buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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ayam apīti amukhyas tādrūpyād upakalpitaḥ //	‘Even this’ cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.
athāpi syād yathā khaḍgo hasyādikaṃ chinatti yathā vā vahnir dāhyaṃ dahati na caite khāḍgādayo hastyādirūpāḥ tathā jñānamapratipannaviṣayākāramapi viṣayaṃ paricchetsyatīti etat syānmatirityādinā śaṅkate /	The following might be urged: “The sword strikes the Elephant, the Fire burns the inflammable thing; and yet the Sword and the Fire are not of the form of the Elephant and the inflammable thing in the same way the Cognition, though not assuming the form of the Object, would apprehend that object”.
chedadāhādītyetad apekṣya dantidāhyāder iti ṣaṣṭhī /	The genitive ending in ‘dantidāhyādeḥ’ is in connection with ‘cheda-dāhādi’.
ada iti / etajjñānam /	‘This’ i.e. the Cognition.
ādiśabdena pradīpādayo nīlādīnāṃ yathāprakāśakā ityādi gṛhyate //	The term ‘ādi’ includes such other cases as the Lamp illuminating the Blue and other things. The following Text provides the answer to the above: [see verse 2008 next]
tadidam ityādinottaram āha [p.561]	The following Text provides the answer to the above: [see verse 2008 above]
tadidaṃ viṣamaṃ yasmāt te tathotpattihetavaḥ /	The Sword is ‘productive’ of the Elephant, and is, on that account, known as the ‘Cutter’;
khaḍgādayo hi hastyādīnām utpādakāḥ eva santo dāhakāditvena prasiddhās tathā hi khaḍgādidhārābhighāte viśliṣṭasandhayo gajāssumupajāyante tathā vahnisamparkādindhanamaṅgārādirūpam evaṃ ghaṭādayo 'pyalokavaśājjñānajananayogyā bhavanti natvevaṃ jñānena viṣayasya kaścid upakāraḥ kriyate kintuviṣayeṇaiva vijñānaṃ vispaṣṭam upajanyata iti katham akiñcitkaraṃ tasya vedakaṃ bhavet /	what happens is that when the Elephant is struck by the Sword, there is produced an Elephant with sundered limbs; similarly when the Fuel is touched by Fire, it becomes produced as the Live-coal; in the same manner, the Jar and other external things also become capable of producing cognitions, through Light.
naca tat kāryatvam eva tadvedakatvaṃ vijñānasyeti yuktaṃ kalpayituṃ mābhūccakṣurādivedakatvam apyasyeti // bhadantaśubhaguptastvāha vijñānamanāpannaviṣayākāram api viṣayaṃ pratipadyate tat paricchedarūpatvāt tasmānnāśaṅkā kartavyā kathaṃ paricchinatti kiṃvat paricchinattīti /	But even so, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object; on the contrary it is the Object that produces the Cognition in a clear form. When, thus, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object, how could it be its ‘Cogniser’? The mere fact of the Cognition being the product of the Object cannot justify the idea that it is ‘Cognisant’ of that Object; as otherwise, the Cognition might be regarded as ‘Cognisant’ of the Eye and other means of Cognition also.
āha ca	Bhadanta-Śubhagupta has argued as follows:
"kathaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ tac cetat paricchedalakṣaṇam / vijñānaṃ tena nāśaṅkā kathaṃ tatkiṃvadityapi" //	“Even though not assuming the form of the Object, the Cognition does apprehend it, because it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object; hence no question should be raised as to how it apprehends it and like what it apprehends it.
tadatrāha tat paricchedetyādi / tat paricchedarūpatvaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate / jñānarūpaḥ paricchedo yadi grāhyasya sambhavet //	This has been thus asserted ‘If the Cognition does apprehend the Objoct, then it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object, and no question should be raised as to how, and like what, it apprehends it
siddhe hi vyatiriktārthaparicchedātmakatve sati sarvam etat syāt tadeva tu nasiddham /	All this would be true if it were proved that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of something other than itself; as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved.
tathā hi na jñānaṃ sattāmātreṇa paricchinatti sarvaparicchedaprasaṅgāt /	Because the Cognition does not apprehend the Object by its mere existence; if it did so, it would apprehend all things.
nāpi tat kāryatayā cakṣurāder api paricchedāpatteḥ /	Nor does it apprehend the Object, as its product; for, if it did, there would be apprehension of the Eye and other organs also.
naca sākārateṣṭā yena tādrūpyād avibhaktaṃ bhavet tat saṃvedakam /	Nor is Cognition held to be with form, by virtue of which, being similar to the Object, it could not be distinguished from it and thus regarded as ‘cognisant’ of it.
tasmād grāhyasya yaḥ paricchedaḥ sa yati jñānarūpo bhavet evaṃ jñānasyārthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ bhavet /	Thus then, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the nature of Cognition, then the Cognition could be said to be of the nature of the apprehension of the object.
anyathā katham arthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ jñānasyeti spaṣṭam abhidhīyate /	Otherwise, how can it be unequivocally stated that“Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the object”?
tataścārthasya paricchedād vyatirekāt tu jñānātmataiva jāteti siddhā vijñaptimātratā /	In fact, Cognition being something different from the apprehension of the object, it must be of the nature of Cognition itself; and hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone is what exists.
syād etat ko 'pyasya viśeṣo 'sti yenārthameva paricchinatti na{sa---}cedantayā viśeṣaḥ /	The following might be urged: “There must be some peculiarity in the Cognition, whereby it apprehends the Object only; and what this peculiarity is cannot be exactly indicated”.
yadyapyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu sarvam eva nirdeṣṭuṃ na śakyate tathāpyudbhāvanāsaṃvṛttyā kathyata eva /	The answer to this is given in the words ‘It has not been pointed out, etc. etc.’ ‘Bhavati’ has to be supplied. Though every specific entity cannot be indicated, yet by some feat of imagination it is always spoken of somehow.
anyathā hi rūpādīnām api viśeṣo na vaktavyaḥ syāt /	If it were not so, then no peculiarity could be asserted in regard to Colour and other things also.
nacettham anavadhāritena rūpeṇārthasya saṃvedanaṃ jñānam iti vispaṣṭamasaṃśayaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ bhavati /	The mere vague assertion, that ‘Cognition is the apprehension of the object’ does not state anything clearly and unequivocally and with certainty.
tasmādani [p.562] rūpitena rūpeṇa bhāvavyavasthāne suvyavasthitā bhāvā iti yatkiñcid etat //	From this it follows that if the existence of objects were established in this vague indefinite form, the objects would indeed become really well-established!
syād etat paricchedyārthābhāve kasyāsau paricchedo bhaved ity āha paricchedaḥ sa kasyetyādi / paricchedaḥ sa kasyeti naca paryanuyogabhāk /	It might be asked: “If there were no Object to be apprehended, whose apprehension would be there?” Answer: [see verse 2011 above]
ātmaiva hi sa tasya prakāśātmatayā pariccheda ity ucyate /	It is the nature or essence of the Cognition itself that is called ‘apprehension’, by reason of its being of the nature of Light;
yathā sukhādeḥ sātateti nahi sukhasyeti vyatirekanirdeśamātreṇa tato 'nyā sā tathā bhavet /	just as ‘Satisfaction’ is of Pleasure; when one speaks of ‘the satisfaction of Pleasure’, the mere fact of the two being mentioned separately does not make the Satisfaction something different from Pleasure.
tasmād yadyapi nīlasya paricchedaḥ pītasyeti vā vyatirekīva vyapadeśas tathāpi svabhāva eva sa tathā nīlādirūpeṇa prakāśamānatvāt tathocyate svasaṃvedanarūpatvājjñānasya //	Similarly, though there are such expressions as ‘apprehension of Blue’, ‘apprehension of Yellow’, and so forth, where the two appear to be different, yet, it is the very nature of the Cognition that it appears in the form of Blue, etc., and hence it is spoken of in the said manner; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Cognition is by its nature self-cognisant.
atha ko 'yaṃ svasaṃvidartho yadbalāt tathocyata ity āha svarūpetyādi /	Question: “What is this ‘Self-cognition’ that is spoken of?” Answer: [see verse 2012 next]
vyāpṛtam ityādinā svarūpavedanāyānyan na vyapekṣata ityatra kumārilaścodyamāśaṅkate /	[verse 2012]: The following text raises an objection to the statement just made from the view-point of kumārila: [see verse 2013 above]
sa hyāha yadyapi jñānaṃ prakāśātmakaṃ tathāpyātmaprakāśanāya paramapekṣate /	[verse 2013]: This is how Kumārila argues “Though Cognition is of the nature of Light, yet for its own manifestation, it needs something else;
natu svayam ātmānamṛcchati pratipadyate tasyārthaprakāśana eva vyāpṛtatvāt /	and it does not touch apprehend itself; as it is wholly taken up in the manifesting (apprehending) of the object;
nahyekatra vyāpṛtasya tadaparityāgenānyatra tadaiva vyāpāraṇaṃ yuktam //	and when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abandoning the former.” (2013)
atra pradīpaṃ vyabhicaritāmāśaṅkya pakṣāntaram āha īdṛśam ityādi /	[verse 2014]: Anticipating an objection on the basis of the Lamp (which is self-illumined), Kumārila states as follows: [see verse 2014 above]
nanu cāsatyātmaprakāśātmakatve bāhyaprakāśakatvam apyasya kathaṃ vyavasthāpyata ity āha satītyādi /	The question arising ‘If the Cognition is not illuminative of itself, how can it be regarded as illuminative of the external object?’ Kumārila offers the following answer: [see verse 2015 above]
yathā cakṣurādīnāṃ rūpādau viṣaye prakāśakatvavyavasthānam asatyapyātmaprakāśakatve tathātrāpi jñāne bhaviṣyati //	In the case of the Eye and other organs, it is found that their illuminative-ness is restricted to certain definite things, like Colour and the rest, even though the Eye, etc. are not illuminative of themselves; the same would be the case with Cognition also.
[p.563] syād etat kimityātmānam antaraṅgaṃ parityajya bāhyam eva prakāśayatītyāha prakāśakatvam ityādi /	The following might be urged (against Kumārila): ‘How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?’
prakāśakatvaṃ bāhyo 'rthaṃ śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani /	Question: ‘Why should the Cognition not have the potency to illuminate itself?’
śaktiś ca sarvabhāvānāṃ naivam paryanuyujyate //	Answer: The potency of things cannot be complained of’;
yathā ---" agnirdahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām" iti //	as has been thus declared ‘It is fire alone that burns, not Ākāśa, who is to be complained against for this?’ (2016)
nanu cārthasya saṃvittir jñānamevābhidhīyate / tasyāṃ tadātmabhūtāyāṃ ko vyāpāro 'paro bhavet //	The following might be urged (against Kumārila): ‘How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?’
yaduktaṃ vyāpṛtaṃ hyarthavittāviti tadasaṃgatam nahyarthavittir anyā jñānāt /	It has been asserted (under Text 2013) that “while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself This is irrelevant.
tathā hi vittirupalabdhir arthapratītir vijñaptir iti jñānam evaitaiḥ paryāyair abhidhīyate /	For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as ‘vitti’ (apprehension), ‘upalabdhi’ (comprehension), ‘arthapratiti’ (objective consciousness), and ‘vijñapti’ (ideation).
tasyāṃ cārthavittau tadātmabhūtāyām jñānātmabhūtāyāṃ kīdṛśo 'paro jñānasyārthasaṃvedanātmako vyāpāro bhaved ātmyavyatirikto yenārthavittauvyāpṛtam iti bhavet / na cātmanyeva vyāpṛtir yuktā //	When, then, this ‘apprehending of the object’ forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other ‘functioning’, in the shape of the ‘apprehending of the object’ could the Cognition have, apart from itself, by virtue of which it could be said that ‘the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object’? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.
syād etajjñānātmatvam evārthavitteḥ kathaṃ siddhaṃ yena paryāyatā jñānārthasaṃvittyor ity āha arthasyānubhavo rūpam ityādi /	The following question might be raised “How is it known that the ‘apprehending of the object’ is of the nature of Cognition, on account of which ‘Cognition’ and ‘apprehending of the object’ are regarded as synonymous?”
arthasyānubhavo 'vaśyaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ /	‘Apprehension’ must be regarded as of the nature form of the Object;
anyathā kathaṃ tatra jñānaṃ vyāpriyeta / nahyasati śaśaviṣāṇādau kasyacid vyāpāraṇaṃ yuktam / tataś ca tadarthānubhavātmakaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yadi jñānādavyatiriktaṃ bhavet tadā jñāne 'rthānubhavātmakatvaṃ yad taduktam īdṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃtasyārthānubhavātmakam iti tadyuktaṃ syāt /	otherwise, how could the Cognition operate over it? There can be no operation of anything upon what does not exist e.g. the ‘Hares’ Horn Consequently if the said ‘nature’ of the Object in the form of Apprehension were not-different from Cognition, then alone could it be correct to regard the Cognition as being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects, as has been declared (by the Opponent) in the sentence “the illuminativeness of the Cognition consists in its being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects” (Text 2014).
kadācinnirbadhyamāno 'rthānubhavād avyatiriktaṃ jñānam abhyupagacched api para ity āha nacāsti taditi /	On being pressed hard, the Opponent might admit the non-difference of Cognition from the Apprehension of Objects; hence it is added ‘But it cannot be-so under your view’;
tat jñānād avyatiriktatvam anubhavasya /	‘it’ stands for the idea of the Apprehension being non-different from Cognition.
jñānasyārthānubhavāvyatirekābhyupagame svasaṃvittipra [p.564] saṅgāt / syād etannārthānubhavātmatvājjñānasya prakāśakatvam iṣṭam kiṃ tarhi/	That is, if it be admitted that the Cognition is not different from the Apprehension of Objects, it would mean that Cognition is self-cognised. The following might be urged: “When we speak of Cognition as ‘illuminative’, we do not mean that it is so because it is of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects;
anubhavātmatvād eva kevalādityāha tasya tu svata ityādi / tasya jñānasya /	but only that it is of the nature of Apprehension, pure and simple”. The answer to this is ‘Even when, etc. etc.’ ‘Tasya’ stands for the Cognition.
yadyapyanubhavātmakatvam eva kevalaṃ jātaṃ nārthānubhavātmatvaṃ tathā{ca} nīlasyeyaṃ saṃvittir na pītasyetyādibhedenārthasaṃvittir na siddhyet //	Even though. Cognition has now come to be of the nature of mere Apprehension, not of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects, even so there could be no distinct Apprehension of Objects, such as ‘this is the apprehension of Blue, not of Yellow (2018-2019)
kimiti na siddhyed ity āha nahi tatretyādi /	Question: “Why should not there be such apprehension?” Answer: [see verse 2020 next]
parasyeti anākārajñānavādinaḥ /	‘For the other party’, one who holds the view that Cognition is form-less;
prakṛtyā jaḍarūpatvānnāsyātmānubhavo yadi /	whose opinion is that “it is the external Object that has form, the Cognition, is formless”.
jñānasaṃvedanābhāvāt parārthānubhavas tadā{tha---} //	It has been assorted (under Text 2014) that “the illuminativeness of Cognition consists in its being of the nature of Apprehension”.
yadi vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpatayātmānaṃ na saṃvedayate tadā tasya svato 'pratyakṣatve 'rthānubhavo 'pyapratyakṣatayā na{ei---}ṣṭaḥ syāt //	If Cognition, being unconscious, does not apprehend itself, then the Cognition itself being imperceptible, the apprehension of the Object also would have to be regarded as imperceptible.
syād etadyadi nāma jñānamapratyakṣam arthānubhavo 'pi kimityapratyakṣo bhavet / nahi rūpasyāpratyakṣatve śabdasyāpyapratyakṣatā syād ity āha arthasyānubhavo nāmetyādi /	The following might be urged “If the Cognition is not perceptible, why should the apprehension of the Object also cease to be perceptible? Certainly the imperceptibility of Colour does not make Sound also imperceptible”.
na hi jñānasyānyadrūpaṃ nirddhārayāmo 'nyatrārthānubhavāt /	We cannot find any other form (or character) of the Cognition, apart from Apprehension.
anirddhārayantaḥ svavācamanyatvaṃ {svabhāvamanyaṃ taṃ---} niścayaṃ vyavaharantaḥ svaparānu{n---}vipralabhemahi /	And so long as we cannot find any such, if we were to carry on any business, we would be deceiving ourselves and also others.
tasya jñānasyāprasiddharūpatve sati prasiddhis tasyārthānubhavasya kā parā bhavet naiva kācit //	If the Cognition is uncognised, what other cognition could there be of the apprehension of the object? None whatsoever.
athāpi syājjñānāntareṇa tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatītyāha jñānāntareṇetyādi / jñānāntareṇānubhave so 'rthaḥ svānubhave sati / pra{a---}siddhaḥ siddhyasaṃsiddheḥ kadā siddho bhavet punaḥ // tajjñānajñānajātau ced asiddhaḥ svātmasaṃvidi /	If the apprehension of the object were apprehended by another cognition, then it would mean that at the time that the object is apprehended, it is not cognised; because its cognition has not yet come about: and if that is so, then when again would it become cognised? If it be held that “it would become cognised when its cognition becomes cognised”, then it would mean that the object which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension, becomes cognised on the apprehension of something else.
parasaṃvidi siddhas tu sa ityetat subhāṣitam //	This indeed would be an extremely wise assertion! (2023-2024) It might be held that there would be apprehension of it by another Cognition.
[p.565] siddheḥ jñānasya asiddheḥ /	‘Siādhyasamsiddheḥ’ on account of its cognition not having come about.
pra{a---}siddhavyaktikaṃ vyaktam iti {na} yujyate /	It cannot be right that the thing whose appearance has not become cognised should be regarded as apparent.
tathā hi na tāvadarthasya svānubhavakāle 'pi siddhis tadabhivyaktisvabhāvasyānubhavasya tadānīm asiddhatvāt kadā tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatīti vaktavyam /	That is to say, even at the time that the Object is apprehended, there is no cognition of it; because the apprehension consisting of the manifestation of the Object has not yet been cognised; under the circumstances, it behoves you to explain at what time it would become cognised.
tajjñānajñānajātau arthajñānajñānotpattikāle siddhir bhaviṣyatīti cet / etad atisubhāṣitam /	If it be held that ‘it would become cognised, etc. etc.’; i.e. it would become cognised at the time of the appearance of the Cognition of its cogni -tion, this indeed would be a very clever assertion!
yo hi nāma svānubhavakāle na siddhaḥ sa kathamasvā{nya---}nubhavakāle setsyatīti //	How can a thing which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension become cognised at the time of the cognition of something else? (2023-2024)
tasyāpyanubhave{ 'siddhe} prathamasyāpyasiddhatā /	If the said cognition of the apprehension is not cognised, then the preceding one remains uncognised.
tatrānyasaṃvidutpattāvanavasthā prasajyate //	If of that also, yet another cognition were postulated, then there would be an infinite regress.
tasyeti dvitīyasyārthajñānajñānasya /	‘Tasya’ stands for the second cognition of the apprehension of the Object,.
prathamasyeti arthānubhavasya /	‘Preceding one’ i.e. the apprehension of the Object.
{a}siddhateti nāsya siddhirastītyasiddhas tadbhāvo 'siddhatā //	And if there is cognition of another object, the last of the series of cognitions could not be cognised by any other cognition;
kiṃ ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrāpi jñānāntare smṛtirutpadyata eva jñānajñānaṃ mamotpannam iti tasyāpyapareṇānubhavo vaktavyaḥ nahyananubhūte smṛtir yuktā tataścemā jñānamālāḥ ko 'nanyakarmā janayatīti vaktavyam /	Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition, then in connection with this latter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form ‘I have had the Cognition of the Cognition’; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be postulated another apprehension; as without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions.
na tāvad arthas tasya mūlajñānaviṣayatvāt /	It cannot be the Object that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.
nāpīndriyālokau tayoścakṣur jñāna evopayogāt / nāpi nirnimittā sadā sattvādiprasaṅgāt /	Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could be effective only in the case of Visual Perception. Nor can the said string of Cognitions be regarded as without cause.
saiva pūrvadhīruttarottarāṃ buddhiṃ janayatīti cedāha gocarāntaretyādi /	It might be said that “it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one after the other”.
na siddhyet tasya cāsiddhau sarveṣām apy asiddhatā /	In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness).
jñānatvād anyathā naiṣāṃ jñānatvaṃ syād ghaṭādivat //	Because, each succeeding Cognition would be the Object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause;
evaṃ hi viṣayāntarasañcāro na prāpnoti tathā hi pūrvapūrvā buddhiruttarottarasya jñānasya viṣayabhāvenāvathitā pratyāsannā copādānakāraṇatayātāṃ tādṛśīmantaraṅgikāṃ tyaktvā kathaṃ ca bahiraṅgamarthaṃ gṛhṇīyāt /	and so long as it had such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objective? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not simply because it is external, prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition.
atha bahiraṅgo 'pi san pratibadhnīyāt tadā na kadācit kaścid dru{dbu} buddhim anubhavet /	If, even though external, the Object could prevent the Cognition of the Cognition, then no one could never apprehend any Cognition at all.
tathā hi na kācid avasthāsti yasyāmartho na sannihita iti /	Because there is no point of time when an external Object is not present.
smṛtir apy ucchinnā syād anubhavābhāvāt /	Remembrance also would become rooted out; because there would be no Apprehension that could bring about Remembrance.
kiṃ ca ye 'tītā divikalpā viṣayasannidhānam antareṇa bhavanti, teṣāṃ sañcārakāraṇābhāvād vikalpaparamparāyām asaṃsāramavasthānān na kasyacid arthacintā syāt /	Further, for the appearance of the conceptions of ‘Past’ and the rest, which appear when the Object concerned is not there, there would be no cause; so that the series of conceptions would continue there as long as the world lasts;
bhavatu nāmārthāntarasañcāro 'nupapadyamāno 'pi /	and no one would have any anxiety for anything at all.
tathāpi yat tadanyajjñānaṃ tat kenānubhūyeteti vaktavyam / atha syāt saivottara buddhir arthāntaragrāhiṇī pūrvā dhiyam arthaṃ cobhayam api gṛhṇātīti tadetad asamyak /	Granting the presence of other objects, even though it is not possible, even so, it behoves you to explain by what the other (second) Cognition is cognised. It might be said that “that same succeeding Cognition, while apprehending another Object, would apprehend both, this Object as well as the preceding Cognition
tathā hi yadā śabdajñānād anantaraṃ rūpagrāhi jñānaṃ bhavati tadā tasmin rūpagrāhiṇi jñāne śabdajñānasya pratibhāsāt tadā rūḍhasyāpi śabdasya pratibhāsaḥ prāpnoti /	Because, when after the Cognition of Sound, there follows the Cognition of Colour, the Cognition of Sound would figure in the later Cognition of Colour, and hence there should be Cognition of Sound also which would be figuring in its own Cognition. Even for one who regards Cognition as formless, unless there is apprehension of Sound, there can be no apprehension of what apprehends the Sound;
yasyāpi nirākārajñānaṃ tasyāpi na śabdagrahaṇamantareṇa tadgrāhakasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam nahi daṇḍagrahaṇam antareṇa tadgrāhakasya daṇḍino grahaṇaṃ nyāyyam iti rūpagrāhiṇi cakṣurjñāne śabdasyāpi pratibhāsaḥ syāt /	e.g. unless there is apprehension of the stick, there can be no apprehension of the Holder of the Stick. Thus Sound also would figure in the Visual Cognition of Colour.
tathā cintājñānepyakārādiviṣayiṇi yathoktanītyābhilāpadvayamekasminnu{kta}krameṇa syāt /	Similarly on the said principle, in the Cognition of Cogitation also in regard to such objects as the letter ‘A’ and the like, there would always be two verbal expressions one after the other.
tathā hi yadekāracintāsamanantaramakāraṃ cintayati tadā tadakāracintājñānamikāragrāhakam api cintayatīti svajñānsamārūḍhasyekārābhilāpasyākārābhilāpini jñāne pratibhāsaḥ prāpnoti /	For instance, when after the Cogitation over the letter ‘Ī’, one Cogitates over the letter ‘A’, then, the Cogitation of the letter ‘A’ should apprehend the apprehender of the letter ‘Ī’ also; consequently the verbal expression relating to the letter ‘Ī’ as figuring in its own Cognition, should appear in the Cognition of the letter ‘A’.
kiṃ ca sarvam eva vastu vāradvaya pratibhāseta svajñānakāle 'vabhāsanāt /	Further, under this view, everything would appear in Consciousness twice over; because it must so appear at the time of its own Cognition also.
na caivaṃ pratibhāso 'stītyayuktam uktyā buddhyā dvayor grahaṇam /	But as a matter of fact, there is no such double appearance of Objects. For these reasons, it is not right to say that the succeeding Cognition apprehends both (the preceding Cognition and also the Object).
athāpi syād ekam antyaṃ jñānam ananubhūtamasmṛtaṃ cāstāṃ ko doṣaḥ syād ity āha gocarāntarasañcāra iti /	It might be urged “The one final Cognition might remain unapprehended and unremembered; where would be the harm?”
svasaṃvitter anabhyupagamān na svataḥ siddhatā.{nā}pi parataḥ anavasthādoṣāt tasyāntasyāsiddhau satyāṃ pūrvakasyāpyasiddhiḥ apratyakṣopalambhakatvāt tataścārthasyāpyasiddhir iti na kadācit kiñcid upalabhyeta /	The answer to this is ‘If there is Cognition of another Object, etc. etc.’ Self-Cognition being not accepted by the other party, the last Cognition cannot be regarded as ‘self-cognised’; nor can it be cognised by anything else; as in that case there would be an infinite regress. Thus the final Cognition being uncognised, the Cognition preceding it must remain uncognised, as it would apprehend something that is not perceptible;
tataścāndhyamāyātamaśeṣasya jagataḥ /	which means that the entire world becomes blind.
athāntasya yathoktadoṣabhayāt svasaṃvittyā svata eva siddhir abhyupagamyate tadā tadvadeva sarvasya jñānatvāviśeṣāt svasaṃvidas tu /	If, in order to avoid the said difficulty, it be admitted that the final Cognition of the series is cognised by itselfthen the entire lot of Cognitions might bo self-cognised; as all are equally ‘Cognition’,
prayogaḥ yajjñānaṃ tadātmabodhaṃ pratyanapekṣitānyavyāpāraṃ jñānatvāt antyajñānavat jñānaṃ ca vivādāspadībhūtaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	This argument may be formulated as follows: Every Cognition, for its own Cognition, does not depend upon the operation of anything else, because it is Cognition, like the final Cognition of the series, the Cognition under dispute is a Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
anyathā hi yatsvato na siddhas tasya ghaṭādivajjaḍarūpatayā jñānatvam eva hīyeteti bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //	If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, like the Jar and other things; and hence it would lose the character of ‘Cognition’. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary.
vijñānaṃ janayad rūpe cakṣus tasya prakāśakam / natu tasyāvabodhatvāt tajjñānenāsya kopamā //	The eye is regarded as ‘illuminative’ of colour, because it brings about the cognition of colour, not because it is its apprehension; what similarity then can the eye have to cognition? (2029)
[p.567] rūpaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ janayaccakṣū rūpasya prakāśakam ucyate / vijñānaṃ tu na kiñcid rūpe karoti virūpasyaiva jñānakatvāt /	As a matter of fact, the Eye is spoken of as ‘illuminative’ of Colour, because it brings about the Cognition of Colour: As regards Cognition, it does not do anything to the Colour; as what it does bring about is entirely Colourless (formless);

ayam apīti amukhyas tādrūpyād upakalpitaḥ //

‘Even this’ cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.

athāpi syād yathā khaḍgo hasyādikaṃ chinatti yathā vā vahnir dāhyaṃ dahati na caite khāḍgādayo hastyādirūpāḥ tathā jñānamapratipannaviṣayākāramapi viṣayaṃ paricchetsyatīti etat syānmatirityādinā śaṅkate /

The following might be urged: “The sword strikes the Elephant, the Fire burns the inflammable thing; and yet the Sword and the Fire are not of the form of the Elephant and the inflammable thing in the same way the Cognition, though not assuming the form of the Object, would apprehend that object”.

chedadāhādītyetad apekṣya dantidāhyāder iti ṣaṣṭhī /

The genitive ending in ‘dantidāhyādeḥ’ is in connection with ‘cheda-dāhādi’.

ada iti / etajjñānam /

‘This’ i.e. the Cognition.

ādiśabdena pradīpādayo nīlādīnāṃ yathāprakāśakā ityādi gṛhyate //

The term ‘ādi’ includes such other cases as the Lamp illuminating the Blue and other things. The following Text provides the answer to the above: [see verse 2008 next]

tadidam ityādinottaram āha [p.561]

The following Text provides the answer to the above: [see verse 2008 above]

tadidaṃ viṣamaṃ yasmāt te tathotpattihetavaḥ /

The Sword is ‘productive’ of the Elephant, and is, on that account, known as the ‘Cutter’;

khaḍgādayo hi hastyādīnām utpādakāḥ eva santo dāhakāditvena prasiddhās tathā hi khaḍgādidhārābhighāte viśliṣṭasandhayo gajāssumupajāyante tathā vahnisamparkādindhanamaṅgārādirūpam evaṃ ghaṭādayo 'pyalokavaśājjñānajananayogyā bhavanti natvevaṃ jñānena viṣayasya kaścid upakāraḥ kriyate kintuviṣayeṇaiva vijñānaṃ vispaṣṭam upajanyata iti katham akiñcitkaraṃ tasya vedakaṃ bhavet /

what happens is that when the Elephant is struck by the Sword, there is produced an Elephant with sundered limbs; similarly when the Fuel is touched by Fire, it becomes produced as the Live-coal; in the same manner, the Jar and other external things also become capable of producing cognitions, through Light.

naca tat kāryatvam eva tadvedakatvaṃ vijñānasyeti yuktaṃ kalpayituṃ mābhūccakṣurādivedakatvam apyasyeti // bhadantaśubhaguptastvāha vijñānamanāpannaviṣayākāram api viṣayaṃ pratipadyate tat paricchedarūpatvāt tasmānnāśaṅkā kartavyā kathaṃ paricchinatti kiṃvat paricchinattīti /

But even so, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object; on the contrary it is the Object that produces the Cognition in a clear form. When, thus, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object, how could it be its ‘Cogniser’? The mere fact of the Cognition being the product of the Object cannot justify the idea that it is ‘Cognisant’ of that Object; as otherwise, the Cognition might be regarded as ‘Cognisant’ of the Eye and other means of Cognition also.

āha ca

Bhadanta-Śubhagupta has argued as follows:

"kathaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ tac cetat paricchedalakṣaṇam / vijñānaṃ tena nāśaṅkā kathaṃ tatkiṃvadityapi" //

“Even though not assuming the form of the Object, the Cognition does apprehend it, because it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object; hence no question should be raised as to how it apprehends it and like what it apprehends it.

tadatrāha tat paricchedetyādi / tat paricchedarūpatvaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate / jñānarūpaḥ paricchedo yadi grāhyasya sambhavet //

This has been thus asserted ‘If the Cognition does apprehend the Objoct, then it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object, and no question should be raised as to how, and like what, it apprehends it

siddhe hi vyatiriktārthaparicchedātmakatve sati sarvam etat syāt tadeva tu nasiddham /

All this would be true if it were proved that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of something other than itself; as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved.

tathā hi na jñānaṃ sattāmātreṇa paricchinatti sarvaparicchedaprasaṅgāt /

Because the Cognition does not apprehend the Object by its mere existence; if it did so, it would apprehend all things.

nāpi tat kāryatayā cakṣurāder api paricchedāpatteḥ /

Nor does it apprehend the Object, as its product; for, if it did, there would be apprehension of the Eye and other organs also.

naca sākārateṣṭā yena tādrūpyād avibhaktaṃ bhavet tat saṃvedakam /

Nor is Cognition held to be with form, by virtue of which, being similar to the Object, it could not be distinguished from it and thus regarded as ‘cognisant’ of it.

tasmād grāhyasya yaḥ paricchedaḥ sa yati jñānarūpo bhavet evaṃ jñānasyārthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ bhavet /

Thus then, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the nature of Cognition, then the Cognition could be said to be of the nature of the apprehension of the object.

anyathā katham arthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ jñānasyeti spaṣṭam abhidhīyate /

Otherwise, how can it be unequivocally stated that“Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the object”?

tataścārthasya paricchedād vyatirekāt tu jñānātmataiva jāteti siddhā vijñaptimātratā /

In fact, Cognition being something different from the apprehension of the object, it must be of the nature of Cognition itself; and hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone is what exists.

syād etat ko 'pyasya viśeṣo 'sti yenārthameva paricchinatti na{sa---}cedantayā viśeṣaḥ /

The following might be urged: “There must be some peculiarity in the Cognition, whereby it apprehends the Object only; and what this peculiarity is cannot be exactly indicated”.

yadyapyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu sarvam eva nirdeṣṭuṃ na śakyate tathāpyudbhāvanāsaṃvṛttyā kathyata eva /

The answer to this is given in the words ‘It has not been pointed out, etc. etc.’ ‘Bhavati’ has to be supplied. Though every specific entity cannot be indicated, yet by some feat of imagination it is always spoken of somehow.

anyathā hi rūpādīnām api viśeṣo na vaktavyaḥ syāt /

If it were not so, then no peculiarity could be asserted in regard to Colour and other things also.

nacettham anavadhāritena rūpeṇārthasya saṃvedanaṃ jñānam iti vispaṣṭamasaṃśayaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ bhavati /

The mere vague assertion, that ‘Cognition is the apprehension of the object’ does not state anything clearly and unequivocally and with certainty.

tasmādani [p.562] rūpitena rūpeṇa bhāvavyavasthāne suvyavasthitā bhāvā iti yatkiñcid etat //

From this it follows that if the existence of objects were established in this vague indefinite form, the objects would indeed become really well-established!

syād etat paricchedyārthābhāve kasyāsau paricchedo bhaved ity āha paricchedaḥ sa kasyetyādi / paricchedaḥ sa kasyeti naca paryanuyogabhāk /

It might be asked: “If there were no Object to be apprehended, whose apprehension would be there?” Answer: [see verse 2011 above]

ātmaiva hi sa tasya prakāśātmatayā pariccheda ity ucyate /

It is the nature or essence of the Cognition itself that is called ‘apprehension’, by reason of its being of the nature of Light;

yathā sukhādeḥ sātateti nahi sukhasyeti vyatirekanirdeśamātreṇa tato 'nyā sā tathā bhavet /

just as ‘Satisfaction’ is of Pleasure; when one speaks of ‘the satisfaction of Pleasure’, the mere fact of the two being mentioned separately does not make the Satisfaction something different from Pleasure.

tasmād yadyapi nīlasya paricchedaḥ pītasyeti vā vyatirekīva vyapadeśas tathāpi svabhāva eva sa tathā nīlādirūpeṇa prakāśamānatvāt tathocyate svasaṃvedanarūpatvājjñānasya //

Similarly, though there are such expressions as ‘apprehension of Blue’, ‘apprehension of Yellow’, and so forth, where the two appear to be different, yet, it is the very nature of the Cognition that it appears in the form of Blue, etc., and hence it is spoken of in the said manner; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Cognition is by its nature self-cognisant.

atha ko 'yaṃ svasaṃvidartho yadbalāt tathocyata ity āha svarūpetyādi /

Question: “What is this ‘Self-cognition’ that is spoken of?” Answer: [see verse 2012 next]

vyāpṛtam ityādinā svarūpavedanāyānyan na vyapekṣata ityatra kumārilaścodyamāśaṅkate /

[verse 2012]: The following text raises an objection to the statement just made from the view-point of kumārila: [see verse 2013 above]

sa hyāha yadyapi jñānaṃ prakāśātmakaṃ tathāpyātmaprakāśanāya paramapekṣate /

[verse 2013]: This is how Kumārila argues “Though Cognition is of the nature of Light, yet for its own manifestation, it needs something else;

natu svayam ātmānamṛcchati pratipadyate tasyārthaprakāśana eva vyāpṛtatvāt /

and it does not touch apprehend itself; as it is wholly taken up in the manifesting (apprehending) of the object;

nahyekatra vyāpṛtasya tadaparityāgenānyatra tadaiva vyāpāraṇaṃ yuktam //

and when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abandoning the former.” (2013)

atra pradīpaṃ vyabhicaritāmāśaṅkya pakṣāntaram āha īdṛśam ityādi /

[verse 2014]: Anticipating an objection on the basis of the Lamp (which is self-illumined), Kumārila states as follows: [see verse 2014 above]

nanu cāsatyātmaprakāśātmakatve bāhyaprakāśakatvam apyasya kathaṃ vyavasthāpyata ity āha satītyādi /

The question arising ‘If the Cognition is not illuminative of itself, how can it be regarded as illuminative of the external object?’ Kumārila offers the following answer: [see verse 2015 above]

yathā cakṣurādīnāṃ rūpādau viṣaye prakāśakatvavyavasthānam asatyapyātmaprakāśakatve tathātrāpi jñāne bhaviṣyati //

In the case of the Eye and other organs, it is found that their illuminative-ness is restricted to certain definite things, like Colour and the rest, even though the Eye, etc. are not illuminative of themselves; the same would be the case with Cognition also.

[p.563] syād etat kimityātmānam antaraṅgaṃ parityajya bāhyam eva prakāśayatītyāha prakāśakatvam ityādi /

The following might be urged (against Kumārila): ‘How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?’

prakāśakatvaṃ bāhyo 'rthaṃ śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani /

Question: ‘Why should the Cognition not have the potency to illuminate itself?’

śaktiś ca sarvabhāvānāṃ naivam paryanuyujyate //

Answer: The potency of things cannot be complained of’;

yathā ---" agnirdahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām" iti //

as has been thus declared ‘It is fire alone that burns, not Ākāśa, who is to be complained against for this?’ (2016)

nanu cārthasya saṃvittir jñānamevābhidhīyate / tasyāṃ tadātmabhūtāyāṃ ko vyāpāro 'paro bhavet //

The following might be urged (against Kumārila): ‘How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?’

yaduktaṃ vyāpṛtaṃ hyarthavittāviti tadasaṃgatam nahyarthavittir anyā jñānāt /

It has been asserted (under Text 2013) that “while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself This is irrelevant.

tathā hi vittirupalabdhir arthapratītir vijñaptir iti jñānam evaitaiḥ paryāyair abhidhīyate /

For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as ‘vitti’ (apprehension), ‘upalabdhi’ (comprehension), ‘arthapratiti’ (objective consciousness), and ‘vijñapti’ (ideation).

tasyāṃ cārthavittau tadātmabhūtāyām jñānātmabhūtāyāṃ kīdṛśo 'paro jñānasyārthasaṃvedanātmako vyāpāro bhaved ātmyavyatirikto yenārthavittauvyāpṛtam iti bhavet / na cātmanyeva vyāpṛtir yuktā //

When, then, this ‘apprehending of the object’ forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other ‘functioning’, in the shape of the ‘apprehending of the object’ could the Cognition have, apart from itself, by virtue of which it could be said that ‘the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object’? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.

syād etajjñānātmatvam evārthavitteḥ kathaṃ siddhaṃ yena paryāyatā jñānārthasaṃvittyor ity āha arthasyānubhavo rūpam ityādi /

The following question might be raised “How is it known that the ‘apprehending of the object’ is of the nature of Cognition, on account of which ‘Cognition’ and ‘apprehending of the object’ are regarded as synonymous?”

arthasyānubhavo 'vaśyaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ /

‘Apprehension’ must be regarded as of the nature form of the Object;

anyathā kathaṃ tatra jñānaṃ vyāpriyeta / nahyasati śaśaviṣāṇādau kasyacid vyāpāraṇaṃ yuktam / tataś ca tadarthānubhavātmakaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yadi jñānādavyatiriktaṃ bhavet tadā jñāne 'rthānubhavātmakatvaṃ yad taduktam īdṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃtasyārthānubhavātmakam iti tadyuktaṃ syāt /

otherwise, how could the Cognition operate over it? There can be no operation of anything upon what does not exist e.g. the ‘Hares’ Horn Consequently if the said ‘nature’ of the Object in the form of Apprehension were not-different from Cognition, then alone could it be correct to regard the Cognition as being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects, as has been declared (by the Opponent) in the sentence “the illuminativeness of the Cognition consists in its being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects” (Text 2014).

kadācinnirbadhyamāno 'rthānubhavād avyatiriktaṃ jñānam abhyupagacched api para ity āha nacāsti taditi /

On being pressed hard, the Opponent might admit the non-difference of Cognition from the Apprehension of Objects; hence it is added ‘But it cannot be-so under your view’;

tat jñānād avyatiriktatvam anubhavasya /

‘it’ stands for the idea of the Apprehension being non-different from Cognition.

jñānasyārthānubhavāvyatirekābhyupagame svasaṃvittipra [p.564] saṅgāt / syād etannārthānubhavātmatvājjñānasya prakāśakatvam iṣṭam kiṃ tarhi/

That is, if it be admitted that the Cognition is not different from the Apprehension of Objects, it would mean that Cognition is self-cognised. The following might be urged: “When we speak of Cognition as ‘illuminative’, we do not mean that it is so because it is of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects;

anubhavātmatvād eva kevalādityāha tasya tu svata ityādi / tasya jñānasya /

but only that it is of the nature of Apprehension, pure and simple”. The answer to this is ‘Even when, etc. etc.’ ‘Tasya’ stands for the Cognition.

yadyapyanubhavātmakatvam eva kevalaṃ jātaṃ nārthānubhavātmatvaṃ tathā{ca} nīlasyeyaṃ saṃvittir na pītasyetyādibhedenārthasaṃvittir na siddhyet //

Even though. Cognition has now come to be of the nature of mere Apprehension, not of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects, even so there could be no distinct Apprehension of Objects, such as ‘this is the apprehension of Blue, not of Yellow (2018-2019)

kimiti na siddhyed ity āha nahi tatretyādi /

Question: “Why should not there be such apprehension?” Answer: [see verse 2020 next]

parasyeti anākārajñānavādinaḥ /

‘For the other party’, one who holds the view that Cognition is form-less;

prakṛtyā jaḍarūpatvānnāsyātmānubhavo yadi /

whose opinion is that “it is the external Object that has form, the Cognition, is formless”.

jñānasaṃvedanābhāvāt parārthānubhavas tadā{tha---} //

It has been assorted (under Text 2014) that “the illuminativeness of Cognition consists in its being of the nature of Apprehension”.

yadi vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpatayātmānaṃ na saṃvedayate tadā tasya svato 'pratyakṣatve 'rthānubhavo 'pyapratyakṣatayā na{ei---}ṣṭaḥ syāt //

If Cognition, being unconscious, does not apprehend itself, then the Cognition itself being imperceptible, the apprehension of the Object also would have to be regarded as imperceptible.

syād etadyadi nāma jñānamapratyakṣam arthānubhavo 'pi kimityapratyakṣo bhavet / nahi rūpasyāpratyakṣatve śabdasyāpyapratyakṣatā syād ity āha arthasyānubhavo nāmetyādi /

The following might be urged “If the Cognition is not perceptible, why should the apprehension of the Object also cease to be perceptible? Certainly the imperceptibility of Colour does not make Sound also imperceptible”.

na hi jñānasyānyadrūpaṃ nirddhārayāmo 'nyatrārthānubhavāt /

We cannot find any other form (or character) of the Cognition, apart from Apprehension.

anirddhārayantaḥ svavācamanyatvaṃ {svabhāvamanyaṃ taṃ---} niścayaṃ vyavaharantaḥ svaparānu{n---}vipralabhemahi /

And so long as we cannot find any such, if we were to carry on any business, we would be deceiving ourselves and also others.

tasya jñānasyāprasiddharūpatve sati prasiddhis tasyārthānubhavasya kā parā bhavet naiva kācit //

If the Cognition is uncognised, what other cognition could there be of the apprehension of the object? None whatsoever.

athāpi syājjñānāntareṇa tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatītyāha jñānāntareṇetyādi / jñānāntareṇānubhave so 'rthaḥ svānubhave sati / pra{a---}siddhaḥ siddhyasaṃsiddheḥ kadā siddho bhavet punaḥ // tajjñānajñānajātau ced asiddhaḥ svātmasaṃvidi /

If the apprehension of the object were apprehended by another cognition, then it would mean that at the time that the object is apprehended, it is not cognised; because its cognition has not yet come about: and if that is so, then when again would it become cognised? If it be held that “it would become cognised when its cognition becomes cognised”, then it would mean that the object which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension, becomes cognised on the apprehension of something else.

parasaṃvidi siddhas tu sa ityetat subhāṣitam //

This indeed would be an extremely wise assertion! (2023-2024) It might be held that there would be apprehension of it by another Cognition.

[p.565] siddheḥ jñānasya asiddheḥ /

‘Siādhyasamsiddheḥ’ on account of its cognition not having come about.

pra{a---}siddhavyaktikaṃ vyaktam iti {na} yujyate /

It cannot be right that the thing whose appearance has not become cognised should be regarded as apparent.

tathā hi na tāvadarthasya svānubhavakāle 'pi siddhis tadabhivyaktisvabhāvasyānubhavasya tadānīm asiddhatvāt kadā tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatīti vaktavyam /

That is to say, even at the time that the Object is apprehended, there is no cognition of it; because the apprehension consisting of the manifestation of the Object has not yet been cognised; under the circumstances, it behoves you to explain at what time it would become cognised.

tajjñānajñānajātau arthajñānajñānotpattikāle siddhir bhaviṣyatīti cet / etad atisubhāṣitam /

If it be held that ‘it would become cognised, etc. etc.’; i.e. it would become cognised at the time of the appearance of the Cognition of its cogni -tion, this indeed would be a very clever assertion!

yo hi nāma svānubhavakāle na siddhaḥ sa kathamasvā{nya---}nubhavakāle setsyatīti //

How can a thing which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension become cognised at the time of the cognition of something else? (2023-2024)

tasyāpyanubhave{ 'siddhe} prathamasyāpyasiddhatā /

If the said cognition of the apprehension is not cognised, then the preceding one remains uncognised.

tatrānyasaṃvidutpattāvanavasthā prasajyate //

If of that also, yet another cognition were postulated, then there would be an infinite regress.

tasyeti dvitīyasyārthajñānajñānasya /

‘Tasya’ stands for the second cognition of the apprehension of the Object,.

prathamasyeti arthānubhavasya /

‘Preceding one’ i.e. the apprehension of the Object.

{a}siddhateti nāsya siddhirastītyasiddhas tadbhāvo 'siddhatā //

And if there is cognition of another object, the last of the series of cognitions could not be cognised by any other cognition;

kiṃ ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrāpi jñānāntare smṛtirutpadyata eva jñānajñānaṃ mamotpannam iti tasyāpyapareṇānubhavo vaktavyaḥ nahyananubhūte smṛtir yuktā tataścemā jñānamālāḥ ko 'nanyakarmā janayatīti vaktavyam /

Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition, then in connection with this latter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form ‘I have had the Cognition of the Cognition’; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be postulated another apprehension; as without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions.

na tāvad arthas tasya mūlajñānaviṣayatvāt /

It cannot be the Object that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.

nāpīndriyālokau tayoścakṣur jñāna evopayogāt / nāpi nirnimittā sadā sattvādiprasaṅgāt /

Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could be effective only in the case of Visual Perception. Nor can the said string of Cognitions be regarded as without cause.

saiva pūrvadhīruttarottarāṃ buddhiṃ janayatīti cedāha gocarāntaretyādi /

It might be said that “it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one after the other”.

na siddhyet tasya cāsiddhau sarveṣām apy asiddhatā /

In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness).

jñānatvād anyathā naiṣāṃ jñānatvaṃ syād ghaṭādivat //

Because, each succeeding Cognition would be the Object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause;

evaṃ hi viṣayāntarasañcāro na prāpnoti tathā hi pūrvapūrvā buddhiruttarottarasya jñānasya viṣayabhāvenāvathitā pratyāsannā copādānakāraṇatayātāṃ tādṛśīmantaraṅgikāṃ tyaktvā kathaṃ ca bahiraṅgamarthaṃ gṛhṇīyāt /

and so long as it had such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objective? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not simply because it is external, prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition.

atha bahiraṅgo 'pi san pratibadhnīyāt tadā na kadācit kaścid dru{dbu} buddhim anubhavet /

If, even though external, the Object could prevent the Cognition of the Cognition, then no one could never apprehend any Cognition at all.

tathā hi na kācid avasthāsti yasyāmartho na sannihita iti /

Because there is no point of time when an external Object is not present.

smṛtir apy ucchinnā syād anubhavābhāvāt /

Remembrance also would become rooted out; because there would be no Apprehension that could bring about Remembrance.

kiṃ ca ye 'tītā divikalpā viṣayasannidhānam antareṇa bhavanti, teṣāṃ sañcārakāraṇābhāvād vikalpaparamparāyām asaṃsāramavasthānān na kasyacid arthacintā syāt /

Further, for the appearance of the conceptions of ‘Past’ and the rest, which appear when the Object concerned is not there, there would be no cause; so that the series of conceptions would continue there as long as the world lasts;

bhavatu nāmārthāntarasañcāro 'nupapadyamāno 'pi /

and no one would have any anxiety for anything at all.

tathāpi yat tadanyajjñānaṃ tat kenānubhūyeteti vaktavyam / atha syāt saivottara buddhir arthāntaragrāhiṇī pūrvā dhiyam arthaṃ cobhayam api gṛhṇātīti tadetad asamyak /

Granting the presence of other objects, even though it is not possible, even so, it behoves you to explain by what the other (second) Cognition is cognised. It might be said that “that same succeeding Cognition, while apprehending another Object, would apprehend both, this Object as well as the preceding Cognition

tathā hi yadā śabdajñānād anantaraṃ rūpagrāhi jñānaṃ bhavati tadā tasmin rūpagrāhiṇi jñāne śabdajñānasya pratibhāsāt tadā rūḍhasyāpi śabdasya pratibhāsaḥ prāpnoti /

Because, when after the Cognition of Sound, there follows the Cognition of Colour, the Cognition of Sound would figure in the later Cognition of Colour, and hence there should be Cognition of Sound also which would be figuring in its own Cognition. Even for one who regards Cognition as formless, unless there is apprehension of Sound, there can be no apprehension of what apprehends the Sound;

yasyāpi nirākārajñānaṃ tasyāpi na śabdagrahaṇamantareṇa tadgrāhakasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam nahi daṇḍagrahaṇam antareṇa tadgrāhakasya daṇḍino grahaṇaṃ nyāyyam iti rūpagrāhiṇi cakṣurjñāne śabdasyāpi pratibhāsaḥ syāt /

e.g. unless there is apprehension of the stick, there can be no apprehension of the Holder of the Stick. Thus Sound also would figure in the Visual Cognition of Colour.

tathā cintājñānepyakārādiviṣayiṇi yathoktanītyābhilāpadvayamekasminnu{kta}krameṇa syāt /

Similarly on the said principle, in the Cognition of Cogitation also in regard to such objects as the letter ‘A’ and the like, there would always be two verbal expressions one after the other.

tathā hi yadekāracintāsamanantaramakāraṃ cintayati tadā tadakāracintājñānamikāragrāhakam api cintayatīti svajñānsamārūḍhasyekārābhilāpasyākārābhilāpini jñāne pratibhāsaḥ prāpnoti /

For instance, when after the Cogitation over the letter ‘Ī’, one Cogitates over the letter ‘A’, then, the Cogitation of the letter ‘A’ should apprehend the apprehender of the letter ‘Ī’ also; consequently the verbal expression relating to the letter ‘Ī’ as figuring in its own Cognition, should appear in the Cognition of the letter ‘A’.

kiṃ ca sarvam eva vastu vāradvaya pratibhāseta svajñānakāle 'vabhāsanāt /

Further, under this view, everything would appear in Consciousness twice over; because it must so appear at the time of its own Cognition also.

na caivaṃ pratibhāso 'stītyayuktam uktyā buddhyā dvayor grahaṇam /

But as a matter of fact, there is no such double appearance of Objects. For these reasons, it is not right to say that the succeeding Cognition apprehends both (the preceding Cognition and also the Object).

athāpi syād ekam antyaṃ jñānam ananubhūtamasmṛtaṃ cāstāṃ ko doṣaḥ syād ity āha gocarāntarasañcāra iti /

It might be urged “The one final Cognition might remain unapprehended and unremembered; where would be the harm?”

svasaṃvitter anabhyupagamān na svataḥ siddhatā.{nā}pi parataḥ anavasthādoṣāt tasyāntasyāsiddhau satyāṃ pūrvakasyāpyasiddhiḥ apratyakṣopalambhakatvāt tataścārthasyāpyasiddhir iti na kadācit kiñcid upalabhyeta /

The answer to this is ‘If there is Cognition of another Object, etc. etc.’ Self-Cognition being not accepted by the other party, the last Cognition cannot be regarded as ‘self-cognised’; nor can it be cognised by anything else; as in that case there would be an infinite regress. Thus the final Cognition being uncognised, the Cognition preceding it must remain uncognised, as it would apprehend something that is not perceptible;

tataścāndhyamāyātamaśeṣasya jagataḥ /

which means that the entire world becomes blind.

athāntasya yathoktadoṣabhayāt svasaṃvittyā svata eva siddhir abhyupagamyate tadā tadvadeva sarvasya jñānatvāviśeṣāt svasaṃvidas tu /

If, in order to avoid the said difficulty, it be admitted that the final Cognition of the series is cognised by itselfthen the entire lot of Cognitions might bo self-cognised; as all are equally ‘Cognition’,

prayogaḥ yajjñānaṃ tadātmabodhaṃ pratyanapekṣitānyavyāpāraṃ jñānatvāt antyajñānavat jñānaṃ ca vivādāspadībhūtaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

This argument may be formulated as follows: Every Cognition, for its own Cognition, does not depend upon the operation of anything else, because it is Cognition, like the final Cognition of the series, the Cognition under dispute is a Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

anyathā hi yatsvato na siddhas tasya ghaṭādivajjaḍarūpatayā jñānatvam eva hīyeteti bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //

If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, like the Jar and other things; and hence it would lose the character of ‘Cognition’. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary.

vijñānaṃ janayad rūpe cakṣus tasya prakāśakam / natu tasyāvabodhatvāt tajjñānenāsya kopamā //

The eye is regarded as ‘illuminative’ of colour, because it brings about the cognition of colour, not because it is its apprehension; what similarity then can the eye have to cognition? (2029)

[p.567] rūpaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ janayaccakṣū rūpasya prakāśakam ucyate / vijñānaṃ tu na kiñcid rūpe karoti virūpasyaiva jñānakatvāt /

As a matter of fact, the Eye is spoken of as ‘illuminative’ of Colour, because it brings about the Cognition of Colour: As regards Cognition, it does not do anything to the Colour; as what it does bring about is entirely Colourless (formless);