buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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abhāsamāno vedyaś ca kathaṃ nāmopapadyate / taṃ ca vettyanyathā ceti parasparavirodhi ca //	How is it possible that it should not figure there and yet be cognised? It is certainly a contradiction in terms to say that ‘one cognises it’ and ‘one does not cognise it’.
ata eva svavedyatvaṃ duḥsādhyaṃ naiva cetasām /	It is for these reasons that it is not difficult to prove that cognitions are self-cognised;
ātmabhūtāvabhāsasya tathā saṃvittidarśanāt //	because such is found to be the cognition in everything which is of the nature of ‘light’.
tasmād buddhiriyaṃ bhrāntā kalpayantyarthameva na / kalpayatyanyathāsantaṃ tenātmānamavaśyati{veekśate---} //	From all this it follows that it is not true that “the wrong cognition, while apprehending the object, apprehends it as otherwise than it really exists, and thus envisages itself (?)”.
sa hyāha iha pītadvicandrādijñāne vyabhicāraviṣayatvenopanyasto bāhya eva śaṅkhādirarthaḥ pītādirūpeṇālambyate /	Kumārila argues as follows: “In the cases cited of wrong cognitions (like that of Two Moons, Yellow conch-shell and so forth), what is put forward as the basis of wrong cognition is an external object itself in the form of the Conch-shelly etc. only it is in the yellow form that it supplies the basis for the Cognition.
tato vyabhicāro na siddha iti /	Hence there is no ‘falsity’ (or ‘Inconclusiveness’) at all”.
ayamatra saṅkṣepārthaḥ ya evākāro yasmin jñāne pratyavabhāsate sa eva tena saṃvedyata iti yuktam anyathā hi sarvaṃ jñānaṃ sarvaviṣayaṃ syāt /	The answer to this is ‘The form that actually figures, etc. etc.’ What is meant is briefly as follows: The only right view is that that same form can be apprehended by a certain Cognition which actually figures in that Cognition; otherwise every Cognition would apprehend everything.
pratibhāsamānatvena [p.577] saṃvedyatvaṃ vyāptam /	Thus then, ‘being apprehended’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearing or figuring’.
naca pītākāre jñāne śuklākāraḥ pratibhāsate dṛśyābhimatasyānupalambdher iti vyāpakasya pratibhāsamānatvasya nivṛttau vyāpyasya saṃvedya{tvasya}nivṛttir iti /	In the Cognition of the Yellow form, the white form does not figure, at all; because what is meant to be perceptible is not actually perceived; so that the wider character of ‘appearing or figuring’ being absent, there must be absence of the less wide character of ‘apprehensibility’.
prayogaḥ yo yasminnākāro na pratibhāsate na sa saṃvedyaḥ yathā śabdajñāne na rūpam na pratibhāsate ca pītākāre jñāte śuklaśaṅkharūpam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows: When a certain form does not figure in a Cognition, it cannot be regarded as cognisable (by that Cognition), e.g. Colour in the Cognition of Sound; the white colour of the Conch-shell does not figure in the cognition of the yellow form; and thus there is no apprehension of the wider character.
taṃ ca vettītyanena svavacanavirodhamāha ata eveti prasaṅgena svasaṃvittiṃ sādhayati /	‘One cognises it, etc. etc.’ This shows that there is self-contradiction. ‘It is for this reason, etc. etc.’ By this passage the Author tries to establish, by the way, his view that Cognition is self-cognised.
tena yajjaiminīyair iṣṭam apratyakṣā no buddhir nirākārā ceti tadapāstambhavati /	And this also serves to set aside what has been asserted by the followers of Jaimini (Śabara-bhāṣya) to the effect and that “Our Cognition is imperceptible and formless”.
tasmādityādinopasaṃhāraḥ / kalpayantī satī arthamevānyathā santaṃ kalpayatītyevaṃ neti sambandhaḥ /	‘From all this, etc. etc.’ The sentence is to be construed as ‘Kalpayantī satī arthameva anyathā santam kalpayati iti na’, ‘it is not true that, etc. etc.’ This denies what has been asserted by Kumārila.
atha yadgrāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā / tat saṃvittāvasaṃvitte rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā //	“(a) That which is the apprehender of colour must be different from what is apprehended, because the cognition of the one does not appear on the cognition of the other as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.
grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakāccaivaṃ tat parāmṛśatā yataḥ /	(b) What is apprehended must be different from the apprehender;
na parāmṛśyate 'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakādivat // dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ rasādivat / aikyarūpeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat //	because one who thinks of the one does not necessarily think of the other; as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc., (c) For the same reason the two must, thus, be concluded to be different from one another, like taste, etc., (d) The two must be different, because they are never cognised as being of the same form, like the cognition occurring in another ‘chain’.
jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat /	(e) the cognition cannot apprehend any portion of itself; because it proceeds from the cognition; like its own potency.
grāhyatvapratiṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā //	(f) There should be denial also of ‘apprehensibility’ (of the cognition by itself); because the impression is devoid of the duplicate character.
caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam / jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam //	(g) Caitra’s cognition cannot bring about the apprehension of the apprehensible part of the cognition arising out of his cognition; because it is cognition; just as the cognition appearing in another person.” [Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 172-177] (2064-2068)
yadetad rūpe grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ tat tasmāt tadgrāhyād rūpād bhinnaṃ tasya rūpasya saṃvittau satyāṃ tasyāsaṃvitteḥ yathā rasādigrāhakam /	“(a) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is apprehended; because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Cognition; just as the Apprehender of Taste.
yadvā grāhyaṃ rūpādi svagrāhakād bhinnaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ parāmṛśatā yato yasmān na parāmṛśyate yathā rasādigrāhakāt / athavā dvayam rupādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca parasparavibhinnam ekataraparāmarśe satya{parasyā---}parāmarśanāt rasarūpādivat /	Or (b) what is apprehended, i.e. Colour, etc., must be different from its Apprehender; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other; just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc. Or (c) the two the Colour and its Apprehender must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of, just like Taste and Colour, etc.
ekatvenāparijñānād vā santānāntaracittavat /	Or (d) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form, like the Cognition appearing in another ‘Chain’.
athavā na svāṃśagrāhakaṃ jñānaṃ jñānād upannatvāt /	Or (e) the Cognition cannot apprehend a portion of itself, because it is produced from the Cognition itself; like its own Potency;
vāsanākhye{Kyā---} ca jñānaśaktiḥ /	this ‘Potency’ is what is known as ‘Impression’.
evaṃ jñānasya grāhyatvapratiṣedho 'pi kartavyas tadyathā jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyo jñānād utpannatvāt /	(f) Similarly, there should be denial of the ‘apprehensibility’ of Cognition, which is done in this form: The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition”.
kathama [p.578] sminnanantare prayogadvaye 'pi sādhyadharmānvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti /	Question: In between these two arguments where is the Corroborative Instance endowed with the character of the Probandum? Answer “Because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character;
dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena /	i.e. the character of the Apprehended and the character of the Apprehender.
athavāparaḥ prayogaḥ nacaitaj jñānaṃ caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya bodhakaṃ jñānatvāt / yadvattasya caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya maitrādidehāntarodbhavaṃ jñānam //	(g) Or, there is another argument This Cognition in question cannot bring about the apprehension of the portion of Cognition produced in one’s Cognition, because it is Cognition, just as the Cognition appearing in other persons Maitra and the rest, does not apprehend the portion arising out of Caitra’s Cognition.
apṛthagvedanādityādinā dūṣaṇam āha	The refutation of the above is set forth in the following: [see verse 2069 next]
apṛthagvedanāt pūrvaṃ tadatra pratipāditāt / aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā //	Because the two are never cognised separately, as explained before, therefore all the reasons adduced (by Kumārila); down to the ‘non-cognition of sameness’, should be rejected as ‘inadmissible’.
apṛthagvedanād iti /	‘Because the two are never cognised separately’;
nīlataddhiyoḥ sahopalambhaniyamāt /	i.e. because the Blue and its Cognition are always found together;
apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyatītyataḥ svasaṃvitprasādhanena pratipāditāt abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt aikarūpyāparijñānaparyantā hetavo na siddhāḥ //	because for the man who has no apprehension of Cognition, there can be no perception of the Object; all this has been explained before in course of the proof of Cognition being self-cognised; where the non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition has been established; because of this, all the Reasons adduced above (by Kumārila) down to the ‘non-cognition of sameness’ cannot be ‘admissible’.
sabahirityādinā paraḥ siddhim udbhāvayati /	In the following Text, the Opponent urges that the Reasons are well-known and ‘admissible’: [see verse 2070 above]
ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ sa bahir deśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate ityanenagranthena bhāṣyakṛtā śabareṇa grāhyasaṃvittir grāhakānubhavād vināpi pratipāditam /	“As a matter of fact, ‘the External Object is directly perceived as having a shape and as connected with external space’ as asserted by Śabara, the author of the Bhāṣya (on Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra 1.1.5), where it has been explained that there is Cognition of the Apprehended Object, even when there is no Cognition of the Apprehending Cognition.
tataś ca saṃvittāvasaṃvitter ityetat siddham //	Hence the Reason ‘Because it is not apprehended on the apprehension of the other’ becomes established and hence ‘admissible’.” (2070)
dvitīyādayo 'pi hetavaḥ kathaṃ siddhā ityata āha na smarāmītyādi / na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi gṛhīto 'rthas tadeti ca / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam //	“As a matter of fact, people have such notions as ‘I do not remember if any object was apprehended by me at the time’, which shows that they remember the appearance of the apprehending cognition, without any idea of the apprehended object. If the two were non-different, there would be remembrance of the apprehended object also, when there is remembrance of the apprehending cognition;
tasmād abhinnatāyāṃ ca grāhye 'pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtisadbhāve tatra tvevaiṣa gṛhyate //	Thus the difference between the two becomes proved by positive and negative concomitance. thus all these reasons become established as residing in the minor term.” [Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 83-85].
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoḥ /	Question: How are the second and subsequent Reasons (urged under Texts 2065 et. seq.) proved and admissible?
evaṃ ca hetavo 'pyete prasiddhāḥ sādhyadharmiṇi //	Answer: [see verses 2071-2073 above]
grāhyasmaraṇe 'pi grāhakasmṛtir dṛṣṭā yadi ca tasmād grāhakād ekāntena grāhyasyābhinnatā syāt tadā grāhye 'pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet grāhakavat naca bhavati tasmād bhinnayogakṣematvād bhinnau grāhyagrāhakau /	The Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition is found to appear even without the remembrance of the Apprehended Object; if there were absolute non-difference between the two, then there would be remembrance of the Apprehended Object also, just as there is, of the Apprehending Cognition; hence as they do not share the same fate, the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition must be different from one another.
syād etad bhavatyeva grāhye 'pi smaraṇam ity āha grāhakasmṛtisadbhāva ityādi /	It might be urged that ‘there is remembrance of the Apprehended Object also’, The answer to that is ‘As a matter of fact, however, etc. etc.’.
tatreti grāhakasmṛtisadbhāvakāle /	‘Tatra’ At the time that there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.
eṣa eva grāhaka eva gṛhyate na grāhyamityevakāro [p.579] bhinnakramaḥ /	‘Eṣa eva’, i.e. the Apprehending Cognition alone, not the Apprehended Object. The particle ‘eva’ is misplaced.
grāhyagrāhakasmaraṇayor bhāvābhāvābhyām /	‘By positive and negative concomitance’ as between the presence and absence of the Remembrances of the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition;
tathā hi grāhakasmaraṇabhāve 'pi grāhyasmṛter abhāvaḥ //	as there is absence of the Remembrance of the Apprehended Object even when there is presence of the Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.
aprasiddhopalambhasyetyādinā pratividhatte / aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasiddhyati /	As a matter of fact, there can be no apprehension of the object for one who has no apprehension of the cognition; hence there can be no apprehension of the apprehended object without the apprehension of the cognition.
tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavādṛte //	and yet it is not apprehended as something differentiated from the element of the apprehending cognition.
sa bahir deśasambandhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyata ityasyānaikāntikatām āha avasthetyādi / avasthalocanair dṛṣṭaṃ tathā pītādyavekṣyate /	The above arguments (of Kumārila) are answered in the following: [see verses 2074-2075 above] The following Text points out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason adduced (by Kumārila, under Text 2070, above) that ‘the Object is clearly perceived as connected with outside space’: [see verse 2075 above]
niṣkṛṣṭamityatra chedaḥ /	[verse 2075]: There should be a stop at ‘niṣkṛṣtam’.
tatheti yathā satyābhimataṃ pītādi bahir deśasambaddhaṃ vispaṣṭam upalabhyate, tathā kāmalādyupahatanayanopalabdham api samīkṣyeta /	‘Also’; i.e. just as the real ‘yellow’ is clearly perceived as connected with outside space, so also is the ‘yellow’ clearly perceived by the man with the jaundiced eyes.
yadi nāma samīkṣyate tataḥ kimityāha grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ /	Question: “What if it is so perceived?” Answer; ‘And yet it is, etc. etc.’ There should be a stop after ‘saṃvedyaṃ na’;
niṣkṛṣṭam ityadhyāhāryam /	and ‘niṣkṛṣṭam’ has to be construed here;
saṃvedyaṃ neti bhavatīti śeṣaḥ /	and after ‘na’, ‘bhavati’ is to be understood.
tenāyam artho bhavati tac ca pītādi taimirikādyupalabdhaṃ grāhakāṃśān niṣkṛṣṭaṃ pṛthaksaṃvedyaṃ na bhavati, atha ca bahirdeśasambaddham upalabhyate, tasmād anaikāntikam etat /	Thus the meaning comes to be this: The yellow that is perceived by the man with the diseased eyes does not become apprehended separately, differentiated from the apprehending factor; and yet it is perceived as ‘connected with outside space Hence the Reason in question is ‘Inconclusive’.
tathā param iti satyābhimatam api pītādi / anena vicchinnaspaṣṭapratibhāsamātreṇa dvayor api sāmyaṃ yojayati //	‘It should be the same, etc. etc.’ i.e. also in the case of the real ‘yellow’, What is meant to be shown by this is that the two cases stand on the same footing only so far as ‘being clearly perceived’ is concerned.
alakṣitaviśeṣā ca bāhyarūpe ca sā smṛtiḥ / sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhyāsādyasambhavāt //	only its special features are not clearly remembered. the remembrance does not pertain to anything as distinct prom everything else; because repeated experience and other conditions cannot be there.
anena grāhakasmaraṇe grāhyāsmaraṇasyāsiddhim āha /	What is meant to be asserted here is the fact that it cannot be ‘admitted’ that “there is no Remembrance of the Apprehended Object when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition”.
syād etat yadi grāhye sā smṛtiḥ kimityalakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati / yāvatā yathaiva tadgrāhyaṃ sarvataḥ sajātīyavijātīyād bhinnaṃ tathaiva tat smaret /	The following might be urged: “If the Remembrance pertains to the Apprehended Object, then why should its special features not be remembered, when as a matter of fact, one would naturally remember the object as differentiated from all other like and unlike things, exactly as it has been apprehended.
evaṃ hi tadviṣayatā tasyāḥ syāt, anyathā katham agṛhṇatī tadbhedaṃ tadviṣayā bhavet, atiprasaṅgād ity āha sarvata ityādi /	Otherwise if it did not apprehend its ‘difference’ from other things, how could it appertain to it? There would certainly be incongruities”.
etad uktaṃ bhavati /	The answer to this is ‘The Remembrance does not pertain, etc. etc’.
na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇasāmarthyaṃ, tasyāvastuviṣayatvāt /	What is meant is as follows: Conception has not the capacity to apprehend, things exactly as they exist, because it does not envisage a real entity;
kevalaṃ tathābhūtapadārthānubhavabalād yatraivārthitvādayo niścayahetavaḥsanti tatra tadākārādhyavasāyī smārttaḥ pratyayo nirviṣaya eva /	what happens is that, when there has been apprehension of a certain thing, the subsequent Remembrance that appears appertains to only that aspect of the thing with reference to which there happen to be such predisposing causes as the man’s being in need of the thing concerned and so forth;
paramārthataḥ svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrānta eva sarvo jāyate /	What happens in reality is that it really manifests itself alone, and by imposing the objective character upon what is purely subjective, all Remembrance becomes wrong (false);
tasya tvadhyavasāyavaśena viṣayavyavasthā, na paramārthataḥ / naca grāhyādhyavasāyaḥ smṛter api vidyate kevalaṃ tathāvidhābhyāsapāṭavāder apratyāsatti [p.580] tāratamyādikāraṇābhāvād alakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati, yena smaraṇāntarād viśiṣyate //	and when a certain Remembrance is relegated to a certain Object, it is only because of the conception, not because there is any real connection between the two. It is not true that the conception of the Apprehended Object is present in Remembrance; and it appears in a form in which the special features of the Object are not conceived, because the varying grades of contact and repeated experience that would be necessary for such conception of the special features are absent.
syād etat katham avasīyate grāhyādhyavasāyo 'trāsti smṛter ity āha gṛhīta ityādi / gṛhīta iti ko 'pyevaṃ nānyathā smaraṇaṃ bhavet /	It is on this account (of the vague conception of the Object) that one Remembrance is distinguished from another. If it were not so, then there could be no remembrance in the form ‘some object had been apprehended’;
śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaṃ vedyate smaraṇaṃ naca //	for remembrance is never cognised as a piece of pure rock-crystal.
kambupītādivijñānair hetoḥ paścimayor api / anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ digeṣānyatra sādhane //	The two last reasons (cited by Kumārila) also are clearly ‘inconclusive’, in view of such cognitions as that of the ‘yellow conch-shell’. This is the way to deal with the other reasons also.
yadi hyanupalakṣitaviśeṣaṃ grāhyam api sā smṛtir nādhyavasyet, tadā ko 'pi gṛhīta ityevam api sāmānyākāreṇa grāhyapratyavamarśane na pravarteta / nacāpi kevalo grāhyākārān aṅkitamūrtitayā grāhakaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaḥ smaryate /	If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that ‘Some object had been apprehended Nor is even a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered);
yenocyate ---"smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam" iti /	by virtue of which it could be asserted that “They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object” as has been asserted by [Kumārila, under Text 2071, above].
tasmāt tat smaraṇe tadasmaraṇam asiddham /	Thus it cannot be admitted that “there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered”.
yau ca jñānotpāter jñānatvāditīmau paścimau hetū tayoḥ pītaśaṅkhādijṇyānaṃ jṇyanootpannamapi sapītāder grāhyasya bodhakaṃ bhavati tathānyad apīti vyabhicārītā hetvoḥ /	As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by Kumārila in Texts 2067 and in 2068) “Because it proceeds from Cognition” (2067) and “Because it is Cognition” (2068), these are ‘Falsified’ (Inconclusive) by such instances as the following: The Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell, though ‘proceeding from Cognition’, does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of yellow; and also while being ‘Cognition’, it brings about the Cognition of the yellow which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do.
sādhitaṃ ca pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya nirālambanatvam ata evātmagatasya pītādyākārasya vedanāt svasaṃvedanaṃ siddham ityetad api pratipāditam /	Hence the two Reasons are ‘Inconclusive As regards the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’, it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’ apprehends is only that form of Yellow which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being self-cognised.
eṣā digiti / anyatrāpi bahir arthasādhane paropanyaste eṣā dūṣaṇadik /	‘This is the way, etc. etc.’ ‘With the other Reasons’, that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.
yaduktaṃ pareṇa katham advayaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kiṃ bhāsamānasya nīlādyākārasya jñānarūpasya ca anubhavasiddhasyābhāvāt katham idaṃ nāma yojyate tathāsati sarvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	It has been asked by the other party “What sort of one-ness (of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of Blue, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience? How can any such idea be entertained? As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things”.
atra vaktavyam na sarvābhāvo yasmāt svavyatiriktasya grāhyasya pṛthivyādeḥ svalakṣaṇato 'satvāt /	The answer to this is as follows: There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself.
santānāntarasya tu grāhyarūpeṇābhāvāt grāhyākāraśūnyaṃ tadapekṣya prakalpitaṃ tu yadvijñānasya kartṛtvaṃ vijānātīti vijñānam iti kṛtvā tasyābhāvād grāhakākāraśūnyaṃ na tu vijñānasvalakṣaṇasyāpi sarvasya sarveṇābhāvāt /	And as for the fact of the Cognition being the Active Agent in relation to it, on the basis of the idea that the Cognition also cognises, that active agency also is not there; and hence that too is devoid of the ‘apprehensible form’; not so the ‘active agency’ in relation to the Specific Individuality of the Cognition itself; as everything cannot be brought about by everything.
tathācoktam	This has been thus described
nīlapītādi yajjñānaṃ bahirvedavabhāsate / tatra satyamato nāsti vijñeyaṃ tattvato bahiḥ //	‘When the Blue, Yellow and the like appear in Cognition as something external, there does not, in reality, exist anything cognisable, outside;
sā na satyamataḥ saṃvidadvaye 'pi vibhāvyate //	hence the idea of the Cognition being the active agent in relation to that is not true;
evaṃ ca kṛtvā ayam api prajñāpāramitāpāṭhaḥ sunīto bhavati vijñānaṃ vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyaṃ lakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāya iti //	hence what appears as Cognition is the only one reality, without a second Under this understanding, the following text of the Prajñāpāramitā also becomes comprehensible Cognition is devoid of the nature of Cognition, in the sense that it is devoid of any definite characteristics’.
evam yadyajñānam ityādau maule prayoge hetau sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhyopasaṃharati vivādāspadam ityādi /	For these reasons, the cognition under dispute must be without a second, being devoid of objective and the active agent, because it is cognition, like the reflection. Having set forth the original formal argument above (in the Commentary introducing Text 1965 on p.
vivādāspadam ārūḍhaṃ vijñānatvādato manaḥ /	550, Line 13) in the words ‘Every Cognition is devoid of both, apprehended and apprehender, because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflection’;
advayaṃ vedyakartṛtvaviyogāt pratibimbavat //	and having so far established the invariable concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum in this reasoning, the Author sums up the whole position in the following: [see verse 2079 above]
[p.581] vivādāsmapadaviśeṣaṇenaitad āha svasthanetrādivijñānamatra viśeṣaḥ sādhyadharmī na sarvaḥ sāmānyaṃ tu vijñānatvād iti hetuḥ tena na pratijñārthaikadeśatā hetor iti /	What is meant by the epithet ‘under dispute’ is that the subject of the Reasoning is the Cognition of persons with healthy eyes, etc., not all Cognitions; while what is put forward as fche Probans ‘because it is Cognition’, is Cognition in general; thus it is bhat the Probans is not part of the Proposition.
vedyakartṛtvaviyogād ityadvayatvaviśeṣaṇam /	‘Being devoid of Objective and Active Agent’ qualifies ‘without a second’;
vedyakartṛtvadvayaviraheṇādvayam iṣṭam na tu sarvathābhāvād ity arthaḥ /	that is, what is meant by its being ‘without a second’ is that it is ‘without Objective and Active Agent’; and not that no ‘second’ exists at all.
pratibimbavad iti / viṣayiṇi viṣayopacārāt pratibimbajñānaṃ pratibimbaśabdenoktam / yadvā saptamyantād vatiḥ kartavyaḥ tena jñānam eva sāmarthyād ādheyatayā labhyate /	‘Like the Reflection’ The Object being spoken of as the Cognition, the term ‘Reflection’ stands for the Cognition of the Reflection, Or the ‘Vati’ affix, in ‘pratibimbavat’ may be taken as coming after the Locative ending; then, as the Receptacle (denoted by the Locative), the Cognition itself becomes indicated.
na cāsiddho hetur bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa svabhāvasyaiva tathā nirdeśān na jñātṛtvasya /	The Probans cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’; because what is put forward is that character of the Cognition which consists in the ‘exclusion of other things’, and not the very nature of ‘Cognition’.
nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt //	Nor is the Probans ‘Contradictory’;
nanu ca pratibimbe 'pi jñānaṃ sālambanaṃ matam /	“In the case of reflection also, the cognition is regarded as having an objective basis;
cakṣūraśminivṛttau hi svamukhādes tathekṣaṇāt //	as it is found that on the visual rays being turned back, one’s own face is seen as it is in the reflection.” (2080)
yasmānnayanā raśmayo darpaṇāditalapratihatā nivartamānāḥ svamukhādinā sambandhyante tatas te tathā mukhādipratītihetavo bhavanti /	“The light-rays, issuing from the eyes and falling upon the surface of the Mirror, become tinned back and thus become connected with one’s own face, and then they bring about the cognition of the face.
ataḥ svamukhādereva tathā darpaṇādyantargatādirūpeṇekṣaṇaṃ bhavati /	Thus it is the face itself that is seen as within the Mirror.
tataś ca na pratibimbajñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakadvayarahitaṃ siddham //	So that it becomes established that the Cognition of the Reflection is not ‘devoid of the Apprehender and the Apprehended’.” (2080)
nābhimukhyenetyādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is provided in the following: [see verse 2081 next]
nābhimukhyena taddṛṣṭeḥ svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam / pramāṇadeśabhedādidṛṣṭeścānyapadārthavat //	It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror, because it is seen in front of one’s self, and because what is seen is different in size, position, etc. (from one’s face), like any other object.
na svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam ābhimukhyena tasya svasukhāder darśanāt /	It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror, because the face seen there stands before one’s self;
taddeśapramāṇavarṇādibhedena dṛṣṭeś ca na svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam iti sambandhaḥ /	also because what is seen has a position, size, complexion and other details different from the face.
anyapadārthavad iti /	‘Like any other object’;

abhāsamāno vedyaś ca kathaṃ nāmopapadyate / taṃ ca vettyanyathā ceti parasparavirodhi ca //

How is it possible that it should not figure there and yet be cognised? It is certainly a contradiction in terms to say that ‘one cognises it’ and ‘one does not cognise it’.

ata eva svavedyatvaṃ duḥsādhyaṃ naiva cetasām /

It is for these reasons that it is not difficult to prove that cognitions are self-cognised;

ātmabhūtāvabhāsasya tathā saṃvittidarśanāt //

because such is found to be the cognition in everything which is of the nature of ‘light’.

tasmād buddhiriyaṃ bhrāntā kalpayantyarthameva na / kalpayatyanyathāsantaṃ tenātmānamavaśyati{veekśate---} //

From all this it follows that it is not true that “the wrong cognition, while apprehending the object, apprehends it as otherwise than it really exists, and thus envisages itself (?)”.

sa hyāha iha pītadvicandrādijñāne vyabhicāraviṣayatvenopanyasto bāhya eva śaṅkhādirarthaḥ pītādirūpeṇālambyate /

Kumārila argues as follows: “In the cases cited of wrong cognitions (like that of Two Moons, Yellow conch-shell and so forth), what is put forward as the basis of wrong cognition is an external object itself in the form of the Conch-shelly etc. only it is in the yellow form that it supplies the basis for the Cognition.

tato vyabhicāro na siddha iti /

Hence there is no ‘falsity’ (or ‘Inconclusiveness’) at all”.

ayamatra saṅkṣepārthaḥ ya evākāro yasmin jñāne pratyavabhāsate sa eva tena saṃvedyata iti yuktam anyathā hi sarvaṃ jñānaṃ sarvaviṣayaṃ syāt /

The answer to this is ‘The form that actually figures, etc. etc.’ What is meant is briefly as follows: The only right view is that that same form can be apprehended by a certain Cognition which actually figures in that Cognition; otherwise every Cognition would apprehend everything.

pratibhāsamānatvena [p.577] saṃvedyatvaṃ vyāptam /

Thus then, ‘being apprehended’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearing or figuring’.

naca pītākāre jñāne śuklākāraḥ pratibhāsate dṛśyābhimatasyānupalambdher iti vyāpakasya pratibhāsamānatvasya nivṛttau vyāpyasya saṃvedya{tvasya}nivṛttir iti /

In the Cognition of the Yellow form, the white form does not figure, at all; because what is meant to be perceptible is not actually perceived; so that the wider character of ‘appearing or figuring’ being absent, there must be absence of the less wide character of ‘apprehensibility’.

prayogaḥ yo yasminnākāro na pratibhāsate na sa saṃvedyaḥ yathā śabdajñāne na rūpam na pratibhāsate ca pītākāre jñāte śuklaśaṅkharūpam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows: When a certain form does not figure in a Cognition, it cannot be regarded as cognisable (by that Cognition), e.g. Colour in the Cognition of Sound; the white colour of the Conch-shell does not figure in the cognition of the yellow form; and thus there is no apprehension of the wider character.

taṃ ca vettītyanena svavacanavirodhamāha ata eveti prasaṅgena svasaṃvittiṃ sādhayati /

‘One cognises it, etc. etc.’ This shows that there is self-contradiction. ‘It is for this reason, etc. etc.’ By this passage the Author tries to establish, by the way, his view that Cognition is self-cognised.

tena yajjaiminīyair iṣṭam apratyakṣā no buddhir nirākārā ceti tadapāstambhavati /

And this also serves to set aside what has been asserted by the followers of Jaimini (Śabara-bhāṣya) to the effect and that “Our Cognition is imperceptible and formless”.

tasmādityādinopasaṃhāraḥ / kalpayantī satī arthamevānyathā santaṃ kalpayatītyevaṃ neti sambandhaḥ /

‘From all this, etc. etc.’ The sentence is to be construed as ‘Kalpayantī satī arthameva anyathā santam kalpayati iti na’, ‘it is not true that, etc. etc.’ This denies what has been asserted by Kumārila.

atha yadgrāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā / tat saṃvittāvasaṃvitte rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā //

“(a) That which is the apprehender of colour must be different from what is apprehended, because the cognition of the one does not appear on the cognition of the other as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.

grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakāccaivaṃ tat parāmṛśatā yataḥ /

(b) What is apprehended must be different from the apprehender;

na parāmṛśyate 'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakādivat // dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ rasādivat / aikyarūpeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat //

because one who thinks of the one does not necessarily think of the other; as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc., (c) For the same reason the two must, thus, be concluded to be different from one another, like taste, etc., (d) The two must be different, because they are never cognised as being of the same form, like the cognition occurring in another ‘chain’.

jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat /

(e) the cognition cannot apprehend any portion of itself; because it proceeds from the cognition; like its own potency.

grāhyatvapratiṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā //

(f) There should be denial also of ‘apprehensibility’ (of the cognition by itself); because the impression is devoid of the duplicate character.

caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam / jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam //

(g) Caitra’s cognition cannot bring about the apprehension of the apprehensible part of the cognition arising out of his cognition; because it is cognition; just as the cognition appearing in another person.” [Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 172-177] (2064-2068)

yadetad rūpe grāhakaṃ jñānaṃ tat tasmāt tadgrāhyād rūpād bhinnaṃ tasya rūpasya saṃvittau satyāṃ tasyāsaṃvitteḥ yathā rasādigrāhakam /

“(a) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is apprehended; because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Cognition; just as the Apprehender of Taste.

yadvā grāhyaṃ rūpādi svagrāhakād bhinnaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ parāmṛśatā yato yasmān na parāmṛśyate yathā rasādigrāhakāt / athavā dvayam rupādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca parasparavibhinnam ekataraparāmarśe satya{parasyā---}parāmarśanāt rasarūpādivat /

Or (b) what is apprehended, i.e. Colour, etc., must be different from its Apprehender; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other; just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc. Or (c) the two the Colour and its Apprehender must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of, just like Taste and Colour, etc.

ekatvenāparijñānād vā santānāntaracittavat /

Or (d) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form, like the Cognition appearing in another ‘Chain’.

athavā na svāṃśagrāhakaṃ jñānaṃ jñānād upannatvāt /

Or (e) the Cognition cannot apprehend a portion of itself, because it is produced from the Cognition itself; like its own Potency;

vāsanākhye{Kyā---} ca jñānaśaktiḥ /

this ‘Potency’ is what is known as ‘Impression’.

evaṃ jñānasya grāhyatvapratiṣedho 'pi kartavyas tadyathā jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyo jñānād utpannatvāt /

(f) Similarly, there should be denial of the ‘apprehensibility’ of Cognition, which is done in this form: The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition”.

kathama [p.578] sminnanantare prayogadvaye 'pi sādhyadharmānvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti /

Question: In between these two arguments where is the Corroborative Instance endowed with the character of the Probandum? Answer “Because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character;

dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena /

i.e. the character of the Apprehended and the character of the Apprehender.

athavāparaḥ prayogaḥ nacaitaj jñānaṃ caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya bodhakaṃ jñānatvāt / yadvattasya caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāṃśasya maitrādidehāntarodbhavaṃ jñānam //

(g) Or, there is another argument This Cognition in question cannot bring about the apprehension of the portion of Cognition produced in one’s Cognition, because it is Cognition, just as the Cognition appearing in other persons Maitra and the rest, does not apprehend the portion arising out of Caitra’s Cognition.

apṛthagvedanādityādinā dūṣaṇam āha

The refutation of the above is set forth in the following: [see verse 2069 next]

apṛthagvedanāt pūrvaṃ tadatra pratipāditāt / aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā //

Because the two are never cognised separately, as explained before, therefore all the reasons adduced (by Kumārila); down to the ‘non-cognition of sameness’, should be rejected as ‘inadmissible’.

apṛthagvedanād iti /

‘Because the two are never cognised separately’;

nīlataddhiyoḥ sahopalambhaniyamāt /

i.e. because the Blue and its Cognition are always found together;

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyatītyataḥ svasaṃvitprasādhanena pratipāditāt abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt aikarūpyāparijñānaparyantā hetavo na siddhāḥ //

because for the man who has no apprehension of Cognition, there can be no perception of the Object; all this has been explained before in course of the proof of Cognition being self-cognised; where the non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition has been established; because of this, all the Reasons adduced above (by Kumārila) down to the ‘non-cognition of sameness’ cannot be ‘admissible’.

sabahirityādinā paraḥ siddhim udbhāvayati /

In the following Text, the Opponent urges that the Reasons are well-known and ‘admissible’: [see verse 2070 above]

ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ sa bahir deśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate ityanenagranthena bhāṣyakṛtā śabareṇa grāhyasaṃvittir grāhakānubhavād vināpi pratipāditam /

“As a matter of fact, ‘the External Object is directly perceived as having a shape and as connected with external space’ as asserted by Śabara, the author of the Bhāṣya (on Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra 1.1.5), where it has been explained that there is Cognition of the Apprehended Object, even when there is no Cognition of the Apprehending Cognition.

tataś ca saṃvittāvasaṃvitter ityetat siddham //

Hence the Reason ‘Because it is not apprehended on the apprehension of the other’ becomes established and hence ‘admissible’.” (2070)

dvitīyādayo 'pi hetavaḥ kathaṃ siddhā ityata āha na smarāmītyādi / na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi gṛhīto 'rthas tadeti ca / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam //

“As a matter of fact, people have such notions as ‘I do not remember if any object was apprehended by me at the time’, which shows that they remember the appearance of the apprehending cognition, without any idea of the apprehended object. If the two were non-different, there would be remembrance of the apprehended object also, when there is remembrance of the apprehending cognition;

tasmād abhinnatāyāṃ ca grāhye 'pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtisadbhāve tatra tvevaiṣa gṛhyate //

Thus the difference between the two becomes proved by positive and negative concomitance. thus all these reasons become established as residing in the minor term.” [Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 83-85].

anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoḥ /

Question: How are the second and subsequent Reasons (urged under Texts 2065 et. seq.) proved and admissible?

evaṃ ca hetavo 'pyete prasiddhāḥ sādhyadharmiṇi //

Answer: [see verses 2071-2073 above]

grāhyasmaraṇe 'pi grāhakasmṛtir dṛṣṭā yadi ca tasmād grāhakād ekāntena grāhyasyābhinnatā syāt tadā grāhye 'pi smaraṇaṃ bhavet grāhakavat naca bhavati tasmād bhinnayogakṣematvād bhinnau grāhyagrāhakau /

The Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition is found to appear even without the remembrance of the Apprehended Object; if there were absolute non-difference between the two, then there would be remembrance of the Apprehended Object also, just as there is, of the Apprehending Cognition; hence as they do not share the same fate, the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition must be different from one another.

syād etad bhavatyeva grāhye 'pi smaraṇam ity āha grāhakasmṛtisadbhāva ityādi /

It might be urged that ‘there is remembrance of the Apprehended Object also’, The answer to that is ‘As a matter of fact, however, etc. etc.’.

tatreti grāhakasmṛtisadbhāvakāle /

‘Tatra’ At the time that there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.

eṣa eva grāhaka eva gṛhyate na grāhyamityevakāro [p.579] bhinnakramaḥ /

‘Eṣa eva’, i.e. the Apprehending Cognition alone, not the Apprehended Object. The particle ‘eva’ is misplaced.

grāhyagrāhakasmaraṇayor bhāvābhāvābhyām /

‘By positive and negative concomitance’ as between the presence and absence of the Remembrances of the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition;

tathā hi grāhakasmaraṇabhāve 'pi grāhyasmṛter abhāvaḥ //

as there is absence of the Remembrance of the Apprehended Object even when there is presence of the Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.

aprasiddhopalambhasyetyādinā pratividhatte / aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasiddhyati /

As a matter of fact, there can be no apprehension of the object for one who has no apprehension of the cognition; hence there can be no apprehension of the apprehended object without the apprehension of the cognition.

tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavādṛte //

and yet it is not apprehended as something differentiated from the element of the apprehending cognition.

sa bahir deśasambandhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyata ityasyānaikāntikatām āha avasthetyādi / avasthalocanair dṛṣṭaṃ tathā pītādyavekṣyate /

The above arguments (of Kumārila) are answered in the following: [see verses 2074-2075 above] The following Text points out the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason adduced (by Kumārila, under Text 2070, above) that ‘the Object is clearly perceived as connected with outside space’: [see verse 2075 above]

niṣkṛṣṭamityatra chedaḥ /

[verse 2075]: There should be a stop at ‘niṣkṛṣtam’.

tatheti yathā satyābhimataṃ pītādi bahir deśasambaddhaṃ vispaṣṭam upalabhyate, tathā kāmalādyupahatanayanopalabdham api samīkṣyeta /

‘Also’; i.e. just as the real ‘yellow’ is clearly perceived as connected with outside space, so also is the ‘yellow’ clearly perceived by the man with the jaundiced eyes.

yadi nāma samīkṣyate tataḥ kimityāha grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ /

Question: “What if it is so perceived?” Answer; ‘And yet it is, etc. etc.’ There should be a stop after ‘saṃvedyaṃ na’;

niṣkṛṣṭam ityadhyāhāryam /

and ‘niṣkṛṣṭam’ has to be construed here;

saṃvedyaṃ neti bhavatīti śeṣaḥ /

and after ‘na’, ‘bhavati’ is to be understood.

tenāyam artho bhavati tac ca pītādi taimirikādyupalabdhaṃ grāhakāṃśān niṣkṛṣṭaṃ pṛthaksaṃvedyaṃ na bhavati, atha ca bahirdeśasambaddham upalabhyate, tasmād anaikāntikam etat /

Thus the meaning comes to be this: The yellow that is perceived by the man with the diseased eyes does not become apprehended separately, differentiated from the apprehending factor; and yet it is perceived as ‘connected with outside space Hence the Reason in question is ‘Inconclusive’.

tathā param iti satyābhimatam api pītādi / anena vicchinnaspaṣṭapratibhāsamātreṇa dvayor api sāmyaṃ yojayati //

‘It should be the same, etc. etc.’ i.e. also in the case of the real ‘yellow’, What is meant to be shown by this is that the two cases stand on the same footing only so far as ‘being clearly perceived’ is concerned.

alakṣitaviśeṣā ca bāhyarūpe ca sā smṛtiḥ / sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhyāsādyasambhavāt //

only its special features are not clearly remembered. the remembrance does not pertain to anything as distinct prom everything else; because repeated experience and other conditions cannot be there.

anena grāhakasmaraṇe grāhyāsmaraṇasyāsiddhim āha /

What is meant to be asserted here is the fact that it cannot be ‘admitted’ that “there is no Remembrance of the Apprehended Object when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition”.

syād etat yadi grāhye sā smṛtiḥ kimityalakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati / yāvatā yathaiva tadgrāhyaṃ sarvataḥ sajātīyavijātīyād bhinnaṃ tathaiva tat smaret /

The following might be urged: “If the Remembrance pertains to the Apprehended Object, then why should its special features not be remembered, when as a matter of fact, one would naturally remember the object as differentiated from all other like and unlike things, exactly as it has been apprehended.

evaṃ hi tadviṣayatā tasyāḥ syāt, anyathā katham agṛhṇatī tadbhedaṃ tadviṣayā bhavet, atiprasaṅgād ity āha sarvata ityādi /

Otherwise if it did not apprehend its ‘difference’ from other things, how could it appertain to it? There would certainly be incongruities”.

etad uktaṃ bhavati /

The answer to this is ‘The Remembrance does not pertain, etc. etc’.

na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇasāmarthyaṃ, tasyāvastuviṣayatvāt /

What is meant is as follows: Conception has not the capacity to apprehend, things exactly as they exist, because it does not envisage a real entity;

kevalaṃ tathābhūtapadārthānubhavabalād yatraivārthitvādayo niścayahetavaḥsanti tatra tadākārādhyavasāyī smārttaḥ pratyayo nirviṣaya eva /

what happens is that, when there has been apprehension of a certain thing, the subsequent Remembrance that appears appertains to only that aspect of the thing with reference to which there happen to be such predisposing causes as the man’s being in need of the thing concerned and so forth;

paramārthataḥ svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrānta eva sarvo jāyate /

What happens in reality is that it really manifests itself alone, and by imposing the objective character upon what is purely subjective, all Remembrance becomes wrong (false);

tasya tvadhyavasāyavaśena viṣayavyavasthā, na paramārthataḥ / naca grāhyādhyavasāyaḥ smṛter api vidyate kevalaṃ tathāvidhābhyāsapāṭavāder apratyāsatti [p.580] tāratamyādikāraṇābhāvād alakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati, yena smaraṇāntarād viśiṣyate //

and when a certain Remembrance is relegated to a certain Object, it is only because of the conception, not because there is any real connection between the two. It is not true that the conception of the Apprehended Object is present in Remembrance; and it appears in a form in which the special features of the Object are not conceived, because the varying grades of contact and repeated experience that would be necessary for such conception of the special features are absent.

syād etat katham avasīyate grāhyādhyavasāyo 'trāsti smṛter ity āha gṛhīta ityādi / gṛhīta iti ko 'pyevaṃ nānyathā smaraṇaṃ bhavet /

It is on this account (of the vague conception of the Object) that one Remembrance is distinguished from another. If it were not so, then there could be no remembrance in the form ‘some object had been apprehended’;

śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaṃ vedyate smaraṇaṃ naca //

for remembrance is never cognised as a piece of pure rock-crystal.

kambupītādivijñānair hetoḥ paścimayor api / anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ digeṣānyatra sādhane //

The two last reasons (cited by Kumārila) also are clearly ‘inconclusive’, in view of such cognitions as that of the ‘yellow conch-shell’. This is the way to deal with the other reasons also.

yadi hyanupalakṣitaviśeṣaṃ grāhyam api sā smṛtir nādhyavasyet, tadā ko 'pi gṛhīta ityevam api sāmānyākāreṇa grāhyapratyavamarśane na pravarteta / nacāpi kevalo grāhyākārān aṅkitamūrtitayā grāhakaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaḥ smaryate /

If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that ‘Some object had been apprehended Nor is even a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered);

yenocyate ---"smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam" iti /

by virtue of which it could be asserted that “They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object” as has been asserted by [Kumārila, under Text 2071, above].

tasmāt tat smaraṇe tadasmaraṇam asiddham /

Thus it cannot be admitted that “there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered”.

yau ca jñānotpāter jñānatvāditīmau paścimau hetū tayoḥ pītaśaṅkhādijṇyānaṃ jṇyanootpannamapi sapītāder grāhyasya bodhakaṃ bhavati tathānyad apīti vyabhicārītā hetvoḥ /

As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by Kumārila in Texts 2067 and in 2068) “Because it proceeds from Cognition” (2067) and “Because it is Cognition” (2068), these are ‘Falsified’ (Inconclusive) by such instances as the following: The Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell, though ‘proceeding from Cognition’, does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of yellow; and also while being ‘Cognition’, it brings about the Cognition of the yellow which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do.

sādhitaṃ ca pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya nirālambanatvam ata evātmagatasya pītādyākārasya vedanāt svasaṃvedanaṃ siddham ityetad api pratipāditam /

Hence the two Reasons are ‘Inconclusive As regards the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’, it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’ apprehends is only that form of Yellow which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being self-cognised.

eṣā digiti / anyatrāpi bahir arthasādhane paropanyaste eṣā dūṣaṇadik /

‘This is the way, etc. etc.’ ‘With the other Reasons’, that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.

yaduktaṃ pareṇa katham advayaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kiṃ bhāsamānasya nīlādyākārasya jñānarūpasya ca anubhavasiddhasyābhāvāt katham idaṃ nāma yojyate tathāsati sarvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

It has been asked by the other party “What sort of one-ness (of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of Blue, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience? How can any such idea be entertained? As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things”.

atra vaktavyam na sarvābhāvo yasmāt svavyatiriktasya grāhyasya pṛthivyādeḥ svalakṣaṇato 'satvāt /

The answer to this is as follows: There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself.

santānāntarasya tu grāhyarūpeṇābhāvāt grāhyākāraśūnyaṃ tadapekṣya prakalpitaṃ tu yadvijñānasya kartṛtvaṃ vijānātīti vijñānam iti kṛtvā tasyābhāvād grāhakākāraśūnyaṃ na tu vijñānasvalakṣaṇasyāpi sarvasya sarveṇābhāvāt /

And as for the fact of the Cognition being the Active Agent in relation to it, on the basis of the idea that the Cognition also cognises, that active agency also is not there; and hence that too is devoid of the ‘apprehensible form’; not so the ‘active agency’ in relation to the Specific Individuality of the Cognition itself; as everything cannot be brought about by everything.

tathācoktam

This has been thus described

nīlapītādi yajjñānaṃ bahirvedavabhāsate / tatra satyamato nāsti vijñeyaṃ tattvato bahiḥ //

‘When the Blue, Yellow and the like appear in Cognition as something external, there does not, in reality, exist anything cognisable, outside;

sā na satyamataḥ saṃvidadvaye 'pi vibhāvyate //

hence the idea of the Cognition being the active agent in relation to that is not true;

evaṃ ca kṛtvā ayam api prajñāpāramitāpāṭhaḥ sunīto bhavati vijñānaṃ vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyaṃ lakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāya iti //

hence what appears as Cognition is the only one reality, without a second Under this understanding, the following text of the Prajñāpāramitā also becomes comprehensible Cognition is devoid of the nature of Cognition, in the sense that it is devoid of any definite characteristics’.

evam yadyajñānam ityādau maule prayoge hetau sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhyopasaṃharati vivādāspadam ityādi /

For these reasons, the cognition under dispute must be without a second, being devoid of objective and the active agent, because it is cognition, like the reflection. Having set forth the original formal argument above (in the Commentary introducing Text 1965 on p.

vivādāspadam ārūḍhaṃ vijñānatvādato manaḥ /

550, Line 13) in the words ‘Every Cognition is devoid of both, apprehended and apprehender, because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflection’;

advayaṃ vedyakartṛtvaviyogāt pratibimbavat //

and having so far established the invariable concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum in this reasoning, the Author sums up the whole position in the following: [see verse 2079 above]

[p.581] vivādāsmapadaviśeṣaṇenaitad āha svasthanetrādivijñānamatra viśeṣaḥ sādhyadharmī na sarvaḥ sāmānyaṃ tu vijñānatvād iti hetuḥ tena na pratijñārthaikadeśatā hetor iti /

What is meant by the epithet ‘under dispute’ is that the subject of the Reasoning is the Cognition of persons with healthy eyes, etc., not all Cognitions; while what is put forward as fche Probans ‘because it is Cognition’, is Cognition in general; thus it is bhat the Probans is not part of the Proposition.

vedyakartṛtvaviyogād ityadvayatvaviśeṣaṇam /

‘Being devoid of Objective and Active Agent’ qualifies ‘without a second’;

vedyakartṛtvadvayaviraheṇādvayam iṣṭam na tu sarvathābhāvād ity arthaḥ /

that is, what is meant by its being ‘without a second’ is that it is ‘without Objective and Active Agent’; and not that no ‘second’ exists at all.

pratibimbavad iti / viṣayiṇi viṣayopacārāt pratibimbajñānaṃ pratibimbaśabdenoktam / yadvā saptamyantād vatiḥ kartavyaḥ tena jñānam eva sāmarthyād ādheyatayā labhyate /

‘Like the Reflection’ The Object being spoken of as the Cognition, the term ‘Reflection’ stands for the Cognition of the Reflection, Or the ‘Vati’ affix, in ‘pratibimbavat’ may be taken as coming after the Locative ending; then, as the Receptacle (denoted by the Locative), the Cognition itself becomes indicated.

na cāsiddho hetur bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa svabhāvasyaiva tathā nirdeśān na jñātṛtvasya /

The Probans cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’; because what is put forward is that character of the Cognition which consists in the ‘exclusion of other things’, and not the very nature of ‘Cognition’.

nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt //

Nor is the Probans ‘Contradictory’;

nanu ca pratibimbe 'pi jñānaṃ sālambanaṃ matam /

“In the case of reflection also, the cognition is regarded as having an objective basis;

cakṣūraśminivṛttau hi svamukhādes tathekṣaṇāt //

as it is found that on the visual rays being turned back, one’s own face is seen as it is in the reflection.” (2080)

yasmānnayanā raśmayo darpaṇāditalapratihatā nivartamānāḥ svamukhādinā sambandhyante tatas te tathā mukhādipratītihetavo bhavanti /

“The light-rays, issuing from the eyes and falling upon the surface of the Mirror, become tinned back and thus become connected with one’s own face, and then they bring about the cognition of the face.

ataḥ svamukhādereva tathā darpaṇādyantargatādirūpeṇekṣaṇaṃ bhavati /

Thus it is the face itself that is seen as within the Mirror.

tataś ca na pratibimbajñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakadvayarahitaṃ siddham //

So that it becomes established that the Cognition of the Reflection is not ‘devoid of the Apprehender and the Apprehended’.” (2080)

nābhimukhyenetyādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is provided in the following: [see verse 2081 next]

nābhimukhyena taddṛṣṭeḥ svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam / pramāṇadeśabhedādidṛṣṭeścānyapadārthavat //

It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror, because it is seen in front of one’s self, and because what is seen is different in size, position, etc. (from one’s face), like any other object.

na svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam ābhimukhyena tasya svasukhāder darśanāt /

It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror, because the face seen there stands before one’s self;

taddeśapramāṇavarṇādibhedena dṛṣṭeś ca na svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam iti sambandhaḥ /

also because what is seen has a position, size, complexion and other details different from the face.

anyapadārthavad iti /

‘Like any other object’;