buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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śabdādipadārthavat /	i.e. like such things as sound and the like.
etad uktaṃ bhavati mukhādigrāhakaṃ tajjñānaṃ syāt tadā yathaiva tanmukhādi vyavasthitaṃ tathaiva gṛhṇīyāt nahyanyākārasya jñānasyānyad grāhyaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	What is meant is as follows; If the Cognition were the Apprehender of the face, then it should have apprehended it exactly as the face itself actually stands; because it cannot be right for the Apprehender of one form to apprehend a thing of another form. If this were possible, then there would be incongruities.
yāvatā dakṣiṇābhimukhasthito darpaṇatalaṃ nibhālayannuttarābhimukhaṃ svamukhaṃ paśyati /	As a matter of fact, when a man facing the South looks at the mirror, what he perceives in the mirror is the face facing the North;
tathālpīyasi darpaṇatale mahato 'pi svamukhasyālpapratibimbakamupalabhyate tathā darpaṇatalasambaddhaṃ dūrādhaḥpraviṣṭamivekṣyate /	similarly, if the mirror is a small one, the face that he sees in the reflection is smaller than his own face; and it is also perceived as touching the mirror’s surface and lying far beneath it.
naca tāvad bahalaṃ tathādarśatalaṃ nāpi sukhādi tat sambaddham /	In reality however, the mirror’s surface is not of that size, nor is it really in contact with the real face.
tathā vimalasalile sarasi taṭāntasthitaśākhiśikhariṇāṃ pratibimbānyadhogataśākhādiśikharaśekharāṇyupalabhyante naca te tathāsthitāḥ /	Similarly when a man is standing on the bank of a lake of clear water, and looks at the water-surface, he perceives the reflections of the trees standing on the brink of the water, with their tops pointing downwards; and yet they are not really in that condition.
tasmāt pratibimbajñānaṃ svamukhādigrāhakaṃ tadvilakṣaṇapratibhāsitvāt śabdajñānavat //	From all this we conclude that the Cognition of the Reflection does not apprehend the man’s own face, because what it envisages is something different from the face, like the Cognition of sound.
dhīmātratvena saṃsādhye yajjñānatvādisādhanam / vijātīyāviruddhatvāt sarvaṃ śeṣavad ucyate //	‘Being cognition’ is ‘luminousness’; and that can have no place in the ‘apprehended object’, because it has no connection with the characters of ‘not envisaging a form’ and the rest;
anirbhāsādyayogena vyāptis tenāsya niścitā //	hence its invariable concomitance has been duly ascertained.
śaktāvanantare jñāne grāhyāṃśe viṣayasthitiḥ / tātvikī neṣyate 'smābhis tena mānaṃ samarthyate //	The subsistence of the object in the apprehended aspect of the potency of the immediately following cognition is not regarded by us to be real. that is why the idea is supported.
vijñaptimātratāsiddhir dhīmadbhir vimalīkṛtā /	The fact of the cognition being the only entity has been clearly established by clever writers.
asmābhis taddiśā yātaṃ paramārthaviniścaye //	we also have trodden the same path for the ascertainment of truth. [verse 2082]:
pūrvam eva hi anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam ityādinā vyāpteḥ prasādhitatvāt nānaikāntiko hetuḥ /	The requisite invariable concomitance has already been established under Text 1999 above ‘Not envisaging a form, or envisaging a form or envisaging something else, the Cognition cannot apprehend any external thing’. Consequently, the Reason put forward here cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.
ācāryadignāgapādair ālambanapratyayavyavasthārtham uktam yadantarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvadavabhāsate / so 'rtho jñānarūpatvāt tat pratyayatayāpi ca //	The Revered Teacher Diṅnāga, for the purpose of determining the ‘basic cause’, has declared as follows: ‘When that which is cognisable only in the internal (subjective) form appears as if it were external, that object must be regarded as existing in the form of the Cognition, and also as forming its basic cause’.
anena hi grāhyāṃśe viṣayavyavasthā pratipāditā /	This serves to determine the objective element in that aspect of the Cognition which is apprehended.
punar apyuktam athavā śaktyarpaṇāt krameṇāpi so 'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṃ vijñānācārāṃ karotītyavirodha iti /	The same Teacher has said again ‘Or, it may be that by transferring the potency, the apprehension of the Object, in due course, brings about, for the bringing about of an effect similar to itself, a potency in the Cognition;
anenānantarajñāne svānurūpakāryotpattinimittaśaktisamarpaṇāt kāraṇatvaṃ ca tasya pratibhāsasya samarthitam /	This establishes the fact that the said Apprehension (of the Object) transfers to the immediately subsequent Cognition, the potency tending to produce an effect similar to itself, and thus becomes the cause.
atra tenaiva bhadantena dūṣaṇam uktam yadyapīndriyavijñapter grāhyāṃśaḥ karaṇaṃ bhavet / atadābhatayā tasyā nākṣavad viṣayaḥ sa tu //	In connection with this, the same Bhadanta (Śubhagupta) argues as follows: “Though the apprehended element may be the instrument of Sense-cognition, yet, inasmuch as that cannot figure in the Cognition itself, it could not be the object of the Sense-cognition”.
ityādinā / atrāha śaktāvityādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2083-2084 above]
anantare jñāna iti /	‘Śaktau anantare jñāne’;
samanantarapratyaye ālayākhye yā śaktistathāvidhārthapratibhāsapratyayasamarthitā /	‘Immediately following Cognition’, in the form of the ‘Ālayavijñāna’ (Recumbent Cognition). ‘Potency’, of forming the basic cause of the said idea of the object.
tātvikī neṣyata iti /	‘Is not held to be real’;
yataḥ paramāṇvāder vyatiriktasyālambanatvaṃ na yujyata iti vistareṇa pratipādyācāryeṇa mābhūt sarvathālambanapratiṣedhe pratītibādhā tathā ālambanādhipatisamanantarahetupratyayatvalakṣaṇāś catasraḥ pratyayitā iti sūtre vacanād abhyupetabādhāpīti avirodhapratipādanāya yathāvidha ālambanapratyayo 'bhipretaḥ sūtre loke ca tathā pratipāditaṃ saṃvṛttyā /	because it is not possible for anything apart from Atoms, etc. to be the objective basis, as has been established in detail. This has also been asserted by the Revered Teacher, in the following words: ‘The absolute denial of the objective basis may involve incompatibility with a fact of direct experience; and there may be incompatibility with the doctrine enunciated in the Sūtra’ ‘There are four kinds of causal factors basic, dominant, immediate antecedent and causal link’; in order to show that there is no incompatibility, it has been explained what sort of Basic Cause is meant in this Sūtra and also in ordinary experience. But all this has been done on the plane of ‘Illusion’, not of Reality;
na paramārthataḥ /	so there is no incompatibility’.
paramārthatastu nirālambanāḥ sarva eva pratyayā iti //	as in reality all Cognitions are entirely devoid of objective basis.
KAPITEL ---RUTIPARIIK.SAA	End of Chapter on the External World.
[p.583] svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅga ityetat samarthanārtham āha anya ityādi / anye punar ihājñānamalīmasadhiyo jaguḥ /	Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows: “It is not right that all this is mere idea (or cognition); because this is set aside by the revealed word”.
cittamātratayā nāyaṃ yujyate śrutibādhanāt //	In the Introductory verses the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been described as ‘not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation’;
anya iti jaiminīyāḥ.	‘Other people’ the followers of Jaimini.
ta evam āhuḥ codanaiva dharmādharmādivyavasthānibandhanam ālokabhūtā sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ sādhāraṇaṃ cakṣur iva vyavasthitā.	These people argue as follows: “Injunction alone is the basis for determining Dharma (what one should do) and Adharma (what one should not do), the only light available for all beings, being like the common ‘Eye’ of all.
avaśyaṃ saiva dharmārthibhiḥ puruṣaiḥ prekṣāvadbhiḥ pramāṇatvenāśrayaṇīyā nānyatpuruṣapraṇītavacanādikam.	It must be accepted as authoritative and reliable by all intelligent men seeking to know their Duty (Dharma); not so other words composed by human beings.
tathā hi puruṣasya rāgādibhir avidyayā ca parītacetaso vacanaṃ nālamatīndriyam arthamaviparītamavagamayitum.	Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest;
atas tadvacanasamadhigamyo na dharmādiḥ.	hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things;
nāpyarvāgdarśinaḥ pratyakṣasamadhigamyaḥ, tasyātīndriyatvenātyantaparokṣatvāt.	Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond ‘the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible.
tathā hi iṣṭāniṣṭārthasādhanayogyatālakṣaṇau dharmādharmau.	“For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively);
yathoktaṃ śābare bhāṣye ya eva śreyaskaraḥ sa eva dharmaśabdenocyate.	as has been asserted in Śabara’s Bhāṣya ‘That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;
katham avagamyateyo yāgam anutiṣṭhati, taṃ janā dhārmikā iti samācakśate.	how.do you know that? when a man performs a sacrifice, people call him dhārmika, firm in the performance of his duty;
yaś ca yasya karttā, sa tenākhyāyate, yathā pācako lāvaka iti. tena yaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti, sa eva dharmaśabdenocyata iti.	and it is only when one does something that he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the cooking is called the Cook, and one who does the chopping is called the Chopper; in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good
tad anena dravyādīnām iṣṭārthasādhanayogyatā dharma iti pratipāditaṃ bhavati /	“What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good.
tathā hi yāgaśabdena dravyaguṇakarmāṇi śreyasaḥ sādhanāni viśiṣṭāny ucyante /	For instance, Substance, Quality and Action are spoken of as particular means of accomplishing the Good;
tatra ca dharmaśabdapravṛttir darśitā /	and it is shown that the name ‘Dharma’ is applicable to these.
yady api tāni dravyādīni pratyakṣāṇi svarūpato, na ca śreyaḥsādhanatvena, tādrūpyeṇa ca teṣāṃ dharmatvam iṣyate na svarūpamātreṇa /	These, Substance and the rest, are perceptible, in their own forms, but not as the means of accomplishing the good; and it is in this latter form that they are held to be ‘dharma’, not merely in their own forms.
yathoktam śreyo hi puruṣaprītiḥ sā dravyaguṇakarmabhiḥ /	This has been thus asserted ‘The Good consists in the happiness of the man, and this happiness is brought about by Substance, Quality and Action as indicated in the Injunction;
codanālakṣaṇaiḥ sādhyā tasmād eṣveva dharmatā //	hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs;
eṣām aindriyakatve 'pi na tādrūpyeṇa dharmatā /	even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma.
śreyaḥ sādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate //	The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda;
tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmād nendriyagocaraḥ /	and it is in this form that these are Dharma; hence Dharma is not amenable to the Senses’.
iti.	[Vide Ślokavārtika, Sū.
tādrūpyeṇa ceti / śreyaḥsādhanarūpeṇa /	2, 191, and 13-14.] ‘In that form’, as being the means of bringing about the Good.
tasmād yogyatā dharma iti sthitam /	Thus it is established that Dharma is a capacity or Potency.
dharmavaiparītyenādharmo 'pi sāmarthyād aniṣṭārthasādhanayogyateti spaṣṭam avasīyate /	“From this it is also clearly understood, by implication, that Adharma also, as contrary to Dharma, is a Potency or capacity to bring about what is not-Good.
naca yogyatāmarvāg darśanaḥ pratyakṣīkartumīśaḥ /	“This capacity or Potency a man with limited powers of vision cannot perceive directly by the Senses;
tasyāḥ sadaiva kāryānumeyatvāt /	because capacity is always inferred from its effects;
yadāha ---"śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpatīsādhanā" iti/	as has been declared in the passage ‘The Potencies of all things are always proved by Presumption from these effects’. (Ślokavārtika, Sū.
anyathā hyarvāgdarśanatvam eva hīyate /	2, 200.) If it were not so, then the character of ‘having limited powers of vision’ would disappear.
nāpi yogipratyakṣamatīndriyaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣatvād itarapratyakṣavat /	Nor can the Perception of mystics apprehend supersensuous things, simply because they are Perception, like any other Perception.
nāpy anumānaṃ dharmādharmādhigamāya yuktam, pratītasambandhasyaiva vatsunastena paricchedāt /	“Nor can Inference be of use in knowing what is Dharma; because Inference can envisage only such a thing as has had its relation with something else already known;
dharmasya cātathābhūtatvāt /	and Dharma is not such a thing.
nāpyupamānaṃ samarthaṃ dharmapratyāyane, tathā hyupamānaṃ sādṛśya [p.584] masannikṛṣṭe buddhimutpādayati /	“Nor can Analogy bring about the knowledge of Dharma; because Analogy consists in similitude and brings about the cognition of a thing not before the Eyes;
yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasya, naca dharmeṇa sadṛśaḥ karścit pratītaḥ sambhavati / yat sādṛśyāt tasyāvakalpanā bhavet /	e.g. the seeing of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow; and there can be nothing which is known to be similar to Dharma, which similarity could bring about the cognition of this Dharma.
nāpyarthāpattiḥ kṣamā dharmādharmāvabodhane /	“Nor is Presumption capable of bringing about the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma.
tathā hi dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārthonyathā nopapadyata ityadṛṣṭārthakalpanārthāpattiḥ /	Because Presumption consists in the assuming of something not perceived, on the ground that something else, which has been perceived or heard of, would not be possible or explicable without the said assumption.
naca dharmeṇa vinā kaścid artho nopapadyate, yato 'sya kalpanā bhaviṣyati /	Dharma is not something without which something else would not be explicable or possible, whereupon its Presumption could be based.
abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstītyasyārthasya prasiddhaye prabhavati, na vidhau /	“Non-apprehension also, which consists in the absence of all Means of Cognition, serves to bring about the idea of this is not, and not any positive idea.
tasmād abhāvakrasthau dharmādharmau yadi codanā na śaknuyād uddhartuṃ tenaiva grastau syātām iti codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmādir nendriyādilakṣaṇaḥ /	“Thus then, Dharma and Adharma would fall within the jaws of this Non-apprehension and would be swallowed by it, if the Vedic Injunction were not there to save them. Hence Dharma must be regarded as ‘that which is indicated by the Injunctive Word as conducive to welfare’, and it cannot be anything that is indicated by the Senses or other Means of Cognition.
codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam ityevaṃjātīyakam arthaṃ śakto 'bhyavagamayituṃ nānyat kiñcanendriyam /	“As a matter of fact, it is the Injunction that is capable of providing knowledge of what is past, present or future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any Sense-organ.
ato 'vaśyaṃ codanā pramāṇayitavyā /	(Śabara-bhāṣya 1.1.2) For these reasons the Injunction must he regarded as authoritative and reliable.
codaneti ca kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ nivartakaṃ ca vākyam āhuḥ / tathā svargakāmo 'gniṣṭomena yajeneti pravartakam, na hiṃsyād bhūtānīti nivartakam /	“The name ‘Injunction’ is applied to words that urge to activity or to avoidance of activity, e.g. the words ‘Desiring Heaven, she should perform the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice’ urge one to activity; and the words ‘One should not injure living beings’ urge one to desist from activity.
tasyāś ca prāmāṇyopāyaṃ bhavatāṃ yajeneti traidhātukam iti pratijñārthaḥ /	“For you (Buddhists) the only means of establishing the authoritative and reliable character of the Injunction consists in mere Ideation with the ‘Three Principles’;
sa na yujyate /	And this view is not correct.
kutaḥ śrutibādhanāt /	Why? Because it is set aside by the Revealed Word;
śrutyā vedena bādhanāt / cittavyatiriktāgnihotrādiprakāśanāt /	that is, it is negatived by the Veda, which has spoken of Agnihotra and other things which are quite distinct from ‘Cognition’ (Idea);
svayaṃ ca cittavyatirekeṇāvasthānāt /	in fact, the Veda itself stands apart from ‘Idea’.
cittamātratayetyupalakṣaṇam /	“The mention of ‘mere Ideation’ is only by way of illustration.
tathā kṣaṇikatvanairātmyasarvajñavairāgyādipratijñāpi bādhyata eva / tadviruddhārthaparidīpanenāvasthānāt //	There are other propositions of the Buddhist which are set aside by the Veda, such as ‘All things are momentary’, ‘There is no Soul’, ‘There has been an Omniscient Person’, ‘There should be freedom from attachment’ and so forth.
syād etat bādhyeta sarvam etat, yadi tasyāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ siddhaṃ bhavatītyāha sā hi pramāṇam iti /	All these words express ideas that are contrary to what is said in the Veda.” (2085) It might be urged against the above Mīmāṃsaka view that all this would be set aside by the Veda only if its authoritative character were established.
sā hi pramāṇaṃ sarveṣāṃ narākṛtatayā sthitā / vaitathyaṃ pratipadyante pauruṣeyyo giro yataḥ // avitathaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ taddhetutvāt sāpi pramāṇam ucyate /	Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows: “It is not right that all this is mere idea (or cognition); because this is set aside by the revealed word”. In the Introductory verses the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been described as ‘not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation’;
katham ity āha narākṛtatayeti /	not so other words composed by human beings.
apauruṣeyatvāt / anenāvitathajñānahetutvaṃ vaitathyakāraṇarāgādidoṣagaṇābhāvena pratipādayati /	Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest; hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things;
prayogaḥ yan mithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitaṃ tadavitathajñānakāraṇaṃ, yathā timirādidoṣānupaplutaṃ cakṣuḥ, mithyātvaheturāgādidoṣasaṃsargarahitaścāpauruṣeyatvād veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond ‘the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible. “For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively); as has been asserted in Śabara’s Bhāṣya ‘That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;
vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntenānaikāntikatāṃ pariharannāha vaitathyam iti /	in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good
anena hi sādhanābhāvena sādhyābhāvasya vyāptimādarśayati /	“What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good.
tathā hi doṣā mithyātvahetavaḥ yatraiva sannidadhati tatraiva svakāryamithyātvam upasthāpayati, nānyatra /	hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs; even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma. The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda;
kāraṇamantareṇakāryasyāsambhayāt/	‘Why?’ Because it is not the work of a human being;
sambhave vā`hetukatvaprasaṅgāt/	hence this is a Reason (for Reliability) based upon the nature of the thing concerned.
nāpi tamantareṇabhavatastatkāryatvaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgādityato mithyātvadoṣayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapattirahetuka [p.585] tvaprasaṅgasya mithyātvasyeti viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nānaikāntikatā /	and what would come about without the cause would not be regarded as the effect of that cause; as that would lead to absurdity. Thus, the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect between Defects and Falsity, and the contingency of falsity being without cause, constitute the ‘Reason’ setting aside any conclusion contrary to the one set forth above. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.
prayogaḥ yatra hi yat kāraṇaṃ nāsti tattatra na bhavati, yathā{pa} yasyavidyamānakāraṇo dhūmaḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows: Where the Cause of a thing does not exist, the Effect cannot appear, e.g. Smoke does not appear in water, where its cause, Fire, is absent;
nāsti ca vaitathyahetumohādidoṣagaṇaḥ śrutāviti kāraṇānupalabdhiḥ //	in the case of the Veda, the Cause of falsity in the shape of the presence of Love, Hate, etc. is not present;
nāpyasiddhateti pratipādayann āha doṣāḥ santītyādi /	hence its Effect, Falsity cannot be there.
doṣāḥ santi na santīti puṃvācyeṣu hi śaṅkyate /	“In the case of the assertion of human beings, it is always open to doubt whether or not there are defects (in the speaker);
śrutau karturabhāvān nu doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ //	in the case of the revealed word, however, as there is no speaker, we can have no suspicion of there being any defects.” (2087)
doṣā hi puruṣāśritās taddharmatvāt, tat kathaṃ te svāśrayamantareṇa bhaveyuḥ sambhave vānāśritatvaprasaṅgāt /	As a matter of fact, Defects reside in human beings only, as they are their property; how then could they be there where their substratum is absent? If they could be there, they would be there without a substratum (baseless);
eṣa hyāśritadharmo yadāśrayānuvidhāyitvam /	in fact it is the very nature of the subsistent thing that it should follow in the wake of its substratum;
doṣāśrayaś ca puruṣaḥ kartā, sa ca nivṛttau veda iti kuto doṣāśaṅkā /	and Man the doer, the compiler, the speaker is the substratum of Defects; and any such author is not there in the case of the Veda;
syād etat doṣāśrayasya karturabhāvo 'pi kathaṃ siddha ityatas tadabhāvas tadgrāhakapramāṇapañcakanivṛttyā pratipādayati kartā tāvad ityādi /	whence then could there be any suspicion of there being Defects? This same argument has set aside also the charge of the Reason being ‘doubtful hence inadmissible’.
kartā tāvadadṛṣṭaḥ sā kada ' 'pyāsīditīṣyate /	it could only be assumed that such a one existed in the past [but such an assumption can have no basis].
adṛṣṭapūrvasambandhaḥ sampratyajñānahetukaḥ // anumānavihīno 'pi so 'stīti parikalpyate /	(b) When any relationship (of concomitance) of such an author has never been perceived before, any inference that could be made regarding him must be based only upon present ignorance;
āgamo 'pi na tat siddhyai kṛtakākṛtako 'sti na // svayam evāpramāṇatvāt kṛtako 'sya na bodhakaḥ /	because no other scripture is without an author; and hence any other scripture which is the work of an author, being itself unreliable, could not provide a reliable notion of the author of the veda.
manvādivacanasyāpi tat kṛtaiva hi satyatā //	As regards the words of manu and others, their reliability rests upon the veda itself.
asambaddhastu vidviṣṭaḥ satyavādī kathaṃ bhavet / ato 'nyakartṛko 'pyasti vedakārāgamo na naḥ //	As for any other writer who has no connection with the veda and is hostile towards it, how can such a one be truthful on this point? Hence for us, there is no scripture compiled even by others which can declare an author of the veda.

śabdādipadārthavat /

i.e. like such things as sound and the like.

etad uktaṃ bhavati mukhādigrāhakaṃ tajjñānaṃ syāt tadā yathaiva tanmukhādi vyavasthitaṃ tathaiva gṛhṇīyāt nahyanyākārasya jñānasyānyad grāhyaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

What is meant is as follows; If the Cognition were the Apprehender of the face, then it should have apprehended it exactly as the face itself actually stands; because it cannot be right for the Apprehender of one form to apprehend a thing of another form. If this were possible, then there would be incongruities.

yāvatā dakṣiṇābhimukhasthito darpaṇatalaṃ nibhālayannuttarābhimukhaṃ svamukhaṃ paśyati /

As a matter of fact, when a man facing the South looks at the mirror, what he perceives in the mirror is the face facing the North;

tathālpīyasi darpaṇatale mahato 'pi svamukhasyālpapratibimbakamupalabhyate tathā darpaṇatalasambaddhaṃ dūrādhaḥpraviṣṭamivekṣyate /

similarly, if the mirror is a small one, the face that he sees in the reflection is smaller than his own face; and it is also perceived as touching the mirror’s surface and lying far beneath it.

naca tāvad bahalaṃ tathādarśatalaṃ nāpi sukhādi tat sambaddham /

In reality however, the mirror’s surface is not of that size, nor is it really in contact with the real face.

tathā vimalasalile sarasi taṭāntasthitaśākhiśikhariṇāṃ pratibimbānyadhogataśākhādiśikharaśekharāṇyupalabhyante naca te tathāsthitāḥ /

Similarly when a man is standing on the bank of a lake of clear water, and looks at the water-surface, he perceives the reflections of the trees standing on the brink of the water, with their tops pointing downwards; and yet they are not really in that condition.

tasmāt pratibimbajñānaṃ svamukhādigrāhakaṃ tadvilakṣaṇapratibhāsitvāt śabdajñānavat //

From all this we conclude that the Cognition of the Reflection does not apprehend the man’s own face, because what it envisages is something different from the face, like the Cognition of sound.

dhīmātratvena saṃsādhye yajjñānatvādisādhanam / vijātīyāviruddhatvāt sarvaṃ śeṣavad ucyate //

‘Being cognition’ is ‘luminousness’; and that can have no place in the ‘apprehended object’, because it has no connection with the characters of ‘not envisaging a form’ and the rest;

anirbhāsādyayogena vyāptis tenāsya niścitā //

hence its invariable concomitance has been duly ascertained.

śaktāvanantare jñāne grāhyāṃśe viṣayasthitiḥ / tātvikī neṣyate 'smābhis tena mānaṃ samarthyate //

The subsistence of the object in the apprehended aspect of the potency of the immediately following cognition is not regarded by us to be real. that is why the idea is supported.

vijñaptimātratāsiddhir dhīmadbhir vimalīkṛtā /

The fact of the cognition being the only entity has been clearly established by clever writers.

asmābhis taddiśā yātaṃ paramārthaviniścaye //

we also have trodden the same path for the ascertainment of truth. [verse 2082]:

pūrvam eva hi anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam ityādinā vyāpteḥ prasādhitatvāt nānaikāntiko hetuḥ /

The requisite invariable concomitance has already been established under Text 1999 above ‘Not envisaging a form, or envisaging a form or envisaging something else, the Cognition cannot apprehend any external thing’. Consequently, the Reason put forward here cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.

ācāryadignāgapādair ālambanapratyayavyavasthārtham uktam yadantarjñeyarūpaṃ tu bahirvadavabhāsate / so 'rtho jñānarūpatvāt tat pratyayatayāpi ca //

The Revered Teacher Diṅnāga, for the purpose of determining the ‘basic cause’, has declared as follows: ‘When that which is cognisable only in the internal (subjective) form appears as if it were external, that object must be regarded as existing in the form of the Cognition, and also as forming its basic cause’.

anena hi grāhyāṃśe viṣayavyavasthā pratipāditā /

This serves to determine the objective element in that aspect of the Cognition which is apprehended.

punar apyuktam athavā śaktyarpaṇāt krameṇāpi so 'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṃ vijñānācārāṃ karotītyavirodha iti /

The same Teacher has said again ‘Or, it may be that by transferring the potency, the apprehension of the Object, in due course, brings about, for the bringing about of an effect similar to itself, a potency in the Cognition;

anenānantarajñāne svānurūpakāryotpattinimittaśaktisamarpaṇāt kāraṇatvaṃ ca tasya pratibhāsasya samarthitam /

This establishes the fact that the said Apprehension (of the Object) transfers to the immediately subsequent Cognition, the potency tending to produce an effect similar to itself, and thus becomes the cause.

atra tenaiva bhadantena dūṣaṇam uktam yadyapīndriyavijñapter grāhyāṃśaḥ karaṇaṃ bhavet / atadābhatayā tasyā nākṣavad viṣayaḥ sa tu //

In connection with this, the same Bhadanta (Śubhagupta) argues as follows: “Though the apprehended element may be the instrument of Sense-cognition, yet, inasmuch as that cannot figure in the Cognition itself, it could not be the object of the Sense-cognition”.

ityādinā / atrāha śaktāvityādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2083-2084 above]

anantare jñāna iti /

‘Śaktau anantare jñāne’;

samanantarapratyaye ālayākhye yā śaktistathāvidhārthapratibhāsapratyayasamarthitā /

‘Immediately following Cognition’, in the form of the ‘Ālayavijñāna’ (Recumbent Cognition). ‘Potency’, of forming the basic cause of the said idea of the object.

tātvikī neṣyata iti /

‘Is not held to be real’;

yataḥ paramāṇvāder vyatiriktasyālambanatvaṃ na yujyata iti vistareṇa pratipādyācāryeṇa mābhūt sarvathālambanapratiṣedhe pratītibādhā tathā ālambanādhipatisamanantarahetupratyayatvalakṣaṇāś catasraḥ pratyayitā iti sūtre vacanād abhyupetabādhāpīti avirodhapratipādanāya yathāvidha ālambanapratyayo 'bhipretaḥ sūtre loke ca tathā pratipāditaṃ saṃvṛttyā /

because it is not possible for anything apart from Atoms, etc. to be the objective basis, as has been established in detail. This has also been asserted by the Revered Teacher, in the following words: ‘The absolute denial of the objective basis may involve incompatibility with a fact of direct experience; and there may be incompatibility with the doctrine enunciated in the Sūtra’ ‘There are four kinds of causal factors basic, dominant, immediate antecedent and causal link’; in order to show that there is no incompatibility, it has been explained what sort of Basic Cause is meant in this Sūtra and also in ordinary experience. But all this has been done on the plane of ‘Illusion’, not of Reality;

na paramārthataḥ /

so there is no incompatibility’.

paramārthatastu nirālambanāḥ sarva eva pratyayā iti //

as in reality all Cognitions are entirely devoid of objective basis.

KAPITEL ---RUTIPARIIK.SAA

End of Chapter on the External World.

[p.583] svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅga ityetat samarthanārtham āha anya ityādi / anye punar ihājñānamalīmasadhiyo jaguḥ /

Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows: “It is not right that all this is mere idea (or cognition); because this is set aside by the revealed word”.

cittamātratayā nāyaṃ yujyate śrutibādhanāt //

In the Introductory verses the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been described as ‘not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation’;

anya iti jaiminīyāḥ.

‘Other people’ the followers of Jaimini.

ta evam āhuḥ codanaiva dharmādharmādivyavasthānibandhanam ālokabhūtā sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ sādhāraṇaṃ cakṣur iva vyavasthitā.

These people argue as follows: “Injunction alone is the basis for determining Dharma (what one should do) and Adharma (what one should not do), the only light available for all beings, being like the common ‘Eye’ of all.

avaśyaṃ saiva dharmārthibhiḥ puruṣaiḥ prekṣāvadbhiḥ pramāṇatvenāśrayaṇīyā nānyatpuruṣapraṇītavacanādikam.

It must be accepted as authoritative and reliable by all intelligent men seeking to know their Duty (Dharma); not so other words composed by human beings.

tathā hi puruṣasya rāgādibhir avidyayā ca parītacetaso vacanaṃ nālamatīndriyam arthamaviparītamavagamayitum.

Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest;

atas tadvacanasamadhigamyo na dharmādiḥ.

hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things;

nāpyarvāgdarśinaḥ pratyakṣasamadhigamyaḥ, tasyātīndriyatvenātyantaparokṣatvāt.

Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond ‘the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible.

tathā hi iṣṭāniṣṭārthasādhanayogyatālakṣaṇau dharmādharmau.

“For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively);

yathoktaṃ śābare bhāṣye ya eva śreyaskaraḥ sa eva dharmaśabdenocyate.

as has been asserted in Śabara’s Bhāṣya ‘That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;

katham avagamyateyo yāgam anutiṣṭhati, taṃ janā dhārmikā iti samācakśate.

how.do you know that? when a man performs a sacrifice, people call him dhārmika, firm in the performance of his duty;

yaś ca yasya karttā, sa tenākhyāyate, yathā pācako lāvaka iti. tena yaḥ puruṣaṃ niḥśreyasena saṃyunakti, sa eva dharmaśabdenocyata iti.

and it is only when one does something that he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the cooking is called the Cook, and one who does the chopping is called the Chopper; in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good

tad anena dravyādīnām iṣṭārthasādhanayogyatā dharma iti pratipāditaṃ bhavati /

“What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good.

tathā hi yāgaśabdena dravyaguṇakarmāṇi śreyasaḥ sādhanāni viśiṣṭāny ucyante /

For instance, Substance, Quality and Action are spoken of as particular means of accomplishing the Good;

tatra ca dharmaśabdapravṛttir darśitā /

and it is shown that the name ‘Dharma’ is applicable to these.

yady api tāni dravyādīni pratyakṣāṇi svarūpato, na ca śreyaḥsādhanatvena, tādrūpyeṇa ca teṣāṃ dharmatvam iṣyate na svarūpamātreṇa /

These, Substance and the rest, are perceptible, in their own forms, but not as the means of accomplishing the good; and it is in this latter form that they are held to be ‘dharma’, not merely in their own forms.

yathoktam śreyo hi puruṣaprītiḥ sā dravyaguṇakarmabhiḥ /

This has been thus asserted ‘The Good consists in the happiness of the man, and this happiness is brought about by Substance, Quality and Action as indicated in the Injunction;

codanālakṣaṇaiḥ sādhyā tasmād eṣveva dharmatā //

hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs;

eṣām aindriyakatve 'pi na tādrūpyeṇa dharmatā /

even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma.

śreyaḥ sādhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratīyate //

The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda;

tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmād nendriyagocaraḥ /

and it is in this form that these are Dharma; hence Dharma is not amenable to the Senses’.

iti.

[Vide Ślokavārtika, Sū.

tādrūpyeṇa ceti / śreyaḥsādhanarūpeṇa /

2, 191, and 13-14.] ‘In that form’, as being the means of bringing about the Good.

tasmād yogyatā dharma iti sthitam /

Thus it is established that Dharma is a capacity or Potency.

dharmavaiparītyenādharmo 'pi sāmarthyād aniṣṭārthasādhanayogyateti spaṣṭam avasīyate /

“From this it is also clearly understood, by implication, that Adharma also, as contrary to Dharma, is a Potency or capacity to bring about what is not-Good.

naca yogyatāmarvāg darśanaḥ pratyakṣīkartumīśaḥ /

“This capacity or Potency a man with limited powers of vision cannot perceive directly by the Senses;

tasyāḥ sadaiva kāryānumeyatvāt /

because capacity is always inferred from its effects;

yadāha ---"śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpatīsādhanā" iti/

as has been declared in the passage ‘The Potencies of all things are always proved by Presumption from these effects’. (Ślokavārtika, Sū.

anyathā hyarvāgdarśanatvam eva hīyate /

2, 200.) If it were not so, then the character of ‘having limited powers of vision’ would disappear.

nāpi yogipratyakṣamatīndriyaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣatvād itarapratyakṣavat /

Nor can the Perception of mystics apprehend supersensuous things, simply because they are Perception, like any other Perception.

nāpy anumānaṃ dharmādharmādhigamāya yuktam, pratītasambandhasyaiva vatsunastena paricchedāt /

“Nor can Inference be of use in knowing what is Dharma; because Inference can envisage only such a thing as has had its relation with something else already known;

dharmasya cātathābhūtatvāt /

and Dharma is not such a thing.

nāpyupamānaṃ samarthaṃ dharmapratyāyane, tathā hyupamānaṃ sādṛśya [p.584] masannikṛṣṭe buddhimutpādayati /

“Nor can Analogy bring about the knowledge of Dharma; because Analogy consists in similitude and brings about the cognition of a thing not before the Eyes;

yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasya, naca dharmeṇa sadṛśaḥ karścit pratītaḥ sambhavati / yat sādṛśyāt tasyāvakalpanā bhavet /

e.g. the seeing of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow; and there can be nothing which is known to be similar to Dharma, which similarity could bring about the cognition of this Dharma.

nāpyarthāpattiḥ kṣamā dharmādharmāvabodhane /

“Nor is Presumption capable of bringing about the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma.

tathā hi dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārthonyathā nopapadyata ityadṛṣṭārthakalpanārthāpattiḥ /

Because Presumption consists in the assuming of something not perceived, on the ground that something else, which has been perceived or heard of, would not be possible or explicable without the said assumption.

naca dharmeṇa vinā kaścid artho nopapadyate, yato 'sya kalpanā bhaviṣyati /

Dharma is not something without which something else would not be explicable or possible, whereupon its Presumption could be based.

abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstītyasyārthasya prasiddhaye prabhavati, na vidhau /

“Non-apprehension also, which consists in the absence of all Means of Cognition, serves to bring about the idea of this is not, and not any positive idea.

tasmād abhāvakrasthau dharmādharmau yadi codanā na śaknuyād uddhartuṃ tenaiva grastau syātām iti codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmādir nendriyādilakṣaṇaḥ /

“Thus then, Dharma and Adharma would fall within the jaws of this Non-apprehension and would be swallowed by it, if the Vedic Injunction were not there to save them. Hence Dharma must be regarded as ‘that which is indicated by the Injunctive Word as conducive to welfare’, and it cannot be anything that is indicated by the Senses or other Means of Cognition.

codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam ityevaṃjātīyakam arthaṃ śakto 'bhyavagamayituṃ nānyat kiñcanendriyam /

“As a matter of fact, it is the Injunction that is capable of providing knowledge of what is past, present or future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any Sense-organ.

ato 'vaśyaṃ codanā pramāṇayitavyā /

(Śabara-bhāṣya 1.1.2) For these reasons the Injunction must he regarded as authoritative and reliable.

codaneti ca kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ nivartakaṃ ca vākyam āhuḥ / tathā svargakāmo 'gniṣṭomena yajeneti pravartakam, na hiṃsyād bhūtānīti nivartakam /

“The name ‘Injunction’ is applied to words that urge to activity or to avoidance of activity, e.g. the words ‘Desiring Heaven, she should perform the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice’ urge one to activity; and the words ‘One should not injure living beings’ urge one to desist from activity.

tasyāś ca prāmāṇyopāyaṃ bhavatāṃ yajeneti traidhātukam iti pratijñārthaḥ /

“For you (Buddhists) the only means of establishing the authoritative and reliable character of the Injunction consists in mere Ideation with the ‘Three Principles’;

sa na yujyate /

And this view is not correct.

kutaḥ śrutibādhanāt /

Why? Because it is set aside by the Revealed Word;

śrutyā vedena bādhanāt / cittavyatiriktāgnihotrādiprakāśanāt /

that is, it is negatived by the Veda, which has spoken of Agnihotra and other things which are quite distinct from ‘Cognition’ (Idea);

svayaṃ ca cittavyatirekeṇāvasthānāt /

in fact, the Veda itself stands apart from ‘Idea’.

cittamātratayetyupalakṣaṇam /

“The mention of ‘mere Ideation’ is only by way of illustration.

tathā kṣaṇikatvanairātmyasarvajñavairāgyādipratijñāpi bādhyata eva / tadviruddhārthaparidīpanenāvasthānāt //

There are other propositions of the Buddhist which are set aside by the Veda, such as ‘All things are momentary’, ‘There is no Soul’, ‘There has been an Omniscient Person’, ‘There should be freedom from attachment’ and so forth.

syād etat bādhyeta sarvam etat, yadi tasyāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ siddhaṃ bhavatītyāha sā hi pramāṇam iti /

All these words express ideas that are contrary to what is said in the Veda.” (2085) It might be urged against the above Mīmāṃsaka view that all this would be set aside by the Veda only if its authoritative character were established.

sā hi pramāṇaṃ sarveṣāṃ narākṛtatayā sthitā / vaitathyaṃ pratipadyante pauruṣeyyo giro yataḥ // avitathaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ taddhetutvāt sāpi pramāṇam ucyate /

Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows: “It is not right that all this is mere idea (or cognition); because this is set aside by the revealed word”. In the Introductory verses the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been described as ‘not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation’;

katham ity āha narākṛtatayeti /

not so other words composed by human beings.

apauruṣeyatvāt / anenāvitathajñānahetutvaṃ vaitathyakāraṇarāgādidoṣagaṇābhāvena pratipādayati /

Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest; hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things;

prayogaḥ yan mithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitaṃ tadavitathajñānakāraṇaṃ, yathā timirādidoṣānupaplutaṃ cakṣuḥ, mithyātvaheturāgādidoṣasaṃsargarahitaścāpauruṣeyatvād veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond ‘the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible. “For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively); as has been asserted in Śabara’s Bhāṣya ‘That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;

vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntenānaikāntikatāṃ pariharannāha vaitathyam iti /

in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good

anena hi sādhanābhāvena sādhyābhāvasya vyāptimādarśayati /

“What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good.

tathā hi doṣā mithyātvahetavaḥ yatraiva sannidadhati tatraiva svakāryamithyātvam upasthāpayati, nānyatra /

hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs; even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma. The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda;

kāraṇamantareṇakāryasyāsambhayāt/

‘Why?’ Because it is not the work of a human being;

sambhave vā`hetukatvaprasaṅgāt/

hence this is a Reason (for Reliability) based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

nāpi tamantareṇabhavatastatkāryatvaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgādityato mithyātvadoṣayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapattirahetuka [p.585] tvaprasaṅgasya mithyātvasyeti viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nānaikāntikatā /

and what would come about without the cause would not be regarded as the effect of that cause; as that would lead to absurdity. Thus, the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect between Defects and Falsity, and the contingency of falsity being without cause, constitute the ‘Reason’ setting aside any conclusion contrary to the one set forth above. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.

prayogaḥ yatra hi yat kāraṇaṃ nāsti tattatra na bhavati, yathā{pa} yasyavidyamānakāraṇo dhūmaḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows: Where the Cause of a thing does not exist, the Effect cannot appear, e.g. Smoke does not appear in water, where its cause, Fire, is absent;

nāsti ca vaitathyahetumohādidoṣagaṇaḥ śrutāviti kāraṇānupalabdhiḥ //

in the case of the Veda, the Cause of falsity in the shape of the presence of Love, Hate, etc. is not present;

nāpyasiddhateti pratipādayann āha doṣāḥ santītyādi /

hence its Effect, Falsity cannot be there.

doṣāḥ santi na santīti puṃvācyeṣu hi śaṅkyate /

“In the case of the assertion of human beings, it is always open to doubt whether or not there are defects (in the speaker);

śrutau karturabhāvān nu doṣāśaṅkaiva nāsti naḥ //

in the case of the revealed word, however, as there is no speaker, we can have no suspicion of there being any defects.” (2087)

doṣā hi puruṣāśritās taddharmatvāt, tat kathaṃ te svāśrayamantareṇa bhaveyuḥ sambhave vānāśritatvaprasaṅgāt /

As a matter of fact, Defects reside in human beings only, as they are their property; how then could they be there where their substratum is absent? If they could be there, they would be there without a substratum (baseless);

eṣa hyāśritadharmo yadāśrayānuvidhāyitvam /

in fact it is the very nature of the subsistent thing that it should follow in the wake of its substratum;

doṣāśrayaś ca puruṣaḥ kartā, sa ca nivṛttau veda iti kuto doṣāśaṅkā /

and Man the doer, the compiler, the speaker is the substratum of Defects; and any such author is not there in the case of the Veda;

syād etat doṣāśrayasya karturabhāvo 'pi kathaṃ siddha ityatas tadabhāvas tadgrāhakapramāṇapañcakanivṛttyā pratipādayati kartā tāvad ityādi /

whence then could there be any suspicion of there being Defects? This same argument has set aside also the charge of the Reason being ‘doubtful hence inadmissible’.

kartā tāvadadṛṣṭaḥ sā kada ' 'pyāsīditīṣyate /

it could only be assumed that such a one existed in the past [but such an assumption can have no basis].

adṛṣṭapūrvasambandhaḥ sampratyajñānahetukaḥ // anumānavihīno 'pi so 'stīti parikalpyate /

(b) When any relationship (of concomitance) of such an author has never been perceived before, any inference that could be made regarding him must be based only upon present ignorance;

āgamo 'pi na tat siddhyai kṛtakākṛtako 'sti na // svayam evāpramāṇatvāt kṛtako 'sya na bodhakaḥ /

because no other scripture is without an author; and hence any other scripture which is the work of an author, being itself unreliable, could not provide a reliable notion of the author of the veda.

manvādivacanasyāpi tat kṛtaiva hi satyatā //

As regards the words of manu and others, their reliability rests upon the veda itself.

asambaddhastu vidviṣṭaḥ satyavādī kathaṃ bhavet / ato 'nyakartṛko 'pyasti vedakārāgamo na naḥ //

As for any other writer who has no connection with the veda and is hostile towards it, how can such a one be truthful on this point? Hence for us, there is no scripture compiled even by others which can declare an author of the veda.