buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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" iti tadihāpi samānam gādīnām ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam iti sarvaṃ vācyam /	What has been said there is equally applicable to the present case: For instance If the one-ness urged is in regard to the ‘Universal’ aspect of the ‘ga’ and other letters (composing the word ‘Gavḥ then it is superfluous, and so forth, all the rest of it may be repeated.
tathā hi deśakālaprayoktṛbhiedād gavādivyaktivad gādivarṇavyaktayo bahvyaḥ, tadādhāraṃ ca gotvādi, ta(dva)dgatvādyapi sāmānyamiṣṭam iti sarvaṃ samānam ityāśaṅkyāha deśakālaprayokt---ṇām ityādi / deśakālaprayokt---ṇāṃ bhede 'pi ca na bhedavān /	Because in view of the diversity of Place, Time and Speaker, the Individual Letters Ga and the rest are many; and it is in these that the ‘Universal’ Cow subsists; and in the same way, the Universal aspect of the letter ‘ga’ is held to subsist in the individual letter; so the two cases are exactly similar in all aspects [and on the same grounds that the individual jars cannot all be the same the individual word ‘Cow’, or the individual letter ‘ga’, cannot all be the same].
pratyabhijñākhyāt tu pratyakṣād vyaktīnām ekatvaṃ siddham, nānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhe pramāṇībhavati, pratyakṣasya sarvapramāṇajyeṣṭhatvād ityabhiprāyaḥ //	Anticipating this argument, the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following answer: [see verse 2141 above] From Perception, in the shape of Recognition, it is proved that the Individuals (letters) are one; Inference can have no validity, as against Perception; Perception being the highest of all Means of Right Cognition.
nanu drutamadhyavilambitādipratītibhedād bhedaḥ siddha eva vyaktīnām, tat katham ucyate pratyabhijñā parisphuṭetyāha nahi drutādibhede 'pīti / na hi drutādibhede 'pi niṣpannā sampratīyate / gavyaktyantaravicchinnā gavyaktiraparā sphuṭā //	“Even when there is diversity in the pronunciation being fast, etc., the individual letter ‘ga’ is not clearly cognised as an established entity, distinguished from the other individual letter ‘ga’.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 22]. Objection: Diversity of the Letters is proved by such diversities in their pronouncing as fast, middling, slow and so forth; under the circumstances, how can it be said that their Recognition as being the same is clear and distinct?
niṣpanneti / akalpitā /	‘Established’ not merely conceived or fancied.
vichhinneti / bhinnā /	‘Distinguished’ distinct, separate, different.
gavyaktir gakāravyaktiḥ /	‘Ga-vayakti’ stands for ‘gakāravyakti’, the Individual letter-sound ‘ga’.
pratyabhijñayaikīkṛtatvān na gavyaktiraparāstīti bhāvaḥ //	What is meant is that Recognition having established the identity among the individuals, there can be no ‘other’ Individual at all.
[p.596] nanu ca gatvādijātirevān na pratyabhijñāyate na vyaktis tatkathaṃ vyakteḥ pratyabhijñetyāha gakāra ityādi / gakāro 'tyantaniṣkṛṣṭagatvādhāro na vidyate / gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvāt parakalpitagatvavat //	“The individual letter ‘ga’ has no existence apart from the substratum of the universal ‘ga’, because it can never be apprehended by any cognition other than that of ‘ga’, just like the universal ‘ga’ postulated by the other party.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 32] (2143) Says the Opponent What is recognised is only the Universal aspect of the Letter ‘ga’, not the individual aspect;
gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvād iti /	how can there be said to be a recognition of the Individuals?
gakārād anyo gānyaḥ, tasmin buddhis tayānirūpyatvād agrāhyatvāt /	‘Gānyabudāhyanirūpyatvāt’ Because it is not apprehended cognised by any cognition except that of the letter ‘Ga’.
parakalpitagatvavad iti / niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti pareṣām siddhāntāt //	‘Like the Universal, etc. etc.’ Because the view of the other party is that ‘Universals are without universals’.
varṇatvāccāpi sādhyo 'yaṃ khakārādivadeva ca /	“The same conclusion could be proved on the ground of its being a letter, like the letter ‘kha’.
vyatirekasya cādṛṣṭer nātra dṛṣṭaṃ nivartakam //	As a matter of fact the contrary of this is never perceived;
gatvaniṣedha iti śeṣaḥ /	‘The same conclusion’ the denial of the individual ‘Ga’ apart from the Universal.
tatra prayogaḥ yo gavarṇasso 'tyantaniṣkṛṣṭagatvādhāro na bhavati, yathā khakārādivarṇaḥ, varṇaścāyaṃ gakāra iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ / gatvādhāratvaviruddhena kila varṇatvasya vyāptatvāt /	The argument may be formulated as follows: The Letter ‘Ga’ cannot be entirely differentiated from the substratum of the universal ‘Ga’, e.g. the letter ‘Kha’, and ‘Ga’ is a letter; hence here there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the Contrary, as ‘being Letter’ is invariably concomitant with the contrary of being the substratum of the Universal ‘Ga’,
na cātra pratijñāyā dṛṣṭavirodha ity āha vyatirekasyetyādi / vyatireko bhedaḥ /	That the Conclusion of this argument is not sublated by Perception is shown by the words ‘The contrary of this, etc. etc.’ ‘contrary’ stands for difference between the two.
dṛṣṭam pratyakṣam //	‘Dṛṣṭam’ Perceived fact.
dvayasiddhastu varṇātmā nityatvādi yathaiva ca / kalpitasyeṣyate tadvat siddhasyaivābhyupeyatām //	“The entity in the form of the ‘letter’ is admitted by both parties; it is only right therefore that ‘eternality’ and other characters, which are attributed to an assumed entity, should be attributed to what is admitted by both parties.
tenaikatvena varṇasya buddhir ekopajāyate /	thus it follows that the one idea arises out of the one-ness of the letter.
viśeṣabuddhisadbhāvo bhaved vyañjakabhedataḥ //	As regards the ideas of peculiar features, that would be due to the diversity in the character of the manifesting agency.” (Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 18, 23].
kimityubhayasiddhaṃ varṇātmānaṃ parityajya kalpitasyaivānyāpohasya nityatvānekatvavyāpitvādayo varṇyante, jātidharmavyavasthiter iti vacanāt / yuktaṃ yadevobhayasiddhaṃ tasyaiva kalpayitum, anyathā hyadṛṣṭakalpanāprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	“Why is it that leaving aside the Letter itself, which is admitted by both parties, such characters as ‘eternality’, ‘multiplicity’, ‘pervasiveness’ and the rest are attributed to an assumed entity, in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, as is clear from such assertions as ‘the class and the property thus become determined’? The right thing to do would be to attribute all these to what is admitted by both parties;
tasmād ekatvād eva varṇasyaikā pratyabhijñābuddhir upajāyate /	Hence it follows that the Recognition of the Letter as one and the same must be due to the one-ness of the Letter itself.”
yadyevaṃ drutamadhyavilambitādiviśeṣabuddhiḥ kathaṃ bhaved ity āha viśeṣabuddhītyādi / vyañjakā vāyavīyāḥ saṃyogavibhāgāḥ //	If that is so, then how could there be such diverse notions regarding the Letter, as short, medium and loud? Answer: ‘As regards, etc. etc.’ ‘Manifesting agency’ consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air (proceeding from the throat of the speaker’.
nanu yasya dvayaṃ śrautraṃ tasya buddhidvayaṃ bhavet /	One for whom both are amenable to auditory perception could have the dual notion;
bhavato 'tīndriyatvāt tu kathaṃ nādair viśeṣadhīḥ // yasyeti /	under the circumstances, unless the manifesting agency is apprehended, how can the manifested (property) be apprehended? For example, until the Light is seen, there is no perception of the Jar illumined by it.
yasya vaiyākaraṇāder ghoṣātmako dhvanir vyañjako natu vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmakaḥ, tasya dvayam vyaṅgyaṃ vyañjakaṃ ca śrotragrāhyam iti buddhidvayam ekabuddhir viśeṣabuddhiś ca bhavati / bhavatas tu mīmāṃsakasya kathaṃ nādair vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmakair viśeṣadhīr bhavet, kutaḥ ---, atīndriyatvāt / nādānām iti śeṣaḥ //	‘One for whom’ i.e. the Grammarian and others, according to whom the manifester consists of the letter-Sound in the form of ghoṣa (articulation), not of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, for such men both, the Manifested (letter-Sound) and the Manifester (articulation), are apprehended by auditory perception; for such people, there may be the two notions, the notion of all as one, and also the notion of the peculiarities of the pitch, etc. But for you, the Mīmāṃsaka, how could the Pitch, which is in the form of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, bring about the notion of the peculiarities, as such Pitches, etc. are not perceptible by the Ear? (2147)
nādenetyādinā pratividhatte /	To the above objection, the Mīmāṃsaka makes the following answer: [see verse 2148 next]
nādena saṃskṛtācchrotrādyadā śabdaḥ pratīyate / tadupaśleṣatas tasya bodhaṃ kecit pracakṣate //	“Some people assert that when a word-sound is cognised by the ear as affected by the degree of the pitch, then it is that there is apprehension of the peculiar degree of pitch, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the word-sound.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 39].
tadupaśleṣata iti / śabdopaśleṣataḥ /	‘Tadupaśleṣa’ being mixed with the Word-Sound.
tasya nādasya /	‘Tasya’ of the Pitch.
bodham grahaṇam /	‘Bodhaḥ’ apprehension.
kecit pracakṣate yadyapi kevalasya nādasya śrotreṇāgrahaṇam, tathāpi śabdopaśliṣṭasya tu grahaṇam asyeveti buddhidvayaṃ bhavedeveti teṣāṃ bhāvaḥ //	‘Some people assert’. What these people mean is that, though pure Pitch by itself is not apprehended by the Ear, yet when it is mixed up with Sound, it does become so apprehended; and hence the dual notion comes about.
naiva vā grahaṇe teṣāṃ śabde buddhis tu tadvaśāt /	“Or, there may be no apprehension of these (pitches); it is only the cognition of the word-sound that is brought about through the pitch.
saṃskārānukṛteścāpi mahattvādyavabudhyate //	as for the degrees of the pitch, in the shape of intensity, etc.
teṣām iti /	‘Teṣām’ of the Pitches;
vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmanām /	consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air.
katham agṛhītavyavyañjake vyaṅgye buddhir bhaved ity āha śabde buddhis tu tadvaśād iti /	Question; How can there be a cognition of the Manifested when the Manifester is not cognised? Answer: ‘It is only, etc. etc.’ ‘Tadvaṣāt’ through the Pitch;
nādavaśāt /	he.
tat sattāmātreṇaiveti yāvat /	by the mere presence of the Pitch.
bhavatu nāma svarūpamātragrahaṇaṃ mahattvādiviśeṣagrahaṇaṃ tu kathaṃ bhavatītyāha saṃskārānukṛter ityādi /	Question; There may be apprehension of the mere form of the Word-Sound; how is there the apprehension of the degrees of the Pitch? Answer; ‘They are cognised, etc. etc.’;
yadā mahadbhir nādair mahān saṃskāra ādhīyate śrotre, tadā mahattvaṃ pratīyate śabde /	When the more intensive Pitch produces an intensive impression on the Ear, then that intensity is cognised in the Sound; on the other hand, when the impression produced is weak, the Sound is perceived as weak.
madhuraṃ tiktarūpeṇa śvetaṃ pītatayā yathā / gṛhṇanti pittadoṣeṇa viṣayaṃ bhrāntacetasaḥ //	Thus the varying degrees of the Pitch are apprehended in accordance with the impression made upon the Ear. “Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of bile perceive the sweet as bitter, and white as yellow;
parvatādīn prajānanti bhrameṇa bhramataś ca tān //	those who are running east, or sailing in a boat, mistake the hill and other objects to be moving;
maṇḍūkavasayāktākṣā vaṃśānuragabuddhibhiḥ /	those who have applied the fat of the frog to their eyes mistake the piece of bamboo to be a serpent.
vyaktyalpatvamahatvābhyāṃ sāmānyaṃ ca tadāśrayam // gṛhṇanti yadvadetāni nimittagrahaṇād vinā / vyañjakasthamabuddhvaivaṃ vyaṅgye bhranatir bhaviṣyati // yathā pittadoṣeṇa madhurādikaṃ viṣayaṃ tiktādirūpeṇa gṛhṇantyagṛhītvaiva pittasvarūpam /	In the same manner, through the higher and lower intensities of the individuals, people have the idea of the universal as being the substratum of those intensities. Just as, in the cases cited, people have the ideas (of bitterness, etc.) without having any perception of their causes (in the shape of the disordered bile, etc.) So, in the case in question, without cognising the varying degrees of pitch in the manifester, there would be a mistaken idea of these in connection with the manifested.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 41-44].
yathāvā"śugamananauyānabhramaṇairāhitavibhramāḥ parvatādīn gacchato bhramataś ca paśyanti /	similarly while running fast or sailing fast on a boat, people are led to the mistaken notion of the Hill and other objects moving along;
yathā ca maṇḍūkavasayāktacakṣuṣo vaṃśānuragarūpeṇa vīkṣante /	similarly when one applies the fat of the frog to his eyes, he perceives bamboo-pieces as serpents;
yathā ca vyakter alpatvamahattvābhyāṃ sāmānyaṃ tadāśrayam alpatvādyāśrayam, pratipadyante, sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyamalpaṃ tu gotvādīti /	similarly, through the varying degrees of intensity in the Individuals, people have the idea of the Universal as being the substratum of those degrees; ‘Being’ being the largest, highest, Universal, and the ‘Cow’ and the like being the lesser, smaller, Universal.
anyathā hi nityasarvagatatvena sarvasya tulyatvāt kiṃkṛtaṃ sāmānyasyālpatvaṃ mahattvaṃ syāt /	If it were not so, then, being eternal and all-pervasive, all Universal would be equal;
tasmād yadvad etāni madhurādīni tiktādirūpeṇa gṛhṇanti nimittasya pittāder grahaṇamantareṇa, tathā vyañjakasthaṃ mahattvādikam agṛhītvaṃ śabde mahattvādibhrāntir bhaviṣyati /	and in that case to what could the ‘largeness’ or ‘smallness’ of the Universal be due? Hence the conclusion is that just as people have the notion of Bitter in connection with the Sweet thing, without having any notion of the Bile to which the misconception is due, so also, in the case in question, without apprehending the larger or smaller intensity in the Manifested, people would have the misconception of these in connection with the manifested Sound.
abuddhveti /	‘Abudhvā’, ‘without cognising’;
bhranatikriyāpekṣayā samānakartṛtvam, anyathā tvāpratyayo na syāt //	the sequence of the nominative agent is in reference to the action of ‘misconception’; otherwise the Past participial affix ‘Ktvā’ would not be possible.
atha katham avagataṃ yeyaṃ hrasvamahattvādidhīḥ śabde bhavati sā paropādhikā, natu svata eva mahattvādibhedasadbhāvād ity āha svato hrasvādibheda ityādi / svato hrasvādibhedas tu nityatvāder virudhyate / sarvadā yasya sadbhāvaḥ sa kathaṃ mātrikaḥ svayam //	for, how can the letter, which is ever present, be said to be measured by duration? Consequently, it is the articulation of the letter that should be regarded as measured by duration, for one or two moments; the letter itself cannot be measured by duration.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 50-51 ]. Question: How do you know that the idea of Larger and Smaller intensity that appears in connection with Sound is due to extraneous circumstances, and the Sound itself has no such diversity?
tasmād uccāraṇaṃ tasya mātrākālaṃ pratīyatām /	Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka): [see verses 2154-2155 above]
ādiśabdena dīrghaplutodāttānudāttasvaritaṣaḍjādibhedaparigrahaḥ /	‘Short, long, etc.’, The ‘etcetera’ includes the Long, the ultra-long, the High Pitch, the Low Pitch, the Middling Pitch, and the ‘Ṣaḍja’ and other musical notes.
nityatvāder viruddhyata iti / pratyabhijṇYayā nityatvasya siddhatvād iti bhāvaḥ // nanvityādinā paramatenābhivyakter asiddhimāśaṅkate	‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’ That is, because the Eternality of the Letter has been established by Recognition. In the following text, the Opposite view is put forward that the said ‘manifestation’ cannot be admitted [see verses 2156-2157 next]
nanu nādair abhivyaktir na śabdasyopapadyate / sā hi syācchabdasaṃskārādindriyasyobhayasya vā //	The manifestation of word-sound by articulation is not possible: that manifestation could be due to the embellishment either of the sound itself, or of the sense-organ concerned, or of both.
tataḥ sarvaiḥ pratīyeta śabdaḥ saṃskriyate yadi /	if it were the sound that was embellished, then it would be cognised by all as so embellished;
nirbhāgasya vibhor na syād ekadeśe hi saṃskriyā //	and it being impartite and all-pervading, there could be no embellishment of it in any parts.
sābhivyaktiḥ śabdasya bhavantī vāyavīyaiḥ saṃyogavibhāgaiḥ śabdasaṃskārād vā bhavet, indriyasaṃskārād vā ubhayasya vā śabdasyendriyasya ca saṃskārān /	If there were manifestation of the Word-Sound by the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, it could be through the embellishment of the Sound itself, or through the embellishment of the Sense-organ, or through the embellishment of both of the Sound and also of the Sense-organ.
tatra yadi śabdaḥ saṃskriyate tadā pāṭaliputrādāvekatra deśe saṃskṛtaḥ sarvadeśasthair gṛhyeta, yugapat tasya sarvagatatvāt /	If there were embellishment of the Sound, then when embellished at one place at Pāṭaliputra for instance, it would become apprehended by people in all places; as it goes everywhere simultaneously.
niravayavo hi śabdo 'mūrtatvāt kathaṃ, vibhutve 'pi niravayavasyaikadeśena saṃskāraḥ syāt // athāpi syād ādhārabhedānniravayavasyāpi sato bhedena saṃskāro bhaviṣyatītyāha nacāpīti /	It might be said that only a part of the Sound becomes embellished. The answer to that is that it is impartite, not made up of parts, being incorporeal; hence, even though it is all-pervading, it being without parts, how could there be any embellishment in part? (2156-2157)
nacāpyādhārabhedena saṃskāraniyamo bhavet /	Nor can there be determination of the embellishment through the diversity of substratum;
yataḥ śabdo nirādhāro vyomātmādivad eva ca //	Because Sound is all-pervading, like Ākāśa and Soul, it is without substratum.
nanvākāśātmādivannirādhāraḥ śabdaḥ // nanvākāśaguṇatvācchabdasya guṇāś ca guṇinamāśritā ityākāśamādhāro 'sti śabdasyetyāha athāpyākāśam ityādi /	If ākāśa is the substratum, even so, ākāśa itself being without parts, there could be no embellishment in part, because the word-sound is always cognised as a whole. Says the other party As a matter of fact Sound is a quality of Ākāśa, and qualities always subsist in the Substance to which they belong;
athāpyākāśamādhāras tatrānavayave sati /	so that Ākāśa would be the substratum (or receptacle) of Sound.
na syāt pradeśasaṃskāraḥ kṛtsnaśabdagater api // tasyāpyākāśasyānavayavatvānnādhārapradeśabhedena saṃskārabhedo 'sti /	The said Ākāśa being without parts, the diversity in the embellishment could not be due to the diversity of the parts of the substratum. The Opponent argues thus Though Ākāśa is without parts, yet there is diversity among substances coming into contact with Ākāśa;
nanu ca yadyapyākāśamanavayavaṃ tathāpi saṃyogibhedāt ghaṭākāśādivat karṇaśaṣkulīparyantaparicchinnamākāśaṃ bhinnaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha kṛtsnaśabdagater apīti /	e.g. we have ‘the Ākāśa in the Jar’ and so forth; so that the Ākāśa within the tympanum of one man would be different from that within another man’s. The answer to that is ‘Because the Word-Sound, etc. etc.’ this is to be construed with the sentence ‘there could be no embellishment in part’;
akhaṇḍa eva hi śabdaḥ pratīyate sā ca pratītir vyomaikadeśasaṃskṛtau na syāt //	In as much as sound exists as a whole pervading over the entire ākāśa, it could not be cognised as a whole, if it were embellished in part.
katham ityetad eva nigamayann āha nahītyādi /	The following text sums up the argument and shows how it is as stated: [see verse 2160 above]
nahi sāmastyarūpeṇa yāvad vyoma vyavasthitaḥ / śakyate sakalo boddhumekadeśena saṃskṛtaḥ // nahyākāśaṃ vyāpya vyavasthitaḥ śabdas tadekadeśena saṃskṛtaḥ śakyate sakalo jṇYātum //	As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound pervades over the entire Ākāśa; and hence the whole of it could not be cognised if it were embellished only in part. Under the view that the auditory organ consists of ākāśa, as the organ would be all-pervading, it would be equally in contact with all things;
dūrabhāve 'pi śabdānām iha jṇYānaṃ prasajyate //	so that even when the sound is produced ear off, it should be heard here.
śrotrasya caivam ekatvaṃ sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ bhavet /	In this way the auditory organ also would be one only for all living beings;
tenaikaśrutivelāyāṃ śṛṇuyuḥ sarva eva te //	hence at the time that one person hears a sound, all men should hear it.
yeṣāṃ khaṃ śrotram iti pakṣas teṣām ekatvād vibhutvāc ca nabhasaḥ sarvaśabdais tulyā prāptir iti dūrasthasyāpi śabdasya grahaṇaṃ prāpnoti /	There are some people who hold that the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa; under this view, as Ākāśa is one and all-pervading, it would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and hence it should be possible to hear Sounds at a distance also.
śrotrasya ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām ekatvaṃ syāt /	The Auditory Organ also would be one and the same for all living beings;
tataścaiko yadā śṛṇoti tadaiva sarvai api śrūyeta, abhinnatvācchrotrasya / ekāśravaṇe sarveṣām aśravaṇadoṣaś ca vaktavyaḥ //	hence when one of them hears a sound, that sound should be heard by all of them; because the Auditory Organ is one and the same for all. It should be added also that if one man does not hear a Sound, no man should hear it.
syād etat dharmādharmābhisaṃskṛtayā karṇaśaṣkulyā paricchinnamākāśaṃ śrotram, ataḥ karṇaśaṣkulimatyākāśadeśe śrotravyavasthiter doṣadvayam apīdam anāspadaṃ yadvibhutvāt prāptitulyatā śrotrasya caikatvaṃ sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ bhaved iti /	The following might be urged The Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa as conditioned by the tympanum embellished by Merit and Demerit; hence as the Sound heard would be subsisting in the Ākāśa as contained in the tympanum, there would be no room for the two undesirable contingencies just pointed out viz.: (a) that being all-pervading, the Organ would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and (b) that there would be one and the same Organ for all living beings.
atrāha tasyānavayavatvād iti /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2163 above]
nahyanavayavasya paramārthataḥ ekadeśāḥ santi / yena kaścid eva nabhodeśaḥ śrotraṃ bhavet /	For that which is impartite, there can be no parts, by, virtue of which a certain part of Ākāśa could constitute the Auditory Organ.
vyavasthādvayam prāpteratulyatvavyavasthā, śrotrānekatvavyavasthā ca / yadvā śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe vyavasthādvayam //	‘The two limitations’ the limitation that the contact of the Organ with all-Sounds cannot be the same, and that there are several Auditory Organs. Or the ‘two limitations’ may be those relating to the apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound.
sakṛcca saṃskṛtaṃ śrotraṃ sarvaśabdān prabodhayet /	Further, the auditory organ, once embellished, should bring about the cognition of all sounds;
ghaṭāyonmīlitaṃ cakṣuḥ paṭaṃ nahi na buddhyate //	when the eye is opened for seeing the jar, it does not fail to apprehend the cloth.
etad eva prasaktavyaṃ viṣayasyāpi saṃsmṛtau /	this same contingency may be urged also in connection with the remembrance of the thing (sound);
samānadeśavṛttitvāt saṃskārasyāviśeṣataḥ //	as the embellishment appertains, without distinction, to the same space in ākāśa.
kiṃ ca sakṛt ekavāraṃ saṃskṛtaṃ śrotraṃ sarvaśabdān prabodhayet grāhayet /	Further, once embellished, the Auditory Organ should lead to the Cognition of all Sounds, make them apprehended;
tasya sarvaśabdasādhāraṇatvāt /	as the said Organ would apply in common to all Sounds;
teṣāṃ ca śabdānāṃ vibhutvenābhinnayogyadeśatvāt /	and also because the Sounds, being all-pervasive, would be occupying the same perceptible place.
syād etat pratipattyartham eva vaktā śrotuḥ śrotramabhisaṃskṛtaṃ tameva śabdaṃtacchrotraṃ grāhayennānyamityāha ghaṭāyetyādi / nahi na budhyate, api tu budhyata eva, tulyatvād deśayogyatāyā iti bhāvaḥ /	It might be argued that it is for the purpose of cognition that the Speaker has embellished the auditory organ of the Hearer; consequently the organ would bring about the cognition of that same Sound, not others The answer to this is ‘When the eye is opened, etc. etc.’ ‘It does not fail to apprehend’ i.e. it does apprehend;
sarvaśabdagrahaṇaṃ katham ity āha samānadeśavṛttitvāt saṃskārasyāviśeṣata iti /	that is, on account of the perceptibility of the place being equal. Question: Why has the word ‘all’ been introduced?
sarve 'pi hi śabdā vibhutvena samānākāśadeśavṛttayaḥ, tataścaiṣāṃ saṃskāro ' [p.601] pyaviśiṣṭa eveti sarvagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ /	‘As the embellishment appertains, etc. etc.’ All Sounds, being all-pervading in character, occupy the same space in Ākāśa; hence their embellishment also should be without distinction.
kavacitpāṭhaḥ ---`saṃskāro hyaviśeṣataḥ ' iti, tatra hiśabdo hetau /	In some places, the reading is ‘saṃskāro hyaviśeṣataḥ In that ease the particle ‘hi’ stands for ‘because’;
aviśeṣata iti /	‘aviśeṣataḥ’ stands for ‘aviśeṣeṇa’;
tataścāyam artho bhavati aviśeṣeṇa yasmācchabdānāṃ saṃskāraḥ kṛtaḥ, samānadeśavṛttitvāt, tataḥ sarvaśabdagrahaḥ prāpnotīti //	hence the meaning comes to be Because the embellishment has been produced in Sounds without distinction, on account of their occupying the same space, therefore it should be possible for all Sounds to be apprehended (at the same time). The embellishment, when it comes, would come about by the removal of the immobile air-envelope;
syād etat yadyapyaviśeṣeṇa saṃskāraḥ, tathāpi ya eva jighṛkṣitaḥ śrotrā śabdaḥ sa eva gṛhyate nānya iti, atrāha sthiravāyvityādi / sthiravāyūpanītyā ca saṃskāro 'sya bhavan bhavet /	and it has been pound that when the covering envelope is removed, the apprehension of what has been there follows (as a matter of course). The following might be urged Though the embellishment appertains to all Sounds equally, yet that Word-Sound alone is actually apprehended which the hearer desires to apprehend, none other. The answer to this is as follows;
dvividho hi vāyuḥ sthiro 'sthiraś ca, tatra yaḥ sthiraḥ sadyanāva(ghanāndha---) kāravat śabdamāvṛtyāste /	[see verse 2166 above] There are two kinds of Air mobile and immobile; it is the immobile Air which envelopes Sound, like dense Darkness;
tasya ca vaktṛprayatnasamutthena vāyunā saṃyogavibhāgā utpadyante /	it is in this Air-envelope that Conjunctions and Disjunctions are produced by the Air proceeding from the Speaker’s mouth;
taiś ca saṃyogavibhāgais tasya sthirasya vāyor apanayaḥ kriyate sa eva ca śabdasya saṃskāro nānyaḥ svalakṣaṇapuṣṭyādiḥ, tasya nityatvenaikarūpatvāt /	these Conjunctions and Disjunctions bring about the removal of the said Air-envelope; removal of the Air-covering is what is meant by the ‘embellishment’ of Sound, which cannot mean the strengthening of its characteristic features; because Sound is eternal and always of one and the same form.
tataḥ kimityāha dṛṣṭam ityādi / dṛṣṭam iti /	What if it is so? ‘It has been found, etc. etc.’ ‘Found’ in scriptures and also in common experience;

" iti tadihāpi samānam gādīnām ekatāpattau jātyeṣṭaṃ siddhasādhanam iti sarvaṃ vācyam /

What has been said there is equally applicable to the present case: For instance If the one-ness urged is in regard to the ‘Universal’ aspect of the ‘ga’ and other letters (composing the word ‘Gavḥ then it is superfluous, and so forth, all the rest of it may be repeated.

tathā hi deśakālaprayoktṛbhiedād gavādivyaktivad gādivarṇavyaktayo bahvyaḥ, tadādhāraṃ ca gotvādi, ta(dva)dgatvādyapi sāmānyamiṣṭam iti sarvaṃ samānam ityāśaṅkyāha deśakālaprayokt---ṇām ityādi / deśakālaprayokt---ṇāṃ bhede 'pi ca na bhedavān /

Because in view of the diversity of Place, Time and Speaker, the Individual Letters Ga and the rest are many; and it is in these that the ‘Universal’ Cow subsists; and in the same way, the Universal aspect of the letter ‘ga’ is held to subsist in the individual letter; so the two cases are exactly similar in all aspects [and on the same grounds that the individual jars cannot all be the same the individual word ‘Cow’, or the individual letter ‘ga’, cannot all be the same].

pratyabhijñākhyāt tu pratyakṣād vyaktīnām ekatvaṃ siddham, nānumānaṃ pratyakṣavirodhe pramāṇībhavati, pratyakṣasya sarvapramāṇajyeṣṭhatvād ityabhiprāyaḥ //

Anticipating this argument, the Mīmāṃsaka offers the following answer: [see verse 2141 above] From Perception, in the shape of Recognition, it is proved that the Individuals (letters) are one; Inference can have no validity, as against Perception; Perception being the highest of all Means of Right Cognition.

nanu drutamadhyavilambitādipratītibhedād bhedaḥ siddha eva vyaktīnām, tat katham ucyate pratyabhijñā parisphuṭetyāha nahi drutādibhede 'pīti / na hi drutādibhede 'pi niṣpannā sampratīyate / gavyaktyantaravicchinnā gavyaktiraparā sphuṭā //

“Even when there is diversity in the pronunciation being fast, etc., the individual letter ‘ga’ is not clearly cognised as an established entity, distinguished from the other individual letter ‘ga’.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 22]. Objection: Diversity of the Letters is proved by such diversities in their pronouncing as fast, middling, slow and so forth; under the circumstances, how can it be said that their Recognition as being the same is clear and distinct?

niṣpanneti / akalpitā /

‘Established’ not merely conceived or fancied.

vichhinneti / bhinnā /

‘Distinguished’ distinct, separate, different.

gavyaktir gakāravyaktiḥ /

‘Ga-vayakti’ stands for ‘gakāravyakti’, the Individual letter-sound ‘ga’.

pratyabhijñayaikīkṛtatvān na gavyaktiraparāstīti bhāvaḥ //

What is meant is that Recognition having established the identity among the individuals, there can be no ‘other’ Individual at all.

[p.596] nanu ca gatvādijātirevān na pratyabhijñāyate na vyaktis tatkathaṃ vyakteḥ pratyabhijñetyāha gakāra ityādi / gakāro 'tyantaniṣkṛṣṭagatvādhāro na vidyate / gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvāt parakalpitagatvavat //

“The individual letter ‘ga’ has no existence apart from the substratum of the universal ‘ga’, because it can never be apprehended by any cognition other than that of ‘ga’, just like the universal ‘ga’ postulated by the other party.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 32] (2143) Says the Opponent What is recognised is only the Universal aspect of the Letter ‘ga’, not the individual aspect;

gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvād iti /

how can there be said to be a recognition of the Individuals?

gakārād anyo gānyaḥ, tasmin buddhis tayānirūpyatvād agrāhyatvāt /

‘Gānyabudāhyanirūpyatvāt’ Because it is not apprehended cognised by any cognition except that of the letter ‘Ga’.

parakalpitagatvavad iti / niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti pareṣām siddhāntāt //

‘Like the Universal, etc. etc.’ Because the view of the other party is that ‘Universals are without universals’.

varṇatvāccāpi sādhyo 'yaṃ khakārādivadeva ca /

“The same conclusion could be proved on the ground of its being a letter, like the letter ‘kha’.

vyatirekasya cādṛṣṭer nātra dṛṣṭaṃ nivartakam //

As a matter of fact the contrary of this is never perceived;

gatvaniṣedha iti śeṣaḥ /

‘The same conclusion’ the denial of the individual ‘Ga’ apart from the Universal.

tatra prayogaḥ yo gavarṇasso 'tyantaniṣkṛṣṭagatvādhāro na bhavati, yathā khakārādivarṇaḥ, varṇaścāyaṃ gakāra iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ / gatvādhāratvaviruddhena kila varṇatvasya vyāptatvāt /

The argument may be formulated as follows: The Letter ‘Ga’ cannot be entirely differentiated from the substratum of the universal ‘Ga’, e.g. the letter ‘Kha’, and ‘Ga’ is a letter; hence here there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the Contrary, as ‘being Letter’ is invariably concomitant with the contrary of being the substratum of the Universal ‘Ga’,

na cātra pratijñāyā dṛṣṭavirodha ity āha vyatirekasyetyādi / vyatireko bhedaḥ /

That the Conclusion of this argument is not sublated by Perception is shown by the words ‘The contrary of this, etc. etc.’ ‘contrary’ stands for difference between the two.

dṛṣṭam pratyakṣam //

‘Dṛṣṭam’ Perceived fact.

dvayasiddhastu varṇātmā nityatvādi yathaiva ca / kalpitasyeṣyate tadvat siddhasyaivābhyupeyatām //

“The entity in the form of the ‘letter’ is admitted by both parties; it is only right therefore that ‘eternality’ and other characters, which are attributed to an assumed entity, should be attributed to what is admitted by both parties.

tenaikatvena varṇasya buddhir ekopajāyate /

thus it follows that the one idea arises out of the one-ness of the letter.

viśeṣabuddhisadbhāvo bhaved vyañjakabhedataḥ //

As regards the ideas of peculiar features, that would be due to the diversity in the character of the manifesting agency.” (Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 18, 23].

kimityubhayasiddhaṃ varṇātmānaṃ parityajya kalpitasyaivānyāpohasya nityatvānekatvavyāpitvādayo varṇyante, jātidharmavyavasthiter iti vacanāt / yuktaṃ yadevobhayasiddhaṃ tasyaiva kalpayitum, anyathā hyadṛṣṭakalpanāprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

“Why is it that leaving aside the Letter itself, which is admitted by both parties, such characters as ‘eternality’, ‘multiplicity’, ‘pervasiveness’ and the rest are attributed to an assumed entity, in the shape of the ‘exclusion of others’, as is clear from such assertions as ‘the class and the property thus become determined’? The right thing to do would be to attribute all these to what is admitted by both parties;

tasmād ekatvād eva varṇasyaikā pratyabhijñābuddhir upajāyate /

Hence it follows that the Recognition of the Letter as one and the same must be due to the one-ness of the Letter itself.”

yadyevaṃ drutamadhyavilambitādiviśeṣabuddhiḥ kathaṃ bhaved ity āha viśeṣabuddhītyādi / vyañjakā vāyavīyāḥ saṃyogavibhāgāḥ //

If that is so, then how could there be such diverse notions regarding the Letter, as short, medium and loud? Answer: ‘As regards, etc. etc.’ ‘Manifesting agency’ consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air (proceeding from the throat of the speaker’.

nanu yasya dvayaṃ śrautraṃ tasya buddhidvayaṃ bhavet /

One for whom both are amenable to auditory perception could have the dual notion;

bhavato 'tīndriyatvāt tu kathaṃ nādair viśeṣadhīḥ // yasyeti /

under the circumstances, unless the manifesting agency is apprehended, how can the manifested (property) be apprehended? For example, until the Light is seen, there is no perception of the Jar illumined by it.

yasya vaiyākaraṇāder ghoṣātmako dhvanir vyañjako natu vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmakaḥ, tasya dvayam vyaṅgyaṃ vyañjakaṃ ca śrotragrāhyam iti buddhidvayam ekabuddhir viśeṣabuddhiś ca bhavati / bhavatas tu mīmāṃsakasya kathaṃ nādair vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmakair viśeṣadhīr bhavet, kutaḥ ---, atīndriyatvāt / nādānām iti śeṣaḥ //

‘One for whom’ i.e. the Grammarian and others, according to whom the manifester consists of the letter-Sound in the form of ghoṣa (articulation), not of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, for such men both, the Manifested (letter-Sound) and the Manifester (articulation), are apprehended by auditory perception; for such people, there may be the two notions, the notion of all as one, and also the notion of the peculiarities of the pitch, etc. But for you, the Mīmāṃsaka, how could the Pitch, which is in the form of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, bring about the notion of the peculiarities, as such Pitches, etc. are not perceptible by the Ear? (2147)

nādenetyādinā pratividhatte /

To the above objection, the Mīmāṃsaka makes the following answer: [see verse 2148 next]

nādena saṃskṛtācchrotrādyadā śabdaḥ pratīyate / tadupaśleṣatas tasya bodhaṃ kecit pracakṣate //

“Some people assert that when a word-sound is cognised by the ear as affected by the degree of the pitch, then it is that there is apprehension of the peculiar degree of pitch, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the word-sound.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 39].

tadupaśleṣata iti / śabdopaśleṣataḥ /

‘Tadupaśleṣa’ being mixed with the Word-Sound.

tasya nādasya /

‘Tasya’ of the Pitch.

bodham grahaṇam /

‘Bodhaḥ’ apprehension.

kecit pracakṣate yadyapi kevalasya nādasya śrotreṇāgrahaṇam, tathāpi śabdopaśliṣṭasya tu grahaṇam asyeveti buddhidvayaṃ bhavedeveti teṣāṃ bhāvaḥ //

‘Some people assert’. What these people mean is that, though pure Pitch by itself is not apprehended by the Ear, yet when it is mixed up with Sound, it does become so apprehended; and hence the dual notion comes about.

naiva vā grahaṇe teṣāṃ śabde buddhis tu tadvaśāt /

“Or, there may be no apprehension of these (pitches); it is only the cognition of the word-sound that is brought about through the pitch.

saṃskārānukṛteścāpi mahattvādyavabudhyate //

as for the degrees of the pitch, in the shape of intensity, etc.

teṣām iti /

‘Teṣām’ of the Pitches;

vāyavīyasaṃyogavibhāgātmanām /

consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air.

katham agṛhītavyavyañjake vyaṅgye buddhir bhaved ity āha śabde buddhis tu tadvaśād iti /

Question; How can there be a cognition of the Manifested when the Manifester is not cognised? Answer: ‘It is only, etc. etc.’ ‘Tadvaṣāt’ through the Pitch;

nādavaśāt /

he.

tat sattāmātreṇaiveti yāvat /

by the mere presence of the Pitch.

bhavatu nāma svarūpamātragrahaṇaṃ mahattvādiviśeṣagrahaṇaṃ tu kathaṃ bhavatītyāha saṃskārānukṛter ityādi /

Question; There may be apprehension of the mere form of the Word-Sound; how is there the apprehension of the degrees of the Pitch? Answer; ‘They are cognised, etc. etc.’;

yadā mahadbhir nādair mahān saṃskāra ādhīyate śrotre, tadā mahattvaṃ pratīyate śabde /

When the more intensive Pitch produces an intensive impression on the Ear, then that intensity is cognised in the Sound; on the other hand, when the impression produced is weak, the Sound is perceived as weak.

madhuraṃ tiktarūpeṇa śvetaṃ pītatayā yathā / gṛhṇanti pittadoṣeṇa viṣayaṃ bhrāntacetasaḥ //

Thus the varying degrees of the Pitch are apprehended in accordance with the impression made upon the Ear. “Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of bile perceive the sweet as bitter, and white as yellow;

parvatādīn prajānanti bhrameṇa bhramataś ca tān //

those who are running east, or sailing in a boat, mistake the hill and other objects to be moving;

maṇḍūkavasayāktākṣā vaṃśānuragabuddhibhiḥ /

those who have applied the fat of the frog to their eyes mistake the piece of bamboo to be a serpent.

vyaktyalpatvamahatvābhyāṃ sāmānyaṃ ca tadāśrayam // gṛhṇanti yadvadetāni nimittagrahaṇād vinā / vyañjakasthamabuddhvaivaṃ vyaṅgye bhranatir bhaviṣyati // yathā pittadoṣeṇa madhurādikaṃ viṣayaṃ tiktādirūpeṇa gṛhṇantyagṛhītvaiva pittasvarūpam /

In the same manner, through the higher and lower intensities of the individuals, people have the idea of the universal as being the substratum of those intensities. Just as, in the cases cited, people have the ideas (of bitterness, etc.) without having any perception of their causes (in the shape of the disordered bile, etc.) So, in the case in question, without cognising the varying degrees of pitch in the manifester, there would be a mistaken idea of these in connection with the manifested.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 41-44].

yathāvā"śugamananauyānabhramaṇairāhitavibhramāḥ parvatādīn gacchato bhramataś ca paśyanti /

similarly while running fast or sailing fast on a boat, people are led to the mistaken notion of the Hill and other objects moving along;

yathā ca maṇḍūkavasayāktacakṣuṣo vaṃśānuragarūpeṇa vīkṣante /

similarly when one applies the fat of the frog to his eyes, he perceives bamboo-pieces as serpents;

yathā ca vyakter alpatvamahattvābhyāṃ sāmānyaṃ tadāśrayam alpatvādyāśrayam, pratipadyante, sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyamalpaṃ tu gotvādīti /

similarly, through the varying degrees of intensity in the Individuals, people have the idea of the Universal as being the substratum of those degrees; ‘Being’ being the largest, highest, Universal, and the ‘Cow’ and the like being the lesser, smaller, Universal.

anyathā hi nityasarvagatatvena sarvasya tulyatvāt kiṃkṛtaṃ sāmānyasyālpatvaṃ mahattvaṃ syāt /

If it were not so, then, being eternal and all-pervasive, all Universal would be equal;

tasmād yadvad etāni madhurādīni tiktādirūpeṇa gṛhṇanti nimittasya pittāder grahaṇamantareṇa, tathā vyañjakasthaṃ mahattvādikam agṛhītvaṃ śabde mahattvādibhrāntir bhaviṣyati /

and in that case to what could the ‘largeness’ or ‘smallness’ of the Universal be due? Hence the conclusion is that just as people have the notion of Bitter in connection with the Sweet thing, without having any notion of the Bile to which the misconception is due, so also, in the case in question, without apprehending the larger or smaller intensity in the Manifested, people would have the misconception of these in connection with the manifested Sound.

abuddhveti /

‘Abudhvā’, ‘without cognising’;

bhranatikriyāpekṣayā samānakartṛtvam, anyathā tvāpratyayo na syāt //

the sequence of the nominative agent is in reference to the action of ‘misconception’; otherwise the Past participial affix ‘Ktvā’ would not be possible.

atha katham avagataṃ yeyaṃ hrasvamahattvādidhīḥ śabde bhavati sā paropādhikā, natu svata eva mahattvādibhedasadbhāvād ity āha svato hrasvādibheda ityādi / svato hrasvādibhedas tu nityatvāder virudhyate / sarvadā yasya sadbhāvaḥ sa kathaṃ mātrikaḥ svayam //

for, how can the letter, which is ever present, be said to be measured by duration? Consequently, it is the articulation of the letter that should be regarded as measured by duration, for one or two moments; the letter itself cannot be measured by duration.” [Ślokavārtika-sphoṭa, 50-51 ]. Question: How do you know that the idea of Larger and Smaller intensity that appears in connection with Sound is due to extraneous circumstances, and the Sound itself has no such diversity?

tasmād uccāraṇaṃ tasya mātrākālaṃ pratīyatām /

Answer (from the Mīmāṃsaka): [see verses 2154-2155 above]

ādiśabdena dīrghaplutodāttānudāttasvaritaṣaḍjādibhedaparigrahaḥ /

‘Short, long, etc.’, The ‘etcetera’ includes the Long, the ultra-long, the High Pitch, the Low Pitch, the Middling Pitch, and the ‘Ṣaḍja’ and other musical notes.

nityatvāder viruddhyata iti / pratyabhijṇYayā nityatvasya siddhatvād iti bhāvaḥ // nanvityādinā paramatenābhivyakter asiddhimāśaṅkate

‘Would be contrary, etc. etc.’ That is, because the Eternality of the Letter has been established by Recognition. In the following text, the Opposite view is put forward that the said ‘manifestation’ cannot be admitted [see verses 2156-2157 next]

nanu nādair abhivyaktir na śabdasyopapadyate / sā hi syācchabdasaṃskārādindriyasyobhayasya vā //

The manifestation of word-sound by articulation is not possible: that manifestation could be due to the embellishment either of the sound itself, or of the sense-organ concerned, or of both.

tataḥ sarvaiḥ pratīyeta śabdaḥ saṃskriyate yadi /

if it were the sound that was embellished, then it would be cognised by all as so embellished;

nirbhāgasya vibhor na syād ekadeśe hi saṃskriyā //

and it being impartite and all-pervading, there could be no embellishment of it in any parts.

sābhivyaktiḥ śabdasya bhavantī vāyavīyaiḥ saṃyogavibhāgaiḥ śabdasaṃskārād vā bhavet, indriyasaṃskārād vā ubhayasya vā śabdasyendriyasya ca saṃskārān /

If there were manifestation of the Word-Sound by the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, it could be through the embellishment of the Sound itself, or through the embellishment of the Sense-organ, or through the embellishment of both of the Sound and also of the Sense-organ.

tatra yadi śabdaḥ saṃskriyate tadā pāṭaliputrādāvekatra deśe saṃskṛtaḥ sarvadeśasthair gṛhyeta, yugapat tasya sarvagatatvāt /

If there were embellishment of the Sound, then when embellished at one place at Pāṭaliputra for instance, it would become apprehended by people in all places; as it goes everywhere simultaneously.

niravayavo hi śabdo 'mūrtatvāt kathaṃ, vibhutve 'pi niravayavasyaikadeśena saṃskāraḥ syāt // athāpi syād ādhārabhedānniravayavasyāpi sato bhedena saṃskāro bhaviṣyatītyāha nacāpīti /

It might be said that only a part of the Sound becomes embellished. The answer to that is that it is impartite, not made up of parts, being incorporeal; hence, even though it is all-pervading, it being without parts, how could there be any embellishment in part? (2156-2157)

nacāpyādhārabhedena saṃskāraniyamo bhavet /

Nor can there be determination of the embellishment through the diversity of substratum;

yataḥ śabdo nirādhāro vyomātmādivad eva ca //

Because Sound is all-pervading, like Ākāśa and Soul, it is without substratum.

nanvākāśātmādivannirādhāraḥ śabdaḥ // nanvākāśaguṇatvācchabdasya guṇāś ca guṇinamāśritā ityākāśamādhāro 'sti śabdasyetyāha athāpyākāśam ityādi /

If ākāśa is the substratum, even so, ākāśa itself being without parts, there could be no embellishment in part, because the word-sound is always cognised as a whole. Says the other party As a matter of fact Sound is a quality of Ākāśa, and qualities always subsist in the Substance to which they belong;

athāpyākāśamādhāras tatrānavayave sati /

so that Ākāśa would be the substratum (or receptacle) of Sound.

na syāt pradeśasaṃskāraḥ kṛtsnaśabdagater api // tasyāpyākāśasyānavayavatvānnādhārapradeśabhedena saṃskārabhedo 'sti /

The said Ākāśa being without parts, the diversity in the embellishment could not be due to the diversity of the parts of the substratum. The Opponent argues thus Though Ākāśa is without parts, yet there is diversity among substances coming into contact with Ākāśa;

nanu ca yadyapyākāśamanavayavaṃ tathāpi saṃyogibhedāt ghaṭākāśādivat karṇaśaṣkulīparyantaparicchinnamākāśaṃ bhinnaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha kṛtsnaśabdagater apīti /

e.g. we have ‘the Ākāśa in the Jar’ and so forth; so that the Ākāśa within the tympanum of one man would be different from that within another man’s. The answer to that is ‘Because the Word-Sound, etc. etc.’ this is to be construed with the sentence ‘there could be no embellishment in part’;

akhaṇḍa eva hi śabdaḥ pratīyate sā ca pratītir vyomaikadeśasaṃskṛtau na syāt //

In as much as sound exists as a whole pervading over the entire ākāśa, it could not be cognised as a whole, if it were embellished in part.

katham ityetad eva nigamayann āha nahītyādi /

The following text sums up the argument and shows how it is as stated: [see verse 2160 above]

nahi sāmastyarūpeṇa yāvad vyoma vyavasthitaḥ / śakyate sakalo boddhumekadeśena saṃskṛtaḥ // nahyākāśaṃ vyāpya vyavasthitaḥ śabdas tadekadeśena saṃskṛtaḥ śakyate sakalo jṇYātum //

As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound pervades over the entire Ākāśa; and hence the whole of it could not be cognised if it were embellished only in part. Under the view that the auditory organ consists of ākāśa, as the organ would be all-pervading, it would be equally in contact with all things;

dūrabhāve 'pi śabdānām iha jṇYānaṃ prasajyate //

so that even when the sound is produced ear off, it should be heard here.

śrotrasya caivam ekatvaṃ sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ bhavet /

In this way the auditory organ also would be one only for all living beings;

tenaikaśrutivelāyāṃ śṛṇuyuḥ sarva eva te //

hence at the time that one person hears a sound, all men should hear it.

yeṣāṃ khaṃ śrotram iti pakṣas teṣām ekatvād vibhutvāc ca nabhasaḥ sarvaśabdais tulyā prāptir iti dūrasthasyāpi śabdasya grahaṇaṃ prāpnoti /

There are some people who hold that the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa; under this view, as Ākāśa is one and all-pervading, it would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and hence it should be possible to hear Sounds at a distance also.

śrotrasya ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām ekatvaṃ syāt /

The Auditory Organ also would be one and the same for all living beings;

tataścaiko yadā śṛṇoti tadaiva sarvai api śrūyeta, abhinnatvācchrotrasya / ekāśravaṇe sarveṣām aśravaṇadoṣaś ca vaktavyaḥ //

hence when one of them hears a sound, that sound should be heard by all of them; because the Auditory Organ is one and the same for all. It should be added also that if one man does not hear a Sound, no man should hear it.

syād etat dharmādharmābhisaṃskṛtayā karṇaśaṣkulyā paricchinnamākāśaṃ śrotram, ataḥ karṇaśaṣkulimatyākāśadeśe śrotravyavasthiter doṣadvayam apīdam anāspadaṃ yadvibhutvāt prāptitulyatā śrotrasya caikatvaṃ sarvaprāṇabhṛtāṃ bhaved iti /

The following might be urged The Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa as conditioned by the tympanum embellished by Merit and Demerit; hence as the Sound heard would be subsisting in the Ākāśa as contained in the tympanum, there would be no room for the two undesirable contingencies just pointed out viz.: (a) that being all-pervading, the Organ would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and (b) that there would be one and the same Organ for all living beings.

atrāha tasyānavayavatvād iti /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2163 above]

nahyanavayavasya paramārthataḥ ekadeśāḥ santi / yena kaścid eva nabhodeśaḥ śrotraṃ bhavet /

For that which is impartite, there can be no parts, by, virtue of which a certain part of Ākāśa could constitute the Auditory Organ.

vyavasthādvayam prāpteratulyatvavyavasthā, śrotrānekatvavyavasthā ca / yadvā śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe vyavasthādvayam //

‘The two limitations’ the limitation that the contact of the Organ with all-Sounds cannot be the same, and that there are several Auditory Organs. Or the ‘two limitations’ may be those relating to the apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound.

sakṛcca saṃskṛtaṃ śrotraṃ sarvaśabdān prabodhayet /

Further, the auditory organ, once embellished, should bring about the cognition of all sounds;

ghaṭāyonmīlitaṃ cakṣuḥ paṭaṃ nahi na buddhyate //

when the eye is opened for seeing the jar, it does not fail to apprehend the cloth.

etad eva prasaktavyaṃ viṣayasyāpi saṃsmṛtau /

this same contingency may be urged also in connection with the remembrance of the thing (sound);

samānadeśavṛttitvāt saṃskārasyāviśeṣataḥ //

as the embellishment appertains, without distinction, to the same space in ākāśa.

kiṃ ca sakṛt ekavāraṃ saṃskṛtaṃ śrotraṃ sarvaśabdān prabodhayet grāhayet /

Further, once embellished, the Auditory Organ should lead to the Cognition of all Sounds, make them apprehended;

tasya sarvaśabdasādhāraṇatvāt /

as the said Organ would apply in common to all Sounds;

teṣāṃ ca śabdānāṃ vibhutvenābhinnayogyadeśatvāt /

and also because the Sounds, being all-pervasive, would be occupying the same perceptible place.

syād etat pratipattyartham eva vaktā śrotuḥ śrotramabhisaṃskṛtaṃ tameva śabdaṃtacchrotraṃ grāhayennānyamityāha ghaṭāyetyādi / nahi na budhyate, api tu budhyata eva, tulyatvād deśayogyatāyā iti bhāvaḥ /

It might be argued that it is for the purpose of cognition that the Speaker has embellished the auditory organ of the Hearer; consequently the organ would bring about the cognition of that same Sound, not others The answer to this is ‘When the eye is opened, etc. etc.’ ‘It does not fail to apprehend’ i.e. it does apprehend;

sarvaśabdagrahaṇaṃ katham ity āha samānadeśavṛttitvāt saṃskārasyāviśeṣata iti /

that is, on account of the perceptibility of the place being equal. Question: Why has the word ‘all’ been introduced?

sarve 'pi hi śabdā vibhutvena samānākāśadeśavṛttayaḥ, tataścaiṣāṃ saṃskāro ' [p.601] pyaviśiṣṭa eveti sarvagrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ /

‘As the embellishment appertains, etc. etc.’ All Sounds, being all-pervading in character, occupy the same space in Ākāśa; hence their embellishment also should be without distinction.

kavacitpāṭhaḥ ---`saṃskāro hyaviśeṣataḥ ' iti, tatra hiśabdo hetau /

In some places, the reading is ‘saṃskāro hyaviśeṣataḥ In that ease the particle ‘hi’ stands for ‘because’;

aviśeṣata iti /

‘aviśeṣataḥ’ stands for ‘aviśeṣeṇa’;

tataścāyam artho bhavati aviśeṣeṇa yasmācchabdānāṃ saṃskāraḥ kṛtaḥ, samānadeśavṛttitvāt, tataḥ sarvaśabdagrahaḥ prāpnotīti //

hence the meaning comes to be Because the embellishment has been produced in Sounds without distinction, on account of their occupying the same space, therefore it should be possible for all Sounds to be apprehended (at the same time). The embellishment, when it comes, would come about by the removal of the immobile air-envelope;

syād etat yadyapyaviśeṣeṇa saṃskāraḥ, tathāpi ya eva jighṛkṣitaḥ śrotrā śabdaḥ sa eva gṛhyate nānya iti, atrāha sthiravāyvityādi / sthiravāyūpanītyā ca saṃskāro 'sya bhavan bhavet /

and it has been pound that when the covering envelope is removed, the apprehension of what has been there follows (as a matter of course). The following might be urged Though the embellishment appertains to all Sounds equally, yet that Word-Sound alone is actually apprehended which the hearer desires to apprehend, none other. The answer to this is as follows;

dvividho hi vāyuḥ sthiro 'sthiraś ca, tatra yaḥ sthiraḥ sadyanāva(ghanāndha---) kāravat śabdamāvṛtyāste /

[see verse 2166 above] There are two kinds of Air mobile and immobile; it is the immobile Air which envelopes Sound, like dense Darkness;

tasya ca vaktṛprayatnasamutthena vāyunā saṃyogavibhāgā utpadyante /

it is in this Air-envelope that Conjunctions and Disjunctions are produced by the Air proceeding from the Speaker’s mouth;

taiś ca saṃyogavibhāgais tasya sthirasya vāyor apanayaḥ kriyate sa eva ca śabdasya saṃskāro nānyaḥ svalakṣaṇapuṣṭyādiḥ, tasya nityatvenaikarūpatvāt /

these Conjunctions and Disjunctions bring about the removal of the said Air-envelope; removal of the Air-covering is what is meant by the ‘embellishment’ of Sound, which cannot mean the strengthening of its characteristic features; because Sound is eternal and always of one and the same form.

tataḥ kimityāha dṛṣṭam ityādi / dṛṣṭam iti /

What if it is so? ‘It has been found, etc. etc.’ ‘Found’ in scriptures and also in common experience;