘import of words’; as such an idea would lead to absurdities.
tasmāt pratītivirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ //	Thus the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience.” (910-911)
yadi gaurityādinā ślokatrayeṇa bhāmahasya matena pratītyādibādhāmudbhāvayati / yadi gau{ritiśabdo 'yaṃ bhaveda}nyanirākṛtau /	“If the whole purpose of the word ‘cow’ is served by the. ‘exclusion of others’, then, please find some other word which brings about the notion of ‘cow’ in regard to the cow itself.” (912) The next three Texts state the fact of the Buddhist’s Proposition being contrary to experience, in accordance with the opinion of Bhāmaha: [see verse 912 above]
yadi gośabdo 'nyavyavacchedapratipādanaparas tadā tasya tatraiva caritārthatvāt sāsnādimati padārthe gośabdāt pratītir na prāpnoti, tataś ca sāsnādimat padārthaviṣayāyā gobuddher janako 'paro dhvaniranveṣaṇīyaḥ syāt //	“If the word ‘Cow’ only serves the purpose of denoting the ‘exclusion of others’, then, as it would be taken up in that, that term ‘Cow’ could not bring about the idea of the animal with the dewlap; hence it would be necessary to seek for some other word which could bring about the notion of ‘Cow’ in regard to the said animal with the dewlap.” (912)
na tu jñānaphalāḥ {śabdā na caikasya phaladva}yam /	“In fact, cognition is the fruit of words; and no single word can have two fruits.
apavādavidhi{jñānaṃ phalam ekasya vā katham} //	how too could both affirmation and negation be the fruit of any one word?” (913)
vidhiviṣayaṃ pratiṣedhaviṣayaṃ ca jñānaṃ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ /	“Words have for their fruit the cognition of affirmation and of negation.
tataḥ kimityāha na caikasyetyādi /	‘What then? No single word can have two fruits;
na hyekasya vidhikāriṇaḥ pratiṣedhakāriṇo vā śabdasya yugapad vijñānadvayalakṣaṇaṃ phalam /	of any one word, be it affirmative or negative, there cannot be two fruits appearing at one and the same time;
upalabhyata iti śeṣaḥ /	that is, no such is ever found.
nacāpi parasparaviruddhamapavādavidhijñānaṃ phalaṃ yuktam //	Nor again is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of affirmation and negation to be the fruit of a single word.” (913)
prāgityādinopacayahetumāha prāgagauriti vijñānaṃ gośabdaśrāviṇo bhavet /	“When one hears the word ‘cow’ uttered, he should, first of all have the idea of the non-cow, as the word ‘cow’ would have been uttered for the purpose of negativing the ‘non-cow’.” (914)
yenāgoḥ pratiṣedhāya pravṛtto gauriti dhvaniḥ //	In the following Text, Bhāmaha puts forward his comprehensive argument (against Apoha): [see verse 914 above]
yadi ca gośabdenāgonivṛttir mukhyataḥ pratipādyate tadā gośabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ prathamataramagaur ity eṣā śrotuḥ pratipattir bhavet /	“If it is the negation of the non-cow that is mainly expressed by the word ‘Cow’, then, on hearing the word ‘Cow’, the first idea in the mind of the hearer would be that of the ‘non-cow’;
yatraiva hy avyavadhānena śabdāt pratyaya upajāyate sa eva śabdārtho vyavasthāpyate /	because that is held to be the ‘import’ of the word the notion regarding which appears directly and immediately after the word;
na cāvyavadhānenāgovyavacchede matir upajāyate / ato gobuddhyanutpattiprasaṅgāt prathamataramagopratītiprasaṅgāc ca nāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti //	the notion of the ‘negation of the non-cow does not appear directly and immediately after the word ‘Cow Thus, on account of the incongruity of there being no notion of the Cow, and on account of the incongruity of the first appearance of the notion of the non-cow, ‘Apoha’ (Negation of others) cannot form the Import of Words.” (914)
agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yai{rurarīkṛtam} / {vācyaṃ} vastveva tairukta{metayā hi girā sphuṭam} //	“Those who have admitted the universal ‘negation of the non-cow’ as the import of the word have, by the expression, admitted the universal ‘cow’ as an entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 1] (915)
sa hyevam apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ vācyatvenābhidhīyamānaṃ kadācit paryudāsalakṣaṇaṃ vābhidhīyate prasajyalakṣaṇaṃ vā /	Kumārila has argued as follows: “When the Universal ‘Negation of the Contrary’ is asserted to be the Import of words, it could be either in the form of ‘Preclusion’ or ‘the negation of what is possible’;
tatra prathame pakṣe siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ tathāhyasmābhir gotvākhyaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdena vācyamityevam iṣyate bhavatā cāgonivṛttilakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdenocyata iti bruvatā tadeva śabdāntareṇābhidhīyata iti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ //	If it be the former, then the Proposition is open to the charge of being ‘futile’, inasmuch as we also hold that what is denoted by the word ‘Cow’ is the Universal named ‘Cow’; and this is exactly what you also assert in other words when you declare that ‘what is denoted by the word Cow is the Universal in the shape of the negation of the non-cow’; so that the dispute is only in regard to the name (of the Universal).” (915) Question: How is it the same thing asserted in different words?
atha kathaṃ tadeva śabdāntareṇābhihitamityāha bhāvāntarātmaka ityādi / bhāvāntarātmako 'bhāvo yena sarvo vyavasthitaḥ / tatrāśvādinivṛttātmābhāvaḥ sa{ka---} iti kathyatām //	“Inasmuch as all ‘inexistence’ has been held to be of the nature of some other ‘existence’, please say what that ‘inexistence’ is which is of the nature of the ‘negation of the horse (and otehr non-cows)’? [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 2] (916) Question: How is it the same thing asserted in different words?
yena yasmāt prāgabhāvādilakṣaṇaścaturvidhaḥ sarva evābhāvo bhāvāntarātmako vyavasthitaḥ /	“Since all ‘Inexistence’, in the four forms of ‘Previous Inexistence’ and the rest, has been found to be of the nature of existence’;
yaccoktam "kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kathyate /	as declared in the following words ‘while the Curd is not present in the Milk, it is called previous Inexistence;
nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāvalakṣaṇam //	Inexistence per Destruction;
gavi hyaśvādyabhāvaś ca so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate /	the absence of the House, etc. in the Cow is called mutual Inexistence;
śiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyavarjitāḥ // śaśaśṛṅgādirūpeṇa{rūpena---} so 'tyantābhāva ucyate /	when portions of the head of the Hare are flat and devoid of a hard protuberance, it is said to be absolute Inexistence, in the shape of the Hare’s Horn...
na cāvastuta ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā" // iti /	These thus are not so many kinds of non-entity. Hence Inexistence must be an entity’ (Ślokavārtika: Abhāva, 2-4 and 8).
etena kṣīrādaya eva ca dadhyādirūpeṇāvidyamānāḥ prāgabhāvādivyapadeśabhāja iti darśitaṃ bhavati /	What is meant is that it is Milk itself which, while not present in the form of the Curd, comes to be known as the ‘Previous Inexistence’ (of the Curd); and similarly with other forms of Inexistence.
tatraivamabhāvasya bhāvāntarātmakatve sthite sati ko 'yaṃ bhavadbhiraśvādinivṛttisvabhāvo 'bhāvo 'bhipreta iti kathyatām //	Thus Inexistence being only a form of Existence, what is that Inexistence which is meant by you to be the ‘Negation of the Horse, etc.’; please tell us this.” (916)
{neṣṭo 'sādhāraṇātmā vo} viśeṣo nirvikalpanāt /	“You do not admit of any individuality in the nature of something uncommon (unique), because it is devoid of conceptual content;
tathā ca śābaleyādirasāmānyaprasaṅgataḥ //	so also (you do not admit) the ‘variegated animal’ and the like;
tasmāt sarveṣu yadrūpaṃ pratyekaṃ pariniṣṭhitam / gobuddhistannimittā syā..............ṣti tat //	Hence the idea of the ‘cow’ must be based upon that form which subsists in common in every single individual (cow); [and in this there can be no dispute between us].” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 3 & 10] (917-918)
yo 'sāvasādhāraṇo viśeṣaḥ so 'śvādinivṛttyātmā neṣṭo bhavatāṃ /	That which is the unique (uncommon) Individuality is not held by you to constitute the ‘negation of Horse and other non-cows’;
kasmād ity āha nirvikalpanāt /	why? because it is devoid of conceptual content (or determination);
tatra sarvavikalpapratyayastamayāt /	that is, all determination ceases in it;
vikalpajñānagocaraḥ sāmānyameveṣyate, [p.293] asādhāraṇastvarthaḥ sarvavikalpānām agocaraḥ /	it is only the Common Universal that is held to form the object of determination (conceptual thought); while that entity which is uncommon, unique is beyond all determination;
yathoktam "svasaṃvedyamanirdeśyaṃ rūpamindriyagocara" iti / viśeṣātmakatve kāraṇamasādhāraṇātmakatā, asādhāraṇātmatayā yo viśeṣa	as declared in the following words ‘What is perceptible by the senses is the self-cognisable, inexplicable form’, The ground for regarding anything as an Individual consists in its uncommon (unique) character; hence what is meant by the words of the Text is ‘that which is an Individuality by reason of its uncommon character
ity arthaḥ /	Hitherto the Text has made only a general statement.
sāmprataṃ viśeṣeṇainamevārthamāha tathācetyādi / yathaiva bhavatām asādhāraṇo viśeṣo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā gośabdābhidheyo neṣṭas tathaiva śābaleyādiśabdavācyatayā neṣṭo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā bhāva ityatrāpyanuvartate /	It reasserts same thing in reference to a particular instance ‘So also, etc. etc.’: that is, just as you do not admit of the Import of the word ‘Cow’ to consist in any unique individual in the shape of the ‘negation of the Horse and other nom cows’, so also you do not admit of any positive entity in the form of the ‘negation of the Horse, etc.’ as forming the Import of such words as the ‘variegated cow’ and the like.
kasmād ity āha asāmānyaprasaṅgata iti /	Why not? Because in that case the Import would not be universal;
yadīṣyeta tadā sāmānyaṃ śabdavācyaṃ na syāt tasyānanvayāt, /	that is, if it were so admitted, then, the Universal could never form the Import of the word; as it would have no connection with the word.
yata evamaśvādinivṛttyātmā bhāvo 'sādhāraṇo na ghaṭate, tasmāt sarveṣu sajātīyeṣu śābaleyādipiṇḍeṣu yat pratyekaṃ parisamāptaṃ tannibandhanā gobuddhiḥ /	Because it is so, therefore there can be no common entity in the shape of the ‘negation of the Horse, etc.’; consequently the conclusion must be that the idea of ‘Cow’ is based upon that character which resides completely in each one of the members of the same class the variegated and other cows;
tac ca gotvākhyam eva sāmānyam / tasyāgo 'pohaśabdenābhidhānāt kevalaṃ nāmāntaram ityataḥ siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ //	and this can be only the Universal ‘Cow’, If you speak of this same as the ‘negation of the non-cow’, then the difference is only in name and your proposition thus is open to the charge of being ‘superfluous’, (917-918)
niṣedhamātrarūpaś ca śabdārthau yadi kalpyate / abhāvaśabda{vācyā syācchūnyatānyaprakārikā} //	“If the import of words be assumed to be of the nature of mere negation, then it would only be another kind of ‘void’ spoken of by means of the negative word.” (919)
abhāvaśabdavācyeti /	‘Spoken of by means of the negative word’;
ago 'pohalakṣaṇo '{ṇā---}bhāvavācakaḥ śabdo 'bhāvaśabdas tadvācyā bahirarthaśusunyatā syāt, vasturūpāpahnavat /	the ‘Negative Word’ is the word expressive of the negation in the form of the ‘negation of the noncow’; and what would be denoted by this word would only be the ‘Void’, the absence of the external world; since the form of the ‘entity’ would be denied.
anyaprakāriketi /	‘Another kind’;
pūrvaṃ vijñānamātravādopanyāsakāle bhavadbhirupanyastā, nirastā cāsmābhiḥ, punar apyatra śabdārthacintāprastāve saivāpohavyājenābhihitā pratītisiddhasyārthasyāpavādāt //	this ‘Void’ you (Buddhist) had postulated, and we had rejected under the chapter on Idealism (Vijñānavāda of the Ślokavartika); and on the present occasion of examining the nature of the Import of Words, the same ‘Void’ is again put forward under the garb of ‘Apoha’; which denies the object whose existence is vouched for by experience.
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha tasyāṃ cetyādi /	“Where is the harm if that is so?” Answer: [see verse 920 next]
tasyāṃ cāśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ bhavet /	“In that ‘void’ there would be an apprehension of the character of the cognitions themselves of the horse and other things;
tatrānyāpohavācyatvaṃ mudhaivābhyupagamyate //	and in that case it would be useless to posit the ‘Apoha (negation) of others’ as the import of words.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 37] (920)
tasyām śūnyatāyāṃ vācyāyāṃ śābdīnām aśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti bāhyavastusvarūpāgrahāt /	If the ‘Void’ is what is denoted, then it comes to this that in all Verbal Cognitions what is comprehended is only the factor of ‘Cognition’ itself; as ex hypothesis there can be no apprehension of the form of any thing external.
evaṃ ca sati ko doṣa ity āha tatretyādi /	“Even so, what is the harm?” In that case, it would be futile to assert that the Apoha is denoted by words;
buddhyākārasyānapekṣitabāhyārthāvalambanasya vidhirūpasyaiva śabdārthatvāpatteḥ / tataścābhyupagamabādhā pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //	as what would become the Import of Words would be the form of the Cognition which would be a positive entity independent of all tinge of anything external. What is meant is that in this way there would be a contradiction of your own doctrine by this Proposition of yours.
etadeva darśayati sāmānyam ityādi /	The same idea is further explained: [see verse 921 next]
sāmānyaṃ {vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyā}kāro bhaviṣyati / śabdārtha............................	“In that case, the ‘form of the Cognition which is posited as the ‘Import of Words’, would be the Universal.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 38] (921)
[p.294] buddhyākāra eva vasturūpaṃ sāmānyaṃ śabdārtho bhaviṣyatīti sambandhaḥ //	That is to say, the ‘form of the Cognition’ itself, in the form of the positive entity, ‘Universal’, would be the Import of Words.
syād etad anālambanāpi sā buddhir vijātīyagavādibuddhibhyo vyāvṛttarūpā pravartate tenāpohakalpanā yuktaivetyata āha vasturūpetyādi /	The following might be urged ‘Even without a substratum (in the external world), the cognition in question would appear in the form of the ‘exclusion of the heterogeneous Cow, etc.’; hence the postulation of the ‘Apoha’ is quite right.’
teṣu vastveva {kalpyeta vācyaṃ} buddhyanapohakam //	This is answered in the following [see verse 922 above]
vasturūpeti vidhirūpāvasāyinī /	‘Vasturūpā’; in the form of a positive entity.
sā buddhiriti / anālambanāśvādibuddhiḥ /	The said cognition’, i.e. the cognition the Horse, without a real substratum in the external world.
śabdārtheṣviti / aśvādiṣvadhyavasiteṣu /	‘In connection with the Import of Words’, as relating to the Horse and other things conceived of.
vastveveti /	‘To consist of a positive entity’;
aśvādipiṇḍādhyavasāyibuddhyātmakam /	in the shape of the Idea embracing the notion of the Horse and other non-cows.
avadhāraṇaphalaṃ darśayati buddhyanapohakam iti /	The effect of the emphasis is explained a cognition not of the nature of Apoha;
avidyamāno 'poho yatra vācye buddhyātmake vastuni tat tathoktam /	i.e. that Import of Words, in the shape of Idea, wherein the Apoha does not enter at all;
buddher anapohakam / buddhyantarāpoharahitam ity arthaḥ / athavā apohata ityapohakaṃ, nāpohakamanapohakaṃ, buddher anapohakaṃ buddhyanapohakam iti samāsaḥ /	the compound ‘buddhyanapohakam’ being expounded as ‘the non-exclusion of the Idea’, i.e. without any exclusion of other Ideas. Or the compound ‘buddhyanapohakam’ may be explained as follows ‘apohaka’ is that which excludes, ‘anapohaka’ is that winch does not exclude;
etad uktaṃ bhavati /	the compound thus standing for ‘that which does not exclude the Idea’, What is meant is as follows;
yadyapi buddhir buddhyantarād vyavacchinnā, tathāpi sā na buddhyantaravyavacchedāvasāyinī jāyate /	Though one Cognition is always different from another Cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of the other cognition;
kiṃ tarhiaśvādiṣvartheṣu vidhirūpāvasāyinī, tena vastveva vidhirūpaṃ vācyaṃ kalpeta yuktimat, nāpohaḥ, buddhyantarasya buddhyantarānapohakatvāt //	Consequently the most reasonable thing is to accept the view that what is denoted is a positive entity, not Apoha; because one Cognition cannot exclude (be of the nature of the Apoha, negation, of) another. “even in the absence of the corresponding external object there is intuition expressed by the sentence;
kiṃ ca yo 'yaṃ bhavadbhirapohaḥ padārthatvena kalpitaḥ sa vākyādapoddhṛtya kalpitasya padasyārtha iṣṭo vākyārthastu pratibhālakṣaṇa eva /	similar may be the case with what is expressed by the word also; why should the apoha be postulated at all?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 43] (923) Then again, this Apoha that you have postulated as the Import of Words, has been held to be denoted by the word as taken out of a Sentence;
yathoktam "apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyādartho vivecitaḥ /	as has been declared in the following “Hitherto has been discussed the denotation of the Word as taken out of a Sentence;
vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāvupajanyate" //	but what is brought about first of all is what is expressed by the Sentence, which has been called Intuition”.
iti / atrocyate asatyapītyādi /	In this connection we have the following Text: [see verse 923 above]
{asatyapi ca vākyārthaḥ pratibhālakṣaṇo} yathā / padārtho 'pi tathaiva syāt kimapohaḥ prakalpyate // yathā bāhye 'rthe śabdavācyatvenāsatyapi vākyārtho bhavadbhiḥ pratibhālakṣaṇa eva varṇyate nāpohalakṣaṇas tathā padārtho 'pi vākyārthavat pratibhālakṣaṇa eva syād ityapohaḥ padārthatayā kimiti kalpyate /	Just as, even in the absence of an external object denoted by the Word, you describe the meaning of the Sentence to be of the nature of Intuition, hot of the nature of ‘Apoha’, even so, the meaning of the word, like the meaning of the Sentence, also may be of the nature of Intuition. Under the circumstances, why is any such thing as ‘Apoha’ postulated at all? That is to say, the Import of both Sentence and Word may be of the positive character. “In the case of a cognition, no ‘exclusion of another cognition’ is apprehended;
dvayor api padavākyārthayor vidhirūpatvamevāstviti bhāvaḥ //	in fact, apart from the coming about of its own form, the cognition carries with it no other factor.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 41] (924)
syād etat pratibhāyāḥ pratibhāntarād vijātīyād vyavacchedo 'stītyato 'pohaḥ kalpyata ity āha buddhyantarād ityādi /	The following might be urged: In the case of Intuitions also, there is always exclusion of one Intuition by another; hence Apoha is postulated. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 924 above]
[p.295] yadyapyasau na pratīyate tathāpyastyeveti cedāha svarūpotpādetyādi /	It might be said that “even though it is not apprehended, it may be there all the same”; hence it is added ‘In fact, etc. etc.’;
yadyapi buddher buddhyantarādvyāvṛttir asti tathāpi tasyāṃ na śabdavyāpāro 'sti /	even though there may be exclusion of one Cognition from another, yet the Word has got nothing to do with it.
tathā hi śabdādiyaṃ buddhirutpadyamānā na svarūpotpādavyatirekeṇānyaṃ buddhyantaravyavacchedalakṣaṇaṃ śabdādavasīyamānamaṃśaṃ bibhratī lakṣyate, kiṃtarhividhirūpāvasāyinyevotpadyata ity arthaḥ /	Because as a matter of fact, when the Cognition is brought about by the Word, it does not bear within itself any factor expressed by the word, apart from its own appearance, in the shape of the exclusion of other Cognitions;
na ca śabdādavasīyamāno vastvaṃśaḥ śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	And the factor of an entity which is not expressed by the word cannot form the Import of that word;
tasmāt pratītibādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //	The sense of all this is that the Proposition (of the Buddhist regarding Apoha) is annulled by actual experience.
bhinnasāmānyavacanā viśeṣavacanāś ca ye / sarve bhaveyuḥ paryāyā yadyapohasya vācyatā //	“If Apoha formed the import of words, then all words would be synonymous, those that denote diverse universals, as well as those that denote particulars.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 42] (925)
ye hi bhinnasāmānyavacanā gavāśvādayo ye ca viśeṣavacanāḥ śābaleyādayas te sarve bhavatāṃ paryāyāḥ prāpnuvantyarthabhedābhāvāt, vṛkṣapādapādiśabdavat //	The words denotative of diverse Universals, like ‘Cow’, ‘Horse’, etc. as well as those denotative of Particulars, the ‘Variegated Cow’, etc. would all become synonymous for you; as there would be no difference in their meanings, just like the words ‘vṛkṣa’ and ‘pādapa’ (both of which denote the tree and are hence synonyms).
kasmāt punar arthabhedo na sambhavatītyāha saṃsṛṣṭetyādi /	Question: Why is there no difference in the meaning? Answer: [see verse 926 next]
avastutvādapohānāṃ} naiva bhedo 'pi vidyate // vastunyeva hi saṃsṛṣṭatvaikatvanānātvavikalpāḥ sambhavanti, nāvastuni, apohānāṃ cāvastutvān na parasparaṃ saṃsṛṣṭatvādivikalpo yuktaḥ, tat katham eṣāṃ parasparaṃ bhedaḥ siddhyati //	“There can be no difference among Apohas, because they are non-entities, and devoid of all such conceptions as ‘related ‘one’ and’ many.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 45] (926) Such conceptions as ‘related’, ‘one’ and ‘many’ are possible only in regard to an entity, not to a non-entity; and as Apohas are non-entities, there can be no such conceptions in regard to them as being ‘mutually related’ and so forth; how then can there be any difference among them? (926)
yadi vā bhidyamānatvā{d vastu sādhāraṇāṃśavat} /	“If the Apohas are different, then they must be entities, because of that difference, just like the specific individuality of things.
avastutve {tvanānātvā}t paryāyatvān na mucyate //	If they are non-entities, then they cannot be many, and hence they cannot escape from being synonymous.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 46] (927)
vastviti sādhyanirdeśaḥ /	‘Vastu’ states the Probandum.
prayogaḥ ye parasparaṃ vibhidyante te vastu, yathā svalakṣaṇāni, parasparaṃ vibhidyante cāpohā iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows: Those that differ among themselves must be entities, like the Specific Individualities; Apohas differ among themselves; hence this is a natural Reason (for regarding them as entities);
tataś ca vastutve sati vidhireva śabdārtha iti siddham /	and if they are entities, then it becomes established that the Import of Words is positive.

atastaimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavad ayaṃ sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāra iti /

hence, just as two men suffering from defective vision see two moons, so also is all this use of words.”

yadyevam asmatpakṣa eva patito 'sīti siddhasādhyatā /

If this is so, then, you have fallen on our side;

pūrvaṃ pratibhādvāreṇāgatatvād ityataḥ punar ity āha tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor nāsiddhateti pratipāditam / anaikāntikatvaviruddhatve tu pūrvam eva niraste /

‘Again’, i.e. once you had come to our side when you postulated the ‘Intuition’ as the ‘Import of words’, It is thus established that the Reason (put forward by the Author) ‘because no Convention can be made’, cannot be regarded as ‘unproven’, The idea that it may be ‘Inconclusive’ or ‘Contradictory’ has been already rejected before.

tasmāt siddhā yathoktāpohakṛtaḥ śabdā iti //

From all this it follows that all that is brought about by words is the ‘Apoha’, ‘Exclusion of others’, (909)

nanvanyāpohakṛcchabdo yuṣmābhiḥ katham ucyate / niṣedhamātraṃ naiveha pratibhāse 'vagamyate //

“Why do you say that the word brings about the ‘exclusion of others’? as a matter of fact mere negation is not apprehended in the idea brought about by the word;

kiṃtu gaurgavayo hastī vṛkṣaśce{tyā}diśabdataḥ / vidhirūpāvasāyena matiḥ śābdī pravartate //

on the contrary, in the case of all such words as ‘cow’, ‘gavaya’, ‘elephant’, ‘tree’ and so forth, the verbal cognition that results is always in the positive form.” (910-911)

[p.291] anyāpohakṛcchabda ityatretiśabdo 'dhyāhāryaḥ / anyāpohakṛcchabda ityevaṃ katham abhidhīyata ity arthaḥ /

The particle ‘iti’ is to be taken as understood after ‘anyāpohakṛt’, The meaning is “Why do you say that what is brought about by the word is the exclusion of others?”

kasmānnābhidheyamityāha niṣedhamātram ityādi /

Why should not this be asserted? “Because, as a matter of fact, mere negation, etc. etc.;

niṣedhamātram eva kilānyāpoho 'bhipretaḥ, naceha śābde pratibhāse niṣedhamātraṃ gamyate /

that is, ‘the exclusion of others’ is intended to be a mere negation; and mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition;

kiṃ tarhi vasturūpādhyavasāyenaiva śābdī dhīḥ pravartamānā samālakṣyate /

on the contrary, Verbal Cognition is always found to apprehend the positive form of things;

naca śābde jñāne yo na pratyavabhāsate sa śabdānāṃ yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

and what does not figure in Verbal Cognition cannot be rightly regarded as the ‘import of words’; as such an idea would lead to absurdities.

tasmāt pratītivirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ //

Thus the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience.” (910-911)

yadi gaurityādinā ślokatrayeṇa bhāmahasya matena pratītyādibādhāmudbhāvayati / yadi gau{ritiśabdo 'yaṃ bhaveda}nyanirākṛtau /

“If the whole purpose of the word ‘cow’ is served by the. ‘exclusion of others’, then, please find some other word which brings about the notion of ‘cow’ in regard to the cow itself.” (912) The next three Texts state the fact of the Buddhist’s Proposition being contrary to experience, in accordance with the opinion of Bhāmaha: [see verse 912 above]

yadi gośabdo 'nyavyavacchedapratipādanaparas tadā tasya tatraiva caritārthatvāt sāsnādimati padārthe gośabdāt pratītir na prāpnoti, tataś ca sāsnādimat padārthaviṣayāyā gobuddher janako 'paro dhvaniranveṣaṇīyaḥ syāt //

“If the word ‘Cow’ only serves the purpose of denoting the ‘exclusion of others’, then, as it would be taken up in that, that term ‘Cow’ could not bring about the idea of the animal with the dewlap; hence it would be necessary to seek for some other word which could bring about the notion of ‘Cow’ in regard to the said animal with the dewlap.” (912)

na tu jñānaphalāḥ {śabdā na caikasya phaladva}yam /

“In fact, cognition is the fruit of words; and no single word can have two fruits.

apavādavidhi{jñānaṃ phalam ekasya vā katham} //

how too could both affirmation and negation be the fruit of any one word?” (913)

vidhiviṣayaṃ pratiṣedhaviṣayaṃ ca jñānaṃ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ /

“Words have for their fruit the cognition of affirmation and of negation.

tataḥ kimityāha na caikasyetyādi /

‘What then? No single word can have two fruits;

na hyekasya vidhikāriṇaḥ pratiṣedhakāriṇo vā śabdasya yugapad vijñānadvayalakṣaṇaṃ phalam /

of any one word, be it affirmative or negative, there cannot be two fruits appearing at one and the same time;

upalabhyata iti śeṣaḥ /

that is, no such is ever found.

nacāpi parasparaviruddhamapavādavidhijñānaṃ phalaṃ yuktam //

Nor again is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of affirmation and negation to be the fruit of a single word.” (913)

prāgityādinopacayahetumāha prāgagauriti vijñānaṃ gośabdaśrāviṇo bhavet /

“When one hears the word ‘cow’ uttered, he should, first of all have the idea of the non-cow, as the word ‘cow’ would have been uttered for the purpose of negativing the ‘non-cow’.” (914)

yenāgoḥ pratiṣedhāya pravṛtto gauriti dhvaniḥ //

In the following Text, Bhāmaha puts forward his comprehensive argument (against Apoha): [see verse 914 above]

yadi ca gośabdenāgonivṛttir mukhyataḥ pratipādyate tadā gośabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ prathamataramagaur ity eṣā śrotuḥ pratipattir bhavet /

“If it is the negation of the non-cow that is mainly expressed by the word ‘Cow’, then, on hearing the word ‘Cow’, the first idea in the mind of the hearer would be that of the ‘non-cow’;

yatraiva hy avyavadhānena śabdāt pratyaya upajāyate sa eva śabdārtho vyavasthāpyate /

because that is held to be the ‘import’ of the word the notion regarding which appears directly and immediately after the word;

na cāvyavadhānenāgovyavacchede matir upajāyate / ato gobuddhyanutpattiprasaṅgāt prathamataramagopratītiprasaṅgāc ca nāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti //

the notion of the ‘negation of the non-cow does not appear directly and immediately after the word ‘Cow Thus, on account of the incongruity of there being no notion of the Cow, and on account of the incongruity of the first appearance of the notion of the non-cow, ‘Apoha’ (Negation of others) cannot form the Import of Words.” (914)

agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yai{rurarīkṛtam} / {vācyaṃ} vastveva tairukta{metayā hi girā sphuṭam} //

“Those who have admitted the universal ‘negation of the non-cow’ as the import of the word have, by the expression, admitted the universal ‘cow’ as an entity.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 1] (915)

sa hyevam apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ vācyatvenābhidhīyamānaṃ kadācit paryudāsalakṣaṇaṃ vābhidhīyate prasajyalakṣaṇaṃ vā /

Kumārila has argued as follows: “When the Universal ‘Negation of the Contrary’ is asserted to be the Import of words, it could be either in the form of ‘Preclusion’ or ‘the negation of what is possible’;

tatra prathame pakṣe siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ tathāhyasmābhir gotvākhyaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdena vācyamityevam iṣyate bhavatā cāgonivṛttilakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdenocyata iti bruvatā tadeva śabdāntareṇābhidhīyata iti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ //

If it be the former, then the Proposition is open to the charge of being ‘futile’, inasmuch as we also hold that what is denoted by the word ‘Cow’ is the Universal named ‘Cow’; and this is exactly what you also assert in other words when you declare that ‘what is denoted by the word Cow is the Universal in the shape of the negation of the non-cow’; so that the dispute is only in regard to the name (of the Universal).” (915) Question: How is it the same thing asserted in different words?

atha kathaṃ tadeva śabdāntareṇābhihitamityāha bhāvāntarātmaka ityādi / bhāvāntarātmako 'bhāvo yena sarvo vyavasthitaḥ / tatrāśvādinivṛttātmābhāvaḥ sa{ka---} iti kathyatām //

“Inasmuch as all ‘inexistence’ has been held to be of the nature of some other ‘existence’, please say what that ‘inexistence’ is which is of the nature of the ‘negation of the horse (and otehr non-cows)’? [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 2] (916) Question: How is it the same thing asserted in different words?

yena yasmāt prāgabhāvādilakṣaṇaścaturvidhaḥ sarva evābhāvo bhāvāntarātmako vyavasthitaḥ /

“Since all ‘Inexistence’, in the four forms of ‘Previous Inexistence’ and the rest, has been found to be of the nature of existence’;

yaccoktam "kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kathyate /

as declared in the following words ‘while the Curd is not present in the Milk, it is called previous Inexistence;

nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāvalakṣaṇam //

Inexistence per Destruction;

gavi hyaśvādyabhāvaś ca so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate /

the absence of the House, etc. in the Cow is called mutual Inexistence;

śiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyavarjitāḥ // śaśaśṛṅgādirūpeṇa{rūpena---} so 'tyantābhāva ucyate /

when portions of the head of the Hare are flat and devoid of a hard protuberance, it is said to be absolute Inexistence, in the shape of the Hare’s Horn...

na cāvastuta ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā" // iti /

These thus are not so many kinds of non-entity. Hence Inexistence must be an entity’ (Ślokavārtika: Abhāva, 2-4 and 8).

etena kṣīrādaya eva ca dadhyādirūpeṇāvidyamānāḥ prāgabhāvādivyapadeśabhāja iti darśitaṃ bhavati /

What is meant is that it is Milk itself which, while not present in the form of the Curd, comes to be known as the ‘Previous Inexistence’ (of the Curd); and similarly with other forms of Inexistence.

tatraivamabhāvasya bhāvāntarātmakatve sthite sati ko 'yaṃ bhavadbhiraśvādinivṛttisvabhāvo 'bhāvo 'bhipreta iti kathyatām //

Thus Inexistence being only a form of Existence, what is that Inexistence which is meant by you to be the ‘Negation of the Horse, etc.’; please tell us this.” (916)

{neṣṭo 'sādhāraṇātmā vo} viśeṣo nirvikalpanāt /

“You do not admit of any individuality in the nature of something uncommon (unique), because it is devoid of conceptual content;

tathā ca śābaleyādirasāmānyaprasaṅgataḥ //

so also (you do not admit) the ‘variegated animal’ and the like;

tasmāt sarveṣu yadrūpaṃ pratyekaṃ pariniṣṭhitam / gobuddhistannimittā syā..............ṣti tat //

Hence the idea of the ‘cow’ must be based upon that form which subsists in common in every single individual (cow); [and in this there can be no dispute between us].” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 3 & 10] (917-918)

yo 'sāvasādhāraṇo viśeṣaḥ so 'śvādinivṛttyātmā neṣṭo bhavatāṃ /

That which is the unique (uncommon) Individuality is not held by you to constitute the ‘negation of Horse and other non-cows’;

kasmād ity āha nirvikalpanāt /

why? because it is devoid of conceptual content (or determination);

tatra sarvavikalpapratyayastamayāt /

that is, all determination ceases in it;

vikalpajñānagocaraḥ sāmānyameveṣyate, [p.293] asādhāraṇastvarthaḥ sarvavikalpānām agocaraḥ /

it is only the Common Universal that is held to form the object of determination (conceptual thought); while that entity which is uncommon, unique is beyond all determination;

yathoktam "svasaṃvedyamanirdeśyaṃ rūpamindriyagocara" iti / viśeṣātmakatve kāraṇamasādhāraṇātmakatā, asādhāraṇātmatayā yo viśeṣa

as declared in the following words ‘What is perceptible by the senses is the self-cognisable, inexplicable form’, The ground for regarding anything as an Individual consists in its uncommon (unique) character; hence what is meant by the words of the Text is ‘that which is an Individuality by reason of its uncommon character

ity arthaḥ /

Hitherto the Text has made only a general statement.

sāmprataṃ viśeṣeṇainamevārthamāha tathācetyādi / yathaiva bhavatām asādhāraṇo viśeṣo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā gośabdābhidheyo neṣṭas tathaiva śābaleyādiśabdavācyatayā neṣṭo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā bhāva ityatrāpyanuvartate /

It reasserts same thing in reference to a particular instance ‘So also, etc. etc.’: that is, just as you do not admit of the Import of the word ‘Cow’ to consist in any unique individual in the shape of the ‘negation of the Horse and other nom cows’, so also you do not admit of any positive entity in the form of the ‘negation of the Horse, etc.’ as forming the Import of such words as the ‘variegated cow’ and the like.

kasmād ity āha asāmānyaprasaṅgata iti /

Why not? Because in that case the Import would not be universal;

yadīṣyeta tadā sāmānyaṃ śabdavācyaṃ na syāt tasyānanvayāt, /

that is, if it were so admitted, then, the Universal could never form the Import of the word; as it would have no connection with the word.

yata evamaśvādinivṛttyātmā bhāvo 'sādhāraṇo na ghaṭate, tasmāt sarveṣu sajātīyeṣu śābaleyādipiṇḍeṣu yat pratyekaṃ parisamāptaṃ tannibandhanā gobuddhiḥ /

Because it is so, therefore there can be no common entity in the shape of the ‘negation of the Horse, etc.’; consequently the conclusion must be that the idea of ‘Cow’ is based upon that character which resides completely in each one of the members of the same class the variegated and other cows;

tac ca gotvākhyam eva sāmānyam / tasyāgo 'pohaśabdenābhidhānāt kevalaṃ nāmāntaram ityataḥ siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ //

and this can be only the Universal ‘Cow’, If you speak of this same as the ‘negation of the non-cow’, then the difference is only in name and your proposition thus is open to the charge of being ‘superfluous’, (917-918)

niṣedhamātrarūpaś ca śabdārthau yadi kalpyate / abhāvaśabda{vācyā syācchūnyatānyaprakārikā} //

“If the import of words be assumed to be of the nature of mere negation, then it would only be another kind of ‘void’ spoken of by means of the negative word.” (919)

abhāvaśabdavācyeti /

‘Spoken of by means of the negative word’;

ago 'pohalakṣaṇo '{ṇā---}bhāvavācakaḥ śabdo 'bhāvaśabdas tadvācyā bahirarthaśusunyatā syāt, vasturūpāpahnavat /

the ‘Negative Word’ is the word expressive of the negation in the form of the ‘negation of the noncow’; and what would be denoted by this word would only be the ‘Void’, the absence of the external world; since the form of the ‘entity’ would be denied.

anyaprakāriketi /

‘Another kind’;

pūrvaṃ vijñānamātravādopanyāsakāle bhavadbhirupanyastā, nirastā cāsmābhiḥ, punar apyatra śabdārthacintāprastāve saivāpohavyājenābhihitā pratītisiddhasyārthasyāpavādāt //

this ‘Void’ you (Buddhist) had postulated, and we had rejected under the chapter on Idealism (Vijñānavāda of the Ślokavartika); and on the present occasion of examining the nature of the Import of Words, the same ‘Void’ is again put forward under the garb of ‘Apoha’; which denies the object whose existence is vouched for by experience.

tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha tasyāṃ cetyādi /

“Where is the harm if that is so?” Answer: [see verse 920 next]

tasyāṃ cāśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ bhavet /

“In that ‘void’ there would be an apprehension of the character of the cognitions themselves of the horse and other things;

tatrānyāpohavācyatvaṃ mudhaivābhyupagamyate //

and in that case it would be useless to posit the ‘Apoha (negation) of others’ as the import of words.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 37] (920)

tasyām śūnyatāyāṃ vācyāyāṃ śābdīnām aśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti bāhyavastusvarūpāgrahāt /

If the ‘Void’ is what is denoted, then it comes to this that in all Verbal Cognitions what is comprehended is only the factor of ‘Cognition’ itself; as ex hypothesis there can be no apprehension of the form of any thing external.

evaṃ ca sati ko doṣa ity āha tatretyādi /

“Even so, what is the harm?” In that case, it would be futile to assert that the Apoha is denoted by words;

buddhyākārasyānapekṣitabāhyārthāvalambanasya vidhirūpasyaiva śabdārthatvāpatteḥ / tataścābhyupagamabādhā pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //

as what would become the Import of Words would be the form of the Cognition which would be a positive entity independent of all tinge of anything external. What is meant is that in this way there would be a contradiction of your own doctrine by this Proposition of yours.

etadeva darśayati sāmānyam ityādi /

The same idea is further explained: [see verse 921 next]

sāmānyaṃ {vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyā}kāro bhaviṣyati / śabdārtha............................

“In that case, the ‘form of the Cognition which is posited as the ‘Import of Words’, would be the Universal.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 38] (921)

[p.294] buddhyākāra eva vasturūpaṃ sāmānyaṃ śabdārtho bhaviṣyatīti sambandhaḥ //

That is to say, the ‘form of the Cognition’ itself, in the form of the positive entity, ‘Universal’, would be the Import of Words.

syād etad anālambanāpi sā buddhir vijātīyagavādibuddhibhyo vyāvṛttarūpā pravartate tenāpohakalpanā yuktaivetyata āha vasturūpetyādi /

The following might be urged ‘Even without a substratum (in the external world), the cognition in question would appear in the form of the ‘exclusion of the heterogeneous Cow, etc.’; hence the postulation of the ‘Apoha’ is quite right.’

teṣu vastveva {kalpyeta vācyaṃ} buddhyanapohakam //

This is answered in the following [see verse 922 above]

vasturūpeti vidhirūpāvasāyinī /

‘Vasturūpā’; in the form of a positive entity.

sā buddhiriti / anālambanāśvādibuddhiḥ /

The said cognition’, i.e. the cognition the Horse, without a real substratum in the external world.

śabdārtheṣviti / aśvādiṣvadhyavasiteṣu /

‘In connection with the Import of Words’, as relating to the Horse and other things conceived of.

vastveveti /

‘To consist of a positive entity’;

aśvādipiṇḍādhyavasāyibuddhyātmakam /

in the shape of the Idea embracing the notion of the Horse and other non-cows.

avadhāraṇaphalaṃ darśayati buddhyanapohakam iti /

The effect of the emphasis is explained a cognition not of the nature of Apoha;

avidyamāno 'poho yatra vācye buddhyātmake vastuni tat tathoktam /

i.e. that Import of Words, in the shape of Idea, wherein the Apoha does not enter at all;

buddher anapohakam / buddhyantarāpoharahitam ity arthaḥ / athavā apohata ityapohakaṃ, nāpohakamanapohakaṃ, buddher anapohakaṃ buddhyanapohakam iti samāsaḥ /

the compound ‘buddhyanapohakam’ being expounded as ‘the non-exclusion of the Idea’, i.e. without any exclusion of other Ideas. Or the compound ‘buddhyanapohakam’ may be explained as follows ‘apohaka’ is that which excludes, ‘anapohaka’ is that winch does not exclude;

etad uktaṃ bhavati /

the compound thus standing for ‘that which does not exclude the Idea’, What is meant is as follows;

yadyapi buddhir buddhyantarād vyavacchinnā, tathāpi sā na buddhyantaravyavacchedāvasāyinī jāyate /

Though one Cognition is always different from another Cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of the other cognition;

kiṃ tarhiaśvādiṣvartheṣu vidhirūpāvasāyinī, tena vastveva vidhirūpaṃ vācyaṃ kalpeta yuktimat, nāpohaḥ, buddhyantarasya buddhyantarānapohakatvāt //

Consequently the most reasonable thing is to accept the view that what is denoted is a positive entity, not Apoha; because one Cognition cannot exclude (be of the nature of the Apoha, negation, of) another. “even in the absence of the corresponding external object there is intuition expressed by the sentence;

kiṃ ca yo 'yaṃ bhavadbhirapohaḥ padārthatvena kalpitaḥ sa vākyādapoddhṛtya kalpitasya padasyārtha iṣṭo vākyārthastu pratibhālakṣaṇa eva /

similar may be the case with what is expressed by the word also; why should the apoha be postulated at all?” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 43] (923) Then again, this Apoha that you have postulated as the Import of Words, has been held to be denoted by the word as taken out of a Sentence;

yathoktam "apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyādartho vivecitaḥ /

as has been declared in the following “Hitherto has been discussed the denotation of the Word as taken out of a Sentence;

vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāvupajanyate" //

but what is brought about first of all is what is expressed by the Sentence, which has been called Intuition”.

iti / atrocyate asatyapītyādi /

In this connection we have the following Text: [see verse 923 above]

{asatyapi ca vākyārthaḥ pratibhālakṣaṇo} yathā / padārtho 'pi tathaiva syāt kimapohaḥ prakalpyate // yathā bāhye 'rthe śabdavācyatvenāsatyapi vākyārtho bhavadbhiḥ pratibhālakṣaṇa eva varṇyate nāpohalakṣaṇas tathā padārtho 'pi vākyārthavat pratibhālakṣaṇa eva syād ityapohaḥ padārthatayā kimiti kalpyate /

Just as, even in the absence of an external object denoted by the Word, you describe the meaning of the Sentence to be of the nature of Intuition, hot of the nature of ‘Apoha’, even so, the meaning of the word, like the meaning of the Sentence, also may be of the nature of Intuition. Under the circumstances, why is any such thing as ‘Apoha’ postulated at all? That is to say, the Import of both Sentence and Word may be of the positive character. “In the case of a cognition, no ‘exclusion of another cognition’ is apprehended;

dvayor api padavākyārthayor vidhirūpatvamevāstviti bhāvaḥ //

in fact, apart from the coming about of its own form, the cognition carries with it no other factor.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 41] (924)

syād etat pratibhāyāḥ pratibhāntarād vijātīyād vyavacchedo 'stītyato 'pohaḥ kalpyata ity āha buddhyantarād ityādi /

The following might be urged: In the case of Intuitions also, there is always exclusion of one Intuition by another; hence Apoha is postulated. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 924 above]

[p.295] yadyapyasau na pratīyate tathāpyastyeveti cedāha svarūpotpādetyādi /

It might be said that “even though it is not apprehended, it may be there all the same”; hence it is added ‘In fact, etc. etc.’;

yadyapi buddher buddhyantarādvyāvṛttir asti tathāpi tasyāṃ na śabdavyāpāro 'sti /

even though there may be exclusion of one Cognition from another, yet the Word has got nothing to do with it.

tathā hi śabdādiyaṃ buddhirutpadyamānā na svarūpotpādavyatirekeṇānyaṃ buddhyantaravyavacchedalakṣaṇaṃ śabdādavasīyamānamaṃśaṃ bibhratī lakṣyate, kiṃtarhividhirūpāvasāyinyevotpadyata ity arthaḥ /

Because as a matter of fact, when the Cognition is brought about by the Word, it does not bear within itself any factor expressed by the word, apart from its own appearance, in the shape of the exclusion of other Cognitions;

na ca śabdādavasīyamāno vastvaṃśaḥ śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

And the factor of an entity which is not expressed by the word cannot form the Import of that word;

tasmāt pratītibādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //

The sense of all this is that the Proposition (of the Buddhist regarding Apoha) is annulled by actual experience.

bhinnasāmānyavacanā viśeṣavacanāś ca ye / sarve bhaveyuḥ paryāyā yadyapohasya vācyatā //

“If Apoha formed the import of words, then all words would be synonymous, those that denote diverse universals, as well as those that denote particulars.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 42] (925)

ye hi bhinnasāmānyavacanā gavāśvādayo ye ca viśeṣavacanāḥ śābaleyādayas te sarve bhavatāṃ paryāyāḥ prāpnuvantyarthabhedābhāvāt, vṛkṣapādapādiśabdavat //

The words denotative of diverse Universals, like ‘Cow’, ‘Horse’, etc. as well as those denotative of Particulars, the ‘Variegated Cow’, etc. would all become synonymous for you; as there would be no difference in their meanings, just like the words ‘vṛkṣa’ and ‘pādapa’ (both of which denote the tree and are hence synonyms).

kasmāt punar arthabhedo na sambhavatītyāha saṃsṛṣṭetyādi /

Question: Why is there no difference in the meaning? Answer: [see verse 926 next]

avastutvādapohānāṃ} naiva bhedo 'pi vidyate // vastunyeva hi saṃsṛṣṭatvaikatvanānātvavikalpāḥ sambhavanti, nāvastuni, apohānāṃ cāvastutvān na parasparaṃ saṃsṛṣṭatvādivikalpo yuktaḥ, tat katham eṣāṃ parasparaṃ bhedaḥ siddhyati //

“There can be no difference among Apohas, because they are non-entities, and devoid of all such conceptions as ‘related ‘one’ and’ many.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 45] (926) Such conceptions as ‘related’, ‘one’ and ‘many’ are possible only in regard to an entity, not to a non-entity; and as Apohas are non-entities, there can be no such conceptions in regard to them as being ‘mutually related’ and so forth; how then can there be any difference among them? (926)

yadi vā bhidyamānatvā{d vastu sādhāraṇāṃśavat} /

“If the Apohas are different, then they must be entities, because of that difference, just like the specific individuality of things.

avastutve {tvanānātvā}t paryāyatvān na mucyate //

If they are non-entities, then they cannot be many, and hence they cannot escape from being synonymous.” [Ślokavārtika-Apoha 46] (927)

vastviti sādhyanirdeśaḥ /

‘Vastu’ states the Probandum.

prayogaḥ ye parasparaṃ vibhidyante te vastu, yathā svalakṣaṇāni, parasparaṃ vibhidyante cāpohā iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows: Those that differ among themselves must be entities, like the Specific Individualities; Apohas differ among themselves; hence this is a natural Reason (for regarding them as entities);

tataś ca vastutve sati vidhireva śabdārtha iti siddham /

and if they are entities, then it becomes established that the Import of Words is positive.