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varddhamānātmako bhāvo varddhamānakabhāvaḥ, sa kiṃviśiṣṭaḥ, kaladhautātmā kaladhautaṃ suvarṇaṃ sa evātmā svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ, tasya svataḥ svarasena, vināśe sati kasyacid arthinaḥ śoka utpadyate /
When the Gold in the shape of the Pol is destroyed by itself why should any man so wanting it be sorry for it? Why too, on the production of a new thing in the shape of the Dish out of the Gold, should one be happy? As for continuance, there can be no such thing for anything of the nature of Gold;
natu kasyacit suvarṇātmano 'vasthānam asti niranvayatvād utpādavināśayoḥ //
as both Production and Destruction are absolute without any connection with anything (past or future).
[p.503] yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi mādhyasthyabuddhirityāha śātakumbhetyādi /
Question: “If that be so, then how is there the feeling of Indifference?” Answer: [see verses 1784-1785 next]
śātakumbhātamakau bhāvau yadā paśyati mūḍhadhīḥ / samānāparabhāvena sthiratvaṃ manyate tadā //
When the dull-witted man perceives the two things made of gold, he looks upon it as a case of the appearance of similar products and thereby comes to think of it as something lasting.
hemno 'vathitarūpatve tadrūpaṃ rucajādyapi /
and as the gold is not-different from them, like its own nature the gold also becomes diverse.
pūrvottarādyavasthāsu dṛśyetānekatānyathā //
Under Text 1717 “If the said entity, etc. etc.” a Reason has been put forward in proof of the Diverse character of things.
śātakumbhātmakau suvarṇasvabhāvau varddhamānarucakākhyau bhāvau krameṇa yadā paśyati mūḍhamatiḥ, paśyannapi svabhāvavivekaṃ sadṛśāparotpattivipralabdho vivecayitum aśaktatvād ata eva samānāparabhāvena bhrāntinimittena vipralabdho 'vasthādvaye 'pi hemnaḥ sthiratvaṃ manyate /
The only objection we have to urge against that is that it is superfluous [proving what is already admitted]. When the dull-witted man perceives the two things made of gold, he looks upon it as a case of the appearance of similar products and thereby comes to think of it as something lasting. If the gold itself had a lasting form, then that form, in the shape of the dish, could be perceived in its preceding and succeeding states also;
samānāparabhāveneti /
or else, there would be diversity.
ahemavyāvṛttimātrasādharmyeṇa samānasyāparasya bhāva utpādaḥ samānāparabhāvaḥ /
‘Samānāparabhāvena?; though the common character of being negation of not-gold, the two articles are regarded as the same or similar; and the man regards it as a case of the birth of two things with a common character.
kathaṃ punar avasīyate samānāparabhāvena vipralabdhaḥ sthiratvaṃ manyate, na tu punar vastuna eva tathābhāvād ity āha hemna ityādi /
Question: “How do you know that the man regards the gold as something lasting, on account of being deceived by the appearance of common products; and not on account of the gold being really lasting?”
yadi hemnaḥ sthiratvaṃ syāt tadā tadavyatiriktaṃ rucakādyapi varddhamānāvasthāsu dṛśyeta, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvāt /
Answer: ‘If the gold, etc. etc.’ If eternality did belong to the gold, then the Dish also would be perceived in the Pot, which is perceptible.
anyathā yadi rucakasya varddhamānāvasthāyāṃ na dṛṣṭir varddhamānasya rucakāvathāyām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya, tadānīṃ tayoḥ parasparato bhedaḥ, tataś ca tābhyām avyatirekāc ca tat svabhāvavad hemno 'pi bhedaḥ siddhaḥ syād ityālocyāha anekatānyatheti /
‘Otherwise’ if the Dish is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Pot, which should be perceptible, or if the Pot is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Dish, which should be perceptible, then there is clear difference between the two (Dish and Pot); and as the gold is not-different from them, like its own nature the gold also becomes diverse. It is in view of all this that the Text says ‘Or else, there would be diversity’, Under Text 1717 “If the said entity, etc. etc.” a Reason has been put forward in proof of the Diverse character of things.
yaccāvadhīkṛtavastubhya ityādi bhedasādhanamuktaṃ tatra siddhasādhyataivetidūṣaṇam ucyate //
On the ground of the gold continuing to be the same, when it comes to be regarded as something permanent, some Buddhists also hold (on the basis of this) that the thing (by itself permanent) passes through diverse states. Under Text 4, the True Doctrine has been called ‘Immobile’;
iti syādvādaparīkṣā //
the Author proceeds to support that idea.
KAPITEL TRAIKAALYAPARIIK.SAA
[see verse 1786 above]
asaṅkrāntim ityasya samarthanārtham āha hemetyādi /
The Buddhist Doctrine is that ‘there is nothing that has continued existence’;
hemno 'nugamasāmyena sthiratvaṃ manyate tadā / avasthābhedavān bhāvaḥ kaścid bauddhair apīṣyate //
On the ground of the gold continuing to be the same, when it comes to be regarded as something permanent, some Buddhists also hold (on the basis of this) that the thing (by itself permanent) passes through diverse states.
nāvasthānaṃ tu kasyacid ityatredaṃ codyam /
The Buddhist Doctrine is that ‘there is nothing that has continued existence’;
nanu katham ucyate nāvasthānaṃ tu kasyacid iti, yāvatā kaiścid dharmatrātaprabhṛtibhir bauddhair api kālatrayāvathitau bhāva iṣṭo 'vasthābhedāt, hemānugamasādharmyeṇa //
against this, the following objection is urged: “How can it be said that ‘there is nothing that has continued existence’ when as a matter of fact, some Buddhists (of the Vaibhāṣika-Realistic-School) also, like Dharmatrāta and others have accepted the view that an object continues to exist at three points of time, through its diverse states;
etad eva dvitīyena ślokena darśayati /
This same idea is further expounded in the following texts: [see verses 1787-1790 next]
avasthābhedabhāve 'pi yathā varṇyaṃ jahāti na / hemādhvasu tathābhāvo dravyatvaṃ na tyajatyayam //
“Just as gold does not abandon its colour, even when there are differences in its state, similarly under all its states, the entity does not abandon its character of ‘substance’.
atītājātayor jñānam anyathāviṣayaṃ bhavet /
If it were not so, then the cognition of past and future things would be objectless.
dvayāśrayaṃ ca vijñānaṃ tāyinā kathitaṃ katham // karmātītaṃ ca niḥsattvaṃ kathaṃ phaladamiṣyate / atītānāgate jñānaṃ vibhaktaṃ yogināṃ ca kim //
How again, is it that it has been asserted by Tāyin that cognition rests upon these two? How again is action, which is past and has no further existence, held to be productive of results? How too could mystics have the distinct cognition of past and future. Among the Buddhist writers (referred to under Text 1786) are the following:
adhvasaṅgraharūpād vibhāvāder vartamānavat // tatra bhāvānyathāvādī bhadantadharmatrātaḥ, sa kilāha dharmasyādhvasu vartamānasya bhāvānyathātvam eva kevalaṃ natu dravyam asyeti /
(1) Bhadanta-Dharmatrāta the upholder of the view that while the thing undergoes changes, it remains substantially the same. He argues as follows: When a certain thing has entered into its course of existence, there is change only in its mode of existence, not in the substance;
yathā suvarṇadravyasya kaṭakakeyūrakuṇḍalādyabhidhānanimittasya guṇasyānyathātvaṃ na suvarṇasya, tathā dharmasyānāgatādibhāvād anyathātvam /
for instance, the substance Gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called the ‘armlet’, ‘necklet’, ‘ear-ring’ and so forth, but there is no change in the Gold, itself. In the same way, the object is something different from the Future, and other ‘modes’.
tathā hi anāgatabhāvaparityāgena vartamānabhāvaṃ pratipadyate dharmo, vartamānabhāvaparityāgena cātītabhāvam, natu dravyānyathātvaṃ, sarvatra dravyasyāvyabhicārāt /
For instance, when a certain object abandons its ‘f uture’ Mode and reaches the ‘present’ Mode; and when it renounces its ‘present’ Mode, it reaches the ‘past’ Mode, and yet the Object itself does not change; as throughout the three Modes, the same character of the ‘substance’ continues.
anyathānya evānāgate 'nyo vartamāno 'nyo 'tīta iti prasajyate /
If it were not so, the ‘future’, ‘present’ and ‘past’ objects would be entirely different from one another.
kaḥ punarbhāvas teneṣṭaḥ/ guṇaviśeṣaḥ, yato 'tītādyabhidhānajñānapravṛttiḥ /
What is it that is meant by the term ‘bhāva’, ‘Mode’, here? It is a particular quality on which the notions of ‘Past,’ etc. are based.”
lakṣaṇānyathāvādī bhadantaghoṣakaḥ /
(2) Bhadanta-Ghoṣaka holds that the changes undergone by the Object are in its character.
sa kilāha / dharmo 'dhvasu vartamāno 'tīto 'tītalakṣaṇayukto 'nāgatapratyutpannābhyāṃ lakṣaṇābhyām aviyuktaḥ, yathā puruṣa ekasyāṃ striyāṃ raktaḥ śeṣāsvavirakta evam anāgatapratyutpannāvapi vācye / asya hyatītādilakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahāra iti pūrvakād bhedaḥ /
He argues as follows: “When the Object has entered into its course of existence, it is said to be ‘past’, when it has the character of the ‘past’, but is not entirely deprived of the character of the ‘future’ and the ‘present’: for example, a man may be attached to one woman, but he need not be disgusted with other women. Similarly when the Object is ‘future’ or ‘present’ [it has these characters, but is not entirely devoid of the other two characters].” The difference between this view and the previous one is that under this view things are spoken of as ‘past’ on account of the actual presence of a particular character.
sa kilāha dharmo 'dhvasu vartamāno 'vasthāmavasthāṃ prāpyānyo 'nyo nirdiśyate 'vasthāntarato, na dravyataḥ, dravyasya triṣvapi kāleṣvabhinnatvāt /
He argues as follows: “When a thing has entered the course of existence, it is spoken of variously, according to its varying aspects (or conditions); and these variations relate to the aspect, not to the substance; as the Substance remains the same at all three points of time.
yathā mṛdguḍikā ekāṅke prakṣiptā ekam ity ucyate, śatāṅke śataṃ, sahasrāṅge sahasraṃ tathā kāritre 'vasthito bhāvo vartamānas tataḥ pracyuto 'tītas tadaprāpto 'nāgata iti /
For example, when the clay counting-piece is placed in the place of Units, it is denominated ‘one’, when placed in the place of Hundreds, it is denominated ‘hundred’, and tin place of Thousands, it is denominated a ‘thousand Similarly when the thing is in the state of activity, it is called ‘present’;
asya vyavsathāpekṣayā vyavahāro yathā mṛdguḍikāyāṃ, nahi tasyāḥ svabhāvānyathātvaṃ bhavati, kiṃ tarhi/
and when it has ceased from activity, it is ‘past’, and while it has not become active at all, it is ‘future So that things are spoken of in accordance with their states, as in the ease of the clay counting-piece, where there is no change in the nature of the Substance;
sthānaviśeṣasambandhāt saṅkhyābhidyotakaṃ saṃjñāntaram utpadyata /
only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with its varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers
anyathānyathiko buddhadevaḥ, sa kilāha dharmo 'dhvasu vartamānaḥ pūrvāparamapekṣyānyonya ucyata iti /
(4) Buddha-deva (a writer of the second century A.D.) holds the view that the changes are due to changes in ‘Relativity’. He argues as follows: “When an object has entered its course of existence, it is called one or the other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come.
yathaikā strī mātā cocyate duhitā ceti /
For instance, the same woman is called ‘mother’ as well as ‘daughter’;
asya pūrvāparāpekṣo vyavahāraḥ, yasya pūrvam evāsti nāparaḥ so 'nāgataḥ, yasya pūrvam asti aparaṃ ca sa vartamānaḥ, yasyāparameva na pūrvaṃ so 'tīta ityete catvāraḥ sarve 'stivādā bhāvalakṣaṇāvasthānyathānyathikasaṃjñitāḥ /
and the usage in question is also dependent upon the past and the future; when a thing has something before it, but nothing after it, it is called ‘future’; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called ‘present’; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called ‘past’.” All these four Buddhists are Asti-vādins, Realists (upholding the view that things have real and permanent existence), called respectively: (1) ‘Mode-changers’, Bhāvavādin, (2) Lakṣaṇavādin, ‘Character-changers’, (3) Avasthāvādin, ‘Aspect-changers’ and (4) Anyathānyathika, ‘Relative changers’.
tatra prathamaḥ pariṇāmavāditvāt sāṅkhyamatān na bhi [p.505] dyate /
(1) Of these, the first (Dharmatrāta the Mode-changer) does not differ from the Sāṅkhya, who holds the ‘Modification’ theory.
yas tasya pratiṣedhaḥ so 'syāpi draṣṭavyaḥ /
So that the refutation that has been put forward against the Sāṅkhya is applicable to this Buddhist Realist.
tathā hi pūrvasvabhāvāparityāgena vā pariṇāmo bhavet parityāgena vā /
For instance, would the ‘modification’ come about without the abandoning of the previous mode or after its abandonment? If the former, then there would be comingling and confusion of the Modes.
yadyaparityāgena tadādhvasaṅkaraprasaṅgaḥ /
If the latter, then that would be incompatible with the permanent existence of things.
dvitīyasyāpi vādino 'yaṃ saṅkara eva, sarvasya sarvalakṣaṇayogāt /
(2) As regards the second view (that of Ghoṣaka), here also there would be the same comingling and confusion; as all things may have*all characters.
puruṣastvarthāntarabhūtarāgasamudācārādrakta ucyate 'viraktaś ca samanvāgamamātreṇa, natu dharmasya lakṣaṇasamudācāro lakṣaṇasamanvāgamo vā prāptilakṣaṇo 'sti, anyatvaprasaṅgāllakṣaṇasya prāptivad iti na sāmyaṃ dṛṣṭāntasyadārṣṭyāntikena vādhvani trayo 'dhvānaḥ prāpnuvanti /
in the case of the ordinary thing however, there is no appearance of the ‘character’, nor the mere association of ‘character’, which would constitute the ‘attainment’ of it by the thing; as, if it were, then like ‘attainment’, the ‘character’ also would become something different from the thing. Thus there is no analogy between the two cases the ease in question and that of the example cited. (3) As regards the third view (of Vasumitra), that the changes in things are due to variations in their aspects or states of activity, its refutation is going to be set forth in detail below.
tathā hi atīte 'dhvani pūrvapaścimau kṣaṇāvatītānāgatau madhyamaḥ kṣaṇaḥ pratyutpanna iti /
For instance, under the ‘Past’ state, the preceding and the succeeding moments would be ‘past’ and ‘future’ and the ‘middle’ moment would be the ‘present This criticism against this is quite clear.
eṣā dūṣaṇadigeṣāṃ spaṣṭā / tṛtīyam evārabhya bhūyastraikālyaparīkṣārabhyate /
The Examination of the ‘Idea of things continuing to exist during the Three Points of Time’ proceeds in the Text, only with reference to the third among the above views [i.e. the view of Vasumitra, that the changes in things are due to the variations in their states of activity].
hemadṛṣṭāntena tu siddhāntopakṣepamātraṃ kṛtam natu dharmatrātadarśanamevābhimatam /
What has been stated in connection with the example of Gold (under Texts 1786-1787) is only an indication of the thesis of all these writers, and it is not in strict reference to the view of Dharmatrāta only (the first of the views described).
tathā ca vakṣyati "kāritreṇa vibhāgo 'yam adhvanāṃ yat prakalpyata" iti /
This is clear from what is going to be said (under Text 1791) ‘As regards the distinction among things due to their states of activity, etc. etc.’;
naca dharmatrātasya kāritreṇādhvavyavasthā, kiṃ tarhi/
and under the view of Dharmatrāta the distinction is not based upon states of activity;
vasumitrasya /
it is only under Vasumitra’s view that it is so.
tatra yadyatītānāgataṃ na syāt, abhūn mahāsammato bhaviṣyati śaṅkhaścakravartītyatītājātayor vijñānaṃ nirālambanam eva syāt /
“If the ‘Past’ and the ‘Future’ were not there, then such notions as ‘There lived Mahāsammata’, ‘Śaṅkha is going to be an all-world sovereign’ and so forth, which involve the idea of what is past and what is going to be would be entirely baseless;
tataś ca vijñānam eva na syād ālambanābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ /
in fact, the Object not being there, the Idea also could not be there;
tathā hi prativastu vijñaptyātmakaṃ vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kiñcidanena jñeyam ityavijñānam eva syāt /
so that if the cognised Object is not there, there is nothing that could be apprehended by the Cognition; hence there would be no Cognition (or Idea) at all.
kiñca dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānamutpadyata iti bhagavatoktam "katamaddvayam, cakṣūrūpāṇi yāvan manodharmā" iti / asati cātītānāgate tadālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ dvayaṃ pratītya na syād ityāgamavirodhaḥ /
“Further, the Blessed One has declared that ‘Every cognition is produced on the basis of two things. Which two things? The Eye and the Colours and the Menta l Function If then the Past and the Future are not there, the cognition based upon these would not be on the basis of two things; so that there would be incompatibility with the scriptures,
apicātītaṃ karma phaladaṃ na syād yadi tanniḥsattvaṃ sattāśūnyaṃ bhavet, phalotpattikāle vipākahetor abhāvāt /
“Further, a past act could not bring about its fruit, if it were devoid of essence and devoid of existence, at the time of the appearance of the fruit, as the cause of that fruit would not be there;
nacāsataḥ kāryotpādanaśaktir asti, sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād asattvasya /
what is non-existent cannot have the capacity to produce an effect; as ‘non-existence’ consists in the absence of all capacity.
kiṃ ca āsīn māndhāno brahmadatto, bhaviṣyati śaṅkhaścakravartī maitreyastathāgata, ityādinā vibhāgena yoginām atītādiviṣayaṃ vibhaktaṃ vijñānaṃna syāt /
“Then again, such ideas as ‘Māndhāna Devadatta lived’, ‘the world-sovereign Śaṅkha shall be Maitreya Tathāgata’, which appear distinctly and severally in the minds of Mystics, in regard to the Past and the Future, could not be possible;
na hyasatāṃ vibhāgo 'sti /
as there can be no distinction among things that are non-existent.
tasmād atītānāgatā bhāvāḥ śrīharṣādayo na dravyapratiṣedharūpāḥ, adhvasaṃgṛhītarūpāditvenopadiṣṭatvād vartamānavat /
“From all this it follows that past and future entities, like Shrīharṣa and others, cannot be regarded as mere ‘negations of substance’, because they have been declared as ‘to be included under the states’.
uktaṃ hi bhagavatā "atītaṃ ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ nābhaviṣyan na śrutavānāryaśrāvako 'tītarūpe 'napekṣo 'bhaviṣyat /
The Blessed Lord has declared as follows: ‘O Bhikṣus, if the Past form had not existed, then the noble Śrāmka would not have heard and been entirely indifferent regarding past forms;
yasmāt tarhyastyatītaṃ rūpaṃ tasmācchrutavānāryaśrāvako 'tītarūpe 'napekṣo bhavatīti vistaraḥ tathā yat kiñcid rūpam atītamanāgatādi tat sarvamabhisaṃkṣipya rūpaskandha iti saṅkhyāṃ gacchatī"tyādi / adhvanā saṅgraho yeṣāṃ te 'dhvasaṅgrahā rūpādayaḥ /
hence, because there is a Past form of things, therefore the noble Śrāvaka has heard and has thus become indifferent to the Past, All tins severally would be much too detailed; hence thus whatever form has been past or is in future, all this is spoken of briefly as Colour-phase’.” In the compound (in the text) Adhvasaṃgraha, etc. etc.’, the term ‘adhvasaṃgraha’ stands for Colour, etc., in the sense that they are ‘included under the states’.
ādiśabdena vedanādiparigrahaḥ /
The ‘Etc.’ includes ‘Sensation’ and other Phases.
atrāpyādiśabdena duḥkhasamudayānityānātmāditvenopadiṣṭatvād iti gṛhyate //
The second ‘ādi’ implies the further reason that all these have been taught as consisting of suffering, transitory as a whole, devoid of the Soul, and so forth.
ityāha nacaivam ityādi / na caivamiha mantavyam adhvabhedaḥ kuto nvayam /
“In this connection, there should be no such cogitation as to how this diversity in the states comes about.
kāritreṇa vibhāgo 'yam adhvanāṃ yat prakalpyate //
Because this distinction among the states is conceived on the basis of activity.
kāritre vartate yo hi vartamānaḥ sa ucyate /
that which is engaged in activity is called ‘present’;
kāritrāt pracyuto 'tītas tadaprāptastvanāgataḥ // phalākṣepaś ca kāritraṃ dharmāṇāṃ janakaṃ na tu /
The ‘activity’ of things serves only to ‘project’ the result, not to produce it. As there can be no such ‘projecting’ in the case of past things, there is no possibility of activity in them.” (1791-1793)
na vākṣepostyatītānāṃ nātaḥ kāritrasambhavaḥ //
hence there can be no idea of the Past, etc.’ The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1791-1793 above]
yataḥ samprāptakāritro vartamāna ucyate, uparatakāritro 'tītaḥ, aprāptakāritro 'nāgata ityadhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ /
The various states are determined through activity; that which is engaged in activity is ‘Present’; that of which the activity has ceased is ‘Past’ and that which has not yet attained Activity is ‘future’.
kiṃ punar atra kāritramabhipretam, yadi darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpāraḥ, yathā pañcānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ darśanādikam yataścakṣuḥ paśyati śrotraṃ śṛṇoti ghrāṇam jighrati jihvā svādayatītyādivijñānasyāpi vijñātṛtvaṃ, vijānātīti kṛtvā rūpādīnām indriyagocaratvam /
Objection: “What is it that is meant by ‘Kāritra’, ‘Activity’, in this connection? If it is operation, in the shape of seeing and the rest, e.g. seeing and the rest are the ‘activity’ of the Eye and other organs, since the Eye sees, the Ear hears, the Nose smells, the Tongue tastes, and Cognition also is the Cogniser, as it is that which cognises things; and thus Colour, etc. become perceptible by the Senses;
evaṃ sati pratyutpannasya tat sabhāgasya cakṣuṣo nidrādyavasthāyāṃ kāritrābhāvād vartamānatā na syāt /
if this is what is meant by ‘activity’, then, even when the Man has been born, if the Eye, which shares the fate of the body, has no activity, the man (or the Eye) could not be regarded as ‘present’.
atha phaladānagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṃ kāritram yathā cakṣuṣā sahabhavā dharmā jātyādayaḥ puruṣākāraphalam anantarotpannaṃ cakṣurindriyaṃ puruṣakāraphalam adhipatiphalaṃ niṣyandaphalaṃ ca etat phalaṃ, jananāt prayacchaddhetubhāvāvasthānād gṛhṇacihnaccakṣur vartamānam ucyata iti / evaṃ tarhyatītānām api sabhāgasarvatragavipākahetūnāṃ phaladānābhyupagamād vartamānatvaprasaṅgaḥ /
Secondly, activity may be held to consist in the giving (producing) and receiving of the fruit, for instance, the caste and other properties of man, which are born along with the Eye, are the result (fruit) of human effort; the Visual organ (Eye) or the supervising Deity, or Vibration brings about human effort; and it is by reason of bringing about this result that the Eye becomes a cause, and hence comes to be spoken of as ‘present’, Under this definition of ‘activity’, even Past things, being held to be productive of all-embracing results sharing the same fate, would have to be regarded as ‘Present’. Thirdly, it may be held that the ‘Activity’ meant here is that which gives and takes all sorts of results.
evam atītasya sabhāgahetutvāder arddhavartamānatvaprasaṅga ityetad doṣabhayād ācāryasahantabhadra āha dharmāṇāṃ kāritram ucyate phalākṣepaśaktiḥnatu phalajananaṃ, nacātītānāṃ sabhāgahetvādīnāṃ phalākṣepo 'sti, vartamānāvasthāyām evākṣiptatvāt /
In that case, the Past, being the cause of some part of such results, would have to be regarded as ‘Half-present’.” In view of this objection, Ācārya Sahantabhadra has offered the following explanation: What is called the ‘activity’ of things is the potency of projecting the Result, not of producing it; the Past and other things, which are only partial causes, do not project the result; it is only in the ‘present’ state that the Result is projected (thrown out) by its cause.
nacākṣiptasyākṣepo yukto 'navasthāprasaṅgāt /
Nor can there be ‘projection’ of what has been already projected, as that would lead to an infinite regress.
tasmād atītānāṃ ca kāritrasambhava iti nāsti lakṣaṇasaṅkara iti //
Thus there being no ‘activity’ possible in what is ‘past’, there can be no confusion in the character of these (Past, Future and Present).
tair ityādinā pratividhatte /
The following Texts answer the above arguments (of the Realist Buddhist): [see verses 1794-1796 next]
taiḥ kāritram idaṃ dharmād anyat tadrūpa eva vā / abhyupeyaṃ yadanyāsti gatiḥ kācin na vāstavī //
These people will have to admit that this ‘activity’ is either different from, or the same as, the object concerned; as there can be no other way in which it can really exist.
anyatve vartamānānāṃ prāgūrdhvaṃ vāsvabhāvatā / hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasyeva gamyatām //
If it is something different from the object, then the past and future states of ‘present’ things would have to be regarded as formless, because they are ‘causes’ and are ‘embellished’, and so forth, like the activity.
anyathā nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā /
otherwise, the things would be everlasting;
naitad rūpātiriktaṃ hi vidyate nityalakṣaṇam //
as the ‘form’ would be there all the time; and apart from this, there is no other characteristic of the ‘everlasting (1794-1796)
tat kāritraṃ dharmād anyadvā syādananyadveti tairabhyupagantavyam, anyānanyayor anyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt /
The said Activity will have to be regarded by these people either as different from, or the same as, the Entity; as there can be nothing apart from both ‘difference’ and ‘non-difference’, as these are mutually exclusive;
ekaniṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvāt /
the affirmation of one being invariably concomitant with the denial of the other;
nānyā vastuno gatir asti /
and there is no other way in which the thing can exist.
tatra yadyanyat tadā vartamānānāṃ prāgūrdhvāvasthayoḥ niḥsvabhāvatā prāpnoti / hetutvasaṃskṛtatvāddhetoḥ kāritravat /
If then the Activity is something different from the Entity, then the Past and Future states of Present things would have to be regarded as ‘formless’, because of their being causes and being embellished, like the Activity.
ādiśabdena vastutvādayoḥ gṛhyante /
The term ‘and so forth’ is meant to include ‘being an entity’ and so forth.
anyathā yadi prāgūrdhvaṃ ca niḥsvabhāvatā na syāt tadā sarvasya saṃskṛtasya nityatā prāpnoti, svabhāvasya sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt /
Otherwise that is, if, they were not formless in the Past and in the Future, then, all ‘embellished’ things would have to be regarded as eternal; as the ‘form’ (or Nature) would be always there; and the ‘eternality’ of a thing is nothing more than being always there;
naca sadāsattvavyatirekeṇa nityatvalakṣaṇam asti yadāha ---"nityaṃ tamāhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyatī"ti //
as declared in the following words ‘The learned men regard that Form as eternal which is never destroyed’.
hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādes tu hetoḥ kathaṃ sādhyavipakṣeṇa virodha ity āha nityasyetyādi / nityasya hetutā pūrvaṃ kramākramavirodhataḥ /
The idea of the eternal thing being a cause has already been rejected before on the ground of the impossibility of its effects appearing either successively or simultaneously.
niṣiddhā saṃskṛtatvaṃ hi vyaktaṃ nitye nirāspadam //
as for being embellished, this is clearly impossible in an eternal thing.
skandhādivyatiriktasya kāritrasyopavarṇane / svasiddhāntavirodhaś ca durnivāraḥ prasajyate //
When ‘activity’ is described as something different from the ‘phases’ and other things (postulated by Buddhists), there is the irresistible contradiction of your own doctrines.
pūrvam iti / sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyām /
This is answered in the following [see verses 1797-1798 above]
sarvasya ca saṃskṛtasyānityatvābhyupagamāt saṃskṛtatvaṃ nitye na sambhavatīti spaṣṭam evāvasīyate /
‘Before’ i.e. under the chapter on the ‘Permanence of Things All that is ‘embellished’ has been held to be non-eternal, hence the character of being embellished cannot belong to an eternal entity;
kiṃ ca skandhāyatanavyatiriktasya kāritrasyopavarṇane siddhāntavirodhaḥ, tathā hi bhavatatoktam "sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yaduta pañcaskandhā dvādaśāyatanāni, aṣṭādaśacā{ścā---}bhava iti //
Further, when the ‘Activity’ is described as something different from the ‘Phases’ (Skandhas) and the ‘Inner Receptacles’ (Āyatanaṣ), there is clear contradiction of your own (Buddhist) doctrine; as the Blessed Lord has declared as follows “All things, O Brāhmaṇa, are included in the Five ‘Phases’ and the Twelve ‘Receptacles’ and the Eighteen ‘Substances’.” (1797-1798)
ananyatve 'pi kāritraṃ dharmād avyatirekataḥ / svarūpam iva dharmasya prasaktaṃ sārvakālikam //
If, on the other hand, the ‘activity’ is not different from the entity, then, being inseparable from the entity, it would be there at all times, just like the nature of the entity;
tataścādhvavibhāgo 'yaṃ tadvaśān na prakalpyate /
and in that case, the division among the states could not be made on the basis of this activity;
na hi tasya cyutiḥ prāptir aprāptir vā vibhāgataḥ //
as there could be no such distinction as that between cessation, and non-attainment, of the said activity.
[p.508] athānanyat kāritramabhyupagamyate tadā dharmasvarūpavat tadavyatirekāt tadapi sārvakālikaṃ prāpnoti /
If the Activity is held to be non-different from the Entity, then like the nature of things, it would be inseparable from the Entity; the Activity also would be something existing at all times;
tataś ca kāritrāt pracyuto 'tītas tat prāpto vartamānas tadaprāpto 'nāgata iti kāritravaśād ayam adhvavibhāgo na syāt / yato 'sya kāritrasya yadi vibhāgena yadi prāptyaprāptayaḥ syus tadā syād ayam adhvavibhāgaḥ, na ca tāni vibhāgena sambhavanti, sadāvasthitaikarūpasya vibhāgābhāvāt //
and in that case there could be no such distinction among states as that that winch has ceased from activity is ‘Past’, that which is still active is ‘Present’, and that which has not yet attained Activity is ‘Future Because if the Activity were distinguishable into ‘attained’ and ‘not attained’, then alone could the said distinction be possible; the said distinguishing however is not possible; because there can be no such distinction in the case of what is always present in the same form (1799-1800)
kāritrāvyatirekād vā dharmaḥ kāritravad bhavet / pūrvāparavyavacchinnamadhyamātrakasarvavān //
Or (conversely),, because it would be non-different from the activity the entity, like the activity, would be devoid of the ‘previous’ and ‘later’ conditions, and would have its sole existence in the middle (present).
kiñca kāritrād avyatiriktatvād dharmo 'pi pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyasattāyogī prāpnoti kāritravat /
Further, being non-different from Activity, the Entity also would have only such existence as is devoid of the previous and later ends, like Activity itself.
pūrvāparavyavacchinnam pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyaṃ, madhyamātrakaṃ ca tat sarvaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ /
The compound ‘Pūrvāpara, etc.’ is to be explained as ‘that which has its all sole existence in the middle, being devoid of the two ends of the ‘previous’ and the ‘later’.