Datasets:
buddhist-nlp
/
tatpa-noisy

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
Community
1
sanskrit
stringlengths
4
615
english
stringlengths
2
1.3k
anvayavyatirekābhyām idam eva viniścitam / samarthaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasyāmanyeṣām anavasthitiḥ //
that this is the cause (basis) of the said notions is thus known definitely through affirmative and negative premisses in regard to other causes, there would be an infinite regress (773-774)
anvayavyatirekasamadhigamyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ, sa ca sāmānyadhiyaṃ pratīcchāracitasaṅketābhogamātrasya niścitaḥ /
The relation, of Cause and Effect is ascertainable only by means of affirmative and negative premisses: and in regard to the comprehensive notion in question, the only cause that is so ascertained is the Body of Conventions set up by the desire of man.
tathā hi prathamataraṃ tāvad bhedaviṣayamanubhavajñānam utpadyate, tasminnutpanne saṅketakaraṇecchā jāyate tataścecchātas tasya saṅketasya kṛtiḥ karaṇam, tatas tasyaiva vyavahārakāle śrutiḥ śravaṇam, asyāś ca śruteḥ sakāśād uttarakālamābhogo yathā śrutasaṅketaviṣayaḥ, tataścābhogāt teṣveva bhedeṣu tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtter ghaṭa ityādikā matir udayamāsādayati /
For instance, first of all, there appears the cognition of difference among things; after this cognition has come, there comes the desire to set up a Convention; from that desire proceeds the setting up of the Convention; then the hearing of the same at the time of actual usage of the name; from that hearing of the usage, there foUows the ‘body’ or ‘form’ of the Convention;
āgopālametāvan mātram evāsyāṃ buddhau kāraṇatvena niścitam /
Among all people, down to the veriest cowherd, the idea of such being the cause of the notions in question is definitely recognised with certainty.
aparidṛṣṭasāmarthyasya tu sāmānyasya kāraṇatvopakalpane 'tiprasaṅgaḥ syāt tadapi kalpayitvāparamapyadṛṣṭasāmarthyena tulyatvāt kimiti na kalpyeta //
As for the ‘Universal’ on the other hand, its capacity has nowhere been seen; if then it were regarded as the Cause of the notions, it would lead to absurdities; for, after having assumed that as the Cause, why could you not assume another cause, of which also the capacity may not be known and so on? (773-77á)
[p.252] tatraivopacayamāha anurūpo hītyādi /
The following Texts continue the same line of reasoning [see verses 775-776 next]
anurūpo hi saṃsargī syād ityanyārthakalpanā / vailakṣaṇye tu buddhīnām iyadevāśritaṃ varam // sāmarthyaniyamo hyatra kalpanīyo varaṃ sa ca /
The assumption of something else (as the cause of the comprehensive notion) is based upon the idea that the correlative of a thing should be of the same nature as that thing. but, even so, when the notions are diverse, it is far better to accept what has been just suggested (by us);
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kalpito jñātaśaktiṣu // tathā hi bhavadbhiḥ sāmānyabuddhīnām anurūpamālambanākhyaṃ hetuṃ nirūpayadbhiḥ bhedanyarbudhasya sāmānyamupakalpitam, yadi ca tadapi kalpitaṃ sāmānyamanyākārā api buddhīrjanayati tadā varamiyadeva, yadeva yathopavarṇitaṃ dṛṣṭasāmarthyaṃ kalpitaṃ bhavet /
and it is far better to assume that which has been found to be true in regard to things whose capacity is well known, through affirmative and negative premisses. When you were expounding the reason for your conclusions to consist in the fact that they should have a basis similar to themselves, you had to postulate millions of ‘Universals’, If the ‘Universal’ also produces notions of diverse forms, then it is far better to assume this, that is, that which has been actually found to have the capacity (of producing the said notions).
evaṃ hyadṛṣṭārthakalpanā na kṛtā syāt /
As in so doing, there would not have to be an assumption of anything not actually seen.
api ca katham abhinnaṃ sāmānyaṃ vilakṣaṇā buddhīr janayatīti pṛṣṭena satā vaktavyam idam avaśyaṃ, yaduta śaktipratiniyamo 'yaṃ padārthānāṃ yadekam api sadanekākārapratyayopajananāyālam iti /
Further, when you are asked the question How is it that one and the same ‘Universal’ produces diverse notions? You will have to say that “such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself one, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms”.
yadyevaṃ, jñātaśaktiṣu niścitasāmarthyeṣu bhedādiṣveva sāmarthyaniyāmakam iti na kalpyeta / evaṃ hi nānubhavaviruddhamanuṣṭhitaṃ syāt //
If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.
syād etat sāmānyasyāpyanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sāmarthyaṃ niścitam evetyāha anvayetyādi /
The following might be urged “Of the ‘Universal’ also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 777 next]
anvayānuvidhānaṃ ca sāmānyeṣu na vidyate / sadāsattvān na nityānāṃ vyatirekastu sambhavī //
As a matter of fact, there can be no affirmative concomitance (of the notions) with the universals: as their notion is not always present; as for negative concomitance, that is not possible in the case of what are eternal (777)
sadā sadādipratyayānām asattvādanutpatter naiṣāṃ tadgatānvayānuvidhāyitvaṃ yuktam /
As a matter of fact the notions of ‘Being’ and such other Universals do not appear at all times; and hence it can never be right to assert the affirmative concomitance of these with the Universals.
yadi hyete sāmānyānuvidhāyinaḥ syus tadā sarvadā sāmānyasyāvasthitatvāt kimiti sadā na bhaveyuḥ, nahi sāmānyasya kācid apekṣāsti, parais tasyānupādheyaviśeṣatvād ato na tadgatānvayānuvidhānam eṣām /
If the notions were really concomitant with the presence of the Universals, then, as the Universals would be there at all times, why could not the notions appear at all times? Specially as the Universal does not need anything else; because other things cannot create any peculiar capacities in it.
nāpi vyatirekānuvidhānam tathā hi yadāmī sadādipratyayā notpadyante tadā tatra sāmānyābhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti na śakyaṃ vaktum, nityānāṃ sadāvasthāyitayā vyatirekāsambhavāt, ato nāpi tadgatavyatirekānuvidhānam eṣām asti //
Hence there can be no affirmative concomitance with these Universals. Nor is negative concomitance possible. Because at the time that the notions of Being, etc. do not appear, it cannot be said that the cause of this non-appearance lies in the non-existence of the Universal; because eternal things must be always present, and hence their non-existence (absence) is impossible. Consequently there can be no negative concomitance with the Universals.
yataścaivaṃ nimittāntarābhyupagame sāmānyādidhiyāṃ doṣas tasmādyatparair ucyate guṇatvādireva sāmānyaviśeṣo guṇādiṣvadravyākarmādipratyayahetuḥ, sāmānyeṣu ca sattādiṣu sāmānyamityanugatapratyayasyānekārthasamavāyo nimittam iti, tadapāstaṃ bhavatītyetad āha adravyādītyādi /
Thus then, there being objections against the view that Comprehensive notions should have their cause in something different (from the individual things), the following assertion of the other party also becomes discarded: “When in regard to Quality, there arises the notion that it is not-substance, it is not-Action and so forth, the basis for this lies in the particular-Universal ‘Quality’; while Inherence in the same object is the basis for the comprehensive notion of the ‘Universal’ that appears in regard to the pure Universals ‘Being’ and the like
[p.253]
This is what is explained in the following [see verses 778 above]
adravyādidhiyo hetur na guṇatvādi yuktimat / anekasamavāyaś ca na sāmānyadhiyas tataḥ //
As for ‘inherence in several things’, this is present in number, etc. also, just as in the ‘universals’; hence the notion of ‘universal’ must be there in regard to number, etc. also.
atiprasaṅgaścāsyām api kalpanāyām iti darśayann āha aneketyādi /
The following Text shows that the Theory in question involves an absurdity also [see verse 779 above]
yadyanekārthasamavāyaḥ sāmānyeṣu sāmānyadhiyo nibandhanaṃ syāt, tadā saṅkhyāsaṃyogavibhāgāvayavidravyādiṣvanekadravyāśritatvam astīti, teṣvapi sāmānyam iti dhiyaḥ syur nimittāviśeṣāt /
If ‘Inherence in several things’ were the basis of the Comprehensive notion in regard to ‘Universals’, then, as such ‘subsistence in several substances’ is found in such things also as Number, Conjunction, Disjunction, Composite Substances and so forth, the notion of ‘Universal’ should appear in regard to these also; because the basis of such notion would be equally present in this case also.
ekabuddhihetutvam api sattādīnāṃ sadādyākāreṇa svātmaniyatatvān na sāmānyāntaramāskandati, tataś ca tadbalenāpi na sāmānyeṣu sāmānyaṃ sāmānyamityanugataḥ pratyaya upapadyate /
As for the character of ‘forming the object of one and the same cognition’, this also is restricted to the luiiversals ‘Being’, etc. as appearing in the forms of the ‘existing,’ etc.; and it does not touch any other ‘Universal’; so that, on the strength of that also, the comprehensive notion of ‘Universal Universal’ cannot appear in regard to the several Universals.
tataścāsambaddham idaṃ kumārilenoktam "tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ / sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādāvekadhīkaraṇena vā" //
Consequently the following assertion of Kumārila is entirely irrelevant: “The subsistence of one in several different things is the basis of the name ‘Universal’ as applied to Being, etc.; or it may be due to their being the basis of one and the same cognition”.
iti //
(Ślokavārtika-Ākṛtivāda, 24).
ghaṭatvādi ca sāmānyaṃ ghaṭādāveva vartate /
Universals called ‘jar’ and the rest subsist only in the jar;
nābhāveṣvasya vṛttis tu tasmāt teṣu kathaṃ nu dhīḥ // nāśrayāntaravṛttāddhi yuktāvanyatra dhīdhvanī /
they cannot subsist in negations; how then does the comprehensive notion (of negation) arise in regard to these latter? The (comprehensive) notion and name cannot be applied to one thing on the basis of what subsists in something else;
hastitvādiva karkādāvatraikārthāśrayo 'pi na //
for instance, the notion and name ‘cancer’ cannot be based upon the universal ‘elephant’.
rasaḥ śīto guruśceti syād ekārthāśrayān matiḥ /
Notions of taste, colour, and heaviness might arise from their ‘subsistence in one and the same thing’;
ihāyam api naivāsti nābhāvo vartate kvacit //
in the case in question (of negation) however, even this subsistence is not there;
ghaṭādiṣveva sāmānyaṃ samavetaṃ nābhāveṣu tasyāvastutvāt /
As a matter of fact, the ‘Universal’ subsists only in the Jar and such entities, never in Negations, because these latter are non-entities.
tat kathaṃ teṣvabhāveṣu tasmād ghaṭatvāder anyasamavāyinaḥ sāmānyānukārānugataḥ pratyayo bhavet / nahi gajatvadi karkādiṣvekākārapratyayanibandhanaṃ bhavati /
How then could there appear, in regard to these Negations, any comprehensive notion associated with the form of a Universal, on the basis of the ‘Universal’ Jar which subsists in something other (than the Negations)? For instance, the ‘Elephant’ does not become the basis of a comprehensive notion regarding the Cancer.
nanu cānyatra samavetādapyanyatra pratyayo dṛṣṭas tadyathā madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruśceti /
“But a notion is actually’ found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that subsists elsewhere; e.g. such notions as ‘the sweet Taste is viscid, cool and heavy
yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pītyekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam, na tu punar abhāvo ghaṭatvādisāmānyaiḥ saha kvacid apyekasmin dravye samavaiti /
This is answered in the words ‘Even subsistence in one and the same thing, etc., etc.’: In the example cited, the qualities of ‘Coolness’ and the rest subsist in that same substance wherein the sweetness subsists; so that on the strength of this ‘subsistence in the same substratum’, there is coexistence; while Negation never subsists in any substance along with Universals like the ‘Jar’;
nīrūpasya kvacid api samavāyāyogāt //
for the simple reason that that which has no colour and form cannot subsist in anything.
viśeṣaṇetyādinātrodyotakarasya parihāram āśaṅkate / [p.254]
The following Text anticipates the answer given by Uddyotakara [see verses 783-784 next]
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandho 'pyasti cediha / sambandhāntarasadbhāve nanu cāsau prakalpyate //
If it be argued that “in this case there is the relation of qualification and qualified”, then the answer is that such a relation is assumed only when some other relation is already there;
tayor āsattimāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā /
for instance, the relation of qualification and qualified is assumed on the basis of the close proximity (contact) between the two factors concerned;
kalpyate tadabhāve tu sānimittā na siddhyati //
in the absence of such contact, the relation in question cannot be possible, as there would be no basis for it.
sa hyāha ghaṭavādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvānāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇas tataś ca sāmānyābhāvayor ekārthasambandho 'trāpi vyapadeśaheturastyeveti /
Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “The relation between the Universal ‘Jar’ with the particular Jar is of the nature of Inherence, while the relation of Negations is of the nature of Qualification and Qualified; so in both cases the ‘relation of the same thing’ is the basis for the common name”.
tadatra pratividhānam āha sambandhāntaretyādi /
The answer to this is that ‘Such a relation, etc., etc.’;
sambandhāntaropajanito hi bhāvānāṃ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, tadyathā daṇḍadevadattayo rājapuruṣayoś ca saṃyogasvasvamibhāvādikaṃ sambandhamāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā, tasya tu sambandhāntarasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaṃ prati nimittabhūtasyābhāve sā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā katham iva bhavet, anyathā hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /
that is, the relation of Qualification and Qualified among Entities is always brought about by some other relation; e.g. the relation of Qualification and Qualified between Devadatta and his stick is due to conjunction (contact) between them, and the same between the King and his officer is due to the relation of Master and Servant. In the case of Negations however, there is no such other Relation which could form the basis of the relation of Qualification and Qualified; how then could any such relation be possible? If it were possible, then there would be an absurdity;
evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavet //
everything could be the qualification of everything’, (783-784)
katham idānīṃ ghaṭasya prāgabhāva ityādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo loke sambandhamantareṇa pratīta ity āha ghaṭasyetyādi /
The question then arising as to “how, in the absence of any other relation, such notions are current among people as ‘the Prior Negation of the Jar’? the following Texts supply the answer [see verses 785-786 next]
ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yam ityādi vacanaṃ punaḥ / kalpanāmātranirmāṇaṃ kalpitaṃ śūratādivat //
As regards such expressions as ‘the prior negation of the jar’, it is a creation of mere fancy; just like the description of ‘bravery’ in regard to an imaginary person.
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ yatra vastusamāśrayam / sambandhāntarasadbhāvas tathāvaśyaṃ prakalpyate //
in cases where the relation of qualification and qualified is based upon a real entity, there is bound to be some other relation (regarded as its basis).
prāgabhūtvābhavatītyetan mātrārthajijñāsāyāṃ buddhiriyaṃ kalpikā bhāvād arthāntarabhūtam iva sambandhena prāgabhāvamupadarśayantī prasūyate /
When it is found that a thing which was not there has come into existence, and there is a desire to speak of it, there appears an imaginary notion which indicates ‘Prior Negation’ as something different from theng concerned, and related to it by the relation of Qualification and Qualified;
tadabhiprāyavaśād atra viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, natu vāstavaḥ /
it is on this imaginary basis that the relation of Qualification and Qualified is mentioned, and there is no such relation in reality;
yathā kalpanāśilpighaṭitasya śūratvādayo dharmā viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyante /
just as in the case of the picture drawn by an artist, the qualities of ‘bravery’ and the like are assumed.
yatra tu bhavadbhir vastusamāśrayo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo gṛhītas tatrāvaśyaṃ sambandhāntaramanveṣvaṇīyamanyathā vyavasthāniyamo na syāt //
In cases where you postulate the said relation of Qualification and Qualified, some other relation (as its basis) has surely to be looked for; otherwise there would be no regularity or restriction.
apicāyaṃ na navo{naśco---}dyānurūpa eva parihāraḥ śaṅkarasvāminokta iti darśayannāha abhāvo 'bhāva ityādi /
The following Text proceeds to show that the answer given by Śaṅkarasvāmin is not relevant to the objection urged by us [see verse 787 next]
abhāvo 'bhāva ityeva jñānamatrāvacoditam / upādhisthaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ svāśrayeṣveva vartate //
The objection urged by us was in regard to such notions as ‘this negation’, ‘that negation as regards the ‘universal’ subsisting in the adjunct, that subsists only in its own substratum.
[p.255] yadidaṃ ghaṭābhāve paṭābhāve śaśaviṣāṇādyabhāve vābhāvo 'bhāva ityanugāmijñānaṃ pravṛttaṃ tatrāsmābhir asatyapi sāmānye 'nugatapratyayadarśanādvyarthānyatrāpi sāmānyakalpaneti coditam, na tu sajātīyānāṃ bahūnāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ ye prāgabhāvādayas tatra yajjñānaṃ{tatra} /
What we had urged was as follows: In the case of the Negation of the Jar, the Negation of the Cloth, the Negation of the Hare’s Horn and so forth, we find the comprehensive notion of ‘Negation’ appearing, even when there is no such ‘Universal’ as ‘Negation’, hence in other cases also the assumption of the ‘Universal’ is useless; and we did not raise the objection against the ‘Prior Negation’ and other Negations that are conceived of in connection with a large number of things of the same kind.
yadi nāmaivaṃ tataḥ kimityāha upādhisthaṃ cetyādi /
“If that is so, what then?” As regards the ‘Universal’ subsisting in the adjunct, etc., etc.
ghaṭādyupādhigataṃ yatsāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādi tatsvāśrayeṣveva ghaṭādiṣu vartate nāśrayāntare paṭādau tat kathaṃ vijātīyapaṭādigataprāgabhāvādau tasmāt pratyayaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ //
That is, the Universal ‘Jar’ subsisting in the adjunct, the particular Jar, subsists only in its own substratum, i.e. only in the Jar, not in the Cloth and other things. How then could there arise, from that, the notion regarding the ‘Prior’ and other Negations of such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the rest? This is what is meant.
sarvatraikamanugāmi sāmānyamastīti cedāha nacetyādi /
Nor is it held that the single all-embracing universal ‘being’ subsists in them all.
na ṣaḍarthātirekeṇa jāyante 'bhāvabuddhayaḥ //
because notions of ‘negation’ do not appear apart from the six categories.
nahi sakalapaṭādivijātīyānekapadārthavyāpyaparaṃ sāmānyamasti, yato 'sau pratyayo bhavet /
There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the like, upon which the notion in question could be based.
syān mataṃ sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyam asti tadbalād abhāvapratyayo bhaviṣyatīti tadayuktam vyabhicārāt /
It might be argued that “there is the Great Universal (the Summum Genus) called ‘Being’, and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of that That however cannot be right; as it is not true;
tathā hi ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇāparasya pratisaṃkhyānirodhādeḥ padārthasyābhāva iti bhavatāmabhāvabuddhayo yāḥ samudācaranti tathotpadyakathāracitānāṃ kapiñjalādīnām abhāvaḥ paramārthata iti matayas tāsu, katamad upādhigataṃ sāmānyaṃ, yattāsāṃ nimittaṃ syāt / na hyeṣāṃ pratisaṅkhyānirodhādīnāṃ sattvam asti bhavan matena /
that is to say, you have such notions of Negation as are involved (a) in the denial of suchngs as ‘Dissociation from Impurities’ [‘Pratisaṅkhyānirodha’, a technicality postulated by the Bauddha, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories, and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like Kapiñjala; to which adjunct would such notions of ‘Negation’ be due, which could be regarded as their basis? Surely according to your view there is no real ‘Being’ (existence) in the case of such things as the said ‘Dissociation from Impurities’ and the like.
etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ yaduktaṃ kumārilena "nanu ca prāgabhāvādau sāmānyaṃ vastu neṣyate / sattaiva hyatra sāmānyamanutpattyādirūpatā" //
This same argument answers also the following assertion of Kumārila’s: “If it be urged that ‘in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universal posited’, the answer is that Being itself is the Universal in these, as qualified by non-appearance” [Ślokavārtika-Apohavāda, 11];
anutpattyādirūpatā anutpādādiviśiṣṭatetyarthaḥ /
where the last qualification means that the ‘Being’ that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being not-produced.
atrāpi hyayam eva doṣaḥ /
The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also.
nahi matāntarīyānāṃ padārthānām utpādyakathārthānāṃ ca sattāsti yenatadabhāvapratītiḥ syāt /
Because there can be no ‘Being’ (Existence, Reality) in thengs postulated under other systems, or in character andngs created in imaginary tales, etc., on which basis the notion of ‘Negation’ could arise in regard to them.
tadadhyavasāyivikalpasattā tatra bahirarthaśūnyā pratīyata iti cet /
“What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary ‘Being’, which has no counter-part reality in the external world.”
yadyevaṃ nityaikasattārahito vikalpamātrātmaka eva sakalaśabdārthaḥ kiṃ neṣyate / anyathā hi nityaikasattādirūpasāmānyābhyupagame sattāpuruṣatvādīnāṃ sarvatra svabhede niratiśayatvāt kathaṃ bhinnarūpā pratītiḥ syād iti codyaṃ duṣparihāram eva syād iti //
If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere fancy, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of ‘Being’? Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal ‘Being’ be postulated, inasmuch as all such terms as ‘Being’, ‘Man’ and the like would equally connote only the ‘exclusion of other things’, why should there be divergent notions regarding these? There can be no answer to this objection.
icchāracitarūpādāvarthe jātir na vidyate /
In the case of things created by imagination, there can be no universal subsisting in them;
vyakter asambhavād eva sthitā tadvyabhicāritā //
Hence the ‘fallibility’ of the opponent’s reasons remains as before.
atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram / jñānaṃ cet kevalaṃ cedaṃ sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate na tu //
Similarly with regard to past and future things, if there is a cognition of an eternal universal, then no such pure ‘universal’ (without the constituent individuals) can ever be apprehended.
kevalasyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnām idaṃ bhavet /
Or, if such a pure universal by itself were apprehended, then it could not be the ‘universal’ of any particulars.
sāmānyaṃ na ca tadvyaṅkyaṃ vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ //
Such a universal could not be manifestable by particulars; just as the himālaya is not manifestable by the vindhya.
notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddhaṃ hi tāsvidam / na jñānapāratantryaṃ ca nityatvāt kevalāgrahāt //
Nor can the universal be tied down to the particulars through its birth being dependent upon these, nor lastly can the universal be dependent upon the particulars for its cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.
svāśrayendriyayogādi vyapekṣāyā asambhavāt /
There is also no possibility of its being dependent upon any such thing as the contact of its own substratum with the sense-organ concerned.
tat sadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana //
Consequently this universal could either be apprehended at all times, or not apprehended at any time at all.
svātmani jñānajanane yogyaṃ vāyogyam eva vā /
As regards its capacity to bring about its own cognition by itself, it may or may not have this capacity;
yadyekadā tadā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tadbhavet // tasya yogyamayogyaṃ vā rūpaṃ yatprakṛtisthitam /
whichsoever way it is, it would always remain so. Its natural form, with or without the said capacity, would be unshakeable, because it is itself permanent.
taddhrauvyādaprakampyaṃ hi ko nāma calayiṣyati //
Who then, could ever shake what is unshakeable? (789-795)
icchāyā racitaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya sa tathoktaḥ, sa ādir yasyeti vigrahaḥ / ādiśabdena naṣṭājātaparigrahaḥ /
The compound ‘īcchāracita, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘that of which the form is created by imagination’: The term ‘ādi’ includes dead and unborn things.
nahi tatra kalpitādiṣu sāmānyam asti, yena tannibandhanā teṣu matiḥ syāt /
There is no Universal subsisting in such imaginary things, on which the said notion could be based. “There may be no Universal in regard to imaginary things;
syād etanmābhūt kalpiteṣu sāmānyam atītājāte tu tannibandhanā buddhir bhaviṣyatīti, tadetan mithyā, na hyāśritānām ayaṃ dharmo yadāśrayamantareṇāpi tathāpi doṣa eva, kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇānabhyupagamāt /
in regard to the past and future things, the notion could be due to the Universal”. This is not true; the nature of things subsisting in other things is not such that they exist by themselves, without their substratum; if they did not exist, then they would cease to be subsistent. Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves, even so, the difficulty remains;
tathācoktam "svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam" iti /
This has been thus declared by them “The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ”,
kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇe sāmānyadhiyo vyaktivyavasāyo na prāpnoti vyaktes tadānīm abhāvāt / vyaktīnām idaṃ sāmānyam iti sambaddhaś ca na syāt, nibandhanābhāvāt /
because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itself. Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal, such as is involved in the notion that ‘this is the Universal of these Particulars’; as there would be no basis for such a connection.
tathā hi nibandhanaṃ bhavat sambandhasya tadvyaṅgyatvaṃ vā sāmānyasya bhavet tajjanyatā, vā tadgrahaṇāpekṣagrahaṇatā vā /
For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either, (a) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (b) in its being produced by them, or (c) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.
tatra na tāvat tābhir vyaṅgyatvāt tat sambaddhaṃ sāmānyaṃ, nityatayā parair anupakāryasya viśeṣābhāvād vyaṅgyatvānupapatteḥ /
(a) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Particulars on account of its being manifested by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else;
yo hi yasyānupakārakaḥ sa tasyābhivyañjako na bhavati, yathā vindhyasya himavān /
when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its manifester; for instance, the Himālaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya.
tathā ca vyaktayaḥ sāmānyasyeti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ /
Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition.
anupakārakasyāpi vyañjakatve 'tiprasaṅgaḥ, sarvaḥ sarvasya vyañjakaḥ syāt /
If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the manifester, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifester of everything else.
ata eva nityatayā tasyābhyupagatatvāt tāsu notpattipāratantryam iti tasya yuktam /
(6) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its production.
kevalasyāpi grahaṇān nāpi tajjñānapāratantryam iti, trayāṇām api pakṣāṇām asambhavaḥ /
(c) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition. Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.
tataś ca yadidam ucyate svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam iti tadayuktam āśrayasyaivāyogāt, kuta [p.257] stadgatendriyasannikarṣādyapekṣatā bhaviṣyati /
Hence the assertion that “the Universal has its apprehension dependent upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ” is not right; because there can be no ‘substratum’ for the Universal; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such ‘substratum’?
ādigrahaṇenātmamanaḥsannikarṣādiparigrahaḥ /
The particle ‘ādi’ includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the Vaiśeṣikaḥ
nityatayā parair anupādheyaviśeṣatvān nāpyasya kvacid apekṣāsti /
Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things, it cannot be dependent upon anything else.
tataś ca yadi tatsvaviṣayajñānotpādanasamarthaṃ tadā sarvadaiva tajjanayet,
Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it should bring it about at all times;
athāsamarthaṃ tadā na kadāpi janayet nahi tasya tadrūpaṃ samartham asamarthaṃvā tat kvacidanyathākartumīśate nityatvahāniprasaṅgāt /
if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whatever its nature be capable or incapable, it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence;
"tasya śaktiraśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā / nityatvād acikitsyasya kastāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣama" // iti //
this has been thus declared ‘Its capacity or incapacity, which rests in its very nature, who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment (789-795)
tasya pācakādibhir anaikānta iti darśayati gota ityādi / gotaścārthātnaraṃ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaitraturaṅgavat // ityasmin vyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhis tathā /
“The universal ‘cow’ is something distinct from the individual cow, because it forms the object of a different idea, like colour, touch and the like; also because it is spoken of as belonging to that, just as the horse is spoken of as belonging to caitra”, this argument may be shown to be ‘fallible’ (untrue) in view of the notion of the ‘cook’ and so forth.
anayā ca diśānye 'pi sarve dūṣyāḥ kuhetavaḥ //
In this same manner, other wrong arguments also are to be discredited.
tathā hi pācakādibhyaḥ pācakatvāder asatyapyarthāntarabhāve pācakaḥ pācaka iti bhinnadhīviṣayatvaṃ bhavatyeva, devadattasya pācakatvam iti ca vyatirekavibhaktir bhavatītyataḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /
For instance, even though the Universal ‘Cook’ is not held to be anything different from the individual Cook, yet it does become the object of diverse cognitions, such as ‘this is a cook that is a cook’ and so forth; there are also such verbal expressions as ‘Devadatta’s Cook-ship’, where the two things are expressed by words with different case-terminations. Thus the Reason adduced by the other party is found to be ‘Inconclusive’ because ‘too wide’,
anye 'pi kuhetava iti /
‘Other wrong arguments’;
kumārilagaditāḥ /
such as those put forward by Kumārila and others.
tatrāmī tena kuhetava uktāḥ / gopiṇḍabhedeṣu yā gobuddhiriyamekagotvanibandhanā gavābhāsatvādekākāratvāc ca / ekagopiṇḍaviṣayabuddhivat /
The following are the ‘wrong arguments’ set forth by Kumārila: “(1) In regard to the diverse particular cows there appears the notion of ‘cow’, this must be due to a single entity in the shape of the Universal ‘Cow’, because it manifests the cow and is of one form just like the notion in regard to a single individual cow.