buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tathā hi dvābhyāṃ rūpābhyāṃ vastuno 'nyānyatvād dve eva vastunī prāpte /	Then again, the two forms, being not-different from the Thing itself, would be identical, both being like the form of a single thing;
ekasmād vā vastuno rūpadvayasyāvyatirekādekavastusvarūpavad rūpadvayasya parasparātmakataiveti katham ekaṃ dvirūpaṃ syāt /	how then could it be a single thing having two forms? Further, as the Particular form of a thing is not entirely different from the Universal form, there would he a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses;
tataśceyam asaṅkīrṇā vyavasthā na prāpnoti samānaṃ rūpam akṣajñānagocaro 'samānaṃ tu yogipratyakṣam iṣyata iti //	and in that case there could not be the clear cut distinction that ‘the Common form is amenable to Sense-cognition and the Uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition’.
[p.555]	[verse 1986a]:
parasparaviruddhātmanaikarūpaṃ kathaṃ bhavet /	Further, the assertion that ‘one thing has two forms’ involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms.
tathā hi tulyātulye rūpe parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇe tat kathaṃ tadātmakam ekaṃ bhavet /	The two forms Common and Uncommon are such that the absence of one implies the presence of tlie other and vice versa; how then can any single thing have these two forms? (1986)
saṃvitteścetyādinā kumārilamatamāśaṅkate	The following Text sets forth the view of Kumārila: [see verses 1986b-1987 above]
sa hyāha ekasmin vastuni parasparaviruddhānām ākārāṇām asambhava ityetannāsti /	[verses 1986b-1987]: Kumārila argues thus: “It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing;
kasmāt ---/ saṃvitteḥ kāraṇāt /	why? because it is actually found to be the case.
tathā hi ekākāreṇaivaikena vastunā bhavitavyam iti neyam ājñā rājñām kiṃ tu yadyathopalabhyate tat tathaivābhyupagantavyam /	Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that ‘one thing must have only one form’; in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found;
pratītinibandhanatvād vastuvyavasthāyāḥ /	as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same.
ekānekākārā ca sattārūpādibhedataḥ pratītir bhavantī samupalabhyate /	As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form, as in the form of ‘Being’ and also in many forms;
tasmāt tathaiva vyavasthāpyata iti //	hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised.” (1986-1987)
tannetyādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 1988 next]
evaṃ sati na kiñcid vijñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ syād bhedavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaś	If it be as asserted, then no Cognition could be wrong; and there would be an end to all notions of ‘difference’.
atha bādhyamānatvāt kasyacid bhrāntatvaṃ syāt / tadaikasminnanekavijñānaṃ bādhyamānaṃ katham abhrāntaṃ bhavet /	It might be possible to characterise that Cognition as ‘wrong’ which is subsequently sublated. But even so, when the idea of ‘many’ in reference to what is one is sublated, how could it be not-wrong?
evaṃ tāvad aṇūnāṃ{na} pratyakṣato nāpyanumāna{taḥ}siddhir iti na bāhyārthāpahnavepratyakṣavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ /	Thus it is found that the existence of Atoms cannot be proved either by Perception or by Inference; consequently the proposition denying the external world does not involve the contradiction of any fact of perception.
nāpi hetor asiddhatā //	Nor is the Reason adduced by us ‘inadmissible’.
idānīṃ para ekānekasvabhāvarahitatvād ityasya hetoḥ sandigdhāsiddhatām udbhāvayann āha mābhūd ityādi / mābhūt pramāṇataḥ siddhir aṇūnām astu saṃśayaḥ /	In the following text, the Opponent raises the objection that the Reason propounded in the form ‘Because the Earth and other things are not of the nature of one or several [therefore they must be non-existent]’ is doubtful and hence ‘inadmissible’: [see verse 1989 above]
saṃyuktam ityādinā pratividhatte /	The following texts supply the answer to this [see verses 1990-1992 next]
aṇvāntarābhimukhyena rūpaṃ cedanyadiṣyate / kathaṃ nāma bhaved ekaḥ paramāṇus tathāsati //	The argument may be formulated as follows: That which is devoid of the form of one or many is ñt for being regarded as non-existent, as the ‘sky-lotus’;
prayogaḥ yadekānekasvabhāvarahitaṃ tadasadvyavahārayogyam, yathā viyadabjam, ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhimatāḥ paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	the Atoms postulated by the other party are devoid of the form of one or many; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
na cāsiddho hetur iti mantavyam /	It cannot be said that the Reason here adduced is ‘inadmissible’;
tathāhyekatvaṃ tāvad aṇūnām asiddhaṃ bhūdharādipracitarūpāṇāṃ digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvāt /	because that the Atom is one cannot be admitted; because in the Hill and other things which are aggregates of Atoms, there is diversity of facings towards various directions.
tameva digbhāgabhedaṃ bhūdarādyupacayānyathānupapattyā paramāṇūnāṃ prasaṃjayannekatvaniṣedhaṃ tāvad āha saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśastham ityādi /	This ‘diversity of facings in various directions’ must be present in the Atoms also, otherwise it could not be possible in the aggregates of Atoms, like the Hill and other things; this is what is set forth in the words ‘If the assumption is, etc. etc. Some people hold that in every Object, the Atoms are in close conjunction with one another;
tatra kecid āhuḥ parasparaṃ saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti sāntarā eva nityaṃ naspṛśantītyapare nirantaratve tu spṛṣṭasaṃjñetyanye tatraitasmin pakṣatraye 'pi madhyavartinaḥ paramāṇor bahubhiḥ parivāritasya yadi digbhāgabhedo na syāt	others hold that they remain there separate from each other, always, without touching one another; others again hold that there is no intervening space between atoms, hence they are said to be in contact. Under all these three views, when the Atom in the middle is surrounded by many other Atoms, if there were no diversity in its facings towards various directions, then, as in the case of the Mind and Mental entities, no aggregation would be possible, as Atoms have no parts.
tathā hi yenaikarūpeṇakāṇvabhimukho madhyavartī paramāṇus tenaivāparaparamāṇvabhimukho yadi syāt tadā parivārakāṇām aṇūnām ekadeśatvaprasaṅgātpracayo na syāt / prayogaḥ yadekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvarūpaṃ bhavet tadekadeśam yathā tasyaiva pūrvadeśasthitaḥ paramāṇuḥ ekaprāsādābhimukhapūrvaprassādavac ca ekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvabhāvaś ca sarve parivāryāvasthitāḥ paramāṇava	For instance, that form in which the central Atom would be facing one Atom, if in that same form, it also faced other Atoms, then, it would imply that all the surrounding Atoms occupy the same point in space, and no aggregation of them would be possible. The argument may be formulated as follows: Whatever faces the Atom of one form must occupy the same point in space, as for example, the Atom lying in space behind the said Atom, or the House that stands facing another House; and all the Atoms surrounding the central Atom stand facing that central Atom which has only one form;
iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.
ataḥ pracayo na syāt /	As a consequence of this, there could be no aggregation (of Atoms).
athānyena rūpeṇābhimukhas tadā digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvād ghaṭādivadekatvaṃ na prāpnoti /	If, on the other hand, the central Atom faces the other Atom in another form, then as the diverse facings would be there, the Atom could not be one, being just like the Jar and other things.
bhandataśubhaguptas tu prāha yathaikasvabhāvasyāsadadravuādovuāvṛttasuānekaṃ sāmānyaṃ na tattvena kalpyate evam ihāpi paramāṇūnām anekavartitvādanekatvaṃ kalpyate na bhūtārthena /	Bhadanta-Śubhagupta has offered the following explanation: “In the case of an entity, as differentiated from the ‘non-existent’ and the ‘non-entity’, several Universals are assumed, but not in reality; similarly in the case in question, as Atoms exist in several things, they are assumed to be many, but not in reality.
tathā hi na dikpadārtho nāmāsti kaṇādādikalpitaḥ tasyaikasvarūpatvād anekarūpaḥ pūrvādipratyayo na syāt /	Because there is no distinct Category in the shape of Space (or Direction) as posited by Kaṇāda and others; because if this Space were one only, then the diverse notions of ‘East’, ‘West’ and the rest, would not be possible.
kevalamaṇava eva paurvāparyeṇāvasthitā dikśabdavācyās tataś ca digbhāgabhedavattvād iti kevalaṃ bahibhiḥ parivāraṇamevoktaṃ syān na sāvayavatvam iti /	It is only the Atoms that lie there one after the other which come to be spoken of as ‘Space’ or ‘Direction’; hence when it is said ‘because there is diversity of facings in Space’, all that is meant is that one Atom is surrounded of several Atoms, and not that the Atom has parts”.
tadetad asamyak /	This is not right.
tathā hi niravayavatvāccittasyevaṇūnāṃ paramārthato norddhvādhobhāgāḥ santīti bahubhiḥ parivāraṇam eva na syāt cittacaittādivat /	Because, if the Atom has no parts, it is like the Mind; and hence there cannot be any such diversity as its ‘upper’ or ‘lower’ parts; and in that case there could be no ‘surrounding’ of the one by the many; just as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mind-products.
tataś ca parivārakāṇām aṇūnāṃ paramārthenābhāvāt kathaṃ taddvāreṇānekamadhyavartitvaṃ yenānekatvaṃ deśakṛtaṃ kalpyeta /	Thus the ‘surrounding’ being, in reality, non-existent, how could there be any existence (of the Atom) in the middlé of surrounding Atoms; by virtue of which diversity due to facings could foe assumed?
athāsatyapi paramārthata ūrddhvādhobhāgavattve bahubhiḥ parivāraṇaṃ syāt tarhi cittacaitānām api syāt /	If, even in the absence of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there were ‘surroundings’ by other Atoms, then there could be such surrounding of Mind and Mental effects also;
tataś ca paramāṇuvac cittādīnam api deśasthatvaṃ syāt /	and in that case, like the Atoms, these latter also would subsist in Space.
no cet paramāṇūnām api na syāt /	If not, then the Atoms also could not subsist in Space.
tataś ca pracayo na syāc cittādivad ityekāntaḥ /	Hence it follows that there could be no aggregation of Atoms;
syād etat yathā vartamāna [p.657] cittakṣaṇasyātītānāgatābhyāṃ cittalakṣaṇābhyāṃ kālakṛtanairantaryam asti atha ca vartamānacittakṣaṇasya kalāmuhūrtādivatsāvayavatvam evam aṇūnāṃsatyapi bahubhiḥ parivāraṇe na deśakṛtaṃ sāvayavatvaṃ bhaviṣyati /	The following might be urged “In the case of the Present ‘Mind-moment’ there is immediate sequence, in time, to the Past and Future ‘Mind-moments’, and yet the Present Moment has no parts like the various divisions of Time Seconds, Minutes and so forth; in the same mariner, in the case of Atoms, even though there is surrounding of one Atom by many Atoms, there would be no parts in the Atom, due to the facings in Space,”
tadetad asamyak / nahi vartamānacittalakṣaṇasya pūrvottarābhyāṃ nairantaryaṃ paramārthato 'stitadānīṃ tayor asattvāt /	This is not right.- As a matter of fact, there is no real immediate sequence between the Present Moment and the Past and Future Moments; because at that moment, these latter are non-existent;
na cāsatā saha paurvāparyaṃ bhāvikaṃ yuktaṃ kevalaṃ sahabhūtayor na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'stīti tad dvāreṇa parikalpya samutthāpitaṃ pūrvāparayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ sattvaṃ prāk paścādabhāvavat /	and there can be no real sequence to what is non-existent. All that is possible is that, because there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between things existing at the same moment, therefore through that relation the existence of the Past and Future Momenta is implied and assumed; just as there is assumption of Prior and Posterior Non-existence.
nacaivam aṇūnāṃ deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ parikalpitaṃ pracayābhāvaprasaṅgāt /	In the case of Atoms however, there cannot be any such assumption of sequence in space; as in that case, no aggregation would be possible.
kiṃ ca na tāvad ahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ yuktimat nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgād iti /	Then again, it cannot be right to regard things as without cause; for if they were so, they would be always there.
yo 'pi sāmvṛtatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pratipannastenāpyavaśyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ sahetukatvam eṣṭavyam /	Even the person who admits the ‘illusory’ character of things, must regard all things as with cause.
sati ca sahetukatve na tāvat samakāle kāryakāraṇe yukte /	And when they are with cause, it is not right that the Cause and Effect should exist at the same moment;
nāpi prākkāryotpatteḥ kāraṇasyāsattvenāsāmarthyāt / paścād api kārye samutpanne hetor anupayogāt /	nor can the Cause be non-existent before the Effect, as, in that case, it could not have the requisite potency; after the appearance of the Effect, there would be no use for the Cause.
ataḥ prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnam avaśyam aṅgīkartavyaḥ /	Hence it must be admitted that all Causes exist before the Effect.
yathoktam "asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt paścāt cānupayogataḥ /	This idea has been thus expressed---4 Previous to the Effect if the Cause is non-existent, it can have no potency;
prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnāṃ nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha" //	hence all causes must have existence prior to the Effect; hence no Object can exist along with its cognition
tadevaṃ niraṃśatve 'pi sarvabhāvānāṃ nyāyato 'vasthitaṃ kālakṛtaṃ sāvayavatve deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ syāt cittacaittyānām api syād aviśeṣād ityuktam /	Thus, even when all things are without parts, the existence of some sort of sequence in time stands to reason; but how could there be any sequence in space, if there were no parts? This is the point that is urged. If, even in the absence of parts, there were sequence in space, then there could be such sequence in the case of Mind and Mental effects also;
mūrttatvakṛto 'sti viśeṣa iti cen na /	“There is difference due to corporeality”. Not so;
tadevāsiddhamasati sāvayavatve /	as in the absence of parts, there cannot be corporeality also.
kevalaṃ paryāyeṇa sāvayavatvam evoktaṃ syāt nānyo viśeṣa iti yatkiñcid etat /	So this explanation means nothing more than the assertion of the presence of parts. There is no other point of difference.
tasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ nyāyye kālakṛte paurvāparye sati yadetad aparamadhikaṃ kasyacid deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ tat sāvayavatvamantareṇa na sambhavatīti yuktam uktam /	So there is nothing in this. Thus then, in the case of all things, it is only sequence in time that has some basis in reason; anything more than that, in the shape of sequence in space, is not possible except when there are parts. Hence it is a perfectly correct statement that where there is diversity of facings in Space, the thing cannot be one’.
digbhāgabhedo yasyāti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate ityalaṃ vistareṇa //	We desist from further labouring of this point.
atra kecid āhuḥ evaṃ tarhyaṇīyāṃsaḥ pradeśāḥ santu paramāṇavas tatrāpyavayavakalpanāyāṃ punar api pradeśānām evāṇutvaṃ bhaviṣyati yadi paramanavasthaiva natu punaḥ sāvayavatvaprasaṅgena śakyate 'ṇūnāṃ prajñaptisattvamāpādayitum /	On this subject, some people argue as follows: “Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself; and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite regress. But in no ease does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts. Even if they are mere subjective entities, it is necessary to postulate a cause for that Idea;
yat tatprajñaptyupādānaṃ tasyaiva paramāṇutvaṃ bhaviṣyati /	that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.
athāsattvam evāṇūnāṃ sādhyate evam api digbhāgabhedādityasiddhatvaṃ hetoḥ / nahi kharaviṣāṇādayotyantāsantaḥ pūrvādidigbhāgabhedavanto bhavanti /	If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at ah, even so, the Reason adduced -‘Because there is diversity of facings’ is ‘inadmissible’, Because mere non-entities like the ‘Horns of the Ass’ do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.
nāpīdaṃ prasaṅgasādhanaṃ digbhāgabhedasyānabhyupagatatvād iti /	because ‘the diversity of facings’ is not admitted by us The answer to this is given in the following [see verses 1993-1997 next]
atra pratividhānam āha apetetyādi /	On this subject, some people argue as follows: “Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself;
apetabhāgabhedaśca yaḥ parair aṇuriṣyate / tatraiveyaṃ kṛtāc cintā nāniṣṭāsambhavastataḥ // bhāgānāṃ paramāṇutvam aṅgīkurvanti te yadā /	and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite regress. But in no ease does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts.
svapratijñācyutis teṣāṃ tadāvaśyaṃ prasajyate //	that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.
prasaṅgasādhanatvena nāśrayāsiddhateha ca / parābhyupetayogādibalād aikyaṃ hyapohyate // tadevaṃ sarvapakṣeṣu naivaikātmā sa yujyate /	If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at ah, even so, the Reason adduced -‘Because there is diversity of facings’ is ‘inadmissible’, Because mere non-entities like the ‘Horns of the Ass’ do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.
ekāniṣpattito 'nekasvabhāvo 'pi na sambhavī //	Nor can your argument be treated as a Redactio ad Absurdum;
asanniścayayogyo 'taḥ paramāṇur vipaścitām /	because ‘the diversity of facings’ is not admitted by us The answer to this is given in the following [see verses 1993-1997 above]
avaśyaṃ hi pariniṣṭhitarūpaṃ kiñcid vastu paramāṇutvena tadvādināṅgīkartavyam / anyathā hyanavasthāyām anavadhāritarūpatvād anupākhyatvam eva svayaṃ pratipāditaṃ syāt /	The man who postulates the ‘Atom’ must hold that it is a certain entity with a well-defined form. Otherwise, if there were an indefinite Infinite Regress, the form of the ‘Atom’ could not be determined; and in that case our Opponent would himself have established the fact that it is something ‘indescribable’, ‘indefinite’, ‘indeterminate’;
tasmād yadeva pariniṣṭhitaṃ tvayā vyavasthāpitamaṇutvena tatraivānapāśritānavasthāvikalpe yadā cintā kriyate tadā katham anavasthā syād yadi paramanavasthayā svābhyupagamavirodhaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt /	and thus he would have established what is desired by Ins Opponent, For these reasons, that same well-defined entity which you would prove to be the ‘Atom’, without having recourse to an Infinite Regress, if with regard to that same entity an investigation is carried on, why should there be an Infinite Regress? Specially so when the Infinite Regress would lead to the subversion of your doctrine.
natu parasya kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditam /	But that would not bring about a situation undesirable for your Opponent.
etāvataiva parasyeṣṭasiddheḥ prasaṅgasādhanamevedam /	And as this would be enough to prove what is desired by your Opponent, the argument that we have put forward is only by way of a Reductio ad Absurdum.
nacāsiddhitā hetoḥ /	Our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.
tathā hi pareṇa paramāṇūnāṃ saṃyuktatvaṃ nairantaryaṃ tathā bahubhiḥ sāntaraiḥ parivāraṇaṃ cetyabhyupagatam anyathā kathaṃ ca pratyayo bhavet tataś ca yadyapi digbhāgabhedo vācā nābhyupagatas tathāpi saṃyuktatvādidharmābhyupagamabalādevāpatati /	Because the other party has accepted the view.that. Atoms are in conjunction with one another, that there is no intervening space between them, and that each Atom is surrounded by Atoms distinct from one another; if it were not so, how could there be any Cognition of it? Thus though it has not been admitted in so many words that there is ‘diversity of facings’ in Atoms, yet it follows from the acceptance of their being in conjunction and so forth. Unless there is diversity of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there cannot be any Conjunction, etc., as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mental Effects;
nahyasatyūrddhvadhobhāgādibhede saṃyuktatvādipakṣatrayaṃ yuktaṃ cittādivad ityuktam / yaccoktam aṇuprajñapter avaśyam upādānamaṅgīkartavyam yattadupādānaṃ sa eva paramāṇur bhaviṣyatīti /	It has been argued that “It is necessary to admit a Cause for the Idea of the Atom, and that which is the Cause of that Idea is the Atom”, The answer to that is that there is already a cause for the illusory idea of ‘Atom’, in the shape of the notion of the dust-particles coming in through the hole, this notion resulting from the fruition of the Impressions left by the contemplation of wrong teachings.
nahi yatprajñaptyāṃ ca tadeva kāraṇaṃ yuktam aprajñaptisattvaprasaṅgād anyathātmaprajñapter ātmaiva kāraṇaṃ syāt na skandhāḥ / tataścāṇuvadātmapratiṣedho 'pi na syāt /	It cannot be right to regard the Atom itself as the cause of its own Idea; as in that case, the Atom would not have a purely subjective existence. If it were not so, then the cause of the Idea of the So til would consist of the Soul itself, -and not of the ‘Thought-phases’ (Skandhas) In this way, as of the Atom, so of the Soul also, there could be no denial.
evaṃ tāvad ekatvaṃ paramāṇūnām asiddham /	Thus it is established that Atoms cannot be one;
tat sandehātmakatvāt tasyeti nāsiddho 'ṇūnām abhāvavyavahāre sādhano hetuḥ //	and as there can no longer be any doubt oil this point, our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’ for proving the fact of Atoms being non-existent.
evaṃ tāvad bāhyārthasyānekasvabhāvarahitatvaṃ prasādhyedānīm ekasvabhāvarahitatvaṃ prasādhayann āha paramāṇor ayogaccetyādi /	Having thus proved that the ‘External Object’ is devoid of the nature of ‘many’, the Text proceeds to show that it cannot have the nature of ‘one’: [see verse 1998 above]
[p.559] yair apyanārabdhaḥ paramāṇubhis sthūla iṣṭas teṣāṃ so 'pi paramāṇuvad digbhāgabhinnatvād eko na yuktaḥ pāṇyādikampādau sarvakampādiprasaṅgāt /	Those people who admit of the Gross Object, even though not composed of Atoms, for them, like the Atom, the Gross Object also could not be regarded as one, because of ‘the diversity of its facings’; because if it were one entity, then the shaking of the hand or the limbs would lead to the shaking of the whole body.
spaṣṭatvād bahuśaścarvitatvān na pṛthaktasya dūṣaṇam ayuktam /	As this is quite clear, and was threshed out on several occasions, the Author has not pointed out here any objections to this view.
tadevaṃ bāhyārthāvyavahārasādhane yadekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavatītyādau prayoge nāsiddho hetur iti siddho bāhyasya pṛthivyāder grāhyasyāsad vyavahāras tadasiddhau grāhakatvam api jñānasya tadapekṣaṃ kalpitaṃ nāstīti siddhā vijñaptimātratā //	Thus the Reason that which is devoid of the nature of one and many, etc. etc.’ which has been put forward by us, for proving that there can be no activity in regard to ‘external objects’, is one that cannot be regarded as' ‘inadmissible’, And when that is ‘admissible’, the Earth and other external things apprehended should be treated as non-existent. And when the Earth, etc. cannot be ‘apprehended’, the fact of the Cognition being the ‘apprehender’, assumed on the basis of the apprehension of those things, also, becomes proved to be inadmissible.
tadevam arthāyogād vijñaptimātratāṃ pratipādya samprati grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt pratipādayann āha anirbhāsam ityādi /	Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no ‘object’, the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the ‘apprehended’ and the ‘apprehender’: [see verse 1999 above]
anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca / vijānāti naca jñānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathañcana //	Neither as ‘formless’, nor as ‘with form’, nor ‘with the form of something other than the object’, can there be any apprehension of the external Object;
na nirākāreṇa nāpi sākāreṇa nāpi viṣayākārād anyākāreṇa bāhyasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam anyaśca prakāro nāsti tasmād ātmasaṃvedanam eva sadaiva jñānaṃ satyapi bāhye santānāntara iti siddhyati vijñaptimātratā /	and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another ‘Chain’ which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.
kaiścidanyākāram api jñānam anyākārasyārthasya saṃvedakam iṣṭam yathā kila pītākāram api jñānaṃ śuklaśaṅgagrāhīti /	Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the ‘yellow’ form apprehends also the ‘white’ conch-shell.
yathāha kumārilaḥ sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam / janmanyekatra bhinne vā sadā kālāntare 'pi ca //	This has been thus asserted by Kumārila [Ślokavārtika-nirālambanavāda, 108] “In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time, be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time.”
iti atas tṛtīyaṃ pakṣāntaram āśaṅkitam //	It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative.
nanu cātmasaṃvedano 'pyete 'nirbhāsādayo vikalpāḥ kasmānnāvatarantītyāha vijñānam ityādi /	Question: “Why should not the alternatives just set forth ‘not envisaging a form, etc.’ apply to the view that the Cognition (or Idea) is self-cognised?”
vijñānaṃ jadarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate /	Answer: [see verse 2000 above]
nahi grāhakabhāvenātmasaṃvedanamabhipretam kiṃ tarhi /	When Cognition is said to be ‘self-cognisant’, it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself;
svayam prakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā nabhastalavartyālokavat //	what is meant is that it shines, becomes manifested, by itself, by its very nature, just like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.
atha kasmād grāhyagrāhakabhāvena neṣyata ityāh kriyākārakabhāvenetyādi / kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittirasya tu /	Question: “Why is the Cognition not regarded as the Apprehender (of itself)?” Answer: [see verses 2001-2002 above]
[p.560] trairūpyam vedyavedakavittibhedena //	‘Three characters’ of the Cognised, the Cogniser and the Cognition (2001-2002)
athāpi syād bāhyasyāpyātmasaṃvittivad vinaiva grāhyagrāhakabhāvena saṃvittir bhaviṣyatītyāha nahi tadrūpam ityādi / nahi tadrūpamanyasya yena tadvedane param /	The following might bo urged Just as there is self-cognition of the Cognition itself, so would there be cognition of. the External Thing also, without there being an apprehender and an apprehended”.
yadyapyasadādivyāvṛttyā sadādirūpam ekaṃ bhāveṣu kalpyate tathāpi tasya pratipādanārtham paramārthato bhedādekatvaṃ nāstyevetyāha paramārthata iti //	Though it has been assumed that there is the single form of ‘Entity’ as differentiated from ‘non-entity’ which is common to all things, yet in reality, they are all different among themselves; hence there is no ‘one-ness’ among them. This is what is meant by the phrase ‘in reality’, (2003)
nirbhāsijñānapakṣe tu tayor bhede 'pi tattvataḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktaṃ syād api vedanam //	The following might be urged: “Even though the External Thing be different from the Cognition, yet it could be ‘cognised’, ‘apprehended’ just as the Cognition itself is”.
yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthākāroparāgavat / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedanaṃ //	Having thus proved the ‘self-cognition’ of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form): [see verses 2005-2006 above]
pratibimbasyeti jñānākārasya /	‘Reflection’ i.e. of the form of the Cognition.
tādrūpyād iti sārūpyāt /	‘Tādrūpyāt’ on account of its having the same form.
bhāktam iti amukhyam /	‘Indirect’ not primary; secondary.

tathā hi dvābhyāṃ rūpābhyāṃ vastuno 'nyānyatvād dve eva vastunī prāpte /

Then again, the two forms, being not-different from the Thing itself, would be identical, both being like the form of a single thing;

ekasmād vā vastuno rūpadvayasyāvyatirekādekavastusvarūpavad rūpadvayasya parasparātmakataiveti katham ekaṃ dvirūpaṃ syāt /

how then could it be a single thing having two forms? Further, as the Particular form of a thing is not entirely different from the Universal form, there would he a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses;

tataśceyam asaṅkīrṇā vyavasthā na prāpnoti samānaṃ rūpam akṣajñānagocaro 'samānaṃ tu yogipratyakṣam iṣyata iti //

and in that case there could not be the clear cut distinction that ‘the Common form is amenable to Sense-cognition and the Uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition’.

[p.555]

[verse 1986a]:

parasparaviruddhātmanaikarūpaṃ kathaṃ bhavet /

Further, the assertion that ‘one thing has two forms’ involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms.

tathā hi tulyātulye rūpe parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇe tat kathaṃ tadātmakam ekaṃ bhavet /

The two forms Common and Uncommon are such that the absence of one implies the presence of tlie other and vice versa; how then can any single thing have these two forms? (1986)

saṃvitteścetyādinā kumārilamatamāśaṅkate

The following Text sets forth the view of Kumārila: [see verses 1986b-1987 above]

sa hyāha ekasmin vastuni parasparaviruddhānām ākārāṇām asambhava ityetannāsti /

[verses 1986b-1987]: Kumārila argues thus: “It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing;

kasmāt ---/ saṃvitteḥ kāraṇāt /

why? because it is actually found to be the case.

tathā hi ekākāreṇaivaikena vastunā bhavitavyam iti neyam ājñā rājñām kiṃ tu yadyathopalabhyate tat tathaivābhyupagantavyam /

Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that ‘one thing must have only one form’; in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found;

pratītinibandhanatvād vastuvyavasthāyāḥ /

as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same.

ekānekākārā ca sattārūpādibhedataḥ pratītir bhavantī samupalabhyate /

As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form, as in the form of ‘Being’ and also in many forms;

tasmāt tathaiva vyavasthāpyata iti //

hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised.” (1986-1987)

tannetyādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 1988 next]

evaṃ sati na kiñcid vijñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ syād bhedavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaś

If it be as asserted, then no Cognition could be wrong; and there would be an end to all notions of ‘difference’.

atha bādhyamānatvāt kasyacid bhrāntatvaṃ syāt / tadaikasminnanekavijñānaṃ bādhyamānaṃ katham abhrāntaṃ bhavet /

It might be possible to characterise that Cognition as ‘wrong’ which is subsequently sublated. But even so, when the idea of ‘many’ in reference to what is one is sublated, how could it be not-wrong?

evaṃ tāvad aṇūnāṃ{na} pratyakṣato nāpyanumāna{taḥ}siddhir iti na bāhyārthāpahnavepratyakṣavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ /

Thus it is found that the existence of Atoms cannot be proved either by Perception or by Inference; consequently the proposition denying the external world does not involve the contradiction of any fact of perception.

nāpi hetor asiddhatā //

Nor is the Reason adduced by us ‘inadmissible’.

idānīṃ para ekānekasvabhāvarahitatvād ityasya hetoḥ sandigdhāsiddhatām udbhāvayann āha mābhūd ityādi / mābhūt pramāṇataḥ siddhir aṇūnām astu saṃśayaḥ /

In the following text, the Opponent raises the objection that the Reason propounded in the form ‘Because the Earth and other things are not of the nature of one or several [therefore they must be non-existent]’ is doubtful and hence ‘inadmissible’: [see verse 1989 above]

saṃyuktam ityādinā pratividhatte /

The following texts supply the answer to this [see verses 1990-1992 next]

aṇvāntarābhimukhyena rūpaṃ cedanyadiṣyate / kathaṃ nāma bhaved ekaḥ paramāṇus tathāsati //

The argument may be formulated as follows: That which is devoid of the form of one or many is ñt for being regarded as non-existent, as the ‘sky-lotus’;

prayogaḥ yadekānekasvabhāvarahitaṃ tadasadvyavahārayogyam, yathā viyadabjam, ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhimatāḥ paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

the Atoms postulated by the other party are devoid of the form of one or many; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

na cāsiddho hetur iti mantavyam /

It cannot be said that the Reason here adduced is ‘inadmissible’;

tathāhyekatvaṃ tāvad aṇūnām asiddhaṃ bhūdharādipracitarūpāṇāṃ digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvāt /

because that the Atom is one cannot be admitted; because in the Hill and other things which are aggregates of Atoms, there is diversity of facings towards various directions.

tameva digbhāgabhedaṃ bhūdarādyupacayānyathānupapattyā paramāṇūnāṃ prasaṃjayannekatvaniṣedhaṃ tāvad āha saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśastham ityādi /

This ‘diversity of facings in various directions’ must be present in the Atoms also, otherwise it could not be possible in the aggregates of Atoms, like the Hill and other things; this is what is set forth in the words ‘If the assumption is, etc. etc. Some people hold that in every Object, the Atoms are in close conjunction with one another;

tatra kecid āhuḥ parasparaṃ saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti sāntarā eva nityaṃ naspṛśantītyapare nirantaratve tu spṛṣṭasaṃjñetyanye tatraitasmin pakṣatraye 'pi madhyavartinaḥ paramāṇor bahubhiḥ parivāritasya yadi digbhāgabhedo na syāt

others hold that they remain there separate from each other, always, without touching one another; others again hold that there is no intervening space between atoms, hence they are said to be in contact. Under all these three views, when the Atom in the middle is surrounded by many other Atoms, if there were no diversity in its facings towards various directions, then, as in the case of the Mind and Mental entities, no aggregation would be possible, as Atoms have no parts.

tathā hi yenaikarūpeṇakāṇvabhimukho madhyavartī paramāṇus tenaivāparaparamāṇvabhimukho yadi syāt tadā parivārakāṇām aṇūnām ekadeśatvaprasaṅgātpracayo na syāt / prayogaḥ yadekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvarūpaṃ bhavet tadekadeśam yathā tasyaiva pūrvadeśasthitaḥ paramāṇuḥ ekaprāsādābhimukhapūrvaprassādavac ca ekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvabhāvaś ca sarve parivāryāvasthitāḥ paramāṇava

For instance, that form in which the central Atom would be facing one Atom, if in that same form, it also faced other Atoms, then, it would imply that all the surrounding Atoms occupy the same point in space, and no aggregation of them would be possible. The argument may be formulated as follows: Whatever faces the Atom of one form must occupy the same point in space, as for example, the Atom lying in space behind the said Atom, or the House that stands facing another House; and all the Atoms surrounding the central Atom stand facing that central Atom which has only one form;

iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

ataḥ pracayo na syāt /

As a consequence of this, there could be no aggregation (of Atoms).

athānyena rūpeṇābhimukhas tadā digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvād ghaṭādivadekatvaṃ na prāpnoti /

If, on the other hand, the central Atom faces the other Atom in another form, then as the diverse facings would be there, the Atom could not be one, being just like the Jar and other things.

bhandataśubhaguptas tu prāha yathaikasvabhāvasyāsadadravuādovuāvṛttasuānekaṃ sāmānyaṃ na tattvena kalpyate evam ihāpi paramāṇūnām anekavartitvādanekatvaṃ kalpyate na bhūtārthena /

Bhadanta-Śubhagupta has offered the following explanation: “In the case of an entity, as differentiated from the ‘non-existent’ and the ‘non-entity’, several Universals are assumed, but not in reality; similarly in the case in question, as Atoms exist in several things, they are assumed to be many, but not in reality.

tathā hi na dikpadārtho nāmāsti kaṇādādikalpitaḥ tasyaikasvarūpatvād anekarūpaḥ pūrvādipratyayo na syāt /

Because there is no distinct Category in the shape of Space (or Direction) as posited by Kaṇāda and others; because if this Space were one only, then the diverse notions of ‘East’, ‘West’ and the rest, would not be possible.

kevalamaṇava eva paurvāparyeṇāvasthitā dikśabdavācyās tataś ca digbhāgabhedavattvād iti kevalaṃ bahibhiḥ parivāraṇamevoktaṃ syān na sāvayavatvam iti /

It is only the Atoms that lie there one after the other which come to be spoken of as ‘Space’ or ‘Direction’; hence when it is said ‘because there is diversity of facings in Space’, all that is meant is that one Atom is surrounded of several Atoms, and not that the Atom has parts”.

tadetad asamyak /

This is not right.

tathā hi niravayavatvāccittasyevaṇūnāṃ paramārthato norddhvādhobhāgāḥ santīti bahubhiḥ parivāraṇam eva na syāt cittacaittādivat /

Because, if the Atom has no parts, it is like the Mind; and hence there cannot be any such diversity as its ‘upper’ or ‘lower’ parts; and in that case there could be no ‘surrounding’ of the one by the many; just as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mind-products.

tataś ca parivārakāṇām aṇūnāṃ paramārthenābhāvāt kathaṃ taddvāreṇānekamadhyavartitvaṃ yenānekatvaṃ deśakṛtaṃ kalpyeta /

Thus the ‘surrounding’ being, in reality, non-existent, how could there be any existence (of the Atom) in the middlé of surrounding Atoms; by virtue of which diversity due to facings could foe assumed?

athāsatyapi paramārthata ūrddhvādhobhāgavattve bahubhiḥ parivāraṇaṃ syāt tarhi cittacaitānām api syāt /

If, even in the absence of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there were ‘surroundings’ by other Atoms, then there could be such surrounding of Mind and Mental effects also;

tataś ca paramāṇuvac cittādīnam api deśasthatvaṃ syāt /

and in that case, like the Atoms, these latter also would subsist in Space.

no cet paramāṇūnām api na syāt /

If not, then the Atoms also could not subsist in Space.

tataś ca pracayo na syāc cittādivad ityekāntaḥ /

Hence it follows that there could be no aggregation of Atoms;

syād etat yathā vartamāna [p.657] cittakṣaṇasyātītānāgatābhyāṃ cittalakṣaṇābhyāṃ kālakṛtanairantaryam asti atha ca vartamānacittakṣaṇasya kalāmuhūrtādivatsāvayavatvam evam aṇūnāṃsatyapi bahubhiḥ parivāraṇe na deśakṛtaṃ sāvayavatvaṃ bhaviṣyati /

The following might be urged “In the case of the Present ‘Mind-moment’ there is immediate sequence, in time, to the Past and Future ‘Mind-moments’, and yet the Present Moment has no parts like the various divisions of Time Seconds, Minutes and so forth; in the same mariner, in the case of Atoms, even though there is surrounding of one Atom by many Atoms, there would be no parts in the Atom, due to the facings in Space,”

tadetad asamyak / nahi vartamānacittalakṣaṇasya pūrvottarābhyāṃ nairantaryaṃ paramārthato 'stitadānīṃ tayor asattvāt /

This is not right.- As a matter of fact, there is no real immediate sequence between the Present Moment and the Past and Future Moments; because at that moment, these latter are non-existent;

na cāsatā saha paurvāparyaṃ bhāvikaṃ yuktaṃ kevalaṃ sahabhūtayor na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'stīti tad dvāreṇa parikalpya samutthāpitaṃ pūrvāparayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ sattvaṃ prāk paścādabhāvavat /

and there can be no real sequence to what is non-existent. All that is possible is that, because there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between things existing at the same moment, therefore through that relation the existence of the Past and Future Momenta is implied and assumed; just as there is assumption of Prior and Posterior Non-existence.

nacaivam aṇūnāṃ deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ parikalpitaṃ pracayābhāvaprasaṅgāt /

In the case of Atoms however, there cannot be any such assumption of sequence in space; as in that case, no aggregation would be possible.

kiṃ ca na tāvad ahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ yuktimat nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgād iti /

Then again, it cannot be right to regard things as without cause; for if they were so, they would be always there.

yo 'pi sāmvṛtatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pratipannastenāpyavaśyaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ sahetukatvam eṣṭavyam /

Even the person who admits the ‘illusory’ character of things, must regard all things as with cause.

sati ca sahetukatve na tāvat samakāle kāryakāraṇe yukte /

And when they are with cause, it is not right that the Cause and Effect should exist at the same moment;

nāpi prākkāryotpatteḥ kāraṇasyāsattvenāsāmarthyāt / paścād api kārye samutpanne hetor anupayogāt /

nor can the Cause be non-existent before the Effect, as, in that case, it could not have the requisite potency; after the appearance of the Effect, there would be no use for the Cause.

ataḥ prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnam avaśyam aṅgīkartavyaḥ /

Hence it must be admitted that all Causes exist before the Effect.

yathoktam "asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt paścāt cānupayogataḥ /

This idea has been thus expressed---4 Previous to the Effect if the Cause is non-existent, it can have no potency;

prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnāṃ nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha" //

hence all causes must have existence prior to the Effect; hence no Object can exist along with its cognition

tadevaṃ niraṃśatve 'pi sarvabhāvānāṃ nyāyato 'vasthitaṃ kālakṛtaṃ sāvayavatve deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ syāt cittacaittyānām api syād aviśeṣād ityuktam /

Thus, even when all things are without parts, the existence of some sort of sequence in time stands to reason; but how could there be any sequence in space, if there were no parts? This is the point that is urged. If, even in the absence of parts, there were sequence in space, then there could be such sequence in the case of Mind and Mental effects also;

mūrttatvakṛto 'sti viśeṣa iti cen na /

“There is difference due to corporeality”. Not so;

tadevāsiddhamasati sāvayavatve /

as in the absence of parts, there cannot be corporeality also.

kevalaṃ paryāyeṇa sāvayavatvam evoktaṃ syāt nānyo viśeṣa iti yatkiñcid etat /

So this explanation means nothing more than the assertion of the presence of parts. There is no other point of difference.

tasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ nyāyye kālakṛte paurvāparye sati yadetad aparamadhikaṃ kasyacid deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ tat sāvayavatvamantareṇa na sambhavatīti yuktam uktam /

So there is nothing in this. Thus then, in the case of all things, it is only sequence in time that has some basis in reason; anything more than that, in the shape of sequence in space, is not possible except when there are parts. Hence it is a perfectly correct statement that where there is diversity of facings in Space, the thing cannot be one’.

digbhāgabhedo yasyāti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate ityalaṃ vistareṇa //

We desist from further labouring of this point.

atra kecid āhuḥ evaṃ tarhyaṇīyāṃsaḥ pradeśāḥ santu paramāṇavas tatrāpyavayavakalpanāyāṃ punar api pradeśānām evāṇutvaṃ bhaviṣyati yadi paramanavasthaiva natu punaḥ sāvayavatvaprasaṅgena śakyate 'ṇūnāṃ prajñaptisattvamāpādayitum /

On this subject, some people argue as follows: “Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself; and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite regress. But in no ease does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts. Even if they are mere subjective entities, it is necessary to postulate a cause for that Idea;

yat tatprajñaptyupādānaṃ tasyaiva paramāṇutvaṃ bhaviṣyati /

that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.

athāsattvam evāṇūnāṃ sādhyate evam api digbhāgabhedādityasiddhatvaṃ hetoḥ / nahi kharaviṣāṇādayotyantāsantaḥ pūrvādidigbhāgabhedavanto bhavanti /

If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at ah, even so, the Reason adduced -‘Because there is diversity of facings’ is ‘inadmissible’, Because mere non-entities like the ‘Horns of the Ass’ do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.

nāpīdaṃ prasaṅgasādhanaṃ digbhāgabhedasyānabhyupagatatvād iti /

because ‘the diversity of facings’ is not admitted by us The answer to this is given in the following [see verses 1993-1997 next]

atra pratividhānam āha apetetyādi /

On this subject, some people argue as follows: “Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself;

apetabhāgabhedaśca yaḥ parair aṇuriṣyate / tatraiveyaṃ kṛtāc cintā nāniṣṭāsambhavastataḥ // bhāgānāṃ paramāṇutvam aṅgīkurvanti te yadā /

and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite regress. But in no ease does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere ideal (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts.

svapratijñācyutis teṣāṃ tadāvaśyaṃ prasajyate //

that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the Atom.

prasaṅgasādhanatvena nāśrayāsiddhateha ca / parābhyupetayogādibalād aikyaṃ hyapohyate // tadevaṃ sarvapakṣeṣu naivaikātmā sa yujyate /

If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at ah, even so, the Reason adduced -‘Because there is diversity of facings’ is ‘inadmissible’, Because mere non-entities like the ‘Horns of the Ass’ do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions.

ekāniṣpattito 'nekasvabhāvo 'pi na sambhavī //

Nor can your argument be treated as a Redactio ad Absurdum;

asanniścayayogyo 'taḥ paramāṇur vipaścitām /

because ‘the diversity of facings’ is not admitted by us The answer to this is given in the following [see verses 1993-1997 above]

avaśyaṃ hi pariniṣṭhitarūpaṃ kiñcid vastu paramāṇutvena tadvādināṅgīkartavyam / anyathā hyanavasthāyām anavadhāritarūpatvād anupākhyatvam eva svayaṃ pratipāditaṃ syāt /

The man who postulates the ‘Atom’ must hold that it is a certain entity with a well-defined form. Otherwise, if there were an indefinite Infinite Regress, the form of the ‘Atom’ could not be determined; and in that case our Opponent would himself have established the fact that it is something ‘indescribable’, ‘indefinite’, ‘indeterminate’;

tasmād yadeva pariniṣṭhitaṃ tvayā vyavasthāpitamaṇutvena tatraivānapāśritānavasthāvikalpe yadā cintā kriyate tadā katham anavasthā syād yadi paramanavasthayā svābhyupagamavirodhaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt /

and thus he would have established what is desired by Ins Opponent, For these reasons, that same well-defined entity which you would prove to be the ‘Atom’, without having recourse to an Infinite Regress, if with regard to that same entity an investigation is carried on, why should there be an Infinite Regress? Specially so when the Infinite Regress would lead to the subversion of your doctrine.

natu parasya kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditam /

But that would not bring about a situation undesirable for your Opponent.

etāvataiva parasyeṣṭasiddheḥ prasaṅgasādhanamevedam /

And as this would be enough to prove what is desired by your Opponent, the argument that we have put forward is only by way of a Reductio ad Absurdum.

nacāsiddhitā hetoḥ /

Our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.

tathā hi pareṇa paramāṇūnāṃ saṃyuktatvaṃ nairantaryaṃ tathā bahubhiḥ sāntaraiḥ parivāraṇaṃ cetyabhyupagatam anyathā kathaṃ ca pratyayo bhavet tataś ca yadyapi digbhāgabhedo vācā nābhyupagatas tathāpi saṃyuktatvādidharmābhyupagamabalādevāpatati /

Because the other party has accepted the view.that. Atoms are in conjunction with one another, that there is no intervening space between them, and that each Atom is surrounded by Atoms distinct from one another; if it were not so, how could there be any Cognition of it? Thus though it has not been admitted in so many words that there is ‘diversity of facings’ in Atoms, yet it follows from the acceptance of their being in conjunction and so forth. Unless there is diversity of ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ parts, there cannot be any Conjunction, etc., as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mental Effects;

nahyasatyūrddhvadhobhāgādibhede saṃyuktatvādipakṣatrayaṃ yuktaṃ cittādivad ityuktam / yaccoktam aṇuprajñapter avaśyam upādānamaṅgīkartavyam yattadupādānaṃ sa eva paramāṇur bhaviṣyatīti /

It has been argued that “It is necessary to admit a Cause for the Idea of the Atom, and that which is the Cause of that Idea is the Atom”, The answer to that is that there is already a cause for the illusory idea of ‘Atom’, in the shape of the notion of the dust-particles coming in through the hole, this notion resulting from the fruition of the Impressions left by the contemplation of wrong teachings.

nahi yatprajñaptyāṃ ca tadeva kāraṇaṃ yuktam aprajñaptisattvaprasaṅgād anyathātmaprajñapter ātmaiva kāraṇaṃ syāt na skandhāḥ / tataścāṇuvadātmapratiṣedho 'pi na syāt /

It cannot be right to regard the Atom itself as the cause of its own Idea; as in that case, the Atom would not have a purely subjective existence. If it were not so, then the cause of the Idea of the So til would consist of the Soul itself, -and not of the ‘Thought-phases’ (Skandhas) In this way, as of the Atom, so of the Soul also, there could be no denial.

evaṃ tāvad ekatvaṃ paramāṇūnām asiddham /

Thus it is established that Atoms cannot be one;

tat sandehātmakatvāt tasyeti nāsiddho 'ṇūnām abhāvavyavahāre sādhano hetuḥ //

and as there can no longer be any doubt oil this point, our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’ for proving the fact of Atoms being non-existent.

evaṃ tāvad bāhyārthasyānekasvabhāvarahitatvaṃ prasādhyedānīm ekasvabhāvarahitatvaṃ prasādhayann āha paramāṇor ayogaccetyādi /

Having thus proved that the ‘External Object’ is devoid of the nature of ‘many’, the Text proceeds to show that it cannot have the nature of ‘one’: [see verse 1998 above]

[p.559] yair apyanārabdhaḥ paramāṇubhis sthūla iṣṭas teṣāṃ so 'pi paramāṇuvad digbhāgabhinnatvād eko na yuktaḥ pāṇyādikampādau sarvakampādiprasaṅgāt /

Those people who admit of the Gross Object, even though not composed of Atoms, for them, like the Atom, the Gross Object also could not be regarded as one, because of ‘the diversity of its facings’; because if it were one entity, then the shaking of the hand or the limbs would lead to the shaking of the whole body.

spaṣṭatvād bahuśaścarvitatvān na pṛthaktasya dūṣaṇam ayuktam /

As this is quite clear, and was threshed out on several occasions, the Author has not pointed out here any objections to this view.

tadevaṃ bāhyārthāvyavahārasādhane yadekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavatītyādau prayoge nāsiddho hetur iti siddho bāhyasya pṛthivyāder grāhyasyāsad vyavahāras tadasiddhau grāhakatvam api jñānasya tadapekṣaṃ kalpitaṃ nāstīti siddhā vijñaptimātratā //

Thus the Reason that which is devoid of the nature of one and many, etc. etc.’ which has been put forward by us, for proving that there can be no activity in regard to ‘external objects’, is one that cannot be regarded as' ‘inadmissible’, And when that is ‘admissible’, the Earth and other external things apprehended should be treated as non-existent. And when the Earth, etc. cannot be ‘apprehended’, the fact of the Cognition being the ‘apprehender’, assumed on the basis of the apprehension of those things, also, becomes proved to be inadmissible.

tadevam arthāyogād vijñaptimātratāṃ pratipādya samprati grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt pratipādayann āha anirbhāsam ityādi /

Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no ‘object’, the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the ‘apprehended’ and the ‘apprehender’: [see verse 1999 above]

anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca / vijānāti naca jñānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathañcana //

Neither as ‘formless’, nor as ‘with form’, nor ‘with the form of something other than the object’, can there be any apprehension of the external Object;

na nirākāreṇa nāpi sākāreṇa nāpi viṣayākārād anyākāreṇa bāhyasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam anyaśca prakāro nāsti tasmād ātmasaṃvedanam eva sadaiva jñānaṃ satyapi bāhye santānāntara iti siddhyati vijñaptimātratā /

and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another ‘Chain’ which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.

kaiścidanyākāram api jñānam anyākārasyārthasya saṃvedakam iṣṭam yathā kila pītākāram api jñānaṃ śuklaśaṅgagrāhīti /

Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the ‘yellow’ form apprehends also the ‘white’ conch-shell.

yathāha kumārilaḥ sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam / janmanyekatra bhinne vā sadā kālāntare 'pi ca //

This has been thus asserted by Kumārila [Ślokavārtika-nirālambanavāda, 108] “In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time, be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time.”

iti atas tṛtīyaṃ pakṣāntaram āśaṅkitam //

It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative.

nanu cātmasaṃvedano 'pyete 'nirbhāsādayo vikalpāḥ kasmānnāvatarantītyāha vijñānam ityādi /

Question: “Why should not the alternatives just set forth ‘not envisaging a form, etc.’ apply to the view that the Cognition (or Idea) is self-cognised?”

vijñānaṃ jadarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate /

Answer: [see verse 2000 above]

nahi grāhakabhāvenātmasaṃvedanamabhipretam kiṃ tarhi /

When Cognition is said to be ‘self-cognisant’, it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself;

svayam prakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā nabhastalavartyālokavat //

what is meant is that it shines, becomes manifested, by itself, by its very nature, just like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.

atha kasmād grāhyagrāhakabhāvena neṣyata ityāh kriyākārakabhāvenetyādi / kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittirasya tu /

Question: “Why is the Cognition not regarded as the Apprehender (of itself)?” Answer: [see verses 2001-2002 above]

[p.560] trairūpyam vedyavedakavittibhedena //

‘Three characters’ of the Cognised, the Cogniser and the Cognition (2001-2002)

athāpi syād bāhyasyāpyātmasaṃvittivad vinaiva grāhyagrāhakabhāvena saṃvittir bhaviṣyatītyāha nahi tadrūpam ityādi / nahi tadrūpamanyasya yena tadvedane param /

The following might bo urged Just as there is self-cognition of the Cognition itself, so would there be cognition of. the External Thing also, without there being an apprehender and an apprehended”.

yadyapyasadādivyāvṛttyā sadādirūpam ekaṃ bhāveṣu kalpyate tathāpi tasya pratipādanārtham paramārthato bhedādekatvaṃ nāstyevetyāha paramārthata iti //

Though it has been assumed that there is the single form of ‘Entity’ as differentiated from ‘non-entity’ which is common to all things, yet in reality, they are all different among themselves; hence there is no ‘one-ness’ among them. This is what is meant by the phrase ‘in reality’, (2003)

nirbhāsijñānapakṣe tu tayor bhede 'pi tattvataḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktaṃ syād api vedanam //

The following might be urged: “Even though the External Thing be different from the Cognition, yet it could be ‘cognised’, ‘apprehended’ just as the Cognition itself is”.

yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthākāroparāgavat / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedanaṃ //

Having thus proved the ‘self-cognition’ of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form): [see verses 2005-2006 above]

pratibimbasyeti jñānākārasya /

‘Reflection’ i.e. of the form of the Cognition.

tādrūpyād iti sārūpyāt /

‘Tādrūpyāt’ on account of its having the same form.

bhāktam iti amukhyam /

‘Indirect’ not primary; secondary.