buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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nacākurvat kiñcit prakāśakaṃ yujyate 'tiprasaṅgāt /	and what does not do anything to a certain Object cannot be regarded as ‘illuminative’ of it; otherwise there would be incongruities.
tasmāt /	‘Tat’ Therefore.
upamā sādṛśyam //	‘Upamā’ Similarity.
yat saṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam / tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate //	When there is cognition of a certain thing, and also that thing of which that alone is the cognition, this thing is not-different from that cognition; or this does not differ from that.
yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ /	For example, the cognition of the blue, or the second moon;
nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanāt // yasya saṃvedanaṃ yat saṃvedanam tadeva yasya saṃvedanaṃ niyamena nānyat tasmāt prathamayacchabdavācyāt /	and this is the cognition of blue, because it apprehends the blue form. The following texts proceed to address certain arguments to the philosopher who holds Cognition to be formless, for the purpose of proving that there is non-difference between the Blue and other forms and the Cognition of these forms;
etad uktaṃ bhavati /	[see verses 2030-2031 above]
{yat}asmād apṛthaksaṃvedanam eva tat tasmādabhinnaṃ yathā nīladhīḥ svasvabhāvāt /	When there is Cognition of a certain thing, and also the thing of which that alone none other is the Cognition, then the latter is absolutely not-different from the former.
yathā vā taimirikajñānapratibhābhāsī dvitīya uḍupaḥ candramāḥ /	e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself, or the Second Moon, which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.
nīladhīvedanaṃ cedam iti pakṣadharmopasaṃhāraḥ / dharmyatra nīlākārataddhiyau /	The Cognition in question is the Cognition of the Cognition of the Blue; this reiterates the presence of the Probans; the ‘Subject’ or ‘Minor Term’ consists of the Blue Form and its Cognition;
tayor abhinnatvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ /	and the ‘non-difference’ of these two is the Probandum.
yathoktaḥ sahopalambhaniyamo hetuḥ /	The said ‘constancy of their being found together’ is the Probans.
īdṛśa evācāryīye sahopalambhaniyamād ityādau prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ /	This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the text of the Great Teacher which says ‘There must be non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition, because they are always found together’.
tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha viruddho 'yaṃ hetur yasmāt	Bhadanta-Śubhagupta however has argued as follows: “This Probans is ‘contradictory’;
"sahaśabdaś ca loko 'nyo{syā---} naivāne{nye---}na vinā kvacit /	because in common parlance, the term ‘together’ is never used except with another thing;
viruddho 'yaṃ tato hetur yadyasti sahavedanam" //	hence the Reason that ‘they are cognised together’ is contradictory”.
tad etad asamyak /	This is not right;
yasya vipakṣa eva bhāvaḥ sa viruddho hetuḥ /	that Probans is ‘contradictory’ which resides only where the Probandum is known to be absent;
na cāsya vipakṣa eva sapakṣe 'pi bhāvāt /	the Probans in question does not reside only where the Probandam is known to be absent;
tathā hi candradvayasya sahopalambhābhimāno 'sti loke na ca tayor bhedo 'sti paramārthataḥ /	For instance, among people, there is the idea that the ‘two moons’ (seen by the man with defective vision) are perceived together; and yet there is no real difference between them;
athaca saha śaśidvayopalambhāt saheti vaktāro bhavanti /	and people are found to use the term ‘together’ in such assertions as ‘two moons are seen together’.
evam ihāpi jñānād avyatiriktam api bahiriva bhāsamānamākāraṃ dvitīyaṃ kṛtvā kalpitabhedanibandhanaḥ sahaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ /	Similarly in the case in question, the term ‘together’ has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis of the idea that the form (Blue) appearing as ‘external’ is the ‘second’, the ‘other’, though it is really non-different from the Cognition.
nahi sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāro yathāvastuniveśī yena sahaśabdaprayogamātreṇa vastupratibaddhasya liṅgasyānyatvaṃ syāt yato viruddho hetur bhavet /	In fact, all verbal usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things; whereby the mere use of the term ‘together’ would make the Inferential Indicative, which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.
punaḥ sa evāha yadi sahaśabda ekārthas tadā hetur asiddhaḥ tathā hi naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu nahyekenaivopalambho nīlādeḥ /	The same Bhadanta-Śubhagupta says again: “If the term ‘together’ means one, then the Reason is ‘inadmissible’; because the Blue and other things are not apprehended as one, in such shows as those of dancers, wrestlers, etc.
nāpi nīlatadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhaḥ /	Nor are the Blue and the Cognition of Blue both apprehended by one (person);
tathā hi nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānagatānām anupalambhāt /	because even when the Blue is apprehended, the Cognitions of the same Blue, appearing in other ‘series’ or ‘chains’, are not apprehended.
[p.568] yadā ca sattvaṃ prāṇabhṛtāṃ sarve cittakṣaṇāḥ sarvajñenāvasīyante tadā katham ekenaivopalambhaḥ siddhaḥ syāt / kiṃ cānyopalambhaniṣedhe satyekopalambhaniyamaḥ siddhyati /	When again, the existence of all living beings and all ‘Cognition-moments’ are apprehended by the Omniscient Being, how can it be admitted that there is apprehension by one only? Then again, it is only when the apprehension of ‘others’ is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding the apprehension of one but the negation of the apprehension of others is not possible;
nacānyopalambhapratiṣedhasambhavaḥ svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya vidhipratiṣedhāyogāt /	because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and denial cannot be possible.
atha sahaśabda ekakālavivakṣā tadā buddhavijñeyacittena cittacaittaiś ca sarvathānaikāntikatāhetoḥ /	If the term ‘together’ is meant to convey the idea of being present at the same time, then the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddha, and also of the Mind and Mind-effects.
yathā kila buddhasya bhagavato yadvijñeyaṃ santānāntaracittaṃ tasya buddhajñānasya ca sahopalambhaniyame '{pya}styeva ca nānātvam tathā cittacaittānāṃsatyapi sahopalambhe naikatvamityato 'naikāntiko hetur iti /	For instance, the Cognition in other ‘chains’ which are cognised by the Blessed Lord Buddha, that Cognition and Buddha’s Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together, i.e. at the same time, and yet they are different. Similarly in the case of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended ‘together’, yet they are not one and the same.
tadetat sarvamasamyak /	Thus the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’ All this is not right.
na hyatraikenaivopalambha ekopalambha ityayam artho 'bhipretaḥ / kiṃ tarhijñānajñeyayoḥ parasparameka evopalambho na pṛthagiti /	What is meant is, not ‘apprehension by one’, nor ‘apprehension of one’; what is meant is that there is a single not separate apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised;
ya eva hi jñānopalambhaḥ sa eva jñeyasya ya eva jñeyasya sa eva jñānasyetiyāvat /	that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Cognised- In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also;
na ca naṭacandramallaprakṣāsu kaścijjñānopalambho 'sti yo na jñeyopalambhakaḥ jñeyopalambho vā na jñānopalambhaka iti kuto 'siddhatā /	nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reason be regarded as ‘inadmissible’? Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘of doubtful admissibility’;
tathā hi yadevātmasaṃvedanaṃ jñānasya tadevārthasyeti pareṇāpi bāhyārthavādināṅgīkṛtam /	because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as has been admitted also by our opponent, the upholder of the Reality of the External World.
etenaikasyaivopalambha ekopalambha ityevaṃ vikalpya yo 'siddhatādoṣa uktaḥ sa tat pakṣānaṅgīkṛter evāpāsto draṣṭavyaḥ /	This also serves to refute the ‘inadmissibility’ urged on the basis of the alternatives whether what is meant is ‘the apprehension of one’, etc. etc.
naca buddhasya bhagavataścittena parasantānavartinaścittakṣaṇā avasīyate /	Then again, it is not a fact that the ‘Cognition-moments’ figuring in another ‘chain’ are cognised by the Buddha.
tasya bhagavataḥ sarvāvaraṇavigamena grāhyagrāhakakalaṅgarahitatvāt /	Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from, all obscuring influences, is entirely free from defects as those of the ‘apprehender’ and the ‘apprehended’.
yathoktam ---"grāhyaṃ na tasya grahaṇaṃ na tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi śūnya"mi{mi---}ti /	This has been thus declared ‘For Him, there is no Apprehended, nor Apprehension, nor Apprehensibility by other Cognitions; it is pure Void’.
akṣuṇṇavidhānaṃ tvādhipatyamātreṇa /	As regards the declaration of ‘being untrammelled’ (made in regard to Buddha’s Cognition), that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things;
yathoktam pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasatatānābhogavāhi parakāryam iti sarvārthakāritvāt sarvajña iṣyata iti vakṣyati /	as has been declared in the following words ‘He is held to be omniscient, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations, as is going to be described later on’.
tasmānnāsiddhatā hetur iti /	Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.
nanu cācāryadharmakīrtinā "viṣayasya jñānahetutayopanidhiḥ prāgupalambhaḥpaścāt saṃvedanasyeti ce"dityevaṃ pūrvapakṣamādarśayatā ekakālārthaḥ sahaśabdo 'tra darśito natvabhedārthaḥ ekakāle hi vivakṣite kālabhedopadarśanaṃ parasya yuktaṃ natvabhede satīti cen na /	Says the Opponent: “Ācārya Dharmakīrti, in setting forth the Pūrvapakṣa (the Opponent’s view), says ‘At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later’; and here he has shown that what the term ‘together’ means is simultaneity, not sameness; it is only when simultaneity is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant”.
kālabhedasya vastubhedena vyāptatvāt kāla{bhedopa}darśanamupalambhe nānātvapratipādanārtham eva sutarāṃ yuktam vyāpyasya vyāpakāvyabhicārāt /	Because difference in time is included under real material difference; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the ‘less wide’ term should not be inconcomitant with the ‘wider’ term.
nāpi buddhavijñeyacittenānaikāntiko hetuḥ nahi tatraikopalambha{niyamoo '}sti pṛthak pṛthaksarvaireva tasya cittasya saṃvedanāt /	Nor again can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddhas; because in that case there is no limitation of the Cognition being one; because one by one all the Buddhas cognise the Cognition.
ata eva cittaviparyayavicāras teṣām api pratyekamātmana eva saṃvedanāt /	For this same reason, in their case also, there is consideration regarding the wrongness of Cognitions; because each Cognition is cognised by itself.
athavā bhavatu bhagavaccittena paracittasya saṃvedanaṃ tathāpi nānaikāntikatā /	Or, there may be Cognition of the Cognition of others by the Buddha; even so, the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’;
niyamena vyāvartitatvāt /	because there is always differentiation.
yayor hi parasparamupalambhanānātvam api sambhavati tanniyamena vyāvartitaṃ natu punar upalambhānāṃ santānakāle bhedena svalakṣaṇā [p.569] {nāṃ}nānātvam /	Even when there is diversity in the apprehension of two things, there is always differentiation; in the case of Oognitions however, when appearing in the same ‘Chain’, there is no diversity in their specific Individualities.
tenāyam artho bhavati yadupalambha eva yasyopalambho nānyo 'pīti.	Hence what is meant is that there is apprehension of the Cognition only when there is apprehension of the Object.
na ca bhagavajjñānopalambha evānyasantānagatacittopalambhaḥ. nāpy anyasantānagatacittopalambha eva bhagavajjñānopalambhaḥ ati tvanyo 'pi pṛthaktvasya svasyāpi cittasya saṃvedanāt /	The apprehension of the Cognition of the Blessed Lord however is not always the same as the apprehension of the Cognitions occurring in other ‘Chains’, there is another Cognition also; because the separateness (difference) of His own Cognition is also distinctly apprehended.
ata eva na rūpālokair vyabhicāraḥ /	For this same reason, the Reason does not become wrong, in view of Colour and Light;
kevalasyāpy ālokadarśanāt /	because Light is perceived also alone by itself;
rūpasyāpyālokarahitasya kaiścit prāṇiviśeṣair upalambhāt tasmād vipakṣe bhāvāsambhavānnānaikāntiko hetuḥ //	and Colour also is perceived by certain animals (e.g. Cats), even when there is no Light. Thus then, the Reason, not being present where the Probandum is known to be absent, cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.
syād etat yady api vipakṣe sattvaṃ na niścitam, saṃdigdhaṃ tu.	The following might be urged: “Even though the presence of your Probans where the Probandum is known to be absent is not known with certainty, yet it is suspected all the same;
tataś cānaikānto hetuḥ saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt /	and even so the Probans becomes ‘Inconclusive’; as its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful.
tathā hi viṣayaviṣayibhāvena niyatatvād anyathāpi sahopalambhaniyamaḥ sambhavatyeva yato jñānasya grāhaka eva svabhāvo viṣayagrahaṇadharmakatvāt tasyaviṣayasyāpi tadgrāhya eva svabhāvaḥ tayoścaikasāmagryadhīnatvān nityaṃ saha bhāvāt /	Because, inasmuch as the relation of ‘Subject’ and ‘Object’ (between the Cognition and the Cognised) is definite, the fact of their ‘being apprehended together’ (Concomitance) is open to an explanation other than their non-difference; because the Cognition is always of the nature of the apprehended, as it has the character of apprehending things; and the Object is always the apprehended; and the fact of these two being always together is due to their being dependent upon the same set of circumstances.
tathā hi sāmagryā nīlādiviṣayādhyavasāyarūpam eva jñānaṃ janyate na cakṣurādyadhyavasāyarūpam / nīlādir api tu tadadhyavasīyamānarūpo janito na cakṣurādir iti /	Because, as a matter of fact, what the causal circumstances bring about is the Cognition only in the form of the apprehension of the Blue and other objects, not in that of the apprehension of such objects as the Eye, etc.; the, Blue, etc. also are produced in the form in which they are apprehended by that Cognition; not so the Eye, etc.
āha ca	All this has been declared as follows;
"nānyo 'sti grāhako jñānāc cākṣuṣair viṣayair vinā /	‘There is no apprehender other than Cognition, nor without the visible and other objects;
ataś ca sahasaṃvittir nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ" //	it is on this ground that the fact of the Blue Object and its Cognition being apprehended together rests, not upon their non-difference;
"pūrvikaiva tu sāmagrī prajñānaṃ viṣayalakṣaṇam /	the antecedent circumstances would bring about the Cognition of the object-moment, in the same way as Light does that of Colour;
sā{ā---} lokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam" //	and in this way they would be apprehended together
iti / atrāha na jñānātmetyādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2032 above]
nahi vyatiriktasya pratibandhamantareṇa sahopalambhaniyamo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	When one thing differs from another, there can be no certainty of their being apprehended together, except through a constant relationship;
nacātra vyatiriktasya saṃvedane kaścit pratibandho 'sti /	In the case in question, there is no Relationship in the cognition of the different thing.
tathā hi pratibandhobhavan bhavet tādātmyaṃ tadutpattir vā /	For instance, if there were such Relationship, it could either consist (a) in being of the same nature or (b) in one being the product of the other;
na tāvat tādātmyamatra pareṇeṣṭam tasyaiva sādhyatvāt /	(a) in the case in question the Opposite party does not admit the sameness of the two factors concerned;
nāpi tadutpatteḥ sahavedanam saha bhūtayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvābhāvāt /	(b) nor could the fact of being apprehended together be due to one being the product of the other; because there can be no relationship of Cause and Effect between things that come into existence at the same time;
cakṣurādīnām apyupalabdhiprasaṅgāc ca /	and also because in that case, there should be apprehension of the Eye and the other organs also (which are the cause of Cognition).
nāpi pūrvasāmagrīvaśād yaugapadyamātreṇa viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ cittacaityānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ ca parasparaṃ viṣayaviṣayitvaprasaṅgāt /	Nor can their relation of Object and Subject’ be based upon mere simultaneity due to the antecedent circumstances. Because, in that case, the relationship of ‘Object and Subject’ would have to be admitted as subsisting between the Mind and Mental Effects on the one hand and the Eye and other Sense-organs on the other.
nāpi sāmagryā pratiniyataviṣayaviṣayirūpeṇa janitatvān nātiprasaṅga iti yuktaṃ vaktum viṣayaviṣayitvasyaiva vicāryamāṇatvenāsiddhatvāt /	It cannot be said in answer to this that “what the Antecedent circumstances bring about is the relationship of object and subject in regulated form, and hence there could be no incongruities”; because, in reality, it is this same ‘relation of object and subject’ that forms the subject of the present discussion, and as such cannot be admitted as established.
siddhe hi pratibandhe viṣayaviṣayibhāvo yukto yāvatā sa eva viṣayaviṣayibhāvavyavasthāyāṃ pratibandho vicāryate /	In fact, it is only when the constant relationship has become established, that the ‘relation of subject and object’ could be there; and it is this same constant relationship as the basis of the Relation of subject and object, that is being considered now.
naca tādātmyatadutpattivyatire [p.570] keṇāparaḥ pratibandho 'sti yato viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ siddhyet /	Apart from sameness and being produced, there can be no other constant relationship, on which the Relation of object and subject could be based.
nāpi tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ viṣayaviṣayibhāvo yukta iti vicāritam ato na vyatiriktasya kathañcit sahopalambho 'stīti kutaḥ saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatāhetoḥ //	And we have just arrived at the conclusion that (in the case in question) no such relation of subject and object can be based upon the said sameness and being produced. Consequently, apart from these there can be no ‘joint apprehension’. Why then should the Reason be regarded as having its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum doubtful? (2032)
saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ na cārthāntaragocaram /	All this cognition does not envisage other things;
saṃvedanaṃ ca {nīlasya} svātmasaṃvedanaṃ yathā //	there is cognition of the blue; like the cognition of the cognition itself.
yadyat saṃvedanaṃ tat tajjñānānnārthāntaraviṣayaṃ yathātmasaṃvedanaṃ saṃvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlādyākārasyeti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ /	Whatever is Cognition does not envisage anything other than the Cognition itself, the Cognition of the Blue and other forms is Cognition hence there is apprehension of something embraced by its contrary;
arthāntaragocaratvaviruddhenānarthāntaragocaratvena saṃvedanasya vyāptatvāt //	inasmuch as the ‘Cognition’ is embraced within the character of not envisaging any other thing, which is contrary to the character of envisaging some other thing.
tāmeva vyāptiṃ sādhayannāha mukhyato 'rthamityādi /	The following Texts proceed to establish the Premiss just set forth: [see verses 2034-2035 next]
mukhyato 'rthaṃ na gṛhṇāti svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / arthākāroparāgeṇa viyogāc ca na bhaktitaḥ //	Primarily, the cognition does not apprehend an object at all, as it rests within its own self; also because there is absence of the imprint of the objective form; nor can it be said to do so secondarily (figuratively).
śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśam arthākārair anaṅkitam / yairiṣṭaṃ vedanaṃ kaścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam //	This reasoning is addressed to those who regard cognition as imprinted with the forms of things, itself being like pure rock-crystal.
nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ na paramārthataḥ kasyacit kenacid grahaṇaṃ kevalaṃ prakāśarūpatayā tathā prathamānaṃ vijñānamātmano grāhyakam ucyate /	In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of one thing by another; what happens is only that Cognition, being of the nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the ‘apprehender’ of itself.
nacaiva mukhyato 'rthasya grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ yuktam sarvabhāvānāṃ svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ na hi tadātmā yaḥ so 'parasyāpi /	Primarily, in the direct primary sense, the Cognition cannot be the apprehender of the Object; because all things rest within their own self; and the ‘self’ of one thing cannot be the ‘self’ of another.
syād etat nahi mukhyato yādṛśaṃ jñānasyātmasaṃvedanaṃ tādṛgevārthasyeṣṭam kiṃ tarhisvābhāsajñānajanakatvamevārthasya saṃvedyatvam tataś ca yadi mukhyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadā hetor asiddhatā athāpi yathākathañcit saṃvedanaśabdavācyatāsāmyāt /	The following might be urged: “Primarily the Cognition of the Object is not held to be of the same kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition; the apprehensibility of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is ‘apprehensibility’ in the primary sense that is adduced; as the Reason (in the above Buddhistic arguments), then it is ‘inadmissible If on the other hand the ‘apprehensibility’ meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as ‘apprehension’ in some sort of a way, then such a Reason cannot prove what is wanted.
tathāpi na tathāvidhādiṣṭasiddhiḥ nahi gośabdasāmyād gavayādīnāṃ viṣāṇitvasiddhiḥ /	Because the similarity of the words ‘go’ and ‘gavaya’ cannot prove the presence of Horns in the Gavaya.
atha jñānarūḍhaṃ nīlādyākāraṃ dharmiṇāmāśritya sākārajñānapakṣe dvividho 'pi hetur abhipretas tadā siddhasādhyatā /	If both kinds of Reason put forward are with reference to the Blue and other forms that figure in the Cognition, and in favour of the idea of the form belonging to the Cognition, then, the whole argument is superfluous proving what is already-admitted.
yathoktam "sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā /	This has been thus described ‘Under the view of the form belonging to Cognitions, what is cognised is the imprint of that form;
tasyābhede ca saṃsādhye siddhasādhanatā bhavet" // % QUOTE SOURCE?	and if what is meant to be proved is the non-difference of this with the Cognition, then the Reason would be open to the charge of proving what is already admitted’.”
ityatat sarvaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptasya codyamāśaṅkyāha arthākāroparāgeṇetyādi / arthākāro 'rthasadṛśaścāsāvuparāgo nirbhāsaścetyarthākāroparāgaḥ /	It is in anticipation of and in answer to all this objection emanating from Bhadanta-Śubdagupta, that the Author has added the words ‘There is absence of the imprint, etc. etc.’ In the compound ‘arthākāroparāga’, ‘arthākāra’ qualifies ‘uparāya’, the meaning being ‘the imprint of (in the shape of) the form of the object’.
idam iti dvividham api sādhanaṃ nirākāravādinaṃ pratiyatas tena na siddhasādhyatā nāpyupacāreṇānyasya saṃvedanam asti upacāranibandhanābhāvāt //	‘Idam’ both the aforesaid arguments in question have been put forward against the person who regards Cognition as formless. Hence they are not ‘futile’ proving what is already admitted.
nāpi sanirbhāsam iti dvitīyaṃ pakṣam āśritya pratipādayann āha astu tarhītyādi /	Nor can there be an apprehension of something else (other than the Cognition) in the secondary (figurative) sense either; as there is no basis for such figurative expression.
astu tarhi sasārūpyaṃ vijñānaṃ bāhyavedakam /	[Says the other party] “the cognition endowed with similarity of form may be the apprehender of the external object”.
tasyāpi sarvathāyogān na yuktā vedakasthitiḥ // nahi bhāvika ākāro yukto yatas tadvaśād arthavyavasthānaṃ syāt /	That also being impossible, it cannot have the position of the apprehender. It has thus been proved that there can be no apprehension of Objects by a Cognition that does not bear any imprint (objective).
nacālīkena sākāreṇārthaḥ saṃvidito bhavet bhrānte 'pi jñāne tathāvidhasya bhāvāt //	There can be no real form in the Cognition, on the basis of which the exact nature of things could be determined; and a Cognition with an unreal form could not apprehend the Object;
katham alīkatvaṃ sākārāṇām iti cedāha jñānād ityādi /	as such form is present in wrong Cognition also.
jñānād avyatiriktatānnākārabahutā bhavet /	As the form would be not-different from the cognition, there could not be a multiplicity (variety) of forms;
tataś ca tadbalenāsti nārthasaṃvedanasthitiḥ //	consequently, on the basis of that there can be no apprehension.
ākārāvyatiriktatvāt jñāne vānekatā bhavet /	Or, the cognition, being not-different from the forms, should be many (multiple).
anyathā katham ekatvam anayoḥ parikalpyate //	if not, then how can these two be regarded as one and the same? (2037-2038)

nacākurvat kiñcit prakāśakaṃ yujyate 'tiprasaṅgāt /

and what does not do anything to a certain Object cannot be regarded as ‘illuminative’ of it; otherwise there would be incongruities.

tasmāt /

‘Tat’ Therefore.

upamā sādṛśyam //

‘Upamā’ Similarity.

yat saṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam / tasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tato vā na vibhidyate //

When there is cognition of a certain thing, and also that thing of which that alone is the cognition, this thing is not-different from that cognition; or this does not differ from that.

yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ /

For example, the cognition of the blue, or the second moon;

nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanāt // yasya saṃvedanaṃ yat saṃvedanam tadeva yasya saṃvedanaṃ niyamena nānyat tasmāt prathamayacchabdavācyāt /

and this is the cognition of blue, because it apprehends the blue form. The following texts proceed to address certain arguments to the philosopher who holds Cognition to be formless, for the purpose of proving that there is non-difference between the Blue and other forms and the Cognition of these forms;

etad uktaṃ bhavati /

[see verses 2030-2031 above]

{yat}asmād apṛthaksaṃvedanam eva tat tasmādabhinnaṃ yathā nīladhīḥ svasvabhāvāt /

When there is Cognition of a certain thing, and also the thing of which that alone none other is the Cognition, then the latter is absolutely not-different from the former.

yathā vā taimirikajñānapratibhābhāsī dvitīya uḍupaḥ candramāḥ /

e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself, or the Second Moon, which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.

nīladhīvedanaṃ cedam iti pakṣadharmopasaṃhāraḥ / dharmyatra nīlākārataddhiyau /

The Cognition in question is the Cognition of the Cognition of the Blue; this reiterates the presence of the Probans; the ‘Subject’ or ‘Minor Term’ consists of the Blue Form and its Cognition;

tayor abhinnatvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ /

and the ‘non-difference’ of these two is the Probandum.

yathoktaḥ sahopalambhaniyamo hetuḥ /

The said ‘constancy of their being found together’ is the Probans.

īdṛśa evācāryīye sahopalambhaniyamād ityādau prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ /

This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the text of the Great Teacher which says ‘There must be non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition, because they are always found together’.

tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha viruddho 'yaṃ hetur yasmāt

Bhadanta-Śubhagupta however has argued as follows: “This Probans is ‘contradictory’;

"sahaśabdaś ca loko 'nyo{syā---} naivāne{nye---}na vinā kvacit /

because in common parlance, the term ‘together’ is never used except with another thing;

viruddho 'yaṃ tato hetur yadyasti sahavedanam" //

hence the Reason that ‘they are cognised together’ is contradictory”.

tad etad asamyak /

This is not right;

yasya vipakṣa eva bhāvaḥ sa viruddho hetuḥ /

that Probans is ‘contradictory’ which resides only where the Probandum is known to be absent;

na cāsya vipakṣa eva sapakṣe 'pi bhāvāt /

the Probans in question does not reside only where the Probandam is known to be absent;

tathā hi candradvayasya sahopalambhābhimāno 'sti loke na ca tayor bhedo 'sti paramārthataḥ /

For instance, among people, there is the idea that the ‘two moons’ (seen by the man with defective vision) are perceived together; and yet there is no real difference between them;

athaca saha śaśidvayopalambhāt saheti vaktāro bhavanti /

and people are found to use the term ‘together’ in such assertions as ‘two moons are seen together’.

evam ihāpi jñānād avyatiriktam api bahiriva bhāsamānamākāraṃ dvitīyaṃ kṛtvā kalpitabhedanibandhanaḥ sahaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ /

Similarly in the case in question, the term ‘together’ has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis of the idea that the form (Blue) appearing as ‘external’ is the ‘second’, the ‘other’, though it is really non-different from the Cognition.

nahi sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāro yathāvastuniveśī yena sahaśabdaprayogamātreṇa vastupratibaddhasya liṅgasyānyatvaṃ syāt yato viruddho hetur bhavet /

In fact, all verbal usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things; whereby the mere use of the term ‘together’ would make the Inferential Indicative, which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.

punaḥ sa evāha yadi sahaśabda ekārthas tadā hetur asiddhaḥ tathā hi naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu nahyekenaivopalambho nīlādeḥ /

The same Bhadanta-Śubhagupta says again: “If the term ‘together’ means one, then the Reason is ‘inadmissible’; because the Blue and other things are not apprehended as one, in such shows as those of dancers, wrestlers, etc.

nāpi nīlatadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhaḥ /

Nor are the Blue and the Cognition of Blue both apprehended by one (person);

tathā hi nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānagatānām anupalambhāt /

because even when the Blue is apprehended, the Cognitions of the same Blue, appearing in other ‘series’ or ‘chains’, are not apprehended.

[p.568] yadā ca sattvaṃ prāṇabhṛtāṃ sarve cittakṣaṇāḥ sarvajñenāvasīyante tadā katham ekenaivopalambhaḥ siddhaḥ syāt / kiṃ cānyopalambhaniṣedhe satyekopalambhaniyamaḥ siddhyati /

When again, the existence of all living beings and all ‘Cognition-moments’ are apprehended by the Omniscient Being, how can it be admitted that there is apprehension by one only? Then again, it is only when the apprehension of ‘others’ is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding the apprehension of one but the negation of the apprehension of others is not possible;

nacānyopalambhapratiṣedhasambhavaḥ svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya vidhipratiṣedhāyogāt /

because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and denial cannot be possible.

atha sahaśabda ekakālavivakṣā tadā buddhavijñeyacittena cittacaittaiś ca sarvathānaikāntikatāhetoḥ /

If the term ‘together’ is meant to convey the idea of being present at the same time, then the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddha, and also of the Mind and Mind-effects.

yathā kila buddhasya bhagavato yadvijñeyaṃ santānāntaracittaṃ tasya buddhajñānasya ca sahopalambhaniyame '{pya}styeva ca nānātvam tathā cittacaittānāṃsatyapi sahopalambhe naikatvamityato 'naikāntiko hetur iti /

For instance, the Cognition in other ‘chains’ which are cognised by the Blessed Lord Buddha, that Cognition and Buddha’s Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together, i.e. at the same time, and yet they are different. Similarly in the case of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended ‘together’, yet they are not one and the same.

tadetat sarvamasamyak /

Thus the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’ All this is not right.

na hyatraikenaivopalambha ekopalambha ityayam artho 'bhipretaḥ / kiṃ tarhijñānajñeyayoḥ parasparameka evopalambho na pṛthagiti /

What is meant is, not ‘apprehension by one’, nor ‘apprehension of one’; what is meant is that there is a single not separate apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised;

ya eva hi jñānopalambhaḥ sa eva jñeyasya ya eva jñeyasya sa eva jñānasyetiyāvat /

that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Cognised- In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also;

na ca naṭacandramallaprakṣāsu kaścijjñānopalambho 'sti yo na jñeyopalambhakaḥ jñeyopalambho vā na jñānopalambhaka iti kuto 'siddhatā /

nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reason be regarded as ‘inadmissible’? Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘of doubtful admissibility’;

tathā hi yadevātmasaṃvedanaṃ jñānasya tadevārthasyeti pareṇāpi bāhyārthavādināṅgīkṛtam /

because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as has been admitted also by our opponent, the upholder of the Reality of the External World.

etenaikasyaivopalambha ekopalambha ityevaṃ vikalpya yo 'siddhatādoṣa uktaḥ sa tat pakṣānaṅgīkṛter evāpāsto draṣṭavyaḥ /

This also serves to refute the ‘inadmissibility’ urged on the basis of the alternatives whether what is meant is ‘the apprehension of one’, etc. etc.

naca buddhasya bhagavataścittena parasantānavartinaścittakṣaṇā avasīyate /

Then again, it is not a fact that the ‘Cognition-moments’ figuring in another ‘chain’ are cognised by the Buddha.

tasya bhagavataḥ sarvāvaraṇavigamena grāhyagrāhakakalaṅgarahitatvāt /

Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from, all obscuring influences, is entirely free from defects as those of the ‘apprehender’ and the ‘apprehended’.

yathoktam ---"grāhyaṃ na tasya grahaṇaṃ na tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi śūnya"mi{mi---}ti /

This has been thus declared ‘For Him, there is no Apprehended, nor Apprehension, nor Apprehensibility by other Cognitions; it is pure Void’.

akṣuṇṇavidhānaṃ tvādhipatyamātreṇa /

As regards the declaration of ‘being untrammelled’ (made in regard to Buddha’s Cognition), that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things;

yathoktam pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasatatānābhogavāhi parakāryam iti sarvārthakāritvāt sarvajña iṣyata iti vakṣyati /

as has been declared in the following words ‘He is held to be omniscient, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations, as is going to be described later on’.

tasmānnāsiddhatā hetur iti /

Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.

nanu cācāryadharmakīrtinā "viṣayasya jñānahetutayopanidhiḥ prāgupalambhaḥpaścāt saṃvedanasyeti ce"dityevaṃ pūrvapakṣamādarśayatā ekakālārthaḥ sahaśabdo 'tra darśito natvabhedārthaḥ ekakāle hi vivakṣite kālabhedopadarśanaṃ parasya yuktaṃ natvabhede satīti cen na /

Says the Opponent: “Ācārya Dharmakīrti, in setting forth the Pūrvapakṣa (the Opponent’s view), says ‘At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later’; and here he has shown that what the term ‘together’ means is simultaneity, not sameness; it is only when simultaneity is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant”.

kālabhedasya vastubhedena vyāptatvāt kāla{bhedopa}darśanamupalambhe nānātvapratipādanārtham eva sutarāṃ yuktam vyāpyasya vyāpakāvyabhicārāt /

Because difference in time is included under real material difference; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the ‘less wide’ term should not be inconcomitant with the ‘wider’ term.

nāpi buddhavijñeyacittenānaikāntiko hetuḥ nahi tatraikopalambha{niyamoo '}sti pṛthak pṛthaksarvaireva tasya cittasya saṃvedanāt /

Nor again can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddhas; because in that case there is no limitation of the Cognition being one; because one by one all the Buddhas cognise the Cognition.

ata eva cittaviparyayavicāras teṣām api pratyekamātmana eva saṃvedanāt /

For this same reason, in their case also, there is consideration regarding the wrongness of Cognitions; because each Cognition is cognised by itself.

athavā bhavatu bhagavaccittena paracittasya saṃvedanaṃ tathāpi nānaikāntikatā /

Or, there may be Cognition of the Cognition of others by the Buddha; even so, the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’;

niyamena vyāvartitatvāt /

because there is always differentiation.

yayor hi parasparamupalambhanānātvam api sambhavati tanniyamena vyāvartitaṃ natu punar upalambhānāṃ santānakāle bhedena svalakṣaṇā [p.569] {nāṃ}nānātvam /

Even when there is diversity in the apprehension of two things, there is always differentiation; in the case of Oognitions however, when appearing in the same ‘Chain’, there is no diversity in their specific Individualities.

tenāyam artho bhavati yadupalambha eva yasyopalambho nānyo 'pīti.

Hence what is meant is that there is apprehension of the Cognition only when there is apprehension of the Object.

na ca bhagavajjñānopalambha evānyasantānagatacittopalambhaḥ. nāpy anyasantānagatacittopalambha eva bhagavajjñānopalambhaḥ ati tvanyo 'pi pṛthaktvasya svasyāpi cittasya saṃvedanāt /

The apprehension of the Cognition of the Blessed Lord however is not always the same as the apprehension of the Cognitions occurring in other ‘Chains’, there is another Cognition also; because the separateness (difference) of His own Cognition is also distinctly apprehended.

ata eva na rūpālokair vyabhicāraḥ /

For this same reason, the Reason does not become wrong, in view of Colour and Light;

kevalasyāpy ālokadarśanāt /

because Light is perceived also alone by itself;

rūpasyāpyālokarahitasya kaiścit prāṇiviśeṣair upalambhāt tasmād vipakṣe bhāvāsambhavānnānaikāntiko hetuḥ //

and Colour also is perceived by certain animals (e.g. Cats), even when there is no Light. Thus then, the Reason, not being present where the Probandum is known to be absent, cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.

syād etat yady api vipakṣe sattvaṃ na niścitam, saṃdigdhaṃ tu.

The following might be urged: “Even though the presence of your Probans where the Probandum is known to be absent is not known with certainty, yet it is suspected all the same;

tataś cānaikānto hetuḥ saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt /

and even so the Probans becomes ‘Inconclusive’; as its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful.

tathā hi viṣayaviṣayibhāvena niyatatvād anyathāpi sahopalambhaniyamaḥ sambhavatyeva yato jñānasya grāhaka eva svabhāvo viṣayagrahaṇadharmakatvāt tasyaviṣayasyāpi tadgrāhya eva svabhāvaḥ tayoścaikasāmagryadhīnatvān nityaṃ saha bhāvāt /

Because, inasmuch as the relation of ‘Subject’ and ‘Object’ (between the Cognition and the Cognised) is definite, the fact of their ‘being apprehended together’ (Concomitance) is open to an explanation other than their non-difference; because the Cognition is always of the nature of the apprehended, as it has the character of apprehending things; and the Object is always the apprehended; and the fact of these two being always together is due to their being dependent upon the same set of circumstances.

tathā hi sāmagryā nīlādiviṣayādhyavasāyarūpam eva jñānaṃ janyate na cakṣurādyadhyavasāyarūpam / nīlādir api tu tadadhyavasīyamānarūpo janito na cakṣurādir iti /

Because, as a matter of fact, what the causal circumstances bring about is the Cognition only in the form of the apprehension of the Blue and other objects, not in that of the apprehension of such objects as the Eye, etc.; the, Blue, etc. also are produced in the form in which they are apprehended by that Cognition; not so the Eye, etc.

āha ca

All this has been declared as follows;

"nānyo 'sti grāhako jñānāc cākṣuṣair viṣayair vinā /

‘There is no apprehender other than Cognition, nor without the visible and other objects;

ataś ca sahasaṃvittir nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ" //

it is on this ground that the fact of the Blue Object and its Cognition being apprehended together rests, not upon their non-difference;

"pūrvikaiva tu sāmagrī prajñānaṃ viṣayalakṣaṇam /

the antecedent circumstances would bring about the Cognition of the object-moment, in the same way as Light does that of Colour;

sā{ā---} lokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam" //

and in this way they would be apprehended together

iti / atrāha na jñānātmetyādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2032 above]

nahi vyatiriktasya pratibandhamantareṇa sahopalambhaniyamo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /

When one thing differs from another, there can be no certainty of their being apprehended together, except through a constant relationship;

nacātra vyatiriktasya saṃvedane kaścit pratibandho 'sti /

In the case in question, there is no Relationship in the cognition of the different thing.

tathā hi pratibandhobhavan bhavet tādātmyaṃ tadutpattir vā /

For instance, if there were such Relationship, it could either consist (a) in being of the same nature or (b) in one being the product of the other;

na tāvat tādātmyamatra pareṇeṣṭam tasyaiva sādhyatvāt /

(a) in the case in question the Opposite party does not admit the sameness of the two factors concerned;

nāpi tadutpatteḥ sahavedanam saha bhūtayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvābhāvāt /

(b) nor could the fact of being apprehended together be due to one being the product of the other; because there can be no relationship of Cause and Effect between things that come into existence at the same time;

cakṣurādīnām apyupalabdhiprasaṅgāc ca /

and also because in that case, there should be apprehension of the Eye and the other organs also (which are the cause of Cognition).

nāpi pūrvasāmagrīvaśād yaugapadyamātreṇa viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ cittacaityānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ ca parasparaṃ viṣayaviṣayitvaprasaṅgāt /

Nor can their relation of Object and Subject’ be based upon mere simultaneity due to the antecedent circumstances. Because, in that case, the relationship of ‘Object and Subject’ would have to be admitted as subsisting between the Mind and Mental Effects on the one hand and the Eye and other Sense-organs on the other.

nāpi sāmagryā pratiniyataviṣayaviṣayirūpeṇa janitatvān nātiprasaṅga iti yuktaṃ vaktum viṣayaviṣayitvasyaiva vicāryamāṇatvenāsiddhatvāt /

It cannot be said in answer to this that “what the Antecedent circumstances bring about is the relationship of object and subject in regulated form, and hence there could be no incongruities”; because, in reality, it is this same ‘relation of object and subject’ that forms the subject of the present discussion, and as such cannot be admitted as established.

siddhe hi pratibandhe viṣayaviṣayibhāvo yukto yāvatā sa eva viṣayaviṣayibhāvavyavasthāyāṃ pratibandho vicāryate /

In fact, it is only when the constant relationship has become established, that the ‘relation of subject and object’ could be there; and it is this same constant relationship as the basis of the Relation of subject and object, that is being considered now.

naca tādātmyatadutpattivyatire [p.570] keṇāparaḥ pratibandho 'sti yato viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ siddhyet /

Apart from sameness and being produced, there can be no other constant relationship, on which the Relation of object and subject could be based.

nāpi tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ viṣayaviṣayibhāvo yukta iti vicāritam ato na vyatiriktasya kathañcit sahopalambho 'stīti kutaḥ saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatāhetoḥ //

And we have just arrived at the conclusion that (in the case in question) no such relation of subject and object can be based upon the said sameness and being produced. Consequently, apart from these there can be no ‘joint apprehension’. Why then should the Reason be regarded as having its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum doubtful? (2032)

saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ na cārthāntaragocaram /

All this cognition does not envisage other things;

saṃvedanaṃ ca {nīlasya} svātmasaṃvedanaṃ yathā //

there is cognition of the blue; like the cognition of the cognition itself.

yadyat saṃvedanaṃ tat tajjñānānnārthāntaraviṣayaṃ yathātmasaṃvedanaṃ saṃvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlādyākārasyeti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ /

Whatever is Cognition does not envisage anything other than the Cognition itself, the Cognition of the Blue and other forms is Cognition hence there is apprehension of something embraced by its contrary;

arthāntaragocaratvaviruddhenānarthāntaragocaratvena saṃvedanasya vyāptatvāt //

inasmuch as the ‘Cognition’ is embraced within the character of not envisaging any other thing, which is contrary to the character of envisaging some other thing.

tāmeva vyāptiṃ sādhayannāha mukhyato 'rthamityādi /

The following Texts proceed to establish the Premiss just set forth: [see verses 2034-2035 next]

mukhyato 'rthaṃ na gṛhṇāti svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / arthākāroparāgeṇa viyogāc ca na bhaktitaḥ //

Primarily, the cognition does not apprehend an object at all, as it rests within its own self; also because there is absence of the imprint of the objective form; nor can it be said to do so secondarily (figuratively).

śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśam arthākārair anaṅkitam / yairiṣṭaṃ vedanaṃ kaścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam //

This reasoning is addressed to those who regard cognition as imprinted with the forms of things, itself being like pure rock-crystal.

nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ na paramārthataḥ kasyacit kenacid grahaṇaṃ kevalaṃ prakāśarūpatayā tathā prathamānaṃ vijñānamātmano grāhyakam ucyate /

In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of one thing by another; what happens is only that Cognition, being of the nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the ‘apprehender’ of itself.

nacaiva mukhyato 'rthasya grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ yuktam sarvabhāvānāṃ svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ na hi tadātmā yaḥ so 'parasyāpi /

Primarily, in the direct primary sense, the Cognition cannot be the apprehender of the Object; because all things rest within their own self; and the ‘self’ of one thing cannot be the ‘self’ of another.

syād etat nahi mukhyato yādṛśaṃ jñānasyātmasaṃvedanaṃ tādṛgevārthasyeṣṭam kiṃ tarhisvābhāsajñānajanakatvamevārthasya saṃvedyatvam tataś ca yadi mukhyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadā hetor asiddhatā athāpi yathākathañcit saṃvedanaśabdavācyatāsāmyāt /

The following might be urged: “Primarily the Cognition of the Object is not held to be of the same kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition; the apprehensibility of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is ‘apprehensibility’ in the primary sense that is adduced; as the Reason (in the above Buddhistic arguments), then it is ‘inadmissible If on the other hand the ‘apprehensibility’ meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as ‘apprehension’ in some sort of a way, then such a Reason cannot prove what is wanted.

tathāpi na tathāvidhādiṣṭasiddhiḥ nahi gośabdasāmyād gavayādīnāṃ viṣāṇitvasiddhiḥ /

Because the similarity of the words ‘go’ and ‘gavaya’ cannot prove the presence of Horns in the Gavaya.

atha jñānarūḍhaṃ nīlādyākāraṃ dharmiṇāmāśritya sākārajñānapakṣe dvividho 'pi hetur abhipretas tadā siddhasādhyatā /

If both kinds of Reason put forward are with reference to the Blue and other forms that figure in the Cognition, and in favour of the idea of the form belonging to the Cognition, then, the whole argument is superfluous proving what is already-admitted.

yathoktam "sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā /

This has been thus described ‘Under the view of the form belonging to Cognitions, what is cognised is the imprint of that form;

tasyābhede ca saṃsādhye siddhasādhanatā bhavet" // % QUOTE SOURCE?

and if what is meant to be proved is the non-difference of this with the Cognition, then the Reason would be open to the charge of proving what is already admitted’.”

ityatat sarvaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptasya codyamāśaṅkyāha arthākāroparāgeṇetyādi / arthākāro 'rthasadṛśaścāsāvuparāgo nirbhāsaścetyarthākāroparāgaḥ /

It is in anticipation of and in answer to all this objection emanating from Bhadanta-Śubdagupta, that the Author has added the words ‘There is absence of the imprint, etc. etc.’ In the compound ‘arthākāroparāga’, ‘arthākāra’ qualifies ‘uparāya’, the meaning being ‘the imprint of (in the shape of) the form of the object’.

idam iti dvividham api sādhanaṃ nirākāravādinaṃ pratiyatas tena na siddhasādhyatā nāpyupacāreṇānyasya saṃvedanam asti upacāranibandhanābhāvāt //

‘Idam’ both the aforesaid arguments in question have been put forward against the person who regards Cognition as formless. Hence they are not ‘futile’ proving what is already admitted.

nāpi sanirbhāsam iti dvitīyaṃ pakṣam āśritya pratipādayann āha astu tarhītyādi /

Nor can there be an apprehension of something else (other than the Cognition) in the secondary (figurative) sense either; as there is no basis for such figurative expression.

astu tarhi sasārūpyaṃ vijñānaṃ bāhyavedakam /

[Says the other party] “the cognition endowed with similarity of form may be the apprehender of the external object”.

tasyāpi sarvathāyogān na yuktā vedakasthitiḥ // nahi bhāvika ākāro yukto yatas tadvaśād arthavyavasthānaṃ syāt /

That also being impossible, it cannot have the position of the apprehender. It has thus been proved that there can be no apprehension of Objects by a Cognition that does not bear any imprint (objective).

nacālīkena sākāreṇārthaḥ saṃvidito bhavet bhrānte 'pi jñāne tathāvidhasya bhāvāt //

There can be no real form in the Cognition, on the basis of which the exact nature of things could be determined; and a Cognition with an unreal form could not apprehend the Object;

katham alīkatvaṃ sākārāṇām iti cedāha jñānād ityādi /

as such form is present in wrong Cognition also.

jñānād avyatiriktatānnākārabahutā bhavet /

As the form would be not-different from the cognition, there could not be a multiplicity (variety) of forms;

tataś ca tadbalenāsti nārthasaṃvedanasthitiḥ //

consequently, on the basis of that there can be no apprehension.

ākārāvyatiriktatvāt jñāne vānekatā bhavet /

Or, the cognition, being not-different from the forms, should be many (multiple).

anyathā katham ekatvam anayoḥ parikalpyate //

if not, then how can these two be regarded as one and the same? (2037-2038)