buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tataś ca yadi bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi buddhīnāṃ sakṛdbhāvabhrāntirāśūtpattibalād upajāyate, tadā latā tālaḥ saro rasa ityevamādāveikaikajñānavyavadhānād varṇaśrutīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvartanam astīti sakṛdvarṇapratibhāsaḥprāpnoti /	[All this goes on simultaneously.] Thus even when there are so many intervening factors, among the several cognitions, there appears the illusion that all these appear at one and the same time, this illusion being due to the quick succession in which the cognitions appear; such being the case even when there are several intervening factors, it becomes all the more possible that there should he the notion of the letters being pronounced at one and the same time, in cases where two words like ‘latā’ and ‘tāla’, or ‘saraḥ’ and ‘rasaḥ’ are pronounced, where the utterance of the syllables is so much quicker;
tataś ca saro rasa ityādau śabde śrūyamāṇe śrutibhedo 'rthapratītibhedaś ca na syāt /	so that in the case of such utterances as ‘saraḥ-rasaḥ’, when the words are heard, there should be no recognition of the two different words or the two different things denoted by them.
kinca buddher vijātīyacakṣurādivijñānāvyavahite nānāvidyārthacintārūpe vikalpe samutpadyamāne śīghravṛttir astīti na kramavyavasāyaḥ prāpnoti /	Further, in a case where there is Conceptual Content in the form of pondering over several philosophical and literary problems, which ponderings are not interrupted by heterogeneous sensations through the Eye, etc., the appearance of the ideas is extremely quick;
sarvāsāṃ ca buddhīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvena cirānavasthānād āśuvṛttirastīti kasyacid arthasya na kramavatī pratītiḥ syāt /	and hence it would not be possible to form any idea of succession in them. And as all Cognitions are momentary, and cannot continue for any length of time they always appear quickly; so that the cognition of nothing could be successive at all;
śabdādibodhavad iti /	‘just as in the case of the perception of sound, etc.’;
nartakīprekṣāvasthāyāṃ śabdādisaṃvedanavat //	i.e. just as in the case of the perception of sound, taste, etc. while seeing the girl dancing.
alāte 'pi sakṛdbhrāntiścakrābhāsā pravartate /	In the case of the whirling fire-brand, the illusion of simultaneity appears in the form of the circle;
na dṛśāṃ pratisandhānād vispaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanāt //	this notion of the circle is not due to the connecting of the various perceptions of the fire-brand as it is whirled round;
tathā hi pratisandhānaṃ smṛtyaiva kriyate natu / darśanena vyatītasya viṣayasyānavagrahāt //	because the (continuous) circular form is clearly perceived. In fact, the said connecting of the various perceptions could be done only by remembrance, not by direct perception;
yaścāsyā viṣayo nāsau vinaṣṭatvāt parisphuṭaḥ /	as no perception can apprehend what is past and gone. The object also of the remembrance could not be very clear, as it has already disappeared;
tataḥ parisphuṭo nāyaṃ cakrābhāsaḥ prasajyate //	for this same reason, the appearance of the circle also could not be very clear (if it were due to the remembrance of the many cognitions).
yato neyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ kramavartinī darśanāni ghaṭayantī samupajāyatekiṃ tarhisakṛdekaivendriyajā cakrākārā bhrāntiḥ sāmagrīviśeṣabalād utpadyate, vispaṣṭapratibhāsatvāt /	this is shown in the following [see verses 1254-1256 above] When this mental illusion appears, it does not appear as combining the several visual perceptions (of the Fire-brand); it appears only as the Sense-born single perception of the Circular form, through the force of certain accessory circumstances; that this is so is clear from the fact that the perception is quite clear;
nahi vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭapratibhāsitvaṃ yuktam /	and it would not be so clear if it were accompanied by the Conceptual Content.
tathā hi ghaṭanā [p.377] kriyamāṇā spṛtyaiva kriyate, nendriyajñānena, tasya vastusannidhānabalabhāvino 'tītārthagrahaṇasāmarthyāt /	Because such combination of perceptions could be done only by Remembrance, not by Sense-born Perception; as the latter functions only when the object perceived is close by, and hence it could not apprehend what is past and gone.
yaścāsyāḥ smṛter viṣayo nāsau parisphuṭaḥ, kasmāt---, vinaṣṭatvāt /	The object too of such a Remembrance could not be clear; why? because it will have already disappeared.
tasmād aspaṣṭābhatvaprasaṅgānneyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ / kiṃ tarhi---, indriyajā, iti sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ //1254- evaṃ pratyakṣato dhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaṃ pratipādya sāmpratamanumānataḥ pratipādayati yadi cetyādi /	Hence, as the perception of the Whirling Fire-brand, if it were an, illusion, would be indistinct, it cannot be an illusion; in fact, it is a sense-born regular Perception. Thus the Instance cited by the Opponent is devoid of the character sought to be proved.
yadi cāpyasya bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam / na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate budhaiḥ //	Or again, when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing in that form is not admitted as real, by the wise.
avidyamānasāsnādir yathā karko gavātmanā /	For instance, the white horse is not admitted to be the cow because the dewlap and the other features of the cow are not present in the horse.
viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthaṃ grahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate // savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe nibandhanam /	In the case of sense-perception there is no reason for the presence of the determinate character (the character of being associated with conceptual content), which could bring about the apprehension of the thing along with its properties.
vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādiranyathātiprasajyate //	Spotted and other cows are instances to the contrary.
nacāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ / bhedena cāparicchedān nacāstyevaṃ viśeṣaṇam //	The reason adduced cannot be said to be ‘unproven’ (or not-admitted); as the universal and other qualifying factors have all been rejected. Nor are the properties cognised as apart from those factors.
prayogaḥ yasya yadrūpaṃ vyavasthitau nimittaṃ nāsti na tat tathā prekṣāvadbhir vyavahartṛbhir vyavasthāpyate, tadyathā avidyamānagoprajñaptinimittabhūtakakudādisamudāyaḥ karko gotvena / nāsti ca pratyakṣasya nīlādyasādhāraṇaviṣayabalenotpadyamānasya savikalpakabhāvavyavasthitau viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam iti karaṇānupalabdhiḥ /	The argument may be thus formulated: When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form; for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the ‘cow-idea’, in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse; in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object Blue, the basis for its being regarded as associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its properties, is absent; and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause [the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there].
vaidharmyeṇa śābaleyabāhuleyādayaḥ /	The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance per contra.
sarvathā sarvasya vyavasthānaprasaṅgo vyavasthāpayituścāprekṣāpūrvakāritāprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti saṃkṣepārthaḥ /	Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid. Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.
karkaḥ śuklo 'śvaḥ /	‘Karka’ is white Horse.
jātyāder iti / viśeṣasyeti śeṣaḥ /	‘Universal, etc.’ i.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists).
santu nāma vastubhūtā jātyādayas tathāpi nāsiddhateti darśayann āha	Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not ‘Unproven’; this is what is meant by the words ‘Nor is the thing, etc.’;
viśeṣyatvenābhimatād rūpāder ityadhyāhāryam /	i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).
yadi nāma bhedenāparicchedo jātas tathāpi viśeṣaṇaṃ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cāstyevam iti / bhedenāparicchinnam /	Question: “If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor?” Answer: ‘Nor are there any such Properties’ i.e. as differentiated from the thing.
tasmād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣitārthagrahaṇaṃ na vidyata ityasya hetor nāsiddhatā //	From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’.
nāmāpi vācakaṃ naiva yacchabdasya svalakṣaṇam /	The name also, which would be the ‘specific individuality’ of the word, can never be denotative;
svalakṣaṇasya vācyatvavācakatve hi dūṣite // adhyāropitamevāto vācyavācakamiṣyate /	as the idea of the ‘specific individuality’ being the denotes or the denoted has been already rejected. It is for this reason that the idea of the denoter and denoted has been regarded as something superimposed (upon things);
anāropitam arthaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate //	while what one apprehends by sense-perception is something which is not superimposed;
svalakṣaṇasya sadbhāve sadbhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ / vyavadhānādi bhāve ca tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ //	because this perception is there only when the ‘specific individuality’ is there, and it is not there when the specific individuality is not there through the intervention of something else or some such reason.
nahi svalakṣaṇe saṅketaḥ, nāpi śabdasvalakṣaṇe, tayor vyavahārakāle 'nanvayāt /	It might be argued that “There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property.”
naca svalakṣaṇavyatirekeṇānyacchabdasvarūpam asti /	There can be no Convention in regard to the ‘Specific Individuality’, not even to the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the Word;
nacāsaṅketito 'rthaḥ śabdena yojyate 'tiprasaṅgāt / nāpi śabdayojanam antareṇa vikalpaḥ /	and apart from its ‘Specific Individuality’, there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention;
tasmād adhyāropita eva vācyavācakabhāvo na pāramārthikaḥ / syād etad āropitam evārthaṃ tarhi pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyamānaṃ savikalpakaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha anāropitam ityādi /	if it did, it would lead to absurdities nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words; from all this it follows that the whole idea of the Denoter and Denoted is something ‘superimposed’ imaginary not real. It might be argued that “even so, the Perception shall become associated with Conceptual Content (Determinate) through apprehending the ‘superimposed’ thing.”
tadabhāvata iti /	The answer is that ‘what one apprehends, etc. etc.’
tasya svalakṣaṇasyābhāvāt tasyāpi pratyakṣasya vyatirekato 'bhāvād iti yāvat /	‘When it is not there’, i.e. through its absence, the word ‘vyatirekataḥ’ being construed here; the sense being that ‘it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)
kadā svalakṣaṇasyābhāva ity āha vyavadhānādīti /	Question: “When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?”
ādiśabdena deśakālaviprakarṣādiḥ //	Answer: ‘Through the intervention, etc. etc.’ The term ‘some such reason’ stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.
aśakyasamaya ityādinā pramāṇāntaram apyāha	The following Text adduces another proof for the same: [see verse 1264 next]
aśakyasamayo hyātmā nīlādīnām ananyabhāk /	The nature of the blue and other things, being individually specific, is incapable of having any convention in regard to it;
teṣām ataś ca saṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī //	the perception of these things, therefore, cannot be associated with words.
nīlādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ, aśakyasamayaḥ aśakyasaṅketaḥ / katham iti praśne kāraṇam āha ananyabhāgiti /	The nature essence of the Blue and other things is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them. The question being “why is it so?”, the answer is ‘being individually specific’;
ananyabhāk asādhāraṇaḥ /	that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage;
vyavahārārthatvāt samayasyeti nātra śabdasaṅketaḥ /	and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.
kiñca viṣayīkṛte cāyaṃ samayo bhavati nāviṣayīkṛte, na tāvad anutpannaṃ	Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised, not while it remains uncognised, unknown;
pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmānaṃ viṣayīkaroti, utpannaṃ cābhilāpamādāya yojayet/	and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words;
utpattikāle 'bhilāpagrahaṇakāle ca kṣaṇikatvān na viṣayeṇāpi pratyakṣaṃ viṣayīti kena kutra yojanam ityato 'pyaśakyasamayo nīlādīnām ātmā /	but at the time that the Perception actually appears, and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression, the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated? From all this it is clear that the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.
teṣām iti nīlādīnām /	‘Of these’ i.e. of the Blue and other things.
nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇīti / nāviṣṭābhilāpā /	‘Cannot he associated, etc. etc.’ i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.
tatra prayogaḥ yadyatrāgṛhītasamarthaṃ na tat tatra savikalpakaṃ bhavati, tadyathā cakṣur vijñānaṃ gandhe, agṛhītasamayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmanīti vyāpakaviruddhopalambhaḥ //	The argument may be formulated thus: When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it, there can be no ‘determinate’ Perception of it, e.g. the Visual Perception of Odour; and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it, hence the idea of the Perception being ‘determinate’ would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.
nanu nāmādiktaṃ mābhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam /	“Name (universal) and the rest may not be the distinguishing properties perceived, in the object (op sense-perception);
tathāpyasiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate yataḥ //	even so, the reason put forward does not cease to be inadmissible;
arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / arthamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghaṭe yathā //	because if there is no apprehension of the thing as distinguished from other things, then, there would either be an apprehension of the thing by itself only, or no apprehension at all;
ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / ghaṭamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghatasya vai //	as in the case of the jar, if there is no apprehension of the jar as distinguished from other jars, then there is either apprehension of the jar by itself alone, or no apprehension of the jar at all.” (1265-1267)
sa hi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenobhayarūpaṃ sarvaṃ vastu varṇayati / sāmānyaṃ ca dvirūpam / viśeṣeṇāvicchinnaṃ yathā gotvādi, anavacchinnaṃ yathā sattāvastutvādi / tatra yadanavacchinnam ekarūpaṃ tadālocanāmātrasya nirvikalpakapratyakṣasya gocaraḥ /	Sumati describes all things as existing in two forms the Universal and the Particular; the Universal again is of two kinds one determined by the Particular, e.g. the ‘Cow’, and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g. ‘Being’, ‘Entity’, That Universal which exists only in the undetermined (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to non-conceptual Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere observation, purely subjective Ideation;
itaratpunaḥ savikalpakasyetyeṣā tasya prakriyā /	while the other i.e. the Universal determined by particulars is amenable to Conceptual Perception.
kumārilastu ālocanājñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ vyaktisvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ varṇayati /	Kumārila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the particular (or Individual);
sāmānyaviṣayaṃ tu savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam /	and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the ‘Universal
tatra sumatiḥ kumārilādyabhimatālocanāmātrapratyakṣavicāraṇārthamāha /	Sumati, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely subjective Ideation as posited by Kumārila and others, has argued thus “One who holds this view should be asked the following question.
tadvādīdaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ / kiṃ tadindriyasya puraḥsthitamarthamātraṃ svena rūpeṇārthāntarāsambhavināviśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyateneti /	In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? Or is it not so apprehended? If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows: If there is non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished from other things;
atrocyate arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi vivakṣitādarthādyadarthāntaraṃ, tato vyavacchinnam tatrāvidyamānaṃ vivakṣitārthastham rūpaṃsvabhāvaḥ , tena viśiṣṭasya yadi tasyārthasyāgrahaṇam iṣyate, tadā tadarthamātragraho vā syāt yat tadarthamātram arthāntarāsambhavi svabhāvarahitaṃ tasyaiva grahaṇaṃ syāt /	that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing, i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing; if there is nonapprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form, then, either there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only, i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things;
atha tadapi na gṛhyate, tadā, agraho vā agrahaṇam eva syāt /	or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all.
ghaṭe yatheti nidarśanam uktaṃ tacchlokāntareṇa vyācaṣṭe ghaṭāntaretyādi /	‘As in the case of the Jar’; this cites an example.
avadhīkṛtaghaṭāsambhavinā rūpeṇa yadi tasya ghaṭasyāgrahaṇaṃ tadā ghaṭamātragraho vā syāt kenacidrājatatāmrādinā viśeṣeṇāviśiṣṭasya ghaṭamātrasya grahaṇaṃ syāt /	This example is explained in the next text (1267): “In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared, then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone, without any qualification as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;
ghaṭamātrasyāpi grahaṇaṃ na bhavati tadā kasyacidapyabhimatasyāpi na grahaṇaṃ syād ityagraho vā ghaṭasya vai /	or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all, not even of the one intended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.
evam atrāpi dārṣṭāntike viśeṣāgrahaṇe 'rthamātragrahaṇaṃ na grahaṇaṃ vā syād ityekāntaḥ //	In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either he apprehension of the thing alone by itself, or there would be no apprehension at all;
atha pūrvakaḥ pakṣaḥ atrāha grāhyāntaretyādi /	[Sumati’s] Pūrvapakṣa (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows: [see verse 1268 next]
grāhyāntaravyavacchinnaṃ bhāvena grāhi cenmatam / savikalpakavijñānaṃ bhaved vṛkṣādibodhavat //	“If perception is regarded as apprehending the thing as distinguished from other apprehensible things, then this cognition would be conceptual (determinate), just like the cognition of the tree and other things.” (1268)
[p.380] yadi paratrāsambhavinā svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhīndriyajñānamabhipretaṃ tadā savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, kenacidrūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhitvāt, vṛkṣoyamityādibodhavat //	“If Sense-perception is intended to be apprehensive of the Thing as characterised (distinguished) by a character not found anywhere else, then it becomes Conceptual; because it apprehends the thing as characterised or qualified by some character; just like the Perception in the form ‘This is a tree’.” (1268)
viśeṣo 'spṛṣṭasāmānyo na ca kaścana vidyate /	“There is no particular (or individual) without a touch of the universal.
grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyate //	if this is not touched in the apprehension, then the particular, becoming devoid of being, cannot be apprehended.” (1269)
atra mātraṃ nāma sāmānyamucyate, yat tat sattetyākhyāyate, tannirapekṣo nakaścid viśeṣo vidyate yo gṛhyeta tatra /	To this Sumati makes the following answer: [see verse 1269 above] “The term ‘mātra’, ‘itself’, in the Opponent’s statements stands for the Universal, that which is called ‘Being’;
etat syāt tvanmatyā yadyapi tadasti sāmānyaṃ, grahaṇakāle tu tan na spṛśyata ity āha grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyata iti /	and absolutely independent of this Universal, there is no Particular (or Individual) which could be apprehended. It might be said ‘Under your view there may be such a Universal, but this is not touched at all at the time of the apprehension’.
grahaṇakāle yadi tat sāmānyaṃ sattākhyaṃ indriyajñānena na spṛśyate, viśeṣamātram eva gṛhyate tadā tadviśeṣamātraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ bhāvarahitaṃ sattākhyasvabhāvaravikalaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ prāptam iti nendriyajñānagrāhyaṃ syāt, vibhāvatvāt vigatabhāvatvāt /	Our answer to that is If this is not quite char in the apprehension, that is due to its having become devoid of Being; that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal ‘Being’ is not touched by Sense-perception, and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended, then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as ‘Being’;
viyatpuṣpavad iti //	and thus it could become characterless;
viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam /	“The assertion that the cognition apprehends a qualified thing, and yet it is not conceptual implies great temerity indeed!
na viśeṣaṇasambandhād ṛte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ //	certainly, no ‘qualification’ is possible except through connection with qualifications.” (1270)
tasmād viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho 'tha ca kalpanā nāstīti sāhasametad bhavatāṃ pramāṇabādhitamabhyupagacchatāmityupasaṃhāraḥ /	“From all this it follows that your assertion that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great temerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition.”
atraivopapattimāha na viśeṣaṇetyādi / nahi daṇḍasambandhamantareṇa tadvān bhavati, tadvad viśiṣṭo 'pi viśeṣasambandhamantareṇa na yukta iti bhāvaḥ /	“The Reason for this is provided, in the words ‘Certainly no qualification, etc. etc.’ that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick, so a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.
tasmād yadviśeṣaṇasambandhagrahaṇaṃ tat savikalpakam iti /	Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is ‘Conceptual’ (with Conceptual Content).
prayogaḥ vivādasapadībhūtaṃ viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt, paṭo 'yam ityādijñānavad iti //	“The argument may be formulated as follows: The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual, because it apprehends a qualified thing, like the cognition ‘This is a piece of Cloth’.” (1270)
sajātīyetyādinā pratividhatte	The following Text proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati: [see verse 1271 next]
sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttārthagrahān mataḥ / viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho na viśeṣaṇasaṅgate //	When the cognition is held to apprehend the qualified thing, it is by reason of its apprehending the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and not of the connection of qualifications.
yadatra yadi vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhāt{iti} viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, tadā na siddho hetuḥ, tathā hi na bauddhasya viśeṣaṇaṃ nāma kiñcidasti /	If what is meant by Sumati’s Reason ‘because it apprehends the qualified thing’ is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct from itself, then it is ‘inadmissible’; because for the Buddhist, there is no such thing as the ‘qualification’, through connection, with which the cognition would apprehend things along with qualifications;
kathaṃ tarhi viśiṣtatvam asya vaiśiṣṭyamasyetyādi vyapadeśo vyatirekīvetyāha bheda ityādi /	according to the Buddhist, what is apprehended is only the Thing itself as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is by reason of this latter apprehension that the Cognition is said to apprehend the ‘qualified’ thing.
bhedo vaiśiṣṭyamuktaṃ hi na viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ /	What is meant by ‘being qualified’ (distinguished) is ‘difference” not the connection of qualifications.
bhinnam ityapi tadvācā nānuviddhaṃ pratīyate //	but the idea also that ‘this is different’ is not cognised as associated with words.
bhedaḥ sajātīyavijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttiḥ /	‘Difference’ i.e. Differentiation (Preclusion) from homogeneous and heterogeneous things;
sā ca nānyā vyāvṛttād bhāvāt bhāva eva hi bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathocyate /	and this is not anything different from the thing differentiated; it is the thing itself which is spoken of in that form, through, the exclusion of other things, when this exclusion is meant to be emphasised.
syād etat yadi vijātīyasajātīyebhyo bhinnasya vastuno grahaṇaṃ niyamena	The following might be urged “If there is always the apprehension of the Thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things,, then the Apprehension becomes ‘determinate’ (Conceptual);
anyathā kathaṃ tadviṣayaṃ syād yadyanyākārapravṛttaṃ bhavet, nahyanyākārapravṛttaṃ tadviṣayaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgād ityāśaṅkyāha bhinnam ityapi tadityādi //	because it appears in the Verbal form ‘This is different Otherwise how could it apprehend the ‘difference’, if it appeared in any other form? When a certain apprehension appears in one form, it cannot be said to apprehend another; if it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.” The answer to this is ‘But the idea also, etc. etc.’ (1272)
kathaṃ tarhi bhinnam ityabhidhīyata ity āha svabhāvāparetyādi /	Question: “How is it then that it is said to be ‘different’?”
svabhāvāparaniḥśeṣapadārthavyatirekiṇi /	Answer: [see verse 1273 above] ‘Svabhāvāt’ other than its own self.
svabhāvād apare ye niḥśeṣāḥ padārthās tebhyo vyatirekiṇi vyāvṛtte gṛhīte satyasādhāraṇanīlādyākārapratibhāsanāt paścād bhedādhyavasāyī śabdākārānusmṛto bhinnam ityabhilapannutpadyate vikalpaḥ / nacedastvabhilāpasvabhāvaṃ tat saṃsṛṣṭātmatattvaṃ vā, yena bhinnamityabhinnamiti nāmnā saṃyojyagrahaṇe sati gṛhītaṃ syāt /	When the Thing has been apprehended as the negation of as differentiated from all other things, and when the (non-conceptual) perception in the specific form of the Blue has appeared, then there follows the Conceptual Content associated with the words ‘it is different’, If this were not so. then it would be something of the nature of purely verbal expression, or the essence of the thing as associated with the verbal expression, through which the thing could be associated with the name ‘different’ or ‘non-different’, and apprehended as such.
tasmād asiddha eva hetuḥ //	From all this it follows that our Reason is not ‘inadmissible’.
atha vyāvṛttivaśād viśiṣṭa iti kṛtvā viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, nārthāntaraviśeṣaṇasambandhāt / tadāpi svato naikāntiko hetur iti darśayann āha viśeṣaṇetyādi / viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ paraiḥ sāmānyamiṣyate /	In case the Reason adduced by the Opponent ‘because it apprehends -a qualified thing’ is based on the idea that through ‘negation’ (differentiation) itself the thing becomes qualified, even though it be not qualified in the sense of being connected with a qualification in the shape of some other thing, even so our Reason cannot become ‘Inconclusive’, This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1274 above]

tataś ca yadi bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi buddhīnāṃ sakṛdbhāvabhrāntirāśūtpattibalād upajāyate, tadā latā tālaḥ saro rasa ityevamādāveikaikajñānavyavadhānād varṇaśrutīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvartanam astīti sakṛdvarṇapratibhāsaḥprāpnoti /

[All this goes on simultaneously.] Thus even when there are so many intervening factors, among the several cognitions, there appears the illusion that all these appear at one and the same time, this illusion being due to the quick succession in which the cognitions appear; such being the case even when there are several intervening factors, it becomes all the more possible that there should he the notion of the letters being pronounced at one and the same time, in cases where two words like ‘latā’ and ‘tāla’, or ‘saraḥ’ and ‘rasaḥ’ are pronounced, where the utterance of the syllables is so much quicker;

tataś ca saro rasa ityādau śabde śrūyamāṇe śrutibhedo 'rthapratītibhedaś ca na syāt /

so that in the case of such utterances as ‘saraḥ-rasaḥ’, when the words are heard, there should be no recognition of the two different words or the two different things denoted by them.

kinca buddher vijātīyacakṣurādivijñānāvyavahite nānāvidyārthacintārūpe vikalpe samutpadyamāne śīghravṛttir astīti na kramavyavasāyaḥ prāpnoti /

Further, in a case where there is Conceptual Content in the form of pondering over several philosophical and literary problems, which ponderings are not interrupted by heterogeneous sensations through the Eye, etc., the appearance of the ideas is extremely quick;

sarvāsāṃ ca buddhīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvena cirānavasthānād āśuvṛttirastīti kasyacid arthasya na kramavatī pratītiḥ syāt /

and hence it would not be possible to form any idea of succession in them. And as all Cognitions are momentary, and cannot continue for any length of time they always appear quickly; so that the cognition of nothing could be successive at all;

śabdādibodhavad iti /

‘just as in the case of the perception of sound, etc.’;

nartakīprekṣāvasthāyāṃ śabdādisaṃvedanavat //

i.e. just as in the case of the perception of sound, taste, etc. while seeing the girl dancing.

alāte 'pi sakṛdbhrāntiścakrābhāsā pravartate /

In the case of the whirling fire-brand, the illusion of simultaneity appears in the form of the circle;

na dṛśāṃ pratisandhānād vispaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanāt //

this notion of the circle is not due to the connecting of the various perceptions of the fire-brand as it is whirled round;

tathā hi pratisandhānaṃ smṛtyaiva kriyate natu / darśanena vyatītasya viṣayasyānavagrahāt //

because the (continuous) circular form is clearly perceived. In fact, the said connecting of the various perceptions could be done only by remembrance, not by direct perception;

yaścāsyā viṣayo nāsau vinaṣṭatvāt parisphuṭaḥ /

as no perception can apprehend what is past and gone. The object also of the remembrance could not be very clear, as it has already disappeared;

tataḥ parisphuṭo nāyaṃ cakrābhāsaḥ prasajyate //

for this same reason, the appearance of the circle also could not be very clear (if it were due to the remembrance of the many cognitions).

yato neyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ kramavartinī darśanāni ghaṭayantī samupajāyatekiṃ tarhisakṛdekaivendriyajā cakrākārā bhrāntiḥ sāmagrīviśeṣabalād utpadyate, vispaṣṭapratibhāsatvāt /

this is shown in the following [see verses 1254-1256 above] When this mental illusion appears, it does not appear as combining the several visual perceptions (of the Fire-brand); it appears only as the Sense-born single perception of the Circular form, through the force of certain accessory circumstances; that this is so is clear from the fact that the perception is quite clear;

nahi vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭapratibhāsitvaṃ yuktam /

and it would not be so clear if it were accompanied by the Conceptual Content.

tathā hi ghaṭanā [p.377] kriyamāṇā spṛtyaiva kriyate, nendriyajñānena, tasya vastusannidhānabalabhāvino 'tītārthagrahaṇasāmarthyāt /

Because such combination of perceptions could be done only by Remembrance, not by Sense-born Perception; as the latter functions only when the object perceived is close by, and hence it could not apprehend what is past and gone.

yaścāsyāḥ smṛter viṣayo nāsau parisphuṭaḥ, kasmāt---, vinaṣṭatvāt /

The object too of such a Remembrance could not be clear; why? because it will have already disappeared.

tasmād aspaṣṭābhatvaprasaṅgānneyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ / kiṃ tarhi---, indriyajā, iti sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ //1254- evaṃ pratyakṣato dhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaṃ pratipādya sāmpratamanumānataḥ pratipādayati yadi cetyādi /

Hence, as the perception of the Whirling Fire-brand, if it were an, illusion, would be indistinct, it cannot be an illusion; in fact, it is a sense-born regular Perception. Thus the Instance cited by the Opponent is devoid of the character sought to be proved.

yadi cāpyasya bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam / na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate budhaiḥ //

Or again, when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing in that form is not admitted as real, by the wise.

avidyamānasāsnādir yathā karko gavātmanā /

For instance, the white horse is not admitted to be the cow because the dewlap and the other features of the cow are not present in the horse.

viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthaṃ grahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate // savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe nibandhanam /

In the case of sense-perception there is no reason for the presence of the determinate character (the character of being associated with conceptual content), which could bring about the apprehension of the thing along with its properties.

vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādiranyathātiprasajyate //

Spotted and other cows are instances to the contrary.

nacāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ / bhedena cāparicchedān nacāstyevaṃ viśeṣaṇam //

The reason adduced cannot be said to be ‘unproven’ (or not-admitted); as the universal and other qualifying factors have all been rejected. Nor are the properties cognised as apart from those factors.

prayogaḥ yasya yadrūpaṃ vyavasthitau nimittaṃ nāsti na tat tathā prekṣāvadbhir vyavahartṛbhir vyavasthāpyate, tadyathā avidyamānagoprajñaptinimittabhūtakakudādisamudāyaḥ karko gotvena / nāsti ca pratyakṣasya nīlādyasādhāraṇaviṣayabalenotpadyamānasya savikalpakabhāvavyavasthitau viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam iti karaṇānupalabdhiḥ /

The argument may be thus formulated: When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form; for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the ‘cow-idea’, in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse; in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object Blue, the basis for its being regarded as associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its properties, is absent; and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause [the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there].

vaidharmyeṇa śābaleyabāhuleyādayaḥ /

The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance per contra.

sarvathā sarvasya vyavasthānaprasaṅgo vyavasthāpayituścāprekṣāpūrvakāritāprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti saṃkṣepārthaḥ /

Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid. Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.

karkaḥ śuklo 'śvaḥ /

‘Karka’ is white Horse.

jātyāder iti / viśeṣasyeti śeṣaḥ /

‘Universal, etc.’ i.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists).

santu nāma vastubhūtā jātyādayas tathāpi nāsiddhateti darśayann āha

Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not ‘Unproven’; this is what is meant by the words ‘Nor is the thing, etc.’;

viśeṣyatvenābhimatād rūpāder ityadhyāhāryam /

i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).

yadi nāma bhedenāparicchedo jātas tathāpi viśeṣaṇaṃ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cāstyevam iti / bhedenāparicchinnam /

Question: “If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor?” Answer: ‘Nor are there any such Properties’ i.e. as differentiated from the thing.

tasmād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣitārthagrahaṇaṃ na vidyata ityasya hetor nāsiddhatā //

From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’.

nāmāpi vācakaṃ naiva yacchabdasya svalakṣaṇam /

The name also, which would be the ‘specific individuality’ of the word, can never be denotative;

svalakṣaṇasya vācyatvavācakatve hi dūṣite // adhyāropitamevāto vācyavācakamiṣyate /

as the idea of the ‘specific individuality’ being the denotes or the denoted has been already rejected. It is for this reason that the idea of the denoter and denoted has been regarded as something superimposed (upon things);

anāropitam arthaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate //

while what one apprehends by sense-perception is something which is not superimposed;

svalakṣaṇasya sadbhāve sadbhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ / vyavadhānādi bhāve ca tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ //

because this perception is there only when the ‘specific individuality’ is there, and it is not there when the specific individuality is not there through the intervention of something else or some such reason.

nahi svalakṣaṇe saṅketaḥ, nāpi śabdasvalakṣaṇe, tayor vyavahārakāle 'nanvayāt /

It might be argued that “There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property.”

naca svalakṣaṇavyatirekeṇānyacchabdasvarūpam asti /

There can be no Convention in regard to the ‘Specific Individuality’, not even to the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the Word;

nacāsaṅketito 'rthaḥ śabdena yojyate 'tiprasaṅgāt / nāpi śabdayojanam antareṇa vikalpaḥ /

and apart from its ‘Specific Individuality’, there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention;

tasmād adhyāropita eva vācyavācakabhāvo na pāramārthikaḥ / syād etad āropitam evārthaṃ tarhi pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyamānaṃ savikalpakaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha anāropitam ityādi /

if it did, it would lead to absurdities nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words; from all this it follows that the whole idea of the Denoter and Denoted is something ‘superimposed’ imaginary not real. It might be argued that “even so, the Perception shall become associated with Conceptual Content (Determinate) through apprehending the ‘superimposed’ thing.”

tadabhāvata iti /

The answer is that ‘what one apprehends, etc. etc.’

tasya svalakṣaṇasyābhāvāt tasyāpi pratyakṣasya vyatirekato 'bhāvād iti yāvat /

‘When it is not there’, i.e. through its absence, the word ‘vyatirekataḥ’ being construed here; the sense being that ‘it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)

kadā svalakṣaṇasyābhāva ity āha vyavadhānādīti /

Question: “When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?”

ādiśabdena deśakālaviprakarṣādiḥ //

Answer: ‘Through the intervention, etc. etc.’ The term ‘some such reason’ stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.

aśakyasamaya ityādinā pramāṇāntaram apyāha

The following Text adduces another proof for the same: [see verse 1264 next]

aśakyasamayo hyātmā nīlādīnām ananyabhāk /

The nature of the blue and other things, being individually specific, is incapable of having any convention in regard to it;

teṣām ataś ca saṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī //

the perception of these things, therefore, cannot be associated with words.

nīlādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ, aśakyasamayaḥ aśakyasaṅketaḥ / katham iti praśne kāraṇam āha ananyabhāgiti /

The nature essence of the Blue and other things is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them. The question being “why is it so?”, the answer is ‘being individually specific’;

ananyabhāk asādhāraṇaḥ /

that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage;

vyavahārārthatvāt samayasyeti nātra śabdasaṅketaḥ /

and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.

kiñca viṣayīkṛte cāyaṃ samayo bhavati nāviṣayīkṛte, na tāvad anutpannaṃ

Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised, not while it remains uncognised, unknown;

pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmānaṃ viṣayīkaroti, utpannaṃ cābhilāpamādāya yojayet/

and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words;

utpattikāle 'bhilāpagrahaṇakāle ca kṣaṇikatvān na viṣayeṇāpi pratyakṣaṃ viṣayīti kena kutra yojanam ityato 'pyaśakyasamayo nīlādīnām ātmā /

but at the time that the Perception actually appears, and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression, the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated? From all this it is clear that the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.

teṣām iti nīlādīnām /

‘Of these’ i.e. of the Blue and other things.

nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇīti / nāviṣṭābhilāpā /

‘Cannot he associated, etc. etc.’ i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.

tatra prayogaḥ yadyatrāgṛhītasamarthaṃ na tat tatra savikalpakaṃ bhavati, tadyathā cakṣur vijñānaṃ gandhe, agṛhītasamayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmanīti vyāpakaviruddhopalambhaḥ //

The argument may be formulated thus: When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it, there can be no ‘determinate’ Perception of it, e.g. the Visual Perception of Odour; and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it, hence the idea of the Perception being ‘determinate’ would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.

nanu nāmādiktaṃ mābhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam /

“Name (universal) and the rest may not be the distinguishing properties perceived, in the object (op sense-perception);

tathāpyasiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate yataḥ //

even so, the reason put forward does not cease to be inadmissible;

arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / arthamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghaṭe yathā //

because if there is no apprehension of the thing as distinguished from other things, then, there would either be an apprehension of the thing by itself only, or no apprehension at all;

ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / ghaṭamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghatasya vai //

as in the case of the jar, if there is no apprehension of the jar as distinguished from other jars, then there is either apprehension of the jar by itself alone, or no apprehension of the jar at all.” (1265-1267)

sa hi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenobhayarūpaṃ sarvaṃ vastu varṇayati / sāmānyaṃ ca dvirūpam / viśeṣeṇāvicchinnaṃ yathā gotvādi, anavacchinnaṃ yathā sattāvastutvādi / tatra yadanavacchinnam ekarūpaṃ tadālocanāmātrasya nirvikalpakapratyakṣasya gocaraḥ /

Sumati describes all things as existing in two forms the Universal and the Particular; the Universal again is of two kinds one determined by the Particular, e.g. the ‘Cow’, and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g. ‘Being’, ‘Entity’, That Universal which exists only in the undetermined (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to non-conceptual Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere observation, purely subjective Ideation;

itaratpunaḥ savikalpakasyetyeṣā tasya prakriyā /

while the other i.e. the Universal determined by particulars is amenable to Conceptual Perception.

kumārilastu ālocanājñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ vyaktisvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ varṇayati /

Kumārila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the particular (or Individual);

sāmānyaviṣayaṃ tu savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam /

and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the ‘Universal

tatra sumatiḥ kumārilādyabhimatālocanāmātrapratyakṣavicāraṇārthamāha /

Sumati, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely subjective Ideation as posited by Kumārila and others, has argued thus “One who holds this view should be asked the following question.

tadvādīdaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ / kiṃ tadindriyasya puraḥsthitamarthamātraṃ svena rūpeṇārthāntarāsambhavināviśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyateneti /

In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? Or is it not so apprehended? If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows: If there is non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished from other things;

atrocyate arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi vivakṣitādarthādyadarthāntaraṃ, tato vyavacchinnam tatrāvidyamānaṃ vivakṣitārthastham rūpaṃsvabhāvaḥ , tena viśiṣṭasya yadi tasyārthasyāgrahaṇam iṣyate, tadā tadarthamātragraho vā syāt yat tadarthamātram arthāntarāsambhavi svabhāvarahitaṃ tasyaiva grahaṇaṃ syāt /

that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing, i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing; if there is nonapprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form, then, either there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only, i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things;

atha tadapi na gṛhyate, tadā, agraho vā agrahaṇam eva syāt /

or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all.

ghaṭe yatheti nidarśanam uktaṃ tacchlokāntareṇa vyācaṣṭe ghaṭāntaretyādi /

‘As in the case of the Jar’; this cites an example.

avadhīkṛtaghaṭāsambhavinā rūpeṇa yadi tasya ghaṭasyāgrahaṇaṃ tadā ghaṭamātragraho vā syāt kenacidrājatatāmrādinā viśeṣeṇāviśiṣṭasya ghaṭamātrasya grahaṇaṃ syāt /

This example is explained in the next text (1267): “In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared, then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone, without any qualification as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;

ghaṭamātrasyāpi grahaṇaṃ na bhavati tadā kasyacidapyabhimatasyāpi na grahaṇaṃ syād ityagraho vā ghaṭasya vai /

or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all, not even of the one intended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.

evam atrāpi dārṣṭāntike viśeṣāgrahaṇe 'rthamātragrahaṇaṃ na grahaṇaṃ vā syād ityekāntaḥ //

In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either he apprehension of the thing alone by itself, or there would be no apprehension at all;

atha pūrvakaḥ pakṣaḥ atrāha grāhyāntaretyādi /

[Sumati’s] Pūrvapakṣa (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows: [see verse 1268 next]

grāhyāntaravyavacchinnaṃ bhāvena grāhi cenmatam / savikalpakavijñānaṃ bhaved vṛkṣādibodhavat //

“If perception is regarded as apprehending the thing as distinguished from other apprehensible things, then this cognition would be conceptual (determinate), just like the cognition of the tree and other things.” (1268)

[p.380] yadi paratrāsambhavinā svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhīndriyajñānamabhipretaṃ tadā savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, kenacidrūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhitvāt, vṛkṣoyamityādibodhavat //

“If Sense-perception is intended to be apprehensive of the Thing as characterised (distinguished) by a character not found anywhere else, then it becomes Conceptual; because it apprehends the thing as characterised or qualified by some character; just like the Perception in the form ‘This is a tree’.” (1268)

viśeṣo 'spṛṣṭasāmānyo na ca kaścana vidyate /

“There is no particular (or individual) without a touch of the universal.

grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyate //

if this is not touched in the apprehension, then the particular, becoming devoid of being, cannot be apprehended.” (1269)

atra mātraṃ nāma sāmānyamucyate, yat tat sattetyākhyāyate, tannirapekṣo nakaścid viśeṣo vidyate yo gṛhyeta tatra /

To this Sumati makes the following answer: [see verse 1269 above] “The term ‘mātra’, ‘itself’, in the Opponent’s statements stands for the Universal, that which is called ‘Being’;

etat syāt tvanmatyā yadyapi tadasti sāmānyaṃ, grahaṇakāle tu tan na spṛśyata ity āha grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyata iti /

and absolutely independent of this Universal, there is no Particular (or Individual) which could be apprehended. It might be said ‘Under your view there may be such a Universal, but this is not touched at all at the time of the apprehension’.

grahaṇakāle yadi tat sāmānyaṃ sattākhyaṃ indriyajñānena na spṛśyate, viśeṣamātram eva gṛhyate tadā tadviśeṣamātraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ bhāvarahitaṃ sattākhyasvabhāvaravikalaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ prāptam iti nendriyajñānagrāhyaṃ syāt, vibhāvatvāt vigatabhāvatvāt /

Our answer to that is If this is not quite char in the apprehension, that is due to its having become devoid of Being; that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal ‘Being’ is not touched by Sense-perception, and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended, then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as ‘Being’;

viyatpuṣpavad iti //

and thus it could become characterless;

viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam /

“The assertion that the cognition apprehends a qualified thing, and yet it is not conceptual implies great temerity indeed!

na viśeṣaṇasambandhād ṛte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ //

certainly, no ‘qualification’ is possible except through connection with qualifications.” (1270)

tasmād viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho 'tha ca kalpanā nāstīti sāhasametad bhavatāṃ pramāṇabādhitamabhyupagacchatāmityupasaṃhāraḥ /

“From all this it follows that your assertion that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great temerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition.”

atraivopapattimāha na viśeṣaṇetyādi / nahi daṇḍasambandhamantareṇa tadvān bhavati, tadvad viśiṣṭo 'pi viśeṣasambandhamantareṇa na yukta iti bhāvaḥ /

“The Reason for this is provided, in the words ‘Certainly no qualification, etc. etc.’ that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick, so a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.

tasmād yadviśeṣaṇasambandhagrahaṇaṃ tat savikalpakam iti /

Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is ‘Conceptual’ (with Conceptual Content).

prayogaḥ vivādasapadībhūtaṃ viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt, paṭo 'yam ityādijñānavad iti //

“The argument may be formulated as follows: The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual, because it apprehends a qualified thing, like the cognition ‘This is a piece of Cloth’.” (1270)

sajātīyetyādinā pratividhatte

The following Text proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati: [see verse 1271 next]

sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttārthagrahān mataḥ / viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho na viśeṣaṇasaṅgate //

When the cognition is held to apprehend the qualified thing, it is by reason of its apprehending the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and not of the connection of qualifications.

yadatra yadi vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhāt{iti} viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, tadā na siddho hetuḥ, tathā hi na bauddhasya viśeṣaṇaṃ nāma kiñcidasti /

If what is meant by Sumati’s Reason ‘because it apprehends the qualified thing’ is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct from itself, then it is ‘inadmissible’; because for the Buddhist, there is no such thing as the ‘qualification’, through connection, with which the cognition would apprehend things along with qualifications;

kathaṃ tarhi viśiṣtatvam asya vaiśiṣṭyamasyetyādi vyapadeśo vyatirekīvetyāha bheda ityādi /

according to the Buddhist, what is apprehended is only the Thing itself as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is by reason of this latter apprehension that the Cognition is said to apprehend the ‘qualified’ thing.

bhedo vaiśiṣṭyamuktaṃ hi na viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ /

What is meant by ‘being qualified’ (distinguished) is ‘difference” not the connection of qualifications.

bhinnam ityapi tadvācā nānuviddhaṃ pratīyate //

but the idea also that ‘this is different’ is not cognised as associated with words.

bhedaḥ sajātīyavijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttiḥ /

‘Difference’ i.e. Differentiation (Preclusion) from homogeneous and heterogeneous things;

sā ca nānyā vyāvṛttād bhāvāt bhāva eva hi bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathocyate /

and this is not anything different from the thing differentiated; it is the thing itself which is spoken of in that form, through, the exclusion of other things, when this exclusion is meant to be emphasised.

syād etat yadi vijātīyasajātīyebhyo bhinnasya vastuno grahaṇaṃ niyamena

The following might be urged “If there is always the apprehension of the Thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things,, then the Apprehension becomes ‘determinate’ (Conceptual);

anyathā kathaṃ tadviṣayaṃ syād yadyanyākārapravṛttaṃ bhavet, nahyanyākārapravṛttaṃ tadviṣayaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgād ityāśaṅkyāha bhinnam ityapi tadityādi //

because it appears in the Verbal form ‘This is different Otherwise how could it apprehend the ‘difference’, if it appeared in any other form? When a certain apprehension appears in one form, it cannot be said to apprehend another; if it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.” The answer to this is ‘But the idea also, etc. etc.’ (1272)

kathaṃ tarhi bhinnam ityabhidhīyata ity āha svabhāvāparetyādi /

Question: “How is it then that it is said to be ‘different’?”

svabhāvāparaniḥśeṣapadārthavyatirekiṇi /

Answer: [see verse 1273 above] ‘Svabhāvāt’ other than its own self.

svabhāvād apare ye niḥśeṣāḥ padārthās tebhyo vyatirekiṇi vyāvṛtte gṛhīte satyasādhāraṇanīlādyākārapratibhāsanāt paścād bhedādhyavasāyī śabdākārānusmṛto bhinnam ityabhilapannutpadyate vikalpaḥ / nacedastvabhilāpasvabhāvaṃ tat saṃsṛṣṭātmatattvaṃ vā, yena bhinnamityabhinnamiti nāmnā saṃyojyagrahaṇe sati gṛhītaṃ syāt /

When the Thing has been apprehended as the negation of as differentiated from all other things, and when the (non-conceptual) perception in the specific form of the Blue has appeared, then there follows the Conceptual Content associated with the words ‘it is different’, If this were not so. then it would be something of the nature of purely verbal expression, or the essence of the thing as associated with the verbal expression, through which the thing could be associated with the name ‘different’ or ‘non-different’, and apprehended as such.

tasmād asiddha eva hetuḥ //

From all this it follows that our Reason is not ‘inadmissible’.

atha vyāvṛttivaśād viśiṣṭa iti kṛtvā viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, nārthāntaraviśeṣaṇasambandhāt / tadāpi svato naikāntiko hetur iti darśayann āha viśeṣaṇetyādi / viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ paraiḥ sāmānyamiṣyate /

In case the Reason adduced by the Opponent ‘because it apprehends -a qualified thing’ is based on the idea that through ‘negation’ (differentiation) itself the thing becomes qualified, even though it be not qualified in the sense of being connected with a qualification in the shape of some other thing, even so our Reason cannot become ‘Inconclusive’, This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1274 above]