buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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vibhutvaṃ ca sthitaṃ tasya ko 'dhyavasyed viparyayam //	who, then, could ever conceive of the contrary?” (2117)
[p.591] anena pratyakṣato bādhām āha /	This shows annulment by Perception.
tathā hi sarvakālaṃ sa evāyam iti pratyakṣābhijñāyamānatvān nityatvaṃ pratyabhijñākhyāt pratyakṣasiddham /	For instance, at all times, the Word is recognised by Perception as ‘the same’; hence the eternality of the Word is proved by this Recognition which is called ‘Perception’.
sarvatra deśe pratyabhijñānād vibhutvaṃ ca siddham iti ko viparyayaṃ nityavibhutvayor adhyavasyet, naiva kaścit /	And being recognised as ‘the same’, in all places, Word is proved to be all-pervasive also. Under the circumstances, who could conceive of the contrary of the said eternality and all-pervasiveness? No one.
nityatvavyāpitvaviparyayo 'nityatvam avibhutvaṃ ca //	The ‘contrary’ of eternality and, all-pervasiveness would be non-eternality and non-pervasiveness (respectively).
tasmād ityupasaṃharati	The position is summed up in the following: [see verse 2118 next]
tasmād vā sarvakāleṣu sarvadeśeṣu caikatā / pratyakṣapratyabhijñānaprasiddhā sāsya bādhikā //	“From all this it follows that the fact of its remaining the same at all times and at all places is proved by perceptional recognition;
sarvakāleṣviti / atītānāgatavartamāneṣu /	‘At all times’, i.e. in the past, present and future.
asyeti viparyayasya //	‘It’ the ‘contrary’ (spoken of in the preceding text).
jvālāder ityādinā pratyabhijñāyā vyabhicāram āśaṅkate jvālādeḥ kṣaṇikatve 'pi pratyabhijñeti cen na tat /	“If it be urged that ‘in the case of such things as the flame, it is found that though it exists for one moment only, yet there is recognition’, the answer is that it is not so;
tatra hi pratyabhijñeyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nityam eva naḥ //	what is recognised in these cases is the universal, and that is eternal, for us.
bhedabuddhistu yatrāṃśe syāt kenacid upādhinā / na tatra pratyabhijñānaṃ bhedabuddhyāvadhāritam //	In cases where there is notion of difference in regard to any aspect of the thing, on account of certain circumstantial conditions, there is no recognition, as is clear from the notion of difference.” (2119-2120).
ādiśabdena lūnapunar jātānāṃ keśanasvatṛṇādīnāṃ nirjharādīnāṃ grahaṇam, yatas tatrāpi pratyabhijñāsti, ta evāmī keśās tānyeva tṛṇāni saiva nirjharadhārā tadeva sarito jalamiti /	‘Such things’ this includes the cases of Hail, nails and grass, etc. which are cut and grow again, as also that of water-falls; as in these cases also there is Recognition that these are the same Hairs and Nails, the same grasses, the water-fall, the same river-water and so forth.
naitadasti /	This is not right.
tatra hi sāmānyaṃ tejastvādi pratyabhijñāyate /	In all these case what is recognised is the Universal, the commonalty such as ‘Fire’ (in the case of the Lamp) and so forth;
tac ca nityamiṣṭameveti kṛto vyabhicāraḥ /	and this Universal is held to he eternal;
yadapi vyaktirūpam anityaṃ tat tu naiva pratyabhijñāyata iti kuto vyabhicāraḥ / yatrāṃśa iti /	where then is there any falsity in our Premiss? The individual form of these things, which is evanescent, that certainly is not recognised (as being the same);
kenacid upādhineti /	where then is there any falsity in our Premiss?
mandatvorddhvagamanādinā /	‘In regard to any aspect’ as in regard to the greater or less degree.
katham avagatam ity āha bhedabuddhyāvadhāritam iti /	Question: How do you know that there is no Recognition in such cases?
bhinnabuddher etad avagatam ity arthaḥ // anumānair bādhāmāha deśakālādītyādi /	Answer: ‘As is clear from the notion of difference’, it is deduced from the presence of the notion of difference that there is in such cases.
deśakālādibhinnāś ca gośabdavyaktibuddhayaḥ / samānaviṣayāḥ sarvā navā nānārthagocarāḥ // gaurityutpadyamānatvāt sampratyutpannabuddhivat /	“(1) The notions of the individual cow-word, though diverse in points place, time, etc., must all envisage the same cow-word, they do not envisage several words, because they always appear in the form ‘cow’, like the notion of ‘cow’ that appears at the present moment.
gośabdabuddhyā hyastanyā gośabdo 'yaṃ prakāśitaḥ // gośabdaviṣayatvena yathaivādyaṃ prasūtayā /	(2) The notion of the cow-word that appeared yesterday envisaged this same cow-word, because it envisaged the cow-word, like the notion appearing to-day.
iyaṃ vā taṃ vijānāti taddhetoḥ pūrvabuddhivat //	(3) This notion envisages that cow-word, for the same said reason, like the previous notion.
ubhe vāpyekaviṣaye bhavetām ekabuddhivat /	(4) Both notions envisage the same cow-word, like the single notion.
deśakālādibhinnā vā samastā gotvabuddhayaḥ // ekagośabdajanyāḥ syur godhītvād ekabuddhivat /	(5) All notions of the ‘cow’, divergent as regards place, time, etc., are brought about by the same cow-word, because they are notions of the ‘cow’, like the single notion.
hyastanoccarāṇo vāpi gośabdo 'dyāpi vidyate // gośabdajñānagamyatvād adyoccāritaśabdavat /	(6) The cow-word that was uttered yesterday must exist today also, because it is envisaged by the cognition of the cow-word, like the same word uttered today.
gauriti śrūyamāṇo 'dya hyo 'pi śabdo mayā śrutaḥ //	(7) The cow-word that is heard today was heard by me yesterday also;
hetoḥ pūrvoditādeva hya uccāritaśabdavat /	for the aforesaid reason, like the word uttered yesterday.
śabdo vā vācako yāvan sthiro 'sau dīrghakālabhāk // sambandhānubhavāpekṣajñeyajñānapravartanāt / ya īdṛksa sthiro dṛṣṭo dhūmasāmānyabhāgavat //	(8) All such words as are expressive must be regarded as lasting a long time, because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships, everything that does this has been found to be permanent, like the ‘universal’ aspect of smoke.
asthirastu na sambandhajñānāpekṣo 'vabodhakaḥ / tādāstvikanimittatvād dīpavidyutprakāśavat //	(9) That which denotes things through the apprehension of relationships cannot be evanescent, because it must have its relationship continuing till the time of use, like the light of the lamp and the lightning.
śabdānityatvapakṣo 'taḥ sarvair ebhir virudhyate /	Thus the idea of word-sound being non-eternal is annulled by all these inferences which must be admitted to be perfectly sound.
anumānair dṛḍhaiḥ siddhair nityāḥ śabdās tataḥ sthitāḥ //	Consequently it becomes established that words are eternal.” (2121-2130)
gośabdavyaktiṣu yā buddhayo deśakāladrutamadhyavilambitādipratibhedabhāsabhinnās tā ekārthaviṣayāḥ, nānārthaviṣayā navā bhavanti, gaur ityākāropagrahaṇotpadyamānatvāt /	(1) The notions that appear in connection with the individual words ‘Cow,’ though divergent through diversities of place, time, quick, middling and prolonged, and so forth, all envisage the same word, they do not envisage diverse words, because they all appear in the same form ‘Cow’, like the notion of the cow-word appearing at the present time.
athavā yā yā gośabdaviṣayā buddhiḥ sādyatanagośabdaviṣayā, gośabdaviṣayatvāt /	“Or, (2) Whenever there is notion of the word. ‘Cow’, it must be taken as referring to the word ‘Cow’ appearing to-day, because it envisages the word ‘Cow’, like the word appearing to-day;
adya prasūtagośabdabuddhivat /	the notion of the word appearing yesterday envisages the same word.
gośabdaviṣayā ca hyastanī gośabdabuddhir iti svabhāvahetuḥ / athavā ahyastanī gośabdabuddhir dharmiṇī, hyastanagośabdaviṣayatvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ, gośabdaviṣayatvād iti hetuḥ, hyastanī gośabdabuddhir dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	This is thus a Reason based upon the nature of things. “Or, (3) The ‘subject’ of the Inference may be the notion of the word appearing to-day, ‘being envisaged by the notion of the word that appeared yesterday’ is the Probandum, ‘because it envisages the word’ is the Probans; and ‘the notion of the word appearing yesterday’ is the Corroborative Instance. This is the argument formulated in the words.
etad evāha iyam ityādi / iyam ityadyatanī /	‘This notion envisages, etc. etc.’ ‘this notion’ stands for the notion appearing to-day.
tam iti hyastanagośabdajñānopalabdhaṃ gośabdam /	That’ the word ‘Cow’ apprehended by the Cognition of the word ‘Cow’ that appeared yesterday.
taddhetor iti / gośabdaviṣayatvāt /	‘For the same said reason’ i.e. ‘because it envisages the word Cow
athavā ubhe hyastanyadyatanyau buddhī ekaviṣaye gośabdaviṣayatvād ekāgośabdabuddhivat /	“Or, (4) Both the notions appearing to-day and yesterday envisage the same word, because both envisage the word ‘Cow’; like the notion of the single word ‘Cow’.
ubhe cetyetad eva darśayati /	This argument is expressed in the words ‘Both, etc. etc.’.
hetuḥ prakṛtatvāt sujñāta iti noktaḥ /	The Reason has not been stated in detail, as it is well-known.
athavā samastā gotvabuddhayo deśādibhedabhinnā ekagośabdajanyā godhītvād ekagobuddhivat /	“Or, (5) All notions of the universal ‘Cow’, though divergent in regard to diversities of place, time, etc.
pūrvaṃ gośabdaviṣayā buddhayo dharmiṇyaḥ, ekaviṣayatvaṃ ca sādhyam, idānīṃ ca gotvajātiviṣayā buddhayo dharmiṇyaḥ, ekagośabdajanyatvaṃ sādhyam iti viśeṣaḥ / hyastanamuccāraṇamasyeti hyastanoccāraṇaḥ /	are produced by the same word ‘Cow’, because they are notions of the Cow, like the notion of the single Cow. In the previous argument, the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term) consisted of ‘the notions envisaging the word ‘Cow’, ‘envisaging the same object’ being the Probandum; while in the present argument, the notions envisaging the universal ‘Cow’ form the Minor Term, and ‘beng produced by the same word Cow’ is the Probandum;
[p.593] ayaṃ ca dharminirdeśaḥ /	this is the difference between the two arguments.
gauriti śrūyamāṇo 'dyeti dharminirdeśaḥ /	“(6) The compound ‘hyastanoccāraṇa’ means ‘that which had its utterance yesterday’; this mentions the Minor Term;
pūrvoditād iti /	‘existing to-day’ is the Probandum.
athavā yāvān vācakaśabda ityayaṃ dharminirdeśaḥ / tasya dīrghakālabhāktvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ /	The rest is easily understood. “(7) The word ‘Cow’ that is heard to-day is the Minor Term; ‘was heard yesterday’ is the Probandum.
sambandhānubhavāpekṣajñeyajñānapravartanād iti hetuḥ /	‘Aforesaid’, i.e. ‘because it is apprehended by the Cognition of the word Cow’, is the Probans.
sambandhānubhavam apekṣata iti sambandhānubhavāpekṣaṃ tac ca tat jñeyajñānapravartanaṃ ceti tathoktam /	and ‘because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships’ is the Probans. In the compound ‘sambandhānubhavā, etc.’ ‘sambandhānubhāpekṣam’ qualifies ‘jñeyajñanapravartanam’;
tasmāt sthiro jñeyaḥ sthirasyaiva viśeṣaṇaṃ dīrghakālabhāgiti /	‘should be regarded as lasting’; ‘for a long time’ qualifies ‘lasting’.
kālasthair yeṇa sthiratvamātrābhipretaṃ natu deśasthair yeṇa parvatāderivetiviśeṣaṇena darśayati /	The ‘lasting character’ meant here is in regard to time, not in regard to place, as in the case of mountains; this is what is intended to be indicated by the qualifying term ‘for a long time’.
dhūmasāmānyabhāgavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	‘Like the universal aspect of Smoke’ is the Corroborative Instance;
svalakṣaṇasyānanvayān na liṅgatvam iti sāmānyabhāga eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ / asthirastvityādi vyatirekakathanam /	the ‘specific individuality’ of things cannot have any continuity of existence or concomitance, hence it is the ‘universal aspect’ alone that can serve as the Corroborative Instance. “(9) ‘Cannot be evanescent’;
tādātvikanimittatvād iti /	‘Because it must have, etc. etc.’.
tādātvikam tāvat kālikaṃ vyavahārakālānuyāyi nimittaṃ sambandho yasya sa tathoktaḥ tadbhāvas tattvam //2121 //	‘Tādātvika’ till that time, i.e. till the time of use, its ‘nimitta’, relationship should continue.” (2121-2130)
nanu cānayā diśā ghaṭādīnām apyekatvaṃ śakyate vaktum /	The following objection is raised In this way, the Jar and such things also may be asserted to be one only.
tathā hi sarvā deśakālādibhinnā ghaṭādivyaktibuddhayaḥ samānaviṣayā navā nānārthagocarāḥ / ghaṭa ityutpadyamānatvāt sampratyutpannaghaṭabuddhivad ityevam ādi /	For instance, all notions of the individual Jar, though diverse through divergence of Place, Time, etc. must be regarded as envisaging one and the same thing, and not as envisaging several things, because it appears in the form of ‘Jar’, like the notion of the Jar appearing a.t the present moment; and so forth.
nacaikatvaṃ ghaṭādīnām iṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā /	As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouched for by perception.
tasmād ete sarva eva hetavo vyabhicāriṇa ityāśaṅkyāha ghaṭāder ityādi /	Hence all the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as False (Fallacious). The answer to this objection (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows: [see verses 2131-2132 next]
ghaṭāder ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam / vyaktīnām ekatāpattiṃ kuryāccedanayā diśā // tathā dṛṣṭaviruddhatvaṃ vācyaṃ śabdapramāṇakam /	“If the one-ness of the jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’, then the argument is superfluous. If however, one were to urge the contingency of the individual jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all forms of right cognition;
yato 'dhyakṣādibhir mānair vyaktibhedaḥ suniścitaḥ //	because the multiplicity of individuals has been definitely established by all means of right cognition, sense-perception and the rest.” (2131-2132)
yadi jātyā jātirūpeṇa, ghaṭādīnām ekatvaṃ sādhyate prasaṅgena tadā siddhasādhanam /	If it is in reference to the ‘Universal’ the ‘genius’, ‘Jar’ that one-ness is sought to be proved by the above Reductio ad, Absurdum, then, it is superfluous;
taduktam ---``aṃśā hyetasya jātyākhyo nityo dhvaṃsītaro mata" iti /	as it has been declared ‘That aspect of the object which is Universal, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable’.
atha vyaktirūpāṇām ekatvaṃ prasaṅgena sādhyate, tadāpi na vyabhicāraḥ /	On the other hand, if the Reductio ad Absurdum is meant to prove the one-ness of the Individual Jars, even so, that does not falsify our premisses.
pratyakṣādibhir bādhitatvād asyāḥ pratijñāyāḥ /	Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition;
yasmād abādhitaviṣayatvena satīti sarve hetavaḥ saviśeṣaṇā ihābhipretāḥ /	specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that ‘what they assert is not annulled’;
tat kuto vyabhicāra ityabhiprāyaḥ /	how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons? Such is the sense of the passage.
dṛṣṭaviruddhatvam iti / pratijñāyā iti śeṣaḥ /	‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’ That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary.
śeṣaṃ sugamam //2131 //	The rest is easily understood.
kṛtrimatve ca sambandhas tat prayogāpavarjanāt / tadekavyaktiniṣṭhatvān naiva sārvatriko bhavet //	“If the relationship in question were artificial (set up for the occasion), then, as the particular use will have become accomplished and come to an end, it would be applicable to that one particular case only, and would not be universal in its application.
pārthivadravyasattvādilāṅgūlatvādisaṅkarāt / vinā prayogabhūyastvaṃ na syād gotvāvadhāraṇā //	In the cow there is a commingling of several factors such as the ‘earth’, ‘substance’, ‘being’, ‘tail’ and so forth, there could be no definite idea of the ‘cow’ except through frequent repeated usage.
tasmād akṛtrimaḥ śabdo na kadācid vinaśyati /	From this it follows that the word is not-artificial;
nityena nityasambandhād ākāśaparamāṇuvat //	and it never perishes, because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity like the ākāśa and the atom,” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 359-361].
kṛtrimatve ca sambandhasyetyapekṣaṇīyam /	The sense requires the reading ‘kṛtrimatve ca sambandhasya’.
yadi sambandhaḥ kṛtrimo bhavettadā tatprayogāpavarganātśabdaprayogavināśāt, śabdasyāpi vināśa iti sārvatrikaḥ sarvaprayogānuyāyī, na syāt /	If the Relationship were artificial, then, inasmuch as the particular use will have been accomplished, come to an end, the Word would have come to an end; hence the relationship between the Word and its meaning would not be universal i.e. applicable to all uses of the Word at all times.
kutaḥ---, tadekavyaktiniṣṭhatvāt ekagovyaktiniṣṭhatvāt /	Why? Because it would he applicable to that one particular case only; i.e. it would apply to one particular Cow only.
tatrārthāpattiḥ yeyaṃ saṃmukhe 'nekasaminnekasyām api govyaktau sāmānyasthite sati gośabdānniṣkṛṣṭasya gotvasyaiva pratipattiḥ, sā śabdamantareṇānupapannā /	In support of this a Presumption is put forward When several Cows are there before one. even though the Universal ‘Cow’ may be subsisting in a single individual Cow, what is understood is the universal ‘Cow’ as extracted from the word ‘Cow’; and this would not be possible if the Word were not there.
katham ity āha pārthivetyādi / śābdapramāṇapūrvakeyam arthāpattiḥ /	Why it would not be possible is explained in the Words ‘There is a commingling of several factors, etc. etc.’ This Presumption is based upon the authority of Words.
tasmād akṛtrimaḥ śabda ityanumānam upasaṃharati nityeneti /	‘For these reasons Word cannot be artificial’. This sums up the Inference.
jātisaṃjñākenārthena / nityaṃ sarvakālaṃ sambandhāt /	‘With an eternal entity’ i.e. the object named ‘Universal’, ‘Community ‘Eternal relationship’ which lasts for all time;
yathā paramāṇūnāṃ nityenākāśeneti //2133-2135 //	just like the relationship of Atoms with Ākāśa, which is eternal.
arthāpatter anaikāntikatvaṃ pariharann āha saṃmukhānekasāmānyetyādi /	The following texts reject the ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the above Presumption: [see verses 2136-2138 next]
saṃmukhānekasāmānyaviṣayaś ca sakṛcchrutaḥ / niṣkṛṣṭaṃ svārthavācitvaṃ gośabdo na prapadyate //	“Inasmuch as the word, heard but once, envisages several ‘universals’ in an indefinite form, it cannot definitely point to its own specific denotation, as distinguished from the other ‘universals’ (until it has been used several times).
bahubhiḥ śravaṇair eṣa prāṇitvādīni varjayan / śuklādigamanādīni sāsnālāṅgūlatādi ca // śāvaleyādikhaṇḍādivyaktīḥ svasvanibandhanāḥ /	As a matter of fact, the word ‘cow’ would get at the specific denotation of the particular ‘universal’ ‘cow’ only after a long time when it has been heard several times, and has thereby excluded the other universals ‘living beings’, ‘the quality of whiteness’, the action of ‘moving’, the universals ‘dewlap’, ‘tail’, and also the individuals, the ‘cow of variegated colour’, the ‘hornless cow’ and the like, which are diverse by reason of their individual peculiarities.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words 364-366] (2136-2138) This has been thus explained in the Bhāṣya (of Śabara, on Sū.
niṣkṛṣṭagotvavācitvaṃ cireṇa pratipadyate //	I.
yathoktaṃ bhāṣye ---``nitye tu khalu vai śabde bahukṛtva uccāritaḥ śrutapūrvastvanyānyāsu goṣvanvayavyatirekābhyām ākṛtivacanatvamavagamayati tasmād apinitya"iti /	19) “If the word ‘Cow’ is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also several times, as applied to other individual Cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the Word comes to he recognised as denoting the particular Universal; for this reason also, the Word must be eternal.”
vyaktī svasvanibandhanā iti / yathāsvaṃ bhedabhinnā ity arthaḥ /	‘Individuals which are diverse, etc. etc.’ i.e. distinguished by their respective peculiarities;
bhinnatvaṃ hi tāsāṃ bheda [p.595] pratipattinibandhanam /	their diversity is based upon their being cognised as different from one another.
tena svaṃ bhinnatvaṃ bhedapratipattinibandhanaṃ yāsāṃ tāḥ svanibandhanāḥ /	Hence the compound ‘svasvanibandhanāḥ’ is to be expounded to mean ‘which have their diversity based upon the cognition of their respective peculiarities’.
varjayanniti sambandhaḥ //2136 2137 //	‘Having excluded’ has to be construed with all these.
tāvatkālaṃ sthiraṃ cainaṃ kaḥ paścānnāśayiṣyati /	“And if the word existed for such a long time, who could destroy it after that? [Ślokavārtika eternality of words 367].
sambhāvyate 'sya nāśitvaṃ na bhūyo 'nyena hetunā // yathā śastrādibhiśchedājjarayā vā ghaṭādayaḥ /	For another reason again it is not possible for the word to be destroyed: in the case of the jar and other things, it is understood that they would become destroyed either through decay or through some weapon;
naṅkṣyantītyavagamyante naivaṃ śabde 'sti kāraṇam //	there is no such cause by which the word could be destroyed.” (2139-2140)
tāvatkālam niṣkṛṣṭasvārthapratipādanakālam /	‘For such a long time’, i.e. during which time it denotes its own meaning after excluding so many other factors.
nanu yathā ghaṭādīnāṃ tāvatkālaṃ sthirāṇām api mudgarādibhyaḥ paścād vināśas tathā śabdasyāpi bhaviṣyatītyāha sambhāvyate 'syetyādi /	Says the Opponent: In the case of the Jar, etc. it is found that though they continue to exist for a long time, yet they come to be destroyed by the stroke of a stick or some such thing; the same may be the case with Word also.
bhūya iti/ punaḥ /	The answer to this is “For another reason, etc. etc.” ‘Bhūyaḥ’ again.
yathā śastrādibhiśchedād vināśaṃ pratipadyante ghaṭādayo jarayā vā, naivaṃ śabde 'sti kāraṇam / katham---, amūrtattvāt, ghaṭādīnāṃ ca mūrttatvād iti bhāvaḥ //2139 //	Things like the Jar undergo destruction either by decay or by the stroke of some weapon; there is no such cause for the destruction of the Word, Why? Because the Word is incorporeal, while the Jar and other things are corporeal. “Even though there are differences of place, time and user, there is no diversity in the letter ‘ga’ and the rest;
yaduktam ``ghaṭāder ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam / vyaktīnām ekatāpattiṃ kuryāc cedanayā diśā // tadā dṛṣṭaviruddhatvaṃ vācyaṃ sarvapramāṇakam //	It has been declared (under Text 2131, above) as follows: ‘If the oneness of the Jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the Universal aspect, then the argument is superfluous. If however, one were to urge the contingency of the Individual Jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all Forms of Bight Cognition’.

vibhutvaṃ ca sthitaṃ tasya ko 'dhyavasyed viparyayam //

who, then, could ever conceive of the contrary?” (2117)

[p.591] anena pratyakṣato bādhām āha /

This shows annulment by Perception.

tathā hi sarvakālaṃ sa evāyam iti pratyakṣābhijñāyamānatvān nityatvaṃ pratyabhijñākhyāt pratyakṣasiddham /

For instance, at all times, the Word is recognised by Perception as ‘the same’; hence the eternality of the Word is proved by this Recognition which is called ‘Perception’.

sarvatra deśe pratyabhijñānād vibhutvaṃ ca siddham iti ko viparyayaṃ nityavibhutvayor adhyavasyet, naiva kaścit /

And being recognised as ‘the same’, in all places, Word is proved to be all-pervasive also. Under the circumstances, who could conceive of the contrary of the said eternality and all-pervasiveness? No one.

nityatvavyāpitvaviparyayo 'nityatvam avibhutvaṃ ca //

The ‘contrary’ of eternality and, all-pervasiveness would be non-eternality and non-pervasiveness (respectively).

tasmād ityupasaṃharati

The position is summed up in the following: [see verse 2118 next]

tasmād vā sarvakāleṣu sarvadeśeṣu caikatā / pratyakṣapratyabhijñānaprasiddhā sāsya bādhikā //

“From all this it follows that the fact of its remaining the same at all times and at all places is proved by perceptional recognition;

sarvakāleṣviti / atītānāgatavartamāneṣu /

‘At all times’, i.e. in the past, present and future.

asyeti viparyayasya //

‘It’ the ‘contrary’ (spoken of in the preceding text).

jvālāder ityādinā pratyabhijñāyā vyabhicāram āśaṅkate jvālādeḥ kṣaṇikatve 'pi pratyabhijñeti cen na tat /

“If it be urged that ‘in the case of such things as the flame, it is found that though it exists for one moment only, yet there is recognition’, the answer is that it is not so;

tatra hi pratyabhijñeyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nityam eva naḥ //

what is recognised in these cases is the universal, and that is eternal, for us.

bhedabuddhistu yatrāṃśe syāt kenacid upādhinā / na tatra pratyabhijñānaṃ bhedabuddhyāvadhāritam //

In cases where there is notion of difference in regard to any aspect of the thing, on account of certain circumstantial conditions, there is no recognition, as is clear from the notion of difference.” (2119-2120).

ādiśabdena lūnapunar jātānāṃ keśanasvatṛṇādīnāṃ nirjharādīnāṃ grahaṇam, yatas tatrāpi pratyabhijñāsti, ta evāmī keśās tānyeva tṛṇāni saiva nirjharadhārā tadeva sarito jalamiti /

‘Such things’ this includes the cases of Hail, nails and grass, etc. which are cut and grow again, as also that of water-falls; as in these cases also there is Recognition that these are the same Hairs and Nails, the same grasses, the water-fall, the same river-water and so forth.

naitadasti /

This is not right.

tatra hi sāmānyaṃ tejastvādi pratyabhijñāyate /

In all these case what is recognised is the Universal, the commonalty such as ‘Fire’ (in the case of the Lamp) and so forth;

tac ca nityamiṣṭameveti kṛto vyabhicāraḥ /

and this Universal is held to he eternal;

yadapi vyaktirūpam anityaṃ tat tu naiva pratyabhijñāyata iti kuto vyabhicāraḥ / yatrāṃśa iti /

where then is there any falsity in our Premiss? The individual form of these things, which is evanescent, that certainly is not recognised (as being the same);

kenacid upādhineti /

where then is there any falsity in our Premiss?

mandatvorddhvagamanādinā /

‘In regard to any aspect’ as in regard to the greater or less degree.

katham avagatam ity āha bhedabuddhyāvadhāritam iti /

Question: How do you know that there is no Recognition in such cases?

bhinnabuddher etad avagatam ity arthaḥ // anumānair bādhāmāha deśakālādītyādi /

Answer: ‘As is clear from the notion of difference’, it is deduced from the presence of the notion of difference that there is in such cases.

deśakālādibhinnāś ca gośabdavyaktibuddhayaḥ / samānaviṣayāḥ sarvā navā nānārthagocarāḥ // gaurityutpadyamānatvāt sampratyutpannabuddhivat /

“(1) The notions of the individual cow-word, though diverse in points place, time, etc., must all envisage the same cow-word, they do not envisage several words, because they always appear in the form ‘cow’, like the notion of ‘cow’ that appears at the present moment.

gośabdabuddhyā hyastanyā gośabdo 'yaṃ prakāśitaḥ // gośabdaviṣayatvena yathaivādyaṃ prasūtayā /

(2) The notion of the cow-word that appeared yesterday envisaged this same cow-word, because it envisaged the cow-word, like the notion appearing to-day.

iyaṃ vā taṃ vijānāti taddhetoḥ pūrvabuddhivat //

(3) This notion envisages that cow-word, for the same said reason, like the previous notion.

ubhe vāpyekaviṣaye bhavetām ekabuddhivat /

(4) Both notions envisage the same cow-word, like the single notion.

deśakālādibhinnā vā samastā gotvabuddhayaḥ // ekagośabdajanyāḥ syur godhītvād ekabuddhivat /

(5) All notions of the ‘cow’, divergent as regards place, time, etc., are brought about by the same cow-word, because they are notions of the ‘cow’, like the single notion.

hyastanoccarāṇo vāpi gośabdo 'dyāpi vidyate // gośabdajñānagamyatvād adyoccāritaśabdavat /

(6) The cow-word that was uttered yesterday must exist today also, because it is envisaged by the cognition of the cow-word, like the same word uttered today.

gauriti śrūyamāṇo 'dya hyo 'pi śabdo mayā śrutaḥ //

(7) The cow-word that is heard today was heard by me yesterday also;

hetoḥ pūrvoditādeva hya uccāritaśabdavat /

for the aforesaid reason, like the word uttered yesterday.

śabdo vā vācako yāvan sthiro 'sau dīrghakālabhāk // sambandhānubhavāpekṣajñeyajñānapravartanāt / ya īdṛksa sthiro dṛṣṭo dhūmasāmānyabhāgavat //

(8) All such words as are expressive must be regarded as lasting a long time, because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships, everything that does this has been found to be permanent, like the ‘universal’ aspect of smoke.

asthirastu na sambandhajñānāpekṣo 'vabodhakaḥ / tādāstvikanimittatvād dīpavidyutprakāśavat //

(9) That which denotes things through the apprehension of relationships cannot be evanescent, because it must have its relationship continuing till the time of use, like the light of the lamp and the lightning.

śabdānityatvapakṣo 'taḥ sarvair ebhir virudhyate /

Thus the idea of word-sound being non-eternal is annulled by all these inferences which must be admitted to be perfectly sound.

anumānair dṛḍhaiḥ siddhair nityāḥ śabdās tataḥ sthitāḥ //

Consequently it becomes established that words are eternal.” (2121-2130)

gośabdavyaktiṣu yā buddhayo deśakāladrutamadhyavilambitādipratibhedabhāsabhinnās tā ekārthaviṣayāḥ, nānārthaviṣayā navā bhavanti, gaur ityākāropagrahaṇotpadyamānatvāt /

(1) The notions that appear in connection with the individual words ‘Cow,’ though divergent through diversities of place, time, quick, middling and prolonged, and so forth, all envisage the same word, they do not envisage diverse words, because they all appear in the same form ‘Cow’, like the notion of the cow-word appearing at the present time.

athavā yā yā gośabdaviṣayā buddhiḥ sādyatanagośabdaviṣayā, gośabdaviṣayatvāt /

“Or, (2) Whenever there is notion of the word. ‘Cow’, it must be taken as referring to the word ‘Cow’ appearing to-day, because it envisages the word ‘Cow’, like the word appearing to-day;

adya prasūtagośabdabuddhivat /

the notion of the word appearing yesterday envisages the same word.

gośabdaviṣayā ca hyastanī gośabdabuddhir iti svabhāvahetuḥ / athavā ahyastanī gośabdabuddhir dharmiṇī, hyastanagośabdaviṣayatvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ, gośabdaviṣayatvād iti hetuḥ, hyastanī gośabdabuddhir dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

This is thus a Reason based upon the nature of things. “Or, (3) The ‘subject’ of the Inference may be the notion of the word appearing to-day, ‘being envisaged by the notion of the word that appeared yesterday’ is the Probandum, ‘because it envisages the word’ is the Probans; and ‘the notion of the word appearing yesterday’ is the Corroborative Instance. This is the argument formulated in the words.

etad evāha iyam ityādi / iyam ityadyatanī /

‘This notion envisages, etc. etc.’ ‘this notion’ stands for the notion appearing to-day.

tam iti hyastanagośabdajñānopalabdhaṃ gośabdam /

That’ the word ‘Cow’ apprehended by the Cognition of the word ‘Cow’ that appeared yesterday.

taddhetor iti / gośabdaviṣayatvāt /

‘For the same said reason’ i.e. ‘because it envisages the word Cow

athavā ubhe hyastanyadyatanyau buddhī ekaviṣaye gośabdaviṣayatvād ekāgośabdabuddhivat /

“Or, (4) Both the notions appearing to-day and yesterday envisage the same word, because both envisage the word ‘Cow’; like the notion of the single word ‘Cow’.

ubhe cetyetad eva darśayati /

This argument is expressed in the words ‘Both, etc. etc.’.

hetuḥ prakṛtatvāt sujñāta iti noktaḥ /

The Reason has not been stated in detail, as it is well-known.

athavā samastā gotvabuddhayo deśādibhedabhinnā ekagośabdajanyā godhītvād ekagobuddhivat /

“Or, (5) All notions of the universal ‘Cow’, though divergent in regard to diversities of place, time, etc.

pūrvaṃ gośabdaviṣayā buddhayo dharmiṇyaḥ, ekaviṣayatvaṃ ca sādhyam, idānīṃ ca gotvajātiviṣayā buddhayo dharmiṇyaḥ, ekagośabdajanyatvaṃ sādhyam iti viśeṣaḥ / hyastanamuccāraṇamasyeti hyastanoccāraṇaḥ /

are produced by the same word ‘Cow’, because they are notions of the Cow, like the notion of the single Cow. In the previous argument, the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term) consisted of ‘the notions envisaging the word ‘Cow’, ‘envisaging the same object’ being the Probandum; while in the present argument, the notions envisaging the universal ‘Cow’ form the Minor Term, and ‘beng produced by the same word Cow’ is the Probandum;

[p.593] ayaṃ ca dharminirdeśaḥ /

this is the difference between the two arguments.

gauriti śrūyamāṇo 'dyeti dharminirdeśaḥ /

“(6) The compound ‘hyastanoccāraṇa’ means ‘that which had its utterance yesterday’; this mentions the Minor Term;

pūrvoditād iti /

‘existing to-day’ is the Probandum.

athavā yāvān vācakaśabda ityayaṃ dharminirdeśaḥ / tasya dīrghakālabhāktvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ /

The rest is easily understood. “(7) The word ‘Cow’ that is heard to-day is the Minor Term; ‘was heard yesterday’ is the Probandum.

sambandhānubhavāpekṣajñeyajñānapravartanād iti hetuḥ /

‘Aforesaid’, i.e. ‘because it is apprehended by the Cognition of the word Cow’, is the Probans.

sambandhānubhavam apekṣata iti sambandhānubhavāpekṣaṃ tac ca tat jñeyajñānapravartanaṃ ceti tathoktam /

and ‘because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships’ is the Probans. In the compound ‘sambandhānubhavā, etc.’ ‘sambandhānubhāpekṣam’ qualifies ‘jñeyajñanapravartanam’;

tasmāt sthiro jñeyaḥ sthirasyaiva viśeṣaṇaṃ dīrghakālabhāgiti /

‘should be regarded as lasting’; ‘for a long time’ qualifies ‘lasting’.

kālasthair yeṇa sthiratvamātrābhipretaṃ natu deśasthair yeṇa parvatāderivetiviśeṣaṇena darśayati /

The ‘lasting character’ meant here is in regard to time, not in regard to place, as in the case of mountains; this is what is intended to be indicated by the qualifying term ‘for a long time’.

dhūmasāmānyabhāgavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

‘Like the universal aspect of Smoke’ is the Corroborative Instance;

svalakṣaṇasyānanvayān na liṅgatvam iti sāmānyabhāga eva dṛṣṭāntaḥ / asthirastvityādi vyatirekakathanam /

the ‘specific individuality’ of things cannot have any continuity of existence or concomitance, hence it is the ‘universal aspect’ alone that can serve as the Corroborative Instance. “(9) ‘Cannot be evanescent’;

tādātvikanimittatvād iti /

‘Because it must have, etc. etc.’.

tādātvikam tāvat kālikaṃ vyavahārakālānuyāyi nimittaṃ sambandho yasya sa tathoktaḥ tadbhāvas tattvam //2121 //

‘Tādātvika’ till that time, i.e. till the time of use, its ‘nimitta’, relationship should continue.” (2121-2130)

nanu cānayā diśā ghaṭādīnām apyekatvaṃ śakyate vaktum /

The following objection is raised In this way, the Jar and such things also may be asserted to be one only.

tathā hi sarvā deśakālādibhinnā ghaṭādivyaktibuddhayaḥ samānaviṣayā navā nānārthagocarāḥ / ghaṭa ityutpadyamānatvāt sampratyutpannaghaṭabuddhivad ityevam ādi /

For instance, all notions of the individual Jar, though diverse through divergence of Place, Time, etc. must be regarded as envisaging one and the same thing, and not as envisaging several things, because it appears in the form of ‘Jar’, like the notion of the Jar appearing a.t the present moment; and so forth.

nacaikatvaṃ ghaṭādīnām iṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā /

As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouched for by perception.

tasmād ete sarva eva hetavo vyabhicāriṇa ityāśaṅkyāha ghaṭāder ityādi /

Hence all the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as False (Fallacious). The answer to this objection (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows: [see verses 2131-2132 next]

ghaṭāder ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam / vyaktīnām ekatāpattiṃ kuryāccedanayā diśā // tathā dṛṣṭaviruddhatvaṃ vācyaṃ śabdapramāṇakam /

“If the one-ness of the jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the ‘universal aspect’, then the argument is superfluous. If however, one were to urge the contingency of the individual jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all forms of right cognition;

yato 'dhyakṣādibhir mānair vyaktibhedaḥ suniścitaḥ //

because the multiplicity of individuals has been definitely established by all means of right cognition, sense-perception and the rest.” (2131-2132)

yadi jātyā jātirūpeṇa, ghaṭādīnām ekatvaṃ sādhyate prasaṅgena tadā siddhasādhanam /

If it is in reference to the ‘Universal’ the ‘genius’, ‘Jar’ that one-ness is sought to be proved by the above Reductio ad, Absurdum, then, it is superfluous;

taduktam ---``aṃśā hyetasya jātyākhyo nityo dhvaṃsītaro mata" iti /

as it has been declared ‘That aspect of the object which is Universal, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable’.

atha vyaktirūpāṇām ekatvaṃ prasaṅgena sādhyate, tadāpi na vyabhicāraḥ /

On the other hand, if the Reductio ad Absurdum is meant to prove the one-ness of the Individual Jars, even so, that does not falsify our premisses.

pratyakṣādibhir bādhitatvād asyāḥ pratijñāyāḥ /

Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition;

yasmād abādhitaviṣayatvena satīti sarve hetavaḥ saviśeṣaṇā ihābhipretāḥ /

specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that ‘what they assert is not annulled’;

tat kuto vyabhicāra ityabhiprāyaḥ /

how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons? Such is the sense of the passage.

dṛṣṭaviruddhatvam iti / pratijñāyā iti śeṣaḥ /

‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’ That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary.

śeṣaṃ sugamam //2131 //

The rest is easily understood.

kṛtrimatve ca sambandhas tat prayogāpavarjanāt / tadekavyaktiniṣṭhatvān naiva sārvatriko bhavet //

“If the relationship in question were artificial (set up for the occasion), then, as the particular use will have become accomplished and come to an end, it would be applicable to that one particular case only, and would not be universal in its application.

pārthivadravyasattvādilāṅgūlatvādisaṅkarāt / vinā prayogabhūyastvaṃ na syād gotvāvadhāraṇā //

In the cow there is a commingling of several factors such as the ‘earth’, ‘substance’, ‘being’, ‘tail’ and so forth, there could be no definite idea of the ‘cow’ except through frequent repeated usage.

tasmād akṛtrimaḥ śabdo na kadācid vinaśyati /

From this it follows that the word is not-artificial;

nityena nityasambandhād ākāśaparamāṇuvat //

and it never perishes, because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity like the ākāśa and the atom,” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words, 359-361].

kṛtrimatve ca sambandhasyetyapekṣaṇīyam /

The sense requires the reading ‘kṛtrimatve ca sambandhasya’.

yadi sambandhaḥ kṛtrimo bhavettadā tatprayogāpavarganātśabdaprayogavināśāt, śabdasyāpi vināśa iti sārvatrikaḥ sarvaprayogānuyāyī, na syāt /

If the Relationship were artificial, then, inasmuch as the particular use will have been accomplished, come to an end, the Word would have come to an end; hence the relationship between the Word and its meaning would not be universal i.e. applicable to all uses of the Word at all times.

kutaḥ---, tadekavyaktiniṣṭhatvāt ekagovyaktiniṣṭhatvāt /

Why? Because it would he applicable to that one particular case only; i.e. it would apply to one particular Cow only.

tatrārthāpattiḥ yeyaṃ saṃmukhe 'nekasaminnekasyām api govyaktau sāmānyasthite sati gośabdānniṣkṛṣṭasya gotvasyaiva pratipattiḥ, sā śabdamantareṇānupapannā /

In support of this a Presumption is put forward When several Cows are there before one. even though the Universal ‘Cow’ may be subsisting in a single individual Cow, what is understood is the universal ‘Cow’ as extracted from the word ‘Cow’; and this would not be possible if the Word were not there.

katham ity āha pārthivetyādi / śābdapramāṇapūrvakeyam arthāpattiḥ /

Why it would not be possible is explained in the Words ‘There is a commingling of several factors, etc. etc.’ This Presumption is based upon the authority of Words.

tasmād akṛtrimaḥ śabda ityanumānam upasaṃharati nityeneti /

‘For these reasons Word cannot be artificial’. This sums up the Inference.

jātisaṃjñākenārthena / nityaṃ sarvakālaṃ sambandhāt /

‘With an eternal entity’ i.e. the object named ‘Universal’, ‘Community ‘Eternal relationship’ which lasts for all time;

yathā paramāṇūnāṃ nityenākāśeneti //2133-2135 //

just like the relationship of Atoms with Ākāśa, which is eternal.

arthāpatter anaikāntikatvaṃ pariharann āha saṃmukhānekasāmānyetyādi /

The following texts reject the ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the above Presumption: [see verses 2136-2138 next]

saṃmukhānekasāmānyaviṣayaś ca sakṛcchrutaḥ / niṣkṛṣṭaṃ svārthavācitvaṃ gośabdo na prapadyate //

“Inasmuch as the word, heard but once, envisages several ‘universals’ in an indefinite form, it cannot definitely point to its own specific denotation, as distinguished from the other ‘universals’ (until it has been used several times).

bahubhiḥ śravaṇair eṣa prāṇitvādīni varjayan / śuklādigamanādīni sāsnālāṅgūlatādi ca // śāvaleyādikhaṇḍādivyaktīḥ svasvanibandhanāḥ /

As a matter of fact, the word ‘cow’ would get at the specific denotation of the particular ‘universal’ ‘cow’ only after a long time when it has been heard several times, and has thereby excluded the other universals ‘living beings’, ‘the quality of whiteness’, the action of ‘moving’, the universals ‘dewlap’, ‘tail’, and also the individuals, the ‘cow of variegated colour’, the ‘hornless cow’ and the like, which are diverse by reason of their individual peculiarities.” [Ślokavārtika eternality of words 364-366] (2136-2138) This has been thus explained in the Bhāṣya (of Śabara, on Sū.

niṣkṛṣṭagotvavācitvaṃ cireṇa pratipadyate //

I.

yathoktaṃ bhāṣye ---``nitye tu khalu vai śabde bahukṛtva uccāritaḥ śrutapūrvastvanyānyāsu goṣvanvayavyatirekābhyām ākṛtivacanatvamavagamayati tasmād apinitya"iti /

19) “If the word ‘Cow’ is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also several times, as applied to other individual Cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the Word comes to he recognised as denoting the particular Universal; for this reason also, the Word must be eternal.”

vyaktī svasvanibandhanā iti / yathāsvaṃ bhedabhinnā ity arthaḥ /

‘Individuals which are diverse, etc. etc.’ i.e. distinguished by their respective peculiarities;

bhinnatvaṃ hi tāsāṃ bheda [p.595] pratipattinibandhanam /

their diversity is based upon their being cognised as different from one another.

tena svaṃ bhinnatvaṃ bhedapratipattinibandhanaṃ yāsāṃ tāḥ svanibandhanāḥ /

Hence the compound ‘svasvanibandhanāḥ’ is to be expounded to mean ‘which have their diversity based upon the cognition of their respective peculiarities’.

varjayanniti sambandhaḥ //2136 2137 //

‘Having excluded’ has to be construed with all these.

tāvatkālaṃ sthiraṃ cainaṃ kaḥ paścānnāśayiṣyati /

“And if the word existed for such a long time, who could destroy it after that? [Ślokavārtika eternality of words 367].

sambhāvyate 'sya nāśitvaṃ na bhūyo 'nyena hetunā // yathā śastrādibhiśchedājjarayā vā ghaṭādayaḥ /

For another reason again it is not possible for the word to be destroyed: in the case of the jar and other things, it is understood that they would become destroyed either through decay or through some weapon;

naṅkṣyantītyavagamyante naivaṃ śabde 'sti kāraṇam //

there is no such cause by which the word could be destroyed.” (2139-2140)

tāvatkālam niṣkṛṣṭasvārthapratipādanakālam /

‘For such a long time’, i.e. during which time it denotes its own meaning after excluding so many other factors.

nanu yathā ghaṭādīnāṃ tāvatkālaṃ sthirāṇām api mudgarādibhyaḥ paścād vināśas tathā śabdasyāpi bhaviṣyatītyāha sambhāvyate 'syetyādi /

Says the Opponent: In the case of the Jar, etc. it is found that though they continue to exist for a long time, yet they come to be destroyed by the stroke of a stick or some such thing; the same may be the case with Word also.

bhūya iti/ punaḥ /

The answer to this is “For another reason, etc. etc.” ‘Bhūyaḥ’ again.

yathā śastrādibhiśchedād vināśaṃ pratipadyante ghaṭādayo jarayā vā, naivaṃ śabde 'sti kāraṇam / katham---, amūrtattvāt, ghaṭādīnāṃ ca mūrttatvād iti bhāvaḥ //2139 //

Things like the Jar undergo destruction either by decay or by the stroke of some weapon; there is no such cause for the destruction of the Word, Why? Because the Word is incorporeal, while the Jar and other things are corporeal. “Even though there are differences of place, time and user, there is no diversity in the letter ‘ga’ and the rest;

yaduktam ``ghaṭāder ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam / vyaktīnām ekatāpattiṃ kuryāc cedanayā diśā // tadā dṛṣṭaviruddhatvaṃ vācyaṃ sarvapramāṇakam //

It has been declared (under Text 2131, above) as follows: ‘If the oneness of the Jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the Universal aspect, then the argument is superfluous. If however, one were to urge the contingency of the Individual Jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all Forms of Bight Cognition’.