buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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hiśabdo hetau /	The term ‘hi’ denotes reason;
yasmā [p.365] tpratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ saṅketaviṣayor dvayor vaktṛśrotror eko na siddhyati /	the meaning being Became the Apoha in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.
kasmād ity āha na hi jñānam ityādi /	Why? “Because the Idea of one, etc. etc.;
pratyātmasaṃvedanīyam evārvāgdarśanānāṃ jñānam /	people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas;
na hyanyadīyajñānam aparo 'paradarśanaḥ saṃvedayate /	no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the idea in another’s mind;
jñānād avyatiriktaś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātmakalakṣaṇāpohaḥ /	and in reality the Apoha in the form of Reflection is nothing different from Idea (Cognition);
tataś ca vaktṛśrotror dvayor api kasyacid ekasya saṅketaviṣayasyārthasyāsiddheḥ kutra saṅketaḥ kriyate gṛhyate vā /	so that as between the Speaker and the Listener, what would be known as the subject of a Convention could not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or comprehended? Unless the Speaker knows the thing, he cannot make any Convention relating to it;
na hyasiddhe vastuni vaktā saṅketaṃ kartumīśāno 'pi śrotā gṛhītumatiprasaṅgāt /	nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did, it would lead to absurdities.
tathā hi śrotā yatpratipadyate svavijñānārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ na tadvakrā saṃvedyate /	For instance, the Reflection of the object, which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the Speaker;
yat saṅketakāle pratibimbakamanubhūtaṃ śrotrā vaktā vā na tadvyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate /	“The futility of Convention is next shown ‘What too, etc. etc.’ The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time of the use of the word;
tasya kṣaṇakṣayitvena ciraniruddhatvāt /	as the former, being in a perpetual flux, has long ceased to existence;
yac ca vyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate na tat saṅketakāle dṛṣṭam /	and that which is apprehended at the time of the use of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention;
anyasyaiva tadānīm anubhūyamānatvāt /	as what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different.
nacānyatra saṅketādanyatra vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgād iti //	And it is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon something different;
svasya svasyetyādinā pratividhatte /	This argument is answered in the following [see verses 1210 above]
svasya svasyābhāsasya vedane 'pi sa vartate / bāhyārthādhyavasāye yadvayor api samo yataḥ //	Even though each person is cognisant of what appears to himself, yet there is something in the cognition of external things which is common to both persons.
nahi paramārthato jñānākāro 'pi śabdānāṃ vācyatayābhīṣṭā yena tatra saṅketāsambhavaścodyate yataḥ sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāraḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavadbhrānta iṣyate kevalam arthaśūnyābhijalpavāsanāprabodhācchabdebhyo 'rthāvasāyivikalpamātrotpādāt /	As a matter of fact, the form of the cognition also is not accepted by us to be denoted by words, in view of which the impossibility of Conventions relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons, it is as illusory and false as the idea of two moons that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of the Impressions of objectless conceptions;
tat pratibimbakaṃ śabdānāṃ vācyamityabhidhīyate jananāt natvabhidheyatayā /	and it is the Reflection of this that is called the ‘Denotation’ of words, because it is produced by words, not because they are denoted (expressed) by them.
tatra yadyapi svasya svasyaivabhāsasya vaktṛśrotṛbhyāṃ paramārthataḥ saṃvedanaṃ tathāpi taimirikadvayasyeva bhrantibījasya tulyatvād dvayor api vaktṛśrotror bāhyārthādhyavasāyastulya eva /	So that though, in reality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their own consciousness, yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present in both men, just as in the case of the man with the disordered vision, the apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar;
tathāpi vaktur ayam abhimāno vartate yamevāham arthaṃ pratipādye tamevāyaṃ pratipadyata iti /	and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that ‘the thing that I cognise is also cognised by this man’;
evaṃ śrotur api yojyam /	the Listener also has the same idea.
ekārthādhyavasāyitvaṃ katham anayor vaktṛśrotroḥ parasparaṃ viditam iti cet yadi nāma paramārthato na viditam tathāpi bhrāntibījasya tulyatvād astyeva paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayavad bhrānta evāyaṃ vyavahāra iti niveditam etat /	It might be asked How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same thing known to each of them? The answer to that is that in reality it is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is as already explained by us a mistaken usage in accordance with each man’s own apprehension, just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.
tenaikārthādhyavasāyavaśāt saṅketakaraṇam upapadyata eva //	Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.
[p.366] atra dṛṣṭāntamāha timiropahatākṣo hītyādi / timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayam /	An example is cited to illustrate the above: [see verse 1211 next] Just as the man whose eye has been attacked by a disorder says to another like himself that ‘there are two moons’, so also is all verbal usage. ‘Who is like himself’, i.e. to the other man, with disordered vision.
svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā //	in fact, all cognitions brought about by words are ultimately false.
svasamāyeti /	it is not really true;
ātmatulyāyāparasmai taimirikāyetyarthaḥ // nacāpyānarthakyaṃ saṅketasyeti darśayati vyāpakatvaṃ ceti /	the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same. Question: “Why is this not accepted as being so in reality?”
vyāpakatvaṃ ca tasyedam iṣṭamādhyavasāyikam /	End of Chapter XVI. The concomitance of the convention has been accepted only on the basis of the notions of men;
mithyāvabhāsino hyete pratyayāḥ śabdanirmitāḥ //	in fact, all cognitions brought about by words are ultimately false.
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvaṃ ca vaktṛśrotṛbhyām adhyavasitārthapratibimbakasyāvasāyavaśād eveṣṭaṃ na paramārthataḥ vyāvahārakāle 'pi vaktṛśrotroḥ pūrvāparakāladṛṣṭayor arthayor aikayābhimānāt /	The idea that the Convention is concomitant with the two points of time, that of its making and the consequent usage, is admitted only on the basis of the apprehension of Reflection of the Thing apprehended by the Speaker and the Listener; it is not really true; the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same.
atha paramārthataḥ kasmānneṣṭam ity āha mithyāvabhāsina ityādi //	Question: “Why is this not accepted as being so in reality?” Answer: ‘In fact, all cognitions, etc, etc.’. End of Chapter XVI.
iti śabdārthaparīkṣā //	they are of the nature described below.
tatra pramāṇe svarūpaphalagocarasaṅkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattiścaturvidhā /	On the subject of the Means of Bight Cognition, there are four kinds of difference of opinion bearing upon (1) their Nature, (2) their Resultant,
tannirākaraṇena spaṣṭaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇamādarśayituṃ spaṣalakṣaṇasaṃyuktapramādvitayaniścitam ityetat samarthanārtham āha pratyakṣam ityādi / pratyakṣamanumānaṃ ca yadupādhiprasiddhaye /	And by setting aside these diverse opinions, the clear idea of the Means of Right Cognition can be obtained. In order to show this and to support the idea that ‘the Truth is ascertained by means of Two Means of Right Cognition which are endowed with the true characteristics of the Means of Right Cognition’ (as asserted under Text 3, of the Introduction), the Author proceeds with the following [see verse 1213 above] ‘In proof of their concepts’ i.e. such concepts as Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.
parairuktaṃ na tat siddham evaṃlakṣaṇakaṃ hi tat //	The sense-perception and the inference, which others have put forward, in proof of their concepts, are not acceptable.
upādhiprasiddhaya iti /	they are of the nature described below.
guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhiprasiddhaye /	‘In proof of their concepts’ i.e. such concepts as Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.
parair iti / vaiśeṣikādibhiḥ /	‘Others’ The Vaiśeṣika and others,
evam iti vakṣyamāṇam //	‘Evam’ as going to be described.
tatra savikalpakamajñānasvabhāvaṃ vā cakṣurādhikaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iti pratyakṣasvarūpavipratipattiḥ tannirākaraṇena tallakṣaṇam āha pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam iti /	‘Conceptual content’ is idea associated with verbal expression; it is not [regarded as] the basis of verbal expression, etc. ‘Sense-perception’ as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and the rest and is (a) conceptual (determinate), or (b) of the nature of ‘Non-cognition Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of Sense-perception.
pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam abhilāpinī /	By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own definition of it: [see verse 1214 above]
pratītiḥ kalpanā klṛptihetutvādyātmikā na tu // tatra jñānasya kalpanāpoḍhatvam abhrāntatvaṃ cānūdya pratyakṣatvaṃ vidhīyate sarvatraiva lakṣyasya vidhīyamānatvāt /	The character of being ‘Sense-perception’ is what is predicated of that Cognition which has been described as ‘free from conceptual content and not erroneous’; as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is ‘That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception’];
yathā yaḥ kampate so 'śvattha iti / lakṣyamatra pratyakṣam /	as is found in the case of such expressions as ‘That which shakes is the Aśvattha The thing defined here is Sense-perception;
tallakṣaṇasyaiva prastutatvāt /	as it is the definition of tins that forms the subject-matter of the present Context.
natu kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntalakṣaṇaṃ prakṛtaṃ yena tadvidhīyata iti syāt /	It is not the definition of ‘freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneous-ness’ that is the subject-matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.
[p.367] kalpanāpratiṣedhāc ca jñānasya sāmarthyalabdhatvāt avatsā dhenurānīyatām iti yathā vatsapratiṣedhena godhenoḥ ityato jñānam iti noktam /	The ‘Cognition’ has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of ‘Conceptual Content’; just as in the case of the sentence ‘Bring the milch one without the calf’, where the cow is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the calf.
kā punar atra kalpanābhipretā / yadapoḍhaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam ity āha abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti /	Question: “What is it that is meant by the term ‘Conceptual Content’ (‘Kalpanā’), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception?” Answer: ‘Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression’.
atha yasyāṃ klṛptihetutvādyātmikāyāṃ śaṅkarasvāmiprabhṛtayo vistareṇa doṣamuktavantaḥ sāpi kiṃ gṛhītavyā uta netyāha klṛptihetutvādyātmikā natviti /	Question: “Is that Kalpanā also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the basis of verbal expression, Śaṅkarasvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail?” Answer: No; it is not the basis of verbal expression;
gṛhyata iti śeṣaḥ /	‘regarded as’ this has to be taken as understood.
tena tadāśrayeṇa yo doṣāḥ pareṇoktās te tat pakṣānaṅgīkārādeva nāvatarantītyuktam bhavati /	Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view; because we do not accept that view. ‘Klṛpti’ is verbal expression (‘being spoken, of’, ‘being named’);
klṛptirvyapadeśas taddhetutvaṃ jātyādīnām iti boddhavyam yato jātyādiviśeṣamantareṇa na vyapadeśo 'sti / ādiśabdena śabdasaṃsargacittaudārikasūkṣmatāhetū vitarkavicārau tathā grāhyagrāhakakalpenetyavamādi grahītavyam /	and the basis for such expression consists of the Universal, the Name and so forth; since there can be no speaking of things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc. The term ‘ādi’ (etcetera) in the text is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.
abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ sa vidyate yasyāḥ pratibhāsataḥ sā tathoktā //	‘Abhilāpa’ is expressive word; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called ‘abhilāpinī’ (1214)
śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ / yā vācām aprayoge 'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate //	As a matter of fact, the cognition that is capable of connecting the thing and the word always appears as associated with verbal expression (words), even when the words-like ‘tree’ and the like are not actually used.
vṛkṣa ityādirūpato yā vācām aprayoge 'pīti sambandhaḥ / yadi vā pūrveṇa śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpata iti sambandhaḥ /	Answer: [see verse 1215 above] The construction may be as ‘even when the words like tree, etc. are not used’, or as ‘which is capable of connecting the thing and the word, in the shape of tree, etc.’. This indicates the Conceptual Content as something directly perceived;
anena pratyakṣata eva kalpanāyāḥ siddhimādarśayati sarvaprāṇabhṛtāmanusiddhatvād vikalpasya //	The following Text shows that the said Conceptual Content is well known as the source of all activities of persons from infancy onwards: [see verse 1216 above]
atītabhavanāmārthabhāvanāvāsanānvayāt /	‘Atīta-bhava’ is past lives;
atīto bhavaḥ atītaṃ janma tatra nāmārthabhāvanā śabdārthābhyāsaḥ tenāhitā yā vāsanā sāmarthyaṃ tasyā anvayaḥ anugamo yato bālasyāpyasti tenāhbilāpinī pratītis tasyāpi bhavatyeva / yasyāḥ kalpanāyā yogāt itikartavyatāyāṃ smitaruditastanapānapraharṣādilakṣaṇāyāṃ paṭuḥ caturo bhavati /	during these there has been ‘nāmārthabhāvanā’, constant associating of things with their names; this constant associating leaves its ‘Vāsanā’, Impressions, or capacity in the mind; through the ‘anvaya’, continuance of this capacity, even the infant has ideas associated with words; and it is through the presence of this Conceptual Content (Idea associated with words), that the infant becomes capable of activity, such as smiling, crying, sucking the breast, becoming pleased and so forth.
ato 'nayā kāryabhūtayā yathoktā kalpanā bālasyāpyanumīyata eva /	From this effect its cause in the -shape of the said Conceptual Content is assumed in the infant.
itikartavyatā loke sarvaśabdavyapāśrayā / yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyata // iti /	This has been thus declared ‘All activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to, through the impressions left by past lives’.
sā punaḥ sanmūrchitākṣarākāradhvaniviśiṣṭamantarmātrāviparivartinam arthaṃ bahirivādarśayantī teṣāṃ samupajāyate yayā paścāt saṅketagrahaṇakuśalā bhavanti //	This Conceptual Content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form, as if it were something external, appears in the mind of Infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant Conventions.
cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭaṃ yā pravedyate / anuviddheva sā śabdair apahnotuṃ na śakyate //	That which is clearly cognised at the time of reflection and imagination as if interpenetrating them, cannot be set aside by mere words.
tasyāścetyādinā śābdavyavahārākhyakāryaliṅgito 'pi siddhimāha /	The Author shows again how the existence of the Conceptual Content is vouched for by Perception: [see verse 1217 above]
tasyāścādhyavasāyena bhrāntā śabdārthayoḥ sthitiḥ /	The connection between words and things, due to conceptual content, is illusory;
anyāyogād asattve 'syāḥ sedṛśyapi na sambhavet //	hence as it cannot be based upon anything else, if there were no conceptual content, the said connection, even as it is, would not be possible.
yatas tāttvikī śabdārthavyavasthā pūrvaniṣiddhā bhrānteti ca vyavasthāpitā /	Any real connection between Words and Things has been negatived by our predecessors, and it has also been proved that it is all illusory.
yadi cāsyāḥ kalpanāyā asattvaṃ syāt tadā sā śabdārthavyavasthā īdṛśyapi bhrāntāpi na sambhavet tadabhiprāyavaśāt tasyāvyavasthānāt /	Under the circumstances, if this Conceptual Content were not there, then the said connection, even as it is i.e. even in the illusory form, would not be possible; as that connection is based upon the Conceptual Content; and as it has been proved that anything external, in the form of Specific Individuality, Universal and the like, cannot form the denotation of words.
anyeṣāṃ ca svalakṣaṇādīnāṃ bāhyānāṃ vācyatvenāyogasya pratipāditatvāt //	Some people have regarded the conceptual content to be that which is capable of being connected with the universal and the rest;
nanu cānye 'pi na kevalam abhilāpinī pratītiṃ kalpanāṃ varṇayanti kintu jātiguṇakriyādisambandhayogyām api /	Question: “Other people describe the Conceptual Content not only as ‘the idea associated with words’, but also as that which is capable of being connected with the Universal, Quality, Action and so forth.
sā kasmān na gṛhyata ity āha jātyādītyādi /	Why do not you accept these?” Answer: [see verse 1219 above]
sā jātyāder apāstatvād adṛṣṭeś ca na saṅgatā // adṛṣṭeśceti /	‘They are never perceived’ i.e. the Universal, etc. are never actually perceived.
ayaṃ cābhyupagamya jātyādīn parihāra uktaḥ //	This answer has been given on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the Universal, etc. do exist.
jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt / kṣīrodakādivaccārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham //	The universal and the rest being never perceived, and their connection being never manifested, how can their association with things be possible, as between milk and water, etc.? (1220)
kṣīrodakādivacceti /	The said ‘non-perception’ of the Universal, etc. is further emphasised in the following [see verse 1220 above]
yathā kṣīrodakāder miśrībhūtasya vivekenāpratibhāsanān na ghaṭanā śakyate kartuṃ tadvajjātyādīnāṃ sattve 'pi vivekenāśrayād apratibhāsanān na	‘Like Milk and Water, etc.’ When Milk and Water are mixed up, they do not appear separately, and hence it is no longer possible to connect the two; in the same manner, even if the Universal and the rest do exist, they never appear as distinguished from their substratum;
śakyate tadāśrayeṇa sahetyarthaḥ //	and hence it is not possible to connect them with their substratum.
yadi tarhi jātyādiyojanā kalpanā na yuktaiva tat kathaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇoktaṃ nāma jātyādiyojanā kalpaneti āha heyetyādi /	“If then the Conceptual Content in the form of association with the Universal is not possible, then, how is it that the propounder of the definition (Diṅnāga in his Nyāyamukha) has asserted that ‘Conceptual Content’ consists in connection with Name, Universal and so forth’?”
heyopādeyaviṣayakathanāya dvayoktitaḥ /	In order to set forth this distinction, both views relating to Conceptual Content have been asserted.
tatra heyā jātyādiyojanā paraprasiddhā kalpanā upādeyā svaprasiddho nāmayojanākalpanā iti darśanāya dviprakārāpi kalpanā nirdiṣṭā / katham avagamyata ity āha [p.369] dvayoktitaḥ yasmānnāma ca jātyādayaś ca nāmajātyādayas teṣāṃ yojanetyevaṃ vargadvayam uktam, anyathā nāmādiyojanā yadivā jātyādiyojanetyeva	Answer: ‘By the two assertions’ that is the words used by the Teacher are ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’, ‘connection or association with Name and Universal, etc.’, where both the Name and the Universal, etc. have been mentioned, as representing tho two views. If this were not intended, then the expression used would have been either ‘association with Name, etc.’ or ‘association with the Universal, etc.’ Nor is the enumeration meant to be exhaustive; as in that case the addition of ‘etcetera’ would be meaningless. This ‘connection with name, etc.’ remains there after having indicated its own immediate cause;
vācyaṃ syāt /	hence the assertion is not irrelevant.
nacedaṃ parigaṇanam, ādiśabdavaiphalyaprasaṅgāt //	what forms the subject-matter of the present context is the view that the said Content is absent (in Sense-perception);
nāmajātyādīnāṃ ca yā yojanā tadvadbhiḥ sārthagato dharmaḥ na jñānasyatataścāprastutābhidhāyitvaṃ lakṣaṇakārasyeti codyamāśaṅkyāha nāmādiyojanā ceyam iti /	as it is Sense-perception that is being considered; and it is not intended to expound the absence of the Object; as regards the ‘association of Name, Universal, etc.’, on the other hand, it is a property of the Object, not of the Cognition. So that what the pro-pounder of the Lakṣaṇa has asserted appears to be entirely irrelevant.”
ākṣipya vartate yena tena nāprastutābhidhā //	Anticipating this criticism, the Author supplies the following answer: [see verse 1222 above]
anantaram avyavahitaṃ nimittaṃ yat tasyāḥ kāraṇam /	‘Anantaram’ immediate ‘nimittam’ cause; and that cause is in the form of the verbally-associated Idea;
tat punar āviṣṭābhilāpā pratītiḥ /	and this is called ‘connection’ because it appears in a form envisaging two things;
sā ca vastudvayānusandhānākārotpattitas tathā yojaneti vyapadiśyate naiva tu kaścit kaṃścidyojayati nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām /	and there is no connecting of one thing by another; as properties of things have no functions to perform.
tasyākṣepo dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyām /	The indication of this immediate cause is done in two ways;
tābhyāṃ yojanā yato bhavati sā tathoktā /	and why this ‘connection’ comes in has been explained.
gamakatvād vaiyadhikaraṇye 'pi ca bahuvrīhiḥ /	there being Bahuvrīhi compound even when there is no co-ordination between the factors concerned.
kāraṇe kāryopacārād vā / upacārasya ca prayojanaṃ tadanyakāraṇebhyo viśiṣṭakāryakāriṇaḥ svabhāvakhyāpanam //	Or the compound may be explained on the basis of the assumption that the Cause is spoken of as the Effect. The purpose served by this indirect expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of the cause as bringing about an effect different from other causes.
athavā yojyate 'nayeti yojanā nāmajātyādīnāṃ yojaneti samāsaṃ kṛtvābhilāpinyeva kalpanā nirdiṣṭetyadoṣa iti darśayati nāmajātyādaya ityādi /	hence what is spoken of (by Diṅnāga’s definition) is the same conceptual content which has been described as ‘the idea associated with verbal expression’. Or, the expression ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’ may be explained in another way (as standing for kalpanā, Conceptual Content, itself): ‘Yojanas’ is that wherewith one is connected;
nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vānayeti sā / tathoktā kalpanā proktā pratītir abhilāpinī //	and this ‘yojanā’ of ‘Name, Universal, etc.’ would be the same Conceptual Content, explained as ‘Idea associated with verbal expression’; so that there is nothing defective in the definition propounded by Diṅnāga.
yadvetyādinā parihārāntaram āha	This is what is explained in the following [see verse 1223 above]
yadvā svamatasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanoditā /	Or, what has been spoken of (in the definition in question) is the same conceptual content that we have ourselves asserted;
sarvatra nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyata iti yojanāt //	(this interpretation) being based upon the fact that in all cases things are spoken of by their name (this being the meaning of the compound ‘nāmādiyojanā’).
yadyevaṃ katham ayam ācāryīyo vṛttigrantho nīyate / tadyathā yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti jātiśabdeṣujātyā gaur iti guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka itidravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇīti /	Question: “If it be as asserted above, then how do you explain the explanatory words of the Teacher? For instance, he has declared as follows: In the case of Proper names, like Ḍittha, what is denoted is an object qualified by a Name: in the case of common nouns like ‘Cow’ what is denoted is the object qualified by the Universal ‘Cow’; in the case of adjectives, like ‘white’, what is expressed is the object qualified by the Quality of ‘whiteness’; in the case of verbal nouns what is denoted is the object qualified by the Action;
anena hi granthena jātyādiviśeṣaṇayuktasyāpyarthasyocyamānatvaṃ pṛthakprakāśitam ityata āha sarvatretyādi / sarvatreti jātyādiśabdeṣvapi /	By this text the Teacher has made it quite clear that things qualified by the qualifications of the ‘Universal’, etc. are also separately denoted by words.” The answer to this is that ‘In all cases, etc, etc.’ ‘In all cases’ i.e. even in the case of words denoting the Universal, etc.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā [p.370] yadṛcchāśabdeṣu prayujyamāneṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate, evaṃ jātyādiśabdeṣu gaurityādiṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ityetat sarvatra granthe yojanīyamiti //	What is meant is as follows: Just as when Proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object qualified by the Namne, so also in the case of words expressive of the Universal, etc., like ‘Cow’ what is denoted is the object qualified by that Name; similarly in all cases [what is denoted is an object qualified by, connected with, a name].
kathaṃ tarhi jātyā guṇena kriyayā dravyeṇa vetyetadaparaṃ tṛtīyāntaṃ yojanīyam ity āha tair ityādi /	Question: “In that case, how are we to construe the Instrumental in the words ‘jātyā’, ‘guṇena’ etc. (by the Universal, by the Quality)?” Answer: [see verse 1225 next]
taistu karaṇavibhaktyā sāphalyamanubhūyate /	It is through these that the instrumental ending becomes useful;
nāmno jātyādibhiḥ seyam ityartho 'dhyavatiṣṭhate // jātyā karaṇabhūtayā nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur iti, tathā guṇādibhiḥ ityevaṃ tair jātyādibhiḥ karaṇavibhaktyā sambandhātsāphalyamanubhūyate /	so that the meaning comes to be that the conceptual content becomes connected with the name, through the instrumentality of the universal, etc. The particular thing spoken as ‘Cow’ is that which is connected with that Name through the Instrumentality of the Universal; similarly, through the instrumentality of the Quality, etc. It is in this sense that the Universal, etc. become the Instrument (of Connection), and thus the Instrumental Ending becomes useful.

hiśabdo hetau /

The term ‘hi’ denotes reason;

yasmā [p.365] tpratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ saṅketaviṣayor dvayor vaktṛśrotror eko na siddhyati /

the meaning being Became the Apoha in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.

kasmād ity āha na hi jñānam ityādi /

Why? “Because the Idea of one, etc. etc.;

pratyātmasaṃvedanīyam evārvāgdarśanānāṃ jñānam /

people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas;

na hyanyadīyajñānam aparo 'paradarśanaḥ saṃvedayate /

no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the idea in another’s mind;

jñānād avyatiriktaś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātmakalakṣaṇāpohaḥ /

and in reality the Apoha in the form of Reflection is nothing different from Idea (Cognition);

tataś ca vaktṛśrotror dvayor api kasyacid ekasya saṅketaviṣayasyārthasyāsiddheḥ kutra saṅketaḥ kriyate gṛhyate vā /

so that as between the Speaker and the Listener, what would be known as the subject of a Convention could not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or comprehended? Unless the Speaker knows the thing, he cannot make any Convention relating to it;

na hyasiddhe vastuni vaktā saṅketaṃ kartumīśāno 'pi śrotā gṛhītumatiprasaṅgāt /

nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did, it would lead to absurdities.

tathā hi śrotā yatpratipadyate svavijñānārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ na tadvakrā saṃvedyate /

For instance, the Reflection of the object, which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the Speaker;

yat saṅketakāle pratibimbakamanubhūtaṃ śrotrā vaktā vā na tadvyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate /

“The futility of Convention is next shown ‘What too, etc. etc.’ The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time of the use of the word;

tasya kṣaṇakṣayitvena ciraniruddhatvāt /

as the former, being in a perpetual flux, has long ceased to existence;

yac ca vyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate na tat saṅketakāle dṛṣṭam /

and that which is apprehended at the time of the use of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention;

anyasyaiva tadānīm anubhūyamānatvāt /

as what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different.

nacānyatra saṅketādanyatra vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgād iti //

And it is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon something different;

svasya svasyetyādinā pratividhatte /

This argument is answered in the following [see verses 1210 above]

svasya svasyābhāsasya vedane 'pi sa vartate / bāhyārthādhyavasāye yadvayor api samo yataḥ //

Even though each person is cognisant of what appears to himself, yet there is something in the cognition of external things which is common to both persons.

nahi paramārthato jñānākāro 'pi śabdānāṃ vācyatayābhīṣṭā yena tatra saṅketāsambhavaścodyate yataḥ sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāraḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavadbhrānta iṣyate kevalam arthaśūnyābhijalpavāsanāprabodhācchabdebhyo 'rthāvasāyivikalpamātrotpādāt /

As a matter of fact, the form of the cognition also is not accepted by us to be denoted by words, in view of which the impossibility of Conventions relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons, it is as illusory and false as the idea of two moons that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of the Impressions of objectless conceptions;

tat pratibimbakaṃ śabdānāṃ vācyamityabhidhīyate jananāt natvabhidheyatayā /

and it is the Reflection of this that is called the ‘Denotation’ of words, because it is produced by words, not because they are denoted (expressed) by them.

tatra yadyapi svasya svasyaivabhāsasya vaktṛśrotṛbhyāṃ paramārthataḥ saṃvedanaṃ tathāpi taimirikadvayasyeva bhrantibījasya tulyatvād dvayor api vaktṛśrotror bāhyārthādhyavasāyastulya eva /

So that though, in reality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their own consciousness, yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present in both men, just as in the case of the man with the disordered vision, the apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar;

tathāpi vaktur ayam abhimāno vartate yamevāham arthaṃ pratipādye tamevāyaṃ pratipadyata iti /

and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that ‘the thing that I cognise is also cognised by this man’;

evaṃ śrotur api yojyam /

the Listener also has the same idea.

ekārthādhyavasāyitvaṃ katham anayor vaktṛśrotroḥ parasparaṃ viditam iti cet yadi nāma paramārthato na viditam tathāpi bhrāntibījasya tulyatvād astyeva paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayavad bhrānta evāyaṃ vyavahāra iti niveditam etat /

It might be asked How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same thing known to each of them? The answer to that is that in reality it is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is as already explained by us a mistaken usage in accordance with each man’s own apprehension, just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.

tenaikārthādhyavasāyavaśāt saṅketakaraṇam upapadyata eva //

Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.

[p.366] atra dṛṣṭāntamāha timiropahatākṣo hītyādi / timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayam /

An example is cited to illustrate the above: [see verse 1211 next] Just as the man whose eye has been attacked by a disorder says to another like himself that ‘there are two moons’, so also is all verbal usage. ‘Who is like himself’, i.e. to the other man, with disordered vision.

svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā //

in fact, all cognitions brought about by words are ultimately false.

svasamāyeti /

it is not really true;

ātmatulyāyāparasmai taimirikāyetyarthaḥ // nacāpyānarthakyaṃ saṅketasyeti darśayati vyāpakatvaṃ ceti /

the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same. Question: “Why is this not accepted as being so in reality?”

vyāpakatvaṃ ca tasyedam iṣṭamādhyavasāyikam /

End of Chapter XVI. The concomitance of the convention has been accepted only on the basis of the notions of men;

mithyāvabhāsino hyete pratyayāḥ śabdanirmitāḥ //

in fact, all cognitions brought about by words are ultimately false.

saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvaṃ ca vaktṛśrotṛbhyām adhyavasitārthapratibimbakasyāvasāyavaśād eveṣṭaṃ na paramārthataḥ vyāvahārakāle 'pi vaktṛśrotroḥ pūrvāparakāladṛṣṭayor arthayor aikayābhimānāt /

The idea that the Convention is concomitant with the two points of time, that of its making and the consequent usage, is admitted only on the basis of the apprehension of Reflection of the Thing apprehended by the Speaker and the Listener; it is not really true; the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same.

atha paramārthataḥ kasmānneṣṭam ity āha mithyāvabhāsina ityādi //

Question: “Why is this not accepted as being so in reality?” Answer: ‘In fact, all cognitions, etc, etc.’. End of Chapter XVI.

iti śabdārthaparīkṣā //

they are of the nature described below.

tatra pramāṇe svarūpaphalagocarasaṅkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattiścaturvidhā /

On the subject of the Means of Bight Cognition, there are four kinds of difference of opinion bearing upon (1) their Nature, (2) their Resultant,

tannirākaraṇena spaṣṭaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇamādarśayituṃ spaṣalakṣaṇasaṃyuktapramādvitayaniścitam ityetat samarthanārtham āha pratyakṣam ityādi / pratyakṣamanumānaṃ ca yadupādhiprasiddhaye /

And by setting aside these diverse opinions, the clear idea of the Means of Right Cognition can be obtained. In order to show this and to support the idea that ‘the Truth is ascertained by means of Two Means of Right Cognition which are endowed with the true characteristics of the Means of Right Cognition’ (as asserted under Text 3, of the Introduction), the Author proceeds with the following [see verse 1213 above] ‘In proof of their concepts’ i.e. such concepts as Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.

parairuktaṃ na tat siddham evaṃlakṣaṇakaṃ hi tat //

The sense-perception and the inference, which others have put forward, in proof of their concepts, are not acceptable.

upādhiprasiddhaya iti /

they are of the nature described below.

guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhiprasiddhaye /

‘In proof of their concepts’ i.e. such concepts as Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.

parair iti / vaiśeṣikādibhiḥ /

‘Others’ The Vaiśeṣika and others,

evam iti vakṣyamāṇam //

‘Evam’ as going to be described.

tatra savikalpakamajñānasvabhāvaṃ vā cakṣurādhikaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iti pratyakṣasvarūpavipratipattiḥ tannirākaraṇena tallakṣaṇam āha pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam iti /

‘Conceptual content’ is idea associated with verbal expression; it is not [regarded as] the basis of verbal expression, etc. ‘Sense-perception’ as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and the rest and is (a) conceptual (determinate), or (b) of the nature of ‘Non-cognition Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of Sense-perception.

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam abhilāpinī /

By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own definition of it: [see verse 1214 above]

pratītiḥ kalpanā klṛptihetutvādyātmikā na tu // tatra jñānasya kalpanāpoḍhatvam abhrāntatvaṃ cānūdya pratyakṣatvaṃ vidhīyate sarvatraiva lakṣyasya vidhīyamānatvāt /

The character of being ‘Sense-perception’ is what is predicated of that Cognition which has been described as ‘free from conceptual content and not erroneous’; as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is ‘That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception’];

yathā yaḥ kampate so 'śvattha iti / lakṣyamatra pratyakṣam /

as is found in the case of such expressions as ‘That which shakes is the Aśvattha The thing defined here is Sense-perception;

tallakṣaṇasyaiva prastutatvāt /

as it is the definition of tins that forms the subject-matter of the present Context.

natu kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntalakṣaṇaṃ prakṛtaṃ yena tadvidhīyata iti syāt /

It is not the definition of ‘freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneous-ness’ that is the subject-matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.

[p.367] kalpanāpratiṣedhāc ca jñānasya sāmarthyalabdhatvāt avatsā dhenurānīyatām iti yathā vatsapratiṣedhena godhenoḥ ityato jñānam iti noktam /

The ‘Cognition’ has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of ‘Conceptual Content’; just as in the case of the sentence ‘Bring the milch one without the calf’, where the cow is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the calf.

kā punar atra kalpanābhipretā / yadapoḍhaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam ity āha abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti /

Question: “What is it that is meant by the term ‘Conceptual Content’ (‘Kalpanā’), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception?” Answer: ‘Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression’.

atha yasyāṃ klṛptihetutvādyātmikāyāṃ śaṅkarasvāmiprabhṛtayo vistareṇa doṣamuktavantaḥ sāpi kiṃ gṛhītavyā uta netyāha klṛptihetutvādyātmikā natviti /

Question: “Is that Kalpanā also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the basis of verbal expression, Śaṅkarasvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail?” Answer: No; it is not the basis of verbal expression;

gṛhyata iti śeṣaḥ /

‘regarded as’ this has to be taken as understood.

tena tadāśrayeṇa yo doṣāḥ pareṇoktās te tat pakṣānaṅgīkārādeva nāvatarantītyuktam bhavati /

Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view; because we do not accept that view. ‘Klṛpti’ is verbal expression (‘being spoken, of’, ‘being named’);

klṛptirvyapadeśas taddhetutvaṃ jātyādīnām iti boddhavyam yato jātyādiviśeṣamantareṇa na vyapadeśo 'sti / ādiśabdena śabdasaṃsargacittaudārikasūkṣmatāhetū vitarkavicārau tathā grāhyagrāhakakalpenetyavamādi grahītavyam /

and the basis for such expression consists of the Universal, the Name and so forth; since there can be no speaking of things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc. The term ‘ādi’ (etcetera) in the text is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.

abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ sa vidyate yasyāḥ pratibhāsataḥ sā tathoktā //

‘Abhilāpa’ is expressive word; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called ‘abhilāpinī’ (1214)

śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ / yā vācām aprayoge 'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate //

As a matter of fact, the cognition that is capable of connecting the thing and the word always appears as associated with verbal expression (words), even when the words-like ‘tree’ and the like are not actually used.

vṛkṣa ityādirūpato yā vācām aprayoge 'pīti sambandhaḥ / yadi vā pūrveṇa śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpata iti sambandhaḥ /

Answer: [see verse 1215 above] The construction may be as ‘even when the words like tree, etc. are not used’, or as ‘which is capable of connecting the thing and the word, in the shape of tree, etc.’. This indicates the Conceptual Content as something directly perceived;

anena pratyakṣata eva kalpanāyāḥ siddhimādarśayati sarvaprāṇabhṛtāmanusiddhatvād vikalpasya //

The following Text shows that the said Conceptual Content is well known as the source of all activities of persons from infancy onwards: [see verse 1216 above]

atītabhavanāmārthabhāvanāvāsanānvayāt /

‘Atīta-bhava’ is past lives;

atīto bhavaḥ atītaṃ janma tatra nāmārthabhāvanā śabdārthābhyāsaḥ tenāhitā yā vāsanā sāmarthyaṃ tasyā anvayaḥ anugamo yato bālasyāpyasti tenāhbilāpinī pratītis tasyāpi bhavatyeva / yasyāḥ kalpanāyā yogāt itikartavyatāyāṃ smitaruditastanapānapraharṣādilakṣaṇāyāṃ paṭuḥ caturo bhavati /

during these there has been ‘nāmārthabhāvanā’, constant associating of things with their names; this constant associating leaves its ‘Vāsanā’, Impressions, or capacity in the mind; through the ‘anvaya’, continuance of this capacity, even the infant has ideas associated with words; and it is through the presence of this Conceptual Content (Idea associated with words), that the infant becomes capable of activity, such as smiling, crying, sucking the breast, becoming pleased and so forth.

ato 'nayā kāryabhūtayā yathoktā kalpanā bālasyāpyanumīyata eva /

From this effect its cause in the -shape of the said Conceptual Content is assumed in the infant.

itikartavyatā loke sarvaśabdavyapāśrayā / yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyata // iti /

This has been thus declared ‘All activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to, through the impressions left by past lives’.

sā punaḥ sanmūrchitākṣarākāradhvaniviśiṣṭamantarmātrāviparivartinam arthaṃ bahirivādarśayantī teṣāṃ samupajāyate yayā paścāt saṅketagrahaṇakuśalā bhavanti //

This Conceptual Content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form, as if it were something external, appears in the mind of Infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant Conventions.

cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭaṃ yā pravedyate / anuviddheva sā śabdair apahnotuṃ na śakyate //

That which is clearly cognised at the time of reflection and imagination as if interpenetrating them, cannot be set aside by mere words.

tasyāścetyādinā śābdavyavahārākhyakāryaliṅgito 'pi siddhimāha /

The Author shows again how the existence of the Conceptual Content is vouched for by Perception: [see verse 1217 above]

tasyāścādhyavasāyena bhrāntā śabdārthayoḥ sthitiḥ /

The connection between words and things, due to conceptual content, is illusory;

anyāyogād asattve 'syāḥ sedṛśyapi na sambhavet //

hence as it cannot be based upon anything else, if there were no conceptual content, the said connection, even as it is, would not be possible.

yatas tāttvikī śabdārthavyavasthā pūrvaniṣiddhā bhrānteti ca vyavasthāpitā /

Any real connection between Words and Things has been negatived by our predecessors, and it has also been proved that it is all illusory.

yadi cāsyāḥ kalpanāyā asattvaṃ syāt tadā sā śabdārthavyavasthā īdṛśyapi bhrāntāpi na sambhavet tadabhiprāyavaśāt tasyāvyavasthānāt /

Under the circumstances, if this Conceptual Content were not there, then the said connection, even as it is i.e. even in the illusory form, would not be possible; as that connection is based upon the Conceptual Content; and as it has been proved that anything external, in the form of Specific Individuality, Universal and the like, cannot form the denotation of words.

anyeṣāṃ ca svalakṣaṇādīnāṃ bāhyānāṃ vācyatvenāyogasya pratipāditatvāt //

Some people have regarded the conceptual content to be that which is capable of being connected with the universal and the rest;

nanu cānye 'pi na kevalam abhilāpinī pratītiṃ kalpanāṃ varṇayanti kintu jātiguṇakriyādisambandhayogyām api /

Question: “Other people describe the Conceptual Content not only as ‘the idea associated with words’, but also as that which is capable of being connected with the Universal, Quality, Action and so forth.

sā kasmān na gṛhyata ity āha jātyādītyādi /

Why do not you accept these?” Answer: [see verse 1219 above]

sā jātyāder apāstatvād adṛṣṭeś ca na saṅgatā // adṛṣṭeśceti /

‘They are never perceived’ i.e. the Universal, etc. are never actually perceived.

ayaṃ cābhyupagamya jātyādīn parihāra uktaḥ //

This answer has been given on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the Universal, etc. do exist.

jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt / kṣīrodakādivaccārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham //

The universal and the rest being never perceived, and their connection being never manifested, how can their association with things be possible, as between milk and water, etc.? (1220)

kṣīrodakādivacceti /

The said ‘non-perception’ of the Universal, etc. is further emphasised in the following [see verse 1220 above]

yathā kṣīrodakāder miśrībhūtasya vivekenāpratibhāsanān na ghaṭanā śakyate kartuṃ tadvajjātyādīnāṃ sattve 'pi vivekenāśrayād apratibhāsanān na

‘Like Milk and Water, etc.’ When Milk and Water are mixed up, they do not appear separately, and hence it is no longer possible to connect the two; in the same manner, even if the Universal and the rest do exist, they never appear as distinguished from their substratum;

śakyate tadāśrayeṇa sahetyarthaḥ //

and hence it is not possible to connect them with their substratum.

yadi tarhi jātyādiyojanā kalpanā na yuktaiva tat kathaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇoktaṃ nāma jātyādiyojanā kalpaneti āha heyetyādi /

“If then the Conceptual Content in the form of association with the Universal is not possible, then, how is it that the propounder of the definition (Diṅnāga in his Nyāyamukha) has asserted that ‘Conceptual Content’ consists in connection with Name, Universal and so forth’?”

heyopādeyaviṣayakathanāya dvayoktitaḥ /

In order to set forth this distinction, both views relating to Conceptual Content have been asserted.

tatra heyā jātyādiyojanā paraprasiddhā kalpanā upādeyā svaprasiddho nāmayojanākalpanā iti darśanāya dviprakārāpi kalpanā nirdiṣṭā / katham avagamyata ity āha [p.369] dvayoktitaḥ yasmānnāma ca jātyādayaś ca nāmajātyādayas teṣāṃ yojanetyevaṃ vargadvayam uktam, anyathā nāmādiyojanā yadivā jātyādiyojanetyeva

Answer: ‘By the two assertions’ that is the words used by the Teacher are ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’, ‘connection or association with Name and Universal, etc.’, where both the Name and the Universal, etc. have been mentioned, as representing tho two views. If this were not intended, then the expression used would have been either ‘association with Name, etc.’ or ‘association with the Universal, etc.’ Nor is the enumeration meant to be exhaustive; as in that case the addition of ‘etcetera’ would be meaningless. This ‘connection with name, etc.’ remains there after having indicated its own immediate cause;

vācyaṃ syāt /

hence the assertion is not irrelevant.

nacedaṃ parigaṇanam, ādiśabdavaiphalyaprasaṅgāt //

what forms the subject-matter of the present context is the view that the said Content is absent (in Sense-perception);

nāmajātyādīnāṃ ca yā yojanā tadvadbhiḥ sārthagato dharmaḥ na jñānasyatataścāprastutābhidhāyitvaṃ lakṣaṇakārasyeti codyamāśaṅkyāha nāmādiyojanā ceyam iti /

as it is Sense-perception that is being considered; and it is not intended to expound the absence of the Object; as regards the ‘association of Name, Universal, etc.’, on the other hand, it is a property of the Object, not of the Cognition. So that what the pro-pounder of the Lakṣaṇa has asserted appears to be entirely irrelevant.”

ākṣipya vartate yena tena nāprastutābhidhā //

Anticipating this criticism, the Author supplies the following answer: [see verse 1222 above]

anantaram avyavahitaṃ nimittaṃ yat tasyāḥ kāraṇam /

‘Anantaram’ immediate ‘nimittam’ cause; and that cause is in the form of the verbally-associated Idea;

tat punar āviṣṭābhilāpā pratītiḥ /

and this is called ‘connection’ because it appears in a form envisaging two things;

sā ca vastudvayānusandhānākārotpattitas tathā yojaneti vyapadiśyate naiva tu kaścit kaṃścidyojayati nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām /

and there is no connecting of one thing by another; as properties of things have no functions to perform.

tasyākṣepo dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyām /

The indication of this immediate cause is done in two ways;

tābhyāṃ yojanā yato bhavati sā tathoktā /

and why this ‘connection’ comes in has been explained.

gamakatvād vaiyadhikaraṇye 'pi ca bahuvrīhiḥ /

there being Bahuvrīhi compound even when there is no co-ordination between the factors concerned.

kāraṇe kāryopacārād vā / upacārasya ca prayojanaṃ tadanyakāraṇebhyo viśiṣṭakāryakāriṇaḥ svabhāvakhyāpanam //

Or the compound may be explained on the basis of the assumption that the Cause is spoken of as the Effect. The purpose served by this indirect expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of the cause as bringing about an effect different from other causes.

athavā yojyate 'nayeti yojanā nāmajātyādīnāṃ yojaneti samāsaṃ kṛtvābhilāpinyeva kalpanā nirdiṣṭetyadoṣa iti darśayati nāmajātyādaya ityādi /

hence what is spoken of (by Diṅnāga’s definition) is the same conceptual content which has been described as ‘the idea associated with verbal expression’. Or, the expression ‘nāmajātyādiyojanā’ may be explained in another way (as standing for kalpanā, Conceptual Content, itself): ‘Yojanas’ is that wherewith one is connected;

nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vānayeti sā / tathoktā kalpanā proktā pratītir abhilāpinī //

and this ‘yojanā’ of ‘Name, Universal, etc.’ would be the same Conceptual Content, explained as ‘Idea associated with verbal expression’; so that there is nothing defective in the definition propounded by Diṅnāga.

yadvetyādinā parihārāntaram āha

This is what is explained in the following [see verse 1223 above]

yadvā svamatasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanoditā /

Or, what has been spoken of (in the definition in question) is the same conceptual content that we have ourselves asserted;

sarvatra nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyata iti yojanāt //

(this interpretation) being based upon the fact that in all cases things are spoken of by their name (this being the meaning of the compound ‘nāmādiyojanā’).

yadyevaṃ katham ayam ācāryīyo vṛttigrantho nīyate / tadyathā yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti jātiśabdeṣujātyā gaur iti guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka itidravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇīti /

Question: “If it be as asserted above, then how do you explain the explanatory words of the Teacher? For instance, he has declared as follows: In the case of Proper names, like Ḍittha, what is denoted is an object qualified by a Name: in the case of common nouns like ‘Cow’ what is denoted is the object qualified by the Universal ‘Cow’; in the case of adjectives, like ‘white’, what is expressed is the object qualified by the Quality of ‘whiteness’; in the case of verbal nouns what is denoted is the object qualified by the Action;

anena hi granthena jātyādiviśeṣaṇayuktasyāpyarthasyocyamānatvaṃ pṛthakprakāśitam ityata āha sarvatretyādi / sarvatreti jātyādiśabdeṣvapi /

By this text the Teacher has made it quite clear that things qualified by the qualifications of the ‘Universal’, etc. are also separately denoted by words.” The answer to this is that ‘In all cases, etc, etc.’ ‘In all cases’ i.e. even in the case of words denoting the Universal, etc.

etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā [p.370] yadṛcchāśabdeṣu prayujyamāneṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate, evaṃ jātyādiśabdeṣu gaurityādiṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ityetat sarvatra granthe yojanīyamiti //

What is meant is as follows: Just as when Proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object qualified by the Namne, so also in the case of words expressive of the Universal, etc., like ‘Cow’ what is denoted is the object qualified by that Name; similarly in all cases [what is denoted is an object qualified by, connected with, a name].

kathaṃ tarhi jātyā guṇena kriyayā dravyeṇa vetyetadaparaṃ tṛtīyāntaṃ yojanīyam ity āha tair ityādi /

Question: “In that case, how are we to construe the Instrumental in the words ‘jātyā’, ‘guṇena’ etc. (by the Universal, by the Quality)?” Answer: [see verse 1225 next]

taistu karaṇavibhaktyā sāphalyamanubhūyate /

It is through these that the instrumental ending becomes useful;

nāmno jātyādibhiḥ seyam ityartho 'dhyavatiṣṭhate // jātyā karaṇabhūtayā nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur iti, tathā guṇādibhiḥ ityevaṃ tair jātyādibhiḥ karaṇavibhaktyā sambandhātsāphalyamanubhūyate /

so that the meaning comes to be that the conceptual content becomes connected with the name, through the instrumentality of the universal, etc. The particular thing spoken as ‘Cow’ is that which is connected with that Name through the Instrumentality of the Universal; similarly, through the instrumentality of the Quality, etc. It is in this sense that the Universal, etc. become the Instrument (of Connection), and thus the Instrumental Ending becomes useful.