buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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naca sarvopasaṃhārādvyāptirasya prasādhitā //	then again the all-embracing concomitance of the reason has not yet been established.
anyadharmanimittatve 'pyabhyupagamyamāne vyabhicāradoṣas tadavastha eva yasmāttatrāpyasmin dharme 'tyevāstitāmatiḥ asti saddharma iti /	Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of ‘Fallibility’ remains; because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that ‘it exists’, which is expressed by the words ‘this property of existence is there’;
tatrāpyanyadharmābhyupagame 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	so this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than ‘Existence’ (or Being);
anyeṣām api dharmāntarāśrayatvād dharmitvaprasaṅgaś ca /	as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence ‘things possessing that property’;
tataś ca ṣaḍeva padārthā dharmiṇa iti ṣaṭsaṅkhyāniyamo na syāt /	and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that ‘there are only six Categories’ which can have properties.
athānavasthābhayāddharmāntaraṃ nāśrīyate tadāmībhiḥ padārtheṣu sattādau dharme vā pravṛttaiḥ pratyayair vyabhicāritā hetoḥ /	Regress, a further property (of is-ness) is not postulated, then, in view of these notions, as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of Existence, the Reason -would have to be regarded as ‘fallible’ (untrue).
mābhūdvāsya sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā tu kena parihriyata ityetad āha naca sarvopasaṃhārād ityādi /	It may be that the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason is not due to its being Too Wide; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to ‘doubt’ be avoided? This is what is pointed out in the words ‘Then again, etc. etc.’;
sarvasmin dharmiṇi hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptipradarśanaṃ sarvopasaṃhāraḥ /	what is meant by ‘all-embracing concomitance’ is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.
syād etadvyāptiratra yuktaiveti nimittāntarābhāve hi tadvastupratyayavailakṣaṇyaṃ katham upapadyeta nahyekaviṣayāṇāṃ bahūnām api pratyayānāṃ vailakṣaṇyam asti yadi syāt tadā rūparasādipratyayānām [p.246] api nānāviṣayo na siddhyet /	The following argument might be urged “The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question (of the Universal ‘Cow’, etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself? There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could he no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth;
pratyayabhedakṛtatvād viṣayabhedavyavasthānasyeti /	because diversity among things is always due to the diversity among Cognitions.”
tadapyayuktam /	This is not right;
nahi sāmānyapratyayo vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayaḥ paramārthato yuktaḥ /	as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of ‘Universal’ in regard to the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ of things.
āviṣṭābhilāpena pratyayena svalakṣaṇasyāviṣayīkāraṇāt /	Because the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.
kintu yato yatas tasyaikasyāpi vastuno vyāvṛttis tannibandhanās tatra yathāsaṅketābhyāsaṃ tadvastvanubhavadvārā yato vikalpā vācakāś ca viśvakalpā yadi pravarterannasatyapi sāmānye tadā ko virodha ityato vyāptyabhāva ucyate //	But, even in the absence of any ‘Universal’, if the view be held that each thing by itself is one only and is excluded, from other things, on some basis, and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people; if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it.
yaccoktaṃ gavādiṣvanuvṛttaṃ cetyādi tatrāha tadanantaram ityādi /	It has been argued (above, under Text 719) that “The comprehensive idea that appears in regard to the Cow and other things, etc. etc.”.
tadanantaram uddiṣṭam anenaiva nirākṛtam /	‘By this’, i.e. by the refutation just explained.
tatrāpi tulyadoṣatvāt /	As the same objections are equally applicable to that also;
tathāhīṣṭasiddhyādayo 'trāpi samānāḥ / ādiśabdena sādhyaśūnyatā dṛṣṭāntasya hetor asiddhir vyabhicāraścetyādi parigṛhyate // prakārāntareṇāpi vyabhicāramāha pācakādiṣvityādi /	for instance, the defect of being ‘futile’, ‘superfluous’ (proving what is already admitted) and the rest are applicable to this argument also. The phrase ‘and the rest’ includes the fallacies of the Corroborative Instance ‘being devoid of the Probandum’, the Reason being ‘unproven’, and ‘fallible’ (Inconclusive) and so forth.
pācakādiṣu ca jñānaṃ viśiṣṭamupajāyate / abhāve 'bhāvabuddhiś ca vinaikenānugāminā //	Without any all-embracing basis, there is (a) a particular cognition in regard to the ‘cook’; (b) similarly there is the notion of ‘negation’ in regard to negation itself;
icchāracitarūpeṣu naṣṭājāteṣu vā tataḥ /	as also (c) in regard to persons and things created by imagination, and (d) in regard to dead and unborn persons.
anaikāntikatā hetoḥ sarvair ebhir yathoditaiḥ //	In view of all these cognitions, the reason becomes open to the fallacy of ‘fallibility’.
nahi tatraikamanugāmi nimittaṃ pācakatvapāṭhakatvādikam asti yena pācakaḥ pāṭhaka ityanuvṛttipratyayo bhavet /	In the case of the notion of the ‘Cook’, the ‘Teacher’ and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the character of being Cook, the character of being the Teacher and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the ‘Cook’ and the ‘Teacher’ could be based.
tathā prāgabhāvādiṣu caturṣvabhāvo 'bhāva iti katham anuvṛttapratyayo bhavet nahyatrāpi sāmānyam asti tasya vastvāśritatvāt /	Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation, Prior Negation and the like, how could there be any such comprehensive notion as ‘Negation’? Certainly there could be no ‘Universal’ in this case, as this must rest in positive entities.
icchāracitarūpeṣu candrāpīḍādiṣu nabhastalopakalpitadhavanagṛhādiṣu naṣṭājāteṣu ca mahāsammataśaṅkhaprabhṛtiṣu buddhirvinaikenānugāminā kathaṃ bhavet / nahi tatrāpi sāmānyam asti vyaktyāśritatvāt tasya //	Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination, such as the poetical character of Candrāpīḍa (in Kādambarī) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth, and also in regard to persons dead and unborn such as Mahāsammata, Śaṅkha and the rest, how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character? Surely there is no ‘Universal’ in these cases; which are all based upon individuals.
na pācakādibuddhīnām asti kiñcinnibandhanam /	In fact, there is no single basis for the notions of ‘cook’ and the rest.
karmāsti cet prativyakti nanu tadbhidyate tathā //	If it be said that “the act (of cooking) is the basis”, then, the answer is that the act varies with each individual person;
bhinneṣvanvayino 'satve na yuktānvayinī matiḥ / ityekamiṣṭaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanuvṛttimat //	and you have postulated the ‘universal’ as embracing all individuals only, on the ground that unless there is an all-embracing entity, there can be no comprehensive notion of things which are different.
karmanvayadaridraṃ ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate / tadā vyaktaya evāsyāḥ kimitīṣṭā na hetavaḥ //	If, even without such all-embracing character, the act be regarded as the basis (of the comprehensive notion) then why should not the individuals themselves be regarded as causes of it? Further (if the act were the basis, then) the notion of ‘cook’ could not appear in regard to the man after he has desisted from the act (of cooking);
pācakādimatir na syāt tatra coparatakriye / na sadāsannidhānaṃ hi karmeṣṭaṃ jātivat paraiḥ // atītānāgataṃ karma nimittīkṛtya teṣu cet /	surely even the other party do not regard the act as present there at all times, like the ‘universal’, if it be held that “the notion and name of the cook, etc. is based on past and future action”, then such an act cannot be the cause at all, for the simple reason that it is not present at the time.
pācakādiṣu dhīśabdau, tan na heturasattvataḥ //	The following Texts explain the notions of the ‘Cook’, etc.: [see verses 750-754 above]
nahi pācakādiṣu karmanibandhanā buddhir iti yuktaṃ vaktum /tasyāpi karmaṇaḥ prativyaktivadbhedābhyupagamāt, bhinneṣu hi vinaikenānugāminānvayī pratyayo nopapadyata iti kṛtvā sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanugataṃ parikalpyate bhavadbhiḥ /	It cannot be right to say that the notion in. regard to the Cook is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person, just like the individuality. You postulate the ‘Universal’ as embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity.
yadi cānvayaśūnyam api karmābhinnābhidhānapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā ko vyaktiṣu pradveṣo yena tāḥ parihṛtya sāmānyaṃ taddhetutvena kalpyate /	Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diversengs as one, then why should there be an aversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the ‘Universal’ has been postulated as the basis of that notion?
kiṃ ca yadi karmanibandhanaḥ pācakādiṣu pratyayaḥ syāt tadā parataḥ kriye pākamakurvati pācaka iti pratyayo na syāt /	Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cook were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Cook could not appear in regard to him.
nahi jātivadbhavadbhiḥ sadā sannihitaṃ karmābhīṣṭaṃ, yenoparatakriye 'pi pratyayaḥ syāt /	You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the ‘Universal’, by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased.
nahi yo yannibandhanaḥ sa tadabhāve bhavitum arhati, atiprasaṅgāt, evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvanibandhanaṃ syāt /	When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.
nacāpyatītānāgataṃ karma tat pratyayanibandhanaṃ yuktaṃ, tasyātītāder asattvāt, asataś ca hetubhāvānupapatteḥ //	Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.
śaṅkarasvāmī prāha pācakādyanuvṛttipratyayas tat karmajātisambaddhayā kriyayā yogas tasmād bhavati, tenoparatakriye 'pi kriyayā dhruvanimittasyopalakṣaṇāt pācakādipratyaya ityavaseyam iti /	If the idea be said to be due to the presence of the act related to the ‘universal’ action, and this permanent basis is always indicated by it even when the particular act has ceased, [then, the answer is as given in the following text]. Śaṅkara-svāmin argues as follows: “The comprehensive idea of the Cook is based upon the presence of that particular Action which is related to the ‘Universal’ (or Genus) ‘Action’;
tadetad darśayati kriyetyādi /	The answer to this is given in the following [see verse 756 next]
kriyātvajātisambandhakriyāyogān matir yadi / naṣṭakriye 'pi ca tayā dhurvahetūpalakṣaṇāt //	When the particular act has ceased, the permanent ‘universal’, even though indicated, cannot really exist; for the simple reason that its receptacle has ceased to exist.
tayeti kriyayā /	i.e. the particular act.
na tvityādinā pratividhatte / na tu naṣṭakriye tatra lakṣitāpi na vidyate /	As a matter of fact, the ‘Universal’ cannot be perceived, or even exist, by itself, apart from its receptacle; otherwise it would have to be regarded as baseless.
gṛhyate yā dhruvā jātiḥ svādhāravinivṛttitaḥ //	The answer to this argument is as follows: [see verses 757-760 next]
svasyā ādhāraḥ kriyā{tva}jāteḥ saiva kriyā /	as the conditions would be the same.
nahi jāter āśrayagrahaṇamantareṇa kevalāyā grahaṇamavasthitir vāsti, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt //	It may be that at the initial stage (when the child is just born) there is no inherence between the two (the universal and the particular) because of the defective character of their relationship.
[p.248] syād etat ekadā jāter lakṣitatvād uparate 'pi karmaṇi tadādhāre pravartata eva tannibandhanapratyaya ity āha daṇḍetyādi / daṇḍādgadādijātīnām ekadā na hi lakṣaṇe /	For instance, such ‘Universals’ as ‘Stick’ and the like having been perceived once, when Devadatta had given up the Stick, the idea of his being ‘with Stick’, or ‘with the Ear-ring’, would be there. Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up cooking, the ‘Universal’ Cook is present;
tadviyoge 'pi daṇḍyādimatis teṣu pravartate //	because, the ‘Universal’ being eternal, it would be present in the new-born child also.
athāpi pācakatvādijātiranyaiva vartate / sadyojāte 'pi tadyogāt pācakādimatir bhavet //	in the same way, the ‘Universal’ Cook also, being inherent in a certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.
sadādimativanno cet tadā sā samavāyinī /	‘Inhering’ is mentioned only by way of illustration;
paścādapi na sā tatra tathā syād aviśeṣataḥ //	But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all.
naca pācakatvādijātiratrāpyastīti yuktaṃ, sadyojāter 'pi jāter vidyamānatvāt pācakādibuddhiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	Because the non-inherence of the ‘Universal’ in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object;
evaṃ tarhi na kadācid api sā tat samavāyinī prāpnoti /	and this defect would be present there at the later stages also;
tathā hi prathamataraṃ tayor jātidravyayos tatsambaddhasvabhāvavaiguṇyān nasamavāyo jāteḥ paścādapi tadvaiguṇyaṃ tadavasthameveti kathaṃ sā samaveyāt nahi dravyaṃ bhavatāṃ matena kṣaṇikaṃ yena paścād viśiṣṭatā tasya bhavet /	how then could the ‘Universal’ inhere in it at all? According to your view, the Object is not momentary, by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.
tatheti samavāyinī /	‘That’ i.e. inherence.
tayor iti jātidravyayoḥ / tādātmya iti aparityaktaprāktanaviguṇarūpatve //	‘Their relationship’ i.e. the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object. ‘Tādātmye’, i.e. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.
athāpi dravyamanityamaṅgīkriyate tadāpi doṣa iti darśayann āha yadi nāmetyādi /	Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 761 next]
yadi nāmādhruvā vyaktir lābhetātiśayaṃ tadā /	If the particular object be not permanent, it might acquire additional characters;
jātes tu viguṇaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācinnivartate //	but even so, the defective nature of the ‘universal’ would never cease.
yadi nāmādhruvatayā vyaktir atiśayaṃ paścāllabhate, jātes tu dhruvatvāt prāgvtpaścād api tat samavāyaviguṇaṃ rūpam asti, katham iva paścād api samavāyinī bhavet / na cāpi paścāt kālabhāvidravyasamavāyāviguṇarūpaiva jātiḥ sarvadāvasthiteti śakyaṃ vaktum dravya [p.249] syāpi nityatvaprasaṅgāt, tat sambaddhasvabhāvāyā jāteḥ sadāvasthitatvāt /	It may be that the Particular Object, being impermanent, will acquire additional qualities later on; but the ‘Universal’, being permanent, will always retain its character of being averse to Inherence; hence how could it be ‘inherent’ even at a later stage? Nor can it be right to assert that “the ‘Universal’ remains for ever in a state which is not averse to subsequent Inherence”; because in that case, the Particular Object also would have to be regarded as eternal;
nahi dvitīyasambandhyabhāve tat sambaddhasvabhāvāvaiguṇyaṃ yuktam //	because in the absence of one relative, the other relative cannot be said to be devoid of the defect preventing its related nature.
pacanādītyādinodyotakaravihitaṃ parihāramāśaṅkate	The following Text puts forward the answer given by Uddyotakara: [see verse 762 next]
pacanādikriyāyāś ca pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ matam / pācakādīti taccāsti prādhānyaṃ pācakāntare //	“The name ‘cook’ is meant to be applied to that which is the principal cause of the act of cooking; and this ‘principality’ is present in another cook also.” (762)
sa hyāha hetvarthāparijñānādidamucyate / yathā pācakādiśabdā anuvṛttāś ca bhavanti, naca pācakatvaṃ nāma sāmānyamasti, tathā gavādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayā iti /	8, page 320) “It is through ignorance of our Reason that our Opponent has urged that ‘just as the term Cook is comprehensive in its connotation, and yet there is no such Universal as Cook, so also is the comprehensive character of the connotation of the term Cow Because what is meant by our Reason is that ‘Particular Cognition cannot be accidental (without cause)’;
yasmād viśeṣapratyayānāmanākasmikatvādityasya hetor ayam arthaḥ /	and what this means is that the Idea which is different from the idea of the individual object must be due to a different cause;
piṇḍapratyayavyatiriktapratyayasya nimittāntarād utpāda iti, na punaḥ sarvo 'nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavatīti /	and not that all comprehensive ideas are based upon ‘Universal Such being the case, that which is the principal cause of the action of cooking is what is spoken of by the name ‘Cook’; and this principal character is present in other persons also;
evaṃ sati pacanakriyāyā yat pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ tat pācakaśabdenocyate, tac ca prādhanyaṃ pācakāntare 'pyastīti na doṣa iti //	hence the objection urged against us has no force.”
tadetat prādhānyam ityādinā pratividhatte	This argument is answered in the following [see verse 763 next]
prādhānyaṃ kimidaṃ nāma na śaktirasamanvayāt /	What is it that is called ‘principal character’? It cannot be a potency;
dravyakriyāguṇātmādi nāta evāvakalpyate //	For the same reason it cannot be said to consist in the nature of the substance, quality or action, etc.
kimidaṃ prādhānyaṃ, nāma yadi śaktiḥ, tadayuktam, tasyāḥ pratyādhāraniyatāyā vyaktyantarāsamanvayāt /	What is this ‘Principal Character’? If it is a Potency, that cannot be right; as potency is restricted to each individual substratum, and must therefore vary with each individual object, and cannot subsist in another object.
nāpi dravyādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ svātantryamata evāsamanvayāt /	For the same reason, it cannot consist in the ‘nature’ essence, self-sufficiency, of Substance, etc.;
ādiśabdena ṣaṭpadārthavyatirikta iṣṭo dharmo gṛhyate /	The term ‘etc.’ is meant to include any entity that may be held to be distinct from Substance, Quality and Action.
yat punar uktaṃ nimittāntarād utpāda ityasyāyam artha iti, tatra prativihitameva sāmānyena kiñcinnimittāntaram astīti sādhane siddhasādhyatā, saṅketamanaskārasya nimittatveneṣṭatvāt viśeṣeṇa tvanvayavaikalyaṃ vyabhicāraś ca pācakādipratyayair iti // tadityādinopasaṃharati	As regards the explanation offered (by Uddyotakara) of the assertion that “the appearance of the notions in question is due to other causes”, this has already been answered by pointing out that if some sort of a Cause is meant, then the argument is futile, as we also admit it as being due to Conventional Conception if on the other hand any particular Cause is meant, then there is ‘absence of concomitance’ and also ‘Falsity’, in view of such notions as those of the Cook and the like.
tadvijātīyaviśleṣirūpamātrāvasāyinī / saṅketabhedasāpekṣā pācakādiṣu śemuṣī //	Thus the notion that appears in regard to the ‘cook’ is dependent only upon the diversity of convention, and apprehends only the form that precludes all unlike things.
yathāsaṅketamevātaḥ śabdā buddhaya eva ca / vibhāge na pravartante vinaikenānugāminā //	From all this it follows that all names and notions proceed diversely in accordance with convention, without there being any all-embracing entity.
tat tasmāt, yadyato nimittantaraṃ nirūpyamāṇaṃ pācakādidhiyo nopapadyate / tasmāt / vijātīyasya vyavacchinnavastumātrādhyavasāyinī yathāsamayaṃ pācakaḥ pācaka ityevam ākārānugatā bhinneṣvapi vastuṣvabhedena pācakādiṣu śemuṣī dhīrupajāyate, [p.250] sarvatra vijātīyavyavacchedasya vidyamānatvāt /	‘Thus’, because no other cause is found, on examination, for the notions of the Cook and the rest, therefore, even in connection with diverse objects like the Cook, etc., the comprehensive notion idea which ultimately apprehends only something distinguished from all things unlike itself proceeds in accordance with Convention; as this exclusion of the unlike is always present.
yat evaṃ gavādiṣvapi yathāsaṅketamabhinnākāravyavasāyinaḥ pratyayāḥ śabdāś ca pravartiṣyante vināpi sāmānyamityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ //	Because this is so, therefore it follows that in the case of the ‘Cow’, etc. also, notions partaking of a uniform character, as also Names, should proceed on the basis of Convention, even without any entity like the ‘Universal So that the Reason put forward by the other party remains ‘Inconclusive’, (Fallible, Untrue).
tathā cābhāvavijñānaṃ nābhāveṣu virudhyate /	Thus the notion of negation with regard to negation is not incompatible;
dhvanir vānugato 'narthasaṅketānugamāttayoḥ //	The only basis for a comprehensive notion, that will apply to all cases, consists in the Body of Convention;
idam eva hi sāmānyapratyayasya nibandhanaṃ vyāpi yaduta saṅketābhogaḥ, anyathā hyabhāveṣvabhāva ityanugataḥ pratyayo dhvaniś ca kena na virudhyeta na hyatra jātir asti vastusamavāyinītvāt tasya / kasmān na virudhyata ityatra kāraṇam āha anarthasaṅketānugamāt tayor iti /	otherwise, the incongruity of the comprehensive notion that we have in regard to all Negations, as also of the very term ‘Negation’ cannot be denied. Because in the case of Negations, there can be no ‘Universal’, which subsists only in entities (not in non-entities). Why it is not incompatible is shown by the words ‘Because they 'proceed etc., etc.’; the Convention is called ‘anartha’ in the sense that it does not involve the assumption of any other entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’ and so forth;
śabdajñānayoḥ saṅketamātrānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvād iti yāvat //	i.e. the Name and the Idea follow the presence or absence of the, said Convention.
ghaṭasyetyādinā śaṅarasvāmina uttaramāśaṅkate ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ ghaṭapradhvaṃsa ityayam /	“Such motions (of negation) as ‘the previous negation of the jar’, ‘the destruction of the jar’ and the like, apprehend negations with positive entities as their adjuncts;
tadvastūpādhikāneva dhīrabhāvān prapadyate // upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā / tasyāḥ sarvatra cennaivaṃ vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt //	and the comprehensive character of the said notion of ‘negation’ is due to the comprehensive character of those adjuncts”, if this is urged, then (our answer is that) this cannot be so; (a) because there is disparity and (b) because it cannot rest upon that.
ghaṭa ityādikā buddhis tebhyo yuktānugāminī /	(a) The comprehensive notion of the ‘jar’ may be rightly regarded as being due to that;
nābhāvo bhāva ityeṣā tanmatis tu vilakṣaṇā //	the notion of ‘presence’ (affirmation) is entirely different from the notion of ‘absence’ (negation).
nahi sattāvaśād buddhir gauraś ca iti ceṣyate /	(b) The notion of the ‘cow’ or the’ horse’ is not held to be due to the ‘universal’ being.
ekamevānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvasādhanam //	If it did, then only one ‘universal’ would have to be postulated as accomplishing everything (as being the basis of all notions).
sa hyāha na hi teṣvabhāveṣvanupādhikāḥ pratyayā dṛśyante, kiṃ tarhighaṭasya prāgabhāvaḥ ghaṭasya pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ ityevaṃ sarvatrābhāvapratyayo vastūpādhikānevābhāvānavalambate /	Śaṅkarasvāmin has argued thus: “The notions of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Negation is always of something]; for instance, in all such notions of Negation as ‘the previous negation of the Jar’, ‘the Destruction of the Jar’ and so forth, they are found to rest upon Negations associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts;
tasmāt sarvatraiva tasyā dhiya upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttiteti nāsti vyabhicāra iti /	which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the ‘Universal’ permeating the said adjuncts; so that there is no ‘fallibility’ in our Premiss”.
tasyā iti dhiyaḥ prakṛtatvāt sambandhaḥ /	‘Tasyāḥ’ of the said notion (of Negation).
naivamityādinā pratividhatte / vailakṣaṇyasahito 'tadāśraya iti vigrahaḥ / samāhāradvandvo vā / vailakṣaṇyādatadāśrayāc ca naiva yuktam ity arthaḥ /	The above argument is answered in the words ‘It cannot be so, etc., etc.’ The compound ‘Vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt’ may be construed to mean either (a) ‘because there is the fact that it cannot rest upon that, along with the fact that there is disparity’, or as (b) ‘because there is disparity, and also because it cannot rest upon that’.
tatra vailakṣaṇyād ityasya tāvad vistareṇa samarthanam āha ghaṭa ityādi /	The first of these two reasons ‘because there is disparity’ is explained in detail, in the words ‘The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.’;
[p.251] na hyekopādhinibandhanā bhinnākārā buddhayo yuktāḥ, ekanaiva sarvasāmānyakāryasādhanād anekasāmānyakalpanāvaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt / tasmād ghaṭatvādisāmānyavaśād ghaṭa ityādikā dhiyo bhavantu, abhāva ityādikās tu katham ivātyantavilakṣaṇās tannibandhanā yujyeran, nahi sattāvaśādgotvādidhīr bhavet //	it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct; as in that case a single ‘Universal’ would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several ‘Universals’, Thus then notions of positive entities like the ‘Jar’ etc. may be due to the ‘Universal’ ‘Jar’, how could the notions of ‘Negations’ be based upon those ‘Universals’, being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character? For example the notion of the universal ‘Cow’ does not proceed on the basis of the ‘Universal’ Being.
bhāviviktas tv āha nahi sarvatra nimittānurūpaḥ pratyaya ity arthaḥ /	Bhāvivikta has argued as follows It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basis).
tathā hi gajaturagadhavakhadirādisamavāyinī bahutvasaṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnāṃ nimittaṃ, pānakakāñjikādibuddhīnāṃ vijātīyadravyasaṃyogo nimittam, anyathāhi bahavaḥ saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād iti / tadetan na nimittetyādināśaṅkya yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte /	For instance, the number ‘Plurality’ subsisting (a) in Elephants and Horses, or (b) in the Dhava and Khadira trees, forms the basis of the notions of (a) the ‘Army’ and (b) the ‘Forest’; similarly the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of ‘drinks’, ‘fermented gruel’ and the like. Otherwise (i.e. if the resultant notion must be exactly in keeping with its basis) the notions in question should have been of (a) ‘Many’ and (b) ‘Mixture’”.
yatas senādibuddhīnāṃ saṅkhyādīṣṭaṃ nibandhanam //	This is the argument that is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 771-772 above]
iyam iti / sāmānyadhīḥ /	‘The said notion’, i.e. the Comprehensive notion.
saṅketasya bhedo viśeṣaḥ //	The ‘diversity’ i.e. Peculiarity of the Conventions.
kaḥ punar atrātiśayo yenaivamucyata ity āha bhedetyādi /	Question: “What is the peculiarity on the basis whereof this statement is made?” Answer: [see verses 773-774 next]
bhedajñāne satīcchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ /	When there is cognition of diversity, then there arises the desire to set up a convention;
tatkṛtistacchrutiścāsyā ābhogas tanmatistataḥ //	then comes the hearing of the name in accordance with that convention; then the ‘body’ or ‘form’ of the convention;

naca sarvopasaṃhārādvyāptirasya prasādhitā //

then again the all-embracing concomitance of the reason has not yet been established.

anyadharmanimittatve 'pyabhyupagamyamāne vyabhicāradoṣas tadavastha eva yasmāttatrāpyasmin dharme 'tyevāstitāmatiḥ asti saddharma iti /

Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of ‘Fallibility’ remains; because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that ‘it exists’, which is expressed by the words ‘this property of existence is there’;

tatrāpyanyadharmābhyupagame 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

so this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than ‘Existence’ (or Being);

anyeṣām api dharmāntarāśrayatvād dharmitvaprasaṅgaś ca /

as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence ‘things possessing that property’;

tataś ca ṣaḍeva padārthā dharmiṇa iti ṣaṭsaṅkhyāniyamo na syāt /

and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that ‘there are only six Categories’ which can have properties.

athānavasthābhayāddharmāntaraṃ nāśrīyate tadāmībhiḥ padārtheṣu sattādau dharme vā pravṛttaiḥ pratyayair vyabhicāritā hetoḥ /

Regress, a further property (of is-ness) is not postulated, then, in view of these notions, as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of Existence, the Reason -would have to be regarded as ‘fallible’ (untrue).

mābhūdvāsya sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā tu kena parihriyata ityetad āha naca sarvopasaṃhārād ityādi /

It may be that the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason is not due to its being Too Wide; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to ‘doubt’ be avoided? This is what is pointed out in the words ‘Then again, etc. etc.’;

sarvasmin dharmiṇi hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptipradarśanaṃ sarvopasaṃhāraḥ /

what is meant by ‘all-embracing concomitance’ is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

syād etadvyāptiratra yuktaiveti nimittāntarābhāve hi tadvastupratyayavailakṣaṇyaṃ katham upapadyeta nahyekaviṣayāṇāṃ bahūnām api pratyayānāṃ vailakṣaṇyam asti yadi syāt tadā rūparasādipratyayānām [p.246] api nānāviṣayo na siddhyet /

The following argument might be urged “The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question (of the Universal ‘Cow’, etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself? There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could he no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth;

pratyayabhedakṛtatvād viṣayabhedavyavasthānasyeti /

because diversity among things is always due to the diversity among Cognitions.”

tadapyayuktam /

This is not right;

nahi sāmānyapratyayo vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayaḥ paramārthato yuktaḥ /

as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of ‘Universal’ in regard to the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ of things.

āviṣṭābhilāpena pratyayena svalakṣaṇasyāviṣayīkāraṇāt /

Because the ‘Specific Peculiarity’ never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.

kintu yato yatas tasyaikasyāpi vastuno vyāvṛttis tannibandhanās tatra yathāsaṅketābhyāsaṃ tadvastvanubhavadvārā yato vikalpā vācakāś ca viśvakalpā yadi pravarterannasatyapi sāmānye tadā ko virodha ityato vyāptyabhāva ucyate //

But, even in the absence of any ‘Universal’, if the view be held that each thing by itself is one only and is excluded, from other things, on some basis, and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people; if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it.

yaccoktaṃ gavādiṣvanuvṛttaṃ cetyādi tatrāha tadanantaram ityādi /

It has been argued (above, under Text 719) that “The comprehensive idea that appears in regard to the Cow and other things, etc. etc.”.

tadanantaram uddiṣṭam anenaiva nirākṛtam /

‘By this’, i.e. by the refutation just explained.

tatrāpi tulyadoṣatvāt /

As the same objections are equally applicable to that also;

tathāhīṣṭasiddhyādayo 'trāpi samānāḥ / ādiśabdena sādhyaśūnyatā dṛṣṭāntasya hetor asiddhir vyabhicāraścetyādi parigṛhyate // prakārāntareṇāpi vyabhicāramāha pācakādiṣvityādi /

for instance, the defect of being ‘futile’, ‘superfluous’ (proving what is already admitted) and the rest are applicable to this argument also. The phrase ‘and the rest’ includes the fallacies of the Corroborative Instance ‘being devoid of the Probandum’, the Reason being ‘unproven’, and ‘fallible’ (Inconclusive) and so forth.

pācakādiṣu ca jñānaṃ viśiṣṭamupajāyate / abhāve 'bhāvabuddhiś ca vinaikenānugāminā //

Without any all-embracing basis, there is (a) a particular cognition in regard to the ‘cook’; (b) similarly there is the notion of ‘negation’ in regard to negation itself;

icchāracitarūpeṣu naṣṭājāteṣu vā tataḥ /

as also (c) in regard to persons and things created by imagination, and (d) in regard to dead and unborn persons.

anaikāntikatā hetoḥ sarvair ebhir yathoditaiḥ //

In view of all these cognitions, the reason becomes open to the fallacy of ‘fallibility’.

nahi tatraikamanugāmi nimittaṃ pācakatvapāṭhakatvādikam asti yena pācakaḥ pāṭhaka ityanuvṛttipratyayo bhavet /

In the case of the notion of the ‘Cook’, the ‘Teacher’ and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the character of being Cook, the character of being the Teacher and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the ‘Cook’ and the ‘Teacher’ could be based.

tathā prāgabhāvādiṣu caturṣvabhāvo 'bhāva iti katham anuvṛttapratyayo bhavet nahyatrāpi sāmānyam asti tasya vastvāśritatvāt /

Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation, Prior Negation and the like, how could there be any such comprehensive notion as ‘Negation’? Certainly there could be no ‘Universal’ in this case, as this must rest in positive entities.

icchāracitarūpeṣu candrāpīḍādiṣu nabhastalopakalpitadhavanagṛhādiṣu naṣṭājāteṣu ca mahāsammataśaṅkhaprabhṛtiṣu buddhirvinaikenānugāminā kathaṃ bhavet / nahi tatrāpi sāmānyam asti vyaktyāśritatvāt tasya //

Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination, such as the poetical character of Candrāpīḍa (in Kādambarī) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth, and also in regard to persons dead and unborn such as Mahāsammata, Śaṅkha and the rest, how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character? Surely there is no ‘Universal’ in these cases; which are all based upon individuals.

na pācakādibuddhīnām asti kiñcinnibandhanam /

In fact, there is no single basis for the notions of ‘cook’ and the rest.

karmāsti cet prativyakti nanu tadbhidyate tathā //

If it be said that “the act (of cooking) is the basis”, then, the answer is that the act varies with each individual person;

bhinneṣvanvayino 'satve na yuktānvayinī matiḥ / ityekamiṣṭaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanuvṛttimat //

and you have postulated the ‘universal’ as embracing all individuals only, on the ground that unless there is an all-embracing entity, there can be no comprehensive notion of things which are different.

karmanvayadaridraṃ ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate / tadā vyaktaya evāsyāḥ kimitīṣṭā na hetavaḥ //

If, even without such all-embracing character, the act be regarded as the basis (of the comprehensive notion) then why should not the individuals themselves be regarded as causes of it? Further (if the act were the basis, then) the notion of ‘cook’ could not appear in regard to the man after he has desisted from the act (of cooking);

pācakādimatir na syāt tatra coparatakriye / na sadāsannidhānaṃ hi karmeṣṭaṃ jātivat paraiḥ // atītānāgataṃ karma nimittīkṛtya teṣu cet /

surely even the other party do not regard the act as present there at all times, like the ‘universal’, if it be held that “the notion and name of the cook, etc. is based on past and future action”, then such an act cannot be the cause at all, for the simple reason that it is not present at the time.

pācakādiṣu dhīśabdau, tan na heturasattvataḥ //

The following Texts explain the notions of the ‘Cook’, etc.: [see verses 750-754 above]

nahi pācakādiṣu karmanibandhanā buddhir iti yuktaṃ vaktum /tasyāpi karmaṇaḥ prativyaktivadbhedābhyupagamāt, bhinneṣu hi vinaikenānugāminānvayī pratyayo nopapadyata iti kṛtvā sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanugataṃ parikalpyate bhavadbhiḥ /

It cannot be right to say that the notion in. regard to the Cook is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person, just like the individuality. You postulate the ‘Universal’ as embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity.

yadi cānvayaśūnyam api karmābhinnābhidhānapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā ko vyaktiṣu pradveṣo yena tāḥ parihṛtya sāmānyaṃ taddhetutvena kalpyate /

Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diversengs as one, then why should there be an aversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the ‘Universal’ has been postulated as the basis of that notion?

kiṃ ca yadi karmanibandhanaḥ pācakādiṣu pratyayaḥ syāt tadā parataḥ kriye pākamakurvati pācaka iti pratyayo na syāt /

Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cook were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Cook could not appear in regard to him.

nahi jātivadbhavadbhiḥ sadā sannihitaṃ karmābhīṣṭaṃ, yenoparatakriye 'pi pratyayaḥ syāt /

You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the ‘Universal’, by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased.

nahi yo yannibandhanaḥ sa tadabhāve bhavitum arhati, atiprasaṅgāt, evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvanibandhanaṃ syāt /

When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.

nacāpyatītānāgataṃ karma tat pratyayanibandhanaṃ yuktaṃ, tasyātītāder asattvāt, asataś ca hetubhāvānupapatteḥ //

Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.

śaṅkarasvāmī prāha pācakādyanuvṛttipratyayas tat karmajātisambaddhayā kriyayā yogas tasmād bhavati, tenoparatakriye 'pi kriyayā dhruvanimittasyopalakṣaṇāt pācakādipratyaya ityavaseyam iti /

If the idea be said to be due to the presence of the act related to the ‘universal’ action, and this permanent basis is always indicated by it even when the particular act has ceased, [then, the answer is as given in the following text]. Śaṅkara-svāmin argues as follows: “The comprehensive idea of the Cook is based upon the presence of that particular Action which is related to the ‘Universal’ (or Genus) ‘Action’;

tadetad darśayati kriyetyādi /

The answer to this is given in the following [see verse 756 next]

kriyātvajātisambandhakriyāyogān matir yadi / naṣṭakriye 'pi ca tayā dhurvahetūpalakṣaṇāt //

When the particular act has ceased, the permanent ‘universal’, even though indicated, cannot really exist; for the simple reason that its receptacle has ceased to exist.

tayeti kriyayā /

i.e. the particular act.

na tvityādinā pratividhatte / na tu naṣṭakriye tatra lakṣitāpi na vidyate /

As a matter of fact, the ‘Universal’ cannot be perceived, or even exist, by itself, apart from its receptacle; otherwise it would have to be regarded as baseless.

gṛhyate yā dhruvā jātiḥ svādhāravinivṛttitaḥ //

The answer to this argument is as follows: [see verses 757-760 next]

svasyā ādhāraḥ kriyā{tva}jāteḥ saiva kriyā /

as the conditions would be the same.

nahi jāter āśrayagrahaṇamantareṇa kevalāyā grahaṇamavasthitir vāsti, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt //

It may be that at the initial stage (when the child is just born) there is no inherence between the two (the universal and the particular) because of the defective character of their relationship.

[p.248] syād etat ekadā jāter lakṣitatvād uparate 'pi karmaṇi tadādhāre pravartata eva tannibandhanapratyaya ity āha daṇḍetyādi / daṇḍādgadādijātīnām ekadā na hi lakṣaṇe /

For instance, such ‘Universals’ as ‘Stick’ and the like having been perceived once, when Devadatta had given up the Stick, the idea of his being ‘with Stick’, or ‘with the Ear-ring’, would be there. Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up cooking, the ‘Universal’ Cook is present;

tadviyoge 'pi daṇḍyādimatis teṣu pravartate //

because, the ‘Universal’ being eternal, it would be present in the new-born child also.

athāpi pācakatvādijātiranyaiva vartate / sadyojāte 'pi tadyogāt pācakādimatir bhavet //

in the same way, the ‘Universal’ Cook also, being inherent in a certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.

sadādimativanno cet tadā sā samavāyinī /

‘Inhering’ is mentioned only by way of illustration;

paścādapi na sā tatra tathā syād aviśeṣataḥ //

But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all.

naca pācakatvādijātiratrāpyastīti yuktaṃ, sadyojāter 'pi jāter vidyamānatvāt pācakādibuddhiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

Because the non-inherence of the ‘Universal’ in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object;

evaṃ tarhi na kadācid api sā tat samavāyinī prāpnoti /

and this defect would be present there at the later stages also;

tathā hi prathamataraṃ tayor jātidravyayos tatsambaddhasvabhāvavaiguṇyān nasamavāyo jāteḥ paścādapi tadvaiguṇyaṃ tadavasthameveti kathaṃ sā samaveyāt nahi dravyaṃ bhavatāṃ matena kṣaṇikaṃ yena paścād viśiṣṭatā tasya bhavet /

how then could the ‘Universal’ inhere in it at all? According to your view, the Object is not momentary, by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.

tatheti samavāyinī /

‘That’ i.e. inherence.

tayor iti jātidravyayoḥ / tādātmya iti aparityaktaprāktanaviguṇarūpatve //

‘Their relationship’ i.e. the relation between the ‘Universal’ and the Particular Object. ‘Tādātmye’, i.e. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.

athāpi dravyamanityamaṅgīkriyate tadāpi doṣa iti darśayann āha yadi nāmetyādi /

Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force; this is what is shown in the following [see verse 761 next]

yadi nāmādhruvā vyaktir lābhetātiśayaṃ tadā /

If the particular object be not permanent, it might acquire additional characters;

jātes tu viguṇaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācinnivartate //

but even so, the defective nature of the ‘universal’ would never cease.

yadi nāmādhruvatayā vyaktir atiśayaṃ paścāllabhate, jātes tu dhruvatvāt prāgvtpaścād api tat samavāyaviguṇaṃ rūpam asti, katham iva paścād api samavāyinī bhavet / na cāpi paścāt kālabhāvidravyasamavāyāviguṇarūpaiva jātiḥ sarvadāvasthiteti śakyaṃ vaktum dravya [p.249] syāpi nityatvaprasaṅgāt, tat sambaddhasvabhāvāyā jāteḥ sadāvasthitatvāt /

It may be that the Particular Object, being impermanent, will acquire additional qualities later on; but the ‘Universal’, being permanent, will always retain its character of being averse to Inherence; hence how could it be ‘inherent’ even at a later stage? Nor can it be right to assert that “the ‘Universal’ remains for ever in a state which is not averse to subsequent Inherence”; because in that case, the Particular Object also would have to be regarded as eternal;

nahi dvitīyasambandhyabhāve tat sambaddhasvabhāvāvaiguṇyaṃ yuktam //

because in the absence of one relative, the other relative cannot be said to be devoid of the defect preventing its related nature.

pacanādītyādinodyotakaravihitaṃ parihāramāśaṅkate

The following Text puts forward the answer given by Uddyotakara: [see verse 762 next]

pacanādikriyāyāś ca pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ matam / pācakādīti taccāsti prādhānyaṃ pācakāntare //

“The name ‘cook’ is meant to be applied to that which is the principal cause of the act of cooking; and this ‘principality’ is present in another cook also.” (762)

sa hyāha hetvarthāparijñānādidamucyate / yathā pācakādiśabdā anuvṛttāś ca bhavanti, naca pācakatvaṃ nāma sāmānyamasti, tathā gavādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayā iti /

8, page 320) “It is through ignorance of our Reason that our Opponent has urged that ‘just as the term Cook is comprehensive in its connotation, and yet there is no such Universal as Cook, so also is the comprehensive character of the connotation of the term Cow Because what is meant by our Reason is that ‘Particular Cognition cannot be accidental (without cause)’;

yasmād viśeṣapratyayānāmanākasmikatvādityasya hetor ayam arthaḥ /

and what this means is that the Idea which is different from the idea of the individual object must be due to a different cause;

piṇḍapratyayavyatiriktapratyayasya nimittāntarād utpāda iti, na punaḥ sarvo 'nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavatīti /

and not that all comprehensive ideas are based upon ‘Universal Such being the case, that which is the principal cause of the action of cooking is what is spoken of by the name ‘Cook’; and this principal character is present in other persons also;

evaṃ sati pacanakriyāyā yat pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ tat pācakaśabdenocyate, tac ca prādhanyaṃ pācakāntare 'pyastīti na doṣa iti //

hence the objection urged against us has no force.”

tadetat prādhānyam ityādinā pratividhatte

This argument is answered in the following [see verse 763 next]

prādhānyaṃ kimidaṃ nāma na śaktirasamanvayāt /

What is it that is called ‘principal character’? It cannot be a potency;

dravyakriyāguṇātmādi nāta evāvakalpyate //

For the same reason it cannot be said to consist in the nature of the substance, quality or action, etc.

kimidaṃ prādhānyaṃ, nāma yadi śaktiḥ, tadayuktam, tasyāḥ pratyādhāraniyatāyā vyaktyantarāsamanvayāt /

What is this ‘Principal Character’? If it is a Potency, that cannot be right; as potency is restricted to each individual substratum, and must therefore vary with each individual object, and cannot subsist in another object.

nāpi dravyādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ svātantryamata evāsamanvayāt /

For the same reason, it cannot consist in the ‘nature’ essence, self-sufficiency, of Substance, etc.;

ādiśabdena ṣaṭpadārthavyatirikta iṣṭo dharmo gṛhyate /

The term ‘etc.’ is meant to include any entity that may be held to be distinct from Substance, Quality and Action.

yat punar uktaṃ nimittāntarād utpāda ityasyāyam artha iti, tatra prativihitameva sāmānyena kiñcinnimittāntaram astīti sādhane siddhasādhyatā, saṅketamanaskārasya nimittatveneṣṭatvāt viśeṣeṇa tvanvayavaikalyaṃ vyabhicāraś ca pācakādipratyayair iti // tadityādinopasaṃharati

As regards the explanation offered (by Uddyotakara) of the assertion that “the appearance of the notions in question is due to other causes”, this has already been answered by pointing out that if some sort of a Cause is meant, then the argument is futile, as we also admit it as being due to Conventional Conception if on the other hand any particular Cause is meant, then there is ‘absence of concomitance’ and also ‘Falsity’, in view of such notions as those of the Cook and the like.

tadvijātīyaviśleṣirūpamātrāvasāyinī / saṅketabhedasāpekṣā pācakādiṣu śemuṣī //

Thus the notion that appears in regard to the ‘cook’ is dependent only upon the diversity of convention, and apprehends only the form that precludes all unlike things.

yathāsaṅketamevātaḥ śabdā buddhaya eva ca / vibhāge na pravartante vinaikenānugāminā //

From all this it follows that all names and notions proceed diversely in accordance with convention, without there being any all-embracing entity.

tat tasmāt, yadyato nimittantaraṃ nirūpyamāṇaṃ pācakādidhiyo nopapadyate / tasmāt / vijātīyasya vyavacchinnavastumātrādhyavasāyinī yathāsamayaṃ pācakaḥ pācaka ityevam ākārānugatā bhinneṣvapi vastuṣvabhedena pācakādiṣu śemuṣī dhīrupajāyate, [p.250] sarvatra vijātīyavyavacchedasya vidyamānatvāt /

‘Thus’, because no other cause is found, on examination, for the notions of the Cook and the rest, therefore, even in connection with diverse objects like the Cook, etc., the comprehensive notion idea which ultimately apprehends only something distinguished from all things unlike itself proceeds in accordance with Convention; as this exclusion of the unlike is always present.

yat evaṃ gavādiṣvapi yathāsaṅketamabhinnākāravyavasāyinaḥ pratyayāḥ śabdāś ca pravartiṣyante vināpi sāmānyamityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ //

Because this is so, therefore it follows that in the case of the ‘Cow’, etc. also, notions partaking of a uniform character, as also Names, should proceed on the basis of Convention, even without any entity like the ‘Universal So that the Reason put forward by the other party remains ‘Inconclusive’, (Fallible, Untrue).

tathā cābhāvavijñānaṃ nābhāveṣu virudhyate /

Thus the notion of negation with regard to negation is not incompatible;

dhvanir vānugato 'narthasaṅketānugamāttayoḥ //

The only basis for a comprehensive notion, that will apply to all cases, consists in the Body of Convention;

idam eva hi sāmānyapratyayasya nibandhanaṃ vyāpi yaduta saṅketābhogaḥ, anyathā hyabhāveṣvabhāva ityanugataḥ pratyayo dhvaniś ca kena na virudhyeta na hyatra jātir asti vastusamavāyinītvāt tasya / kasmān na virudhyata ityatra kāraṇam āha anarthasaṅketānugamāt tayor iti /

otherwise, the incongruity of the comprehensive notion that we have in regard to all Negations, as also of the very term ‘Negation’ cannot be denied. Because in the case of Negations, there can be no ‘Universal’, which subsists only in entities (not in non-entities). Why it is not incompatible is shown by the words ‘Because they 'proceed etc., etc.’; the Convention is called ‘anartha’ in the sense that it does not involve the assumption of any other entity in the shape of the ‘Universal’ and so forth;

śabdajñānayoḥ saṅketamātrānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvād iti yāvat //

i.e. the Name and the Idea follow the presence or absence of the, said Convention.

ghaṭasyetyādinā śaṅarasvāmina uttaramāśaṅkate ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ ghaṭapradhvaṃsa ityayam /

“Such motions (of negation) as ‘the previous negation of the jar’, ‘the destruction of the jar’ and the like, apprehend negations with positive entities as their adjuncts;

tadvastūpādhikāneva dhīrabhāvān prapadyate // upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā / tasyāḥ sarvatra cennaivaṃ vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt //

and the comprehensive character of the said notion of ‘negation’ is due to the comprehensive character of those adjuncts”, if this is urged, then (our answer is that) this cannot be so; (a) because there is disparity and (b) because it cannot rest upon that.

ghaṭa ityādikā buddhis tebhyo yuktānugāminī /

(a) The comprehensive notion of the ‘jar’ may be rightly regarded as being due to that;

nābhāvo bhāva ityeṣā tanmatis tu vilakṣaṇā //

the notion of ‘presence’ (affirmation) is entirely different from the notion of ‘absence’ (negation).

nahi sattāvaśād buddhir gauraś ca iti ceṣyate /

(b) The notion of the ‘cow’ or the’ horse’ is not held to be due to the ‘universal’ being.

ekamevānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvasādhanam //

If it did, then only one ‘universal’ would have to be postulated as accomplishing everything (as being the basis of all notions).

sa hyāha na hi teṣvabhāveṣvanupādhikāḥ pratyayā dṛśyante, kiṃ tarhighaṭasya prāgabhāvaḥ ghaṭasya pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ ityevaṃ sarvatrābhāvapratyayo vastūpādhikānevābhāvānavalambate /

Śaṅkarasvāmin has argued thus: “The notions of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Negation is always of something]; for instance, in all such notions of Negation as ‘the previous negation of the Jar’, ‘the Destruction of the Jar’ and so forth, they are found to rest upon Negations associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts;

tasmāt sarvatraiva tasyā dhiya upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttiteti nāsti vyabhicāra iti /

which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the ‘Universal’ permeating the said adjuncts; so that there is no ‘fallibility’ in our Premiss”.

tasyā iti dhiyaḥ prakṛtatvāt sambandhaḥ /

‘Tasyāḥ’ of the said notion (of Negation).

naivamityādinā pratividhatte / vailakṣaṇyasahito 'tadāśraya iti vigrahaḥ / samāhāradvandvo vā / vailakṣaṇyādatadāśrayāc ca naiva yuktam ity arthaḥ /

The above argument is answered in the words ‘It cannot be so, etc., etc.’ The compound ‘Vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt’ may be construed to mean either (a) ‘because there is the fact that it cannot rest upon that, along with the fact that there is disparity’, or as (b) ‘because there is disparity, and also because it cannot rest upon that’.

tatra vailakṣaṇyād ityasya tāvad vistareṇa samarthanam āha ghaṭa ityādi /

The first of these two reasons ‘because there is disparity’ is explained in detail, in the words ‘The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.’;

[p.251] na hyekopādhinibandhanā bhinnākārā buddhayo yuktāḥ, ekanaiva sarvasāmānyakāryasādhanād anekasāmānyakalpanāvaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt / tasmād ghaṭatvādisāmānyavaśād ghaṭa ityādikā dhiyo bhavantu, abhāva ityādikās tu katham ivātyantavilakṣaṇās tannibandhanā yujyeran, nahi sattāvaśādgotvādidhīr bhavet //

it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct; as in that case a single ‘Universal’ would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several ‘Universals’, Thus then notions of positive entities like the ‘Jar’ etc. may be due to the ‘Universal’ ‘Jar’, how could the notions of ‘Negations’ be based upon those ‘Universals’, being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character? For example the notion of the universal ‘Cow’ does not proceed on the basis of the ‘Universal’ Being.

bhāviviktas tv āha nahi sarvatra nimittānurūpaḥ pratyaya ity arthaḥ /

Bhāvivikta has argued as follows It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basis).

tathā hi gajaturagadhavakhadirādisamavāyinī bahutvasaṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnāṃ nimittaṃ, pānakakāñjikādibuddhīnāṃ vijātīyadravyasaṃyogo nimittam, anyathāhi bahavaḥ saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād iti / tadetan na nimittetyādināśaṅkya yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte /

For instance, the number ‘Plurality’ subsisting (a) in Elephants and Horses, or (b) in the Dhava and Khadira trees, forms the basis of the notions of (a) the ‘Army’ and (b) the ‘Forest’; similarly the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of ‘drinks’, ‘fermented gruel’ and the like. Otherwise (i.e. if the resultant notion must be exactly in keeping with its basis) the notions in question should have been of (a) ‘Many’ and (b) ‘Mixture’”.

yatas senādibuddhīnāṃ saṅkhyādīṣṭaṃ nibandhanam //

This is the argument that is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 771-772 above]

iyam iti / sāmānyadhīḥ /

‘The said notion’, i.e. the Comprehensive notion.

saṅketasya bhedo viśeṣaḥ //

The ‘diversity’ i.e. Peculiarity of the Conventions.

kaḥ punar atrātiśayo yenaivamucyata ity āha bhedetyādi /

Question: “What is the peculiarity on the basis whereof this statement is made?” Answer: [see verses 773-774 next]

bhedajñāne satīcchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ /

When there is cognition of diversity, then there arises the desire to set up a convention;

tatkṛtistacchrutiścāsyā ābhogas tanmatistataḥ //

then comes the hearing of the name in accordance with that convention; then the ‘body’ or ‘form’ of the convention;