buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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teṣām api bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānāṃ sarveṣāṃ vivakṣāsāmānye nānumānatvavirodhaḥ ekāntasadbhāvāt avyabhicārāt / naca	In the case of all words, uttered by deluded as well as undeluded persons, there is no incongruity in the Inference of a general ‘Intention to Speak’ because it is always there, i.e. there is no failure in the general premiss.
"sānnidhyatas tasya puṃsaścintāmaṇer iva / nissaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ" // ityanenābhyupagamena vyabhicāra āśaṅkanīyaḥ /	It might be argued that “The assertion that ‘through the mere presence of such a Person, as through that of the Cintāmaṇi gem, instructions issue forth at will, even out of the walls’, would appear to indicate that (as there is no speaker, there can be no ‘desire to speak’), there may be falsity (in such assertions).”
yatas tatrāpi vivakṣaivādyā kāraṇam / pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasaṃskārabalenaiva tatra vacanapravṛtteḥ /	because in this ease also the initial cause lies in the ‘desire to speak’; as even here the word issues forth only under the influence of the faculty produced by previous meditations.
tathā hi atyabhyastagranthaścādyāyā{syādyāyā---}dikāle 'nyadvikalpayate '{too '---}pi vacanapādaviharaṇādikriyāpravṛtteḥ /	For instance, when a person has thoroughly got up a certain Text, it so happens that even when his thoughts are turned towards other things, he can go on repeating (automatically) words and portions of verses of that text.
nahi pūrvasamīhā na teṣāṃ kāraṇa [p.443] manyathā hi gopālaghaṭikādau dhūmopalambhād bhūmāder api liṅgasya vyabhicāritvaṃ codanīyaṃ syāt /	And it cannot be said that the initial cause of such utterances does not lie in some previous efforts put forth by the man, because, if it were not so, then, even on perceiving (misconceiving) smoke, in the vapour issuing from the cowherd’s pot (and finding it as not truly indicating the Fire), one might regard the real Smoke also to be fallible as an indicative of real Fire.
tasmāt sarvatraiva kāryaliṅgadeśakālādyapekṣayā na vyabhicāraḥ sambhavītyekāntasadbhāvā eva / naca vaiphalyam prāṇitādisiddhaye pravṛtteḥ sāphalyasambhavāt /	From all this it follows that in all cases, there is no fallibility in the Indicative at aū, when due consideration is given to the Effect, the Indicative, the Time, the Place and other details, and hence it is always present. Nor can the Inference (of the ‘desire to speak’) be regarded as useless;
ādiśabdena kāraṇadoṣādayo gṛhyante //	as it serves to prove the fact of the utterance being due to the breath of the Speaker and so forth.
bhavatu nāma vivakṣāṃ prati śabdasya prāmāṇyam /	Says the Opponent “We grant that words can serve as the means of cognising the ‘Desire to Speak’;
tathāpi ko 'tra dharmī kiṃ sādhyaṃ kathaṃ vā sambandhaḥ siddho yena trairūpyasadbhāvenānumāne 'ntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaratvaṃ syād ity āha vivakṣāyām iti / vivakṣāyāṃ ca gamyāyāṃ vispaṣṭaiva trirūpatā /	but what is the Minor Term, what the Probandum, what too the well-known relation between them, by virtue of which the Verbal Statement can be regarded as a full-fledged Three-featured Inference, and not a distinct Means of Cognition by itself?”
pādapārthavivakṣāvān puruṣo 'yaṃ pratīyate /	Answer: [see verses 1521-1522 above] The Man is the Minor Term, where he is actually seen;
vṛkṣaśabdaprayoktṛtvāt pūrvāvasthāsvahaṃ yathā //	the desire to speak is the Probandum; the relation consists of occurring in the same ‘chain’, as shown before.
yatra tu vaktā na dṛśyate tatra pradeśo dharmī puruṣaviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyaḥ /	Where, however, the speaker is not visible, the Place would be the Minor Term, and the man with the said desire would be the Probandum;
tathā hi pradeśasyāpi śabdakāraṇatvamastyeva / parvatakuharādāvanyādṛśaśabdaśravaṇāt //	because the place also is one of the causes of the Word; as is clear from the fact that the Word that is heard in places like the mountain-cave is different from that heard elsewhere.
ato yatra parair bāhye trairūpyādi nirākṛtam / śabdānām iṣyate tatra naivāsmābhiḥ pramāṇatā //	Thus then, in cases where the other party have denied the presence of the three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition.
yatra tveṣām abhīṣṭeyaṃ vyaktaṃ tatra trirūpatā / vivakṣāyāṃ tu sādhyāyāṃ trailakṣaṇyaṃ prakāśitam //	In cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by them, the fact of its being ‘three-featured’ is quite clear. Where the ‘desire to speak’ is to be proved, it has been shown that the three features are present.
evaṃ sthite 'numānatvaṃ śabde dhūmādivadbhavet /	Such being the case, the word is as good a means of inference as the smoke, because it is equipped with the three features, and because its objective is of that same kind.
trairūpyasahitatvena tādṛgviṣayasattvataḥ //	because in regard to that, it has been shown, that all the three features are clearly present.
ata ityādinā bāhyāpekṣayā śabdasyānumānatve sādhye trairūpyarahitatvenetyasya hetor vaiphalyam āha siddhasādhyatayā /	Thus then, in cases where the other party have denied the presence of the three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition. In cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by them, the fact of its being ‘three-featured’ is quite clear.
vivakṣāpekṣayā tvasiddhatāṃ yatretyādinā prāha /	Where the ‘desire to speak’ is to be proved, it has been shown that the three features are present.
tāṃ prati śabdasya trairūpyasya prakāśitatvāt //	because in regard to that, it has been shown, that all the three features are clearly present.
iti śābdavicāraḥ //	it is this that is known as upamāna (analogy).
[p.444] upamānamadhikṛtyāha kīdṛgityādi /	With regard to Analogical Cognition, the Author declares as follows: [see verses 1526-1527 above]
kīdṛggavaya ityevaṃ pṛṣṭo nāgarikair yadā /	On being asked ‘What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?’ The man makes the statement ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’;
bravītyāraṇyako vākyaṃ yathā gaur gavayas tathā //	for instance, the sight of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow’.[1] (1526-1527)
etasminn upamānatvaṃ prasiddhaṃ śābare punaḥ / asyāgamābahirbhāvād anyathaivopavarṇitam //	it is this that is known as upamāna (analogy). according to Śabara’s view however, this is not outside the scope of ‘word’ (verbal statement), hence it has been described in another way.
kīdṛśo gavaya ityevaṃ pṛṣṭasya yadvākyaṃ yādṛśo gaus tādṛśo gavaya iti, asya vākyasyopamānatvaṃ vṛddhanaiyāyikānāṃ prasiddham /	On being asked ‘What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?’ The man makes the statement ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’; it is this Verbal Statement that is known as ‘Upamāna’, ‘Analogy’, among the older Naiyāyīkas [e.g. Vātsyāyana, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Sū.
śābare tu bhāṣye śabarasvāminā śābda evāsyāntarbhāvān na yuktaṃ pṛthakpramāṇāntaratvam īdṛśasyopamānasyeti manvānyādṛśamevopamānaṃ varṇitam /	According to Śabara’s view, as stated in his Bhāṣya (on ML Sū. 5), the cognition brought about by the said statement would be included under ‘Verbal Cognition’, and hence the Means of such a Cognition could not be regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition (apart from the Word);
upamānāni sādṛśyamasannikṛṣṭe 'rthe buddhimutpādayati /	he says ‘Upamāna that is, Similitude, also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses;
yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasyetyamunā granthena // enam eva vyācikhyāsurāha gāṃ dṛṣṭvetyādi /	for instance, the sight of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow’.[1] (1526-1527) This (Śabara’s) view the author proceeds to expound in the following [see verses 1528-1530 next]
gāṃ dṛṣṭvāyamāraṇyānyāṃ gavayaṃ vīkṣate yadā / bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyabhājaṃ vartulakaṇṭhakam //	“Having seen the cow, when the man goes to the forest and sees the gavaya, bearing a manifold commonalty (similitude, to the cow) in several parts of the body, but with rounded neck (not with the dewlap);
tadāsya gavayajñānaṃ rūpamātrāvabodhakam /	the first cognition that he has of the gavaya is one that apprehends only its shape;
pratyakṣam eva yaccāpi viśeṣeṇa vikalpakam //	and this cognition is purely perceptional.
gavā sadṛśarūpo 'yaṃ paśurityetad īdṛśam / akṣavyāpārasadbhāve jāteḥ pratyakṣamiṣyate //	the cognition that follows is in the more determinate form “the shape of this animal is similar to the cow’s”; and this also comes about only when the operation of the senses is there;
pūrvaṃ gāṃ dṛṣṭvā paścād araṇyaṃ gato yadā gavayaṃ paśyati, kiṃviśiṣṭam, bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyabhājam bhūyāṃsyavayavasāmānyāni bhajata iti kṛtvā, vartulakaṇṭhakam sāsnārahitam tadā yat prathamaṃ gavayasvarūpamātragrāhinirvikalpakamālocanājñānam utpadyate tat tāvat pratyakṣam /	so that this also is regarded to be perceptional.” (1528-1530) Having seen the Cow previously, the man, later on, goes to the forest and sees the Gavaya, of what sort? bearing a manifold commonalty in several parts of the body, i.e. he thinks that many parts of its body are similar, but with a rounded neck, i.e. without the dewlap (which is the distinctive feature of the Cow), then the first cognition that appears is of the non-conceptual (non-determinate) kind, which apprehends only the general shape of the Gavaya;
yaccāpi gavā sadṛśo 'yaṃ paśur ityevam ākāraṃ viśeṣeṇa vikalpayad utpadyate ---tadapi pratyakṣam eva akṣavyāpāreṇotpatteḥ //	That cognition also which appears later on, in the form ‘this animal is similar to the Cow’ which is more specifically conceptual, is also pure Perception; as it is brought about by the operation of the senses.
syād etat smaraṇabalād asadeva sādṛśyaṃ vikalpayad utpadyate nākṣavyāpāreṇetyāśaṅkyāha tatra yadyapītyādi /	The following might be urged against the above ‘The cognition that appears is through Remembrance, as envisaging the similarity, and not through the operation of the senses’. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1531 next]
tatra yadyapi gāṃ smṛtvā tajjñānamupajāyate / sannidher gavayasthatvād bhaved indriyagocaram //	“Though the said cognition appears on the remembrance of the cow, yet, on account of subsisting in the gavaya, there is proximity (of the similarity, to the senses), and hence it would be within reach of the senses.” (1531)
yadyapi smṛtipūrvakaṃ tat sādṛśyagrāhi jñānaṃ, tathāpi gavayasthatvena sannihitatvā [p.445] tsādṛśyamindriyagocaraḥ /	Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the similarity follows after the Remembrance (of the Cow), yet, because as residing in the Gavaya, it would be in proximity (to the senses), the similarity would be within reach of the senses.
sannidhiḥ sannihitatvam /	‘Sannidhi’ stands for the character of being in proximity.
gavayasthatvād iti sannihitatve hetuḥ / yasmād gavayasthaṃ sādṛśyaṃ tasmād asya sannidhiḥ //	‘Gavayasthatvāt’ is the reason for its being regarded as in proximity; the sense being that because the similarity resides in the Gavaya, therefore it is in proximity to the senses.
sāmānyavaddhi sādṛśyaṃ pratyekaṃ ca samāpyate /	“Like the universal, similarity resides in its entirety in each member;
pratiyoginyadṛṣṭe 'pi yasmāt tadupalabhyate //	because even when the co-relative is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived.” (1532)
sāmānyena tulyaṃ vartata iti sāmānyavat /	Answer: [see verse 1532 above] The term ‘sāmānyavat’, means that it is like the Universal.
yadyapi sādṛśyaṃ dviṣṭhaṃ tathāpi sāmānyavatpratyekaṃ samāptam iti kṛtvā pratiyigini gavādāvadṛṣṭe 'pi sannihitatvād ekatrāpyupalabhyata eva //	Even though similarity lies between two members, yet, like the Universal, it resides in its entirety in each member; it is for this reason that even when the co-relative, in the shape of the Cow (in the case in question) is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived in the other member (Gavaya) which is before the eyes.
syād etat yadi sādṛśyaṃ vastu bhavet tadopalabhyeta yāvatā tadevāsya vastutvaṃ na siddham ity āha sādṛśyasyetyādi /	The following might be urged “If similarity were an entity by itself, then it could be perceived; as a matter of fact, however, it is not admitted that it is an entity by itself”.
bhūyasāṃ gavādiśṛṅgādyavayavasāmānyānāṃ gavayādijātyantareṇaikavyaktisamavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ sādṛśyam /	Answer: [see verse 1533 above] As a matter of fact, Similarity is a relationship in the shape of the Inherence, in a particular individual, of many parts in the shape of the Homs and others, as existing in the Cow, in the particular Individual, the Gavaya;
sambandhaś ca sambandhibhyo nātyantaṃ bhinnaḥ, sambandhādipratyayābhāvaprasaṅgāt / sajātīyasya sarvāvayavasāmānyasadbhāvāt sādṛśyaṃ nāstīti jñāpanārthaṃ jātyantaragrahaṇam //	and a Relationship is not something entirely different from the Relatives; for, if it were, then there might be the possibility of there being no cognition of the Relationship at all. The qualifying term is ‘in a thing of another kind’, because the presence of all common features in things of the same kind is not regarded as similarity.
sāmpratamupamāyāḥ svarūpaṃ darśayann āha tasyām iti /	“Under the said circumstances, the cognition that appears in the form, ‘the cow is similar to this animal’, is what is called analogical cognition.” (1534) The following Text shows the real form of Analogical Cognition (according to Śabara) [see verse 1534 above]
tasyām eva vyavasthāyāṃ yadvijñānaṃ pravartate /	and this cognition is what is called ‘Analogical Cognition’, which thus is a Means or Form of Cognition.
anena paridṛśyamānena paśunā sadṛśo gaur ityevamākāraṃ parokṣagoviṣayaṃ yajjñānamupajāyate tadupamānaṃ pramāṇam // prameyam asya darśayann āha tasmād ityādi /	The following Text shows the object that is apprehended by the said Analogical Cognition: [see verse 1535 next] “Thus that which is remembered, and which is qualified by the (perceived) similarity, is the object that is apprehended by analogical cognition.
tasmādyatsmaryate tat syāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadāśritam //	or, the object of the said cognition may consist of the similarity itself as subsisting in that (remembered) thing.” [Ślokavārtika-upamāna, 37.] (1535)
yasmād yathoktalakṣaṇayuktamupamānaṃ, tasmād yadgavādi smaryate gavayādisādṛśyaviśiṣṭaṃ, tadupamānasya prameyam /	Because Analogical Cognition is as described above, therefore the Cow that is remembered and which is qualified by the similarity of the Gavaya (seen) is the object apprehended by that Cognition.
yadvā sādṛśyamātraṃ gavādisamāśritam //	Or it may be the Similarity itself as subsisting in the Cow.
[p.446] nanu ca pratyakṣeṇa sādṛśyam upalabdhaṃ, gauś ca smṛtyā viṣayīkṛta eva, tat	“Similarity having been apprehended by sense-perception, and the cow haying been remembered, the two together (i.e. the cow qualified by similarity) are not cognisable by any other means of cognition;
kim anyadadhikaṃ prameyam asti yadadhigamād upamānasya prāmāṇyaṃ syād ity āha ---	what then is left to be known, apprehending which, Analogy would become the Means of Cognition’?
pratyakṣeṇeti /	Answer: [see verse 1536 above]
yadyapi pratyakṣeṇa sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītaṃ, gauś ca smṛtyā viṣayīkṛtyaḥ, tathāpi sādṛśyaviśiṣṭasya gopiṇḍasyānyataḥ pratyakṣātsmaraṇāccāsiddhatvāt /	Though the similarity has become cognised by Sense-perception, and the Cow also has been remembered, yet, the cognition of the Cow as qualified by the Similarity has not been cognised by any other Sense-perception or Remembrance.
upamānasya tadadhigame prāmāṇyam //	Hence in the bringing about of this Cognition lies the operation of Analogy as a Means of Cognition.
atraiva dṛṣṭāntam āha pratyakṣe 'pīti /	An example is cited, to illustrate this: [see verse 1537 next]
pratyakṣe 'pi yathā deśe smaryamāṇe 'pi pāvake / viśiṣṭaviṣayatvena nānumānāpramāṇatā // yathā pradeśādau dharmiṇi pratyakṣe 'pi smṛtyā cāgnau gṛhīte 'pi vahniviśiṣṭapradeśādiviṣayatvān nānumānasyāprāmāṇyam api tu prāmāṇyam eva, tadvadupamānasyāpīti //	“[For instance, in the case of the well-known inference of fire from smoke] though the place is perceived by sense-perception, and the fire (in the kitchen) is remembered, yet the cognition of the two together (i.e. the fire and the place in the hill), does not cease to be inferential (1537) For instance, when the Place, the Minor Term is directly perceived, and the Fire is cognised by Remembrance, yet, when the resultant Inference of the place as qualified by Fire appears, it does not lose its character of the Means of Cognition;
athāpi syād bhavatu pramāṇam, upamānaṃ tat kathaṃ pratyakṣādeḥ pṛthak prāaṇam ity āha nahīti /	in fact it remains a Means of Right Cognition. The same should be the case with Analogical Cognition also.
nahi pratyakṣatāsiddhaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate / indriyārthābhisambandhavyāpāravirahāt tadā //	“(a) Analogical cognition cannot be regarded as sense-perception, because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses.
trairūpyānupapatteś ca naca tasyānumānatā /	(b) Nor can it be regarded as inference, because the ‘three-features’ are not there;
pakṣadharmādi naivātra kathañcidavakalpate // {prāgogataṃ hi sādṛśyaṃ na} dharmatvena gṛhyate /	for instance, there is no probans here (which subsists in the subject); and the similarity of the cow (to the gavaya) has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the subject;
gavaye gṛhyamāṇe ca na gavām anumāpakam //	and the similarity that is perceived in the gavaya cannot bring about the inference of the cow.” (1538-1540)
na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ yuktam indriyārthābhisambandhenānutpatteḥ /	It cannot be right to regard the cognition in. question as Perception, because it is not brought about by the contact of the senses.
nāpyanumānaṃ trairūpyābhāvāt /	Nor can it be regarded as Inference; as the ‘Three Features’ are absent.
tathā hi atra pakṣadharmaḥ sādṛśyaṃ vā parikalpyate, paridṛśyamāno gavayādir vā, tac ca sādṛśyaṃ liṅgatvena parikalpyamānaṃ gogataṃ vā kalpyeta gavayagataṃ veti pakṣadvayam /	For instance, what would be the ‘property of the Subject’, i.e. the Probans? the similarity? or the Gavaya that is seen? If the similarity were taken to be the Probans, would it be the similarity in the Cow? or that in the Gavaya? These are the only two alternatives possible.
tatra na tāvad gavādiprameyasthasya sādṛśyasya liṅgatvaṃ, gavayadarśanāt prāktasyāgṛhītatvāt /	Now the similarity residing in such cognisable things as the Cow and the like cannot serve as the Probans, because, prior to the perception of the Gavaya, that similarity has not been apprehended;
nacāgṛhītasya liṅgatvasya liṅgatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	and what has not been apprehended cannot serve as the Probans;
gavayasthaṃ tarhi sādṛśyaṃ liṅgaṃ bhaviṣyati, tatra tasya gṛhītatvād ity āha gavaye gṛhyamāṇaṃ ca na gavām anumāpakam vyadhikaraṇatvāt kākasya kārṣṇyādivat //	if it did, it would lead to absurdities. ‘Then it is the Similarity residing in the Gavaya that could serve as the Probans, because this similarity is apprehended when the Gavaya is seen The answer to that is that what is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the Inference of the Cow; as there is no co-ordination between them;
pratijñārthaikadeśatvād gogatasya na liṅgatā /	“The similarity residing in the cow cannot serve as the probans, as it forms a part of the proposition itself.
gavayaścāpyasambandhān na goliṅgatvamṛcchati //	the gavaya also cannot serve as the probans indicative of the cow, as it has no connection with the cow.” (1541)
sādṛśyasya prameyatvān na yuktaṃ tasyaiva liṅgatvam /	Inasmuch as Similarity is the object Inferred, it cannot serve as the Probans.
gavayas tarhi liṅgaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha gavaya iti /	“In that case, the Gavaya would be the Probans”.
atrāpi vyadhikaraṇatvān na gavayasya liṅgatvam //	Here also, the Gavaya cannot serve as the Probans, for want of coordination.
na cāpramāṇaṃ tajjñānam ajñātārthaprakāśanāt /	“The cognition in question cannot be regarded as not a form of right cognition; because it makes known what is not already known;
gavayādarśanāt pūrvaṃ tat sādṛśyānavagrahāt //	for instance, before the perception of the gavaya, its similarity (in the cow) has not been apprehended at all.” (1542)
pūrvaṃ gavayasādṛśyaviśiṣṭasya goragrahaṇāt /	Answer: [see verse 1545 above] That is, before the perception of the Gavaya, there has been no apprehension of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya;
ajñātasya sādṛśyopādher goḥ prakāśanamastīti yuktaṃ prāmāṇyam // prameyetyādinā pratividhatte /	consequently, as Analogical Cognition brings about the cognition of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya, which has not been known previously, it is only right that it should be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition.
prameyavastvabhāvena nābhipretāsya mānatā /	As there is no object that could be cognised by this means, it cannot be regarded as a means of cognition.
bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogaḥ sādṛśyam asti cet //	It might be urged that “there is the connection of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is what is cognised”.
sāmānyāni nirastāni bhūyastā teṣu sā kutaḥ / taiś ca yogaḥ pramāṇaṃ cedasti tat pratipādakam // sāmānyasya ca vastutvaṃ pratyakṣagrāhyatāpi ca / abhāvānyaprameyatvād asādhāraṇavastuvat //	But commonalty itself haying been rejected, how could there be any manifoldness in regard to it? How too could there be any ‘connection’ with such manifold ‘commonalty’? [says the opponent] “There is a means of cognition which brings about the cognition of such commonalty, in the form of the inference that commonalty is an entity and is apprehended by sense-perception, because it is cognisable as something other than negation, like the unique entity”.
prameyābhāvāt ṣaṭpramāṇavyatiriktapramāṇavad ato nopamānaṃ pramāṇam /	Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is cognised by means of it, and hence it is like any Means other than the six (that are accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka).
bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogātmakaṃ sādṛśam asti prameyamato hetur asiddha iti cet /	“But there is similarity, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is cognised by its means; lienee the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is ‘inadmissible’.”
tan na /	It is not so;
sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyānāṃ nirastatvān na teṣāṃ bhūyastvam /	in course of our examination of Commonalty (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any ‘manifoldness of Commonalties’? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible.
nāpi tair yogo 'stīti nāsiddhatā hetoḥ /	Hence our Reason cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’.
syād etat astyeva sāmānyapratipādakaṃ pramāṇam ato 'siddha eva hetuḥ /	The following might be urged: “There is a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonalty. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible.
tatredaṃ pramāṇam sāmānyaṃ vastu, tathā pratyakṣagrāhyam, iti pratijñādvayam /	The said Means of Gognition is as follows ‘The Commonalty is an entity’, and ‘it is apprehensible by Sense-perception’, these are the two Propositions;
abhāvānyaprameyatvād iti hetuḥ /	the Reason (Premiss) is, ‘because it is something cognisable, other than Negation’;
abhāvāt prameyād anyaprameyasvabhāvatvād ity arthaḥ / asādhāraṇavastuvad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / asādhāraṇavastutvalakṣaṇam //	that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than ‘non-existence’; ‘the unique entity’ is the Corroborative Instance; the specific Individuality of things is the ‘unique entity’,” (1543-1545)
abhāvetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha	The answer to the above argument is provided in the following [see verse 1546 next]
[p.448] sāmānyārthetyatrārthaśabdaḥ prameyavacanaḥ pratijñādvaye 'pi bauddhānām asvabhāvasāmānyavādinām abhāvād anyatvaṃ sāmānyasyasiddham iti hetor asiddhiḥ /	The reason (premise) here put forward is ‘not admissible’ for those who declare that anything cognisable in the form of ‘commonalty’ (or universal) falls tinder the category of the ‘non-existent and in the case of the former of the two probanda (put forth), the premiss becomes part of the proposition itself.
pratijñārthaikadeśabhāvaścādye sādhye vastulakṣaṇe /	The term ‘artha’ in the compound ‘Sāmānyārtha’, stands for ‘what is cognisable’.
tathā hi abhāvād anyadvastveva bhavati, abhāvavyavacchedalakṣaṇatvād bhāvasya, tadeva śabdāntareṇa hetutvenopāttam /	As regards both the Propositions put forward, the Buddhists hold that any such thing as ‘Commonalty’ (Universal) can have no character (existence); hence they cannot admit the statement that Commonalty is anything other than purely non-existent;
tadeva ca sādhyam iti pratijñārthaikadeśatā //	so that to that extent, the Probans cited is ‘inadmissible
kiṃ ca smṛtisvabhāvatvād vā na pramāṇam upamānaṃ, smṛtyantaravat /	for instance, it is only an entity that can be ‘other than non-existent’; because the entity is only the ‘negation of the non-existent’;
tatra smṛtisvabhāvatvaṃ pratipādayann āha evam ityādi /	and it is this same that has been put forward, in other words, in the Premiss (Reason);
evaṃ tu yujyate tatra gorūpāvayavaiḥ saha / gavayāvayavāḥ kecit tulyapratyayahetavaḥ //	What happens in this case is that there are some parts in the gavaya’s body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of the cow’s body;

teṣām api bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānāṃ sarveṣāṃ vivakṣāsāmānye nānumānatvavirodhaḥ ekāntasadbhāvāt avyabhicārāt / naca

In the case of all words, uttered by deluded as well as undeluded persons, there is no incongruity in the Inference of a general ‘Intention to Speak’ because it is always there, i.e. there is no failure in the general premiss.

"sānnidhyatas tasya puṃsaścintāmaṇer iva / nissaranti yathākāmaṃ kuḍyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ" // ityanenābhyupagamena vyabhicāra āśaṅkanīyaḥ /

It might be argued that “The assertion that ‘through the mere presence of such a Person, as through that of the Cintāmaṇi gem, instructions issue forth at will, even out of the walls’, would appear to indicate that (as there is no speaker, there can be no ‘desire to speak’), there may be falsity (in such assertions).”

yatas tatrāpi vivakṣaivādyā kāraṇam / pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasaṃskārabalenaiva tatra vacanapravṛtteḥ /

because in this ease also the initial cause lies in the ‘desire to speak’; as even here the word issues forth only under the influence of the faculty produced by previous meditations.

tathā hi atyabhyastagranthaścādyāyā{syādyāyā---}dikāle 'nyadvikalpayate '{too '---}pi vacanapādaviharaṇādikriyāpravṛtteḥ /

For instance, when a person has thoroughly got up a certain Text, it so happens that even when his thoughts are turned towards other things, he can go on repeating (automatically) words and portions of verses of that text.

nahi pūrvasamīhā na teṣāṃ kāraṇa [p.443] manyathā hi gopālaghaṭikādau dhūmopalambhād bhūmāder api liṅgasya vyabhicāritvaṃ codanīyaṃ syāt /

And it cannot be said that the initial cause of such utterances does not lie in some previous efforts put forth by the man, because, if it were not so, then, even on perceiving (misconceiving) smoke, in the vapour issuing from the cowherd’s pot (and finding it as not truly indicating the Fire), one might regard the real Smoke also to be fallible as an indicative of real Fire.

tasmāt sarvatraiva kāryaliṅgadeśakālādyapekṣayā na vyabhicāraḥ sambhavītyekāntasadbhāvā eva / naca vaiphalyam prāṇitādisiddhaye pravṛtteḥ sāphalyasambhavāt /

From all this it follows that in all cases, there is no fallibility in the Indicative at aū, when due consideration is given to the Effect, the Indicative, the Time, the Place and other details, and hence it is always present. Nor can the Inference (of the ‘desire to speak’) be regarded as useless;

ādiśabdena kāraṇadoṣādayo gṛhyante //

as it serves to prove the fact of the utterance being due to the breath of the Speaker and so forth.

bhavatu nāma vivakṣāṃ prati śabdasya prāmāṇyam /

Says the Opponent “We grant that words can serve as the means of cognising the ‘Desire to Speak’;

tathāpi ko 'tra dharmī kiṃ sādhyaṃ kathaṃ vā sambandhaḥ siddho yena trairūpyasadbhāvenānumāne 'ntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaratvaṃ syād ity āha vivakṣāyām iti / vivakṣāyāṃ ca gamyāyāṃ vispaṣṭaiva trirūpatā /

but what is the Minor Term, what the Probandum, what too the well-known relation between them, by virtue of which the Verbal Statement can be regarded as a full-fledged Three-featured Inference, and not a distinct Means of Cognition by itself?”

pādapārthavivakṣāvān puruṣo 'yaṃ pratīyate /

Answer: [see verses 1521-1522 above] The Man is the Minor Term, where he is actually seen;

vṛkṣaśabdaprayoktṛtvāt pūrvāvasthāsvahaṃ yathā //

the desire to speak is the Probandum; the relation consists of occurring in the same ‘chain’, as shown before.

yatra tu vaktā na dṛśyate tatra pradeśo dharmī puruṣaviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyaḥ /

Where, however, the speaker is not visible, the Place would be the Minor Term, and the man with the said desire would be the Probandum;

tathā hi pradeśasyāpi śabdakāraṇatvamastyeva / parvatakuharādāvanyādṛśaśabdaśravaṇāt //

because the place also is one of the causes of the Word; as is clear from the fact that the Word that is heard in places like the mountain-cave is different from that heard elsewhere.

ato yatra parair bāhye trairūpyādi nirākṛtam / śabdānām iṣyate tatra naivāsmābhiḥ pramāṇatā //

Thus then, in cases where the other party have denied the presence of the three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition.

yatra tveṣām abhīṣṭeyaṃ vyaktaṃ tatra trirūpatā / vivakṣāyāṃ tu sādhyāyāṃ trailakṣaṇyaṃ prakāśitam //

In cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by them, the fact of its being ‘three-featured’ is quite clear. Where the ‘desire to speak’ is to be proved, it has been shown that the three features are present.

evaṃ sthite 'numānatvaṃ śabde dhūmādivadbhavet /

Such being the case, the word is as good a means of inference as the smoke, because it is equipped with the three features, and because its objective is of that same kind.

trairūpyasahitatvena tādṛgviṣayasattvataḥ //

because in regard to that, it has been shown, that all the three features are clearly present.

ata ityādinā bāhyāpekṣayā śabdasyānumānatve sādhye trairūpyarahitatvenetyasya hetor vaiphalyam āha siddhasādhyatayā /

Thus then, in cases where the other party have denied the presence of the three features, we do not regard the verbal statement to be a means of cognition. In cases, however, where the presence of the three features is admitted by them, the fact of its being ‘three-featured’ is quite clear.

vivakṣāpekṣayā tvasiddhatāṃ yatretyādinā prāha /

Where the ‘desire to speak’ is to be proved, it has been shown that the three features are present.

tāṃ prati śabdasya trairūpyasya prakāśitatvāt //

because in regard to that, it has been shown, that all the three features are clearly present.

iti śābdavicāraḥ //

it is this that is known as upamāna (analogy).

[p.444] upamānamadhikṛtyāha kīdṛgityādi /

With regard to Analogical Cognition, the Author declares as follows: [see verses 1526-1527 above]

kīdṛggavaya ityevaṃ pṛṣṭo nāgarikair yadā /

On being asked ‘What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?’ The man makes the statement ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’;

bravītyāraṇyako vākyaṃ yathā gaur gavayas tathā //

for instance, the sight of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow’.[1] (1526-1527)

etasminn upamānatvaṃ prasiddhaṃ śābare punaḥ / asyāgamābahirbhāvād anyathaivopavarṇitam //

it is this that is known as upamāna (analogy). according to Śabara’s view however, this is not outside the scope of ‘word’ (verbal statement), hence it has been described in another way.

kīdṛśo gavaya ityevaṃ pṛṣṭasya yadvākyaṃ yādṛśo gaus tādṛśo gavaya iti, asya vākyasyopamānatvaṃ vṛddhanaiyāyikānāṃ prasiddham /

On being asked ‘What sort of an animal is the Gavaya?’ The man makes the statement ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’; it is this Verbal Statement that is known as ‘Upamāna’, ‘Analogy’, among the older Naiyāyīkas [e.g. Vātsyāyana, in his Nyāyabhāṣya on Sū.

śābare tu bhāṣye śabarasvāminā śābda evāsyāntarbhāvān na yuktaṃ pṛthakpramāṇāntaratvam īdṛśasyopamānasyeti manvānyādṛśamevopamānaṃ varṇitam /

According to Śabara’s view, as stated in his Bhāṣya (on ML Sū. 5), the cognition brought about by the said statement would be included under ‘Verbal Cognition’, and hence the Means of such a Cognition could not be regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition (apart from the Word);

upamānāni sādṛśyamasannikṛṣṭe 'rthe buddhimutpādayati /

he says ‘Upamāna that is, Similitude, also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses;

yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasyetyamunā granthena // enam eva vyācikhyāsurāha gāṃ dṛṣṭvetyādi /

for instance, the sight of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow’.[1] (1526-1527) This (Śabara’s) view the author proceeds to expound in the following [see verses 1528-1530 next]

gāṃ dṛṣṭvāyamāraṇyānyāṃ gavayaṃ vīkṣate yadā / bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyabhājaṃ vartulakaṇṭhakam //

“Having seen the cow, when the man goes to the forest and sees the gavaya, bearing a manifold commonalty (similitude, to the cow) in several parts of the body, but with rounded neck (not with the dewlap);

tadāsya gavayajñānaṃ rūpamātrāvabodhakam /

the first cognition that he has of the gavaya is one that apprehends only its shape;

pratyakṣam eva yaccāpi viśeṣeṇa vikalpakam //

and this cognition is purely perceptional.

gavā sadṛśarūpo 'yaṃ paśurityetad īdṛśam / akṣavyāpārasadbhāve jāteḥ pratyakṣamiṣyate //

the cognition that follows is in the more determinate form “the shape of this animal is similar to the cow’s”; and this also comes about only when the operation of the senses is there;

pūrvaṃ gāṃ dṛṣṭvā paścād araṇyaṃ gato yadā gavayaṃ paśyati, kiṃviśiṣṭam, bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyabhājam bhūyāṃsyavayavasāmānyāni bhajata iti kṛtvā, vartulakaṇṭhakam sāsnārahitam tadā yat prathamaṃ gavayasvarūpamātragrāhinirvikalpakamālocanājñānam utpadyate tat tāvat pratyakṣam /

so that this also is regarded to be perceptional.” (1528-1530) Having seen the Cow previously, the man, later on, goes to the forest and sees the Gavaya, of what sort? bearing a manifold commonalty in several parts of the body, i.e. he thinks that many parts of its body are similar, but with a rounded neck, i.e. without the dewlap (which is the distinctive feature of the Cow), then the first cognition that appears is of the non-conceptual (non-determinate) kind, which apprehends only the general shape of the Gavaya;

yaccāpi gavā sadṛśo 'yaṃ paśur ityevam ākāraṃ viśeṣeṇa vikalpayad utpadyate ---tadapi pratyakṣam eva akṣavyāpāreṇotpatteḥ //

That cognition also which appears later on, in the form ‘this animal is similar to the Cow’ which is more specifically conceptual, is also pure Perception; as it is brought about by the operation of the senses.

syād etat smaraṇabalād asadeva sādṛśyaṃ vikalpayad utpadyate nākṣavyāpāreṇetyāśaṅkyāha tatra yadyapītyādi /

The following might be urged against the above ‘The cognition that appears is through Remembrance, as envisaging the similarity, and not through the operation of the senses’. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1531 next]

tatra yadyapi gāṃ smṛtvā tajjñānamupajāyate / sannidher gavayasthatvād bhaved indriyagocaram //

“Though the said cognition appears on the remembrance of the cow, yet, on account of subsisting in the gavaya, there is proximity (of the similarity, to the senses), and hence it would be within reach of the senses.” (1531)

yadyapi smṛtipūrvakaṃ tat sādṛśyagrāhi jñānaṃ, tathāpi gavayasthatvena sannihitatvā [p.445] tsādṛśyamindriyagocaraḥ /

Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the similarity follows after the Remembrance (of the Cow), yet, because as residing in the Gavaya, it would be in proximity (to the senses), the similarity would be within reach of the senses.

sannidhiḥ sannihitatvam /

‘Sannidhi’ stands for the character of being in proximity.

gavayasthatvād iti sannihitatve hetuḥ / yasmād gavayasthaṃ sādṛśyaṃ tasmād asya sannidhiḥ //

‘Gavayasthatvāt’ is the reason for its being regarded as in proximity; the sense being that because the similarity resides in the Gavaya, therefore it is in proximity to the senses.

sāmānyavaddhi sādṛśyaṃ pratyekaṃ ca samāpyate /

“Like the universal, similarity resides in its entirety in each member;

pratiyoginyadṛṣṭe 'pi yasmāt tadupalabhyate //

because even when the co-relative is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived.” (1532)

sāmānyena tulyaṃ vartata iti sāmānyavat /

Answer: [see verse 1532 above] The term ‘sāmānyavat’, means that it is like the Universal.

yadyapi sādṛśyaṃ dviṣṭhaṃ tathāpi sāmānyavatpratyekaṃ samāptam iti kṛtvā pratiyigini gavādāvadṛṣṭe 'pi sannihitatvād ekatrāpyupalabhyata eva //

Even though similarity lies between two members, yet, like the Universal, it resides in its entirety in each member; it is for this reason that even when the co-relative, in the shape of the Cow (in the case in question) is not perceived, the similarity is actually perceived in the other member (Gavaya) which is before the eyes.

syād etat yadi sādṛśyaṃ vastu bhavet tadopalabhyeta yāvatā tadevāsya vastutvaṃ na siddham ity āha sādṛśyasyetyādi /

The following might be urged “If similarity were an entity by itself, then it could be perceived; as a matter of fact, however, it is not admitted that it is an entity by itself”.

bhūyasāṃ gavādiśṛṅgādyavayavasāmānyānāṃ gavayādijātyantareṇaikavyaktisamavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ sādṛśyam /

Answer: [see verse 1533 above] As a matter of fact, Similarity is a relationship in the shape of the Inherence, in a particular individual, of many parts in the shape of the Homs and others, as existing in the Cow, in the particular Individual, the Gavaya;

sambandhaś ca sambandhibhyo nātyantaṃ bhinnaḥ, sambandhādipratyayābhāvaprasaṅgāt / sajātīyasya sarvāvayavasāmānyasadbhāvāt sādṛśyaṃ nāstīti jñāpanārthaṃ jātyantaragrahaṇam //

and a Relationship is not something entirely different from the Relatives; for, if it were, then there might be the possibility of there being no cognition of the Relationship at all. The qualifying term is ‘in a thing of another kind’, because the presence of all common features in things of the same kind is not regarded as similarity.

sāmpratamupamāyāḥ svarūpaṃ darśayann āha tasyām iti /

“Under the said circumstances, the cognition that appears in the form, ‘the cow is similar to this animal’, is what is called analogical cognition.” (1534) The following Text shows the real form of Analogical Cognition (according to Śabara) [see verse 1534 above]

tasyām eva vyavasthāyāṃ yadvijñānaṃ pravartate /

and this cognition is what is called ‘Analogical Cognition’, which thus is a Means or Form of Cognition.

anena paridṛśyamānena paśunā sadṛśo gaur ityevamākāraṃ parokṣagoviṣayaṃ yajjñānamupajāyate tadupamānaṃ pramāṇam // prameyam asya darśayann āha tasmād ityādi /

The following Text shows the object that is apprehended by the said Analogical Cognition: [see verse 1535 next] “Thus that which is remembered, and which is qualified by the (perceived) similarity, is the object that is apprehended by analogical cognition.

tasmādyatsmaryate tat syāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadāśritam //

or, the object of the said cognition may consist of the similarity itself as subsisting in that (remembered) thing.” [Ślokavārtika-upamāna, 37.] (1535)

yasmād yathoktalakṣaṇayuktamupamānaṃ, tasmād yadgavādi smaryate gavayādisādṛśyaviśiṣṭaṃ, tadupamānasya prameyam /

Because Analogical Cognition is as described above, therefore the Cow that is remembered and which is qualified by the similarity of the Gavaya (seen) is the object apprehended by that Cognition.

yadvā sādṛśyamātraṃ gavādisamāśritam //

Or it may be the Similarity itself as subsisting in the Cow.

[p.446] nanu ca pratyakṣeṇa sādṛśyam upalabdhaṃ, gauś ca smṛtyā viṣayīkṛta eva, tat

“Similarity having been apprehended by sense-perception, and the cow haying been remembered, the two together (i.e. the cow qualified by similarity) are not cognisable by any other means of cognition;

kim anyadadhikaṃ prameyam asti yadadhigamād upamānasya prāmāṇyaṃ syād ity āha ---

what then is left to be known, apprehending which, Analogy would become the Means of Cognition’?

pratyakṣeṇeti /

Answer: [see verse 1536 above]

yadyapi pratyakṣeṇa sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītaṃ, gauś ca smṛtyā viṣayīkṛtyaḥ, tathāpi sādṛśyaviśiṣṭasya gopiṇḍasyānyataḥ pratyakṣātsmaraṇāccāsiddhatvāt /

Though the similarity has become cognised by Sense-perception, and the Cow also has been remembered, yet, the cognition of the Cow as qualified by the Similarity has not been cognised by any other Sense-perception or Remembrance.

upamānasya tadadhigame prāmāṇyam //

Hence in the bringing about of this Cognition lies the operation of Analogy as a Means of Cognition.

atraiva dṛṣṭāntam āha pratyakṣe 'pīti /

An example is cited, to illustrate this: [see verse 1537 next]

pratyakṣe 'pi yathā deśe smaryamāṇe 'pi pāvake / viśiṣṭaviṣayatvena nānumānāpramāṇatā // yathā pradeśādau dharmiṇi pratyakṣe 'pi smṛtyā cāgnau gṛhīte 'pi vahniviśiṣṭapradeśādiviṣayatvān nānumānasyāprāmāṇyam api tu prāmāṇyam eva, tadvadupamānasyāpīti //

“[For instance, in the case of the well-known inference of fire from smoke] though the place is perceived by sense-perception, and the fire (in the kitchen) is remembered, yet the cognition of the two together (i.e. the fire and the place in the hill), does not cease to be inferential (1537) For instance, when the Place, the Minor Term is directly perceived, and the Fire is cognised by Remembrance, yet, when the resultant Inference of the place as qualified by Fire appears, it does not lose its character of the Means of Cognition;

athāpi syād bhavatu pramāṇam, upamānaṃ tat kathaṃ pratyakṣādeḥ pṛthak prāaṇam ity āha nahīti /

in fact it remains a Means of Right Cognition. The same should be the case with Analogical Cognition also.

nahi pratyakṣatāsiddhaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate / indriyārthābhisambandhavyāpāravirahāt tadā //

“(a) Analogical cognition cannot be regarded as sense-perception, because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses.

trairūpyānupapatteś ca naca tasyānumānatā /

(b) Nor can it be regarded as inference, because the ‘three-features’ are not there;

pakṣadharmādi naivātra kathañcidavakalpate // {prāgogataṃ hi sādṛśyaṃ na} dharmatvena gṛhyate /

for instance, there is no probans here (which subsists in the subject); and the similarity of the cow (to the gavaya) has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the subject;

gavaye gṛhyamāṇe ca na gavām anumāpakam //

and the similarity that is perceived in the gavaya cannot bring about the inference of the cow.” (1538-1540)

na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ yuktam indriyārthābhisambandhenānutpatteḥ /

It cannot be right to regard the cognition in. question as Perception, because it is not brought about by the contact of the senses.

nāpyanumānaṃ trairūpyābhāvāt /

Nor can it be regarded as Inference; as the ‘Three Features’ are absent.

tathā hi atra pakṣadharmaḥ sādṛśyaṃ vā parikalpyate, paridṛśyamāno gavayādir vā, tac ca sādṛśyaṃ liṅgatvena parikalpyamānaṃ gogataṃ vā kalpyeta gavayagataṃ veti pakṣadvayam /

For instance, what would be the ‘property of the Subject’, i.e. the Probans? the similarity? or the Gavaya that is seen? If the similarity were taken to be the Probans, would it be the similarity in the Cow? or that in the Gavaya? These are the only two alternatives possible.

tatra na tāvad gavādiprameyasthasya sādṛśyasya liṅgatvaṃ, gavayadarśanāt prāktasyāgṛhītatvāt /

Now the similarity residing in such cognisable things as the Cow and the like cannot serve as the Probans, because, prior to the perception of the Gavaya, that similarity has not been apprehended;

nacāgṛhītasya liṅgatvasya liṅgatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

and what has not been apprehended cannot serve as the Probans;

gavayasthaṃ tarhi sādṛśyaṃ liṅgaṃ bhaviṣyati, tatra tasya gṛhītatvād ity āha gavaye gṛhyamāṇaṃ ca na gavām anumāpakam vyadhikaraṇatvāt kākasya kārṣṇyādivat //

if it did, it would lead to absurdities. ‘Then it is the Similarity residing in the Gavaya that could serve as the Probans, because this similarity is apprehended when the Gavaya is seen The answer to that is that what is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the Inference of the Cow; as there is no co-ordination between them;

pratijñārthaikadeśatvād gogatasya na liṅgatā /

“The similarity residing in the cow cannot serve as the probans, as it forms a part of the proposition itself.

gavayaścāpyasambandhān na goliṅgatvamṛcchati //

the gavaya also cannot serve as the probans indicative of the cow, as it has no connection with the cow.” (1541)

sādṛśyasya prameyatvān na yuktaṃ tasyaiva liṅgatvam /

Inasmuch as Similarity is the object Inferred, it cannot serve as the Probans.

gavayas tarhi liṅgaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha gavaya iti /

“In that case, the Gavaya would be the Probans”.

atrāpi vyadhikaraṇatvān na gavayasya liṅgatvam //

Here also, the Gavaya cannot serve as the Probans, for want of coordination.

na cāpramāṇaṃ tajjñānam ajñātārthaprakāśanāt /

“The cognition in question cannot be regarded as not a form of right cognition; because it makes known what is not already known;

gavayādarśanāt pūrvaṃ tat sādṛśyānavagrahāt //

for instance, before the perception of the gavaya, its similarity (in the cow) has not been apprehended at all.” (1542)

pūrvaṃ gavayasādṛśyaviśiṣṭasya goragrahaṇāt /

Answer: [see verse 1545 above] That is, before the perception of the Gavaya, there has been no apprehension of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya;

ajñātasya sādṛśyopādher goḥ prakāśanamastīti yuktaṃ prāmāṇyam // prameyetyādinā pratividhatte /

consequently, as Analogical Cognition brings about the cognition of the Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya, which has not been known previously, it is only right that it should be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition.

prameyavastvabhāvena nābhipretāsya mānatā /

As there is no object that could be cognised by this means, it cannot be regarded as a means of cognition.

bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogaḥ sādṛśyam asti cet //

It might be urged that “there is the connection of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is what is cognised”.

sāmānyāni nirastāni bhūyastā teṣu sā kutaḥ / taiś ca yogaḥ pramāṇaṃ cedasti tat pratipādakam // sāmānyasya ca vastutvaṃ pratyakṣagrāhyatāpi ca / abhāvānyaprameyatvād asādhāraṇavastuvat //

But commonalty itself haying been rejected, how could there be any manifoldness in regard to it? How too could there be any ‘connection’ with such manifold ‘commonalty’? [says the opponent] “There is a means of cognition which brings about the cognition of such commonalty, in the form of the inference that commonalty is an entity and is apprehended by sense-perception, because it is cognisable as something other than negation, like the unique entity”.

prameyābhāvāt ṣaṭpramāṇavyatiriktapramāṇavad ato nopamānaṃ pramāṇam /

Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is cognised by means of it, and hence it is like any Means other than the six (that are accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka).

bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogātmakaṃ sādṛśam asti prameyamato hetur asiddha iti cet /

“But there is similarity, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is cognised by its means; lienee the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is ‘inadmissible’.”

tan na /

It is not so;

sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyānāṃ nirastatvān na teṣāṃ bhūyastvam /

in course of our examination of Commonalty (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any ‘manifoldness of Commonalties’? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible.

nāpi tair yogo 'stīti nāsiddhatā hetoḥ /

Hence our Reason cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’.

syād etat astyeva sāmānyapratipādakaṃ pramāṇam ato 'siddha eva hetuḥ /

The following might be urged: “There is a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonalty. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible.

tatredaṃ pramāṇam sāmānyaṃ vastu, tathā pratyakṣagrāhyam, iti pratijñādvayam /

The said Means of Gognition is as follows ‘The Commonalty is an entity’, and ‘it is apprehensible by Sense-perception’, these are the two Propositions;

abhāvānyaprameyatvād iti hetuḥ /

the Reason (Premiss) is, ‘because it is something cognisable, other than Negation’;

abhāvāt prameyād anyaprameyasvabhāvatvād ity arthaḥ / asādhāraṇavastuvad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / asādhāraṇavastutvalakṣaṇam //

that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than ‘non-existence’; ‘the unique entity’ is the Corroborative Instance; the specific Individuality of things is the ‘unique entity’,” (1543-1545)

abhāvetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha

The answer to the above argument is provided in the following [see verse 1546 next]

[p.448] sāmānyārthetyatrārthaśabdaḥ prameyavacanaḥ pratijñādvaye 'pi bauddhānām asvabhāvasāmānyavādinām abhāvād anyatvaṃ sāmānyasyasiddham iti hetor asiddhiḥ /

The reason (premise) here put forward is ‘not admissible’ for those who declare that anything cognisable in the form of ‘commonalty’ (or universal) falls tinder the category of the ‘non-existent and in the case of the former of the two probanda (put forth), the premiss becomes part of the proposition itself.

pratijñārthaikadeśabhāvaścādye sādhye vastulakṣaṇe /

The term ‘artha’ in the compound ‘Sāmānyārtha’, stands for ‘what is cognisable’.

tathā hi abhāvād anyadvastveva bhavati, abhāvavyavacchedalakṣaṇatvād bhāvasya, tadeva śabdāntareṇa hetutvenopāttam /

As regards both the Propositions put forward, the Buddhists hold that any such thing as ‘Commonalty’ (Universal) can have no character (existence); hence they cannot admit the statement that Commonalty is anything other than purely non-existent;

tadeva ca sādhyam iti pratijñārthaikadeśatā //

so that to that extent, the Probans cited is ‘inadmissible

kiṃ ca smṛtisvabhāvatvād vā na pramāṇam upamānaṃ, smṛtyantaravat /

for instance, it is only an entity that can be ‘other than non-existent’; because the entity is only the ‘negation of the non-existent’;

tatra smṛtisvabhāvatvaṃ pratipādayann āha evam ityādi /

and it is this same that has been put forward, in other words, in the Premiss (Reason);

evaṃ tu yujyate tatra gorūpāvayavaiḥ saha / gavayāvayavāḥ kecit tulyapratyayahetavaḥ //

What happens in this case is that there are some parts in the gavaya’s body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of the cow’s body;