buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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vedakārasadṛkkaścid yadi dṛśyeta samprati / tatas tenopamānena kartur apyupamā bhavet //	(d) In case someone were visible now who is similar to the author of the veda, then alone, on the basis of that analogy, there might be an analogical cognition of such an author.
vedakārādṛte kiñcin na siddhyet pramitaṃ yadi / arthāpattyā pratīyeta vedakāras tato dhruvam //	(e) If there were something vouched for by the means of right cognition which would be inexplicable if there were no author of the veda, then alone, such an author of the veda might be accepted on the basis of presumption;
nanu tena vinā kiñcid vede yannopapadyate /	as a matter of fact however, there is nothing in the veda which could not be possible without such an author;
asmin sati hi bahveva prāmāṇyādi na siddhyati //	on the contrary, if there were an author, there is much, in the shape of its reliability and so forth, which could not be duly cognised.
sa pañcabhir agamyatvād abhāvenaiva gamyate / tena durlabhabhāvo 'sau pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt //	Thus then, being not amenable to the said five means of knowledge, the author in question becomes amenable only to the sixth, negation (non-apprehension): consequently, he is one whose existence is impossible, as it is precluded by negation, which is the only means of cognition (applicable to him).” (2088-2095)
[p.586] na tāvat pratyakṣataḥ kartā vedasya siddhaḥ tathā hi ayam asāviti na śakyate śṛṅgagrāhikayā pratipādayitum idānīm anupalabhyamānatvāt /	“(a) The Author of the Veda cannot be known by means of Sense-perception; because it can never be pointed out that ‘Here is the Author of the Veda’, simply because he is not seen at the present moment.
āsīt kartetyevaṃ tu kalpanīyaṃ, sa cādṛṣṭaḥ san kadāpyasīditīṣyate, yat tad apramāṇakam iti śeṣaḥ /	It might be assumed that ‘there was an Author’; and as no such person has ever been seen, the assumption can only be that ‘he existed at some time’; and this idea would not be reliable, this is what is meant and has to be added.
nāpyanumānataḥ siddha ity āha adṛṣṭapūrvetyādi /	“(b) Nor can the Author be known by means of Inference; this is what is said by the words ‘Adṛṣṭapūrva, etc. etc.’;
adṛṣṭapūrveṇakartrā sambandho janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇo yaḥ kriyate samprati vedasya vedanindakaiḥ so 'jñānahetukaḥ, jñāpakapramāṇābhāvāt /	the detractors of the Veda premise a relationship, in the shape of cause and effect, between the Veda and the Author who has never been seen before; and such a premiss can be based only on Ignorance, as there can be no valid means of Cognition indicating any such relationship;
na hyadṛṣṭena vahninā saha kaścid dhūmasya sambandhaṃ grahītuṃ prabhuḥ /	no one can ever be able to apprehend a relationship between Smoke and the Fire that has never been seen.
tasmād anumānavihīno 'pi sa kartā kalpyate /	Hence, if such an Author is assumed, such an assumption cannot be supported by Inference.
apiśabdān na kevalaṃ pratyakṣavihīnaḥ / śābdapramāṇanivṛttim āha āgamo 'pītyādi /	“(c) The words ‘āgamopi, etc. etc.’ point out that the Author cannot be known by means of Verbal Authority (or Revelation, Scripture).
vedasya vyatirekeṇākṛtakasyābhāvān na tāvad akṛtakaḥ /	Because, as there is no scripture other than the Veda which is itself without an author, the required scripture cannot be one which is without an author;
nāpi kṛtakastasya svayam evāpramāṇatvāt /	nor can it be one that has an author; because such a scripture would itself be unreliable.
tathā hi kṛtako bhavannāgamo vedasambaddhamanuprabhṛtipuruṣakartṛko bhavet / tadasambaddhasādhyamuniprabhṛtipraṇīto vā, prathamapakṣamadhikṛtyāha manvādivacanasyetyādi / tatkṛtaiveti/ vedakṛtaiva /	Because, when the scripture would be the work of an author, it could be the work of (1) Manu and other writers related to the Veda, or of (2) the Sādhyas and Munis not related to the Veda. As regards the first alternative, it is said ‘as regards the words of Manu and others, etc. etc.’: ‘Tatkṛtā’ due to the Veda;
anena svataḥ prāmāṇyābhāvamāha/	this means that these works are not self-sufficient in their authority.
dvitīye pakṣe doṣamāha asambaddhastviti / asambaddho vedena, tatrānadhikṛtatvāt /	The objection to the second alternative is next stated ‘Asambaddhastu, etc. etc.’ ‘who has no connection’ with the Veda; because such persons are not entitled to the study of the Veda.
anyakartṛka iti / asambaddhapuruṣakartṛkaḥ /	‘Any other writer’ i.e. the work of a person who has no connection with the Veda.
vedakārāgamo vedakārapratipādakaḥ /	‘Veda-kārāgamaḥ’, i.e. speaking of the Author of the Veda.
pramitipramāṇaṣaṭkaparicchinnaṃ /	(d) Pramitam vouched for by the six Means of Right Cognition.
tena vineti /	‘Tena vinā’ without an Author.
kartrā / kiñciditi / pramitam /	‘Kiñcit’ anything vouched for by the Means of Right Cognition.
asminniti /	‘Asmin’ Author.
kartari / prāmāṇyādītyādiśabdena dharmādivyavasthā /	In the word ‘prāmāṇyādi’, ‘reliability and so forth’, ‘so forth’ is meant to include Dharma and such notions.
abhāvenaiveti /	‘Abhāvena’;
abhāvena pramāṇena nāstītyeva gamyate /	it is only by the sixth Means of Cognition, Negation, that it can be known that a certain thing does not exist;
tasya pratiṣedhaviṣayatvāt /	as it is that alone that envisages negation.
athavā abhāvena rūpeṇa nāstītyevaṃ gamyata iti yāvat /	Or it may mean that such an Author is cognised in the form of negation i.e. as non-existent;
pramāṇābhāvāt / pramāṇābhāvabādhanād iti /	because there is no means of knowing him. ‘Pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt’;
pramāṇānām abhāvo nivṛttiḥ /	‘abhāva’, cessation of the Means of Cognition;
abhāvapramāṇam iti yāvat /	i.e. Negation as the Means of Cognition;
tena bādhanāt /	by this Negation, the idea of the Author is precluded.
nāsti vedasya karteti siddham //2088 //	Hence it is established that there can be no Author of the Veda.
syād etat yadi vedasyāpauruṣeyatvam evaṃ prasādhya prāmāṇyaṃ prasādhyate, hanta tarhi parataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ prayuktaṃ vedasya, tathā hi na tāvad vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ pratīyate yāvad apauruṣeyatā na sādhyata ity āśaṅkyāha aprāmāṇyetyādi /	“As a matter of fact, the idea of the Veda not being the work of an author is emphasised only for the purpose of showing that there can be no cause for unreliability; and as such an idea (being negative) is a nonentity, it cannot be proved by means of proofs.” (2096) The following argument might be urged (against the Mīmāṃsaka): If you prove the fact of the Veda not being the work of an Author, and then, on that basis, prove its authoritative (reliable) character, then, lo!
aprāmāṇyanivṛttyarthā vedasyāpauruṣeyatā / yeṣṭā sāpi tvavastutvāt sādhanīyā na sādhanaiḥ //	the authority of the Veda rests upon something other than itself; as the authority of the Veda cannot become recognised until the fact of its not being the work of an author is recognised.
anenaitad āha na hyasmābhir asiddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vidhirūpeṇa prasādhyate /kiṃ tarhi[p.587] pareṇa yadaprāmāṇyamāsaktaṃ tannivṛttiḥ kriyate /	The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2096 above] What is meant by this is as follows: We are not proving the Reliability (Authority) as a positive fact, which is not recognised; all that we are doing is to reject the unreliability (of the Yeda) which has been urged by our Opponent;
apavāde ca niraste svayam evotsargo 'napiditaḥ siddho 'vatiṣṭhate /	and when this charge has been set aside, the original positive proposition remains fully recognised by itself.
nāpyapauruṣeyatvaṃ prasādhyate, yatas tatsādhanadvāreṇa sāmarthyāt parataḥ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt / kiṃ tarhi tasyāpauruṣeyatānivṛttimātralakṣaṇatvenāvastutvāt //	As a matter of fact, even the idea of the Veda not being the work of an Author is not being sought to be proved by us; because, if it were proved, the implication would be that the reliability of the Yeda rests upon something else. The fact of the matter is that the said idea consists in the mere negation of the fact of the Veda being the work of an Author, and as such, it is a non-entity (which cannot be proved).
yadi na sādhyate kathaṃ tarhi svayaṃ siddhyatītyāha yannāmetyādi /	Question: If it is not proved (by you), how does it become proved by itself? Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka): [see verses 2097-2099 next]
tannirākaraṇāt siddhā vedasyāpauruṣeyatā //	“When the logician asserts the fact of the Veda being the work of an author, the refutation of that fact proves the fact of the Veda not being the work of an author.” (2097)
nanu nirākṛto 'pi parapakṣe svapakṣamasādhayataḥ pramāṇena kathaṃ tat siddhir yena kṛtārthā vedavādino bhavantītyāha vastubhūtāv ityādi /	Question: Even on the refutation of the Opponent’s view, if the upholder of the Veda does not actually prove his own view, how could the latter be accepted and the upholders of the Veda become satisfied? This Question is further expounded: [see verse 2098 above]
pradhānaparamāṇuvad ityetad vyācaṣṭe pradhānakāraṇatvasyetyādi /	[verse 2098]: The following Text explains the term ‘Primordial Matter and Atom’: [see verse 2099 above]
vaiśeṣikeṇa yadyapi sāṅkhyopanyastapradhānakāraṇajagat sādhanaṃ nirākṛtam, tathāpi hetvantareṇaiva paramāṇukṛtaṃ jagatsādhanīyam, ihāpyevaṃ bhaviṣyatīti //	Even though the Vaiśeṣika has (successfully) refuted the Sāṅkhya view that the World is a product of Primordial Matter, yet he has got to prove, by means of other Reasons, the fact of the world being the product of Atoms; similarly in the case in question (it is necessary for the Mīmāṃsaka to adduce reasons in proof of his view).
atrāha bhāvapakṣetyādi /	The answer to the above (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows: [see verses 2100-2101 next]
bhāvapakṣaprasiddhyartham ucyate yat tu sādhanam / tasminnirākṛte samyagabhāvaḥ siddhyati svayam //	“When a proof is adduced in support of the affirmative view, if that is refuted, the negative view (to the contrary) becomes rightly proved by itself.
yat pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyoḥ paraiḥ sādhanam ucyate /	thus it is that, when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the upholders of the Veda have.
tannirākaraṇaṃ kṛtvā kṛtārthā vedavādinaḥ //	their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs.” (2100-2101) ‘Affirmative view’ that the Veda is the work of an Author;
bhāvapakṣaḥ pauruṣeyatā, tannivṛttirabhāvapakṣaḥ /	and the denial of that is the ‘Negative view’.
anyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoścaikapratiṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvād ityabhāvaḥ svayaṃ siddhyatīti bhāvaḥ /	These two views are so related that the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other and vice versa; hence the denial of one is concomitant with the affirmation of the other;
tathā hi vedasya pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyorutpādavināśalakṣaṇayoḥ siddhaye yadbauddhaiḥ sādhanam ucyate tannirākaraṇamātreṇaiva vedāpauruṣeyatvasya koṭidvayaśūnyatālakṣaṇasya siddhāviṣṭasiddhyā kṛtārthā vedavādinaḥ //	For instance, for the purpose of proving the ‘two ends’ beginning and end of the Veda, the Buddhists adduce certain proofs, the mere refutation of these proofs proves the contrary view that the Veda has no beginning or end, and as such, is not the work of an Author; and when this has become proved, the Upholders of the Veda become satisfied on the accomplishment of what is desired by them.
nanu nirākṛte 'pi tat sādhane vedasya nityatvaṃ vidhirūpaṃ yatnāntareṇa sādhanīyam, [p.588] tat katham asādhayanto vedasya nityatvaṃ kṛtārthā bhaveyur vedavida ity āha ---nityatvaṃ vasturūpam ityādi / nityatvaṃ vasturūpaṃ yat tadasādhayatām api / svayaṃ bhavati tat siddhiḥ pūrvapakṣadvaye hate //	“As regards the positive fact of the eternality of the Veda, it becomes established for us on the rejection of the ‘two ends’ (of the Veda), even though we do not adduce proofs in support of the said eternality (2102) Objection: even when the said proofs have been refuted, it is necessary to put forth a further effort to prove the positive fact of the Veda being eternal; under the circumstances, how can the upholders of the Veda be satisfied, until they have actually proved the eternality of the Veda?
pūrvapakṣadvayam pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyoḥ sādhanam // yathā pūrvapakṣadvaye hate nityatvasya svayaṃ siddhir bhavati taddarśayati pūrvā vedasyetyādi / pūrvā vedasya yā koṭiḥ pauruṣeyatvalakṣaṇā /	‘The two ends’ i.e. the proof adduced in proof of the idea of the Veda having a beginning and end. “The ‘first end’ of the Veda consists in the idea of its being the work of an author, and the ‘other end’ consists in its being destroyed;
parā vināśarūpā ca tadabhāvo hi nityatā //	and the negation of these (two ends) means ‘eternality’.” (2103)
pūrvāparakoṭidvayaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvān nityatvasya, parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoścaikanirākaraṇasyāparasadbhāvanāntarīyakatvādityuktam //	As a matter of fact, ‘Eternality’ and ‘Having the two ends’ are mutually exclusive, one involving the negation of the other; and between two mutually exclusive ideas, the absence of one is always concomitant with the presence of the other; as has been already pointed out.
yadyevaṃ, yadi tadabhāvo nityatā, na tarhi vastudharmo nityatā prāpnotītyāha yannādau kriyata iti /	The other party urges If the ‘negation of the two ends’ constitutes Eternality, then it comes to this that Eternality is not a positive quality of things.
yannādau kriyate vedaḥ paścānnaiva vinaśyati /	“The eternality of the Veda consists in the fact that it is not produced in the beginning and does not perish in the end.
tadeva tasya nityatvaṃ jñeyaṃ tadapi cenmatam // akṛtatvāvināśābhyāṃ nityatvaṃ hi vivakṣitam /	If it be urged that ‘even so, this eternality is something cognisable’, then [the answer is that] eternality is what is meant by the two characters of ‘being not produced’ and ‘being not destroyed’;
tau cābhāvātmakatvena nāpekṣete svasādhanam //	and both these being of the nature of negation do not require any proof for themselves.” (2104-2105)
anena vastubhūtasya vedasyātmagata evāsau dharma iti pratipādayati /	What is meant by this is that eternality forms part of the very nature of the Veda, which is an entity.
yadyevaṃ vastubhūtatvāt sādhyaṃ tarhi nityatvaṃ prāptam iti paravacanāvakāśamāśaṅkate jñeyam ityādi / jñeyam pramāṇena jñātavyam, sādhyam iti yāvat /	‘If it be urged, etc. etc.’ This anticipates the following objection from the Opponent If it is as stated, then Eternality is an entity and as such it is something that has to be cognised by a Means of Cognition, to be proved. The answer to this is ‘What is meant, etc. etc.’
tau ceti / akṛtatvāvināśau /	‘Both these’ i.e. the characters of not being produced and not being destroyed.
svarūpasya sādhanaṃ svasādhanam /	‘Proof for themselves’ i.e. any means of cognising their own forms.
abhāvasyāpi vastutvāvirodhāt satyapyakṛtāvināśitvalakṣaṇatve nityatvasya nāvastutvam iti bhāvaḥ //	What is meant is that there need be nothing incongruous in Negation being an entity; so that even though Eternality consists in the two characters of ‘not being produced’ and ‘not being destroyed’, it need not be a nonentity.
evaṃ tāvat pramāṇapañcakanivṛttyā vede karturabhāvasiddhyā yanmithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitamityasya hetornāsiddhiḥ, nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt, vipakṣe cābhāvānnāpyanaikāntikatvam iti siddhaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyam /	“Having thus shown that the five Means of Right Cognition are not effective in the matter, it is regarded as proved that there is no Author of the Veda; and consequently there can be no ‘inadmissibility’ in the Reason adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka because the Veda is free from the contact of defects that bring about falsity’, Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present wherever the Probandum is present;
sāmprataṃ paraprayuktasya vedāprāmāṇyasādhanadvayasya vistareṇa dūṣaṇamārabhate /	Now the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out in detail the defects in the two arguments put forward by his Opponent in support of the view that the Veda is not authoritative and reliable.
tatredaṃ sādhanadvayaṃ yadaindriyakaṃ prayatnānantarīyakaṃ ca, tadanityaṃ, yathā ghaṭaḥ, tathā ca śabdaḥ, iti svabhāvahetusāmānyena śabdasyānityatve siddhe vedasyāpyanityatvasiddhyā sāmarthyādasyāḥ puruṣavākyavan mithyātvaṃ setsya [p.589] tīti parasya bauddhāder abhiprāyaḥ /	and Sound is both (perceptible and produced by effort); these are Reasons based upon the nature of things, which prove the non-eternaliiy of sound in general; and this being proved, the non-eternality of the Veda necessarily follows; and from this it also follows, by implication, that like the assertions of human beings, the words of the Veda also may be false. Such is the sense of what is argued by the Buddhists and others.
tatra śābdapramāṇabādhāṃ tāvad āha vedavākyārtham ityādi / vedavākyārthamithyātvaṃ yo vadatyanumānataḥ / tasya vaidikavijñānabalāt pakṣo nivartate //	Against these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka sets forth in detail the argument that the proposition of the Opponents is annulled by the Verbal and other Means of Right Cognition. First of all, the following Text shows that the Proposition that the Vedic Words are false is annulled by Verbal Cognition itself: [see verse 2106 above] ‘Vaidika’ is derived from, the Veda;
vedād āgataṃ vaidikam agnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādi /	i.e. such cognitions or notions as Heaven follows from the performance of the ‘Agnihotra’;
tadbalāt pakṣo nivartate, tena bāhyamānatvāt /	by the force of such notions, his Proposition becomes annulled, as it is set aside by it.
yathoktam "na cāsya codanā syād vā naveti saṃśayitaṃ pratyayamutpādayati, naca mithyaitad iti kālāntare puruṣāntare deśāntare 'vasthāntare vā punar avyapadeśyapratyayo bhavati /	This has been thus asserted “As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character, in any such form as ‘this may or may not be so’; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person does there appear any notion to the contrary, that ‘it is false’.
yo 'pyanyapratyayaviparyāsaṃ dṛṣṭātrāpi viparyayaḥ siddhyatītyānumānikaḥ pratyaya utpadyate, so 'pyanena pratyakṣeṇa virudhyamāno bādhyete"ti //	As regards the idea that ‘the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false’, this is only an Inference, and as such, becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct cognition to the contrary,” (Śabara-bhāṣya-Transation, page 13.
nanu ca tulyabalayoḥ katham ekanetarasya bādhā / atha tulyabalatve 'pi bādhā, anumānena tarhi tasya kiṃ na bādhā syād ity āha tacca pratyakṣatulyavad iti /	Says the other party: The two Verbal Cognition and Inference being of equal strength (validity), how can one be annulled by the other? If even when they are of equal strength, there can be sublation, then why should not the Inference sublate the Verbal Cognition?”
tacca pratyakṣatulyatvād vaidikaṃ balavattaram /	“The knowledge derived from the Veda is of the same degree as perception, and hence stronger than inference;
na śakyam anumānena kathañcid api bādhitam //	consequently, it can never be annulled by inference.” (2107)
anumānaṃ kathaṃ tarhi tena bādhyata ity āha pratyakṣetyādi /	Question: How then is Inference annulled by the Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda)? Answer: [see verse 2108 above]
yathoktam "pratyakṣastu vedavacanapratyayaḥ, na cānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavatī"ti //	This has been thus declared “The cognition derived from the words of the Veda is Perception, and Inference contrary to Perception cannot be valid” (2108)
katham anumānād āgamasya balīyastvaṃ yena pratyakṣatulyatvaṃ tasyetyāha dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvād iti /	Question: In what way is Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda) stronger than Inference, by virtue of which it is regarded as equal to Perception?
dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvād doṣābhāvāc ca lāghavam / āgamasya pramāṇatve nānumānasya tādṛśam //	“There is a degree of simplicity in the validity of verbal cognition due to the fact of its not needing a corroborative instance, and to the absence of defects, which is not found in inference.
tenāgamānumānābhyāṃ yatrārthe saṃśayo bhavet / tatrāgamabalīyastvāt kāryastenaiva nirṇayaḥ //	Consequently, whenever there should be any doubt between verbal cognition and inference, it is verbal cognition that should be regarded as stronger, and the matter determined accordingly.” (2109-2110).
pramāṇatva iti / lāghavāpekṣā viṣayasaptamī /	‘Pramāṇatve’ the Locative is to be construed with ‘lāghavam’,
nānumānasya tādṛśam iti /	‘Which is not found, in Inference’;
tasya dṛṣṭāntāpekṣatvād doṣasadbhāvāc ca /	because it needs a Corroborative Instance and because defects are possible in it;
doṣas tu pratyakṣatulyena vaidikena jñānena bādhyamānatvāt //	the defect being that it is annulled by Cognition derived from the Veda which is equal in authority to Perception.
[p.590] nanu ca yadevobhayasiddhaṃ tadeva dūṣaṇaṃ bhavati, naca bauddhasyāgamaḥ pramāṇam, dve eva pramāṇe ityavadhāraṇāt, tat katham asiddhenāgamaprāmāṇyena bādhā kriyate bauddhaṃ pratītyāśaṅkyāha mamāpramāṇam ityādi /	The other party raises an objection As a rule that alone is regarded as a ‘Defect’ in argument which is admitted by both parties; in the case in question, Revelation is not a means of valid Cognition, for the Buddhist, who posits only two Means of Cognition (Perception and Inference); then how can there be an ‘annulment’ of Inference by what is not accepted as a Means of Cognition, so far as the Buddhist is concerned?
mamāt pramāṇam ityevaṃ vedo 'rthaṃ bodhayann api / vaktuṃ na dveṣamātreṇa śakyate 'satyavādinā //	“While the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, the assertion that ‘it is not a means of cognition for me’ should not be made by a truthful person, by reason of sheer malice.
dveṣād asammatatvād vā naca syād apramāṇatā /	It cannot cease to be a means of cognition, on the ground that there is malice against it or because it is not popular;
naca prītyabhyanujñābhyāṃ pramāṇamavakalpyate // dviṣanto 'pi ca vedasya naivāprāmāṇyakāraṇam /	nor can anything become a means of cognition, on the ground that one likes it and it is popular. Even those who are hostile to the Veda do not assert any reason why it should not be a means of right cognition;
kiñcijjalpanti ye naite bhaveyuḥ satyavādinaḥ //	by virtue of which they could be regarded as truthful people.
dhāraṇādhyayanavyākhyākarmanityābhiyogibhiḥ / mithyātvaheturajñāto dūrasthair jñāyate katham // abhiyuktā hi ye yatra tannibaddhaprayojanāḥ / tatratyaguṇadoṣāṇāṃ jñāne te 'dhikṛtā yataḥ //	When people, who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the veda and upon the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it? It is only persons who are fully conversant with a thing and who have their purpose centred therein that can detect the good and bad points of that thing.
ye tu brahmadviṣaḥ pāpā vedāddūraṃ bahiṣkṛtāḥ / te vedaguṇadoṣoktīḥ kathaṃ jalpantyalajjitāḥ //	Those evil-minded people on the other hand, who are hostile to Vrahman and have been far removed from the Veda, how can those people bare-facedly speak of the good and bad points in the Veda?” (2111-2116).
evaṃ manyate nahīcchāmātreṇa vastunaḥ siddhyasiddhī bhavataḥ, yenābhyupagamamātreṇa na siddhamāgamaprāmāṇyaṃ bhavet, kiṃ tarhi---, pramāṇabalena yat siddhaṃ taddvayor api siddham, dṛḍhataraścāgnihotrādivākyāt pratyaya iti pratipāditam, tat katham apramāṇam iti śakyaṃ vaktum /	This is how the Mīmāṃsaka argues “Things do not become established or otherwise merely according to one’s whim; by virtue of which the mere assertion of the opinion would set aside the validity of Verbal Cognition; what is established by reason must be accepted by both parties; it has been explained that the conviction derived from the Vedic declarations regarding Agnihotra, etc. is exceptionally strong; how then can it be said that it is not a Means of Cognition? It is a mere assertion of yours, wholly devoid of reason”.
kevalaṃ vāṅmātrametad bhavatām, niryuktikam iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ /	Such in brief is what is meant by the Mīmāṃsaka.
asammatatvād iti /	‘Because it is not popular’.
lokasyābhyanujñā lokasammatatvam /	People’s agreement constitutes its popularity.
śākyādayo vedāt /	‘Aloof from, the Veda’ Śākya and others who keep away from the Veda;
taddhāraṇādikarmabahiṣkṛtatvāt / tannibaddhaprayojanā iti /	because they are excluded from its study, etc. ‘Who have their purpose centred therein’ i.e. whose purpose ends of life, in the shape of sacrifice, etc.
brahmādviṣa iti vedadviṣaḥ /	‘Hostile to Brahman’ i.e. Hostile to the Veda.
tadudbhūtaṃ vā jñāna brahma //2111 //2112 //2113 //	Or ‘Brahman’ may be taken as standing for the knowledge derived from the Veda.
athavā mābhūdāgamato bādhā, tathāpi duṣṭa eva pratijñārthaḥ, pratyakṣādibhir mānair bādhyamānatvād iti pratipādayann āha kiñcetyādi /	“Or, it may be that the Inference is not annulled by Verbal Cognition; even so, the Proposition of the Buddhist is defective; because it is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition”. This is the idea expounded in the following: [see verse 2117 next]
kiñca śabdasya nityatvaṃ śrotrajapratyabhijñayā /	“Then again, the eternality and all-pervasiveness of the word, is established by auditory recognition;

vedakārasadṛkkaścid yadi dṛśyeta samprati / tatas tenopamānena kartur apyupamā bhavet //

(d) In case someone were visible now who is similar to the author of the veda, then alone, on the basis of that analogy, there might be an analogical cognition of such an author.

vedakārādṛte kiñcin na siddhyet pramitaṃ yadi / arthāpattyā pratīyeta vedakāras tato dhruvam //

(e) If there were something vouched for by the means of right cognition which would be inexplicable if there were no author of the veda, then alone, such an author of the veda might be accepted on the basis of presumption;

nanu tena vinā kiñcid vede yannopapadyate /

as a matter of fact however, there is nothing in the veda which could not be possible without such an author;

asmin sati hi bahveva prāmāṇyādi na siddhyati //

on the contrary, if there were an author, there is much, in the shape of its reliability and so forth, which could not be duly cognised.

sa pañcabhir agamyatvād abhāvenaiva gamyate / tena durlabhabhāvo 'sau pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt //

Thus then, being not amenable to the said five means of knowledge, the author in question becomes amenable only to the sixth, negation (non-apprehension): consequently, he is one whose existence is impossible, as it is precluded by negation, which is the only means of cognition (applicable to him).” (2088-2095)

[p.586] na tāvat pratyakṣataḥ kartā vedasya siddhaḥ tathā hi ayam asāviti na śakyate śṛṅgagrāhikayā pratipādayitum idānīm anupalabhyamānatvāt /

“(a) The Author of the Veda cannot be known by means of Sense-perception; because it can never be pointed out that ‘Here is the Author of the Veda’, simply because he is not seen at the present moment.

āsīt kartetyevaṃ tu kalpanīyaṃ, sa cādṛṣṭaḥ san kadāpyasīditīṣyate, yat tad apramāṇakam iti śeṣaḥ /

It might be assumed that ‘there was an Author’; and as no such person has ever been seen, the assumption can only be that ‘he existed at some time’; and this idea would not be reliable, this is what is meant and has to be added.

nāpyanumānataḥ siddha ity āha adṛṣṭapūrvetyādi /

“(b) Nor can the Author be known by means of Inference; this is what is said by the words ‘Adṛṣṭapūrva, etc. etc.’;

adṛṣṭapūrveṇakartrā sambandho janyajanakabhāvalakṣaṇo yaḥ kriyate samprati vedasya vedanindakaiḥ so 'jñānahetukaḥ, jñāpakapramāṇābhāvāt /

the detractors of the Veda premise a relationship, in the shape of cause and effect, between the Veda and the Author who has never been seen before; and such a premiss can be based only on Ignorance, as there can be no valid means of Cognition indicating any such relationship;

na hyadṛṣṭena vahninā saha kaścid dhūmasya sambandhaṃ grahītuṃ prabhuḥ /

no one can ever be able to apprehend a relationship between Smoke and the Fire that has never been seen.

tasmād anumānavihīno 'pi sa kartā kalpyate /

Hence, if such an Author is assumed, such an assumption cannot be supported by Inference.

apiśabdān na kevalaṃ pratyakṣavihīnaḥ / śābdapramāṇanivṛttim āha āgamo 'pītyādi /

“(c) The words ‘āgamopi, etc. etc.’ point out that the Author cannot be known by means of Verbal Authority (or Revelation, Scripture).

vedasya vyatirekeṇākṛtakasyābhāvān na tāvad akṛtakaḥ /

Because, as there is no scripture other than the Veda which is itself without an author, the required scripture cannot be one which is without an author;

nāpi kṛtakastasya svayam evāpramāṇatvāt /

nor can it be one that has an author; because such a scripture would itself be unreliable.

tathā hi kṛtako bhavannāgamo vedasambaddhamanuprabhṛtipuruṣakartṛko bhavet / tadasambaddhasādhyamuniprabhṛtipraṇīto vā, prathamapakṣamadhikṛtyāha manvādivacanasyetyādi / tatkṛtaiveti/ vedakṛtaiva /

Because, when the scripture would be the work of an author, it could be the work of (1) Manu and other writers related to the Veda, or of (2) the Sādhyas and Munis not related to the Veda. As regards the first alternative, it is said ‘as regards the words of Manu and others, etc. etc.’: ‘Tatkṛtā’ due to the Veda;

anena svataḥ prāmāṇyābhāvamāha/

this means that these works are not self-sufficient in their authority.

dvitīye pakṣe doṣamāha asambaddhastviti / asambaddho vedena, tatrānadhikṛtatvāt /

The objection to the second alternative is next stated ‘Asambaddhastu, etc. etc.’ ‘who has no connection’ with the Veda; because such persons are not entitled to the study of the Veda.

anyakartṛka iti / asambaddhapuruṣakartṛkaḥ /

‘Any other writer’ i.e. the work of a person who has no connection with the Veda.

vedakārāgamo vedakārapratipādakaḥ /

‘Veda-kārāgamaḥ’, i.e. speaking of the Author of the Veda.

pramitipramāṇaṣaṭkaparicchinnaṃ /

(d) Pramitam vouched for by the six Means of Right Cognition.

tena vineti /

‘Tena vinā’ without an Author.

kartrā / kiñciditi / pramitam /

‘Kiñcit’ anything vouched for by the Means of Right Cognition.

asminniti /

‘Asmin’ Author.

kartari / prāmāṇyādītyādiśabdena dharmādivyavasthā /

In the word ‘prāmāṇyādi’, ‘reliability and so forth’, ‘so forth’ is meant to include Dharma and such notions.

abhāvenaiveti /

‘Abhāvena’;

abhāvena pramāṇena nāstītyeva gamyate /

it is only by the sixth Means of Cognition, Negation, that it can be known that a certain thing does not exist;

tasya pratiṣedhaviṣayatvāt /

as it is that alone that envisages negation.

athavā abhāvena rūpeṇa nāstītyevaṃ gamyata iti yāvat /

Or it may mean that such an Author is cognised in the form of negation i.e. as non-existent;

pramāṇābhāvāt / pramāṇābhāvabādhanād iti /

because there is no means of knowing him. ‘Pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt’;

pramāṇānām abhāvo nivṛttiḥ /

‘abhāva’, cessation of the Means of Cognition;

abhāvapramāṇam iti yāvat /

i.e. Negation as the Means of Cognition;

tena bādhanāt /

by this Negation, the idea of the Author is precluded.

nāsti vedasya karteti siddham //2088 //

Hence it is established that there can be no Author of the Veda.

syād etat yadi vedasyāpauruṣeyatvam evaṃ prasādhya prāmāṇyaṃ prasādhyate, hanta tarhi parataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ prayuktaṃ vedasya, tathā hi na tāvad vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ pratīyate yāvad apauruṣeyatā na sādhyata ity āśaṅkyāha aprāmāṇyetyādi /

“As a matter of fact, the idea of the Veda not being the work of an author is emphasised only for the purpose of showing that there can be no cause for unreliability; and as such an idea (being negative) is a nonentity, it cannot be proved by means of proofs.” (2096) The following argument might be urged (against the Mīmāṃsaka): If you prove the fact of the Veda not being the work of an Author, and then, on that basis, prove its authoritative (reliable) character, then, lo!

aprāmāṇyanivṛttyarthā vedasyāpauruṣeyatā / yeṣṭā sāpi tvavastutvāt sādhanīyā na sādhanaiḥ //

the authority of the Veda rests upon something other than itself; as the authority of the Veda cannot become recognised until the fact of its not being the work of an author is recognised.

anenaitad āha na hyasmābhir asiddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vidhirūpeṇa prasādhyate /kiṃ tarhi[p.587] pareṇa yadaprāmāṇyamāsaktaṃ tannivṛttiḥ kriyate /

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2096 above] What is meant by this is as follows: We are not proving the Reliability (Authority) as a positive fact, which is not recognised; all that we are doing is to reject the unreliability (of the Yeda) which has been urged by our Opponent;

apavāde ca niraste svayam evotsargo 'napiditaḥ siddho 'vatiṣṭhate /

and when this charge has been set aside, the original positive proposition remains fully recognised by itself.

nāpyapauruṣeyatvaṃ prasādhyate, yatas tatsādhanadvāreṇa sāmarthyāt parataḥ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt / kiṃ tarhi tasyāpauruṣeyatānivṛttimātralakṣaṇatvenāvastutvāt //

As a matter of fact, even the idea of the Veda not being the work of an Author is not being sought to be proved by us; because, if it were proved, the implication would be that the reliability of the Yeda rests upon something else. The fact of the matter is that the said idea consists in the mere negation of the fact of the Veda being the work of an Author, and as such, it is a non-entity (which cannot be proved).

yadi na sādhyate kathaṃ tarhi svayaṃ siddhyatītyāha yannāmetyādi /

Question: If it is not proved (by you), how does it become proved by itself? Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka): [see verses 2097-2099 next]

tannirākaraṇāt siddhā vedasyāpauruṣeyatā //

“When the logician asserts the fact of the Veda being the work of an author, the refutation of that fact proves the fact of the Veda not being the work of an author.” (2097)

nanu nirākṛto 'pi parapakṣe svapakṣamasādhayataḥ pramāṇena kathaṃ tat siddhir yena kṛtārthā vedavādino bhavantītyāha vastubhūtāv ityādi /

Question: Even on the refutation of the Opponent’s view, if the upholder of the Veda does not actually prove his own view, how could the latter be accepted and the upholders of the Veda become satisfied? This Question is further expounded: [see verse 2098 above]

pradhānaparamāṇuvad ityetad vyācaṣṭe pradhānakāraṇatvasyetyādi /

[verse 2098]: The following Text explains the term ‘Primordial Matter and Atom’: [see verse 2099 above]

vaiśeṣikeṇa yadyapi sāṅkhyopanyastapradhānakāraṇajagat sādhanaṃ nirākṛtam, tathāpi hetvantareṇaiva paramāṇukṛtaṃ jagatsādhanīyam, ihāpyevaṃ bhaviṣyatīti //

Even though the Vaiśeṣika has (successfully) refuted the Sāṅkhya view that the World is a product of Primordial Matter, yet he has got to prove, by means of other Reasons, the fact of the world being the product of Atoms; similarly in the case in question (it is necessary for the Mīmāṃsaka to adduce reasons in proof of his view).

atrāha bhāvapakṣetyādi /

The answer to the above (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows: [see verses 2100-2101 next]

bhāvapakṣaprasiddhyartham ucyate yat tu sādhanam / tasminnirākṛte samyagabhāvaḥ siddhyati svayam //

“When a proof is adduced in support of the affirmative view, if that is refuted, the negative view (to the contrary) becomes rightly proved by itself.

yat pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyoḥ paraiḥ sādhanam ucyate /

thus it is that, when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the upholders of the Veda have.

tannirākaraṇaṃ kṛtvā kṛtārthā vedavādinaḥ //

their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs.” (2100-2101) ‘Affirmative view’ that the Veda is the work of an Author;

bhāvapakṣaḥ pauruṣeyatā, tannivṛttirabhāvapakṣaḥ /

and the denial of that is the ‘Negative view’.

anyonyaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoścaikapratiṣedhasyāparavidhināntarīyakatvād ityabhāvaḥ svayaṃ siddhyatīti bhāvaḥ /

These two views are so related that the truth of the one involves the falsity of the other and vice versa; hence the denial of one is concomitant with the affirmation of the other;

tathā hi vedasya pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyorutpādavināśalakṣaṇayoḥ siddhaye yadbauddhaiḥ sādhanam ucyate tannirākaraṇamātreṇaiva vedāpauruṣeyatvasya koṭidvayaśūnyatālakṣaṇasya siddhāviṣṭasiddhyā kṛtārthā vedavādinaḥ //

For instance, for the purpose of proving the ‘two ends’ beginning and end of the Veda, the Buddhists adduce certain proofs, the mere refutation of these proofs proves the contrary view that the Veda has no beginning or end, and as such, is not the work of an Author; and when this has become proved, the Upholders of the Veda become satisfied on the accomplishment of what is desired by them.

nanu nirākṛte 'pi tat sādhane vedasya nityatvaṃ vidhirūpaṃ yatnāntareṇa sādhanīyam, [p.588] tat katham asādhayanto vedasya nityatvaṃ kṛtārthā bhaveyur vedavida ity āha ---nityatvaṃ vasturūpam ityādi / nityatvaṃ vasturūpaṃ yat tadasādhayatām api / svayaṃ bhavati tat siddhiḥ pūrvapakṣadvaye hate //

“As regards the positive fact of the eternality of the Veda, it becomes established for us on the rejection of the ‘two ends’ (of the Veda), even though we do not adduce proofs in support of the said eternality (2102) Objection: even when the said proofs have been refuted, it is necessary to put forth a further effort to prove the positive fact of the Veda being eternal; under the circumstances, how can the upholders of the Veda be satisfied, until they have actually proved the eternality of the Veda?

pūrvapakṣadvayam pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyoḥ sādhanam // yathā pūrvapakṣadvaye hate nityatvasya svayaṃ siddhir bhavati taddarśayati pūrvā vedasyetyādi / pūrvā vedasya yā koṭiḥ pauruṣeyatvalakṣaṇā /

‘The two ends’ i.e. the proof adduced in proof of the idea of the Veda having a beginning and end. “The ‘first end’ of the Veda consists in the idea of its being the work of an author, and the ‘other end’ consists in its being destroyed;

parā vināśarūpā ca tadabhāvo hi nityatā //

and the negation of these (two ends) means ‘eternality’.” (2103)

pūrvāparakoṭidvayaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvān nityatvasya, parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoścaikanirākaraṇasyāparasadbhāvanāntarīyakatvādityuktam //

As a matter of fact, ‘Eternality’ and ‘Having the two ends’ are mutually exclusive, one involving the negation of the other; and between two mutually exclusive ideas, the absence of one is always concomitant with the presence of the other; as has been already pointed out.

yadyevaṃ, yadi tadabhāvo nityatā, na tarhi vastudharmo nityatā prāpnotītyāha yannādau kriyata iti /

The other party urges If the ‘negation of the two ends’ constitutes Eternality, then it comes to this that Eternality is not a positive quality of things.

yannādau kriyate vedaḥ paścānnaiva vinaśyati /

“The eternality of the Veda consists in the fact that it is not produced in the beginning and does not perish in the end.

tadeva tasya nityatvaṃ jñeyaṃ tadapi cenmatam // akṛtatvāvināśābhyāṃ nityatvaṃ hi vivakṣitam /

If it be urged that ‘even so, this eternality is something cognisable’, then [the answer is that] eternality is what is meant by the two characters of ‘being not produced’ and ‘being not destroyed’;

tau cābhāvātmakatvena nāpekṣete svasādhanam //

and both these being of the nature of negation do not require any proof for themselves.” (2104-2105)

anena vastubhūtasya vedasyātmagata evāsau dharma iti pratipādayati /

What is meant by this is that eternality forms part of the very nature of the Veda, which is an entity.

yadyevaṃ vastubhūtatvāt sādhyaṃ tarhi nityatvaṃ prāptam iti paravacanāvakāśamāśaṅkate jñeyam ityādi / jñeyam pramāṇena jñātavyam, sādhyam iti yāvat /

‘If it be urged, etc. etc.’ This anticipates the following objection from the Opponent If it is as stated, then Eternality is an entity and as such it is something that has to be cognised by a Means of Cognition, to be proved. The answer to this is ‘What is meant, etc. etc.’

tau ceti / akṛtatvāvināśau /

‘Both these’ i.e. the characters of not being produced and not being destroyed.

svarūpasya sādhanaṃ svasādhanam /

‘Proof for themselves’ i.e. any means of cognising their own forms.

abhāvasyāpi vastutvāvirodhāt satyapyakṛtāvināśitvalakṣaṇatve nityatvasya nāvastutvam iti bhāvaḥ //

What is meant is that there need be nothing incongruous in Negation being an entity; so that even though Eternality consists in the two characters of ‘not being produced’ and ‘not being destroyed’, it need not be a nonentity.

evaṃ tāvat pramāṇapañcakanivṛttyā vede karturabhāvasiddhyā yanmithyātvahetudoṣasaṃsargarahitamityasya hetornāsiddhiḥ, nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt, vipakṣe cābhāvānnāpyanaikāntikatvam iti siddhaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyam /

“Having thus shown that the five Means of Right Cognition are not effective in the matter, it is regarded as proved that there is no Author of the Veda; and consequently there can be no ‘inadmissibility’ in the Reason adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka because the Veda is free from the contact of defects that bring about falsity’, Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present wherever the Probandum is present;

sāmprataṃ paraprayuktasya vedāprāmāṇyasādhanadvayasya vistareṇa dūṣaṇamārabhate /

Now the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out in detail the defects in the two arguments put forward by his Opponent in support of the view that the Veda is not authoritative and reliable.

tatredaṃ sādhanadvayaṃ yadaindriyakaṃ prayatnānantarīyakaṃ ca, tadanityaṃ, yathā ghaṭaḥ, tathā ca śabdaḥ, iti svabhāvahetusāmānyena śabdasyānityatve siddhe vedasyāpyanityatvasiddhyā sāmarthyādasyāḥ puruṣavākyavan mithyātvaṃ setsya [p.589] tīti parasya bauddhāder abhiprāyaḥ /

and Sound is both (perceptible and produced by effort); these are Reasons based upon the nature of things, which prove the non-eternaliiy of sound in general; and this being proved, the non-eternality of the Veda necessarily follows; and from this it also follows, by implication, that like the assertions of human beings, the words of the Veda also may be false. Such is the sense of what is argued by the Buddhists and others.

tatra śābdapramāṇabādhāṃ tāvad āha vedavākyārtham ityādi / vedavākyārthamithyātvaṃ yo vadatyanumānataḥ / tasya vaidikavijñānabalāt pakṣo nivartate //

Against these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka sets forth in detail the argument that the proposition of the Opponents is annulled by the Verbal and other Means of Right Cognition. First of all, the following Text shows that the Proposition that the Vedic Words are false is annulled by Verbal Cognition itself: [see verse 2106 above] ‘Vaidika’ is derived from, the Veda;

vedād āgataṃ vaidikam agnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādi /

i.e. such cognitions or notions as Heaven follows from the performance of the ‘Agnihotra’;

tadbalāt pakṣo nivartate, tena bāhyamānatvāt /

by the force of such notions, his Proposition becomes annulled, as it is set aside by it.

yathoktam "na cāsya codanā syād vā naveti saṃśayitaṃ pratyayamutpādayati, naca mithyaitad iti kālāntare puruṣāntare deśāntare 'vasthāntare vā punar avyapadeśyapratyayo bhavati /

This has been thus asserted “As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character, in any such form as ‘this may or may not be so’; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person does there appear any notion to the contrary, that ‘it is false’.

yo 'pyanyapratyayaviparyāsaṃ dṛṣṭātrāpi viparyayaḥ siddhyatītyānumānikaḥ pratyaya utpadyate, so 'pyanena pratyakṣeṇa virudhyamāno bādhyete"ti //

As regards the idea that ‘the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false’, this is only an Inference, and as such, becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct cognition to the contrary,” (Śabara-bhāṣya-Transation, page 13.

nanu ca tulyabalayoḥ katham ekanetarasya bādhā / atha tulyabalatve 'pi bādhā, anumānena tarhi tasya kiṃ na bādhā syād ity āha tacca pratyakṣatulyavad iti /

Says the other party: The two Verbal Cognition and Inference being of equal strength (validity), how can one be annulled by the other? If even when they are of equal strength, there can be sublation, then why should not the Inference sublate the Verbal Cognition?”

tacca pratyakṣatulyatvād vaidikaṃ balavattaram /

“The knowledge derived from the Veda is of the same degree as perception, and hence stronger than inference;

na śakyam anumānena kathañcid api bādhitam //

consequently, it can never be annulled by inference.” (2107)

anumānaṃ kathaṃ tarhi tena bādhyata ity āha pratyakṣetyādi /

Question: How then is Inference annulled by the Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda)? Answer: [see verse 2108 above]

yathoktam "pratyakṣastu vedavacanapratyayaḥ, na cānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavatī"ti //

This has been thus declared “The cognition derived from the words of the Veda is Perception, and Inference contrary to Perception cannot be valid” (2108)

katham anumānād āgamasya balīyastvaṃ yena pratyakṣatulyatvaṃ tasyetyāha dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvād iti /

Question: In what way is Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda) stronger than Inference, by virtue of which it is regarded as equal to Perception?

dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvād doṣābhāvāc ca lāghavam / āgamasya pramāṇatve nānumānasya tādṛśam //

“There is a degree of simplicity in the validity of verbal cognition due to the fact of its not needing a corroborative instance, and to the absence of defects, which is not found in inference.

tenāgamānumānābhyāṃ yatrārthe saṃśayo bhavet / tatrāgamabalīyastvāt kāryastenaiva nirṇayaḥ //

Consequently, whenever there should be any doubt between verbal cognition and inference, it is verbal cognition that should be regarded as stronger, and the matter determined accordingly.” (2109-2110).

pramāṇatva iti / lāghavāpekṣā viṣayasaptamī /

‘Pramāṇatve’ the Locative is to be construed with ‘lāghavam’,

nānumānasya tādṛśam iti /

‘Which is not found, in Inference’;

tasya dṛṣṭāntāpekṣatvād doṣasadbhāvāc ca /

because it needs a Corroborative Instance and because defects are possible in it;

doṣas tu pratyakṣatulyena vaidikena jñānena bādhyamānatvāt //

the defect being that it is annulled by Cognition derived from the Veda which is equal in authority to Perception.

[p.590] nanu ca yadevobhayasiddhaṃ tadeva dūṣaṇaṃ bhavati, naca bauddhasyāgamaḥ pramāṇam, dve eva pramāṇe ityavadhāraṇāt, tat katham asiddhenāgamaprāmāṇyena bādhā kriyate bauddhaṃ pratītyāśaṅkyāha mamāpramāṇam ityādi /

The other party raises an objection As a rule that alone is regarded as a ‘Defect’ in argument which is admitted by both parties; in the case in question, Revelation is not a means of valid Cognition, for the Buddhist, who posits only two Means of Cognition (Perception and Inference); then how can there be an ‘annulment’ of Inference by what is not accepted as a Means of Cognition, so far as the Buddhist is concerned?

mamāt pramāṇam ityevaṃ vedo 'rthaṃ bodhayann api / vaktuṃ na dveṣamātreṇa śakyate 'satyavādinā //

“While the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, the assertion that ‘it is not a means of cognition for me’ should not be made by a truthful person, by reason of sheer malice.

dveṣād asammatatvād vā naca syād apramāṇatā /

It cannot cease to be a means of cognition, on the ground that there is malice against it or because it is not popular;

naca prītyabhyanujñābhyāṃ pramāṇamavakalpyate // dviṣanto 'pi ca vedasya naivāprāmāṇyakāraṇam /

nor can anything become a means of cognition, on the ground that one likes it and it is popular. Even those who are hostile to the Veda do not assert any reason why it should not be a means of right cognition;

kiñcijjalpanti ye naite bhaveyuḥ satyavādinaḥ //

by virtue of which they could be regarded as truthful people.

dhāraṇādhyayanavyākhyākarmanityābhiyogibhiḥ / mithyātvaheturajñāto dūrasthair jñāyate katham // abhiyuktā hi ye yatra tannibaddhaprayojanāḥ / tatratyaguṇadoṣāṇāṃ jñāne te 'dhikṛtā yataḥ //

When people, who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the veda and upon the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it? It is only persons who are fully conversant with a thing and who have their purpose centred therein that can detect the good and bad points of that thing.

ye tu brahmadviṣaḥ pāpā vedāddūraṃ bahiṣkṛtāḥ / te vedaguṇadoṣoktīḥ kathaṃ jalpantyalajjitāḥ //

Those evil-minded people on the other hand, who are hostile to Vrahman and have been far removed from the Veda, how can those people bare-facedly speak of the good and bad points in the Veda?” (2111-2116).

evaṃ manyate nahīcchāmātreṇa vastunaḥ siddhyasiddhī bhavataḥ, yenābhyupagamamātreṇa na siddhamāgamaprāmāṇyaṃ bhavet, kiṃ tarhi---, pramāṇabalena yat siddhaṃ taddvayor api siddham, dṛḍhataraścāgnihotrādivākyāt pratyaya iti pratipāditam, tat katham apramāṇam iti śakyaṃ vaktum /

This is how the Mīmāṃsaka argues “Things do not become established or otherwise merely according to one’s whim; by virtue of which the mere assertion of the opinion would set aside the validity of Verbal Cognition; what is established by reason must be accepted by both parties; it has been explained that the conviction derived from the Vedic declarations regarding Agnihotra, etc. is exceptionally strong; how then can it be said that it is not a Means of Cognition? It is a mere assertion of yours, wholly devoid of reason”.

kevalaṃ vāṅmātrametad bhavatām, niryuktikam iti saṅkṣepārthaḥ /

Such in brief is what is meant by the Mīmāṃsaka.

asammatatvād iti /

‘Because it is not popular’.

lokasyābhyanujñā lokasammatatvam /

People’s agreement constitutes its popularity.

śākyādayo vedāt /

‘Aloof from, the Veda’ Śākya and others who keep away from the Veda;

taddhāraṇādikarmabahiṣkṛtatvāt / tannibaddhaprayojanā iti /

because they are excluded from its study, etc. ‘Who have their purpose centred therein’ i.e. whose purpose ends of life, in the shape of sacrifice, etc.

brahmādviṣa iti vedadviṣaḥ /

‘Hostile to Brahman’ i.e. Hostile to the Veda.

tadudbhūtaṃ vā jñāna brahma //2111 //2112 //2113 //

Or ‘Brahman’ may be taken as standing for the knowledge derived from the Veda.

athavā mābhūdāgamato bādhā, tathāpi duṣṭa eva pratijñārthaḥ, pratyakṣādibhir mānair bādhyamānatvād iti pratipādayann āha kiñcetyādi /

“Or, it may be that the Inference is not annulled by Verbal Cognition; even so, the Proposition of the Buddhist is defective; because it is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition”. This is the idea expounded in the following: [see verse 2117 next]

kiñca śabdasya nityatvaṃ śrotrajapratyabhijñayā /

“Then again, the eternality and all-pervasiveness of the word, is established by auditory recognition;