buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tadvyatiriktasya cānyasyābhāvāt /	and there is nothing apart from these.
pakṣadharmasyānyathānupapannatvād avyatirekāccaikalakṣaṇa evāyam /	As regards the character of ‘being present in the Minor Term’, this is ‘otherwise impossible’, and is nothing apart from this latter;
jñeyatvādinā kenacit paryāyeṇetyarthaḥ /	‘Somehow’, under some such term as ‘Cognisable’ or its synonyms.
sadātmakatvād iti / atrāpi kathañcid iti sambandhanīyam /	‘Are essentially existent’, ‘somehow’ has to be construed with this also.
tenāyam artho bhavati kathañcidupalabhyatvāt kathañcit sadātmakāv iti //	Hence the full Reasoning is ‘Because they are somehow apprehensible, therefore they are somehow existent’.
candratvenāpadiṣṭatvān nācandraḥ śaśalāñchanaḥ /	“(1) ‘the śaśa-lāñcana (hare-marked) is not non-moon.
iti dvilakṣaṇo hetur ayaṃ cāpara ucyate //	Because it is spoken of as the moon’; here we have a ‘two-featured’ probans.
patatkīṭakṛteyaṃ me vedanetyavasīyate / patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvataḥ // cakṣū rūpagrahe kārye sadātiśayaśaktimat / tasmin vyāpāryamāṇatvād yadi vā tasya darśanāt // [p.307]	(2) Another is thus stated ‘i think that this pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect, because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect’, (3) ‘in bringing about the effect in the shape of the perception of colour, the eye is endowed with a unique potency, because it is used for that purpose, or, because colour is found to be actually perceived by its means (4) ‘the soul, the jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent, because they are somehow inapprehensible in any way, like the horns of the hare’.
kathañcana sadātmānaḥ śaśaśṛṅgādayo 'pi ca / kathañcidupalabhyatvād yathaivātmaghaṭādayaḥ //	(5) ‘Even the hare’s horn and such things are somehow existent, because they are somehow apprehensible, just like the soul, the jar and such things’.
tvadīyo vāpi tatrāsti veśmanītyavagamyate /	(6) ‘It is understood that your father is in this house, because your father’s voice is heard in the house’.
bhāvatkapitṛśabdasya śravaṇādiha sadmani // anyathānupapattyaiva śabdadīpādivastuṣu / apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ca //	(7) In the case of words, lamps and such things, it is found that they are actually indicative (of things) through the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even though they do not reside in the subject (minor term).
tenaikalakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /	hence for us, it is the ‘one-featured’ probans that should be regarded as the indicative (probans), on the ground of its being the most important;
pakṣadharmādibhis tvanyaiḥ kiṃ vyarthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ //	what is the use of assuming such characters as ‘residing in the subject’ and so forth?” (1372-1379)
nācandraḥ śaśī candraḥ śaśīti vā pakṣaḥ, loke sampradāyaprasiddhacandravyapadeśāc candratvenāpadiṣṭatvād iti vā hetuḥ, vaidharmyeṇa loṣṭādi /	The proposition may be stated either in the form ‘The Hare-marked is not Non-Moon’, or ‘The Hare-marked is the Moon’; and the Probans is ‘because it is spoken of by the well-known popular name Moon’, or ‘because it is spoken of as the Moon’; the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity being supplied by the clod of earth and such things.
ayaṃ cāparo dvilakṣaṇa ucyate patatkīṭakakṛteyaṃ mama vedanā patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvāt /	(2) Another Probans is next mentioned, which is ‘two-featured’: ‘This pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect, because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect’;
patataḥ kīṭakasya pataṅgasya sparśena pratilabdha udaya utpādo yayetyarthaḥ /	i.e. the ‘udaya’, appearance, of which was ‘pratilabdha’, felt, on the ‘sparśa’, touch, of the falling insect.
sāmānyavivakṣā cātrānyapadārthe draṣṭavyā tena ṭāb na bhavati /	The feminine affix ‘ṭāp’ is not added at the end of the compound, because it is intended to be a common factor.
vidyamānarūpagrahaṇasādhakatamaśaktikaṃ cakṣuḥ, anupahatatve sati rūpādidṛkṣāyāṃ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇā karaṇatvena vyāpāryamāṇatvāt, rūpaparicchedanadarśanād vā /	(3) [Another example] ‘The Eye has the potency of the most effective instrument in bringing about the apprehension of the Colour existing at the present time, because, while it is not damaged, it is that which is used as the Instrument, by a man who desires to see Colour and acts intelligently’ or ‘because it is actually found to bring about the cognition of Colour’;
vaidharmyeṇa śrotrādi /	the Ear, etc. being the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.
tasyeti rūpasya /	‘Tasya’ of the Colour.
atra triṣvapi hetuṣvasatyāṣu sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāvād dvirūpatvam / ātmaghaṭādayaḥ kathañcidasadātmānaḥ kathañcid anupalabhyamānatvāt kharaviṣāṇavat /	hence the Probans here is a ‘two-featured’ one. The following Text supplies the answer to the above arguments of Pātrasvāmin: [see verse 1380 next] Is the proposed definition meant to be general? Or, in reference to a particular subject on which knowledge is sought? Or in reference to the instance? (1380) The proposed definition of the Probans is that (it is ‘otherwise impossible’, which means that) it should not exist apart from the Probandum;
sādhanavyavacchedo nirdiśyeta / kharaviṣāṇādayo vā kathañcitsadātmakāḥ kathañcidupalabhyamānatvād ātmaghaṭādivat /	(1) now is this meant to be general (applicable to all Probans)? Or is it meant to be applicable to any particular object? and in the latter case, (2) is it meant to be in reference to a particular object in which the existence or otherwise of the Probandum is sought to he known? Or (3) in reference to that object which forms the Corroborative Instance.
[p.408] tadityādinā pratividhatte /	These are the alternatives possible.
tad idaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetoḥ kiṃ sāmānyena gamyate / jijñāsitaviśeṣe vā dharmiṇy atha nidarśane //	If it were understood to be general, then, what would be indicated would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present;
sāmānyena gate tasminnevaṃ cetsādhyadharmiṇi /	and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished.
hetoḥ sattvaṃ prakāśyeta na vivakṣitasiddhibhāk // na hy avinābhāvitvamātreṇaiva vinā pakṣadharmatvaṃ śabde dharmiṇi cākṣuṣatvam anityatvasya gamakaṃ dṛṣṭam ityayuktaḥ prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ /	The mere fact of its not existing apart from the Probandum, without the other fact of its existing wherever the Probandum is known to exist, does not make ‘visibility’ [which does not exist apart from the Probandum, Non-eternality; but is not present in all cases where Non-eternality is present], does not prove the Non-eternality of Sound,. Hence the first alternative cannot be right.
na vivakṣitasiddhibhāgiti / sādhyadharmiṇi na vivakṣitāṃ siddhiṃ bhajed ity arthaḥ //	‘It would not accomplish, etc. etc.’ that is, it could not establish the desired conclusion regarding the presence of the Probandum in the object.
katham ity āha tadyatheti /	Question: “Why so?” Answer; [see verses 1382-1383 next]
tad yathā cākṣuṣatvasya nāśenāvyabhicāritā /	For instance, ‘visibility’ is known to be inseparable (not existing apart) from ‘destruction’, in a general way;
sāmānyena gatā tac ca dhvanau tasya na sādhanam //	and yet it (visibility) cannot prove it (destruction) in sound.
tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvaḥ khyāpyate cet tathā sati / saiva trirūpatāyātā bhavatām api darśane //	If, then, it be said that its presence in the object is meant, then, in that case, under your view also, the probans becomes ‘three-featured’ as before. ‘Tat’ Visibility.
tacceti cākṣuṣatvam /	‘Tasya’ of Destruction.
tasyeti nāśasya /	‘Cannot prove it’ cannot indicate its presence.
sādhanam gamakam / atha mābhūdyathoktadoṣa iti tasya hetoḥ sādhyadharmiṇi sadbhāva āśrīyate /	It might be said that “in order to guard against the said objection, recourse may be had to the qualification that the Probans should be actually present in the object”.
evaṃ sati tadeva trirūpatvaṃ hetulakṣaṇamasmadīyaṃ bhavaddarśane 'pi jātam //	In that case, under your view also, the Probans comes to have the same ‘three-featured’ character that it had under ours.
katham ity āha anyathetyādi /	Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1384 next]
anyathānupapattya di{hi} vyatirekānvayau gatau /	‘Being otherwise impossible’ includes positive and negative: concomitance;
tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvāt pakṣadharmatvasaṃśayaḥ //	and by its presence in the object its presence in the minor term becomes admitted.
anvayaḥ sapakṣe sattvaṃ, vyatirekaḥ vipakṣāsattvam, saṃśrayaṇaṃ saṃśrayaḥ, parigraha iti yāvat //	‘Positive Concomitance’ is presence wherever the Probandum is known to be present. ‘Negative Concomitance’ is absence where the Probandum is known to be absent. ‘Saṃshraya’ is admission, i.e. acceptance.
ācāryair api nirdiṣṭamīdṛksaṃkṣepalakṣaṇam / grāhyadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto hetur itīdṛśam //	A similar abbreviated definition has been indicated by our teacher also: who says that ‘the probans exists in the cognisable object and is pervaded by a part of it’.
grāhyasya sādhyadharmiṇo dharmaḥ pakṣadharma iti yāvat //	‘Grāhyadharmaḥ’, i.e. existing in the cognisable object, i.e. the object in which the Probandum is sought to be proved;
atheti dvitīyaṃ pakṣamāha	i.e. in the Minor Term.
athedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetor dharmiṇyevāvagamyate / yataḥ pramāṇān nāsiddhiḥ sādhyasyāpi tato na tu // sādhyasyāpratipattau hi hetor api na niścayaḥ /	If the proposed definition of the probans is meant to be one that is found in the minor term only, then that same means of cognition which has made the probans known would make known the probandum also. If the probandum does not become known, then the probans also cannot become known.
ato nirarthako hetur anyataḥ sādhyasiddhitaḥ //	Thus the probans would be useless, the probandum having become known by other means.
anyonyāśrayadoṣaśca hetoḥ sādhyasya niścaye /	There would be the incongruity of ‘mutual interdependence’ also, if the definite cognition of the probandum followed from the probans;
dvayor anyatarāsiddhāvanyasyāviniścaye //	and between these two, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.
atha sādhyadharmiṇyeva sādhyāvinābhāvitvaṃ hetor yat tadeva hetulakṣaṇaṃ yathāha vināsādhyād adṛṣṭasya dṛṣṭānte hetuteṣyate /	The Probans may be defined as being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only, as asserted in the following words “The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum;
parair mayā punar dharmiṇyasambhūṣnor vināmutā //NN	in my opinion however, it is that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;
arthāpatteś ca śābaryā bhaikṣavāścānumānataḥ /	the followers of Śabara derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of Bhikṣu, from Inference;
anyadevānumānaṃ no narasiṃhavadiṣyate //	for us, Inference is something totally different, like Narasiṃha (having a dual character)”.
dharmiṇīti sādhyadharmiṇi.	[In this passage] ‘Dharmiṇi’ In the Minor term;
amunā sādhyadharmeṇa vinā sādhyadharmiṇyasambhavanaśīlasyetyarthaḥ /	That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;
evaṃ tarhi yata eva pramāṇāddhetuḥ sādhyāvinābhūtaḥ sādhyadharmiṇi siddhas tata eva sādhyam api siddham iti vyartho hetuḥ /	this is meant to be the definition (of Probans). If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved, that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term);
atha sādhyaṃ na siddhaṃ tadā hetur api na siddha eva, yasmāt sādhyadharmiṇi	so that the Probans would be entirely useless. If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known;
sādhyāvinābhāvitā hetulakṣaṇam, taccāvinābhāvitvaṃ sādhyāsiddhau na siddhamityasiddho hetuḥ, ubhayasiddhināntarīyakatvād avinābhāvitvasya /	because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this inseparability from the Probandum cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain ‘unknown’, because the cognition of inseparability depends upon the Cognition of both.
anyataḥ pramāṇāt sādhyasiddhau hetuḥ siddha iti cet, kiṃ tadānīṃ hetunā, sādhyasya siddhatvāt /	It might be urged that “The Probans may be known by other means of cognition”; then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?
hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyasya niścaye kartavye 'nyonyanyāśrayadoṣaś ca syāt /	Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.
katham ity āha dvayor ityādi /	Question: “How?” Answer: ‘If the definite Cognition, etc. etc.’;
hetusiddhipūrvikā sādhyasiddhiḥ, tadarthatvāddhetoḥ, hetoś ca sādhyavinābhāvalakṣaṇasya sādhyasiddhipūrvikā siddhir iti vyaktam itaretarāśrayatvam //	the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans, as therein alone lies the use of the Probans, and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum;
tṛtīyapakṣam āha nidarśane 'pīti /	thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence (1386-1388)
nidarśane 'pi tatsiddhau na syād dharmiṇi sādhyadhīḥ /	Even if the probans were known as existent in the corroborative instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the minor term.
na hi sarvopasaṃhārāt tasya vyāptir viniścitā //	because its invariable concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.
[p.410] nidarśane sādhyadharmivyatirikte dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇītyarthaḥ /	‘In the Corroborative Instance’, i.e. in the object that serves as the Corroborative Instance, which object is different from that in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.
tat siddhāviti / hetusiddhau /	‘If it were known’, i.e. if the Probans were known.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi sādhyadharmivyatirekeṇānyatraiva dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi hetor avinābhāvitvam iṣyate, natu sarvopasaṃhāreṇa saha sādhyadharmiṇā, tat kathaṃ sādhyadharmiṇi hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyapratipattiḥ syāt /	What is meant is as follows If the inseparability (concomitance) of the Probans is held to be in the object which forms the Corroborative Instance, and which is something different from the Minor Term, in which the Probandum is sought to be proved, and not ‘all over’ everywhere along with the Minor Term, then how could such a Probans bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term?
kathañca na syād ity āha nahītyādi //	Why it could not bring it about is explained ‘Became its invariable concomitance, etc. etc.’.
yo 'pītyādinā sāmpratam udāharaṇāni dūṣayate / yo 'pyayaṃ hetur atroktaṃ kathañcidupalambhataḥ /	As regards the probans that has been but forward (under 1371), in the, form ‘because it is apprehended somehow’, the object of this is not open to uncertainty;
iti nāstyeva viṣayaḥ sandigdho 'syeti niṣphalaḥ //	hence it is useless.
yo 'yaṃ kathañcidupalambhata iti hetur uktaḥ, asau niṣphalaḥ, sandigdhasya viṣayasyābhāvāt /	As regards the Probans that has been put forward, in the form ‘Because it is somehow apprehended’, this is absolutely futile; as its object is not open to doubt;
siddhasādhyatvād iti yāvat /	that is, it asserts what is already known;
na hi siddho viṣayo hetor iṣyate /	and what is already known cannot bo the objective of the Probans;
tathā hi saṃdigdhe hetuvacanāt /	because ‘a Reason is stated only in reference to what is doubtful’.
vyastavat siddho 'pi hetor anāśraya eva, siddhatvāt sādhyasyeti // atha syāt saṃdigdha eva hetor atrāpi viṣayo 'stīti, ata āha bhāvasyetyādi /	What too is known only in an isolated form cannot be the substratum of the Probans; as the Probandum would be already known (under the definition propounded by Pātrasvāmm).
bhāvasya hi tadātmatvaṃ sarvaireva viniścitam /	That the positive entity is essentially existent is known to all persons;
kathañcit tasya sādhyatvaṃ kimittham abhidhīyate //	then how is it said that it is known ‘somehow’? (1391)
kathañcitsadātmakatvaṃ bhāvasya sarvair yadā niścitam eva tadā bhavatā kimitthamabhidhīyate kathañcit sadātmako bhāva iti /	When all persons somehow know it for certain that the Positive Entity is existent, why do you state your Proposition in the form ‘The Positive Entity is somehow existent’?
tadātmatvam iti / sadātmatvam /	‘Tadātmatvam’ being essentially existent.
bhāvasyetyupalakṣaṇabhāvasyāpi /	The mention of the ‘Positive Entity’ is only by way of illustration; the Negative Entity is also meant.
kathañcit prameyādirūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ niścitam eveti vyartho hetuḥ //	‘Somehow’ i.e. in the form of ‘being cognisable’, it is known for certain that all this is existent;
atha sāṅkhyādīnām asiddhamataḥ sādhyata ity āha sarvetyādi /	hence the Probans is absolutely futile.
sarvabhāvaikyavāde 'pi vikārātmādibhedataḥ / kenacid viśadātmatvamātmanā samprakāśyate //	Even under the doctrine that “all things are one”, on account of the diversity in the nature of the modifications, what is manifested is always in some definitely clear form.
sarvabhāvagataṃ ye 'pi niḥsvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ /	Even those who regard all things as ‘featureless’ (devoid of character), always have recourse to such qualifying terms as ‘truly’ and the like.
te 'pi tattvata ityādi viśeṣaṇamupāśritāḥ //	hence it is sought to be proved”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1392-1393 above]
sarvabhāvānāmaikyavādaḥ sāṅkhyīyo yasmin vāde sthitastair eva sāṅkhyaiḥ kenacid ātmanā svabhāvena tadātmatvaṃ samprakāśyata eva /	‘The doctrine of all things being one’ is the one that is held by the Sāṅkhyas; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is manifested apprehended is always in some definite form.
katham ity āha vikārātmādibhedata iti /	Question: “How so?” Answer: ‘On account of, etc. etc,’;
vikārātmā vikārasvabhāvaḥ /	‘nature of the Modifications’, i.e. in the form of Modifications.
ādiśabdena prakṛtir asaṅkīrṇā sukhaduḥkhādisvabhāvā [p.411] puruṣāś ca parasparataḥ prakṛteś ca bhinnā gṛhyante /	The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the ‘unmixed (Pure) Primordial Matter, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.’ and ‘the Spirits as distinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter’.
ye 'pīti mādhyamikāḥ /	‘Even those’ i.e. the Mādhyamikas, Idealists.
te 'pi tattvata iti saviśeṣaṇaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nissvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ, natu sarvathā /	These also, in asserting the ‘featurelessness’ of all things, always add the qualifying term ‘truly’, and they do not assert them to be absolutely so;
darśana{sa}mutpādādīnām abhyupagamāc ca /	because they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.
tattvata iti / nyāyataḥ /	‘Truly’ i.e, strictly logically.
ādiśabdātparamārthata ityāder grahaṇam /	The term ‘ādi’ includes such qualifying terms as ‘in reality’ and the like.
avaśyaṃ caitad abhyupagantavyaṃ sarvair eva bhāvasya kathañcit sadātmatvaṃ niścitam iti //	In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a thing is somehow existent is quite certainly recognised.
kathañcidupalabhyamanyathā nahi sidhyati /	Otherwise, it cannot be admitted that ‘it is somehow apprehended’.
vyavahārasya sādhyatve prasiddhaṃ syān nidarśanam //	If it is usage that is sought to be proved, then something well known should form the corroborative instance.
anyathaivamaniṣyamāṇe kathañcidupalabhyamānatvād ityayaṃ hetur api na sidhyati /	‘Otherwise’, i.e. if what has been just said is not admitted, then the Probans in the form ‘because it is somehow apprehended’ cannot be admitted.
pūrvaṃ siddhasādhyatā hetudoṣa uktaḥ /	Previous to this the defect pointed out in the statement of the other party was that it was futile;
idānīṃ tvasiddhatoktā /	it is now pointed out that it is inadmissible.
atha vyavahāraḥ sādhyate, tadā yatra pūrvaṃ vyavahāraḥ kṛtas tatprasiddhaṃ nidarśanaṃ sambhavatīti trirūpa eva syāt /	If it is Usage that is meant to be proved, then the Corroborative Instance could be found in the case where the use had been made; and in this case, the Probans would become ‘three-featured’.
anyathā nidarśanābhāve sopi vyavahāro na siddhyet //	Otherwise, if there were no Corroborative Instance, the Usage also could not be known.

tadvyatiriktasya cānyasyābhāvāt /

and there is nothing apart from these.

pakṣadharmasyānyathānupapannatvād avyatirekāccaikalakṣaṇa evāyam /

As regards the character of ‘being present in the Minor Term’, this is ‘otherwise impossible’, and is nothing apart from this latter;

jñeyatvādinā kenacit paryāyeṇetyarthaḥ /

‘Somehow’, under some such term as ‘Cognisable’ or its synonyms.

sadātmakatvād iti / atrāpi kathañcid iti sambandhanīyam /

‘Are essentially existent’, ‘somehow’ has to be construed with this also.

tenāyam artho bhavati kathañcidupalabhyatvāt kathañcit sadātmakāv iti //

Hence the full Reasoning is ‘Because they are somehow apprehensible, therefore they are somehow existent’.

candratvenāpadiṣṭatvān nācandraḥ śaśalāñchanaḥ /

“(1) ‘the śaśa-lāñcana (hare-marked) is not non-moon.

iti dvilakṣaṇo hetur ayaṃ cāpara ucyate //

Because it is spoken of as the moon’; here we have a ‘two-featured’ probans.

patatkīṭakṛteyaṃ me vedanetyavasīyate / patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvataḥ // cakṣū rūpagrahe kārye sadātiśayaśaktimat / tasmin vyāpāryamāṇatvād yadi vā tasya darśanāt // [p.307]

(2) Another is thus stated ‘i think that this pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect, because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect’, (3) ‘in bringing about the effect in the shape of the perception of colour, the eye is endowed with a unique potency, because it is used for that purpose, or, because colour is found to be actually perceived by its means (4) ‘the soul, the jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent, because they are somehow inapprehensible in any way, like the horns of the hare’.

kathañcana sadātmānaḥ śaśaśṛṅgādayo 'pi ca / kathañcidupalabhyatvād yathaivātmaghaṭādayaḥ //

(5) ‘Even the hare’s horn and such things are somehow existent, because they are somehow apprehensible, just like the soul, the jar and such things’.

tvadīyo vāpi tatrāsti veśmanītyavagamyate /

(6) ‘It is understood that your father is in this house, because your father’s voice is heard in the house’.

bhāvatkapitṛśabdasya śravaṇādiha sadmani // anyathānupapattyaiva śabdadīpādivastuṣu / apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ca //

(7) In the case of words, lamps and such things, it is found that they are actually indicative (of things) through the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even though they do not reside in the subject (minor term).

tenaikalakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /

hence for us, it is the ‘one-featured’ probans that should be regarded as the indicative (probans), on the ground of its being the most important;

pakṣadharmādibhis tvanyaiḥ kiṃ vyarthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ //

what is the use of assuming such characters as ‘residing in the subject’ and so forth?” (1372-1379)

nācandraḥ śaśī candraḥ śaśīti vā pakṣaḥ, loke sampradāyaprasiddhacandravyapadeśāc candratvenāpadiṣṭatvād iti vā hetuḥ, vaidharmyeṇa loṣṭādi /

The proposition may be stated either in the form ‘The Hare-marked is not Non-Moon’, or ‘The Hare-marked is the Moon’; and the Probans is ‘because it is spoken of by the well-known popular name Moon’, or ‘because it is spoken of as the Moon’; the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity being supplied by the clod of earth and such things.

ayaṃ cāparo dvilakṣaṇa ucyate patatkīṭakakṛteyaṃ mama vedanā patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvāt /

(2) Another Probans is next mentioned, which is ‘two-featured’: ‘This pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect, because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect’;

patataḥ kīṭakasya pataṅgasya sparśena pratilabdha udaya utpādo yayetyarthaḥ /

i.e. the ‘udaya’, appearance, of which was ‘pratilabdha’, felt, on the ‘sparśa’, touch, of the falling insect.

sāmānyavivakṣā cātrānyapadārthe draṣṭavyā tena ṭāb na bhavati /

The feminine affix ‘ṭāp’ is not added at the end of the compound, because it is intended to be a common factor.

vidyamānarūpagrahaṇasādhakatamaśaktikaṃ cakṣuḥ, anupahatatve sati rūpādidṛkṣāyāṃ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇā karaṇatvena vyāpāryamāṇatvāt, rūpaparicchedanadarśanād vā /

(3) [Another example] ‘The Eye has the potency of the most effective instrument in bringing about the apprehension of the Colour existing at the present time, because, while it is not damaged, it is that which is used as the Instrument, by a man who desires to see Colour and acts intelligently’ or ‘because it is actually found to bring about the cognition of Colour’;

vaidharmyeṇa śrotrādi /

the Ear, etc. being the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.

tasyeti rūpasya /

‘Tasya’ of the Colour.

atra triṣvapi hetuṣvasatyāṣu sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāvād dvirūpatvam / ātmaghaṭādayaḥ kathañcidasadātmānaḥ kathañcid anupalabhyamānatvāt kharaviṣāṇavat /

hence the Probans here is a ‘two-featured’ one. The following Text supplies the answer to the above arguments of Pātrasvāmin: [see verse 1380 next] Is the proposed definition meant to be general? Or, in reference to a particular subject on which knowledge is sought? Or in reference to the instance? (1380) The proposed definition of the Probans is that (it is ‘otherwise impossible’, which means that) it should not exist apart from the Probandum;

sādhanavyavacchedo nirdiśyeta / kharaviṣāṇādayo vā kathañcitsadātmakāḥ kathañcidupalabhyamānatvād ātmaghaṭādivat /

(1) now is this meant to be general (applicable to all Probans)? Or is it meant to be applicable to any particular object? and in the latter case, (2) is it meant to be in reference to a particular object in which the existence or otherwise of the Probandum is sought to he known? Or (3) in reference to that object which forms the Corroborative Instance.

[p.408] tadityādinā pratividhatte /

These are the alternatives possible.

tad idaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetoḥ kiṃ sāmānyena gamyate / jijñāsitaviśeṣe vā dharmiṇy atha nidarśane //

If it were understood to be general, then, what would be indicated would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present;

sāmānyena gate tasminnevaṃ cetsādhyadharmiṇi /

and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished.

hetoḥ sattvaṃ prakāśyeta na vivakṣitasiddhibhāk // na hy avinābhāvitvamātreṇaiva vinā pakṣadharmatvaṃ śabde dharmiṇi cākṣuṣatvam anityatvasya gamakaṃ dṛṣṭam ityayuktaḥ prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ /

The mere fact of its not existing apart from the Probandum, without the other fact of its existing wherever the Probandum is known to exist, does not make ‘visibility’ [which does not exist apart from the Probandum, Non-eternality; but is not present in all cases where Non-eternality is present], does not prove the Non-eternality of Sound,. Hence the first alternative cannot be right.

na vivakṣitasiddhibhāgiti / sādhyadharmiṇi na vivakṣitāṃ siddhiṃ bhajed ity arthaḥ //

‘It would not accomplish, etc. etc.’ that is, it could not establish the desired conclusion regarding the presence of the Probandum in the object.

katham ity āha tadyatheti /

Question: “Why so?” Answer; [see verses 1382-1383 next]

tad yathā cākṣuṣatvasya nāśenāvyabhicāritā /

For instance, ‘visibility’ is known to be inseparable (not existing apart) from ‘destruction’, in a general way;

sāmānyena gatā tac ca dhvanau tasya na sādhanam //

and yet it (visibility) cannot prove it (destruction) in sound.

tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvaḥ khyāpyate cet tathā sati / saiva trirūpatāyātā bhavatām api darśane //

If, then, it be said that its presence in the object is meant, then, in that case, under your view also, the probans becomes ‘three-featured’ as before. ‘Tat’ Visibility.

tacceti cākṣuṣatvam /

‘Tasya’ of Destruction.

tasyeti nāśasya /

‘Cannot prove it’ cannot indicate its presence.

sādhanam gamakam / atha mābhūdyathoktadoṣa iti tasya hetoḥ sādhyadharmiṇi sadbhāva āśrīyate /

It might be said that “in order to guard against the said objection, recourse may be had to the qualification that the Probans should be actually present in the object”.

evaṃ sati tadeva trirūpatvaṃ hetulakṣaṇamasmadīyaṃ bhavaddarśane 'pi jātam //

In that case, under your view also, the Probans comes to have the same ‘three-featured’ character that it had under ours.

katham ity āha anyathetyādi /

Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1384 next]

anyathānupapattya di{hi} vyatirekānvayau gatau /

‘Being otherwise impossible’ includes positive and negative: concomitance;

tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvāt pakṣadharmatvasaṃśayaḥ //

and by its presence in the object its presence in the minor term becomes admitted.

anvayaḥ sapakṣe sattvaṃ, vyatirekaḥ vipakṣāsattvam, saṃśrayaṇaṃ saṃśrayaḥ, parigraha iti yāvat //

‘Positive Concomitance’ is presence wherever the Probandum is known to be present. ‘Negative Concomitance’ is absence where the Probandum is known to be absent. ‘Saṃshraya’ is admission, i.e. acceptance.

ācāryair api nirdiṣṭamīdṛksaṃkṣepalakṣaṇam / grāhyadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto hetur itīdṛśam //

A similar abbreviated definition has been indicated by our teacher also: who says that ‘the probans exists in the cognisable object and is pervaded by a part of it’.

grāhyasya sādhyadharmiṇo dharmaḥ pakṣadharma iti yāvat //

‘Grāhyadharmaḥ’, i.e. existing in the cognisable object, i.e. the object in which the Probandum is sought to be proved;

atheti dvitīyaṃ pakṣamāha

i.e. in the Minor Term.

athedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetor dharmiṇyevāvagamyate / yataḥ pramāṇān nāsiddhiḥ sādhyasyāpi tato na tu // sādhyasyāpratipattau hi hetor api na niścayaḥ /

If the proposed definition of the probans is meant to be one that is found in the minor term only, then that same means of cognition which has made the probans known would make known the probandum also. If the probandum does not become known, then the probans also cannot become known.

ato nirarthako hetur anyataḥ sādhyasiddhitaḥ //

Thus the probans would be useless, the probandum having become known by other means.

anyonyāśrayadoṣaśca hetoḥ sādhyasya niścaye /

There would be the incongruity of ‘mutual interdependence’ also, if the definite cognition of the probandum followed from the probans;

dvayor anyatarāsiddhāvanyasyāviniścaye //

and between these two, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.

atha sādhyadharmiṇyeva sādhyāvinābhāvitvaṃ hetor yat tadeva hetulakṣaṇaṃ yathāha vināsādhyād adṛṣṭasya dṛṣṭānte hetuteṣyate /

The Probans may be defined as being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only, as asserted in the following words “The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum;

parair mayā punar dharmiṇyasambhūṣnor vināmutā //NN

in my opinion however, it is that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;

arthāpatteś ca śābaryā bhaikṣavāścānumānataḥ /

the followers of Śabara derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of Bhikṣu, from Inference;

anyadevānumānaṃ no narasiṃhavadiṣyate //

for us, Inference is something totally different, like Narasiṃha (having a dual character)”.

dharmiṇīti sādhyadharmiṇi.

[In this passage] ‘Dharmiṇi’ In the Minor term;

amunā sādhyadharmeṇa vinā sādhyadharmiṇyasambhavanaśīlasyetyarthaḥ /

That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum;

evaṃ tarhi yata eva pramāṇāddhetuḥ sādhyāvinābhūtaḥ sādhyadharmiṇi siddhas tata eva sādhyam api siddham iti vyartho hetuḥ /

this is meant to be the definition (of Probans). If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved, that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term);

atha sādhyaṃ na siddhaṃ tadā hetur api na siddha eva, yasmāt sādhyadharmiṇi

so that the Probans would be entirely useless. If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known;

sādhyāvinābhāvitā hetulakṣaṇam, taccāvinābhāvitvaṃ sādhyāsiddhau na siddhamityasiddho hetuḥ, ubhayasiddhināntarīyakatvād avinābhāvitvasya /

because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this inseparability from the Probandum cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain ‘unknown’, because the cognition of inseparability depends upon the Cognition of both.

anyataḥ pramāṇāt sādhyasiddhau hetuḥ siddha iti cet, kiṃ tadānīṃ hetunā, sādhyasya siddhatvāt /

It might be urged that “The Probans may be known by other means of cognition”; then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?

hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyasya niścaye kartavye 'nyonyanyāśrayadoṣaś ca syāt /

Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.

katham ity āha dvayor ityādi /

Question: “How?” Answer: ‘If the definite Cognition, etc. etc.’;

hetusiddhipūrvikā sādhyasiddhiḥ, tadarthatvāddhetoḥ, hetoś ca sādhyavinābhāvalakṣaṇasya sādhyasiddhipūrvikā siddhir iti vyaktam itaretarāśrayatvam //

the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans, as therein alone lies the use of the Probans, and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum;

tṛtīyapakṣam āha nidarśane 'pīti /

thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence (1386-1388)

nidarśane 'pi tatsiddhau na syād dharmiṇi sādhyadhīḥ /

Even if the probans were known as existent in the corroborative instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the minor term.

na hi sarvopasaṃhārāt tasya vyāptir viniścitā //

because its invariable concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.

[p.410] nidarśane sādhyadharmivyatirikte dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇītyarthaḥ /

‘In the Corroborative Instance’, i.e. in the object that serves as the Corroborative Instance, which object is different from that in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

tat siddhāviti / hetusiddhau /

‘If it were known’, i.e. if the Probans were known.

etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi sādhyadharmivyatirekeṇānyatraiva dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi hetor avinābhāvitvam iṣyate, natu sarvopasaṃhāreṇa saha sādhyadharmiṇā, tat kathaṃ sādhyadharmiṇi hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyapratipattiḥ syāt /

What is meant is as follows If the inseparability (concomitance) of the Probans is held to be in the object which forms the Corroborative Instance, and which is something different from the Minor Term, in which the Probandum is sought to be proved, and not ‘all over’ everywhere along with the Minor Term, then how could such a Probans bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term?

kathañca na syād ity āha nahītyādi //

Why it could not bring it about is explained ‘Became its invariable concomitance, etc. etc.’.

yo 'pītyādinā sāmpratam udāharaṇāni dūṣayate / yo 'pyayaṃ hetur atroktaṃ kathañcidupalambhataḥ /

As regards the probans that has been but forward (under 1371), in the, form ‘because it is apprehended somehow’, the object of this is not open to uncertainty;

iti nāstyeva viṣayaḥ sandigdho 'syeti niṣphalaḥ //

hence it is useless.

yo 'yaṃ kathañcidupalambhata iti hetur uktaḥ, asau niṣphalaḥ, sandigdhasya viṣayasyābhāvāt /

As regards the Probans that has been put forward, in the form ‘Because it is somehow apprehended’, this is absolutely futile; as its object is not open to doubt;

siddhasādhyatvād iti yāvat /

that is, it asserts what is already known;

na hi siddho viṣayo hetor iṣyate /

and what is already known cannot bo the objective of the Probans;

tathā hi saṃdigdhe hetuvacanāt /

because ‘a Reason is stated only in reference to what is doubtful’.

vyastavat siddho 'pi hetor anāśraya eva, siddhatvāt sādhyasyeti // atha syāt saṃdigdha eva hetor atrāpi viṣayo 'stīti, ata āha bhāvasyetyādi /

What too is known only in an isolated form cannot be the substratum of the Probans; as the Probandum would be already known (under the definition propounded by Pātrasvāmm).

bhāvasya hi tadātmatvaṃ sarvaireva viniścitam /

That the positive entity is essentially existent is known to all persons;

kathañcit tasya sādhyatvaṃ kimittham abhidhīyate //

then how is it said that it is known ‘somehow’? (1391)

kathañcitsadātmakatvaṃ bhāvasya sarvair yadā niścitam eva tadā bhavatā kimitthamabhidhīyate kathañcit sadātmako bhāva iti /

When all persons somehow know it for certain that the Positive Entity is existent, why do you state your Proposition in the form ‘The Positive Entity is somehow existent’?

tadātmatvam iti / sadātmatvam /

‘Tadātmatvam’ being essentially existent.

bhāvasyetyupalakṣaṇabhāvasyāpi /

The mention of the ‘Positive Entity’ is only by way of illustration; the Negative Entity is also meant.

kathañcit prameyādirūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ niścitam eveti vyartho hetuḥ //

‘Somehow’ i.e. in the form of ‘being cognisable’, it is known for certain that all this is existent;

atha sāṅkhyādīnām asiddhamataḥ sādhyata ity āha sarvetyādi /

hence the Probans is absolutely futile.

sarvabhāvaikyavāde 'pi vikārātmādibhedataḥ / kenacid viśadātmatvamātmanā samprakāśyate //

Even under the doctrine that “all things are one”, on account of the diversity in the nature of the modifications, what is manifested is always in some definitely clear form.

sarvabhāvagataṃ ye 'pi niḥsvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ /

Even those who regard all things as ‘featureless’ (devoid of character), always have recourse to such qualifying terms as ‘truly’ and the like.

te 'pi tattvata ityādi viśeṣaṇamupāśritāḥ //

hence it is sought to be proved”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1392-1393 above]

sarvabhāvānāmaikyavādaḥ sāṅkhyīyo yasmin vāde sthitastair eva sāṅkhyaiḥ kenacid ātmanā svabhāvena tadātmatvaṃ samprakāśyata eva /

‘The doctrine of all things being one’ is the one that is held by the Sāṅkhyas; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is manifested apprehended is always in some definite form.

katham ity āha vikārātmādibhedata iti /

Question: “How so?” Answer: ‘On account of, etc. etc,’;

vikārātmā vikārasvabhāvaḥ /

‘nature of the Modifications’, i.e. in the form of Modifications.

ādiśabdena prakṛtir asaṅkīrṇā sukhaduḥkhādisvabhāvā [p.411] puruṣāś ca parasparataḥ prakṛteś ca bhinnā gṛhyante /

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the ‘unmixed (Pure) Primordial Matter, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.’ and ‘the Spirits as distinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter’.

ye 'pīti mādhyamikāḥ /

‘Even those’ i.e. the Mādhyamikas, Idealists.

te 'pi tattvata iti saviśeṣaṇaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nissvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ, natu sarvathā /

These also, in asserting the ‘featurelessness’ of all things, always add the qualifying term ‘truly’, and they do not assert them to be absolutely so;

darśana{sa}mutpādādīnām abhyupagamāc ca /

because they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.

tattvata iti / nyāyataḥ /

‘Truly’ i.e, strictly logically.

ādiśabdātparamārthata ityāder grahaṇam /

The term ‘ādi’ includes such qualifying terms as ‘in reality’ and the like.

avaśyaṃ caitad abhyupagantavyaṃ sarvair eva bhāvasya kathañcit sadātmatvaṃ niścitam iti //

In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a thing is somehow existent is quite certainly recognised.

kathañcidupalabhyamanyathā nahi sidhyati /

Otherwise, it cannot be admitted that ‘it is somehow apprehended’.

vyavahārasya sādhyatve prasiddhaṃ syān nidarśanam //

If it is usage that is sought to be proved, then something well known should form the corroborative instance.

anyathaivamaniṣyamāṇe kathañcidupalabhyamānatvād ityayaṃ hetur api na sidhyati /

‘Otherwise’, i.e. if what has been just said is not admitted, then the Probans in the form ‘because it is somehow apprehended’ cannot be admitted.

pūrvaṃ siddhasādhyatā hetudoṣa uktaḥ /

Previous to this the defect pointed out in the statement of the other party was that it was futile;

idānīṃ tvasiddhatoktā /

it is now pointed out that it is inadmissible.

atha vyavahāraḥ sādhyate, tadā yatra pūrvaṃ vyavahāraḥ kṛtas tatprasiddhaṃ nidarśanaṃ sambhavatīti trirūpa eva syāt /

If it is Usage that is meant to be proved, then the Corroborative Instance could be found in the case where the use had been made; and in this case, the Probans would become ‘three-featured’.

anyathā nidarśanābhāve sopi vyavahāro na siddhyet //

Otherwise, if there were no Corroborative Instance, the Usage also could not be known.