buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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apohyaścāpohagocarāśceti vigrahaḥ / tatrāpohyā aśvādayaḥ, gośabdasya tadapohena pravṛttatvāt / apohagocarāḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, tadviṣayatvād agopohasya /	The compound ‘apohyāpohagocarāḥ’ is made up of the ‘apohya’ ‘what are excluded’ i.e. (in the case of the word ‘Cow’) the Horse and other animals, and the ‘apohagocara’, ‘what are contained in the exclusion’, i.e. the Variegated and other Cows; these are so spoken of as the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’ pertains to them.
tena yadyapye [p.329] kasya sāmānyarūpasyānvayo nāsti, tathāpyabhinnapratyavamarśahetavo ye te prasiddhasārūpyā bhavanti, ye tu viparītās te viparītā iti // syād etat tasyaikapratyavamarśasya hetavo 'ntareṇa sāmānyamekaṃ katham arthā bhinnāḥ siddhyantītyata āha ekapratyavamarśe hītyādi /	Thus, though there is no concomitance of any commonalty, yet, those that bring about the determinate judgment of non-different things are regarded as having their similarity well known, while those that bring about the determinate judgment of diverse things, are regarded as otherwise (i.e. as having their similarity unknown). It would be only a few things which, while being diverse by themselves, would bring about a single determinate judgment;
ekapratyavamarśe hi kecid evopayoginaḥ / prakṛtyā bhedavattve 'pi nānya ityupapāditam //	The following might be urged “In the absence of some one Commonalty, how can the things that bring about a single determinate judgment become diverse?”
pratipāditametat sāmānyaparīkṣāyām, yathā dhātryādayo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti, tathaiva pratyavamarśahetavo bhinnā api bhāvāḥ kecid eva bhaviṣyantīti //	It has been explained in course of our examination of the ‘Universal’ that the Dhātrī (Āmalakī and other fruits), without commonalty, come to perform a single fruitful action; in the same way, it would be only a few things that would bring about the single determinate judgment and yet be many and diverse.
atadrūpaparāvṛttaṃ vastumātraṃ svalakṣaṇam /	The ‘specific individuality’ consists of the thing-by-itself, as ‘excluded from what is not itself’;
yatnena kriyamāṇo 'yam anvayo na virudhyate //	an assertion of concomitance carefully made in this form would not be incongruous.
yadyapi sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ nāsti, tathāpi vijātīyavyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātreṇaivānvayaḥ kriyamāṇo na virudhyate //	Even though there is no entity in the shape of the Commonalty (Universal), yet, if an assertion of concomitance is made in regard to mere ‘Specific Individuality’ as excluded (differentiated) from unlike things, that would not be incompatible (with our view).
katham ity āha yasminnityādi /	Question: “Why so?” Answer: [see verses 1053-1054 next]
yasminnadhūmato bhinnaṃ vidyate hi svalakṣaṇam / tasminnanagnito 'yasti parāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam //	That wherein subsists the specific individuality (smoke) differentiated from non-smoke, in that same subsists also the specific individuality (fire) differentiated from non-fire;
yathā mahānase ceha vidyate 'dhūmabhedi tat /	as in the kitchen;
tasmād anagnito bhinnaṃ vidyate 'tra svalakṣaṇam //	hence the specific individuality differentiated from non-fire also must be there.
yasminniti / pradeśe /	‘That’ i.e. that place.
iha ca vidyate svalakṣaṇamadhūmato bhedīti pakṣadharmopadarśanam /	‘Herein’ subsists the Specific Individuality distinguished from nonsmoke; this proposition asserts the presence of the Inferential Indicative (Probans) in the subject of the Inference (Hill).
tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopadarśanam /	‘Hence, etc. etc.’ asserts the resultant cognition (Conclusion) brought about by the Premises.
yadi vā{yadva '---}vayavapañcakam api svalakṣaṇenānvaye kriyamāṇe śayyo{kyo---}	Or, the meaning may be that all the five factors of the Inferential Process may be shown by indicating the concomitance in connection with Specific Individualities.
padarśanam iti darśayati // idaṃ ca kāryahetāvuktam /	The above is an example of the Inference where the Probans is the effect of the Probandum.
svabhāvahetāvāha asata ityādi /	The following texts cite an example of the Probans in the form of the nature of things: [see verses 1055-1056 next]
asato naraśṛṅgāder yac ca bhinnaṃ svalakṣaṇam / buddhidīpādivatsarvaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ tat sthirādapi //	The specific individuality that is differentiated from ‘man’s horns’ and other non-existent things is also differentiated from permanent things, just as the cognition, the lamp-flame, etc. are;
asadrūpaṃ tathā cedaṃ na śabdādisvalakṣaṇam /	the specific individuality of sound, etc. is not a non-existent thing.
itthaṃ nirdiṣṭabhedena bhavatyevānvayo 'munā //	In this way there can be the assertion of concomitance through differences as indicated.
[p.330] yadasato vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇamatādrūpyāt tat sarvaṃ sthirādapi vyāvṛttaṃ, yathā buddhidīpādayaḥ /	That Specific Individuality which is differentiated from the non-existent, because it is not non-existent, is also differentiated from Permanent Things, as we find in the case of Cognition, Lamp-flame and such things.
tathācedaṃ śabdādisvalakṣaṇam asadrūpaṃ na bhavatīti /	and there would be nothing incongruous in this.
ayaṃ ca sattvādityasya hetor anvayo darśitaḥ //	The concomitance shown here is in regard to the Probans ‘because it exists’;
yadyevaṃ svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaḥ, katham idānīṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṃsidhyatītyata āha avivakṣitabhedaṃ cetyādi /	[the inference being in the form ‘The Specific Individuality of Sounds, etc. is differentiated from Permanent Things, because it exists, like Cognition, Lamp-flame, etc.’]. The specific individuality itself, when its distinction is not meant to be emphasised, has been described as constituting the ‘universal’ (or commonalty);
avivakṣitabhedaṃ ca tadeva parikīrtitam /	nothing else; as nothing else is acceptable.
sāmānyalakṣaṇatvena nāniṣṭer aparaṃ punaḥ //	Question: “If there is concomitance with the Specific Individuality only, then how is there Inference in regard to things partaking of the nature of the ‘Universal?”
tadeva hi svalakṣaṇamavivakṣitabhedaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ityuktam /	That same Specific Individuality, when its distinctive features are not meant to be emphasised, constitutes the ‘Commonalty’;
sāmānyena bhedāparāmarśena, lakṣyate vyavasīyata iti sāmānyalakṣaṇam /	The term ‘Sāmanyalakṣaṇa’ means that which is indicated by the common character, not taking into account the distinctive characters.
nāparaṃ punar iti tīrthikābhimatam, tasyāniṣṭatvāt /	‘Nothing else’, in the shape of the ‘Universal’ as postulated by the other philosophers.
yathoktam "tasyaiva svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam, iti /	This has been thus declared: ‘As it is apprehended through its own form as well as through another, its object has been held to be two-fold’;
"athadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrasamāśrayāt / sāmānyaviṣayaṃ proktaṃ liṅgaṃ bhedāpratiṣṭhiteḥ" //	and again ‘Inasmuch as it is based upon the Thing by itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the Indicative of the absence of diversity has been declared to appertain to the Commonalty’.
iti / tena sāhacaryam api liṅgaśabdayoḥ svalakṣaṇenaiva kathyate /	For this reason, the concomitance also, of the Inferential Indicative and the Word, is declared to pertain to the Specific Individuality itself.
nacāpyadarśanamātreṇāsmābhir vipakṣe liṅgasyābhāvo 'vasīyate / kiṃ tarhianupalambhaviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ //	Thus we conclude that there is no Inferential Indicative in support of the conclusion contrary to ours, not merely from the fact that no such Indicative is actually perceived, but because there is non-apprehension of a particular kind.
śabalāpatyato bhede bāhuleyāśvayoḥ same / turaṅgaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ kiṃ tatra vartate //	The difference from the variegated cow being equally present in the black cow and the horse, why is it that the universal ‘cow’, as differentiated from the horse, subsists in that? (1058)
idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati, sābaleyāc ca bāhuleyāc ca tulye 'pi bhede sati kimiti turaṅgamaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ tatraiva sābaleyādau vartate nāśva iti // syād etat kimatra vaktavyaṃ, tasya hi gotvasyābhivyaktau sābaleyādireva samartho nāśvādiratas tatraiva tadvartate nānyatra /	It behoves you to say when the Horse is equally different from the Variegated Cow and the Black Cow, how it is that the Universal ‘Cow’, as differentiated from the Horse, subsists in the Variegated and other Cows, and not in the Horse? (1058) The reply to this may be as follows: “What is there to be said here? It is clear that it is only the Variegated and other Cows and not the Horse that are capable of manifesting the Universal ‘Cow’; hence the said Universal subsists in the Cows, not in other things.
nacāyaṃ paryanuyogo yujyate, kasmāt tasyābhivyaktau sa eva sābaleyādiḥ samartho bhavati, {iti}yato vastusvabhāpratiniyamo 'yaṃ, nahi vastūnāṃ svabhāvaḥ paryanuyogam arhati /	Nor will it be right to urge the question ‘why the Variegated and other Cows alone have the capacity to manifest the said Universal’, Because such restriction is due to the very nature of things; and there can be no complaint against the nature of things;
teṣāṃ svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt svabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyeti, atrāha tasyavyaktāvityādi /	as all such restrictions are due to the series of causes that have brought about thengs.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1059 next]
tatra vyaktau samarthātmā sa eveti yadīṣyate / tulyapratyavamarśe 'pi sa śakto na turaṅgamaḥ //	If it be held that ‘that alone has the capacity to manifest it’ then, even though the subsequent determinate judgment is the same, that alone has the capacity to produce it, and not the horse.
[p.331] tasyeti gotvasya /	‘Manifest it’ i.e. the particular Universal ‘Cow’.
sa eveti sāvaleyādir na punaraśvaḥ /	‘That alone’, i.e. the Variegated and other Cows, not the Horse.
yadyevaṃ satyapi bhede sāmānyamantareṇāpi tulyapratyavamarśotpādane sāvaleyādireva śakto na turaṅgama ityayam asmatpakṣo na virudhyata eva //	If that be so, then, even when there is diversity, and there is no Commonalty, the variegated and other Cows alone, not the Horse would have the capacity to bring about the determinate judgment; even though this judgment would be the same. This view of ours also would not be incompatible.
tataś ca kiṃ jātam ity āha tādṛgityādi /	Question: “What is the upshot of all this?” Answer: [see verse 1060 next]
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca vidyate yatra vastuni / tatrābhāve 'pi gojāter ago 'pohaḥ pravartate //	Thus then, in whatever thing the said determinate judgment is present, to that the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’ becomes applicable, even in the absence of the universal ‘cow’.
tatraivāsatyam api gojāto vastubhūtāyām agopohaḥ pratibimbātmā pravartate // yaccoktamindriyair ityādi, tadasiddham iti darśayann āha agobhinnaṃ cetyādi /	the said determinate judgment is present in the form ‘this is a Cow’, ‘that is a Cow’, to that, even in the absence of the Universal '‘Cow’, as a positive entity, the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’, in the form of the Reflection becomes applied.
agobhinnaṃ ca yadvastu tadakṣair vyavasīyate /	That thing which is ‘different from the non-cow’ is certainly apprehended by the sense-organs;
pratibimbaṃ tadadhyastaṃ svasaṃvittyāvagamyate //	the reflection also which is superimposed upon it is apprehended by its own cognition.
idaṃ dṛṣṭvā ca lokena śabdas tatra prayujyate /	it is on noticing this that people use the word;
sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya vyaktaṃ tenopapadyate //	the recognition of its relation also becomes clearly explained on the same basis.
tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva /	The Apoha in the shape of the ‘Specific Individuality’ is apprehended through the sense-organs themselves.
yat svārthapratibimbātmāpohaḥ sa paramārthato buddhisvabhāvatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ /	As for the Apoha in the form of the Reflection of what is denoted by the Word, it is really of the nature of Cognition itself, and as such vouched for directly by its own cognition (it being self-cognised).
cakāro 'nuktārthasamuccaye /	The particle ‘ca’ is meant to include the Apohas not directly mentioned.
tena prasajyātmāpi sāmarthyāt pratīyata eva na tadātmā parātmeti darśitaṃ bhavati /	So that the Apoha in the form of Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication; as has been shown under the Text 1014, by the words ‘the nature of one is not the nature of the other
tenedam eva svalakṣaṇādirūpamapohaṃ dṛṣṭvā śabdo lokena prayujyate, , natu sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ, tasyāsattvādapratibhāsanāc ca /	Thus it is on noticing the Apoha in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest, that people come to use words, not on noticing a positive entity in the shape of the Universal; because no such Universal exists and because no such Universal figures in any cognition.
yadeva ca dṛṣṭvā lokena śabdaḥ prayujyate, tenaiva tasya sambandho 'vagamyate nānyenātiprasaṅgāt //	And that through perceiving which people use the words must also be the basis upon which rests the relations of those words, not on any other basis; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca yatra naivāsti vastuni / agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ vispaṣṭaṃ tatra gamyate //	When, in regard to anything, there is no such determinate judgment, the fact of its being denoted by the word ‘non-cow’ becomes clearly perceived.
yaccoktaṃ siddhaścāgaurapohyetetyādi tatrāha gāvo 'gāvaścetyādi /	It has been argued above (under Text 941, by Kumārila) “How could the fact of anything being denoted by the word ‘non-cow’ be cognised?”
gāvo 'gāvaś ca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ /	The cow and the non-cow are both well-established, as there are distinct determinate judgments in regard to both;
śabdas tu kevalo 'siddho yatheṣṭaṃ samprayujyate //	it is only the word that is not well-established; and hence it is applied according to the speaker’s whim.
na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate /	As a matter of fact, a distinct thing does not need for its apprehension, the apprehension of another thing;
anyonyāśrayadoṣo 'yaṃ tasmād asminnirāspadaḥ //	hence there is no room here for the charge of ‘mutual interdependence’.
[p.332] svata eva hi gavādayo bhāvā bhinnapratyavamarśaṃ janayanto vibhāgena samyaṅniścitāḥ /	As a matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well- known in their distinct forms.
teṣu vyavahārārthaṃ vyavahartṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ śabdo 'siddhaḥ prayujyate /	For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims.
tathā hi yadi bhinnavastusvarūpaṃ pratipattyarthamanyapadārthagrahaṇam apekṣyate tadā syād itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, yāvatānyagrahaṇamantareṇaiva bhinnaṃ	Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing, then there might have been mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing;
vastu saṃvedyate, tasmin bhinnākārapratyavamarśahetutayā vibhāgena siddhe sati gaur gaur iti ca yatheṣṭaṃ saṅketaḥ kriyata iti katham itaretarāśrayatvaṃ bhavet /	and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment, and then the Convention is made in the form ‘this is a Cow’, ‘that is a Cow’ and so forth, according to the man’s wish, how then, can there be any mutual interdependence?
vittāviti vittyartham //	‘Vittau’ stands for ‘vittyartham’, for the apprehension.
avedyabāhyatattvāpi prakṛṣṭopaplavādiyam / svollekhaṃ bāhyarūpeṇa śabdadhīradhyavasyati //	As a matter of fact, verbal cognition, not taking cognizance of any external object, apprehends its own mark as something external, on account of strong illusion.
etāvat kriyate śabdair nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi /	This is all that is done by words; and words do not even, touch the object;
nāpohena viśiṣṭaś ca kaścid artho 'bhidhīyate //	nor is any object denoted as qualified by Apoha (1066-1067).
nahi paramārthena kaścid apohena viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate / yataḥ pratipāditametat, yathā na kiñcidapi śabdair vastu saṃspṛśyate, kvacid apisāmagryabhāvād iti /	In reality, no object qualified by Apoha is denoted by words. Because it has already been explained that no object is touched by Words anywhere, for the simple reason that the necessary conditions are absent. For example, Verbal Cognition, even though not pertaining to any external object, actually appears as apprehending its own mark i.e. form as something external;
tathā hi śābdī buddhirabāhyārthaviṣayāpi satī svollekhaṃ svākāraṃ bāhyārthatayādhyavasyantī jāyate na paramārthato vastusvabhāvaṃ spṛśati, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt //	because its apprehension is not in accordance with the real state of things.
yadyevaṃ katham ācāryeṇoktaṃ nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhurityata āha arthāntaretyādi /	Question: “If that is so, then, why has the Teacher declared that ‘words like Blue-Lotus express things qualified by the exclusion of other things?”
proktaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa tatrārtho 'yaṃ vivakṣitaḥ // ko 'sāvartho vivakṣita ity āha anyānyatvenetyādi /	As for the statement made by the author of the lakṣaṇa that ‘words express things qualified by the exclusion of other things’, what it means is as follows. Question: “What does it mean?”
anyānyatvena ye bhāvā hetunā karaṇena vā / viśiṣṭā bhinnajātīyair asaṅkīrṇā viniścitāḥ //	Answer: [see verses 1069-1070 next] Those things that are qualified by the exclusion of other things, either as their cause or their instruments are definitely cognised as not mixed up with things of other kinds.
vṛkṣādīnāhatāndhvānas tadbhāvādhyavasāyinaḥ / jñānasyotpādanādetajjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhanam //	The word expresses these things. and, because it brings about the cognition apprehending those things, there is denial of the ‘universal’ and such other commonalities.
dvividho hyartho bāhyo buddhyārūḍhaś ca /	Things are of two kinds external and imposed upon the Cognition;
tatra bāhye na paramārthato 'bhidhānaṃ śabdaiḥ, kevalaṃ tadapyavasāyivikalpotpādādupacārād uktaṃ śabdo 'rthānāheti /	in regard to the external thing, there is no denotation by words; and it is only on account of words bringing about the conceptual content pertaining to them that it is said, figuratively, that ‘the word denotes things’;
avayavārthastūcyate anyānyatveneti /	The meaning of the words is explained: ‘By the exclusion of other things’;
anyasmād anyatvaṃ vyāvṛttiḥ, tenānyānyatvena hetunā karaṇena vā vṛkṣādayo bhāvā viśiṣṭā niścitāḥ /	i.e. by differentiation from other things; this differentiation being either the Cause or the Instrument, the Tree and other things are definitely Cognised as qualified;
anyato vyāvṛttā niścitā iti yāvat /	that is they are definitely differentiated from other things.
etenārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānityatra pade nivṛttyeti tṛtīyārtho vyākhyātaḥ /	This shows that in the compound ‘arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān’, the term ‘nivṛtti’ is to be construed as with the Instrumental Ending.
dhvāna iti śabdaḥ //	‘Dhvāna’ is Word.
yastu buddhyārūḍho 'rthas tasya mukhyata eva śabdair abhidhānam iti darśayati buddhāvityādi / buddhau ye vā vivartante tānāhābhyantarānayam /	Those things however which appear in the cognition these internal (subjective) things the word denotes directly; and the fact of these things being qualified by ‘exclusion’ has just been explained. As regards the thing imposed upon the Cognition, that is denoted by words primarily and directly.
ayam iti /	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1071 above]
dhvānaḥ /	‘Ayam’ stands for the word.
athārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham eṣāṃ yojanīyam ity āha nivṛttyā	Question; “How can the character of being qualified by the exclusion of other things be attached to them?”
cetyādi /	Answer: ‘The fact, etc. etc.’
anantaram iti anyānyatvenetyādinā teṣām api buddhasamārūḍhānām arthānām anyatovyāvṛttatayā pratipādanāt //	‘Just’ that is, under Text 1069, it has been explained that things imposed upon the Cognition are excluded (or differentiated) from other things.
nanu yadi na kaścid eva vastvaṃśaḥ śabdena pratipādyate tat katham uktam ācāryeṇārthāntaranivṛttyā kaścid eva vastuno bhāgo gamyata ityata āha arthāntaraparāvṛttetyādi /	Objection: “If no objective factor is expressed by the word, then how is it that the Teacher has declared that it is only a certain part of the Thing that is apprehended by the ‘exclusion of otherngs’?” Answer: [see verse 1072 next]
arthāntaraparāvṛttyā gamyate tasya vastunaḥ / kaścid bhāga ti proktaṃ tadeva pratibimbakam //	When it is said that ‘a certain portion of the thing is apprehended by the exclusion of other things’, it is the said reflection that is meant.
nanu buddhidharmatvāt pratibimbasya kathaṃ vastubhāgatvam upapadyata ityata	Objection: “Reflection being a property of the Cognition, how can it be a ‘portion of the object’?”
āha arthāntaraparāvṛttyetyādi / arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanasaṃśrayāt /	It is spoken of as a portion of the object, because it proceeds on the basis of the perception of the object as ‘excluded from other things’, and because it is superimposed upon the object.
arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanadvārāyātatvāt tatrārthāntaraparāvṛtte vastuni bhrāntais tādātmyenāropitatvāt tadeva pratibimbakamupacārād vastuno bhāga iti vyapadiśyate //	Because it comes about through the perception of the object ‘excluded from other things’, and because it is superimposed upon it i.e. upon the Object excluded from other things by deluded persons, therefore that same Reflection is figuratively spoken of as ‘part of the object’, (1073)
hetvarthaḥ karaṇārthaś ca pūrvavat tena vātmanā /	As before, the instrumental ending may signify either the cause or the instrument.
yadi vastu vijātīyān na syād bhinnaṃ na tat tathā //	If the thing were not differentiated from unlike things, then it could not be so.
pūrvavad iti /	‘As before’;
yathārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānāhetyatrānyānyatvenetyādinā darśitaṃ ta{thā}trāpi yojanīyam ity arthaḥ /	i.e. just as under Texts 1068-1070, where it is said that ‘the Word expresses things as qualified by the exclusion of other things’, so the same may be applied here also.
athavā sarvatraivetthambhūtalakṣaṇā tṛtīyeyam iti darśa [p.334] yati tena vātmaneti /	Or in all cases, the Instrumental Ending may be taken as signifying the idea of being ‘in that form’; tills is what is mentioned by the words ‘tena vātmanā’.
nanu bādhāntaranivṛttir bāhyavastugato dharmaḥ, sā kathaṃ pratibimbādhigame hetubhāvaṃ karaṇabhāvaṃ vā pratipadyata ityatrāha yadi vastu vijātīyādityādi /	Question: “The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the Object; as such, how can it be either the Cause or the Instrument of the apprehension of the Reflection?”
yadi hi vijātīyāt padārthād vyāvṛttaṃ vastu na syāt tadā na tat pratibimbātmakaṃ tathā vijātīyaparāvṛttavastvātmanā vyavasīyeta, tasmad arthāntaraparāvṛtter hetubhāvaḥ karaṇabhāvaś ca yujyata iti bhāvaḥ //	Answer: ‘If the thing, etc. etc.’ That is, if the Thing were not excluded (and differentiated) from unlike things, then, in the form of its Reflection, it could not be apprehended as something excluded from unlikengs. That is why the exclusion from other things is to be regarded as the Cause and the Instrument. What is meant by (the cow) being ‘different’ is only the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’;
agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā /	and this exclusion is of the nature of that same difference.

apohyaścāpohagocarāśceti vigrahaḥ / tatrāpohyā aśvādayaḥ, gośabdasya tadapohena pravṛttatvāt / apohagocarāḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, tadviṣayatvād agopohasya /

The compound ‘apohyāpohagocarāḥ’ is made up of the ‘apohya’ ‘what are excluded’ i.e. (in the case of the word ‘Cow’) the Horse and other animals, and the ‘apohagocara’, ‘what are contained in the exclusion’, i.e. the Variegated and other Cows; these are so spoken of as the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’ pertains to them.

tena yadyapye [p.329] kasya sāmānyarūpasyānvayo nāsti, tathāpyabhinnapratyavamarśahetavo ye te prasiddhasārūpyā bhavanti, ye tu viparītās te viparītā iti // syād etat tasyaikapratyavamarśasya hetavo 'ntareṇa sāmānyamekaṃ katham arthā bhinnāḥ siddhyantītyata āha ekapratyavamarśe hītyādi /

Thus, though there is no concomitance of any commonalty, yet, those that bring about the determinate judgment of non-different things are regarded as having their similarity well known, while those that bring about the determinate judgment of diverse things, are regarded as otherwise (i.e. as having their similarity unknown). It would be only a few things which, while being diverse by themselves, would bring about a single determinate judgment;

ekapratyavamarśe hi kecid evopayoginaḥ / prakṛtyā bhedavattve 'pi nānya ityupapāditam //

The following might be urged “In the absence of some one Commonalty, how can the things that bring about a single determinate judgment become diverse?”

pratipāditametat sāmānyaparīkṣāyām, yathā dhātryādayo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti, tathaiva pratyavamarśahetavo bhinnā api bhāvāḥ kecid eva bhaviṣyantīti //

It has been explained in course of our examination of the ‘Universal’ that the Dhātrī (Āmalakī and other fruits), without commonalty, come to perform a single fruitful action; in the same way, it would be only a few things that would bring about the single determinate judgment and yet be many and diverse.

atadrūpaparāvṛttaṃ vastumātraṃ svalakṣaṇam /

The ‘specific individuality’ consists of the thing-by-itself, as ‘excluded from what is not itself’;

yatnena kriyamāṇo 'yam anvayo na virudhyate //

an assertion of concomitance carefully made in this form would not be incongruous.

yadyapi sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ nāsti, tathāpi vijātīyavyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātreṇaivānvayaḥ kriyamāṇo na virudhyate //

Even though there is no entity in the shape of the Commonalty (Universal), yet, if an assertion of concomitance is made in regard to mere ‘Specific Individuality’ as excluded (differentiated) from unlike things, that would not be incompatible (with our view).

katham ity āha yasminnityādi /

Question: “Why so?” Answer: [see verses 1053-1054 next]

yasminnadhūmato bhinnaṃ vidyate hi svalakṣaṇam / tasminnanagnito 'yasti parāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam //

That wherein subsists the specific individuality (smoke) differentiated from non-smoke, in that same subsists also the specific individuality (fire) differentiated from non-fire;

yathā mahānase ceha vidyate 'dhūmabhedi tat /

as in the kitchen;

tasmād anagnito bhinnaṃ vidyate 'tra svalakṣaṇam //

hence the specific individuality differentiated from non-fire also must be there.

yasminniti / pradeśe /

‘That’ i.e. that place.

iha ca vidyate svalakṣaṇamadhūmato bhedīti pakṣadharmopadarśanam /

‘Herein’ subsists the Specific Individuality distinguished from nonsmoke; this proposition asserts the presence of the Inferential Indicative (Probans) in the subject of the Inference (Hill).

tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopadarśanam /

‘Hence, etc. etc.’ asserts the resultant cognition (Conclusion) brought about by the Premises.

yadi vā{yadva '---}vayavapañcakam api svalakṣaṇenānvaye kriyamāṇe śayyo{kyo---}

Or, the meaning may be that all the five factors of the Inferential Process may be shown by indicating the concomitance in connection with Specific Individualities.

padarśanam iti darśayati // idaṃ ca kāryahetāvuktam /

The above is an example of the Inference where the Probans is the effect of the Probandum.

svabhāvahetāvāha asata ityādi /

The following texts cite an example of the Probans in the form of the nature of things: [see verses 1055-1056 next]

asato naraśṛṅgāder yac ca bhinnaṃ svalakṣaṇam / buddhidīpādivatsarvaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ tat sthirādapi //

The specific individuality that is differentiated from ‘man’s horns’ and other non-existent things is also differentiated from permanent things, just as the cognition, the lamp-flame, etc. are;

asadrūpaṃ tathā cedaṃ na śabdādisvalakṣaṇam /

the specific individuality of sound, etc. is not a non-existent thing.

itthaṃ nirdiṣṭabhedena bhavatyevānvayo 'munā //

In this way there can be the assertion of concomitance through differences as indicated.

[p.330] yadasato vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇamatādrūpyāt tat sarvaṃ sthirādapi vyāvṛttaṃ, yathā buddhidīpādayaḥ /

That Specific Individuality which is differentiated from the non-existent, because it is not non-existent, is also differentiated from Permanent Things, as we find in the case of Cognition, Lamp-flame and such things.

tathācedaṃ śabdādisvalakṣaṇam asadrūpaṃ na bhavatīti /

and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

ayaṃ ca sattvādityasya hetor anvayo darśitaḥ //

The concomitance shown here is in regard to the Probans ‘because it exists’;

yadyevaṃ svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaḥ, katham idānīṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṃsidhyatītyata āha avivakṣitabhedaṃ cetyādi /

[the inference being in the form ‘The Specific Individuality of Sounds, etc. is differentiated from Permanent Things, because it exists, like Cognition, Lamp-flame, etc.’]. The specific individuality itself, when its distinction is not meant to be emphasised, has been described as constituting the ‘universal’ (or commonalty);

avivakṣitabhedaṃ ca tadeva parikīrtitam /

nothing else; as nothing else is acceptable.

sāmānyalakṣaṇatvena nāniṣṭer aparaṃ punaḥ //

Question: “If there is concomitance with the Specific Individuality only, then how is there Inference in regard to things partaking of the nature of the ‘Universal?”

tadeva hi svalakṣaṇamavivakṣitabhedaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ityuktam /

That same Specific Individuality, when its distinctive features are not meant to be emphasised, constitutes the ‘Commonalty’;

sāmānyena bhedāparāmarśena, lakṣyate vyavasīyata iti sāmānyalakṣaṇam /

The term ‘Sāmanyalakṣaṇa’ means that which is indicated by the common character, not taking into account the distinctive characters.

nāparaṃ punar iti tīrthikābhimatam, tasyāniṣṭatvāt /

‘Nothing else’, in the shape of the ‘Universal’ as postulated by the other philosophers.

yathoktam "tasyaiva svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam, iti /

This has been thus declared: ‘As it is apprehended through its own form as well as through another, its object has been held to be two-fold’;

"athadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrasamāśrayāt / sāmānyaviṣayaṃ proktaṃ liṅgaṃ bhedāpratiṣṭhiteḥ" //

and again ‘Inasmuch as it is based upon the Thing by itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the Indicative of the absence of diversity has been declared to appertain to the Commonalty’.

iti / tena sāhacaryam api liṅgaśabdayoḥ svalakṣaṇenaiva kathyate /

For this reason, the concomitance also, of the Inferential Indicative and the Word, is declared to pertain to the Specific Individuality itself.

nacāpyadarśanamātreṇāsmābhir vipakṣe liṅgasyābhāvo 'vasīyate / kiṃ tarhianupalambhaviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ //

Thus we conclude that there is no Inferential Indicative in support of the conclusion contrary to ours, not merely from the fact that no such Indicative is actually perceived, but because there is non-apprehension of a particular kind.

śabalāpatyato bhede bāhuleyāśvayoḥ same / turaṅgaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ kiṃ tatra vartate //

The difference from the variegated cow being equally present in the black cow and the horse, why is it that the universal ‘cow’, as differentiated from the horse, subsists in that? (1058)

idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati, sābaleyāc ca bāhuleyāc ca tulye 'pi bhede sati kimiti turaṅgamaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ tatraiva sābaleyādau vartate nāśva iti // syād etat kimatra vaktavyaṃ, tasya hi gotvasyābhivyaktau sābaleyādireva samartho nāśvādiratas tatraiva tadvartate nānyatra /

It behoves you to say when the Horse is equally different from the Variegated Cow and the Black Cow, how it is that the Universal ‘Cow’, as differentiated from the Horse, subsists in the Variegated and other Cows, and not in the Horse? (1058) The reply to this may be as follows: “What is there to be said here? It is clear that it is only the Variegated and other Cows and not the Horse that are capable of manifesting the Universal ‘Cow’; hence the said Universal subsists in the Cows, not in other things.

nacāyaṃ paryanuyogo yujyate, kasmāt tasyābhivyaktau sa eva sābaleyādiḥ samartho bhavati, {iti}yato vastusvabhāpratiniyamo 'yaṃ, nahi vastūnāṃ svabhāvaḥ paryanuyogam arhati /

Nor will it be right to urge the question ‘why the Variegated and other Cows alone have the capacity to manifest the said Universal’, Because such restriction is due to the very nature of things; and there can be no complaint against the nature of things;

teṣāṃ svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt svabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyeti, atrāha tasyavyaktāvityādi /

as all such restrictions are due to the series of causes that have brought about thengs.” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1059 next]

tatra vyaktau samarthātmā sa eveti yadīṣyate / tulyapratyavamarśe 'pi sa śakto na turaṅgamaḥ //

If it be held that ‘that alone has the capacity to manifest it’ then, even though the subsequent determinate judgment is the same, that alone has the capacity to produce it, and not the horse.

[p.331] tasyeti gotvasya /

‘Manifest it’ i.e. the particular Universal ‘Cow’.

sa eveti sāvaleyādir na punaraśvaḥ /

‘That alone’, i.e. the Variegated and other Cows, not the Horse.

yadyevaṃ satyapi bhede sāmānyamantareṇāpi tulyapratyavamarśotpādane sāvaleyādireva śakto na turaṅgama ityayam asmatpakṣo na virudhyata eva //

If that be so, then, even when there is diversity, and there is no Commonalty, the variegated and other Cows alone, not the Horse would have the capacity to bring about the determinate judgment; even though this judgment would be the same. This view of ours also would not be incompatible.

tataś ca kiṃ jātam ity āha tādṛgityādi /

Question: “What is the upshot of all this?” Answer: [see verse 1060 next]

tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca vidyate yatra vastuni / tatrābhāve 'pi gojāter ago 'pohaḥ pravartate //

Thus then, in whatever thing the said determinate judgment is present, to that the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’ becomes applicable, even in the absence of the universal ‘cow’.

tatraivāsatyam api gojāto vastubhūtāyām agopohaḥ pratibimbātmā pravartate // yaccoktamindriyair ityādi, tadasiddham iti darśayann āha agobhinnaṃ cetyādi /

the said determinate judgment is present in the form ‘this is a Cow’, ‘that is a Cow’, to that, even in the absence of the Universal '‘Cow’, as a positive entity, the ‘exclusion of the non-Cow’, in the form of the Reflection becomes applied.

agobhinnaṃ ca yadvastu tadakṣair vyavasīyate /

That thing which is ‘different from the non-cow’ is certainly apprehended by the sense-organs;

pratibimbaṃ tadadhyastaṃ svasaṃvittyāvagamyate //

the reflection also which is superimposed upon it is apprehended by its own cognition.

idaṃ dṛṣṭvā ca lokena śabdas tatra prayujyate /

it is on noticing this that people use the word;

sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya vyaktaṃ tenopapadyate //

the recognition of its relation also becomes clearly explained on the same basis.

tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva /

The Apoha in the shape of the ‘Specific Individuality’ is apprehended through the sense-organs themselves.

yat svārthapratibimbātmāpohaḥ sa paramārthato buddhisvabhāvatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ /

As for the Apoha in the form of the Reflection of what is denoted by the Word, it is really of the nature of Cognition itself, and as such vouched for directly by its own cognition (it being self-cognised).

cakāro 'nuktārthasamuccaye /

The particle ‘ca’ is meant to include the Apohas not directly mentioned.

tena prasajyātmāpi sāmarthyāt pratīyata eva na tadātmā parātmeti darśitaṃ bhavati /

So that the Apoha in the form of Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication; as has been shown under the Text 1014, by the words ‘the nature of one is not the nature of the other

tenedam eva svalakṣaṇādirūpamapohaṃ dṛṣṭvā śabdo lokena prayujyate, , natu sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ, tasyāsattvādapratibhāsanāc ca /

Thus it is on noticing the Apoha in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest, that people come to use words, not on noticing a positive entity in the shape of the Universal; because no such Universal exists and because no such Universal figures in any cognition.

yadeva ca dṛṣṭvā lokena śabdaḥ prayujyate, tenaiva tasya sambandho 'vagamyate nānyenātiprasaṅgāt //

And that through perceiving which people use the words must also be the basis upon which rests the relations of those words, not on any other basis; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.

tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca yatra naivāsti vastuni / agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ vispaṣṭaṃ tatra gamyate //

When, in regard to anything, there is no such determinate judgment, the fact of its being denoted by the word ‘non-cow’ becomes clearly perceived.

yaccoktaṃ siddhaścāgaurapohyetetyādi tatrāha gāvo 'gāvaścetyādi /

It has been argued above (under Text 941, by Kumārila) “How could the fact of anything being denoted by the word ‘non-cow’ be cognised?”

gāvo 'gāvaś ca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ /

The cow and the non-cow are both well-established, as there are distinct determinate judgments in regard to both;

śabdas tu kevalo 'siddho yatheṣṭaṃ samprayujyate //

it is only the word that is not well-established; and hence it is applied according to the speaker’s whim.

na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate /

As a matter of fact, a distinct thing does not need for its apprehension, the apprehension of another thing;

anyonyāśrayadoṣo 'yaṃ tasmād asminnirāspadaḥ //

hence there is no room here for the charge of ‘mutual interdependence’.

[p.332] svata eva hi gavādayo bhāvā bhinnapratyavamarśaṃ janayanto vibhāgena samyaṅniścitāḥ /

As a matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well- known in their distinct forms.

teṣu vyavahārārthaṃ vyavahartṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ śabdo 'siddhaḥ prayujyate /

For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims.

tathā hi yadi bhinnavastusvarūpaṃ pratipattyarthamanyapadārthagrahaṇam apekṣyate tadā syād itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, yāvatānyagrahaṇamantareṇaiva bhinnaṃ

Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing, then there might have been mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing;

vastu saṃvedyate, tasmin bhinnākārapratyavamarśahetutayā vibhāgena siddhe sati gaur gaur iti ca yatheṣṭaṃ saṅketaḥ kriyata iti katham itaretarāśrayatvaṃ bhavet /

and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment, and then the Convention is made in the form ‘this is a Cow’, ‘that is a Cow’ and so forth, according to the man’s wish, how then, can there be any mutual interdependence?

vittāviti vittyartham //

‘Vittau’ stands for ‘vittyartham’, for the apprehension.

avedyabāhyatattvāpi prakṛṣṭopaplavādiyam / svollekhaṃ bāhyarūpeṇa śabdadhīradhyavasyati //

As a matter of fact, verbal cognition, not taking cognizance of any external object, apprehends its own mark as something external, on account of strong illusion.

etāvat kriyate śabdair nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi /

This is all that is done by words; and words do not even, touch the object;

nāpohena viśiṣṭaś ca kaścid artho 'bhidhīyate //

nor is any object denoted as qualified by Apoha (1066-1067).

nahi paramārthena kaścid apohena viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate / yataḥ pratipāditametat, yathā na kiñcidapi śabdair vastu saṃspṛśyate, kvacid apisāmagryabhāvād iti /

In reality, no object qualified by Apoha is denoted by words. Because it has already been explained that no object is touched by Words anywhere, for the simple reason that the necessary conditions are absent. For example, Verbal Cognition, even though not pertaining to any external object, actually appears as apprehending its own mark i.e. form as something external;

tathā hi śābdī buddhirabāhyārthaviṣayāpi satī svollekhaṃ svākāraṃ bāhyārthatayādhyavasyantī jāyate na paramārthato vastusvabhāvaṃ spṛśati, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt //

because its apprehension is not in accordance with the real state of things.

yadyevaṃ katham ācāryeṇoktaṃ nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhurityata āha arthāntaretyādi /

Question: “If that is so, then, why has the Teacher declared that ‘words like Blue-Lotus express things qualified by the exclusion of other things?”

proktaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa tatrārtho 'yaṃ vivakṣitaḥ // ko 'sāvartho vivakṣita ity āha anyānyatvenetyādi /

As for the statement made by the author of the lakṣaṇa that ‘words express things qualified by the exclusion of other things’, what it means is as follows. Question: “What does it mean?”

anyānyatvena ye bhāvā hetunā karaṇena vā / viśiṣṭā bhinnajātīyair asaṅkīrṇā viniścitāḥ //

Answer: [see verses 1069-1070 next] Those things that are qualified by the exclusion of other things, either as their cause or their instruments are definitely cognised as not mixed up with things of other kinds.

vṛkṣādīnāhatāndhvānas tadbhāvādhyavasāyinaḥ / jñānasyotpādanādetajjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhanam //

The word expresses these things. and, because it brings about the cognition apprehending those things, there is denial of the ‘universal’ and such other commonalities.

dvividho hyartho bāhyo buddhyārūḍhaś ca /

Things are of two kinds external and imposed upon the Cognition;

tatra bāhye na paramārthato 'bhidhānaṃ śabdaiḥ, kevalaṃ tadapyavasāyivikalpotpādādupacārād uktaṃ śabdo 'rthānāheti /

in regard to the external thing, there is no denotation by words; and it is only on account of words bringing about the conceptual content pertaining to them that it is said, figuratively, that ‘the word denotes things’;

avayavārthastūcyate anyānyatveneti /

The meaning of the words is explained: ‘By the exclusion of other things’;

anyasmād anyatvaṃ vyāvṛttiḥ, tenānyānyatvena hetunā karaṇena vā vṛkṣādayo bhāvā viśiṣṭā niścitāḥ /

i.e. by differentiation from other things; this differentiation being either the Cause or the Instrument, the Tree and other things are definitely Cognised as qualified;

anyato vyāvṛttā niścitā iti yāvat /

that is they are definitely differentiated from other things.

etenārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānityatra pade nivṛttyeti tṛtīyārtho vyākhyātaḥ /

This shows that in the compound ‘arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān’, the term ‘nivṛtti’ is to be construed as with the Instrumental Ending.

dhvāna iti śabdaḥ //

‘Dhvāna’ is Word.

yastu buddhyārūḍho 'rthas tasya mukhyata eva śabdair abhidhānam iti darśayati buddhāvityādi / buddhau ye vā vivartante tānāhābhyantarānayam /

Those things however which appear in the cognition these internal (subjective) things the word denotes directly; and the fact of these things being qualified by ‘exclusion’ has just been explained. As regards the thing imposed upon the Cognition, that is denoted by words primarily and directly.

ayam iti /

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1071 above]

dhvānaḥ /

‘Ayam’ stands for the word.

athārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham eṣāṃ yojanīyam ity āha nivṛttyā

Question; “How can the character of being qualified by the exclusion of other things be attached to them?”

cetyādi /

Answer: ‘The fact, etc. etc.’

anantaram iti anyānyatvenetyādinā teṣām api buddhasamārūḍhānām arthānām anyatovyāvṛttatayā pratipādanāt //

‘Just’ that is, under Text 1069, it has been explained that things imposed upon the Cognition are excluded (or differentiated) from other things.

nanu yadi na kaścid eva vastvaṃśaḥ śabdena pratipādyate tat katham uktam ācāryeṇārthāntaranivṛttyā kaścid eva vastuno bhāgo gamyata ityata āha arthāntaraparāvṛttetyādi /

Objection: “If no objective factor is expressed by the word, then how is it that the Teacher has declared that it is only a certain part of the Thing that is apprehended by the ‘exclusion of otherngs’?” Answer: [see verse 1072 next]

arthāntaraparāvṛttyā gamyate tasya vastunaḥ / kaścid bhāga ti proktaṃ tadeva pratibimbakam //

When it is said that ‘a certain portion of the thing is apprehended by the exclusion of other things’, it is the said reflection that is meant.

nanu buddhidharmatvāt pratibimbasya kathaṃ vastubhāgatvam upapadyata ityata

Objection: “Reflection being a property of the Cognition, how can it be a ‘portion of the object’?”

āha arthāntaraparāvṛttyetyādi / arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanasaṃśrayāt /

It is spoken of as a portion of the object, because it proceeds on the basis of the perception of the object as ‘excluded from other things’, and because it is superimposed upon the object.

arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanadvārāyātatvāt tatrārthāntaraparāvṛtte vastuni bhrāntais tādātmyenāropitatvāt tadeva pratibimbakamupacārād vastuno bhāga iti vyapadiśyate //

Because it comes about through the perception of the object ‘excluded from other things’, and because it is superimposed upon it i.e. upon the Object excluded from other things by deluded persons, therefore that same Reflection is figuratively spoken of as ‘part of the object’, (1073)

hetvarthaḥ karaṇārthaś ca pūrvavat tena vātmanā /

As before, the instrumental ending may signify either the cause or the instrument.

yadi vastu vijātīyān na syād bhinnaṃ na tat tathā //

If the thing were not differentiated from unlike things, then it could not be so.

pūrvavad iti /

‘As before’;

yathārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānāhetyatrānyānyatvenetyādinā darśitaṃ ta{thā}trāpi yojanīyam ity arthaḥ /

i.e. just as under Texts 1068-1070, where it is said that ‘the Word expresses things as qualified by the exclusion of other things’, so the same may be applied here also.

athavā sarvatraivetthambhūtalakṣaṇā tṛtīyeyam iti darśa [p.334] yati tena vātmaneti /

Or in all cases, the Instrumental Ending may be taken as signifying the idea of being ‘in that form’; tills is what is mentioned by the words ‘tena vātmanā’.

nanu bādhāntaranivṛttir bāhyavastugato dharmaḥ, sā kathaṃ pratibimbādhigame hetubhāvaṃ karaṇabhāvaṃ vā pratipadyata ityatrāha yadi vastu vijātīyādityādi /

Question: “The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the Object; as such, how can it be either the Cause or the Instrument of the apprehension of the Reflection?”

yadi hi vijātīyāt padārthād vyāvṛttaṃ vastu na syāt tadā na tat pratibimbātmakaṃ tathā vijātīyaparāvṛttavastvātmanā vyavasīyeta, tasmad arthāntaraparāvṛtter hetubhāvaḥ karaṇabhāvaś ca yujyata iti bhāvaḥ //

Answer: ‘If the thing, etc. etc.’ That is, if the Thing were not excluded (and differentiated) from unlike things, then, in the form of its Reflection, it could not be apprehended as something excluded from unlikengs. That is why the exclusion from other things is to be regarded as the Cause and the Instrument. What is meant by (the cow) being ‘different’ is only the ‘exclusion of the non-cow’;

agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā /

and this exclusion is of the nature of that same difference.