buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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pratyakṣatā tasya, tathā ca loke vināpyado lakṣaṇataḥ prasiddham, iti //	this is well-known, among people, even without any definition”. (Ślokavārtika Sense-perception, 254).
tadityādinā pratividhatte	What has been urged is not right.
tadayuktaṃ yadi jñānaṃ tat pravṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇe / nāviṣṭābhilāpaṃ taj jātyādigrahaṇe 'pi hi //	if the cognition in question appertains to the specific individuality of the thing, then, even on the apprehension of the universal and other properties, it should remain free from verbal expression.
tathā{cā}vācyamevedaṃ sādhitaṃ prāk svalakṣaṇam /	because it has been proved before that the specific individuality of things cannot be denoted by words;
tasmin vṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ niyataṃ nirvikalpakam //	hence the cognition that rests upon that must be free from conceptual content (and association with words).
jātyādigrahaṇe 'pītyapiśabdo 'bhyupagame / ekadā tāvajjātyādīnāṃ nirastatvān na santyeva ta iti kutas tadgrahaṇe prāmāṇyam, santu nāma tathāpi tadgrahaṇe ālocanājñānavad uttarakālabhāvināṃ jñānāṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvādavikalpataiva jātyādīnāṃ svalakṣaṇadavyatirekasyābhyupagatatvād iti bhāvaḥ /	‘Even on the apprehension, etc.’ The word ‘even’ means’ even granting that the Universal exists In reality, the Universal, etc. having been already rejected, how could there be any validity in the apprehension thereof? Well, granting that they do exist, even so, on their apprehension, the Cognitions that appear subsequently to the initial Pre-cognition, having only the Specific Individuality of Things as their object, must be free from Conceptual Content; just as the Pre-cognition is. Because the Universal and other properties have been held to be not-difîerent from the Specific Individuality.
prayogaḥ yat svalakṣaṇagrāhi tadavika [p.387] lpakaṃ, yathālocanājñānam, svalakṣaṇagrāhi cottarapratyakṣatvenābhimataṃjñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	The argument “may be formulated as follows: That Cognition which apprehends the Specific Individuality must be free from Conceptual Content, like the Pre-cognition; the Cognition that is held to be the subsequent Perception does apprehend the Specific Individuality; so this is a natural reason (proving its non-conceptual character).
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedaṃ, nacānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, yato 'vācyam evedaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti prāganyāpohe prasādhitam /	This argument is only in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum. The Reason cannot be said to be Inconclusive. Because, that the Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words has already been proved in the Chapter dealing with the ‘Exclusion of other Things’ (as forming the denotation of words).
nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt //	Nor is the Reason Contradictory;
jātimātragrahe tu syād ekāntena vibhinnatā /	If the universal alone were apprehended, then the qualification (property) would be something- absolutely distinct;
viśeṣaṇasya naitac ca parair iṣṭaṃ yathoditam //	and this is not what is acceptable to the other party, as asserted (by himself).
ekāntena vibhinnatā viśeṣaṇasyeti /	It might be urged that “The Reason is Inadmissible, as it pertains to the Universal only”.
viśeṣyād iti śeṣaḥ / naitac ca parair iṣṭam iti / ekāntena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor vibhinnatvam /	‘The qualification would be something absolutely distinct’ from the Thing qualified. ‘This is not acceptable to the other party’, i.e. this absolute distinction between the qualification and the qualified.
kathaṃ neṣṭam ity āha yathoditam iti /	“How do you know that it is not acceptable?” Answer: ‘As has been asserted’ i.e. by himself.
kiṃ tadityāha yadītyādi /	Question: “What is it that has been asserted by him?” Answer: [Kumārila says as below] [see verse 1296 next]
yadi hyekāntato bhinnaṃ viśeṣyāt syād viśeṣaṇam / svānurūpāṃ tadā buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayet katham //	“If the qualification were absolutely distinct from the qualified, then how could it bring about in the qualified a cognition in keeping with itself?” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 142].
paryāyeṇa bhedasyāpyabhyupagatatvād ekāntata ity āha /	The term ‘absolutely’ has been added in view of the fact that some sort of indirect distinction is admitted;
tathā hi ---bhinnābhinnasvabhāvā jātyādayas tasyeṣṭā naikāntato bhinnā nāpyabhinnāḥ /	inasmuch as his view is that the Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different.
"buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate /	He has asserted as follows: “As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same;
ekānekatvam iṣṭaṃ vā sattārūpādibhedata" // iti /	what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of ‘Being’ (when they are one) and in the form of ‘Colour’, etc. (when they are diverse)”, (Ślokavārtika, Sense-perception, 158).
punaścoktam "sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" / iti /	He has again asserted that “For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual” (Ślokavārtika, Sense-perception, 141).
paratvam iti / anyatvam /	‘Paratvam’, ‘difference’, here stands for5 other than’.
svānurūpām iti / viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparaktām /	‘In keeping with itself’ i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors;
yato viśeṣaṇoparaktaṃ viśeṣyaṃ grāhayad viśeṣaṇam ucyate, anyathā viśeṣaṇa{tva}syānupapannatvād iti bhāvaḥ /	as the qualification is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor; otherwise, it would not be a qualification at all;
yathoktam "svabuddhyā yena rajyeta viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam" /	as it has been declared that ‘The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition’.
athāpi syāt svasāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvenobhayaviṣayatvāt kevalasvalakṣaṇamātraviṣayatvam asiddham evottareṣāṃ jñānānām ity āha svasāmānyātmanor ityādi / svasāmānyātmanor yuktaṃ jñānaṃ caikaṃ na vedakam /	One and the same cognition cannot comprehend both the specific individuality and the universal; because, if such a cognition were ‘conceptual’, there could be no comprehension of the former, on the other hand, if it were otherwise, there could be no comprehension of the latter. The following might be urged: “As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the Particular as characterised by the Universal;
savikalpānyathābhāve prāktanāparavinna hi //	so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only”.
svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇayor naika jñānaṃ vedakaṃ yuktam /	It is not right that one and the same Cognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.
tathā hi tadekaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ vā syād avikalpakaṃ vā tatra savikalpakabhāve savikalpakatve sati, prāktanasya pūrvoktasya svalakṣaṇasya, vit vedanaṃ, na prāpnoti /	Because, would that Cognition be Conceptual or Non-conceptual? If it were Conceptual, Determinate, then there could be no apprehension of the ‘former’, i.e. the Specific Individuality.
anyathābhāva iti nirvikalpakapakṣe / aparasyeti / sāmānyātmanaḥ, vit vittir na syāt //	If ‘otherwise’, i.e. if it is Non-conceptual, then there could be no apprehension of the ‘latter’ i.e. of the Universal.
[p.388] evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇaviṣayatva itareṣāṃ jñānānām avikalpatā prāpnotīti sādhitam / idānīṃ bhavatu nāma savikalpakatvaṃ tathāpi gṛhītagrāhitvān na teṣāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam iti pratipādayann āha ekāntenetyādi /	It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be ‘Non-conceptual’. The Author now proceeds to show that even granting that the said cognitions are ‘Conceptual’, as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previous Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions: [see verse 1298 above]
ekāntenānyatābhāvāj jātyādyādyena cedgatam /	The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual;
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvāt smārttajñānasamaṃ param //	the Conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended;
tathā hi jātyāder vyaktito naivānyatvam ekānteneṣṭam /	hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).
"sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" /	(At the initial stage), there is only a vague idea of several universals, and there is no definite idea of anything;
tataścādyenaivālocanājñānena jātyādi gṛhītam iti smārttajñānavad adhigatārthādhigantṛtvāt paraṃ jātyādidharmaniścayajñānamapramāṇam eva yuktam iti /	the definite idea comes only later; as this apprehends the thing as differentiated from all impositions (doubts and misconceptions). Just as inference apprehends the object as differentiated from impositions, so also does the (later) definite cognition.” (1299-1300)
tadatra yadi samāropaviṣayavyavacchedena gṛhītam iti hetvarthas tadā hetor asiddhatā, atha yathākathañcid gṛhītatvād iti hetvarthas tadānumānenānekānta iti	[Says the Opponent] “If the Reason adduced here is that “the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions), then it is one that is ‘not-admitted’;
saṃmugdhānekasāmānyarūpeṇādhigame sati /	if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference”.
tathā hi prathamaṃ saṃmugdharūpeṇālocanājñānenādhigataṃ, nahi niścitarūpeṇa, uttarottaras tu niścayaḥ pramāṇaṃ, samāropavyavacchedaviṣayatvād anumānavat /	This is the argument that is set forth in the following [see verses 1299-1300 above] “At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form;
yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte śabdādau dharmiṇi kṛtakatvādinānityatvaniścayo bhavan pramāṇaṃ bhavati, tathā samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścayo bhaviṣyati /	the well-defined cognition comes only later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impo_ sitîons, like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a product, the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal;
tathā hi bhavatāmātrāvivādaḥ samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścaya iti /	in the same manner the subsequent Perceptional Cognition becomes well-defined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions.
yathoktam "niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ /	as is clear from your assertion to the following effect ‘Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the annuller and the annulled;
samāropaviveke 'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate" //	and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions’.” (1299-1300)
iti // netyādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1301-1303 next]
na samāropavicchedaviṣayatvena mānatā / anumāyāḥ pramāṇatvaprasaṅgena smṛter api //	As a matter of pact, the validity of inferential cognition does not rest upon its apprehending a thing differentiated from impositions; if that were so, then remembrance also would have to be regarded as valid.
pratyakṣānantarodbhūtasamāropaṇavāraṇāt / iṣṭaṃ tu laiṅgikaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na tadasti te //	What really happens is that after the sense-perception (of a certain thing) there appear certain impositions (doubts and misconceptions), and it is by reason of setting aside these impositions that inferential-cognition has been regarded as valid.
[p.389]	This is not possible for you;
gauḥśuklaścalatītyādau pratyakṣānantaraṃ na hi / samāropo 'tra vijñāne vedyate yanniṣidhyate //	because in the case of such cognitions as ‘the white cow walking’ after the sense-perception, no imposition is found to appear, which could be negatived (by the subsequent valid cognition).
pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedenānumānasya prāmāṇyaṃ, na tu punaḥ samāropaviṣayavyavacchedamātreṇa, smṛter api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt, naca tat pratyakṣasamanantarabhāvino gauḥ śuklaścalatītyāder vikalpasya pravṛttasamāropanivāraṇam	The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition that has crept in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the (initial non-con-ceptual) Perception being followed by the conceptual perception of the ‘white cow walking’, there is no preclusion of an imposition that has crept in, because no such imposition has actually come in.
katham anutpannatvam iti cedāha gaur ityādi /	“How do you know that it has not come in?”
nahi vikalpo 'saṃviditi utpadyata ityupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhyā siddhamanutpannatvaṃ samāropasya //	Answer: ‘In the case of such cognitions, etc. etc.’; when a Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.
evaṃ tāvad etat sarvaṃ jātyādikamabhyugamyoktam, idānīṃ jātyādayaḥ paramārthato na santyeva kutas tadviṣayatayā pratyakṣasya savikalpatā bhaviṣyatīti darśayann āha tattvetyādi / tattvānyatvobhayātmānaḥ santi jātyādayo na ca /	All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception apprehending them cannot be conceptual: [see verses 1304-1305 next] As a matter of fact, universal and the rest do not exist, either as non-different, or as different, from (individuals), by virtue of which the conceptual cognition of those could have the character of ‘perception’.
anvayāsatvato bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt /	(a) [They cannot be the same as the individuals] because there is no comprehensiveness.
anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiteścānyatva tattvayoḥ // vyaktibhyo hi jātyādayaḥ kadācid avytiriktā vyatiriktā vā vyatiriktāvyatiriktatvenobhayātmāno vā /	(c) [Nor can they be both different and non-different] because difference and non-difference always remain mutually exclusive. The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) non-different from the Individuals, or (6) different from them, or (c) both, different and non-different.
na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ anvayāsatvataḥ anvayābhāvāt /	(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion;
anekavastvanugataṃ hi rūpaṃ sāmānyamucyate, na caivaṃ vyaktayaḥ parasparamanvāviśanti, yena tā eva sāmānyaṃ bhaveyuḥ /	that form is called ‘Universal’ which pervades over several things; there is no such ‘pervasion’ among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the ‘Universal’;
anvāveśe vā viśvam ekam eva rūpaṃ jātam iti sāmānyasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgaḥanekādhāratvāt tasya /	if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt bhedād iti /	(2) Nor is the second alternative possible [i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; ‘because they do not appear as different from the Individuals’;
vyakteḥ /	the term ‘bhedāt’ stands for Individuals;
nacāpratibhāsamānaṃ pratyakṣībhavati /	and what does not appear cannot be perceived.
yathoktam "vyaktayo nānuyantyanyadanuyāyi na bhāsate /	This has been thus declared ‘Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity;
jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet" // iti /	how then can anything be different from Cognition?’
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiter anyatvatattvayoḥ pakṣayoḥ / yauhi parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ so 'paravidhināntarīyakaḥ /	(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; ‘became the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive’, that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other;
parasparaparihāreṇa vānyatvatattve vyavasthite, anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt /	and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must preclude the nature of the other.
tasmānnāsti tṛtīyarāśisambandhaḥ //	Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference).
nanu ca yadyavikalpaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kathaṃ tena vyavahāraḥ, tathā hi idaṃ sukhasādhanamidaṃ [p.390] duḥkhasyeti yadi niścinoti tadā tayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravartate /	Says the Opponent: “If Sense-perception is non-conceptual, how is activity carried on on its basis? ‘This is a means of bringing happiness’, ‘this is a source of unhappiness’, one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.
kiṃ ca anumānānumeyavyavahārābhāvaś ca prāpnoti /	Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred;
tathā hi anumānakāle 'vaśyaṃ dharmī dharmo vā pramāṇāntareṇa niścito gṛhītavyaḥ /	because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form;
sa ca na pratyakṣeṇāniścayātmakena niścito gṛhītuṃ śakyate / nāpyanumānena, anavasthādoṣāt /	and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences.
nacānyatpramāṇāntaramastīti sarvavyavahārocchedaḥ prāpnoti /	There is no third Means of Bight Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference).
tasmād anumānādivyavahārapravṛttito liṅgādanumānabādhiteyam avikalpakapratijñeti yaścodayettaṃ pratyāha avikalpam apītyādi /	From all this, and on the basis of the Beason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being non-conceptual is ruled out by Inference”.
avikalpam api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimat / niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ //	‘Through that’ That is, through the Conceptual Content, the Non-conceptual Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becomes a factor in all activity.
vikalpadvāreṇāvikalpakam api niścayahetutvena sakalavyavahārāṅgaṃ bhavati. tathā hi pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham api sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttam analādikam arthaṃ tadākāranirbhāsotpattitaḥ paricchindad utpadyate. tac ca niyatarūpavyavasthitavastugrāhitvād vijātīyavyāvṛttavastvākārānugatatvān na tatraiva vastuni vidhipratiṣedhāvāvirbhāvayati analo 'yaṃ nāsau kusumastabakādiḥ iti.	For instance, even though Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’, yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived like Fire, for instance as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and as this perception apprehends one definite thing with a well-defined form, and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things, it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts such as ‘this is Fire’, ‘this is not a bunch of flowers’;
tayoś ca vikalpayoḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād asaṃvāditve 'pi na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, dṛśyavikalpayor ekatvādhyavasāyena pravṛtter {PVSV} anadhigatavasturūpādhigamābhāvāt.	as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though they are in perfect accord with the real state of things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is seen and what is conceived, and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid).
ata eva vikalpadvayahetutvāt tṛtīyaprakārābhāvasūcanāyāpi nimittatāṃ pratipadyate.	It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also.
tathā hi yad yatra kvacit pravṛttaṃ ta{tta}tpratibhāsitvāt tat paricchinatti, tadanyasya tatrānupalambhāt tatas tad vyavacchinatti.	For instance, whenever a cognition appears in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thi ng from all else;
sarvabhāvānāṃ ca dṛśyatadanyatvena dvairāśye vyavasthāpanāt prakārāntarābhāvaṃ ca sūcayati.	in connection with all things, there are these two poles what is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.
yady evaṃ pratyekṣeṇaiva (2p.478) śabdādau dharmiṇi gṛhītatvād anityatvādeḥ tatrānumānavikalpaḥ pravartamānaḥ pramāṇaṃ na prāpnoti.	“If that is so, then, if the Subject, Sound, for instance has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternality that appears in connection with it cannot be valid
naiṣa doṣaḥ.	That does not affect our position.
pratyakṣam utpannam api yatrāṃśe 'vasāyaṃ janayati sa evāṃśo vyavahārayogyo gṛhīta ity abhidhīyate, yatra nu bhrāntinimittavaśāt samāropapravṛtter na vyavasāyaṃ janayitum īśam, sa vyavahārāyogyatvād gṛhīto 'py agṛhītaprakhya iti tatrānumānasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedāya pravartamānasya prāmāṇyaṃ bhavati, na punaḥ pratyakṣānantarabhāvivikalpasya, tasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedābhāvāt.	Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be ‘apprehended’ (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception, even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for lending itself to activity, it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid; no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.
kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarvato bhinne vasturūpe anubhavotpattāvapi tathaiva na smārto niścayo bhavati---JJ ucyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvātKK, na hy anubhūta ity eva niścayo bhavati,LL tasyābhyāsārthitvapāṭavādikāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt /	Question: “What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite?” Answer: The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite;
yathā janakādhyāpakāviśeṣe 'pi pitaram āyāntaṃ dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati, nopādhyāya itiMM niścinoti //	Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is ‘My Father is coming’, not ‘my Teacher is coming’.
[p.391] atra bhāviviktādayo vikalpotpādadvāreṇāpi vyavahārāṅgatvaṃ vighaṭayanto yat pramāṇayanti taddarśayati nāvikalpam ityādi / nāvikalpaṃ vikalpe cecchaktaṃ{ca śaktaṃ---} viṣayabhedataḥ /	“The non-conceptual cannot bring about the conceptual content, (a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognition of colour, etc., and also because it is non-conceptual like the eye, etc.” (1307) Bhāvivikta and others, who take exception to the idea that ‘the non-conceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content’, bring forward certain arguments;
akalpatvāc ca rūpādijñānavaccakṣurādivat // nendriyavijñānaṃ savikalpakamanovijñānakāraṇaṃ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādijñānavat nirvikalpakatvāc ca, cakṣurādivad iti /	The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the conceptual cognition, which is mental, (a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.; and also (b) because it is non-conceptual, like the Eye and other organs.
viṣayabhedata ityatra hetau dṛṣṭāntau rūpādijñānavad iti, akalpatvād ityatra tu cakṣurādivad iti //	In support of the Reason ‘Because their objects are different’, the instance cited is ‘as in the case of the cognitions of colour, etc.’; and in support of the Reason ‘Because it is non-conceptual’, the instance cited is ‘like the eye, etc.’ (1307)
tadatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha	The following Text points out the defects in the above reasoning: [see verse 1308 next]
tadatra na virodho 'sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ / nacāpi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ //	There is no incompatibility between the conceptual content and the said reasons; nor is there difference in their objects; as the object apprehended by the one is the same as that apprehended by the other.
ubhayor api hetvor anaikāntikatā, sādhyaviparyayeṇa saha hetor virodhānupadarśanāt /	Both the Reasons adduced (in the preceding Text) are ‘Inconclusive’; as no incompatibility has been indicated between the Reasons and the contrary of the conclusion sought to be proved by them.
anayor iti / hetvoḥ /	‘Anayoḥ’ of the two Reasons.
nacāpi viṣayo bhinna ityanena satyapi saviṣayatve vikalpasya viṣayabhedata ityasya hetor asiddhatāmāha //	‘Nor is there difference, etc. etc.’; that is to say, even though the Conceptual Content is objective (has an object), yet the assertion that ‘their objects are different’ is ‘inadmissible’.
vastutastu nirālambo vikalpaḥ sampravartate /	In reality, the conceptual content proceeds without any objective basis;
tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana //	it has no object at all, which could differ from anything else.
rūpaśabdādītyādinā rūpādijñānavad ityasya dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āha	This is shown in the following [see verse 1309 above]
rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām astyevānyonyahetutā /	Among the cognitions of colour, sound, etc., mutual causal relation is actually present;
tato 'prasiddhasādhyo 'yaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ samudīritaḥ //	hence the instance that has been cited is one in which the probandum is not known to exist.
rūpaśabdādijñānāṃ parasparasamanantarapratyayabhāvena kāraṇatvasya vidyamānatvāt //	As among the Cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mental causal relation is actually present, consisting in the fact of their following in the wake of one another.
agnidhūmādibuddhīnāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ / vyabhicāro 'pi vispaṣṭametasminnupalabhyate //	Inasmuch as between the cognition of fire and the cognition of smoke, there is the relation of cause and effect, the same could be possible in the case in question also;
etasminniti /	hence the reason cited is found to be inconclusive also.
viṣayabhedata ityata hetau / yathāgnyādiliṅgibuddher dhūmādiliṅgabuddhir viṣayabhede 'pi kāraṇaṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyatīti hetor anaikāntikatvam //	‘Etasmin’ stands for the Reason cited “Because their objects are different The Cognition of the Middle Term ‘Smoke’ is the cause of the cognition of the Major Term ‘Fire’, even though the objects of the two cognitions are different. The same may be the case here (with the non-conceptual and the conceptual).
[p.392] evaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvaṃ pratyakṣasya prasādhyābhrāntagrahaṇe prayojanam āha keśoṇḍraketyādi /	So that the Reason adduced is Inconclusive. The epithet ‘not-erroneous’ has been added for the purpose of excluding such illusions as those of the ‘keśoṇḍraka’[1] (hair-tuft) and the like;

pratyakṣatā tasya, tathā ca loke vināpyado lakṣaṇataḥ prasiddham, iti //

this is well-known, among people, even without any definition”. (Ślokavārtika Sense-perception, 254).

tadityādinā pratividhatte

What has been urged is not right.

tadayuktaṃ yadi jñānaṃ tat pravṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇe / nāviṣṭābhilāpaṃ taj jātyādigrahaṇe 'pi hi //

if the cognition in question appertains to the specific individuality of the thing, then, even on the apprehension of the universal and other properties, it should remain free from verbal expression.

tathā{cā}vācyamevedaṃ sādhitaṃ prāk svalakṣaṇam /

because it has been proved before that the specific individuality of things cannot be denoted by words;

tasmin vṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ niyataṃ nirvikalpakam //

hence the cognition that rests upon that must be free from conceptual content (and association with words).

jātyādigrahaṇe 'pītyapiśabdo 'bhyupagame / ekadā tāvajjātyādīnāṃ nirastatvān na santyeva ta iti kutas tadgrahaṇe prāmāṇyam, santu nāma tathāpi tadgrahaṇe ālocanājñānavad uttarakālabhāvināṃ jñānāṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvādavikalpataiva jātyādīnāṃ svalakṣaṇadavyatirekasyābhyupagatatvād iti bhāvaḥ /

‘Even on the apprehension, etc.’ The word ‘even’ means’ even granting that the Universal exists In reality, the Universal, etc. having been already rejected, how could there be any validity in the apprehension thereof? Well, granting that they do exist, even so, on their apprehension, the Cognitions that appear subsequently to the initial Pre-cognition, having only the Specific Individuality of Things as their object, must be free from Conceptual Content; just as the Pre-cognition is. Because the Universal and other properties have been held to be not-difîerent from the Specific Individuality.

prayogaḥ yat svalakṣaṇagrāhi tadavika [p.387] lpakaṃ, yathālocanājñānam, svalakṣaṇagrāhi cottarapratyakṣatvenābhimataṃjñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

The argument “may be formulated as follows: That Cognition which apprehends the Specific Individuality must be free from Conceptual Content, like the Pre-cognition; the Cognition that is held to be the subsequent Perception does apprehend the Specific Individuality; so this is a natural reason (proving its non-conceptual character).

prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedaṃ, nacānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, yato 'vācyam evedaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti prāganyāpohe prasādhitam /

This argument is only in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum. The Reason cannot be said to be Inconclusive. Because, that the Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words has already been proved in the Chapter dealing with the ‘Exclusion of other Things’ (as forming the denotation of words).

nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt //

Nor is the Reason Contradictory;

jātimātragrahe tu syād ekāntena vibhinnatā /

If the universal alone were apprehended, then the qualification (property) would be something- absolutely distinct;

viśeṣaṇasya naitac ca parair iṣṭaṃ yathoditam //

and this is not what is acceptable to the other party, as asserted (by himself).

ekāntena vibhinnatā viśeṣaṇasyeti /

It might be urged that “The Reason is Inadmissible, as it pertains to the Universal only”.

viśeṣyād iti śeṣaḥ / naitac ca parair iṣṭam iti / ekāntena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor vibhinnatvam /

‘The qualification would be something absolutely distinct’ from the Thing qualified. ‘This is not acceptable to the other party’, i.e. this absolute distinction between the qualification and the qualified.

kathaṃ neṣṭam ity āha yathoditam iti /

“How do you know that it is not acceptable?” Answer: ‘As has been asserted’ i.e. by himself.

kiṃ tadityāha yadītyādi /

Question: “What is it that has been asserted by him?” Answer: [Kumārila says as below] [see verse 1296 next]

yadi hyekāntato bhinnaṃ viśeṣyāt syād viśeṣaṇam / svānurūpāṃ tadā buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayet katham //

“If the qualification were absolutely distinct from the qualified, then how could it bring about in the qualified a cognition in keeping with itself?” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 142].

paryāyeṇa bhedasyāpyabhyupagatatvād ekāntata ity āha /

The term ‘absolutely’ has been added in view of the fact that some sort of indirect distinction is admitted;

tathā hi ---bhinnābhinnasvabhāvā jātyādayas tasyeṣṭā naikāntato bhinnā nāpyabhinnāḥ /

inasmuch as his view is that the Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different.

"buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate /

He has asserted as follows: “As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same;

ekānekatvam iṣṭaṃ vā sattārūpādibhedata" // iti /

what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of ‘Being’ (when they are one) and in the form of ‘Colour’, etc. (when they are diverse)”, (Ślokavārtika, Sense-perception, 158).

punaścoktam "sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" / iti /

He has again asserted that “For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual” (Ślokavārtika, Sense-perception, 141).

paratvam iti / anyatvam /

‘Paratvam’, ‘difference’, here stands for5 other than’.

svānurūpām iti / viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparaktām /

‘In keeping with itself’ i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors;

yato viśeṣaṇoparaktaṃ viśeṣyaṃ grāhayad viśeṣaṇam ucyate, anyathā viśeṣaṇa{tva}syānupapannatvād iti bhāvaḥ /

as the qualification is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor; otherwise, it would not be a qualification at all;

yathoktam "svabuddhyā yena rajyeta viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam" /

as it has been declared that ‘The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition’.

athāpi syāt svasāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvenobhayaviṣayatvāt kevalasvalakṣaṇamātraviṣayatvam asiddham evottareṣāṃ jñānānām ity āha svasāmānyātmanor ityādi / svasāmānyātmanor yuktaṃ jñānaṃ caikaṃ na vedakam /

One and the same cognition cannot comprehend both the specific individuality and the universal; because, if such a cognition were ‘conceptual’, there could be no comprehension of the former, on the other hand, if it were otherwise, there could be no comprehension of the latter. The following might be urged: “As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the Particular as characterised by the Universal;

savikalpānyathābhāve prāktanāparavinna hi //

so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only”.

svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇayor naika jñānaṃ vedakaṃ yuktam /

It is not right that one and the same Cognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.

tathā hi tadekaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ vā syād avikalpakaṃ vā tatra savikalpakabhāve savikalpakatve sati, prāktanasya pūrvoktasya svalakṣaṇasya, vit vedanaṃ, na prāpnoti /

Because, would that Cognition be Conceptual or Non-conceptual? If it were Conceptual, Determinate, then there could be no apprehension of the ‘former’, i.e. the Specific Individuality.

anyathābhāva iti nirvikalpakapakṣe / aparasyeti / sāmānyātmanaḥ, vit vittir na syāt //

If ‘otherwise’, i.e. if it is Non-conceptual, then there could be no apprehension of the ‘latter’ i.e. of the Universal.

[p.388] evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇaviṣayatva itareṣāṃ jñānānām avikalpatā prāpnotīti sādhitam / idānīṃ bhavatu nāma savikalpakatvaṃ tathāpi gṛhītagrāhitvān na teṣāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam iti pratipādayann āha ekāntenetyādi /

It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be ‘Non-conceptual’. The Author now proceeds to show that even granting that the said cognitions are ‘Conceptual’, as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previous Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions: [see verse 1298 above]

ekāntenānyatābhāvāj jātyādyādyena cedgatam /

The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual;

vijñātārthādhigantṛtvāt smārttajñānasamaṃ param //

the Conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended;

tathā hi jātyāder vyaktito naivānyatvam ekānteneṣṭam /

hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).

"sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" /

(At the initial stage), there is only a vague idea of several universals, and there is no definite idea of anything;

tataścādyenaivālocanājñānena jātyādi gṛhītam iti smārttajñānavad adhigatārthādhigantṛtvāt paraṃ jātyādidharmaniścayajñānamapramāṇam eva yuktam iti /

the definite idea comes only later; as this apprehends the thing as differentiated from all impositions (doubts and misconceptions). Just as inference apprehends the object as differentiated from impositions, so also does the (later) definite cognition.” (1299-1300)

tadatra yadi samāropaviṣayavyavacchedena gṛhītam iti hetvarthas tadā hetor asiddhatā, atha yathākathañcid gṛhītatvād iti hetvarthas tadānumānenānekānta iti

[Says the Opponent] “If the Reason adduced here is that “the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions), then it is one that is ‘not-admitted’;

saṃmugdhānekasāmānyarūpeṇādhigame sati /

if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference”.

tathā hi prathamaṃ saṃmugdharūpeṇālocanājñānenādhigataṃ, nahi niścitarūpeṇa, uttarottaras tu niścayaḥ pramāṇaṃ, samāropavyavacchedaviṣayatvād anumānavat /

This is the argument that is set forth in the following [see verses 1299-1300 above] “At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form;

yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte śabdādau dharmiṇi kṛtakatvādinānityatvaniścayo bhavan pramāṇaṃ bhavati, tathā samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścayo bhaviṣyati /

the well-defined cognition comes only later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impo_ sitîons, like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a product, the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal;

tathā hi bhavatāmātrāvivādaḥ samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścaya iti /

in the same manner the subsequent Perceptional Cognition becomes well-defined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions.

yathoktam "niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ /

as is clear from your assertion to the following effect ‘Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the annuller and the annulled;

samāropaviveke 'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate" //

and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions’.” (1299-1300)

iti // netyādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1301-1303 next]

na samāropavicchedaviṣayatvena mānatā / anumāyāḥ pramāṇatvaprasaṅgena smṛter api //

As a matter of pact, the validity of inferential cognition does not rest upon its apprehending a thing differentiated from impositions; if that were so, then remembrance also would have to be regarded as valid.

pratyakṣānantarodbhūtasamāropaṇavāraṇāt / iṣṭaṃ tu laiṅgikaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na tadasti te //

What really happens is that after the sense-perception (of a certain thing) there appear certain impositions (doubts and misconceptions), and it is by reason of setting aside these impositions that inferential-cognition has been regarded as valid.

[p.389]

This is not possible for you;

gauḥśuklaścalatītyādau pratyakṣānantaraṃ na hi / samāropo 'tra vijñāne vedyate yanniṣidhyate //

because in the case of such cognitions as ‘the white cow walking’ after the sense-perception, no imposition is found to appear, which could be negatived (by the subsequent valid cognition).

pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedenānumānasya prāmāṇyaṃ, na tu punaḥ samāropaviṣayavyavacchedamātreṇa, smṛter api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt, naca tat pratyakṣasamanantarabhāvino gauḥ śuklaścalatītyāder vikalpasya pravṛttasamāropanivāraṇam

The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition that has crept in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the (initial non-con-ceptual) Perception being followed by the conceptual perception of the ‘white cow walking’, there is no preclusion of an imposition that has crept in, because no such imposition has actually come in.

katham anutpannatvam iti cedāha gaur ityādi /

“How do you know that it has not come in?”

nahi vikalpo 'saṃviditi utpadyata ityupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhyā siddhamanutpannatvaṃ samāropasya //

Answer: ‘In the case of such cognitions, etc. etc.’; when a Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.

evaṃ tāvad etat sarvaṃ jātyādikamabhyugamyoktam, idānīṃ jātyādayaḥ paramārthato na santyeva kutas tadviṣayatayā pratyakṣasya savikalpatā bhaviṣyatīti darśayann āha tattvetyādi / tattvānyatvobhayātmānaḥ santi jātyādayo na ca /

All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception apprehending them cannot be conceptual: [see verses 1304-1305 next] As a matter of fact, universal and the rest do not exist, either as non-different, or as different, from (individuals), by virtue of which the conceptual cognition of those could have the character of ‘perception’.

anvayāsatvato bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt /

(a) [They cannot be the same as the individuals] because there is no comprehensiveness.

anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiteścānyatva tattvayoḥ // vyaktibhyo hi jātyādayaḥ kadācid avytiriktā vyatiriktā vā vyatiriktāvyatiriktatvenobhayātmāno vā /

(c) [Nor can they be both different and non-different] because difference and non-difference always remain mutually exclusive. The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) non-different from the Individuals, or (6) different from them, or (c) both, different and non-different.

na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ anvayāsatvataḥ anvayābhāvāt /

(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion;

anekavastvanugataṃ hi rūpaṃ sāmānyamucyate, na caivaṃ vyaktayaḥ parasparamanvāviśanti, yena tā eva sāmānyaṃ bhaveyuḥ /

that form is called ‘Universal’ which pervades over several things; there is no such ‘pervasion’ among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the ‘Universal’;

anvāveśe vā viśvam ekam eva rūpaṃ jātam iti sāmānyasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgaḥanekādhāratvāt tasya /

if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.

nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt bhedād iti /

(2) Nor is the second alternative possible [i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; ‘because they do not appear as different from the Individuals’;

vyakteḥ /

the term ‘bhedāt’ stands for Individuals;

nacāpratibhāsamānaṃ pratyakṣībhavati /

and what does not appear cannot be perceived.

yathoktam "vyaktayo nānuyantyanyadanuyāyi na bhāsate /

This has been thus declared ‘Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity;

jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet" // iti /

how then can anything be different from Cognition?’

nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiter anyatvatattvayoḥ pakṣayoḥ / yauhi parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ so 'paravidhināntarīyakaḥ /

(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; ‘became the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive’, that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other;

parasparaparihāreṇa vānyatvatattve vyavasthite, anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt /

and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must preclude the nature of the other.

tasmānnāsti tṛtīyarāśisambandhaḥ //

Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference).

nanu ca yadyavikalpaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kathaṃ tena vyavahāraḥ, tathā hi idaṃ sukhasādhanamidaṃ [p.390] duḥkhasyeti yadi niścinoti tadā tayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravartate /

Says the Opponent: “If Sense-perception is non-conceptual, how is activity carried on on its basis? ‘This is a means of bringing happiness’, ‘this is a source of unhappiness’, one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.

kiṃ ca anumānānumeyavyavahārābhāvaś ca prāpnoti /

Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred;

tathā hi anumānakāle 'vaśyaṃ dharmī dharmo vā pramāṇāntareṇa niścito gṛhītavyaḥ /

because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form;

sa ca na pratyakṣeṇāniścayātmakena niścito gṛhītuṃ śakyate / nāpyanumānena, anavasthādoṣāt /

and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences.

nacānyatpramāṇāntaramastīti sarvavyavahārocchedaḥ prāpnoti /

There is no third Means of Bight Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference).

tasmād anumānādivyavahārapravṛttito liṅgādanumānabādhiteyam avikalpakapratijñeti yaścodayettaṃ pratyāha avikalpam apītyādi /

From all this, and on the basis of the Beason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being non-conceptual is ruled out by Inference”.

avikalpam api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimat / niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ //

‘Through that’ That is, through the Conceptual Content, the Non-conceptual Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becomes a factor in all activity.

vikalpadvāreṇāvikalpakam api niścayahetutvena sakalavyavahārāṅgaṃ bhavati. tathā hi pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham api sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttam analādikam arthaṃ tadākāranirbhāsotpattitaḥ paricchindad utpadyate. tac ca niyatarūpavyavasthitavastugrāhitvād vijātīyavyāvṛttavastvākārānugatatvān na tatraiva vastuni vidhipratiṣedhāvāvirbhāvayati analo 'yaṃ nāsau kusumastabakādiḥ iti.

For instance, even though Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’, yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived like Fire, for instance as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and as this perception apprehends one definite thing with a well-defined form, and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things, it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts such as ‘this is Fire’, ‘this is not a bunch of flowers’;

tayoś ca vikalpayoḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād asaṃvāditve 'pi na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, dṛśyavikalpayor ekatvādhyavasāyena pravṛtter {PVSV} anadhigatavasturūpādhigamābhāvāt.

as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though they are in perfect accord with the real state of things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is seen and what is conceived, and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid).

ata eva vikalpadvayahetutvāt tṛtīyaprakārābhāvasūcanāyāpi nimittatāṃ pratipadyate.

It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also.

tathā hi yad yatra kvacit pravṛttaṃ ta{tta}tpratibhāsitvāt tat paricchinatti, tadanyasya tatrānupalambhāt tatas tad vyavacchinatti.

For instance, whenever a cognition appears in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thi ng from all else;

sarvabhāvānāṃ ca dṛśyatadanyatvena dvairāśye vyavasthāpanāt prakārāntarābhāvaṃ ca sūcayati.

in connection with all things, there are these two poles what is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.

yady evaṃ pratyekṣeṇaiva (2p.478) śabdādau dharmiṇi gṛhītatvād anityatvādeḥ tatrānumānavikalpaḥ pravartamānaḥ pramāṇaṃ na prāpnoti.

“If that is so, then, if the Subject, Sound, for instance has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternality that appears in connection with it cannot be valid

naiṣa doṣaḥ.

That does not affect our position.

pratyakṣam utpannam api yatrāṃśe 'vasāyaṃ janayati sa evāṃśo vyavahārayogyo gṛhīta ity abhidhīyate, yatra nu bhrāntinimittavaśāt samāropapravṛtter na vyavasāyaṃ janayitum īśam, sa vyavahārāyogyatvād gṛhīto 'py agṛhītaprakhya iti tatrānumānasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedāya pravartamānasya prāmāṇyaṃ bhavati, na punaḥ pratyakṣānantarabhāvivikalpasya, tasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedābhāvāt.

Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be ‘apprehended’ (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception, even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for lending itself to activity, it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid; no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.

kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarvato bhinne vasturūpe anubhavotpattāvapi tathaiva na smārto niścayo bhavati---JJ ucyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvātKK, na hy anubhūta ity eva niścayo bhavati,LL tasyābhyāsārthitvapāṭavādikāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt /

Question: “What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite?” Answer: The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite;

yathā janakādhyāpakāviśeṣe 'pi pitaram āyāntaṃ dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati, nopādhyāya itiMM niścinoti //

Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is ‘My Father is coming’, not ‘my Teacher is coming’.

[p.391] atra bhāviviktādayo vikalpotpādadvāreṇāpi vyavahārāṅgatvaṃ vighaṭayanto yat pramāṇayanti taddarśayati nāvikalpam ityādi / nāvikalpaṃ vikalpe cecchaktaṃ{ca śaktaṃ---} viṣayabhedataḥ /

“The non-conceptual cannot bring about the conceptual content, (a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognition of colour, etc., and also because it is non-conceptual like the eye, etc.” (1307) Bhāvivikta and others, who take exception to the idea that ‘the non-conceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content’, bring forward certain arguments;

akalpatvāc ca rūpādijñānavaccakṣurādivat // nendriyavijñānaṃ savikalpakamanovijñānakāraṇaṃ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādijñānavat nirvikalpakatvāc ca, cakṣurādivad iti /

The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the conceptual cognition, which is mental, (a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.; and also (b) because it is non-conceptual, like the Eye and other organs.

viṣayabhedata ityatra hetau dṛṣṭāntau rūpādijñānavad iti, akalpatvād ityatra tu cakṣurādivad iti //

In support of the Reason ‘Because their objects are different’, the instance cited is ‘as in the case of the cognitions of colour, etc.’; and in support of the Reason ‘Because it is non-conceptual’, the instance cited is ‘like the eye, etc.’ (1307)

tadatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha

The following Text points out the defects in the above reasoning: [see verse 1308 next]

tadatra na virodho 'sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ / nacāpi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ //

There is no incompatibility between the conceptual content and the said reasons; nor is there difference in their objects; as the object apprehended by the one is the same as that apprehended by the other.

ubhayor api hetvor anaikāntikatā, sādhyaviparyayeṇa saha hetor virodhānupadarśanāt /

Both the Reasons adduced (in the preceding Text) are ‘Inconclusive’; as no incompatibility has been indicated between the Reasons and the contrary of the conclusion sought to be proved by them.

anayor iti / hetvoḥ /

‘Anayoḥ’ of the two Reasons.

nacāpi viṣayo bhinna ityanena satyapi saviṣayatve vikalpasya viṣayabhedata ityasya hetor asiddhatāmāha //

‘Nor is there difference, etc. etc.’; that is to say, even though the Conceptual Content is objective (has an object), yet the assertion that ‘their objects are different’ is ‘inadmissible’.

vastutastu nirālambo vikalpaḥ sampravartate /

In reality, the conceptual content proceeds without any objective basis;

tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana //

it has no object at all, which could differ from anything else.

rūpaśabdādītyādinā rūpādijñānavad ityasya dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āha

This is shown in the following [see verse 1309 above]

rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām astyevānyonyahetutā /

Among the cognitions of colour, sound, etc., mutual causal relation is actually present;

tato 'prasiddhasādhyo 'yaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ samudīritaḥ //

hence the instance that has been cited is one in which the probandum is not known to exist.

rūpaśabdādijñānāṃ parasparasamanantarapratyayabhāvena kāraṇatvasya vidyamānatvāt //

As among the Cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mental causal relation is actually present, consisting in the fact of their following in the wake of one another.

agnidhūmādibuddhīnāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ / vyabhicāro 'pi vispaṣṭametasminnupalabhyate //

Inasmuch as between the cognition of fire and the cognition of smoke, there is the relation of cause and effect, the same could be possible in the case in question also;

etasminniti /

hence the reason cited is found to be inconclusive also.

viṣayabhedata ityata hetau / yathāgnyādiliṅgibuddher dhūmādiliṅgabuddhir viṣayabhede 'pi kāraṇaṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyatīti hetor anaikāntikatvam //

‘Etasmin’ stands for the Reason cited “Because their objects are different The Cognition of the Middle Term ‘Smoke’ is the cause of the cognition of the Major Term ‘Fire’, even though the objects of the two cognitions are different. The same may be the case here (with the non-conceptual and the conceptual).

[p.392] evaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvaṃ pratyakṣasya prasādhyābhrāntagrahaṇe prayojanam āha keśoṇḍraketyādi /

So that the Reason adduced is Inconclusive. The epithet ‘not-erroneous’ has been added for the purpose of excluding such illusions as those of the ‘keśoṇḍraka’[1] (hair-tuft) and the like;