buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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citrāstaraṇadarśane ekasmājjñānād avyatiriktatvājjñānasvarūpavadākārāṇāṃ bahutā na prāpnoti /	When one sees a bedspread of variegated colour, there should not be a multiplicity of forms (colours), because, like the form of the Cognition itself, they are all not-different from the Cognition, which is one only.
evamākārāvyatiriktatvājjñānasyāpyanekatā prāpnoti /	Similarly, as the Cognition is not-different from the forms, it should be more than one.
ye tu manyante samānajātīyānyapi jñānānyākārasaṅkhyānyeva bahūni citrāstaraṇādiṣu yugapat samudbhavantyeva vijātīyarūpaśabdādijñānavad iti /	There are some people who argue thus: “In the case of the Bedspread of variegated colours, what happens is that there do appear simultaneously several homogeneous Cognitions, as many in number as there are forms (colours); as there is in the case of the Cognition of several diverse sounds.
tataś ca prasaṅge siddhasādhyateti /	Hence the Reductio ad Absurdum that has been urged is futile”.
teṣāṃ citrāstaraṇe yathā nīlādayo bahava ākāraḥ saṃvedyante / evam ekākāre 'pi sitādāvarvāgmadhyaparabhāgarūpā bahava ākārā iti tadātmakaṃ tatrāpi jñānam akenātmakaṃ prāpnoti /	For these people, just as, in the ease of the Bedspread of variegated Colour, there are several forms that are cognised, so in the case of the white sheet also which has only one form (colour), as there are several forms in the shape of the nearer, remoter and middle parts of the sheet, the Cognition would have to be multiple.
iṣyata eveti cet /	It might be said “Yes;
kimidānīm ekaṃ jñānaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam / yadanavayavāṇuviṣayam iti cet /	Well, then, it behoves you to explain which is the Cognition that is one. “It is the Cognition that apprehends the Atom which has no parts.”
tadetad anubhavaviruddham /	This is contrary to all experience.
nahi kvacid anavayavamaṇurūpaṃ bhāsamānamālakṣyate jñāne / navāpyamūrtānāṃ paurvāparyāvasthānaṃ deśakṛtaṃ yuktam /	In no Cognition is the impartite atomic form ever found to appear. In the case of incorporeal things, there can be no priority or posteriority due to space, for the justification of which there would be some ground for assuming a multiplicity of Cognitions.
deśavitānapratibhāsasyālīkatve katham ākārāṇāṃ satyatā syānnahi deśavitānāvasthitanīlādipratibhāsavyatirekeṇānyo nīlādijñānākāraḥ saṃvedyate /	The idea of extension in space being false, how can the forms be real? And yet there is no Cognition of the Cognition of Blue, etc. apart from the appearance of the Blue, etc. that have extension in space.
ato 'nekajñānakalpanāvaiyarthyam eva //	Hence the assuming of a multiplicity of Cognitions is entirely futile.
sarvātmanā ca sārūpye jñāne 'jñānāditā bhavet / sāmye kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam //	If the cognition were entirely like the object, then it would have the character of non-cognition (ignorance), etc. If there is only partial likeness, then every cognition should apprehend every object.
ajñānatā jaḍarūpatvam /	‘Character of Non-cognition’ i.e. being of the nature of the unconscious.
ādiśabdena nasarāgatā nasadveṣatetyādi gṛhyate //	‘Etcetera’ is meant to include negation of attachment, negation of hatred and so forth.
anyākāram api jñānaṃ katham anyasya vedakam / sarvaḥ syāt sarvasaṃvedyo na hetuś ca niyāmakaḥ //	How can the cognition envisaging (having the form of) one object apprehend another object? If it did so, everything would be apprehended by every cognition; and there would be no basis for restriction.
athāpi syāt yajjñānaṃ yena janitaṃ tat tasyaiva saṃvedakaṃ bhavet tena na sarvaḥ sarvasaṃvedyo bhaviṣyatītyāha na hetuś ca niyāmaka iti /	It might be urged that “when a Cognition is produced by a certain Object, it apprehends only that Object, and thus every Object could not be apprehended by every Cognition The answer to this is ‘There would be no basis for restriction’;
cakṣurādīnām api saṃvedyatvaprasaṅgāditi bhāvaḥ //	that is, even the Eye, etc. would become ‘apprehended’.
yathāhītyādinā bhadantaśubhaguptasya parihāram āśaṅkate	The following Text presents Bhadanta-Śubhagupta’s answer to the above [see verse 2041 next]
yathāhi bhavatāṃ jñānaṃ nirākāraṃ ca tattvataḥ / vetti cābhūtamākāraṃ bhūtaṃ sarvaṃ tathaiva cet //	“just as your cognition, which is formless in reality, apprehends forms which are non-objective, in the same way would it apprehend all things.” (2041)
sa hyāha yathaiva bhavatāṃ vijñānavādināṃ vijñānaṃ paramārthato nirākāram adhātukanakākāśaśuddhivad buddhiriṣyata iti vacanāt atha ca tamākāraṃ vetti tathā bāhyam apīti //	Bhadanta Śubhagupta has argued as follows: “According to you, Idealists, Cognition is really formless, as is clear from such assertions as ‘Cognition is held to be non-elemental, like the purity of Gold and Ākāśa’; and yet it apprehends forms; in the same manner it would apprehend the external thing also (2041)
atrāha asādhāraṇam ityādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2042-2044 next]
asādhāraṇam evedaṃ svarūpaṃ cittacaittayoḥ /	As a matter of fact, the form of the mind and mental effects is not-common (specific);
saṃvedanaṃ tato 'nyeṣāṃ na mukhyaṃ tat kathañcana //	hence there can be no apprehension of other forms in the real (primary) sense of the term;
ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kāryakāraṇatādi ca / samāśritya bhavennāma bhāktaṃ bhūtasya vedanam //	therefore the name ‘apprehension’ could be applicable to the apprehension of objects only in the secondary (figurative) sense, on the basis of such conditions as ‘being dependent upon the same causal circumstances’, ‘the relation of cause and effect’ and so forth.
nīrūpasya tu bhāvasya naikasāmagryadhīnatā /	An entity however which has no form, cannot be ‘dependent upon the same form’, nor could the other condition be fulfilled.
nacānyat tena naivāsti gauṇamapyasya vedanam //	Hence of such an entity, there can be no ‘apprehension’, even in the figurative sense.” (2042-2044)
nahyabhūtasya mukhyasaṃvedanam asti /	As a matter of fact, of what is non-objective, there can be no ‘Apprehension’ in the primary sense of this term.
tathā hi yadeva prakāśātmakamasādhāraṇamahaṅkārāspadaṃ sātādirūpeṇa prathate rūpamātmā cittacaittānāṃ tadeva teṣāṃ saṃvedanaṃ mukhyam /	Because of the Mind and Mental Effects, the only form or nature that figures in ‘Happiness, etc.’ and which is spoken of as ‘I’, is specific not-common and is of the nature of Light; and it is this figuring that constitutes their ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense.
tato jñānātmano 'nyeṣām abhūtākārāṇāṃ na tanmukhyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ yuktam /	Hence of ‘non-objective’ things other than Cognition, which are not of the nature of Cognition, there can be no such ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense;
teṣām abhūtatvād eva /	simply because they are non-objective.
nāpi gauṇamupacāranimittābhāvāt /	because there is no basis for such secondary signification.
tathā hi ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ ādiśabdena sārūpyam etad upacāranibandhanaṃ bhavet /	Because the only possible grounds for secondary signification are dependence upon the same causal circumstances, the relation of Cause and Effect and similarity of form, this last being indicated by the term ‘and so forth’ in the text.
na cānyad astyupacāranimittam /	And none of these is possible in the case of what is non-objective.
kevalamavidyāvaśād aviṣayamevābhūtākāropadarśakaṃ jñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ jāyate // sa eva tarhi vibhramo 'satyākārasaṃvedane upacāranimittaṃ bhaviṣyatīti cet atrāha athavetyādi /	There can be no other ground for the figurative use of the name ‘Apprehension What happens therefore, in such cases, is only that through Nescience (Illusion) a Wrong Cognition comes about indicating a non-objective form, which really does not form the objective (of the Cognition at all).
athavābhūtamākāraṃ vettīti vyapadiśyate / vibhramān na hi tattvena vetti nirviṣayaṃ hi tat //	Or, it may be that the cognition is spoken of as ‘apprehending the non-objective form’, through mistake, because in reality it does not apprehend it at all, for the simple reason that it has no object.
tvayāpi yadi vijñānamevambhūtasya vedakam / vibhramād ucyate vyāptaṃ vyaktaṃ nirviṣayaṃ tava //	If you also speak through illusion of the cognition apprehending such a thing, then it becomes clearly non-objective. The opponent says “That same false cognition would be the basis of the figurative use of the name to the Apprehension of the unreal form”.
taditi abhūtākārāviṣayatvenoktaṃ jñānam /	‘Tat’ i.e. the Cognition that is spoken of as envisaging the non-objective form.
tathā hi paramārthato nābhūtākāro 'sti vedyaḥ tasya hi vidhinā vedyatvopagame bhūtatvaprasaṅgāt //	In reality, there is no non-objective form at all which could be apprehended; because if it were admitted to be apprehensible in the positive form, then it would have to be regarded as objective.
sākāraṃ tannirākāraṃ tulyakālamatulyajam /	Whether with form or formless, it does not apprehend anything else;
iti bauddhe 'pi vijñāne kiṃ na cintā pravartate //	hence in regard to the Buddha’s cognition, the questions do not arise.
yathā sākārādivijñānena nārthasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam iti cintā kriyate tathā bhagavato 'pi jñānenārthasya grahaṇaṃ prati kiṃ na kriyata ityatrāha sākāram ityādi / sākāraṃ tannirākāraṃ yuktaṃ nānyasya vedakam /	The same writer (Bhadanta-Śubhagupta) says again: “With reference to the Buddha’s Cognition also, the same questions arise Is it with form or formless? Is it produced at the same time or at different times? That is to say, just as the point is discussed that the Cognition with form cannot apprehend the Object, why is not a similar point raised in regard to the apprehension of the Object of the Blessed Lord’s Cognition?”
na hi bhagavato jñānaṃ tasya grāhakam iṣyate yenātrāpi cintā kriyeta /	The Cognition of the Blessed Lord is not regarded as the apprehender of the Object; hence the question is not raised in regard to that.
yāvatā tasya sarvāvaraṇavigamān na grāhyagrāhakavikalpo 'tītīṣṭam //	As a matter of fact, in His case, all obscuration having disappeared, that there should be no question regarding the Apprehender and Apprehended, is exactly what is right.
nanu ca yadyapi bāhyo 'rtho nāsti grāhyas tathāpi cittāntaramastyeva santānāntaravarti tadbhagavajjñānasya kimiti grāhyaṃ na bhavet atrāha anyarāgādīti /	Says the Opponent: “Even though the External Object does not exist, which could be apprehended, yet another Cognition is there, in another ‘Chain’; why cannot this be apprehended by the Cognition of the Blessed Lord?”
prāpnotyāvṛttisadbhāva aupalambhikadarśane //	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2048 above]
anyasantānavarti rāgādisaṃvedanaṃ hi yadi paraṃ sārūpyād eva yuktam nānyathā atiprasaṅgāt /	If there is apprehension of the Love, etc. occurring in other ‘Chains’, that could be due only to similarity, not otherwise; as if it were otherwise, there would be incongruities.
tataś ca yadi sarvātmanā sārūpyaṃ tadā bhagavato 'pi jñānaṃ raktaṃ syāt /	As regards this Similarity (between the Lord’s Cognition and the Love, etc. in another person), if it is similarity on all points, then the Lord’s Cognition should be tainted with the same Love, etc.;
evaṃ sati kleśāvaraṇamaprahīṇaṃ syād ityāvṛttisadbhāvaḥ prāpnoti /	and in that case, the Afflictions and Obscurations would not have ceased in Him; and there could be possibility of Obscuration.
upalambhena cirantītyaupalambhikās teṣāṃ darśane mate / yadvā aupalambhike bhagavato darśane jñāne 'bhyupagamyamāne satītyayam arthaḥ /	‘Aupalambhika-darśane’ under the view opinion of those who proceed on the basis of Cognitions alone, i.e. the Apprehensionists, the Idealists. Or it may be interpreted as ‘under the Apprehensionist or Idealistic, view of the Lord’.
athaikadeśena sārūpyaṃ tathāpi dvyākārasyāprahīṇatvājjñeyāvaraṇasadbhāvaḥ prāpnoti grāhyākārakalaṅgitatvāt tathāhyekasya dvairūpyaṃ bhāvikamayuktam iti tadavaśyaṃ bhrāntaṃ vyavasthāpanīyam /	If, on the other hand, the said similarity is only partial, even so, as the two forms would not have ceased, the obscuration of the apprehended object would be there; as it would be tainted with the form of what is apprehended. Because a duality of form in any single object cannot be real; so that the said Cognition would have to be regarded as wrong, mistaken;
tataś ca bhrāntibījasyādoṣasyālpasyāprahāṇād aprahīṇāvaraṇa eva bhagavān syāt //	and thus, as the seed of wrong-cognition, in the shape of Defect, would not have entirely ceased, the Blessed Lord would come to be one whose obscuration has not ceased entirely.
[p.574] kalpapādapavat sarvasaṅkalpapavanair muniḥ /	The great sage is like the kalpa-tree, unshaken by the winds of desires;
akampo 'pi karotyeva lokānāmarthasampadam //	and yet he brings about the welfare of men.
tenādarśanamapyāhuḥ sarve sarvavidaṃ jinam /	Even though he has no cognitions, all men regard the blessed Jina (Buddha) to be omniscient;
anābhogena niḥśeṣasarvavitkāryasambhavāt //	because by reason of the absence of limitations, he knows all things, without exception, as is clear from what he does (for the welfare of people).
adarśanam iti /	‘Adarśanam’ He who has no cognition.
pūrvapraṇidhānabalād anābhogena kalpatabha{ru---}vadyathābhavyamaśeṣajagadarthasampādānāt sarvajñamāhur nopalambhabalāt /	By the force of his previous Meditations, the Lord has no limitations; He is like the Kalpa-tree, bringing about the welfare of the entire Universe; that is why people regard Him as ‘Omniscient,’ not because He has cognitions;
svabhāvāntarasya sarvathāpyupalambhāyogāt //	in fact, no other character can be attributed to Him.
dhiyo 'sitādirūpatve sā tasyānubhavaḥ katham / dhiyaḥ sitādirūpatve bāhyo 'rthaḥ kimpramāṇakaḥ //	If the cognition is not of the ‘white’ and other forms, then, how can it be the apprehension of the object? if it is of the form of ‘white’, etc., then what is the evidence for the external object? (2051)
tathā hi pratyakṣato bāhyārthasiddhiḥ syād anumānato vā anyasya pramāṇasya sato 'traivāntarbhāvāt /	Having thus stated the arguments negativing the External World, the Author next refutes the argument adduced by the other party in support of the External World.
tatra na tāvat pratyakṣataḥ tathā hi pratyakṣābhimatena jñānena nirākāreṇa vārthasya grahaṇaṃ syāt sākāreṇa vā /	The external object could be proved either by Perception or by Inference; any other Means of Knowledge, if any, is included under these two. It cannot be proved by Perception.
na tāvannirākāreṇa pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvāt /	as in that case there would be no basis for the necessary contacts (without which there can be no Perception).
dhiyo 'sitādirūpatve sati sā nīlādyākārasyaivaikasya jñānagatasyopalambhād bāhyo 'rthaḥ parokṣa eva bhaven na pratyakṣaḥ / nahi dve nīle kadācit saṃvedyete ekaṃ jñānapratibimbakam aparaṃ tadarpakam ityevaṃ tāvan na pratyakṣataḥ siddhiḥ // anumānatas tarhi siddhirastviti cet /	Thus then, if the Cognition were not of the White and other forms, how could it be the apprehension of the Object? It can never be so, as already explained before. If, on the other hand, the Cognition apprehending the Object is with form, then, the only form of the Blue, etc. that would be perceived would be that in the Cognition itself, and the External Object would be only indirectly cognised (by Inference), not perceived. Because two ‘Blues’ are never perceived one in the form of the reflection in the Cognition, and the other in the form of the external object which casts the reflection.
atra bhadantaśubhaguptaḥ pramāṇayati /	Thus the External Object cannot be proved by Perception.
yo jñānākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitas tadyathāgrāhaka ākāro jñānākāraścāyam aviplutendriyasya nīlādipratibhāsaviśeṣaḥ saṃvādīti svabhāvahetuḥ / tadidam āśaṅkate nīlādītyādi /	“The fact of the appearance of the blue and other forms being produced by something of the same kind is sought to be proved by its being the form of the cognition which is in conformity with the reality, like the consciousness.” (2052) It might be said “In that case, it could be proved by Inference”, And in support of this idea, Bhadanta -Śubhagupta has formulated the argument as follows: “The form in which the Cognition appears, if it is in conformity with the real state of things, must be produced by some other Object of that same form, like the apprehending form;
nīlādipratibhāsasya saṃvāditvena sādhyate / jñānākāratayā tulyajātīyāj janma bodhavat //	and the ‘form of Cognition’ in question envisaging the Blue and other forms, appearing in the man with underanged sense-organs, is compatible with the real state of things;
saṃvāditveneti /	‘Samvāditvena’;
itthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā /	The Instrumental ending indicates the characteristic feature of the Cognition;
saṃvāditvenopalakṣitā yā jñānākāratā tayā hetubhūtayā jñānākārasya tulyajātīyāj janma sādhyate /	the sense being that form of the cognition which is in conformity with reality, by that is proved the fact of the form of the Cognition being produced by some other thing of the same kind; like Consciousness;
bodhavat grāhakākāravad ity arthaḥ //	i.e. like the form of the Apprehender.
[p.575] bāhyārthetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha	The following texts point out the defects in this argument: [see verses 2053-2054 next]
bāhyārthaprāpaṇaṃ yadvā tat sāmarthyaṃ yadīṣyate / saṃvāditvam asiddhaṃ tad bahirarthāpalāpinaḥ //	(a) if by ‘being in conformity with reality’ it is meant, either that it presents the external object, or that it has the capacity for presenting it, then this cannot be ‘admissible’ by the man who denies the external object.
arthakriyāvasāye cet pratyaye hetuteṣyate / saṃvāditvaṃ tathāpyetannirālambe 'pi śakyate //	(b) If, on the other hand, ‘being in conformity with reality’ consists in being the cause of a cognition envisaging effective action, then, this is possible also when the cognition is without an external objective basis.
tatra yadi bāhyārthaprāpaṇaṃ tat pramāṇaśaktir vā saṃvāditvaṃ hetuviśeṣaṇam abhipretaṃ tadā bahirarthāpalāpino vijñaptimātratāvādinas tadasiddhamityanyatarāsiddho hetuḥ / athābhimatārthakriyāvabhāsipratyayahetutvaṃ saṃvāditvam iṣṭaṃ tadā viparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatetyanaikāntiko hetuḥ /	(a) If ‘being in conformity with reality’ as the qualification of your Probans, means, either that it represents the external object, or that it has the capacity of representing it, then, for the person who denies the external object i.e. for one who holds that Idea or Cognition is all that exists, such conformity can never be ‘admissible’; hence the Probans is one tainted with ‘inadmissibility’ by one of the two parties. (b) If ‘conformity’ means that it brings about a Cognition which envisages the desired effective action then, so long as a proof setting aside the contrary conclusion has not been adduced, there would always be a suspicion of the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent;
nirālambo 'pi jñāne tathāvidhasaṃvāditvāvirodhāt //	and this would make the Probans ‘Inconclusive Because such conformity would not be incompatible with the view that Cognition has no objective basis.
avirodham eva samarthayitum āha yathā bāhyajalādīnām iti /	The following Texts show how there is no such incompatibility (with the Idealistic position): [see verses 2055-2056 next]
yathā bāhyajalādīnāṃ sāmarthyaṃ niyamo mataḥ / jñāneṣvapi tathaivaite saṃvido 'vyatirekatā{naḥ---} // anumāpratibhāsena spaṣṭaḥ sādhāraṇo 'pyayam /	Just as in the case of the external things, water and the rest, the presence of actual capacity is regarded as the regulating factor in ‘conformity’, this same ‘conformity of cognition’ is found in the case of other cognitions (inferential, etc.) also, so that, in view of what appears in inference, the reason adduced by the opponent is ‘too wide’ (hence ‘inconclusive’).
spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnāṃ rūpaṃ tena samaṃ nahi //	Certainly the form of fire and other things (inferred) which is quite clear and distinct, is not like that of the inference itself.
kiṃ cānumānajñānapratibhāsasya satyapi nirālambatve saṃvāditvam astīti niścitavipakṣasadbhāvāt prameyatvādivat spaṣṭā sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /	Then again, though the Inferential Cognition is devoid of the objective substratum, yet it is in conformity with reality; so that the Reason adduced is clearly found where the Probandum is absent, and hence, like ‘cognisability’, it is clearly ‘too wide’, hence ‘Inconclusive’.
syād etat asiddhā nirālambanatānumānavikalpasyetyāha spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnām ityādi /	It might be argued that “we do not admit that Inferential Cognition is devoid of objective substratum”.
prayogaḥ yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ na tattadviṣayam yathā rūpajñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayam bāhyākāraśūnyaṃ cānumānamānam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ /	The answer to that is ‘Certainly, the form, etc. etc.’ This argument may be thus formulated: When a cognition is devoid of the form of something, it cannot be regarded as having that for its objective basis, e.g. the Cognition of Colour does not have Sound for its objective; Inferential Cognition is devoid of the external form;
nacāsiddho hetuḥ /	The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’;
tathā hi spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnāṃ yat tadrūpaṃ na tat tena anumānajñānākāreṇa samam tulyam tasyāspaṣṭatvāt anyathā hi yathā pratiṣṭhitena tārṇapārṇādibhedato rūpeṇa pratyakṣe jñāne pratyavabhāsate tathaivānumānajñāne 'pi bhāseta yāvatā pratiṣṭhitaṃ rūpam utsṛjya gamakānugasāmānyarūpeṇaiva bhāsate parokṣo bāhyādiranumāne /	because the form of the Fire is quite clear and distinct; and as such, it is not like the form of the Inferential Cognition (of that Fire); because the Inferential Cognition is always somewhat hazy and indefinite. If it were not so, then the Fire which, in Perception, is cognised in a well-defined form, as due to the burning of grasses and leaves, would appear in the same definite form in Inference also; as a matter of fact, what does appear in Inference has abandoned its well-defined form and appears only in a vague general form in accordance with the Indicative on which the Inference is based.
na caikasyākāradvayaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ parasparaviruddhaṃ yuktam iti prākpratipāditam /	Nor can one and the same thing have two forms the General and the Particular, which are mutually contradictory, as already explained before, Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’;
nāpi viruddho hetuḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt /	Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.
nāpyanaikāntiko 'tiprasaṅgāt //	as there is no difference, in these respects, between the colour and the cognition;
prameyatvādihetubhya ityādinodyotakarasya pramāṇānyāśaṅkate /	With the following Text, the Author sets forth the arguments propounded by Uddyotakara [Nyāyavārtika on Sū.
[p.576]	[verse 2057]:
sahyāha yadetad deśavicchedapratibhāsi nīlādikaṃ tadāntarānubhavād bhinnaṃ prameyatvāt, anityatvāt, kāryatvāt, pratyayatvāt, hetumattvāt yathā santānāntaracittam iti //	He has argued thus: “The Blue etc. which appear in various places must be regarded as different from Apprehension, which is interna’, because they are cognisable, because they are evanescent, because they are products, and because they have causes;
atrāpi vyabhicāritvaṃ na rūpeṇāsya cetasaḥ /	just like the Cognition appearing in another Chain”.
atrāpīti /	[verse 2058]:
sarveṣveva hetuṣu /	‘In this argument’ i.e. in all the Reasons adduced.
vyabhicāritvam anaikāntikatvam /	‘Falsity’ Inconclusiveness.
āntarānubhave 'pi prameyatvādīnāṃ sadbhāvāt, yathā taimirikādijñāne pratibhāsibhir dvicandrādyair anaikāntikatā /	Because the ‘inner cognition’ also has the character of ‘cognisability’ and the rest; just as there is ‘inconclusiveness’ also in view of the ‘two moons’ that appear in the Cognition of the man with the diseased eye.
prameyatvaṃ tu dvicandrādīnāṃ dvicandrādīti vikalpakajñānaviṣayatayā draṣṭavyam /	In things like the ‘two moons’, cognisability should be understood to be present in the sense that they appear in that form in the Conceptual Cognition;
naca yasmin vijñāne te bhāsante tadapekṣayā teṣām arthādhi{ga}mo{ '}kṣābhāvāt /	because they are not really cognisable in the sense of forming the object of the cognition itself; because they are not in contact with the Sense-organ;
yadāha keśādinā yo 'na{nāyanā---}rthādhi{ga}mo{ '}kṣata iti //	as declared in the saying ‘On account of the obstruction of the Hair, etc. the visual perception does not proceed from the Sense-organ’.
anyathā bāhya evārthaḥ saṃvedyaścedihocyate / ākāro bhāsamāno 'sau na tadarthātmako nanu //	If it is alleged that “in the cases cited, it is really the external object that is cognised”, [then the answer is as follows]: the form that actually figures in the cognition cannot be of the nature of the real object;
sa caivambhāsamānatvād vijñānena pravedyate /	as it only figures in the cognition and hence becomes cognised;
bāhyasya tu nijaṃ rūpaṃ naivaṃ tatrāvabhāsate //	the actual form of the external object itself does not figure there at all.

citrāstaraṇadarśane ekasmājjñānād avyatiriktatvājjñānasvarūpavadākārāṇāṃ bahutā na prāpnoti /

When one sees a bedspread of variegated colour, there should not be a multiplicity of forms (colours), because, like the form of the Cognition itself, they are all not-different from the Cognition, which is one only.

evamākārāvyatiriktatvājjñānasyāpyanekatā prāpnoti /

Similarly, as the Cognition is not-different from the forms, it should be more than one.

ye tu manyante samānajātīyānyapi jñānānyākārasaṅkhyānyeva bahūni citrāstaraṇādiṣu yugapat samudbhavantyeva vijātīyarūpaśabdādijñānavad iti /

There are some people who argue thus: “In the case of the Bedspread of variegated colours, what happens is that there do appear simultaneously several homogeneous Cognitions, as many in number as there are forms (colours); as there is in the case of the Cognition of several diverse sounds.

tataś ca prasaṅge siddhasādhyateti /

Hence the Reductio ad Absurdum that has been urged is futile”.

teṣāṃ citrāstaraṇe yathā nīlādayo bahava ākāraḥ saṃvedyante / evam ekākāre 'pi sitādāvarvāgmadhyaparabhāgarūpā bahava ākārā iti tadātmakaṃ tatrāpi jñānam akenātmakaṃ prāpnoti /

For these people, just as, in the ease of the Bedspread of variegated Colour, there are several forms that are cognised, so in the case of the white sheet also which has only one form (colour), as there are several forms in the shape of the nearer, remoter and middle parts of the sheet, the Cognition would have to be multiple.

iṣyata eveti cet /

It might be said “Yes;

kimidānīm ekaṃ jñānaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam / yadanavayavāṇuviṣayam iti cet /

Well, then, it behoves you to explain which is the Cognition that is one. “It is the Cognition that apprehends the Atom which has no parts.”

tadetad anubhavaviruddham /

This is contrary to all experience.

nahi kvacid anavayavamaṇurūpaṃ bhāsamānamālakṣyate jñāne / navāpyamūrtānāṃ paurvāparyāvasthānaṃ deśakṛtaṃ yuktam /

In no Cognition is the impartite atomic form ever found to appear. In the case of incorporeal things, there can be no priority or posteriority due to space, for the justification of which there would be some ground for assuming a multiplicity of Cognitions.

deśavitānapratibhāsasyālīkatve katham ākārāṇāṃ satyatā syānnahi deśavitānāvasthitanīlādipratibhāsavyatirekeṇānyo nīlādijñānākāraḥ saṃvedyate /

The idea of extension in space being false, how can the forms be real? And yet there is no Cognition of the Cognition of Blue, etc. apart from the appearance of the Blue, etc. that have extension in space.

ato 'nekajñānakalpanāvaiyarthyam eva //

Hence the assuming of a multiplicity of Cognitions is entirely futile.

sarvātmanā ca sārūpye jñāne 'jñānāditā bhavet / sāmye kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam //

If the cognition were entirely like the object, then it would have the character of non-cognition (ignorance), etc. If there is only partial likeness, then every cognition should apprehend every object.

ajñānatā jaḍarūpatvam /

‘Character of Non-cognition’ i.e. being of the nature of the unconscious.

ādiśabdena nasarāgatā nasadveṣatetyādi gṛhyate //

‘Etcetera’ is meant to include negation of attachment, negation of hatred and so forth.

anyākāram api jñānaṃ katham anyasya vedakam / sarvaḥ syāt sarvasaṃvedyo na hetuś ca niyāmakaḥ //

How can the cognition envisaging (having the form of) one object apprehend another object? If it did so, everything would be apprehended by every cognition; and there would be no basis for restriction.

athāpi syāt yajjñānaṃ yena janitaṃ tat tasyaiva saṃvedakaṃ bhavet tena na sarvaḥ sarvasaṃvedyo bhaviṣyatītyāha na hetuś ca niyāmaka iti /

It might be urged that “when a Cognition is produced by a certain Object, it apprehends only that Object, and thus every Object could not be apprehended by every Cognition The answer to this is ‘There would be no basis for restriction’;

cakṣurādīnām api saṃvedyatvaprasaṅgāditi bhāvaḥ //

that is, even the Eye, etc. would become ‘apprehended’.

yathāhītyādinā bhadantaśubhaguptasya parihāram āśaṅkate

The following Text presents Bhadanta-Śubhagupta’s answer to the above [see verse 2041 next]

yathāhi bhavatāṃ jñānaṃ nirākāraṃ ca tattvataḥ / vetti cābhūtamākāraṃ bhūtaṃ sarvaṃ tathaiva cet //

“just as your cognition, which is formless in reality, apprehends forms which are non-objective, in the same way would it apprehend all things.” (2041)

sa hyāha yathaiva bhavatāṃ vijñānavādināṃ vijñānaṃ paramārthato nirākāram adhātukanakākāśaśuddhivad buddhiriṣyata iti vacanāt atha ca tamākāraṃ vetti tathā bāhyam apīti //

Bhadanta Śubhagupta has argued as follows: “According to you, Idealists, Cognition is really formless, as is clear from such assertions as ‘Cognition is held to be non-elemental, like the purity of Gold and Ākāśa’; and yet it apprehends forms; in the same manner it would apprehend the external thing also (2041)

atrāha asādhāraṇam ityādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2042-2044 next]

asādhāraṇam evedaṃ svarūpaṃ cittacaittayoḥ /

As a matter of fact, the form of the mind and mental effects is not-common (specific);

saṃvedanaṃ tato 'nyeṣāṃ na mukhyaṃ tat kathañcana //

hence there can be no apprehension of other forms in the real (primary) sense of the term;

ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kāryakāraṇatādi ca / samāśritya bhavennāma bhāktaṃ bhūtasya vedanam //

therefore the name ‘apprehension’ could be applicable to the apprehension of objects only in the secondary (figurative) sense, on the basis of such conditions as ‘being dependent upon the same causal circumstances’, ‘the relation of cause and effect’ and so forth.

nīrūpasya tu bhāvasya naikasāmagryadhīnatā /

An entity however which has no form, cannot be ‘dependent upon the same form’, nor could the other condition be fulfilled.

nacānyat tena naivāsti gauṇamapyasya vedanam //

Hence of such an entity, there can be no ‘apprehension’, even in the figurative sense.” (2042-2044)

nahyabhūtasya mukhyasaṃvedanam asti /

As a matter of fact, of what is non-objective, there can be no ‘Apprehension’ in the primary sense of this term.

tathā hi yadeva prakāśātmakamasādhāraṇamahaṅkārāspadaṃ sātādirūpeṇa prathate rūpamātmā cittacaittānāṃ tadeva teṣāṃ saṃvedanaṃ mukhyam /

Because of the Mind and Mental Effects, the only form or nature that figures in ‘Happiness, etc.’ and which is spoken of as ‘I’, is specific not-common and is of the nature of Light; and it is this figuring that constitutes their ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense.

tato jñānātmano 'nyeṣām abhūtākārāṇāṃ na tanmukhyaṃ saṃvedanaṃ yuktam /

Hence of ‘non-objective’ things other than Cognition, which are not of the nature of Cognition, there can be no such ‘apprehension’ in the primary sense;

teṣām abhūtatvād eva /

simply because they are non-objective.

nāpi gauṇamupacāranimittābhāvāt /

because there is no basis for such secondary signification.

tathā hi ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ ādiśabdena sārūpyam etad upacāranibandhanaṃ bhavet /

Because the only possible grounds for secondary signification are dependence upon the same causal circumstances, the relation of Cause and Effect and similarity of form, this last being indicated by the term ‘and so forth’ in the text.

na cānyad astyupacāranimittam /

And none of these is possible in the case of what is non-objective.

kevalamavidyāvaśād aviṣayamevābhūtākāropadarśakaṃ jñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ jāyate // sa eva tarhi vibhramo 'satyākārasaṃvedane upacāranimittaṃ bhaviṣyatīti cet atrāha athavetyādi /

There can be no other ground for the figurative use of the name ‘Apprehension What happens therefore, in such cases, is only that through Nescience (Illusion) a Wrong Cognition comes about indicating a non-objective form, which really does not form the objective (of the Cognition at all).

athavābhūtamākāraṃ vettīti vyapadiśyate / vibhramān na hi tattvena vetti nirviṣayaṃ hi tat //

Or, it may be that the cognition is spoken of as ‘apprehending the non-objective form’, through mistake, because in reality it does not apprehend it at all, for the simple reason that it has no object.

tvayāpi yadi vijñānamevambhūtasya vedakam / vibhramād ucyate vyāptaṃ vyaktaṃ nirviṣayaṃ tava //

If you also speak through illusion of the cognition apprehending such a thing, then it becomes clearly non-objective. The opponent says “That same false cognition would be the basis of the figurative use of the name to the Apprehension of the unreal form”.

taditi abhūtākārāviṣayatvenoktaṃ jñānam /

‘Tat’ i.e. the Cognition that is spoken of as envisaging the non-objective form.

tathā hi paramārthato nābhūtākāro 'sti vedyaḥ tasya hi vidhinā vedyatvopagame bhūtatvaprasaṅgāt //

In reality, there is no non-objective form at all which could be apprehended; because if it were admitted to be apprehensible in the positive form, then it would have to be regarded as objective.

sākāraṃ tannirākāraṃ tulyakālamatulyajam /

Whether with form or formless, it does not apprehend anything else;

iti bauddhe 'pi vijñāne kiṃ na cintā pravartate //

hence in regard to the Buddha’s cognition, the questions do not arise.

yathā sākārādivijñānena nārthasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam iti cintā kriyate tathā bhagavato 'pi jñānenārthasya grahaṇaṃ prati kiṃ na kriyata ityatrāha sākāram ityādi / sākāraṃ tannirākāraṃ yuktaṃ nānyasya vedakam /

The same writer (Bhadanta-Śubhagupta) says again: “With reference to the Buddha’s Cognition also, the same questions arise Is it with form or formless? Is it produced at the same time or at different times? That is to say, just as the point is discussed that the Cognition with form cannot apprehend the Object, why is not a similar point raised in regard to the apprehension of the Object of the Blessed Lord’s Cognition?”

na hi bhagavato jñānaṃ tasya grāhakam iṣyate yenātrāpi cintā kriyeta /

The Cognition of the Blessed Lord is not regarded as the apprehender of the Object; hence the question is not raised in regard to that.

yāvatā tasya sarvāvaraṇavigamān na grāhyagrāhakavikalpo 'tītīṣṭam //

As a matter of fact, in His case, all obscuration having disappeared, that there should be no question regarding the Apprehender and Apprehended, is exactly what is right.

nanu ca yadyapi bāhyo 'rtho nāsti grāhyas tathāpi cittāntaramastyeva santānāntaravarti tadbhagavajjñānasya kimiti grāhyaṃ na bhavet atrāha anyarāgādīti /

Says the Opponent: “Even though the External Object does not exist, which could be apprehended, yet another Cognition is there, in another ‘Chain’; why cannot this be apprehended by the Cognition of the Blessed Lord?”

prāpnotyāvṛttisadbhāva aupalambhikadarśane //

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2048 above]

anyasantānavarti rāgādisaṃvedanaṃ hi yadi paraṃ sārūpyād eva yuktam nānyathā atiprasaṅgāt /

If there is apprehension of the Love, etc. occurring in other ‘Chains’, that could be due only to similarity, not otherwise; as if it were otherwise, there would be incongruities.

tataś ca yadi sarvātmanā sārūpyaṃ tadā bhagavato 'pi jñānaṃ raktaṃ syāt /

As regards this Similarity (between the Lord’s Cognition and the Love, etc. in another person), if it is similarity on all points, then the Lord’s Cognition should be tainted with the same Love, etc.;

evaṃ sati kleśāvaraṇamaprahīṇaṃ syād ityāvṛttisadbhāvaḥ prāpnoti /

and in that case, the Afflictions and Obscurations would not have ceased in Him; and there could be possibility of Obscuration.

upalambhena cirantītyaupalambhikās teṣāṃ darśane mate / yadvā aupalambhike bhagavato darśane jñāne 'bhyupagamyamāne satītyayam arthaḥ /

‘Aupalambhika-darśane’ under the view opinion of those who proceed on the basis of Cognitions alone, i.e. the Apprehensionists, the Idealists. Or it may be interpreted as ‘under the Apprehensionist or Idealistic, view of the Lord’.

athaikadeśena sārūpyaṃ tathāpi dvyākārasyāprahīṇatvājjñeyāvaraṇasadbhāvaḥ prāpnoti grāhyākārakalaṅgitatvāt tathāhyekasya dvairūpyaṃ bhāvikamayuktam iti tadavaśyaṃ bhrāntaṃ vyavasthāpanīyam /

If, on the other hand, the said similarity is only partial, even so, as the two forms would not have ceased, the obscuration of the apprehended object would be there; as it would be tainted with the form of what is apprehended. Because a duality of form in any single object cannot be real; so that the said Cognition would have to be regarded as wrong, mistaken;

tataś ca bhrāntibījasyādoṣasyālpasyāprahāṇād aprahīṇāvaraṇa eva bhagavān syāt //

and thus, as the seed of wrong-cognition, in the shape of Defect, would not have entirely ceased, the Blessed Lord would come to be one whose obscuration has not ceased entirely.

[p.574] kalpapādapavat sarvasaṅkalpapavanair muniḥ /

The great sage is like the kalpa-tree, unshaken by the winds of desires;

akampo 'pi karotyeva lokānāmarthasampadam //

and yet he brings about the welfare of men.

tenādarśanamapyāhuḥ sarve sarvavidaṃ jinam /

Even though he has no cognitions, all men regard the blessed Jina (Buddha) to be omniscient;

anābhogena niḥśeṣasarvavitkāryasambhavāt //

because by reason of the absence of limitations, he knows all things, without exception, as is clear from what he does (for the welfare of people).

adarśanam iti /

‘Adarśanam’ He who has no cognition.

pūrvapraṇidhānabalād anābhogena kalpatabha{ru---}vadyathābhavyamaśeṣajagadarthasampādānāt sarvajñamāhur nopalambhabalāt /

By the force of his previous Meditations, the Lord has no limitations; He is like the Kalpa-tree, bringing about the welfare of the entire Universe; that is why people regard Him as ‘Omniscient,’ not because He has cognitions;

svabhāvāntarasya sarvathāpyupalambhāyogāt //

in fact, no other character can be attributed to Him.

dhiyo 'sitādirūpatve sā tasyānubhavaḥ katham / dhiyaḥ sitādirūpatve bāhyo 'rthaḥ kimpramāṇakaḥ //

If the cognition is not of the ‘white’ and other forms, then, how can it be the apprehension of the object? if it is of the form of ‘white’, etc., then what is the evidence for the external object? (2051)

tathā hi pratyakṣato bāhyārthasiddhiḥ syād anumānato vā anyasya pramāṇasya sato 'traivāntarbhāvāt /

Having thus stated the arguments negativing the External World, the Author next refutes the argument adduced by the other party in support of the External World.

tatra na tāvat pratyakṣataḥ tathā hi pratyakṣābhimatena jñānena nirākāreṇa vārthasya grahaṇaṃ syāt sākāreṇa vā /

The external object could be proved either by Perception or by Inference; any other Means of Knowledge, if any, is included under these two. It cannot be proved by Perception.

na tāvannirākāreṇa pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvāt /

as in that case there would be no basis for the necessary contacts (without which there can be no Perception).

dhiyo 'sitādirūpatve sati sā nīlādyākārasyaivaikasya jñānagatasyopalambhād bāhyo 'rthaḥ parokṣa eva bhaven na pratyakṣaḥ / nahi dve nīle kadācit saṃvedyete ekaṃ jñānapratibimbakam aparaṃ tadarpakam ityevaṃ tāvan na pratyakṣataḥ siddhiḥ // anumānatas tarhi siddhirastviti cet /

Thus then, if the Cognition were not of the White and other forms, how could it be the apprehension of the Object? It can never be so, as already explained before. If, on the other hand, the Cognition apprehending the Object is with form, then, the only form of the Blue, etc. that would be perceived would be that in the Cognition itself, and the External Object would be only indirectly cognised (by Inference), not perceived. Because two ‘Blues’ are never perceived one in the form of the reflection in the Cognition, and the other in the form of the external object which casts the reflection.

atra bhadantaśubhaguptaḥ pramāṇayati /

Thus the External Object cannot be proved by Perception.

yo jñānākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitas tadyathāgrāhaka ākāro jñānākāraścāyam aviplutendriyasya nīlādipratibhāsaviśeṣaḥ saṃvādīti svabhāvahetuḥ / tadidam āśaṅkate nīlādītyādi /

“The fact of the appearance of the blue and other forms being produced by something of the same kind is sought to be proved by its being the form of the cognition which is in conformity with the reality, like the consciousness.” (2052) It might be said “In that case, it could be proved by Inference”, And in support of this idea, Bhadanta -Śubhagupta has formulated the argument as follows: “The form in which the Cognition appears, if it is in conformity with the real state of things, must be produced by some other Object of that same form, like the apprehending form;

nīlādipratibhāsasya saṃvāditvena sādhyate / jñānākāratayā tulyajātīyāj janma bodhavat //

and the ‘form of Cognition’ in question envisaging the Blue and other forms, appearing in the man with underanged sense-organs, is compatible with the real state of things;

saṃvāditveneti /

‘Samvāditvena’;

itthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā /

The Instrumental ending indicates the characteristic feature of the Cognition;

saṃvāditvenopalakṣitā yā jñānākāratā tayā hetubhūtayā jñānākārasya tulyajātīyāj janma sādhyate /

the sense being that form of the cognition which is in conformity with reality, by that is proved the fact of the form of the Cognition being produced by some other thing of the same kind; like Consciousness;

bodhavat grāhakākāravad ity arthaḥ //

i.e. like the form of the Apprehender.

[p.575] bāhyārthetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha

The following texts point out the defects in this argument: [see verses 2053-2054 next]

bāhyārthaprāpaṇaṃ yadvā tat sāmarthyaṃ yadīṣyate / saṃvāditvam asiddhaṃ tad bahirarthāpalāpinaḥ //

(a) if by ‘being in conformity with reality’ it is meant, either that it presents the external object, or that it has the capacity for presenting it, then this cannot be ‘admissible’ by the man who denies the external object.

arthakriyāvasāye cet pratyaye hetuteṣyate / saṃvāditvaṃ tathāpyetannirālambe 'pi śakyate //

(b) If, on the other hand, ‘being in conformity with reality’ consists in being the cause of a cognition envisaging effective action, then, this is possible also when the cognition is without an external objective basis.

tatra yadi bāhyārthaprāpaṇaṃ tat pramāṇaśaktir vā saṃvāditvaṃ hetuviśeṣaṇam abhipretaṃ tadā bahirarthāpalāpino vijñaptimātratāvādinas tadasiddhamityanyatarāsiddho hetuḥ / athābhimatārthakriyāvabhāsipratyayahetutvaṃ saṃvāditvam iṣṭaṃ tadā viparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatetyanaikāntiko hetuḥ /

(a) If ‘being in conformity with reality’ as the qualification of your Probans, means, either that it represents the external object, or that it has the capacity of representing it, then, for the person who denies the external object i.e. for one who holds that Idea or Cognition is all that exists, such conformity can never be ‘admissible’; hence the Probans is one tainted with ‘inadmissibility’ by one of the two parties. (b) If ‘conformity’ means that it brings about a Cognition which envisages the desired effective action then, so long as a proof setting aside the contrary conclusion has not been adduced, there would always be a suspicion of the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent;

nirālambo 'pi jñāne tathāvidhasaṃvāditvāvirodhāt //

and this would make the Probans ‘Inconclusive Because such conformity would not be incompatible with the view that Cognition has no objective basis.

avirodham eva samarthayitum āha yathā bāhyajalādīnām iti /

The following Texts show how there is no such incompatibility (with the Idealistic position): [see verses 2055-2056 next]

yathā bāhyajalādīnāṃ sāmarthyaṃ niyamo mataḥ / jñāneṣvapi tathaivaite saṃvido 'vyatirekatā{naḥ---} // anumāpratibhāsena spaṣṭaḥ sādhāraṇo 'pyayam /

Just as in the case of the external things, water and the rest, the presence of actual capacity is regarded as the regulating factor in ‘conformity’, this same ‘conformity of cognition’ is found in the case of other cognitions (inferential, etc.) also, so that, in view of what appears in inference, the reason adduced by the opponent is ‘too wide’ (hence ‘inconclusive’).

spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnāṃ rūpaṃ tena samaṃ nahi //

Certainly the form of fire and other things (inferred) which is quite clear and distinct, is not like that of the inference itself.

kiṃ cānumānajñānapratibhāsasya satyapi nirālambatve saṃvāditvam astīti niścitavipakṣasadbhāvāt prameyatvādivat spaṣṭā sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /

Then again, though the Inferential Cognition is devoid of the objective substratum, yet it is in conformity with reality; so that the Reason adduced is clearly found where the Probandum is absent, and hence, like ‘cognisability’, it is clearly ‘too wide’, hence ‘Inconclusive’.

syād etat asiddhā nirālambanatānumānavikalpasyetyāha spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnām ityādi /

It might be argued that “we do not admit that Inferential Cognition is devoid of objective substratum”.

prayogaḥ yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ na tattadviṣayam yathā rūpajñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayam bāhyākāraśūnyaṃ cānumānamānam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ /

The answer to that is ‘Certainly, the form, etc. etc.’ This argument may be thus formulated: When a cognition is devoid of the form of something, it cannot be regarded as having that for its objective basis, e.g. the Cognition of Colour does not have Sound for its objective; Inferential Cognition is devoid of the external form;

nacāsiddho hetuḥ /

The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’;

tathā hi spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnāṃ yat tadrūpaṃ na tat tena anumānajñānākāreṇa samam tulyam tasyāspaṣṭatvāt anyathā hi yathā pratiṣṭhitena tārṇapārṇādibhedato rūpeṇa pratyakṣe jñāne pratyavabhāsate tathaivānumānajñāne 'pi bhāseta yāvatā pratiṣṭhitaṃ rūpam utsṛjya gamakānugasāmānyarūpeṇaiva bhāsate parokṣo bāhyādiranumāne /

because the form of the Fire is quite clear and distinct; and as such, it is not like the form of the Inferential Cognition (of that Fire); because the Inferential Cognition is always somewhat hazy and indefinite. If it were not so, then the Fire which, in Perception, is cognised in a well-defined form, as due to the burning of grasses and leaves, would appear in the same definite form in Inference also; as a matter of fact, what does appear in Inference has abandoned its well-defined form and appears only in a vague general form in accordance with the Indicative on which the Inference is based.

na caikasyākāradvayaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ parasparaviruddhaṃ yuktam iti prākpratipāditam /

Nor can one and the same thing have two forms the General and the Particular, which are mutually contradictory, as already explained before, Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’;

nāpi viruddho hetuḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt /

Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.

nāpyanaikāntiko 'tiprasaṅgāt //

as there is no difference, in these respects, between the colour and the cognition;

prameyatvādihetubhya ityādinodyotakarasya pramāṇānyāśaṅkate /

With the following Text, the Author sets forth the arguments propounded by Uddyotakara [Nyāyavārtika on Sū.

[p.576]

[verse 2057]:

sahyāha yadetad deśavicchedapratibhāsi nīlādikaṃ tadāntarānubhavād bhinnaṃ prameyatvāt, anityatvāt, kāryatvāt, pratyayatvāt, hetumattvāt yathā santānāntaracittam iti //

He has argued thus: “The Blue etc. which appear in various places must be regarded as different from Apprehension, which is interna’, because they are cognisable, because they are evanescent, because they are products, and because they have causes;

atrāpi vyabhicāritvaṃ na rūpeṇāsya cetasaḥ /

just like the Cognition appearing in another Chain”.

atrāpīti /

[verse 2058]:

sarveṣveva hetuṣu /

‘In this argument’ i.e. in all the Reasons adduced.

vyabhicāritvam anaikāntikatvam /

‘Falsity’ Inconclusiveness.

āntarānubhave 'pi prameyatvādīnāṃ sadbhāvāt, yathā taimirikādijñāne pratibhāsibhir dvicandrādyair anaikāntikatā /

Because the ‘inner cognition’ also has the character of ‘cognisability’ and the rest; just as there is ‘inconclusiveness’ also in view of the ‘two moons’ that appear in the Cognition of the man with the diseased eye.

prameyatvaṃ tu dvicandrādīnāṃ dvicandrādīti vikalpakajñānaviṣayatayā draṣṭavyam /

In things like the ‘two moons’, cognisability should be understood to be present in the sense that they appear in that form in the Conceptual Cognition;

naca yasmin vijñāne te bhāsante tadapekṣayā teṣām arthādhi{ga}mo{ '}kṣābhāvāt /

because they are not really cognisable in the sense of forming the object of the cognition itself; because they are not in contact with the Sense-organ;

yadāha keśādinā yo 'na{nāyanā---}rthādhi{ga}mo{ '}kṣata iti //

as declared in the saying ‘On account of the obstruction of the Hair, etc. the visual perception does not proceed from the Sense-organ’.

anyathā bāhya evārthaḥ saṃvedyaścedihocyate / ākāro bhāsamāno 'sau na tadarthātmako nanu //

If it is alleged that “in the cases cited, it is really the external object that is cognised”, [then the answer is as follows]: the form that actually figures in the cognition cannot be of the nature of the real object;

sa caivambhāsamānatvād vijñānena pravedyate /

as it only figures in the cognition and hence becomes cognised;

bāhyasya tu nijaṃ rūpaṃ naivaṃ tatrāvabhāsate //

the actual form of the external object itself does not figure there at all.