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praspandaḥ karma so 'syāstīti praspandavat / | ‘Praspanda’ is Action. |
niścalātmakakālavad iti saptamyantādvatiḥ // | In the term ‘niścalātmakakālavat’, the ‘Vati’ affix has been added to the compound with the Locative ending [the meaning being ‘as at the time, etc. etc.’] (701-702) |
yadi tu syād agantāyam ekadā cānyathā punaḥ / parasparavibhinnātmasaṃgater bhinnatā bhavet // | If the object were mobile at one time and immobile at another then, inasmuch as two mutually different characters would be there, it would be two different objects. |
ekadā ceti / | It might be argued that “it is not of the same form; |
cakāro vibhinnakramaḥ, punar ityasyānantaraṃ darṣṭavyaḥ / | it is of both forms, going (mobile) and not-going (immobile); hence the criticism urged is not applicable; |
punaś ca anyathetyarthaḥ / | and the Reason too is ‘unproven’.” |
evaṃ hi gantṛtvāgantṛtvādiviruddhadharmādhyāsādekatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ // | What is meant is that, in the manner suggested, as the mutually contradictory characters of mobility and immobility would be imposed upon it, the object would cease to be one. |
ata eva tasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ siddham iti darśayann āha atyantabhinnāv ityādi / | The following Text shows that for the above reason, it becomes established that the object is momentary: [see verse 704 next] |
atyantabhinnāvātmānau tāviti vyavasīyate / viruddhadharmavṛttitvāc calaniścalavastuvat // | It is clearly seen that the two are entirely different; because of the presence of contradictory properties: like two things of which one is moving and another not moving. |
tāviti / calācalāvasthābhāvinau / | ‘The two’ i.e. things in the mobile and immobile states. |
calaniścalavastuvad iti / latāparvatādivad ity arthaḥ // | ‘Like two things, etc, etc.’, i.e. such things as the Creeper (moving) and the Mountain (not moving). |
dṛśyatvābhimataṃ karma na vastuvyatireki ca / | The action that is regarded as visible is nothing different from the object. |
dṛśyate sopi naivāsya sattā yuktyanupātinī // | even such existence of it as would be compatible with reason, is never actually perceived. |
[p.235] yadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sannopalabhyate tat prekṣāvatāmasadvyavahāramavatarati, yathā kasmiṃścit pradeśe paṭo 'nupalabhyamānaḥ, nopalabhyate ca rūpādivastuvyatirekeṇa karmeti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ / | Having thus established the annulment of the Opponent’s conclusion by Inference, the Author proceeds to show that it is annulled by Perception also: [see verse 705 above] If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it comes to be regarded by intelligent men as ‘non-existent’; as Cloth not perceived at a certain place; and Action is never perceived as apart from the Colour, etc. (of the object); |
nahi rūpādes tathā deśāntarāvaṣṭambhenotpadyamānasya vyatirekeṇa kvacid indriyajñāne pratibhāsamānamālakṣyate karma / | As a matter of fact, Action never becomes manifest in any Sense-perception, as anything apart from the Colour, etc. of the object as produced in a different position. |
yā ceyam utkṣepaṇamavakṣepaṇam iti jalpānuṣaṅgiṇī dhīrupajāyate sā sābhijalpatvān na pratyakṣaṃ nacāpyeṣā karmapadārthānubhavabhāvinī yuktā rūpāder eva tathātathotpadyamānasya darśanāt, yathāsaṅketaṃ teṣvevādhyavasāyena vṛtteḥ / | As regards such notions associated with verbal expressions, as ‘Throwing up’, ‘Throwing down’ and the like, they cannot be Perception, for the very reason that they are associated with verbal expression. Nor are they compatible with reason, if taken as associated with a distinct category in the shape of ‘Action’; because what are really seen are only the Colour, etc. as produced under certain conditions; and the verbal expressions (names) also are applied only to these latter, in accordance with Convention. |
etaccānantaram eva pratipāditaṃ "nityānityayor gatyādyabhāvād" iti / | This has just been explained, when it was pointed out that no movement is possible in things either permanent or impermanent. |
ato 'siddhametad uktaṃ pratyakṣata eva karma siddham iti // | Thus it is not proved, as asserted, that the existence of Action is proved by Perception itself. |
yathoktam evārtham upasaṃharann āha asthire vetyādi / | The above arguments are summed up in the following: [see verse 706 next] |
asthire vā sthire vaivaṃ gatyādīnām asambhavaḥ / | Thus ‘going’ and the rest are impossible either in permanent or impermanent things; |
prāktanāparadeśābhyāṃ vibhāgaprāptyayogataḥ // evam iti anantaroktābhyāṃ pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ nirākṛtatvāt / | ‘Thus’, i.e. because it has been discarded by Inference and Perception, as just shown above. ‘Because it is not possible, etc. etc.’; i.e. because separation from the former place is not possible; and because junction with another place is not possible. |
vibhāgaprāptyayogata iti / | The words are to be construed in the respective order. |
prāktanena vibhāgāyogāt, aparadeśena prāptyayogād iti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ // | The notion of ‘going’ is an illusion, as in the lamp-flame, due to the appearance of different but similar things being found consecutively in diverse places. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi gativyavahāro loke bhavatītyāha deśāntaretyādi / | Question “If this is so, then how is it that people speak of Going?” Answer: [see verse 707 above] ‘Different but similar things’; |
deśāntaropalabdhes tu nairantaryeṇa janmanaḥ / samānāparavastūnāṃ gatibhrāntiḥ pradīpavat // | The notion of ‘going’ is an illusion, as in the lamp-flame, due to the appearance of different but similar things being found consecutively in diverse places. |
samānāparavastūnām iti / | Answer: [see verse 707 above] ‘Different but similar things’; |
teṣāṃ samānāparavastūnāṃ yannairantaryeṇa svopādānakāraṇadeśaparihāreṇa janma sadbhāvaḥ, tasya janmana upalabdheḥ kāraṇāt sa evāyaṃ gacchatītiyathā pradīpasya kenacinnīyamānasya deśāntaraṃ gacchatīti buddhihetutvaṃ | ‘different’ and ‘similar’ are compounded first, then that compound is compounded with ‘tilings Of these different and similar things, there is appearance (birth) which is consecutive, i.e. in a place other than that of its own Cause, when such appearance is seen, there arises, from it, the notion that it is ‘going’; just as in the case of the Lamp-flame, when it is being carried by someone, there appears the notion that ‘the Lamp-flame is moving’; |
nahi pradipaḥ sa eva deśāntaramākrāmati / | while certainly the same Lamp-flame does not move from one place to another; |
tasya ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitvenābhimatatvāt / | because it has been held (even by the Vaiśeṣika) to last for six moments only. |
bhāvasvabhāva eva hi pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyo janmetyabhidhīyate / tena tasyopalabdhir yujyata eva / | Further, what is called the ‘birth’ (appearance) of a thing consists in mere Being, entirely devoid of any preceding or succeeding end; and the apprehension of such ‘birth’ or ‘appearance’ is only natural. |
athavā janmana iti pañcamyantam etat / | Or ‘janmanaḥ’ may be construed as Ablative; |
nairantaryeṇotpādāt samānāparavastūnāṃ deśāntaropalabdher iti sambandhaḥ // | the sense being ‘because things are born consecutively, therefore different and similar things are perceived in different places’. |
iti karmapadārthaparīkṣā // | End of Chapter on ‘Action’. |
[p.236] dravyādiṣvityādinā sāmānyaviśeṣadūṣaṇam ārabhate / dravyādiṣu niṣiddheṣu jātayo 'pi nirākṛtāḥ / padārthatrayavṛttā hi sarvās tāḥ parikalpitāḥ // | ‘Substance’ and other categories having been rejected, the ‘universals’ also have become rejected; as they have all been assumed to subsist in the three categories. With the following Text the Author begins the criticism of the Category of ‘The Universal’: [see verse 708 above] |
jātaya iti / sāmānyāni / | ‘The Universals’, i.e. the Genuses. |
tāś ca dravyaguṇakarmātmakapadārthatrayāśritatvāt tannirākaranād evāpāstāḥ / | These are held to be subsistent in the three Categories, Substance, Quality and Action; and hence become discarded by the rejection of these Categories themselves; |
nahyāśrayamantareṇāśritānāṃ kvacid avasthitir asti, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt / | as without the Substratum, the Subsistent cannot exist anywhere; for if it did, it would not be subsistent at all. |
jātigrahaṇamupalakṣaṇam viśeṣā apyantyadravyavṛttitvād āśritā eveṣṭāḥ ataste 'pyāśrayanirākaraṇād evāpāstāḥ // | The mention of the ‘Universal’ is only by way of an illustration; the Ultimate Individualities also are held to be subsistent, as subsisting in Ultimate Substances; hence these also become discarded by the rejection of their substratum. |
tathāpi punar viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇaṃ vaktukāmo 'nirjñātasvarūpasyāśakyadūṣaṇatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣayos tāvat svarūpaṃ darśayann āha tatretyādi / | ‘Substance’ and other categories having been rejected, the ‘universals’ also have become rejected; as they have all been assumed to subsist in the three categories. With the following Text the Author begins the criticism of the Category of ‘The Universal’: [see verse 708 above] |
tatreyaṃ dvividhā jātiḥ parair abhyupagamyate / | and hence become discarded by the rejection of these Categories themselves; |
sāmānyam eva sattākhyaṃ samasteṣvanuvṛttitaḥ // dravyatvādi tu sāmānyaṃ sadviśeṣo 'bhidhīyate / | for if it did, it would not be subsistent at all. The mention of the ‘Universal’ is only by way of an illustration; the Ultimate Individualities also are held to be subsistent, as subsisting in Ultimate Substances; |
svāśrayeṣvanuvṛttasya cetaso hetubhāvataḥ // vijātibhyaś ca sarvebhyaḥ svāśrayasya viśeṣaṇāt / vyāvṛttibuddhihetutvaṃ teṣām eva tataḥ sthitam // | because in regard to their own substrata, they become the cause of their comprehensive notion, and also serve to differentiate their substrata from all things belonging to other ‘universals’ and in this way they also become the cause of the exclusive notion of those substrata.” (709-711) |
tatra sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ paramaparaṃ ca, paraṃ sattākhyaṃ, tac ca samasteṣu triṣu dravyaguṇakarmasvanuvṛttipratyayasyaiva kāraṇatvāt sāmānyam eva na viśeṣaḥ / | The ‘Universal’ is of two kinds the Higher and the Lower; ‘Being’ is the highest ‘Universal’; it is called ‘Universal’, ‘common’, because it forms the basis of only a comprehensive notion in regard to all its three substrata Substance, Quality and Action; for this same reason it is not a ‘Particular’ at all. |
aparaṃ tu dravyatvakarmatvādilakṣaṇaṃ tac ca svāśrayeṣu dravyādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayahetutvāt sāmānyam ity ucyate svāśrayasya ca vijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttipratyayahetutayā viśeṣaṇāt sāmānyam api sadviśeṣa ityabhidhīyate / tathā hi guṇādiṣvadravyamaguṇa ityādikā yeyaṃ vyāvṛttabuddhirudayamāsādayati tāṃ prati hetutvam eṣām eva guṇatvadravyatvādīnāṃ vyavasthitaṃ nānyasya na hyadravyatvādikamaparam asti / | this kind is called ‘Universal’ (Genus, Class) in so far as it is the basis of the comprehensive notion of its substrata, in the shape of Substances, etc.; and though being ‘Universal’, it is also called ‘Particular’, in so far as it serves as the basis of the exclusive notion of its substratum as distinguished from things belonging to other ‘Universals’, For instance, in regard to Quality, there arise such exclusive notions as ‘it is not-Substance’, ‘it has no qualities’ and so forth; and the cause (basis) of these must consist in such ‘Universals’ as ‘Substance’ and ‘Quality’, not in anything else; because there are no such things as ‘not-Substance’ and so forth. |
apekṣābhedāccaikasya sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvo na virudhyata eveti bhāvaḥ // | There is no incongruity in the same thing being both ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, when it is taken relatively to other things. |
viśeṣā eva kecit tu vyāvṛttereva hetavaḥ / | “There are some ‘particulars’ which serve as the basis of ‘exclusion’ only; |
nityadravyasthitā ye 'ntyā viśeṣā iti varṇitāḥ // | these have been described as ‘ultimate individualities subsisting in eternal substances (712) |
kecid viśeṣā eveṣyante na sāmānyāni / | There are some ‘Particulars’ which are held to be ‘Particulars’ only, not ‘Universals’; |
vyāvṛttereva vyāvṛttipratyayasyaiva hetutvād ity arthaḥ / | became they serve as the basis of exclusion i.e. of ‘exclusive notion’ only. |
[p.237] ke punas ta ity āha nityetyādi / | “Which are these?” Answer ‘These have been defined, etc. etc.’; |
tathācoktam nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā viśeṣā iti / | it has been declared (in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra) that “Ultimate Individualities subsisting in eternal Substances are the ultimate (differentias)”. |
nityadravyavṛttaya iti / paramāṇvākāśakālādigātmamanaḥsu vṛtteḥ / | ‘Subsisting in eternal Substances’, i.e. subsisting in Atoms, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. |
paramāṇūnāṃ jagadvināśārambhakoṭibhūtatvāt muktātmanāṃ muktamanasāṃ casaṃsāraparyantarūpatvād antatvam atasteṣu bhavā antyā ityucyante / | As Atoms are the two ends beginning and end of the Universe, and liberated Souls and liberated Minds continue to exist till the end of the Birth-rebirth-Cycte, and hence forming one end, the Specific Individualities subsisting in them have been called ‘ultimate’; |
teṣu sphuṭataramālakṣyamāṇatvāt / | specially as it is only in these that the said Individualities are more clearly perceived. |
vṛttis tu punareṣāṃ sarvasminneva paramāṇvādau nitye dravye / | Their Subsistence too is always in the eternal Substance, like the Atom. |
ata eva nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā ityubhayorupādānam / tatra parasparamatyantavyāvṛttabuddhihetutvāt svāśrayamanyato viśeṣayantīti viśeṣā ucyante // | This is the reason why they have been described both as ‘ultimate’ and as ‘subsisting in eternal Substances’, These are called ‘Viśeṣa’, ‘Specific Individualities’, because they serve as the basis of the absolute exclusion of the eternal Substances from one another, and hence serve to ‘specify’, ‘distinguish’, their substratum from everything else. |
kutaḥ punar amī siddhā ity āha yadbalādityādi / | The question arising “How is the existence of these Specific Individualities proved?” the following answer is given: [see verse 713 above] |
yadbalātparamāṇvādau jāyante yogināṃ dhiyaḥ / vilakṣaṇo 'yametasmād iti pratyekamāśritāḥ // yathā hyasmadādīnāṃ gavādiṣvākṛtiguṇakriyāvayavasaṃyoganimitto 'śvādibuddhivyāvṛttaḥ pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ tadyathā gauḥ śuklaḥ śīghragatiḥ pīnakakudo | It is found that people like ourselves have, in regard to the Ox, the notion of the ‘Ox’ as distinguished from the ‘Horse’, through the presence of a particular shape, qualities, action and constituents, these notions appearing in the form respectively of ‘the Ox, white, fast moving, fat-humped, with a large bell’; in the same manner, in people different from us, such as Mystics, there appears, in regard to each of the eternal objects, Atoms, Liberated Souls and Liberated Minds, the exclusive notion that ‘this is different from that’; |
mahāghaṇṭa iti yathākramam tathāsmadviśiṣṭānāṃ yogināṃ nityeṣu tulyākṛtiguṇakriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmanaḥsu cānyanimittāsambhavādyadbalāt pratyekaṃ vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyayavyāvṛttir deśakālaviprakarṣadṛṣṭe ca sa evāyāmiti pratyabhijñānaṃ yato bhavati te yogināṃ viśeṣapratyayonnītasattvā antyā viśeṣāḥ siddhāḥ / | and also when the same object is seen at another time and place, there is recognition of it as ‘this is the same’; of such notions there being no other basis, that to which they are due is held to consist in the ‘ultimate Specific Individualities’, whose existence is inferred from the peculiar experience of the Mystics. Each of these Individualities subsists in its own substratum, and their existence is proved by the direct perception of the Mystics. “Such ‘universals’ (communities, genuses) as ‘being’, ‘cow’ and the like are vouched for by direct perception; |
te ca yathāsvaṃ pratyekamāśrayamāśritāḥ yogināṃ pratyakṣata eva siddhāḥ // | as the notion of ‘being’ and the rest are found to appear only when the sense-organs are functioning.” (714) |
atha jātayaḥ kathaṃ siddhā ity āha pratyakṣata ityādi / | Question How is the existence of ‘Universals’ (Genuses, Communities) proved? Answer: [see verse 714 above] |
pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvagotvādi jātayaḥ / akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadādipratyayodayāt // yadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyi yadbhavati tat tato bhavatīti vyavasthāpyate / | It is a well-established principle that when one thing follows the presence and absence of another thing, the former proceeds from the latter; in regard to Substance and the rest, the appearance of the notion of ‘Being’ (Existence), etc. follows the presence and absence of the functioning of the Sense-organs; |
dravyādiṣu ca sadādipratyayaprasūtirakṣagatānvayavyatirekāvanuvidadhatī kimitīndriyajanyatāvyapadeśaṃ nāśnuvīta, tadanyendriyajñānavat, anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt // | wherefore then could the said notion not be regarded as produced by the Sense-organs, just like any other Cognition through the Sense-organs? If it were not so regarded, then it would lead to an absurdity. “The existence of these is cognised by means of inference also: a distinctive notion must be due to a different cause.” (715) |
anumānato 'pi sattvamāsāṃ pratipādayann āha anumānetyādi / | The following Text seeks to prove the existence of ‘Specific Individualities’ by means of Inference also: [see verse 715 above] |
viśeṣapratyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ // viśeṣapratyaya iti / | ‘A distinctive notion’ a notion of a kind different from that ofngs like Substance, etc. ‘Due to a different cause’, whose birth is due to other causes. |
dravyādivastuvilakṣaṇākāraḥ pratyayaḥ / | of this same kind is the notion of ‘being’ in regard to Substance, etc.; |
nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ [p.238] nimittāntarād bhāva utpādaḥ so 'syāstīti kṛtvā / | hence this is a natural reason [for assuming a different cause for it, in the form of the ‘Universal’]. Such is the view of the other Party (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). |
enam eva pramāṇārthaṃ gavādītyādinā bhāviviktādiracitapramāṇopanyāsenadarśayati | The sense of the same argument is shown by setting forth the arguments propounded by Bhāvivikta: [see verses 716-720 next] |
gavādiśabdaprajñānaviśeṣā gogajādiṣu / samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktārthahetavaḥ // gavādiviṣayatve hi sati tacchabdabuddhitaḥ / anyatvāt tadyathaiṣveva savatsāṅkuśadhīdhvanī // | (a) “In regard to the cow and the elephant, the peculiarities of name ‘cow’ and ‘elephant’, and ideas must be due to causes other than convention, shape, body, etc., because while appertaining to the cow and the elephant, they are different from the names and ideas of these latter; just like the names and ideas ‘with calf’ and ‘with the goad’ (respectively) as applied to the same cow and elephant. |
śaśaśṛṅgādivijñānair vyabhicārād viśeṣaṇam / tat svarūpābhidhānaṃ ca vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam // | The qualifying clause has been added for the purpose of excluding the ‘hare’s horns’ and such other non-entities. The name and idea of the other things are the corroborative instance per dissimilarity. |
gavādiṣvanuvṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ piṇḍato 'nyataḥ / viśeṣakatvānnīlādivijñānam iva jāyate // | (b) “The idea pervading over all cows proceeds from something different from the body of the cow, because it appears as a differentiator, like the idea of the ‘blue’ and the like. |
gotattvārthāntara gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / | (c) “The ‘universal’ cow is something different from the ‘individual’ cow, because it forms the object of a different idea; |
rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaiva turaṅgavat // tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ityavaghoṣaṇā / | like the idea of the colour and other qualities of the same cow, also because it (the universal) is spoken of as belonging to that (the individual), just as the horse is spoken of as belonging to caitra.” (716-720) Bhāvivikta has argued, as follows: “In regard to such things as the Cow, Horse, Buffalo, Boar, Elephant, etc., the peculiarities of Name ‘Cow’, etc. and Idea must be due to a cause related to the form of each animal, but different from such causes as Convention, Shape, Body and the like; |
gavādiviṣayatve sati piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatiritābhidhānajñānatvāt, teṣveva gavādiṣu savatsā gaurbhārākrānto mahiṣaḥ saśalyo varāhaḥsāṅkuśo mātaṅga ityādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣavat / | [The Reason is this] Because while appertaining to the Cow, etc., they are Names and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas of the Body, etc.; just like such peculiar Names and Ideas relating to the same animals as ‘the Cow with the calf’, ‘the Bullock with the load’, ‘the Boar with the dart’, ‘the Elephant with the goad’ and so forth. |
vaidharmyeṇa piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ / | The Corroborative Instances per dissimilarity are the Names and Ideas of the forms of the Body and other things. |
yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham / | It follows from this that this ‘other cause’ must be the ‘Universals’, ‘Cow’, ‘Elephant’ and so forth.” |
tatrābhidhānam śabdaḥ, prajñānam pratyayo jñānam ity arthaḥ / | The term ‘abhidhāna’ stands for Name; ‘prajñāna’ for Idea, Cognition; |
abhidhānaprajñānānyeva viśeṣā iti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ / | the peculiarities in the shape of these two are meant by the compound ‘abhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ’. |
samayaḥ saṅketaḥ, ākṛtiḥ saṃsthānaṃ, piṇḍo dravyam, ādiśabdena rūpādiparigrahaḥ, ebhyo vyatiriktaṃ svarūpaṃ yeṣāṃ svābhidhānapratyayaṃ pratyanurūpāṇām upādhitvāt saṃsargiṇāṃ nimittāntarāṇāṃ tāni nibandhanaṃ yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Samaya’ is Convention; ‘Ākṛti’ Shape; ‘Piṇḍa’ Body; the term ‘etc.’ includes Colour and such details. |
athavā samayādivyatiriktāni ca tāni sadādipratyayābhidhānaṃ pratisvarūpānurūpasaṃsargīṇi ceti vigrahaḥ kāryaḥ / | Different from these are the Causes related to and in keeping with the Form of each of the animals in regard to its Name and Idea. Or the compound may mean that the Causes of the names and notions of ‘Being’ and the rest are different from Convention and the rest. |
śeṣaṃ pūrvavat / | The rest being understood as before. |
avaghoṣaṇeti pratijñā / | ‘Proclamation’ Proposition, Conclusion. |
śaśaviṣāṇādipratyayair [p.239] vyabhicāraśaṅkyā tat parihārārthaṃ gavādiviṣayatve satīti viśeṣaṇam / | In order to avoid the ‘fallibility’ due to the Reason otherwise applying to non-entities like the Hare’s Horn (which also has a distinct Name and Idea relating to it), the qualification has been added in the form ‘while appertaining to the Cow, etc.’. |
piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatirikte abhidhānaprajñāne yeṣāṃ tadbhāvas tattvam iti vigrahaḥ / | The compound setting forth the Reason is to be expounded as ‘Because they have Names and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas relating to the Body, etc.’. |
vaidharmyeṇa piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣā iti / | The ‘Names and Ideas of the Body’ serve as the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity; |
tatra hi piṇḍādivyatiriktanimittāntaranibandhanatvābhāve hetor api yathoktasyābhāvāt / | as in this instance, the presence of a cause other than the Names and Ideas of the Body is absent; and hence the Reason adduced is also absent in them. |
udyotakarastvāha gavādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayaḥ piṇḍādivyatiriktānnimittādbhavati, viśeṣakatvān nīlādipratyayavat / tathā goto 'rthāntaraṃ gotvaṃ, bhinnapratyayaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādivat, tasyeti ca vyapadeśaviṣayatvādyathā caitrasyāśva iti caitrādvyatirekeṇa vyapadiśyamāna iti / | 61, page 319 et seq.] has stated the argument as follows: “The Idea pervading over all Cows proceeds from a Cause other than the Body, etc., because it appears as a differentiator, like the Idea of the Blue, etc. Or again, the ‘Universal’ Cow is something different from the individual Cow, because it is the object of a different Idea, like Colour and Touch, etc., also because it is spoken of as belonging to this latter, just as the Horse is spoken of as belonging to Caitra, and as something different from Caitra.” |
tadetad darśayati gavādiṣvityādi / | All these arguments have been set forth in these Texts. |
subodham // | They are easily intelligible. |
asāram ityādinā pratividhatte | The Author answers all these arguments in the following [see verses 721-722 next] |
na tu tajjñāpakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇam iha vidyate // akṣavyāpārasadbhāvān nahyanantarabhāvinaḥ / | All this has no essence in it; it is an elaboration of a mere theory; there is no evidence at all in support of it. as a matter of fact, the notions of ‘being’, etc. Are not found to proceed from the functioning of the sense-organs; |
sadādipratyayāsiddhāḥ saṅketābhogatas tu te // | they arise from a body of conventions. |
yaduktamakṣavyāpārasadbhāvāt sadādipratyayānām akṣāśritatvam iti / | It has been argued (under Text 714, above) that the fact of the notions of ‘Being’, etc. being of the nature of Sense-perception is deduced from the presence of the operation of Sense-organs. |
tatra yadi sākṣād akṣavyāpārāntarabhāvitvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretas tadāhetur asiddhaḥ, savikalpatvena saṅketābhogasmaraṇādivyavahitatvāt // | If, by the Reason here adduced, it is meant that the said notions follow immediately after the operation of the Senses, then it cannot be ‘admitted’; because as they are of the nature of ‘determinate Cognitions’, the body of Conventions (bearing upon the verbal expression) must interpose (between the Sense-operation and the resultant Determinate Cognition). |
yathā dhātryabhayādīnāṃ nānāroganivartane / pratyekaṃ saha vā śaktir nānātve 'pyupalabhyate // | In the case of the dhātrī, harītakī, etc., it is pound that there is present in them, either singly or collectively, the potency to remove various diseases; |
na teṣu vidyate kiñcit sāmānyaṃ tatra śaktimat / | and yet there is no ‘universal’ (community) in them which has that potency; |
cirakṣiprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhataḥ // | because the cure op the diseases is found to be quick and delayed. |
sāmānye 'tiśayaḥ kaścinnahi kṣetrādibhedataḥ / ekarūpatayā nityaṃ dhātryādes tu sa vidyate // | Nor can any diverse peculiar properties be produced in the ‘universal’, through the diversities op the soil, etc. because it remains always in one and the same form; the said diverse properties, however, are present in the dhātrī, etc. |
evamatyantabhede 'pi kecinniyataśaktitaḥ / tulyapratyavamarśāder hetutvaṃ yānti nāpare // | Thus though, as a rule, things are entirely different, yet some of them having well-defined potencies are conceived of as similar, and hence these things become the basis of the conception of similarity, etc., not other things. |
yathā hyāmalakyādayaḥ parasparamatyantavibhinnamūrtayo 'pi pratyekaṃ samuditā vā nānā [p.240] vidhavyādhivyāvartanasāmarthyādhyāsitā bhavantyantareṇāpyanugāminam, nahitatra sāmānyam eva tathāvidhāmarthakriyāṃ sampādayatīti yuktaṃ vaktum / | It might be urged “without a comprehensive something, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly, of the notion of identity or unity?” In anticipation of this question, the Author supplies the following explanation: [see verses 723-726 above] Dhātrī and some other fruits, though of entirely different forms, are yet, severally or jointly, endowed with the capacity to remove various diseases, even without any comprehensive entity embracing them all. |
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