buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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yatas teṣu vividhārthakriyāsampādanayogyaṃ na sāmānyamasti /	for the simple reason that there is no such common ‘Universal’ over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts.
yadi syāt tadā yeyaṃ kvacit kadācit kāsāñciddhātryādīnāṃ cirakṣiprarogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopalabdhiḥ sā na syāt, sāmānyasyaikarūpatvāt /	If there were such a common ‘Universal’, there could he no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some Dhātrī, etc. and that at only certain times;
naca kṣetrakṣīrāvasekādisaṃskāraviśeṣavaśād āsāditātiśayaṃ sāmānyamevaitāmarthakriyāṃ vicitrāṃ sampādayatīti yuktam / tasya nityatayā parair anādheyavikārasya kṣetrādibhedato 'pi nātiśayaḥ kaścid ekarūpatvāt /	Nor can it be right to assert that “the said Universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things because the ‘Universal’ is, ex hypothesi, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things; because the ‘Universal’ is always of one and the same form.
dhātryādīnāṃ tvanityānāṃ so 'tiśayaḥ kṣetrādibhedato bhidyata ityatasta eva rogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopetāḥ /	As for the Dhātrī, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc.; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases.
tataś ca tadvadevānye 'pi ghaṭādayo bhāvāḥ svahetupratyayebhyas tathotpatteḥ prakṛtyaivaikākārapratyavamarśādihetavo bhaviṣyantītyadoṣaḥ /	In the same manner, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same form.
tulyapratyavamarśāder ityādiśabdena salilasaṃdhāraṇādyarthakryāsāmarthyaparigrahaḥ //	The term ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.’, is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.
kāryamātropayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ ca sacchruteḥ / samayaḥ kriyate teṣu yadvānyasyā yathāruci //	All that the expression ‘being’ (existence) is meant to convey is only the idea of capacity for action; it is in this sense that the convention is established, in regard to the things in question, or to any other thing, according to the whim (of people).
vāhadohādirūpeṇa kāryabhedopayogini / gavādiśrutisaṅketaḥ kriyate vyavahartṛbhiḥ //	Persons using the term ‘go’ (‘ox’ or ‘cow’) establish the convention in regard to the term as applicable to things serving such diverse purposes as carrying, yielding milk and so forth.
tat saṅketamanaskārāt sadādipratyayā ime / jāyamānās tu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtyanantaram //	Thus it is that all these notions of ‘being’ and the rest are found to proceed from the conception of these conventions, and not immediately after the functioning of the sense-organs.
nahyagṛhītasamayānāṃ sadādipratyayaprasūtiranyathā saṅketakaraṇavaiyarthyaṃ syāt /	The notions of ‘Being’ and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all.
tasmād yasminnekākāraparāmarśavyavasthitārthakriyāsāmarthyamātrapratipāditamevābhedaṃ parāmṛśya saditi śrutiṃ viniveśayanti samayakṛtaḥ{tasminsadādipratyayaḥ /	Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term ‘existent’ (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of ‘Being’ appears.
yadvānyasyā iti /	‘Or to any other thing’;
vastvityasyāḥ śruteḥ /	i.e. of the expression ‘Entity’.
evaṃ gavādiviśeṣaśruter api vāhādisāmarthyaviśeṣajijñāsāyāṃ samayaḥ kriyata iti yojyam /	Similarly in the case of the terms ‘go’ (‘Ox’ or ‘Cow’) and the rest, the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as carrying and the like.
tataś ca saṅketottarakālaṃ vyavahārakāle gavādiṣu dṛṣṭeṣvapi pūrvakṛtasaṇGketābhogas tatastannāmasmaraṇaṃ tataḥ paścāt sadādipratyayodaya iti sphuṭataramālakṣyata eva /	Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term, even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name ‘Ox’ comes to the mind; and the idea that it ‘exists5 comes only later in a clear form.
kvacidatyabhyāsata āśutarotpādādamīṣāṃ kramo nāvadhāryate /	In some cases, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised;
mandābhyāsās tu sphuṭataradhārayantyeva tadityupasaṃharati /	but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.
tat tasmāt tadevaṃ samayābhogādivyavahitatvāt sākṣād anutpatteḥ pratyakṣatvam eṣāmasiddham, na cāpi pāramparyeṇotpadyamānasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nyāyyamatiprasaṅgād iti bhāvaḥ //	The whole matter is thus summed up: From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be directly perceptible; because it is not reasonable to regard as ‘perceived’ things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.
ajalpākāramevādau vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate /	At first, every cognition appears in a form free from verbal expression;
tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārtaṃ tato 'pi te //	hence the notions in question partake of the nature of remembrance, for that reason also.
svalakṣaṇe saṅketasyākaraṇād dṛṣṭvā ca vikalpanāt prathamataraṃ vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayatayābhilāpasaṃsargaviveki vijñānamakṣāśritamupajāyate /	and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, only as a point of ‘Specific Peculiarity’, free from all contact with verbal expression, that there follows its Cognition based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ then there comes to the mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity;
tataḥ paścāt tasminneva paridṛṣṭe vastuni samayābhogas tadanantaraṃ yathāsamayaṃ paridṛṣṭārthaviṣayās tadavya{dya}vasāyitayā sadādipratyayās tamevārthaṃ paridṛṣṭamabhilapantaḥ samutpadyamānāḥ katham iva smārtatāṃ nāsādayeyuḥ /	then there appear* the notions of ‘Being’ and the rest, in accordance with the said Conventions, in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions embody all the ‘determination’ with reference to the thing, and give verbal expression to them. How can these notions escape from being regarded as ‘Remembrance’?
tato 'pīti / yathā paridṛṣṭāvya{dya}vasāyāt /	‘For that reason also’, i.e. because they are ‘determined’ as seen.
ta iti / sadādipratyayāḥ //	‘The notions in question’, i.e. those of ‘Being’ and the rest.
kutaḥ punar ayam utpattikramo vijñānānām ālakṣita ity āha anyatretyādi /	Question “Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions been deduced?” Answer: [see verse 731 next]
anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam / sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravartate //	It is because the process is as described that when a man has his mind turned somewhere else, there appears only the vague apprehension of the mere thing apart from all specific peculiarities.
yatas te sadādipratyayā amunā krameṇopajāyante tata evānyatra viṣayāntare gatacittasya vyāsaktamanasaḥ puro 'vasthitaṃ vastu paśyataḥ saṃmukhībhūtavastusaṅketamanaskārādyapravṛtteḥ prathamataraḥ sarvopādhiviviktavastumātradarśanaṃ pravartate /	It is because the notions of ‘Being’, etc. appear in the above-mentioned sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere, i.e. he is absent-minded, if he sees a thing lying before himself, until there come to his mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first perception that appears is that of the mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific peculiarities.
anyathā hi yadi sarvam eva sābhijalpaṃ vijñānaṃ syāt tadā puro 'vasthitam ---vastu sarvopādhiśūnyamanyatra gatamanāḥ kathamīkṣeta / na hyekasmin kāle yugapad abhilāpadvayaṃ saṃvedyate /	If it were not so, if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it, then, why should the absent-minded man apprehend the mereng devoid of all qualifications? It is not possible for two determinate Cognitions with verbal expressions to appear at the same time.
tadevaṃ sākṣād akṣagatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvam asiddham //	Thus it is proved that the assertion that “the notions of ‘Being’, etc. are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning” is not true.
tatra yaduktaṃ gavādītyādi tatrāha hetāvityādi / hetāvādye 'pi vaiphalyaṃ samayābhogabhāvitā /	It has been argued above (under Text 716) that “In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of Name and Idea must be due to causes other than Convention, etc. etc.”.
teṣām iṣṭaiva saṃsargī so 'nvayavyatirekavat //	This is answered in the following [see verse 732 above]
yadi sāmānyenānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaramātranibandhanatvam eṣāṃ prasādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā, yato gavādisaṅketābhoga eva gavādipratyayavyapadeśānām anurūpasambandhī /	If all that is sought to be proved is the general fact that the notions in question are due to other causes related, to the character of the things concerned, then it is superfluous proving what is already admitted. Because the Body of Conventions bearing upon the Cow, etc. is that other cause related to and in keeping with the character of the things;
tathā hi tasmin sati bhavanti vijātīyamanaskāre, {asati} ca na bhavanti /	as the said notions appear only when this Body of Conventions is there, and they do not appear when what is there is some heterogeneous Body of Conventions;
ataḥ sa evānvayavyatirekavān hetureṣāṃ siddhaḥ, tadgatānvayavyatirekasyaivānuvidhānāt ato vaiphalyaṃ hetuprayogaprayāsasya //	Thus the attempt to adduce Reasons for this is entirely futile. If the said ‘body of convention’ is included in the ‘subject’ (of the inference propounded by the opponent), then the corroborative instance cited becomes ‘devoid of the probandum’;
naivaṃ taddhetavaḥ sākṣād bāhyavatsāṅkuśādayaḥ //	as the external things mentioned, the calf and the goad, etc. are not the direct causes of the notions;
nābhidhānavikalpānāṃ vṛttirasti svalakṣaṇe /	as the ‘specific peculiarity’ of things is something beyond the reach of verbal expression.
sarvaṃ vāggocarātītamūrtiryena svalakṣaṇam // athainaṃ saṅketamanaskāraṃ pakṣa evāntarbhāvya tadvyatiriktanityaikānugāmisāmānyākhyasaṃsarginibandhanatvam eṣāṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā, na hyevambhūtena kvacidanvayaḥ siddhaḥ /	If the ‘Conventional Conception’ is included in the ‘Subject’ (of the Opponent’s Reasoning), and then it is sought to be proved that all these notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all-embracing Entity named ‘Universal’, which is apart from all those, then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be ‘devoid of the Probandum’; because the concomitance of thengs with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived.
ye cāmī vatsāṅkuśādayaḥ savatsādyabhidhānaprajñānahetutvena varṇitāste 'pi taddhetutvena, na siddhāḥ na hyeṣāmāsāditasvalakṣaṇabhāvānāṃ sākṣādabhidhānaprajñānahetutvam asti sarvāvāgvikalpagocarātītarūpatvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyataḥ sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasya /	As a matter of fact, the Calf, the Goad and suchngs that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the Cow being ‘with Calf’, or the Elephant being ‘with the Goad’, have not been proved to be so. Specially because when these things the Calf and the Goad, revert to the position of their ‘Specific Peculiarity’, they are not found to be the direct cause of any Names and Ideas, for the simple reason that all ‘Specific Peculiarity’ is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression.
pāramparyeṇa tu hetutvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt, sarvasyaiva sarvatra pāramaparyeṇopayogasya vidyamānatvāt //	If they be regarded, as the indirect cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, because indirectly, everything is of use in the producing of everything.
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi loko 'ṅkuśādi bāhyam eva taddhetutvenādhyavasyatītyāha antarmātretyādi /	Question “How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being with the Calf, and the Elephant being with the Goad)?” [see verse 735 next]
antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ tvavalambya te / bahīrūpādhyavasitaṃ pravartante 'ṅkuśādikam //	In fact, all these notions proceed on the basis of things like the goad, which consist in mere ‘idea’ and are illusory, on -which ‘externality’ is imposed.
yattāvad aṅkuśādiprajñaptyupādānaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ na tadvikalpaiḥ spṛśyata ityuktam /	It has been already pointed out that the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ of Things which forms the root-cause of the Idea of the ‘Goad’ and such things, is not touched by an ‘imposition’ (or qualification).
yat tu sāṃvṛtaṃ tatkalpanāśilpinirmitātmarūpatayāntarmātrārūḍham eva nabāhyaṃ dṛśyavikalpayos tu vivekenānabhijñatayā jano bāhyam iva tamākāraṃ manyamāno bāhyam eva vastvabhidhāvatīti nāto bāhyarūpatāsiddhir aṅkuśādīnām /	As regards the ‘Illusory’ form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination; it consists in mere ‘Idea’, and is not an external object. People regard it as an ‘external thing’, because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as ‘external’; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitted.
aṅkuśādikamityavalambyetyanena pūrvakeṇa sambandhanīyam /	‘Avalambya’ is to be construed with ‘aṅkuśādikam’.
antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ bahīrūpatayādhyavasitaṃ sāṃvṛtamaṅkuśādikamālambya bāhye pravartanta ity arthaḥ /	What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere ‘Idea’ and on which the external character is superimposed.
antarmātrā buddhiḥ //	‘Antarmātrā’ is Buddhi, Idea, Cognition.
yac ca gavādiviṣayatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ tadapyayuktam eva, vyavacchedyābhāvād iti darśayann āha kriyetyādi /	In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification “while pertaining to the Cow This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).
kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo hetuś ca varṇyate / abhāvapratyayasyeti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam //	‘The negation of action, quality and name’ is also described (by you) as the cause of the notion of ‘non-existence’; hence the qualification serves no useful purpose.
tadapyayuktaṃ hetutve vastutā śaktito 'pi ca /	because if it is a cause, then it must be a positive entity, as possessing a definite potency.
[p.243] abhāvapratyayasyāpi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāva eva hetutvena bhavadbhir varṇyate /	Of the notion of ‘non-existence’ also, the ‘Negation of action, quality and name’ has been described as the Cause.
tadapyayuktam iti /	This cannot be right;
kriyādyabhāvasya hetutvopavarṇanam /	because what has been said to constitute the character of the ‘Cause’ is the potency to produce the effect;
yadi cābhāvo 'pi tathāvidhasāmarthyādhyāsito bhavet tadā katham iva vastutvaṃ nāsādayet etāvanmātranibandhanatvād vastunaḥ /	as the Positive Entity alone is characterised by the said Potency. If then, Negation also had the said Potency imposed upon it, how could it not attain the character of the Positive Entity? As the presence of that Potency alone constitutes the nature of the Positive Entity.
tataścābhāvarūpatām eva vijahyāt /	In this way the Negation would lose its negative character itself.
vastusvabhāvapracyutirūpatvād abhāvasya /	As ‘negation’ consists only in the cessation of the character of the ‘Positive Entity
apica yadi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo 'bhāvapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā sattādiṣvapyabhāvapratyayaḥ prāptastatrāpi śaśaviṣāṇādivat kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvāviśeṣāt //	Then again, if ‘the negation of Action, Quality and Name’ were the Cause of the notion of Non-existence, then the notion of being ‘non-existent’ would apply to ‘Being’ and other Universals also; as therein also is present ‘the negation of Action, Quality and Name’ just as much as in such nonentities as the ‘Hare’s Horns (736-737)
hetuścāsiddha iti darśayann āha vailakṣaṇyam iti /	The following Text shows that the Reason cited (by the Opponent under Text 716) is ‘unproven’ (not admitted): [see verse 738 next]
vailakṣaṇyam asiddhaṃ ca piṇḍākṛtyādibuddhitaḥ /	The fact of the notions in question being different from the notions of the body, shape, etc. is not admitted (or proved);
tajjñānānām asiddho 'pi hetureṣa bhavatyataḥ //	hence the reason put forward is also open to the charge of being ‘un-proven’, (738)
nahi gavādipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktam arthāntaramadhyavaseyam asti yena tat pratyayānyavatmeṣāṃ bhavet //	As a matter of fact, the notions of the Cow and such things do not have for their objective anything other than the Body, etc. (of the animals); by virtue of which they could be held to be distinct from these latter.
pratijñāyāścānumānabādheti darśayann āha anvayītyādi /	The Conclusion also (of the Opponent’s Argument) is annulled by Inference: [see verse 739 next]
anvayī pratyayo yasmācchabdavyaktyavabhāsavān /	The comprehensive notion (op all cows, for instance) manifests within itself the verbal expression and the constituent individuals;
varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyā jātistu varṇyate //	while the ‘universal’ is described as devoid of all tinge of colour, shape and verbal expression.
etaduktaṃ bhavati anugāmipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktaṃ nimittamālambanabhūtameva bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayiṣitam, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt;tadvilakṣaṇavarṇākṛtyādipratibhāsanāc ca /	What is meant is as follows: What is meant by you to be proved is the fact that the basis of comprehensive notions consists of something different from the Body, etc.; this however is not right;
tathā hi bhavadbhir varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam vijñānaṃ ca varṇādipratibhāsānugatamanubhūyate tat katham asya varṇādiśūnyamālambanaṃ bhavet na hyanyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālambanaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt /	as no such thing enters into the notions at all; and also because what does appear in these notions is something quite different, in the shape of Colour, Shape, etc. That is to say, you describe the ‘Universal’ Cow to be devoid of all tinge of Colour, Shape and Verbal Expression; and yet the actual Cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of Colour, etc.; how then could the basis of such Cognition consist of what is devoid of Colour, etc.? Certainly a Cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form;
prayogaḥ yo yadvilakṣaṇārthapratibhāsaḥ pratyayaḥ sa tadgrāhako na bhavati tadyathā śabdajñānaṃ na rūpagrāhakaṃ jātivilakṣaṇādipratibhāsaścānvayīpratyaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows: When a Cognition manifests an object distinct from some other object, it cannot be regarded as apprehending this latter object; e.g. the Cognition of Sound cannot bo regarded as apprehending Colour; and as a matter of fact, the comprehensive notion manifests within itself Colour and the rest which are something different from the pure ‘Universal’;
śabdavyaktyavabhāsavān iti /	‘Manifests within itself the Verbal Expression, etc. etc.’;
śabdo gaurityādivyapadeśaḥ, vyaktiḥ varṇasaṃsthānātmikā, tayor avabhāsaḥ so 'syāstīti tadvān /	‘verbal expression’, i.e. the name ‘Cow’; ‘constituent individuals’, in the form of colour, shape and the rest; ‘avabhasavān’, containing the manifestation of these.
akṣarāṇi gakāraukāravisarjanīyādīni //	‘Akṣara’, ‘Letters’, stands for the verbal expression ‘gauḥ’, which is made up of the letters ‘ga’, ‘au’ and the Visarga, (739)
sāmānyasyāpi nīlādirūpatve guṇato 'sya kaḥ / bhedo nānugataścaiko nīlādirupalakṣyate //	If the ‘universal’ also were in the form of ‘blue’, then, what would be its difference from ‘quality’? As a matter of fact, however, no all-comprehensive ‘blue’ is ever perceived.
bhāsamāno 'pi cedeṣa na vivekena lakṣyate /	even though it may be manifesting itself, it is never perceived in a differentiated form.
tat kathaṃ dhīdhvanī vyaktau vartete tadbalena tau // niścayātmaka evāyaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ paraiḥ /	under the circumstances, how could the idea and name apply to the individual, on the basis of the said comprehensive notion? Further, the other party holds the notion of the ‘universal’ to be definite and certain;
iṣṭaścāgrahaṇaṃ prāpte yuktaṃ nānupalakṣaṇam //	consequently, its non-perception cannot be right, as that would imply that it is in cognisable.
syānmataṃ guṇo hi nīlādiranugato na bhavati /	if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea as ‘Blue’;
sāmānyaṃ tu bhinnadeśakālavyaktyanugāmītyata ākārabhedo 'stītyāha nānugataścaika ityādi /	thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being not admitted, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika’s Conclusion by Inference (as urged in the preceding Text, by the Author).”
nahi nīlādiguṇavyatiriktamaparaṃ nīlatvādi nīlādyākārānugatamanugāmi	Such, being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality ‘Blue’ and the ‘Universal’ Blue;
pratibhāsānamālakṣyate /	as, ex hypothesis both have the same form.
adhyakṣata ekasyaiva nīlāder asādhāraṇasya pratibhāsanāt /	It might be urged that “the Quality ‘Blue’ is not something comprehensive, while the ‘Universal’ Blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places;
nāpi vikalpacetasi nīlatvādi dvitīyaṃ pratibhāsate, yathādṛṣṭasyaiva tenādhyavasāyāt /	Even in the ‘determinate’ Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue; as that Cognition only ‘determines’ what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception).
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāsamānam api nopalakṣyate vivekena mandais tathedam api sāmānyam iti tadapyayuktam /	It might be argued that “Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence, so the ‘Universal’ also”,
evaṃ hi taddarśanabalād bhinnāsvapi vyaktiṣvabhinnau dhīdhvanī bhavata iti	as even so, the theory propounded by you that “on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse”, would become untenable;
yadetad varṇitaṃ tannopapadyate, nahi viśeṣaṇānupalakṣaṇe viśeṣye dhīrupajāyate yathā daṇḍānupalakṣaṇe daṇḍīti pratyayo na bhavati tadvadatrāpi syāt /	because if the qualifying factor is unperceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as ‘the man with the stick’, Similarly in the case in question.
tathā hi svataḥśabdapratyayagocarātivṛttā bhedā bhavadbhir upavarṇyante /	Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verbal Expression and Cognition;
tāṃś ca bhedān svato buddhiśabdaviṣayavyativṛttaśarīrān sāmānyadarśanabalena pratiyanpratipattā kathaṃ tasmaivānupalakṣako nāma /	and these diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the ‘Universal’; how, then, can the Cogniser not ‘perceive’ the Universal itself?
apica yasyāvikalpakameva pratyakṣaṃ tasyaitadyuktaṃ vaktuṃ pratibhāsamānam api nopalakṣyata iti niścayapratyayavyāpāratvād upalakṣaṇasya yasya tu bhavataḥ sarvam eva savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam iti pakṣas tasyāyuktamanupalakṣaṇamagrahaṇaprasaṅgāt /	Further, for the man for whom Perception is always ‘indeterminate’, it may be right to say that ‘even though apparent, it is not apprehended’; as ‘Apprehension’ involves the functioning of the idea of Certitude; but for you, who hold all Perception to be determinate, it is not right that there should be no apprehension; as that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about certitude;
iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattānniścayanaṃ taccenna niścinvanti na gṛhṇantītyeva prāptam //	if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to tins that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.
abhyupetyāpi nīlādivyatiriktārthāntarasiddhiṃ neṣṭasiddhir bhavatām abhimatasādhyārthasyānumānabādhitatvāt tena vyāptyasiddher iti darśayann āha ---siddhe 'pītyādi /	Even though it may be taken as established that the notions in question have a different cause, the existence of the ‘universal’ as comprehensive, and free from impermanence, does not become established; because the notions in question appear in succession. Even granting that the existence of something other than the ‘Blue’ is proved, there can be no proof for what you desire to prove;
siddhe 'pyanyanimittatve na sāmānyaṃ prasiddhyati /	as your Conclusion itself is barred by Inference, and to that extent, the Premiss also cannot be admitted.
[p.245] adhrauvyaviviktam iti / anityatvaviviktaṃ, nityam iti yāvat /	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 743 above] ‘Free from impermanence’, i.e. free from non-eternality, eternal.
kasmān na siddhyatītikramodayāt /	“Why is it not established?” ‘Because the notions in question appear in succession’;
gavādyabhidhānapratyayānām iti śeṣaḥ /	i.e. the notions of the ‘Cow’ and the rest.
yadā hi tathāvidhasāmānyadharmahetukatvameṣāmabhaviṣyat tadā krameṇāmī nodapatsyanta, avikalakāraṇatvādyugapadevotpadyeran, yugapad utpadyamānānekapadārthavat /	If these were due to any such commonality as the ‘Universal’, then they would not appear in succession, as their cause being always present in its perfect form, they should all appear simultaneously; just like several things produced simultaneously.
nahi pauranupakāryasya kācid apekṣāsti //	Specially because a cause that cannot be helped does not need anything else.
samprati hetoḥ siddhimabhyupagamya vyabhicāramāha padārthaśabda iti /	Now, even admitting the Reason, the Author shows that it is ‘fallible’ (‘not true’, ‘Inconclusive’): [see verse 744 next]
padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetumaparaṃ ṣaṭsvapekṣate / astīti pratyayo yaś ca sattādiṣvanuvartate //	On what basis does the term ‘category’ (‘padārtha’) rest when applied to the six (vaiśeṣika categories)? as also the notion ‘it exists’ which is found to be present in ‘being’, etc.? (744)
nahi padārthatvaṃ nāma ṣaṭsu padārtheṣvaparam asti yena padārthaḥ padārtha ityanugāmī pratyayo bhavet /	There is not (even for the Vaiśeṣika) any such ‘Universal’ as ‘Padārthatva’ (the genus ‘Category’) subsisting in all the six Categories, on the basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as ‘this is a Category this is a Category and so forth’;
tathā sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyeṣu na sattāsti yenāstīti teṣu pratyayaḥ syāt dravyaguṇakarmasveva sattāyāḥ sthitatvāt /	similarly in the ‘Universal’, the ‘Specific Individuality’ and ‘Inherence’, the ‘Universal’ Being does not subsist; by virtue of which each of these could be conceived of as ‘existing’;
syād etat tatrāpi sattādisadupalambhakapramāṇaviṣayatvaṃ dharmo 'sti tenānyanimitto 'yamatrāpi vyapadeśa ityavyabhicāra evetyāha anyadharmetyādi /	because (according to the Vaiśeṣika) ‘Being’ subsists only in the three Categories of ‘Substance’, ‘Quality’ and ‘Action As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the ‘Universal’;
anyadharmanimittaścet tatrāpyastyastitāmatiḥ / tadanyadharmahetutve 'niṣṭhāsakteradharmitā //	If in regard to the categories mentioned, the notion that ‘it exists’ is due to something else, then, in regard to this ‘something’ also the notion that£ it exists’ is present;
vyabhicārī tato heturamībhirayamiṣyate /	in view of these, the reason would become ‘fallible’ (untrue).

yatas teṣu vividhārthakriyāsampādanayogyaṃ na sāmānyamasti /

for the simple reason that there is no such common ‘Universal’ over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts.

yadi syāt tadā yeyaṃ kvacit kadācit kāsāñciddhātryādīnāṃ cirakṣiprarogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopalabdhiḥ sā na syāt, sāmānyasyaikarūpatvāt /

If there were such a common ‘Universal’, there could he no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some Dhātrī, etc. and that at only certain times;

naca kṣetrakṣīrāvasekādisaṃskāraviśeṣavaśād āsāditātiśayaṃ sāmānyamevaitāmarthakriyāṃ vicitrāṃ sampādayatīti yuktam / tasya nityatayā parair anādheyavikārasya kṣetrādibhedato 'pi nātiśayaḥ kaścid ekarūpatvāt /

Nor can it be right to assert that “the said Universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things because the ‘Universal’ is, ex hypothesi, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things; because the ‘Universal’ is always of one and the same form.

dhātryādīnāṃ tvanityānāṃ so 'tiśayaḥ kṣetrādibhedato bhidyata ityatasta eva rogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopetāḥ /

As for the Dhātrī, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc.; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases.

tataś ca tadvadevānye 'pi ghaṭādayo bhāvāḥ svahetupratyayebhyas tathotpatteḥ prakṛtyaivaikākārapratyavamarśādihetavo bhaviṣyantītyadoṣaḥ /

In the same manner, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same form.

tulyapratyavamarśāder ityādiśabdena salilasaṃdhāraṇādyarthakryāsāmarthyaparigrahaḥ //

The term ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.’, is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.

kāryamātropayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ ca sacchruteḥ / samayaḥ kriyate teṣu yadvānyasyā yathāruci //

All that the expression ‘being’ (existence) is meant to convey is only the idea of capacity for action; it is in this sense that the convention is established, in regard to the things in question, or to any other thing, according to the whim (of people).

vāhadohādirūpeṇa kāryabhedopayogini / gavādiśrutisaṅketaḥ kriyate vyavahartṛbhiḥ //

Persons using the term ‘go’ (‘ox’ or ‘cow’) establish the convention in regard to the term as applicable to things serving such diverse purposes as carrying, yielding milk and so forth.

tat saṅketamanaskārāt sadādipratyayā ime / jāyamānās tu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtyanantaram //

Thus it is that all these notions of ‘being’ and the rest are found to proceed from the conception of these conventions, and not immediately after the functioning of the sense-organs.

nahyagṛhītasamayānāṃ sadādipratyayaprasūtiranyathā saṅketakaraṇavaiyarthyaṃ syāt /

The notions of ‘Being’ and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all.

tasmād yasminnekākāraparāmarśavyavasthitārthakriyāsāmarthyamātrapratipāditamevābhedaṃ parāmṛśya saditi śrutiṃ viniveśayanti samayakṛtaḥ{tasminsadādipratyayaḥ /

Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term ‘existent’ (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of ‘Being’ appears.

yadvānyasyā iti /

‘Or to any other thing’;

vastvityasyāḥ śruteḥ /

i.e. of the expression ‘Entity’.

evaṃ gavādiviśeṣaśruter api vāhādisāmarthyaviśeṣajijñāsāyāṃ samayaḥ kriyata iti yojyam /

Similarly in the case of the terms ‘go’ (‘Ox’ or ‘Cow’) and the rest, the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as carrying and the like.

tataś ca saṅketottarakālaṃ vyavahārakāle gavādiṣu dṛṣṭeṣvapi pūrvakṛtasaṇGketābhogas tatastannāmasmaraṇaṃ tataḥ paścāt sadādipratyayodaya iti sphuṭataramālakṣyata eva /

Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term, even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name ‘Ox’ comes to the mind; and the idea that it ‘exists5 comes only later in a clear form.

kvacidatyabhyāsata āśutarotpādādamīṣāṃ kramo nāvadhāryate /

In some cases, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised;

mandābhyāsās tu sphuṭataradhārayantyeva tadityupasaṃharati /

but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.

tat tasmāt tadevaṃ samayābhogādivyavahitatvāt sākṣād anutpatteḥ pratyakṣatvam eṣāmasiddham, na cāpi pāramparyeṇotpadyamānasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nyāyyamatiprasaṅgād iti bhāvaḥ //

The whole matter is thus summed up: From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be directly perceptible; because it is not reasonable to regard as ‘perceived’ things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.

ajalpākāramevādau vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate /

At first, every cognition appears in a form free from verbal expression;

tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārtaṃ tato 'pi te //

hence the notions in question partake of the nature of remembrance, for that reason also.

svalakṣaṇe saṅketasyākaraṇād dṛṣṭvā ca vikalpanāt prathamataraṃ vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayatayābhilāpasaṃsargaviveki vijñānamakṣāśritamupajāyate /

and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, only as a point of ‘Specific Peculiarity’, free from all contact with verbal expression, that there follows its Cognition based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ then there comes to the mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity;

tataḥ paścāt tasminneva paridṛṣṭe vastuni samayābhogas tadanantaraṃ yathāsamayaṃ paridṛṣṭārthaviṣayās tadavya{dya}vasāyitayā sadādipratyayās tamevārthaṃ paridṛṣṭamabhilapantaḥ samutpadyamānāḥ katham iva smārtatāṃ nāsādayeyuḥ /

then there appear* the notions of ‘Being’ and the rest, in accordance with the said Conventions, in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions embody all the ‘determination’ with reference to the thing, and give verbal expression to them. How can these notions escape from being regarded as ‘Remembrance’?

tato 'pīti / yathā paridṛṣṭāvya{dya}vasāyāt /

‘For that reason also’, i.e. because they are ‘determined’ as seen.

ta iti / sadādipratyayāḥ //

‘The notions in question’, i.e. those of ‘Being’ and the rest.

kutaḥ punar ayam utpattikramo vijñānānām ālakṣita ity āha anyatretyādi /

Question “Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions been deduced?” Answer: [see verse 731 next]

anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam / sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravartate //

It is because the process is as described that when a man has his mind turned somewhere else, there appears only the vague apprehension of the mere thing apart from all specific peculiarities.

yatas te sadādipratyayā amunā krameṇopajāyante tata evānyatra viṣayāntare gatacittasya vyāsaktamanasaḥ puro 'vasthitaṃ vastu paśyataḥ saṃmukhībhūtavastusaṅketamanaskārādyapravṛtteḥ prathamataraḥ sarvopādhiviviktavastumātradarśanaṃ pravartate /

It is because the notions of ‘Being’, etc. appear in the above-mentioned sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere, i.e. he is absent-minded, if he sees a thing lying before himself, until there come to his mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first perception that appears is that of the mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific peculiarities.

anyathā hi yadi sarvam eva sābhijalpaṃ vijñānaṃ syāt tadā puro 'vasthitam ---vastu sarvopādhiśūnyamanyatra gatamanāḥ kathamīkṣeta / na hyekasmin kāle yugapad abhilāpadvayaṃ saṃvedyate /

If it were not so, if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it, then, why should the absent-minded man apprehend the mereng devoid of all qualifications? It is not possible for two determinate Cognitions with verbal expressions to appear at the same time.

tadevaṃ sākṣād akṣagatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvam asiddham //

Thus it is proved that the assertion that “the notions of ‘Being’, etc. are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning” is not true.

tatra yaduktaṃ gavādītyādi tatrāha hetāvityādi / hetāvādye 'pi vaiphalyaṃ samayābhogabhāvitā /

It has been argued above (under Text 716) that “In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of Name and Idea must be due to causes other than Convention, etc. etc.”.

teṣām iṣṭaiva saṃsargī so 'nvayavyatirekavat //

This is answered in the following [see verse 732 above]

yadi sāmānyenānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaramātranibandhanatvam eṣāṃ prasādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā, yato gavādisaṅketābhoga eva gavādipratyayavyapadeśānām anurūpasambandhī /

If all that is sought to be proved is the general fact that the notions in question are due to other causes related, to the character of the things concerned, then it is superfluous proving what is already admitted. Because the Body of Conventions bearing upon the Cow, etc. is that other cause related to and in keeping with the character of the things;

tathā hi tasmin sati bhavanti vijātīyamanaskāre, {asati} ca na bhavanti /

as the said notions appear only when this Body of Conventions is there, and they do not appear when what is there is some heterogeneous Body of Conventions;

ataḥ sa evānvayavyatirekavān hetureṣāṃ siddhaḥ, tadgatānvayavyatirekasyaivānuvidhānāt ato vaiphalyaṃ hetuprayogaprayāsasya //

Thus the attempt to adduce Reasons for this is entirely futile. If the said ‘body of convention’ is included in the ‘subject’ (of the inference propounded by the opponent), then the corroborative instance cited becomes ‘devoid of the probandum’;

naivaṃ taddhetavaḥ sākṣād bāhyavatsāṅkuśādayaḥ //

as the external things mentioned, the calf and the goad, etc. are not the direct causes of the notions;

nābhidhānavikalpānāṃ vṛttirasti svalakṣaṇe /

as the ‘specific peculiarity’ of things is something beyond the reach of verbal expression.

sarvaṃ vāggocarātītamūrtiryena svalakṣaṇam // athainaṃ saṅketamanaskāraṃ pakṣa evāntarbhāvya tadvyatiriktanityaikānugāmisāmānyākhyasaṃsarginibandhanatvam eṣāṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā, na hyevambhūtena kvacidanvayaḥ siddhaḥ /

If the ‘Conventional Conception’ is included in the ‘Subject’ (of the Opponent’s Reasoning), and then it is sought to be proved that all these notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all-embracing Entity named ‘Universal’, which is apart from all those, then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be ‘devoid of the Probandum’; because the concomitance of thengs with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived.

ye cāmī vatsāṅkuśādayaḥ savatsādyabhidhānaprajñānahetutvena varṇitāste 'pi taddhetutvena, na siddhāḥ na hyeṣāmāsāditasvalakṣaṇabhāvānāṃ sākṣādabhidhānaprajñānahetutvam asti sarvāvāgvikalpagocarātītarūpatvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyataḥ sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasya /

As a matter of fact, the Calf, the Goad and suchngs that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the Cow being ‘with Calf’, or the Elephant being ‘with the Goad’, have not been proved to be so. Specially because when these things the Calf and the Goad, revert to the position of their ‘Specific Peculiarity’, they are not found to be the direct cause of any Names and Ideas, for the simple reason that all ‘Specific Peculiarity’ is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression.

pāramparyeṇa tu hetutvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt, sarvasyaiva sarvatra pāramaparyeṇopayogasya vidyamānatvāt //

If they be regarded, as the indirect cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, because indirectly, everything is of use in the producing of everything.

yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi loko 'ṅkuśādi bāhyam eva taddhetutvenādhyavasyatītyāha antarmātretyādi /

Question “How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being with the Calf, and the Elephant being with the Goad)?” [see verse 735 next]

antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ tvavalambya te / bahīrūpādhyavasitaṃ pravartante 'ṅkuśādikam //

In fact, all these notions proceed on the basis of things like the goad, which consist in mere ‘idea’ and are illusory, on -which ‘externality’ is imposed.

yattāvad aṅkuśādiprajñaptyupādānaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ na tadvikalpaiḥ spṛśyata ityuktam /

It has been already pointed out that the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ of Things which forms the root-cause of the Idea of the ‘Goad’ and such things, is not touched by an ‘imposition’ (or qualification).

yat tu sāṃvṛtaṃ tatkalpanāśilpinirmitātmarūpatayāntarmātrārūḍham eva nabāhyaṃ dṛśyavikalpayos tu vivekenānabhijñatayā jano bāhyam iva tamākāraṃ manyamāno bāhyam eva vastvabhidhāvatīti nāto bāhyarūpatāsiddhir aṅkuśādīnām /

As regards the ‘Illusory’ form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination; it consists in mere ‘Idea’, and is not an external object. People regard it as an ‘external thing’, because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as ‘external’; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitted.

aṅkuśādikamityavalambyetyanena pūrvakeṇa sambandhanīyam /

‘Avalambya’ is to be construed with ‘aṅkuśādikam’.

antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ bahīrūpatayādhyavasitaṃ sāṃvṛtamaṅkuśādikamālambya bāhye pravartanta ity arthaḥ /

What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere ‘Idea’ and on which the external character is superimposed.

antarmātrā buddhiḥ //

‘Antarmātrā’ is Buddhi, Idea, Cognition.

yac ca gavādiviṣayatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ tadapyayuktam eva, vyavacchedyābhāvād iti darśayann āha kriyetyādi /

In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification “while pertaining to the Cow This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).

kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo hetuś ca varṇyate / abhāvapratyayasyeti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam //

‘The negation of action, quality and name’ is also described (by you) as the cause of the notion of ‘non-existence’; hence the qualification serves no useful purpose.

tadapyayuktaṃ hetutve vastutā śaktito 'pi ca /

because if it is a cause, then it must be a positive entity, as possessing a definite potency.

[p.243] abhāvapratyayasyāpi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāva eva hetutvena bhavadbhir varṇyate /

Of the notion of ‘non-existence’ also, the ‘Negation of action, quality and name’ has been described as the Cause.

tadapyayuktam iti /

This cannot be right;

kriyādyabhāvasya hetutvopavarṇanam /

because what has been said to constitute the character of the ‘Cause’ is the potency to produce the effect;

yadi cābhāvo 'pi tathāvidhasāmarthyādhyāsito bhavet tadā katham iva vastutvaṃ nāsādayet etāvanmātranibandhanatvād vastunaḥ /

as the Positive Entity alone is characterised by the said Potency. If then, Negation also had the said Potency imposed upon it, how could it not attain the character of the Positive Entity? As the presence of that Potency alone constitutes the nature of the Positive Entity.

tataścābhāvarūpatām eva vijahyāt /

In this way the Negation would lose its negative character itself.

vastusvabhāvapracyutirūpatvād abhāvasya /

As ‘negation’ consists only in the cessation of the character of the ‘Positive Entity

apica yadi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo 'bhāvapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā sattādiṣvapyabhāvapratyayaḥ prāptastatrāpi śaśaviṣāṇādivat kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvāviśeṣāt //

Then again, if ‘the negation of Action, Quality and Name’ were the Cause of the notion of Non-existence, then the notion of being ‘non-existent’ would apply to ‘Being’ and other Universals also; as therein also is present ‘the negation of Action, Quality and Name’ just as much as in such nonentities as the ‘Hare’s Horns (736-737)

hetuścāsiddha iti darśayann āha vailakṣaṇyam iti /

The following Text shows that the Reason cited (by the Opponent under Text 716) is ‘unproven’ (not admitted): [see verse 738 next]

vailakṣaṇyam asiddhaṃ ca piṇḍākṛtyādibuddhitaḥ /

The fact of the notions in question being different from the notions of the body, shape, etc. is not admitted (or proved);

tajjñānānām asiddho 'pi hetureṣa bhavatyataḥ //

hence the reason put forward is also open to the charge of being ‘un-proven’, (738)

nahi gavādipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktam arthāntaramadhyavaseyam asti yena tat pratyayānyavatmeṣāṃ bhavet //

As a matter of fact, the notions of the Cow and such things do not have for their objective anything other than the Body, etc. (of the animals); by virtue of which they could be held to be distinct from these latter.

pratijñāyāścānumānabādheti darśayann āha anvayītyādi /

The Conclusion also (of the Opponent’s Argument) is annulled by Inference: [see verse 739 next]

anvayī pratyayo yasmācchabdavyaktyavabhāsavān /

The comprehensive notion (op all cows, for instance) manifests within itself the verbal expression and the constituent individuals;

varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyā jātistu varṇyate //

while the ‘universal’ is described as devoid of all tinge of colour, shape and verbal expression.

etaduktaṃ bhavati anugāmipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktaṃ nimittamālambanabhūtameva bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayiṣitam, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt;tadvilakṣaṇavarṇākṛtyādipratibhāsanāc ca /

What is meant is as follows: What is meant by you to be proved is the fact that the basis of comprehensive notions consists of something different from the Body, etc.; this however is not right;

tathā hi bhavadbhir varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam vijñānaṃ ca varṇādipratibhāsānugatamanubhūyate tat katham asya varṇādiśūnyamālambanaṃ bhavet na hyanyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālambanaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt /

as no such thing enters into the notions at all; and also because what does appear in these notions is something quite different, in the shape of Colour, Shape, etc. That is to say, you describe the ‘Universal’ Cow to be devoid of all tinge of Colour, Shape and Verbal Expression; and yet the actual Cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of Colour, etc.; how then could the basis of such Cognition consist of what is devoid of Colour, etc.? Certainly a Cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form;

prayogaḥ yo yadvilakṣaṇārthapratibhāsaḥ pratyayaḥ sa tadgrāhako na bhavati tadyathā śabdajñānaṃ na rūpagrāhakaṃ jātivilakṣaṇādipratibhāsaścānvayīpratyaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows: When a Cognition manifests an object distinct from some other object, it cannot be regarded as apprehending this latter object; e.g. the Cognition of Sound cannot bo regarded as apprehending Colour; and as a matter of fact, the comprehensive notion manifests within itself Colour and the rest which are something different from the pure ‘Universal’;

śabdavyaktyavabhāsavān iti /

‘Manifests within itself the Verbal Expression, etc. etc.’;

śabdo gaurityādivyapadeśaḥ, vyaktiḥ varṇasaṃsthānātmikā, tayor avabhāsaḥ so 'syāstīti tadvān /

‘verbal expression’, i.e. the name ‘Cow’; ‘constituent individuals’, in the form of colour, shape and the rest; ‘avabhasavān’, containing the manifestation of these.

akṣarāṇi gakāraukāravisarjanīyādīni //

‘Akṣara’, ‘Letters’, stands for the verbal expression ‘gauḥ’, which is made up of the letters ‘ga’, ‘au’ and the Visarga, (739)

sāmānyasyāpi nīlādirūpatve guṇato 'sya kaḥ / bhedo nānugataścaiko nīlādirupalakṣyate //

If the ‘universal’ also were in the form of ‘blue’, then, what would be its difference from ‘quality’? As a matter of fact, however, no all-comprehensive ‘blue’ is ever perceived.

bhāsamāno 'pi cedeṣa na vivekena lakṣyate /

even though it may be manifesting itself, it is never perceived in a differentiated form.

tat kathaṃ dhīdhvanī vyaktau vartete tadbalena tau // niścayātmaka evāyaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ paraiḥ /

under the circumstances, how could the idea and name apply to the individual, on the basis of the said comprehensive notion? Further, the other party holds the notion of the ‘universal’ to be definite and certain;

iṣṭaścāgrahaṇaṃ prāpte yuktaṃ nānupalakṣaṇam //

consequently, its non-perception cannot be right, as that would imply that it is in cognisable.

syānmataṃ guṇo hi nīlādiranugato na bhavati /

if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea as ‘Blue’;

sāmānyaṃ tu bhinnadeśakālavyaktyanugāmītyata ākārabhedo 'stītyāha nānugataścaika ityādi /

thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being not admitted, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika’s Conclusion by Inference (as urged in the preceding Text, by the Author).”

nahi nīlādiguṇavyatiriktamaparaṃ nīlatvādi nīlādyākārānugatamanugāmi

Such, being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality ‘Blue’ and the ‘Universal’ Blue;

pratibhāsānamālakṣyate /

as, ex hypothesis both have the same form.

adhyakṣata ekasyaiva nīlāder asādhāraṇasya pratibhāsanāt /

It might be urged that “the Quality ‘Blue’ is not something comprehensive, while the ‘Universal’ Blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places;

nāpi vikalpacetasi nīlatvādi dvitīyaṃ pratibhāsate, yathādṛṣṭasyaiva tenādhyavasāyāt /

Even in the ‘determinate’ Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue; as that Cognition only ‘determines’ what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception).

syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāsamānam api nopalakṣyate vivekena mandais tathedam api sāmānyam iti tadapyayuktam /

It might be argued that “Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence, so the ‘Universal’ also”,

evaṃ hi taddarśanabalād bhinnāsvapi vyaktiṣvabhinnau dhīdhvanī bhavata iti

as even so, the theory propounded by you that “on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse”, would become untenable;

yadetad varṇitaṃ tannopapadyate, nahi viśeṣaṇānupalakṣaṇe viśeṣye dhīrupajāyate yathā daṇḍānupalakṣaṇe daṇḍīti pratyayo na bhavati tadvadatrāpi syāt /

because if the qualifying factor is unperceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as ‘the man with the stick’, Similarly in the case in question.

tathā hi svataḥśabdapratyayagocarātivṛttā bhedā bhavadbhir upavarṇyante /

Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verbal Expression and Cognition;

tāṃś ca bhedān svato buddhiśabdaviṣayavyativṛttaśarīrān sāmānyadarśanabalena pratiyanpratipattā kathaṃ tasmaivānupalakṣako nāma /

and these diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the ‘Universal’; how, then, can the Cogniser not ‘perceive’ the Universal itself?

apica yasyāvikalpakameva pratyakṣaṃ tasyaitadyuktaṃ vaktuṃ pratibhāsamānam api nopalakṣyata iti niścayapratyayavyāpāratvād upalakṣaṇasya yasya tu bhavataḥ sarvam eva savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam iti pakṣas tasyāyuktamanupalakṣaṇamagrahaṇaprasaṅgāt /

Further, for the man for whom Perception is always ‘indeterminate’, it may be right to say that ‘even though apparent, it is not apprehended’; as ‘Apprehension’ involves the functioning of the idea of Certitude; but for you, who hold all Perception to be determinate, it is not right that there should be no apprehension; as that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about certitude;

iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattānniścayanaṃ taccenna niścinvanti na gṛhṇantītyeva prāptam //

if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to tins that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.

abhyupetyāpi nīlādivyatiriktārthāntarasiddhiṃ neṣṭasiddhir bhavatām abhimatasādhyārthasyānumānabādhitatvāt tena vyāptyasiddher iti darśayann āha ---siddhe 'pītyādi /

Even though it may be taken as established that the notions in question have a different cause, the existence of the ‘universal’ as comprehensive, and free from impermanence, does not become established; because the notions in question appear in succession. Even granting that the existence of something other than the ‘Blue’ is proved, there can be no proof for what you desire to prove;

siddhe 'pyanyanimittatve na sāmānyaṃ prasiddhyati /

as your Conclusion itself is barred by Inference, and to that extent, the Premiss also cannot be admitted.

[p.245] adhrauvyaviviktam iti / anityatvaviviktaṃ, nityam iti yāvat /

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 743 above] ‘Free from impermanence’, i.e. free from non-eternality, eternal.

kasmān na siddhyatītikramodayāt /

“Why is it not established?” ‘Because the notions in question appear in succession’;

gavādyabhidhānapratyayānām iti śeṣaḥ /

i.e. the notions of the ‘Cow’ and the rest.

yadā hi tathāvidhasāmānyadharmahetukatvameṣāmabhaviṣyat tadā krameṇāmī nodapatsyanta, avikalakāraṇatvādyugapadevotpadyeran, yugapad utpadyamānānekapadārthavat /

If these were due to any such commonality as the ‘Universal’, then they would not appear in succession, as their cause being always present in its perfect form, they should all appear simultaneously; just like several things produced simultaneously.

nahi pauranupakāryasya kācid apekṣāsti //

Specially because a cause that cannot be helped does not need anything else.

samprati hetoḥ siddhimabhyupagamya vyabhicāramāha padārthaśabda iti /

Now, even admitting the Reason, the Author shows that it is ‘fallible’ (‘not true’, ‘Inconclusive’): [see verse 744 next]

padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetumaparaṃ ṣaṭsvapekṣate / astīti pratyayo yaś ca sattādiṣvanuvartate //

On what basis does the term ‘category’ (‘padārtha’) rest when applied to the six (vaiśeṣika categories)? as also the notion ‘it exists’ which is found to be present in ‘being’, etc.? (744)

nahi padārthatvaṃ nāma ṣaṭsu padārtheṣvaparam asti yena padārthaḥ padārtha ityanugāmī pratyayo bhavet /

There is not (even for the Vaiśeṣika) any such ‘Universal’ as ‘Padārthatva’ (the genus ‘Category’) subsisting in all the six Categories, on the basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as ‘this is a Category this is a Category and so forth’;

tathā sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyeṣu na sattāsti yenāstīti teṣu pratyayaḥ syāt dravyaguṇakarmasveva sattāyāḥ sthitatvāt /

similarly in the ‘Universal’, the ‘Specific Individuality’ and ‘Inherence’, the ‘Universal’ Being does not subsist; by virtue of which each of these could be conceived of as ‘existing’;

syād etat tatrāpi sattādisadupalambhakapramāṇaviṣayatvaṃ dharmo 'sti tenānyanimitto 'yamatrāpi vyapadeśa ityavyabhicāra evetyāha anyadharmetyādi /

because (according to the Vaiśeṣika) ‘Being’ subsists only in the three Categories of ‘Substance’, ‘Quality’ and ‘Action As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the ‘Universal’;

anyadharmanimittaścet tatrāpyastyastitāmatiḥ / tadanyadharmahetutve 'niṣṭhāsakteradharmitā //

If in regard to the categories mentioned, the notion that ‘it exists’ is due to something else, then, in regard to this ‘something’ also the notion that£ it exists’ is present;

vyabhicārī tato heturamībhirayamiṣyate /

in view of these, the reason would become ‘fallible’ (untrue).