buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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na ca vikalpānubaddhasya sparṣṭārthapratibhāsitā /	and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear.
asmābhistu svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena janitasyaiva pratyakṣatvenābhyupetatvāt /	Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-perception is that which is brought about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is,aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.
api ca grāhyatve sati sukhādīnāṃ vicchinnapratibhāsitā syānnīlādivat /	Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their manifestation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things;
na ca jñānādvicchinnasya śātādirūpasyopalabdhiḥ /	and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.
jñānābhedena śatādirūpasya grahaṇaṃ bhrāntir iti cet /	It might be argued that “as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeableness must be wrong”.
evaṃ tarhi siddhā sukhādīnāṃ sattā svasaṃvidrūpā /	In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition;
śātādirūpamātralakṣaṇatvāt sukhādīnām /	because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable;
tadrūpatā cej jñānasya siddhā, siddhā jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ /	and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself.
vyatiriktānāṃ tvasiddhatvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ /	Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.
śātetyanukūlā, tadviparītā tvaśātā, ādiśabdenopekṣā gṛhyate /	‘Agreeable’ is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is ‘disagreeable’, The term ‘and the rest’ (after ‘Pleasure’) includes Indifference.
yadi ca svasantānotpattilakṣaṇaiva sukhādīnāṃ sattā sa eva teṣām anubhava iti nābhyupagamyate / kiṃtu tadviṣayajñānotpattis tadā yogināṃ parakīyaṃ sukhādi gṛhṇatāṃ tadanubhavināmiva tulyāturāvasthā syāt / bhinnasantānavartitvān na tulyāvastheti na vaktavyam /	If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own ‘Chain’, and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also, but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves, then, in that case? when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that “it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains”;
nahi svasantānavartitvaṃ teṣām anugamo 'bhyupagataḥ /	because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same ‘chain’;
kiṃ tarhitadviṣayajñānotpattiḥ /	what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain;
sā ca parasantānagrāhiṇām apyastīti samānaḥ prasaṅgaḥ /	and the cognition is present in the ‘chain’ of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.
athobhayamanubhave sukhādīnāṃ kāraṇamaṅgīkriyate tadā svasantānavartitvenānubhave siddhaṃ sukhādīnām ātmasaṃvedanam /	If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both, then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own ‘chains’, it becomes proved that they are self-cognised.
evaṃ hi svasantānavartitvaṃ nimittaṃ parasantānavartibhyaś ca viśeṣakaṃ bhavati /	In this way, ‘presence in one’s own chain’ serves to distinguish them from those ‘present in other chains’.
yadi svasaṃvid rūpā bhavanti yeṣāṃ tarhi na yoginaḥ siddhā mīmāṃsakādīnāṃ teṣāṃ kathaṃ taiḥ prasaṅga ity āha paretyādi /	Question: “If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those Mīmāṃsakas for instance, who do not admit of any mystics?”
nahi bauddhānām iva pareṣāṃ nirviṣayaṃ paramārthato 'numānam /	Answer: ‘The same applies, etc. etc.’ Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of objectivity;
tataś ca paraduḥkhānumāne tulyo 'nubhave 'numātur api syāt //	hence, for one who infers the Pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain [so that the said incongruity would be there all the same].
sukhādītyeva gamyante sukhaduḥkhādayo na tu /	[Says Śaṅkarasvāmin] “Pleasure, etc. are apprehended only as ‘pleasure, etc.’;
jñānamityeva gamyante tan na jñānaṃ ghaṭādivat //	they are not apprehended as ‘cognition’; consequently like the jar, etc., they cannot be cognition”.
[p.398] śaṅkarasvāmyāha na jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ, jñānamityavyapadeśyatvāt, ghaṭādivad iti //	Śaṅkarasvāmin says: “Pleasure, etc. cannot he of the nature of Cognition, because they are never spoken of as ‘Cognition’; just like the Jar, etc.”.
yadyevamityādinā dūṣaṇam āha	The objection to this view is as follows: [see verse 1341 next]
yadyevaṃ samayānyatve jñānamityapi no gatiḥ / cetasyasti tataḥ prāptā tatrāpyajñānatā tadā //	If difference is to be accepted on the basis of convention, then cognition itself may not be spoken of as ‘cognition’, and on the basis of that, cognition would become non-cognition.
yadi saṅketānyatvena svabhāvānyatvaṃ syāt, evaṃ sati yadā jñāne 'pi kaścidajñānam iti samayaṃ kuryāt tadā jñānam ityapi cetasi vyapadeśo nāstīti prāptā jñāne 'pyajñānatā bhāvataḥ //	If difference of nature were based upon Convention (i,e. the use of words, which is purely a matter of Convention), then, there may be some one who might set up the Convention that the Cognition should be spoken of as ‘non-cognition’, and in accordance with this Convention, Cognition would become Not-cognition, for you!
vyaktaṃ prakāśarūpatvānno cedevaṃ prasajyate / sukhaduḥkhādike tulyaṃ tac ca sarvamidaṃ na kim //	If it be urged that “being clearly of the nature of light, it could never be as alleged”, then, you are faced with this contingency is not all this the same in the case of pleasure and pain also? (1342)
bhutārthabhāvanodbhūtaṃ kalpanābhrāntivarjitam / vakṣyāmo yogivijñānaṃ sādhanaīr vimalair alam //	As regards the mystic’s cognition, we are going to describe it, on the basis of spotless reasons, as arising out of the contemplation of things and being free from conceptual content and error.
atha prakāśātmakaṃ jñānaṃ spaṣṭamanubhūyata iti nājñānatā syād evaṃ sati sukhādiṣvapi sarvametat samānam /	If the view is that “Cognition, being of the nature of Light, can never be non-cognition”, then the answer is that all this is equally there in the case of Pleasure and Pain also.
hetuścānenaiva vyabhicārī{ti} na kiñcid etat /	The Reason also is false, ‘Inconclusive’; so this is nothing.
vakṣyāma iti / sarvajñasiddhau //	‘We are going to describe’, under the chapter on The Omniscient Being.
pramāṇaphalavipratipattinirākaraṇāyāha viṣayetyādi / viṣayādhigatiścātra pramāṇaphalamiṣyate /	The cognition of the object is held to be the ‘fruit’ of the means of cognition, when the ‘means of cognition’ consists in the ‘sameness of form’ (between the cognition and the cognised);
svavittir vā pramāṇaṃ tu sārūpyaṃ yogyatāpi vā //	or apprehension of itself is the fruit, and the means, in this case, consists in ‘capability’.
bāhye 'the prameye viṣayādhigamaḥ pramāṇaphalaṃ, sārūpyaṃ tu pramāṇam /	(a) When the external object is what is cognised, then the cognition of that object is the Fruit, and Sameness of form the Means, of the Cognition;
svasaṃvittāvapi satyāṃ yathākāram asya prathanāt /	as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised.
jñānātmani tu prameye svasaṃvittiḥ phalam, yogyatā pramāṇam /	(b) When what is cognised is of the nature of Cognition, then the ‘apprehension of itself’ is the fruit, and capability the Means, of the Cognition.
savyāpārapratītatām upādāya jñānasyaiva sā tādṛśī yogyatā /	The said capability belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function;
yena tadevātmānaṃ vedayate na ghaṭādaya iti yogyatayā karaṇabhūtayaivātmaprakāśakaṃ lakṣyate jñānamiti yogyatāyāḥ svasaṃvedane prāmāṇyam /	by virtue of which capability, it is Cognition alone and not the Jar and such things, that apprehends itself; hence it is by the instrumentality of this capability that Cognition is found to be self-manifested; hence Capability is said to be the ‘Means’, the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself.
"tatrāpyanubhayātmatvāt te yogyāḥ svātmasaṃvidaḥ /	This has been thus declared ‘The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are capable of such self-apprehension;
iti sā yogyatā mānamātmā meyaḥ phalaṃ svavit" // iti //	hence their capability is the Instrument (Means) and they themselves are the cognised, and their own apprehension is the fruit’, (1344)
chedana ityādinā kaumārilacodyamāśaṅkate chedane khadiraprāpte palāśe na chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā naikateti cet //	“Just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the resultant cut does not appear in the Palāśa-tree, in the same way nowhere in the world is the (cutting) axe found to be the same as the cut itself” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 75).
[p.399] bhinnapramāṇaphalavādinaṃ prati bauddhenoktam yadi pramāṇaphalayor bhedo 'bhyupagamyate tadā bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ syāt pramāṇaphalayoḥ /	The Bauddha has addressed the following argument to the person who asserted that the Means of Cognition was different from its Fruit: If there is difference between the Means of Cognition and its Fruit, then the objective of these two the Means of Cognition and the Fruit of Cognition also must be different;
na caitad yuktam /	and yet this cannot be right;
nahi paraścādike chedane svadiraprāpte sati palāśe chedo bhavati /	when, for instance, the cutting weapon, the Axe, is struck at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāśa-tree;
tasmāt pramāṇaphalayor ekaviṣayatvād abheda iti /	hence it must be admitted that the objective of both is the same and hence there is no difference between them.
atroktaṃ kumārilena "viṣayaikatvam icchaṃs tu yaḥ pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ vadet / sādhyasādhanayor bhedo laukikās tena bādhitaḥ //	It is in answer to this that Kumārila says “If one who desires the objective to be the same should declare the Means of Cognition to be the same as its Fruit, then he would be setting aside the well-known distinction between Cause and Effect;
chedane khadiraprāpte na palāśe chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā saha naikatā" //	just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāsha-tree, so also nowhere in the world is the Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself” (Śloka-vārtika Sense-perception, 74-75).
iti / chedyate 'neneti chedanam //	The word ‘Chedana’, ‘Cutting weapon’, stands for that by which something is cut.
na vyavasthāśrayatvena sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ /	The distinction of ‘cause and effect’ does not rest upon the substratum of that distinction;
nirākāre tu vijñāne sā saṃsthā na hi yujyate //	cognition being formless, the said distinction cannot be possible.
nīlāspadaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti viṣayāvagativyavasthāyā arthasārūpyameva nibandhanaṃ nānyad iti vyavasthāpakatvabhāvena sādhyasādhanavyavasthā notpadyotpādakabhāvena, yasmān na pāramārthikaḥ kartṛkaraṇādibhāvo 'sti,	The apprehension of Blue is not the apprehension of Yellow, this distinction in the cognition of things is based upon the sameness of form, nothing else; so that the distinction of Cause and Effect is made through the relation of what is distinguished and what distinguishes, not through the relation of the Produced and Producer; because the relation of the Acting Agent, the Instrument and the rest is not real;
kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām /	because all things being momentary, they cannot have any action.
jñānaṃ hi viṣayākāramutpadyamānaṃ viṣayaṃ paricchindadiva savyāpāramivābhāti /	When the Cognition is produced in the form of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active.
ayamevārthaprāpaṇavyāpāro jñānasya na tvavinābhāvitvamātram /	Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object, not in mere invariable concomitance.
na hi bījādyavinābhāvino 'ṅkurādayo na bhavanti /	For instance, the sprout does not cease to be invariably concomitant with the seed.
ye{na} jñānam eva pramāṇaṃ syāt /	Thus the Cognition itself cannot be the Means of Cognition.
tasmāt sākāram eva jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na nirākāram iti vyavasthayā pramāṇyena pradarśyate /	It is for this reason that the nature of the Means of Cognitio7i is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition with a form, not the formless Cognition which is the Means of Cognition.
vyavasthā ca tat pṛṣṭhalabdhena vikalpena veditavyā //	This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.
ata utprekṣito bhedo vidyate dhanurādivat /	Thus then, the (commonly known) distinction (between the cognition as means and cognition as fruit) is purely imaginary, as in the case of the bow.
utpādyotpādakatvena vyavastheyaṃ tu neṣyate //	the distinction cannot be held to be based upon the relation of the producer and produced.
dhanurādivad iti / dhanur vidyati dhanuṣā vidhyati dhanuṣo niḥsṛtya śaro vidyatīti yaccaikasya dhanuṣaḥ kartṛtvādayaḥ kalpitā na virudhyante tathehāpīti //	In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as (a) ‘The Bow pierces’, (b) ‘He pierces with the Bow’, (c) ‘the arrow proceeding from the Bow, pierces’, where the same Bow is spoken of as (a) ‘Agent’, (b) ‘Instrument, and (c) ‘Ablative and this distinction is only imaginary (not real);
viśliṣyamāṇasandhau ca dārvādau paraśucchidā / praviśannucyate tena tatraikatvamavasthitam //	When the compact fibre of the wood is rent asunder by the cut of the axe, the axe is (popularly) called the ‘cut’ only when it enters into the fibre;
paraśunā ca vṛkṣādeśchidā nirūpyamāṇā chedyadravyānupraveśalakṣaṇaivāvatiṣṭhate sa cānupraveśaḥ paraśorātmagata eva dharma iti paramārthataśchidayāsahaikatvam iti nāsti virodhaḥ //	When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the cut consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood-fibre; and this entrance is a property belonging to the Axe itself; so that in tins sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Out; and there is no incongruity in this.
[p.400] vyavasthāyām ityādinaitaddarśayati	The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 1349 next]
vyavasthāyāṃ tu jātāyāṃ kalpyatāmanyathāpi hi /	When once the distinction has been made, it may be assumed to be otherwise also;
utpādyotpādakatvena saṃsthānavidhirucyate //	it is only the form of the distinction that is spoken of in the form of the producer and produced, (1349)
yathā kumārilena paricchedaphalatvetyādinā granthenotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthākṛtā tathāsmākam apyavirodhinyeva /	Kumārila has in his Ślokavārtika (Sense-perception, 78), in the words “The Cognition can be the Means as bringing about the apprehension, etc. etc.” based the distinction between the Means and Fruit on the relation of Producer and Produced.
yathoktamācāryeṇa ---"tatrāpi hi pratyakṣatvopacāro 'viruddhaścakṣurādiṣu tat kāraṇeṣv"iti /	As our Teacher has declared as follows: ‘The attributing of the name Pratyakṣa to the Eye and other causes is not incompatible’, All that we say is as follows: It is essential that in the beginning the relation of Cause and Effect can be based only upon the distinction previously made;
etāvat tu brūmaḥ avaśyamādau vyavasthādvāreṇaiva sādhyasādhanasaṃsthā kartavyā, na hy avyavasthāpya saṃvidbhedaṃ viṣayabhedena niyamena pravṛttir yuktā saṃvidbhedavyavasthāyāś ca sārūpyam eva nibandhanam iti sāmarthyāevāyātaṃ sārūpyasya sādhakatamatvaṃ sārūpyād eva ca jñānasya pravartakatvam /	until the difference in the Cognitions has been distinctly recognised, nothing can proceed on the basis of the difference in objectives; and for the recognition of the difference among Cognitions there can be no basis other than the sameness of form; and from this it follows by implication that the sameness of form is the most efficient instrument; and it is on the basis of this sameness of form that the Cognition proceeds to prompt people to activity;
pravartakasya ca pramāṇatvaṃ pravṛttikāmena nirūpyate na vyasanitayā /	and the fact of the prompter being the Means of Bight Cognition can be determined only by one who is seeking to engage in the activity concerned; and not merely as a whim..
yathoktam ---"arthakriyārthaṃ hi sarvaḥ pramāṇamapramāṇaṃ cānveṣate prekṣāvān"iti /	It has been thus declared ‘Every wise person seeks to determine what is the proper means of cognition and what is not so, only for the purpose of some fruitful activity It is for this reason that that factor alone in the Cognition has to be brought out by which it serves to prompt men to activity.
yato yenaivāṃśena pravartakatvaṃ jñānasya bhavati sa eva darśanīyaḥ, na cotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthāyāṃ pravartakāṃśaḥ sārūpyaṃ gamyate, tataś ca niṣphalamevotpādadvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ syāt /	But in drawing the distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced, there is no recognition of that sameness of form which is the only prompting factor; consequently the said distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the said basis would be absolutely useless.
ata evācāryeṇaitaddvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ na pravṛttyaṅgam iti matvaivopacāra āśritaḥ /	This is the reason why the Teacher had recourse to a figurative (indirect) interpretation, as he felt that the determining of the character of the Means of Cognition on the said basis cannot take any part in the prompting to activity.
tasmājjātāyāṃ tu vyavasthāyāṃ sānyathāpyutpādyotpādakabhāvena kalpyatām /	Thus when the distinction has once been made, it may subsequently be explained on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced;
paricchedetyādinā tadeva kaumārilaṃ phalavyavasthānaṃ darśayati / paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyānantarasya hi / kāraṇatvaṃ mataṃ jñāne pramāṇe tu phalaṃ param //	The ‘fruit’ consisting in the apprehension of the object, the character of the ‘means of cognition’ must belong to what goes immediately before it. Hence if the cognition be held to be the ‘means then the ‘fruit’ must be something else.
svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ cenniṣedhānnaiva yujyate / māne ca viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṃ prasajyate //	It cannot be right to attribute the character of the ‘fruit’ to the self-recognition (by the cognition), as this is going to be refuted later on. Nor can it be right to assert that the ‘means’ consists in the form of the object (cognised);
vṛttasyeti /	as in that case there would be a diversity of objectives” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 78-79], (1350-1351)
pravṛttasya cakṣurāder ity arthaḥ /	‘What goes, etc. etc.’ i.e. the Eye and the other sense-organs.
phalaṃ param iti hānopādānāpekṣābuddhilakṣaṇam .	‘The Fruit must be something else’; in the form of rejecting or acquiring or ignoring the thing cognised;
idam aparamuktaṃ kumārilenaiva svasaṃvedanasya niṣedhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvamayuktam /	this also has been declared by Kumārila himself. As regards ‘self-recognition’ (by the Cognition), that has been refuted; hence that cannot be regarded as the ‘Fruit’ of Right Cognition.
viṣayākārasya ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalayor bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ prasajyate /	If the form of the object be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different;
tathā hi viṣayākāro bāhyaviṣayaḥ svasaṃvedanaṃ tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayam	for instance, the form of the object would be something external (objective), while the self-recognition of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely subjective).
iti // [p.401] sarvetyādinā pratividhatte	The above argument is answered in the following [see verse 1352 next]
sarvāvittaprasaṅgena sā niṣeddhuṃ na śakyate /	‘self-recognition’ cannot be denied; as that would involve the incongruity of there being no cognition at all.
bhinnārthatvam na cehāsti svavidapyarthavinmatā //	Nor can the objectives be different; as ‘self-recognition’ aslo is held to be the cognition of the object.
"apratyakṣopalambhāya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati" iti sarvārthāpratyakṣatvaprasaṅgān na śakyate svasaṃvittir niṣeddhum /	In accordance with the maxim ‘He who has no apprehension of Sense-perception can have no perception of anything’ there would be incongruity of there being no perception of anything, if the cognition of the cognition itself were denied;
nāpi bhinnaviṣayatvaprasaṅgo yuktaḥ, yataḥ svasaṃvittirapyarthasaṃvittir iṣṭātat, kāryatvāt /	Nor can it be right to hold that the two cognitions have two different objectives; because ‘self-recognition’ also is held to be the cognition of the object, because it is the effect of that, not because it consists entirely of that;
natu tanmayatvena /	Hence there is no incongruity at all.
svātiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvataḥ /	“As a matter of fact, the means of cognition must bring about an effect other than itself, because, it is an active agent, like the hatchet”;
kāsyādivaccedvaiphalyamanyaddhyapi phalaṃ matam // uktanyāyena vāsyāder anyad asti phalaṃ na ca / kārakatvaṃ ca no siddhaṃ janakatvavivakṣayā //	as a different ‘fruit’ has been admitted; and in accordance with reasons already explained (under text 1348), there is no ‘different’ fruit at all. As regards the means of cognition being an ‘active agent’, that is not admissible by us, if what is meant by it is that it is productive;
sthāpakatvavivakṣāyāṃ na virodho 'sti kaścana /	if what is meant is that it is the regulator, then there can be no objection to it;
tenānaikāntiko hetur virodhāpratipādanāt //	and in that case the reason becomes ‘inconclusive’, as it indicates no incongruity.
ātmavyatiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvād vāsyādivad iti /	“The Means of Cognition must be one that brings about an effect different from itself, because it is an active agent, like the Hatchet, etc.” (1353)
vaiphalyam ityādinā kathitam /	inasmuch as different ‘fruit’ or ‘effect’ has been already admitted in the form of ‘characterisation’ (specification).
hiśabdo hetau /	The particle ‘hi’ connotes reason (for what is said).
vāsyādivad iti ca sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaśchidayā sahaikatvasya pratipāditatvāt /	The corroborative instance cited ‘like the Hatchet’, is one that is ‘devoid of the Probandum’; because it has been already shown that the Hatchet is the same as the Cut (vide Text, 1348).
kārakatvād iti ca janyajanakatvavivakṣāyām asiddho hetuḥ, sthāpakatvenaiveṣṭatvāt /	The premise ‘because it is an active agent’ is ‘inadmissible’ if what is meant is that it is prodtictive of its effect;
sādhanasya sthāpakatvavivakṣāyām apyanaikāntiko virodhābhāvāt / sāmānyavivakṣāyām anaikāntika eva, virodhasyānupadarśitatvāt //	But even if it is meant that it is the Regulator, the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity (indicated). If ‘activity’ in general be what is meant, then also the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity indicated.
nanu ca yadi viṣayākāraṃ jñānaṃ syāt tadā bhaved viṣayasārūpyasya prāmāṇyam, yāvatā grāhyaviṣayasamānākāraṃ samānasvabhāvaṃ jñānam upapadyate, naiva tathā, grāhyāj jātyantaratvād rūparasayor ivetyāha grāhyetyādi /	If it be argued that “the cognition cannot have the same form as the object apprehended, because it belongs to a different category, like the cognition of colour, taste, etc.”, [then the answer is as follows] in due accordance with our doctrine we have clearly explained this and also other things in course of our rejection of the idea of a real object being apprehended.
idam anyac ca vispaṣṭaṃ grāhyagrāhavivecane //	This is what is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 1356-1357 above]
[p.402] vijñānavādanyāyānusāribhir asmābhir etad iṣṭam eveti na kiñcit kṣīyate /	We who are followers of the doctrine of Idealism readily accept what has been urged; it does not affect our position at all.

na ca vikalpānubaddhasya sparṣṭārthapratibhāsitā /

and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear.

asmābhistu svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena janitasyaiva pratyakṣatvenābhyupetatvāt /

Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-perception is that which is brought about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is,aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.

api ca grāhyatve sati sukhādīnāṃ vicchinnapratibhāsitā syānnīlādivat /

Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their manifestation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things;

na ca jñānādvicchinnasya śātādirūpasyopalabdhiḥ /

and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.

jñānābhedena śatādirūpasya grahaṇaṃ bhrāntir iti cet /

It might be argued that “as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeableness must be wrong”.

evaṃ tarhi siddhā sukhādīnāṃ sattā svasaṃvidrūpā /

In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition;

śātādirūpamātralakṣaṇatvāt sukhādīnām /

because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable;

tadrūpatā cej jñānasya siddhā, siddhā jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ /

and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself.

vyatiriktānāṃ tvasiddhatvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ /

Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.

śātetyanukūlā, tadviparītā tvaśātā, ādiśabdenopekṣā gṛhyate /

‘Agreeable’ is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is ‘disagreeable’, The term ‘and the rest’ (after ‘Pleasure’) includes Indifference.

yadi ca svasantānotpattilakṣaṇaiva sukhādīnāṃ sattā sa eva teṣām anubhava iti nābhyupagamyate / kiṃtu tadviṣayajñānotpattis tadā yogināṃ parakīyaṃ sukhādi gṛhṇatāṃ tadanubhavināmiva tulyāturāvasthā syāt / bhinnasantānavartitvān na tulyāvastheti na vaktavyam /

If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own ‘Chain’, and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also, but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves, then, in that case? when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that “it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains”;

nahi svasantānavartitvaṃ teṣām anugamo 'bhyupagataḥ /

because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same ‘chain’;

kiṃ tarhitadviṣayajñānotpattiḥ /

what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain;

sā ca parasantānagrāhiṇām apyastīti samānaḥ prasaṅgaḥ /

and the cognition is present in the ‘chain’ of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.

athobhayamanubhave sukhādīnāṃ kāraṇamaṅgīkriyate tadā svasantānavartitvenānubhave siddhaṃ sukhādīnām ātmasaṃvedanam /

If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both, then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own ‘chains’, it becomes proved that they are self-cognised.

evaṃ hi svasantānavartitvaṃ nimittaṃ parasantānavartibhyaś ca viśeṣakaṃ bhavati /

In this way, ‘presence in one’s own chain’ serves to distinguish them from those ‘present in other chains’.

yadi svasaṃvid rūpā bhavanti yeṣāṃ tarhi na yoginaḥ siddhā mīmāṃsakādīnāṃ teṣāṃ kathaṃ taiḥ prasaṅga ity āha paretyādi /

Question: “If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those Mīmāṃsakas for instance, who do not admit of any mystics?”

nahi bauddhānām iva pareṣāṃ nirviṣayaṃ paramārthato 'numānam /

Answer: ‘The same applies, etc. etc.’ Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of objectivity;

tataś ca paraduḥkhānumāne tulyo 'nubhave 'numātur api syāt //

hence, for one who infers the Pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain [so that the said incongruity would be there all the same].

sukhādītyeva gamyante sukhaduḥkhādayo na tu /

[Says Śaṅkarasvāmin] “Pleasure, etc. are apprehended only as ‘pleasure, etc.’;

jñānamityeva gamyante tan na jñānaṃ ghaṭādivat //

they are not apprehended as ‘cognition’; consequently like the jar, etc., they cannot be cognition”.

[p.398] śaṅkarasvāmyāha na jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ, jñānamityavyapadeśyatvāt, ghaṭādivad iti //

Śaṅkarasvāmin says: “Pleasure, etc. cannot he of the nature of Cognition, because they are never spoken of as ‘Cognition’; just like the Jar, etc.”.

yadyevamityādinā dūṣaṇam āha

The objection to this view is as follows: [see verse 1341 next]

yadyevaṃ samayānyatve jñānamityapi no gatiḥ / cetasyasti tataḥ prāptā tatrāpyajñānatā tadā //

If difference is to be accepted on the basis of convention, then cognition itself may not be spoken of as ‘cognition’, and on the basis of that, cognition would become non-cognition.

yadi saṅketānyatvena svabhāvānyatvaṃ syāt, evaṃ sati yadā jñāne 'pi kaścidajñānam iti samayaṃ kuryāt tadā jñānam ityapi cetasi vyapadeśo nāstīti prāptā jñāne 'pyajñānatā bhāvataḥ //

If difference of nature were based upon Convention (i,e. the use of words, which is purely a matter of Convention), then, there may be some one who might set up the Convention that the Cognition should be spoken of as ‘non-cognition’, and in accordance with this Convention, Cognition would become Not-cognition, for you!

vyaktaṃ prakāśarūpatvānno cedevaṃ prasajyate / sukhaduḥkhādike tulyaṃ tac ca sarvamidaṃ na kim //

If it be urged that “being clearly of the nature of light, it could never be as alleged”, then, you are faced with this contingency is not all this the same in the case of pleasure and pain also? (1342)

bhutārthabhāvanodbhūtaṃ kalpanābhrāntivarjitam / vakṣyāmo yogivijñānaṃ sādhanaīr vimalair alam //

As regards the mystic’s cognition, we are going to describe it, on the basis of spotless reasons, as arising out of the contemplation of things and being free from conceptual content and error.

atha prakāśātmakaṃ jñānaṃ spaṣṭamanubhūyata iti nājñānatā syād evaṃ sati sukhādiṣvapi sarvametat samānam /

If the view is that “Cognition, being of the nature of Light, can never be non-cognition”, then the answer is that all this is equally there in the case of Pleasure and Pain also.

hetuścānenaiva vyabhicārī{ti} na kiñcid etat /

The Reason also is false, ‘Inconclusive’; so this is nothing.

vakṣyāma iti / sarvajñasiddhau //

‘We are going to describe’, under the chapter on The Omniscient Being.

pramāṇaphalavipratipattinirākaraṇāyāha viṣayetyādi / viṣayādhigatiścātra pramāṇaphalamiṣyate /

The cognition of the object is held to be the ‘fruit’ of the means of cognition, when the ‘means of cognition’ consists in the ‘sameness of form’ (between the cognition and the cognised);

svavittir vā pramāṇaṃ tu sārūpyaṃ yogyatāpi vā //

or apprehension of itself is the fruit, and the means, in this case, consists in ‘capability’.

bāhye 'the prameye viṣayādhigamaḥ pramāṇaphalaṃ, sārūpyaṃ tu pramāṇam /

(a) When the external object is what is cognised, then the cognition of that object is the Fruit, and Sameness of form the Means, of the Cognition;

svasaṃvittāvapi satyāṃ yathākāram asya prathanāt /

as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised.

jñānātmani tu prameye svasaṃvittiḥ phalam, yogyatā pramāṇam /

(b) When what is cognised is of the nature of Cognition, then the ‘apprehension of itself’ is the fruit, and capability the Means, of the Cognition.

savyāpārapratītatām upādāya jñānasyaiva sā tādṛśī yogyatā /

The said capability belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function;

yena tadevātmānaṃ vedayate na ghaṭādaya iti yogyatayā karaṇabhūtayaivātmaprakāśakaṃ lakṣyate jñānamiti yogyatāyāḥ svasaṃvedane prāmāṇyam /

by virtue of which capability, it is Cognition alone and not the Jar and such things, that apprehends itself; hence it is by the instrumentality of this capability that Cognition is found to be self-manifested; hence Capability is said to be the ‘Means’, the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself.

"tatrāpyanubhayātmatvāt te yogyāḥ svātmasaṃvidaḥ /

This has been thus declared ‘The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are capable of such self-apprehension;

iti sā yogyatā mānamātmā meyaḥ phalaṃ svavit" // iti //

hence their capability is the Instrument (Means) and they themselves are the cognised, and their own apprehension is the fruit’, (1344)

chedana ityādinā kaumārilacodyamāśaṅkate chedane khadiraprāpte palāśe na chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā naikateti cet //

“Just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the resultant cut does not appear in the Palāśa-tree, in the same way nowhere in the world is the (cutting) axe found to be the same as the cut itself” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 75).

[p.399] bhinnapramāṇaphalavādinaṃ prati bauddhenoktam yadi pramāṇaphalayor bhedo 'bhyupagamyate tadā bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ syāt pramāṇaphalayoḥ /

The Bauddha has addressed the following argument to the person who asserted that the Means of Cognition was different from its Fruit: If there is difference between the Means of Cognition and its Fruit, then the objective of these two the Means of Cognition and the Fruit of Cognition also must be different;

na caitad yuktam /

and yet this cannot be right;

nahi paraścādike chedane svadiraprāpte sati palāśe chedo bhavati /

when, for instance, the cutting weapon, the Axe, is struck at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāśa-tree;

tasmāt pramāṇaphalayor ekaviṣayatvād abheda iti /

hence it must be admitted that the objective of both is the same and hence there is no difference between them.

atroktaṃ kumārilena "viṣayaikatvam icchaṃs tu yaḥ pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ vadet / sādhyasādhanayor bhedo laukikās tena bādhitaḥ //

It is in answer to this that Kumārila says “If one who desires the objective to be the same should declare the Means of Cognition to be the same as its Fruit, then he would be setting aside the well-known distinction between Cause and Effect;

chedane khadiraprāpte na palāśe chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā saha naikatā" //

just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palāsha-tree, so also nowhere in the world is the Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself” (Śloka-vārtika Sense-perception, 74-75).

iti / chedyate 'neneti chedanam //

The word ‘Chedana’, ‘Cutting weapon’, stands for that by which something is cut.

na vyavasthāśrayatvena sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ /

The distinction of ‘cause and effect’ does not rest upon the substratum of that distinction;

nirākāre tu vijñāne sā saṃsthā na hi yujyate //

cognition being formless, the said distinction cannot be possible.

nīlāspadaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti viṣayāvagativyavasthāyā arthasārūpyameva nibandhanaṃ nānyad iti vyavasthāpakatvabhāvena sādhyasādhanavyavasthā notpadyotpādakabhāvena, yasmān na pāramārthikaḥ kartṛkaraṇādibhāvo 'sti,

The apprehension of Blue is not the apprehension of Yellow, this distinction in the cognition of things is based upon the sameness of form, nothing else; so that the distinction of Cause and Effect is made through the relation of what is distinguished and what distinguishes, not through the relation of the Produced and Producer; because the relation of the Acting Agent, the Instrument and the rest is not real;

kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām /

because all things being momentary, they cannot have any action.

jñānaṃ hi viṣayākāramutpadyamānaṃ viṣayaṃ paricchindadiva savyāpāramivābhāti /

When the Cognition is produced in the form of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active.

ayamevārthaprāpaṇavyāpāro jñānasya na tvavinābhāvitvamātram /

Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object, not in mere invariable concomitance.

na hi bījādyavinābhāvino 'ṅkurādayo na bhavanti /

For instance, the sprout does not cease to be invariably concomitant with the seed.

ye{na} jñānam eva pramāṇaṃ syāt /

Thus the Cognition itself cannot be the Means of Cognition.

tasmāt sākāram eva jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na nirākāram iti vyavasthayā pramāṇyena pradarśyate /

It is for this reason that the nature of the Means of Cognitio7i is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition with a form, not the formless Cognition which is the Means of Cognition.

vyavasthā ca tat pṛṣṭhalabdhena vikalpena veditavyā //

This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.

ata utprekṣito bhedo vidyate dhanurādivat /

Thus then, the (commonly known) distinction (between the cognition as means and cognition as fruit) is purely imaginary, as in the case of the bow.

utpādyotpādakatvena vyavastheyaṃ tu neṣyate //

the distinction cannot be held to be based upon the relation of the producer and produced.

dhanurādivad iti / dhanur vidyati dhanuṣā vidhyati dhanuṣo niḥsṛtya śaro vidyatīti yaccaikasya dhanuṣaḥ kartṛtvādayaḥ kalpitā na virudhyante tathehāpīti //

In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as (a) ‘The Bow pierces’, (b) ‘He pierces with the Bow’, (c) ‘the arrow proceeding from the Bow, pierces’, where the same Bow is spoken of as (a) ‘Agent’, (b) ‘Instrument, and (c) ‘Ablative and this distinction is only imaginary (not real);

viśliṣyamāṇasandhau ca dārvādau paraśucchidā / praviśannucyate tena tatraikatvamavasthitam //

When the compact fibre of the wood is rent asunder by the cut of the axe, the axe is (popularly) called the ‘cut’ only when it enters into the fibre;

paraśunā ca vṛkṣādeśchidā nirūpyamāṇā chedyadravyānupraveśalakṣaṇaivāvatiṣṭhate sa cānupraveśaḥ paraśorātmagata eva dharma iti paramārthataśchidayāsahaikatvam iti nāsti virodhaḥ //

When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the cut consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood-fibre; and this entrance is a property belonging to the Axe itself; so that in tins sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Out; and there is no incongruity in this.

[p.400] vyavasthāyām ityādinaitaddarśayati

The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 1349 next]

vyavasthāyāṃ tu jātāyāṃ kalpyatāmanyathāpi hi /

When once the distinction has been made, it may be assumed to be otherwise also;

utpādyotpādakatvena saṃsthānavidhirucyate //

it is only the form of the distinction that is spoken of in the form of the producer and produced, (1349)

yathā kumārilena paricchedaphalatvetyādinā granthenotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthākṛtā tathāsmākam apyavirodhinyeva /

Kumārila has in his Ślokavārtika (Sense-perception, 78), in the words “The Cognition can be the Means as bringing about the apprehension, etc. etc.” based the distinction between the Means and Fruit on the relation of Producer and Produced.

yathoktamācāryeṇa ---"tatrāpi hi pratyakṣatvopacāro 'viruddhaścakṣurādiṣu tat kāraṇeṣv"iti /

As our Teacher has declared as follows: ‘The attributing of the name Pratyakṣa to the Eye and other causes is not incompatible’, All that we say is as follows: It is essential that in the beginning the relation of Cause and Effect can be based only upon the distinction previously made;

etāvat tu brūmaḥ avaśyamādau vyavasthādvāreṇaiva sādhyasādhanasaṃsthā kartavyā, na hy avyavasthāpya saṃvidbhedaṃ viṣayabhedena niyamena pravṛttir yuktā saṃvidbhedavyavasthāyāś ca sārūpyam eva nibandhanam iti sāmarthyāevāyātaṃ sārūpyasya sādhakatamatvaṃ sārūpyād eva ca jñānasya pravartakatvam /

until the difference in the Cognitions has been distinctly recognised, nothing can proceed on the basis of the difference in objectives; and for the recognition of the difference among Cognitions there can be no basis other than the sameness of form; and from this it follows by implication that the sameness of form is the most efficient instrument; and it is on the basis of this sameness of form that the Cognition proceeds to prompt people to activity;

pravartakasya ca pramāṇatvaṃ pravṛttikāmena nirūpyate na vyasanitayā /

and the fact of the prompter being the Means of Bight Cognition can be determined only by one who is seeking to engage in the activity concerned; and not merely as a whim..

yathoktam ---"arthakriyārthaṃ hi sarvaḥ pramāṇamapramāṇaṃ cānveṣate prekṣāvān"iti /

It has been thus declared ‘Every wise person seeks to determine what is the proper means of cognition and what is not so, only for the purpose of some fruitful activity It is for this reason that that factor alone in the Cognition has to be brought out by which it serves to prompt men to activity.

yato yenaivāṃśena pravartakatvaṃ jñānasya bhavati sa eva darśanīyaḥ, na cotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthāyāṃ pravartakāṃśaḥ sārūpyaṃ gamyate, tataś ca niṣphalamevotpādadvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ syāt /

But in drawing the distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced, there is no recognition of that sameness of form which is the only prompting factor; consequently the said distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the said basis would be absolutely useless.

ata evācāryeṇaitaddvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ na pravṛttyaṅgam iti matvaivopacāra āśritaḥ /

This is the reason why the Teacher had recourse to a figurative (indirect) interpretation, as he felt that the determining of the character of the Means of Cognition on the said basis cannot take any part in the prompting to activity.

tasmājjātāyāṃ tu vyavasthāyāṃ sānyathāpyutpādyotpādakabhāvena kalpyatām /

Thus when the distinction has once been made, it may subsequently be explained on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced;

paricchedetyādinā tadeva kaumārilaṃ phalavyavasthānaṃ darśayati / paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyānantarasya hi / kāraṇatvaṃ mataṃ jñāne pramāṇe tu phalaṃ param //

The ‘fruit’ consisting in the apprehension of the object, the character of the ‘means of cognition’ must belong to what goes immediately before it. Hence if the cognition be held to be the ‘means then the ‘fruit’ must be something else.

svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ cenniṣedhānnaiva yujyate / māne ca viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṃ prasajyate //

It cannot be right to attribute the character of the ‘fruit’ to the self-recognition (by the cognition), as this is going to be refuted later on. Nor can it be right to assert that the ‘means’ consists in the form of the object (cognised);

vṛttasyeti /

as in that case there would be a diversity of objectives” [Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 78-79], (1350-1351)

pravṛttasya cakṣurāder ity arthaḥ /

‘What goes, etc. etc.’ i.e. the Eye and the other sense-organs.

phalaṃ param iti hānopādānāpekṣābuddhilakṣaṇam .

‘The Fruit must be something else’; in the form of rejecting or acquiring or ignoring the thing cognised;

idam aparamuktaṃ kumārilenaiva svasaṃvedanasya niṣedhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvamayuktam /

this also has been declared by Kumārila himself. As regards ‘self-recognition’ (by the Cognition), that has been refuted; hence that cannot be regarded as the ‘Fruit’ of Right Cognition.

viṣayākārasya ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalayor bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ prasajyate /

If the form of the object be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different;

tathā hi viṣayākāro bāhyaviṣayaḥ svasaṃvedanaṃ tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayam

for instance, the form of the object would be something external (objective), while the self-recognition of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely subjective).

iti // [p.401] sarvetyādinā pratividhatte

The above argument is answered in the following [see verse 1352 next]

sarvāvittaprasaṅgena sā niṣeddhuṃ na śakyate /

‘self-recognition’ cannot be denied; as that would involve the incongruity of there being no cognition at all.

bhinnārthatvam na cehāsti svavidapyarthavinmatā //

Nor can the objectives be different; as ‘self-recognition’ aslo is held to be the cognition of the object.

"apratyakṣopalambhāya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati" iti sarvārthāpratyakṣatvaprasaṅgān na śakyate svasaṃvittir niṣeddhum /

In accordance with the maxim ‘He who has no apprehension of Sense-perception can have no perception of anything’ there would be incongruity of there being no perception of anything, if the cognition of the cognition itself were denied;

nāpi bhinnaviṣayatvaprasaṅgo yuktaḥ, yataḥ svasaṃvittirapyarthasaṃvittir iṣṭātat, kāryatvāt /

Nor can it be right to hold that the two cognitions have two different objectives; because ‘self-recognition’ also is held to be the cognition of the object, because it is the effect of that, not because it consists entirely of that;

natu tanmayatvena /

Hence there is no incongruity at all.

svātiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvataḥ /

“As a matter of fact, the means of cognition must bring about an effect other than itself, because, it is an active agent, like the hatchet”;

kāsyādivaccedvaiphalyamanyaddhyapi phalaṃ matam // uktanyāyena vāsyāder anyad asti phalaṃ na ca / kārakatvaṃ ca no siddhaṃ janakatvavivakṣayā //

as a different ‘fruit’ has been admitted; and in accordance with reasons already explained (under text 1348), there is no ‘different’ fruit at all. As regards the means of cognition being an ‘active agent’, that is not admissible by us, if what is meant by it is that it is productive;

sthāpakatvavivakṣāyāṃ na virodho 'sti kaścana /

if what is meant is that it is the regulator, then there can be no objection to it;

tenānaikāntiko hetur virodhāpratipādanāt //

and in that case the reason becomes ‘inconclusive’, as it indicates no incongruity.

ātmavyatiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvād vāsyādivad iti /

“The Means of Cognition must be one that brings about an effect different from itself, because it is an active agent, like the Hatchet, etc.” (1353)

vaiphalyam ityādinā kathitam /

inasmuch as different ‘fruit’ or ‘effect’ has been already admitted in the form of ‘characterisation’ (specification).

hiśabdo hetau /

The particle ‘hi’ connotes reason (for what is said).

vāsyādivad iti ca sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaśchidayā sahaikatvasya pratipāditatvāt /

The corroborative instance cited ‘like the Hatchet’, is one that is ‘devoid of the Probandum’; because it has been already shown that the Hatchet is the same as the Cut (vide Text, 1348).

kārakatvād iti ca janyajanakatvavivakṣāyām asiddho hetuḥ, sthāpakatvenaiveṣṭatvāt /

The premise ‘because it is an active agent’ is ‘inadmissible’ if what is meant is that it is prodtictive of its effect;

sādhanasya sthāpakatvavivakṣāyām apyanaikāntiko virodhābhāvāt / sāmānyavivakṣāyām anaikāntika eva, virodhasyānupadarśitatvāt //

But even if it is meant that it is the Regulator, the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity (indicated). If ‘activity’ in general be what is meant, then also the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity indicated.

nanu ca yadi viṣayākāraṃ jñānaṃ syāt tadā bhaved viṣayasārūpyasya prāmāṇyam, yāvatā grāhyaviṣayasamānākāraṃ samānasvabhāvaṃ jñānam upapadyate, naiva tathā, grāhyāj jātyantaratvād rūparasayor ivetyāha grāhyetyādi /

If it be argued that “the cognition cannot have the same form as the object apprehended, because it belongs to a different category, like the cognition of colour, taste, etc.”, [then the answer is as follows] in due accordance with our doctrine we have clearly explained this and also other things in course of our rejection of the idea of a real object being apprehended.

idam anyac ca vispaṣṭaṃ grāhyagrāhavivecane //

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 1356-1357 above]

[p.402] vijñānavādanyāyānusāribhir asmābhir etad iṣṭam eveti na kiñcit kṣīyate /

We who are followers of the doctrine of Idealism readily accept what has been urged; it does not affect our position at all.