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dikkālaśabdābhyāṃ hyupacārād dikkālapradeśasaṃyuktayor nirdeśaḥ / | The terms ‘Space’ and ‘Time’ are used here figuratively, in the sense of objects in contact with points of Space and Time. |
tathā hyetat paratvam aparatvaṃ ca dvividham api dikkṛtaṃ kālakṛtaṃ ceti varṇitaṃ pareṇa / | So that what is meant is that Priority and Posteriority, both kinds have been explained by other people as being due to Space and Time. |
ekasyāṃ diśyavasthitayoḥ piṇḍayorekasya draṣṭuḥ saṃnikṛṣṭam avadhiṃ kṛtvaitasmād viprakṛṣṭo 'yam iti paratvādhāre buddhir utpadyate tatas tām apekṣya pareṇadikpradeśena saṃyogāt paratvam upajāyate / viprakṛṣṭaṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvaitasmāt sannikṛṣṭo 'yam ityaparatvādhāre buddhir utpadyate tāmapekṣyāpareṇa dikpradeśena saṃyogād aparatvasyotpattiḥ / | The manner in which these are said to be produced by Space is as follows: When two objects are standing in the same direction, then, in reference to the point near any one observer, taken as the standard-point, there appears, in regard to the object wherein Posteriority subsists, the notion of its being ‘far off’; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of the further point in Space, the Quality of Posteriority becomes produced; and taking a point further removed from the observer as the standard-point, there arises the idea of the object being ‘near’, in reference to the object wherein Priority subsists; |
kālakṛtayostvayam utpattikramaḥ / | and from the contact of this with another point in Space, the Quality of Priority becomes produced. |
tathā hi vartamānakālayor aniyatadigdeśasaṃyuktayor yuvasthavirayor madhye yasya valīpalitarūḍhaśmaśrutādinānumitamādityodayāstamayānāṃ bahutvaṃ tatraikasya draṣṭur yavānam avadhiṃ kṛtvā viprakṛṣṭā buddhir utpadyate tāmapekṣya pareṇa kālapradeśena saṃyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ / | The manner in which these Qualities are produced in reference to Time is as follows: Between an old and a young man standing at the present time, in varying directions, with regard to that person whose contacts with sunrise and sunset are deduced to have been larger in number, from his wrinkles, grey hairs, growing beard and so forth, there arises the idea of his being ‘old’ (Prior) in reference to the standard-point provided by the other man; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of another point of Time, the Quality of ‘Priority’ becomes produced; |
sthaviraṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvā yasyārūḍhaśmaśrutādinānumitamādityodayāstamayānām alpatvaṃ tatra yūni sannikṛṣṭabuddhir utpadyate tām apekṣyāpareṇa kālapradeśena saṃyogād aparasyotpattir iti / | and from the standard-point provided by the older man, the idea of the other man having had lesser contacts with sunrise and sunset is deduced from the fact of his being beardless and so forth, from which arises the idea of ‘nearness’ (proximity) in regard to the younger man; and through this idea, out of the contact of another point of Time, the quality of ‘Posteriority’ becomes produced.” |
tadetat paratvāparatvasādhanamanaikāntikaṃ sādhyaviparkṣe 'pi hetor vṛttir iti darśayati yathā nīlādirūpāṇītyādi / bhāva utpādas tatsahitā vyavasthitiḥ krameṇa bhāvavyavasthitir iti vigrahaḥ / | The Text proceeds to show that the above Reasoning in support of Priority and Posteriority is ‘Inconclusive’, on account of the Reason being present in the contrary of the Probandum also ‘Just as the Blue, etc. etc.’ ‘Bhāva’ is existence, and the ‘vyavasthiti’ qualified by this is coming into existence; |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā nīlādiṣu krameṇotpādāt kālopādheḥ krameṇa vyavasthā na guṇopādheḥ paraṃ nīlam aparaṃ nīlam iti parāparavyapadeśo bhavatyasatyapi paratvāparatvalakṣaṇe guṇe nirguṇatvād guṇānāṃ tathā ghaṭādiṣvapi kiṃ neṣyate / | That is to say, in the case of Blue, etc., on account of their coming into existence in succession (one after the other), the whole phenomenon is regulated by the conditions of Time, not by the conditions of any Quality, and hence we have such notions of Priority and Posteriority as ‘this is the prior or earlier Blue’ and ‘that the posterior or later Blue’, even in the absence of any such Qualities as Priority and Posteriority; because no Quality can subsist in a Quality; why cannot the same be accepted in the case of the Jar and other things also? |
etenaitaddarśayati yadyarthāntaranimittatvamātramiha sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ tadāanaikāntikatā hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye 'pi tasya vṛtteḥ / | What is meant by this is as follows: If what is meant by the Opponent is to prove the mere fact of being dependent on something else, then the Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’, as it is present in the contrary of the Probandum also. |
atha nityabhūtadikkālapadārthahetuko yo guṇaviśeṣas tannibandhanatvam asyā buddheḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ tadā dṛṣṭāntābhāvaḥ / | If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion in question is based upon the particular Quality brought about by the eternal substances of Time and Space, then there can be no Corroborative Instance. |
pratijñāyāścānumānabādhā / | The conclusion is also annulled by Inference; |
tathā hi śakyam idaṃ kartuṃ yā parāparabuddhiḥ sā paraparikalpitaguṇarahitārthamātrakṛtakramotpādavyavasthānibandhanā parāparabuddhitvāt yathā rūpādiṣu parāparabuddhiḥ parāparabuddhiśceyaṃ ghaṭādiṣviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | for instance, it is possible to set up the following inference The notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’ is based upon a certain regularity in the successive appearance of things without any such quality as has been postulated by the other party, because it is the notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’, like the notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’ in regard to Colour and such things; the notion in question in regard to Jar, etc. also is such a notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’; |
[p.225] nīlādiṣvekārthasamavāyād upacariteyaṃ paratvādibuddhirato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ pāramparyeṇa nīlādiṣvapi paratvāder nimittabhāvopagamāt sādhyavikalatā ca dṛṣṭāntasyeti cen na / | It might be argued by the Opponent that “In the case of the Blue, etc., the notion of Priority of Posteriority is figurative, based upon the notion subsisting in the same object as the Blue, etc.; and hence the Reason is not open to the fallacy of ‘Inconclusiveness’; and inasmuch as, in the case of the Blue, etc. also, the qualities of Priority, etc. are admitted to form the basis of the said notion, the Corroborative Instance cited is not devoid of the Probandum.” |
prativihitametad askhaladgatitvānnaupacārikatvaṃ yuktam iti / | it has been already answered by the statement that as the notion is not found to be fallible, it cannot be regarded as ‘figurative’; |
svāśraye 'pi tayor upalabdhyabhāvāc ca na tadbalena pratyayo yuktaḥ / | and further, as the two qualities are not perceived even in their own substratum, it is not right to accept any notion as based upon it; |
sukhādiṣu vā pūrvottarakālabhāviṣu kiṃ kalpyeta nahi tatraikārthasamavāyo 'sti / apica dikkālayoḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣiddhatvenābhāvāt taddhetukayor api paratvāparatvayor abhāva iti kutastannimittatvāśaṅkā / | how t hen could it ever be based upon it in the case of Blue and the rest? What too could be assumed to be the basis in the case of such things as Pleasure and the like? As there is no co-subsistence in the same substratum. Further, as Time and Space have already been rejected above, they cannot be regarded as existent; the ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’ based upon these should also be regarded as non-existent; |
yena hetor anaikāntikatā bhavet / | how then could the notion be believed to be based upon those? Consequently any such idea cannot save the Reason from being ‘Inconclusive’. |
nacāpi dikkālayor bhavataḥ pradeśāḥ santi yatsaṃyogād apekṣābuddhisahitāt paratvāder utpattiḥ syāt tayor ekātmatayā niravayavatvāt / | According to you again, Time and Space have no parts, from contact with which, as associated with ‘unitary conception’, the notion of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’ could be produced; the reason for this lying in their being essentially one and without parts. |
na copacarito 'vayavabhedo 'thakriyānurodhī yuktaḥ vastusvabhāvapratibaddhatvāt tasyāḥ upacaritasyācālīkatvād iti nānaikāntikatā / | Nor can it be right to seek explanation for a state of things in a merely imaginary ‘part’ conceived figuratively; as all such assumptions are restricted within well-defined limits by the real state of things; |
parakīyasya ca hetoḥ pūrvavad asiddhatvaṃ vācyam // | As for the Reason adduced by the Opponent, it may be pointed out that it is ‘Unproven’, ‘not admissible’, (675-676) |
saṅkhyāyogādayaḥ sarve na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ / tadvyavacchedakatvena daṇḍādir iva cen matam // teṣāṃ saṃvṛtisattvena varṇanādiṣṭasādhanam / | If it be held that “number, conjunction and the rest cannot be non-different from substance, because they serve to characterise and differentiate this latter, like the stick”, then [our answer is that] there is proving of what is admitted by us, if what is meant is that they have an ‘illusory existence’; |
tattvānyatvena nirvācyaṃ naiva saṃvṛtisadyataḥ // | because what is ‘imaginary’ cannot be defined either as ‘this’ or ‘not this (677-678) |
sarva evāmī yathoktāḥ saṅkhyādayo guṇā na dravyādavyatirekiṇas tasya dravyasya teṣāṃ vyavacchedahetutvāt yo hi yadvyavacchedako nāsau tadavyatirekī yathā daṇḍādir devadattasyeti / tadatra dravyādavyatirekitvaniṣedhamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā doṣaḥ pratijñāyāḥ / | Says the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika “All the above-mentioned qualities, Number and the rest, cannot be non-different from Substance, because they serve to characterise and differentiate Substances; when one thing differentiates another, it cannot be non-different from the latter, just as the stick, which differentiates Devadatta, cannot be the same as Devadatta.” If what is meant to prove by this argument is simply the denial of these being the same as Substance, then it is open to the charge of being futile. |
saṃvṛtisatāṃ sarveṣām avastutayā tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatayābhīṣṭatvāt // | Because all things that have an ‘illusory or imaginary existence’ are nonentities, and as such it cannot be asserted in regard to them as to whether they are the same as, or different from, anything. |
athetyādinātrāviddhakarṇasyottaramāśaṅkate | The following Text anticipates the Answer given to the above by Aviddhakarṇa; |
athānirvacanīyatvaṃ samūhāder niṣidhyata / | [see verse 679 next] |
yasmānniyatadharmatvaṃ rūpaśabdarasādivat // sahyāha samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣās tattvānyatvābhyām avacanīyā na bhavanti pratiniyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādivad iti // | If the fact of the ‘group’ and such things being undefinable is denied (by the opponent) on the ground that they have distinctive features, just like colour, sound, taste and other things, [then our answer is as given in the next text]. He has argued as follows: “The particular states of the Group and the Chain are not incapable of being defined as this or not-this, because they are endowed with distinctive features, just like Colour, Taste and such things.” (679) |
[p.226] tadetanniḥsvabhāvatayetyādinā pratividhatte | The following Text supplies the answer to this argument (of Aviddhakarṇa): [see verses 680-681 next] |
niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato 'mbarapadmavat / na siddhā niyatā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te // | In reality, the ‘group’ is absolutely feature-less; hence, like the ‘sky-lotus’, it can have no specific properties; they are all figments of imagination. |
tathaivoktāvanekānto viyatpadmādibhir yataḥ / abhedo vyatirekaś ca vastunyeva vyavasthitaḥ // | Even when stated in this form, the reasoning adduced would be ‘fallible’, in view of things like the ‘sky-lotus in fact, ‘non-difference’ as well as ‘difference’ rests always in an object. |
yadi hi pāramārthikaniyatadharmatvaṃ hetur iṣṭatas tadā hetor asiddhatā / | If what is meant to be the Reason is the presence of real specific properties, then it cannot be regarded as ‘admitted’ (by both parties); |
nahi bauddhaṃ pratisantānādīnāṃ saṃvṛtisatāṃ pāramārthikaniyatadharmayogitvaṃ siddham / | because for the Bauddha, it cannot be admitted that the ‘Chain’ and other things which have merely ‘illusory existence’ are endowed with any real specific properties. |
atha sāmānyena hetus tadā viyatpadmādīnām apyabhāvatvāmūrtatvādayaḥ kalpitā niyatadharmāḥ santyevetyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / tathaivoktāviti / | If however the Reason is meant to be put forward only in a vague general sort of way, then such imaginary properties as ‘non-existence’, ‘incorporeality’ etc. are present also in the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things; hence the Reason adduced becomes ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive |
sāmānyena vikalpitānupākhyavṛttidharmaparityāgenoktau satyām ity arthaḥ / | ‘Even when stated in this form’, i.e. if the assertion is made in a vague general sort of way, without reference to any well-determined specific properties. |
itaścānaikāntikatvam asya hetoḥ / yasmād abhedo 'nanyatvaṃ, vyatireko 'nyatvam, etau vastunyeva vyavasthitau, nānyatra / santānādayaś ca prajñaptisattvenāvastusantas tatkatham eṣāṃ vastunaḥ sakāśād bhedābhedau siddhyataḥ / | For the following reason also the Reason is ‘fallible inconclusive’: Because ‘non-difference’ sameness and ‘difference’ being something else, rest always in an object, not anywhere else. The ‘Chain’ and other things have a mere ‘ideal’ existence, and as such are not objects; how then could there be any difference or non-difference from these? |
tadevaṃ pratyame prayoge saṅkhyādīnāṃ dravyādavyatirekapratiṣedhamātre sādhye siddhasādhyateti pratipāditam // | Thus then, it has been shown that, in the first argument (propounded by Aviddhakarṇa), if what is meant to be proved is merely the denial of the non-difference of Number, etc. from Substance, then there is ‘futility’. |
athāpi syānnāvyatirekapratiṣedhamātraṃ sādhyate, kiṃ tarhidvau pratiṣedhau vidhimeva gamayata iti pratiṣedhadvayena dravyādvyatirekitvam eva sādhyataiti / | It might be argued that “it is not mere denial of non-difference, that we seek to establish, but, in view of the fact that two negatives make one affirmative, by means of the two negatives we are seeking to prove the difference of Number, etc. from Substance”. |
tadetat saṅkhyāder ityādināśaṅkhyāśrayāsiddhatetyādinā pratiṣedhati ---evam iti / | Thus then, if what is meant to be asserted is that number and the rest are other than (different from) substance, then the reason becomes open to the fallacy of ‘having no substratum’, because number and the rest are not admitted at all. |
na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ / | That is, what the other party seeks to prove is not that they are not non-different, but that they are different. |
kiṃ tarhivyatirekiṇa ity arthaḥ // tadeva saṅkhyāder āśrayasyāsiddhatvaṃ darśayati samuccayādītyādinā samuccayādibhinnaṃ tu dravyam eva tathocyate / svarūpādeva bhedaś ca vyāhataḥ sādhito bhavet // | If it is substance itself, as diversified through ‘group’, etc., that is spoken of as such, then what the argument would prove would be the difference of substance from itself thus involving self-contradiction. The following Text shows how Number and the rest are devoid of substratum: [see verse 683 above] |
tathocyata iti / | ‘Is spoken of as such’; |
eko dvau bahava ityevam ādiḥ / | i.e. as ‘one’, ‘two’ and so forth. |
syād etat dravyātmakasyāpi sataḥ saṅkhyāder bhedaḥ prasādhyata ity āha ---svarūpādevetyādi / | It might be argued that “what is to be proved is the difference of Number, etc. which are only forms of Substance.” The answer to this is ‘What the argument would prove, etc.’; |
nahi vastutaḥ svarūpād bhedo 'sti tasya niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgāt / | i.e. no entity can be different from its own form; as it would become devoid of its own character. |
vyāhata iti / parasparaviruddhaḥ / | ‘Self-contradiction’, i.e. contradiction of one another; |
bhedābhedayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā yugapadekatra viruddhatvāt / | because ‘Difference’ and ‘Non-difference’, being of the nature of exclusion and inclusion, cannot co-exist in any single object. |
evaṃ tāvat paratvāntā guṇāḥ [p.227] pratiṣiddhāḥ / | Thus have all qualities ending with ‘Posteriority’ been rejected. |
buddhyādayas tu prayatnāntā ātmāśritatvena tadguṇā iṣṭāḥ / | The rest of the qualities (postulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) beginning with Cognition and ending with effort have been held to subsist in the Soul. |
te cātmaniṣedhādeva niṣiddhā draṣṭavyāḥ / | They should therefore be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Soul itself. |
nacaiṣāmātmāśrayo yuktaḥ, tathā hi utpattihetutayā cāmīṣāmātmāśrayo bhavetsthitihetutayā vā / | As a matter of fact however, the Soul cannot be the substratum of these qualities. Because the Soul could be the substratum of these, either as being the cause of their production, or as being the cause of their subsistence. |
na tāvad utpattihetutayā, sarvadaivāvikalakāraṇatayā sukhādīnām utpattiprasaṅgāt / | It cannot be the cause of their production, because, the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always; |
na ca parair anādheyātiśayasya sahakārivyapekṣā kācid astīti śataśaścarcitam etat / | nor can there be any dependence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else; as has been reiterated hundreds of times. |
na cāpi nityasya kāryotpādanasāmarthyam asti tasya kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ vyāptatvāt / nityasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhasya pratipāditatvāt / | Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects; as such production could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been explained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity. |
nāpi sthitihetutayā yuktaḥ, sthiteḥ sthātuvyatiricyamānarūpatvāt / | Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the subsistence (of the Qualities in question); because ‘subsistence’ has no other form than that of the ‘Subsistent’ itself; |
taddhetutve sthātṛhetutvamevoktaṃ syāt / | so that if the Soul were said to be the cause of subsistence, it would mean that it is the cause of the subsistent thing itself; |
taccānantaram eva niṣiddham / | and this idea has just been rejected. |
tasya ca sthātuḥ pariniṣṭhitātmasvarūpatvān na kaściddhetuḥ sambhavati / | Then again, the subsistent thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at all; |
tasya tatrakiñcitkaratvāt / | as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause. |
vyatireke 'pi sthiteḥ sthātus tena na kiñcitkṛtam arthāntarabhūtāyāḥ sthiteḥ karaṇāt / | Even if the subsistence were something different from the subsistent thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will have brought about only the subsistence, which ex-hypothesi is something different. |
tataścākiñcitkaraḥ kathaṃ tasyāśrayo bhavet / nāpi tat sambandhinyāḥ sthiteḥ karaṇāt tasyāyam upakārako yuktas tatsambandhitvāsiddheḥ / | And thus not producing anything in the subsistent thing, how could the Soul be its substratum? Nor will it be right to urge that “inasmuch as the Soul will have produced the subsistence related to the subsistent thing, it would be a helper of the latter; because the said relationship is not yet proved. |
na cāpi sthitiṃ prati hetutvaṃ yuktam / | As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the subsistence; |
nityasya kvacid api sāmarthyānupapatter ityuktam / | because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency, as has been explained before. |
kiñcāsau sthāpyamāno bhāvaḥ svayam astirasvabhāvo vā bhavet, sthirasvabhāvo vā / yadyasthirarūpas tatkathaṃ pareṇa sthāpayituṃ śakyena / | Further, the entity (in the shape of subsistence) that is established (by the Soul) would it be of permanent nature? or evanescent? If the latter, then how can it be established by something else? It would lose its character. |
atha sthirasvabhāvastathāpi sthāpako 'kiñcitkara eva svayam eva tat svabhāvatayā tasya sthitisiddheḥ / | If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its establisher (Cause) would be futile; as by its very nature, the subsistence would be there always. |
kiṃ ca ye tāvan mūrtā bhāvās teṣām adhogamanapratibandhakatvena bhavennāmāśrayakalpanā, ye punar amī sukhādayas teṣām amūrtatayā nādhogamanam astīti kiṃkurvāṇas teṣām āśrayo bhavet / | Further, as regards corporeal things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards; for the things in question however, which are incorporeal, such as Pleasure and the rest, there can be no falling downward; then what would the ‘substratum’ do for them? |
sadasatoś ca nirāśaṃsata{yā}nupākhyatvena cāśrayaṇānupapattir iti / | Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as existent or as non-existent, there can be no subsisting at all. |
evaṃ sukhādīnām anyeṣāṃ ca yathāyogamāśritatvāsiddher na guṇo nāmāstīti bhāvaḥ / | In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities may be shown mutatis mutandis to be incapable of being regarded as subsistent; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as ‘Quality’, |
kiṃ ca buddhirjñānasvabhāvāṅgīkṛtā paraiḥ / yathoktam ---"buddhirupalabdhir jñānam ityanarthāntaram" iti / | Then again, Buddhi has beén accepted by the other party as being of the nature of Jñāna, Cognition, as declared in the following Sutra “Buddhi, Upalabdhi, Jñāna, are synonyms” (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.15). |
tasyāścaivaṃrūpāyā api na svasaṃviditarūpam iṣṭaṃ paraiḥ / | Even though Buddhi is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself; |
kintu buddhyantaragamyatvam eva / | in fact they regard it as apprehended by another Buddhi. |
tathābhūtāyāś ca rūpādivat svato 'siddher buddhitvam evāyuktam iti pratipādayiṣyati // | Thus, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things, it cannot rightly be regarded even as Buddhi, This is going to be explained later on. |
sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnānām apyajñānarūpatvam iṣṭam / | Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Effort, are Qualities that have been held to be distinct from Cognition (Buddhi). |
tad api pramāṇalakṣaṇaparīkṣāyāṃ niṣetsyate / gurutvadravatvasnehānāṃ tu rūpādivat pratiṣedhau vidheya ityevam ālocyaiṣāṃ pratiṣedham akṛtvā saṃskārapratiṣedham āha vegākhya ityādi / | These we are going to reject in course of the examination of the Means of Right Cognition (Chapters 17, 18 and 19). As regards the Qualities of Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity, these are to be rejected in the same way as Colour and the rest. In view of this, the Author proceeds next to reject the Quality of Momentum (Saṃskāra): [see verses 684-685 next] |
vegākhyo bhāvanāsaṃjñaḥ sthitasthāpakalakṣaṇaḥ / saṃskāras trividhaḥ prokto nāsau saṃgacchate 'khilaḥ // | Momentum has been described as being of three kinds named ‘vega’, velocity, ‘bhāvanā’, impression, and ‘sthitasthāpaka’, ‘elasticity’. |
kṣaṇikatvāt padārthānāṃ na kācid vidyate kriyā / yat prabandhasya hetuḥ syāt saṃskāro vegasaṃjñakaḥ // | all this however is not compatible because things being momentary, there can be no action in them, of the continuity of which the momentum named ‘velocity’ could be the cause. |
trividhaṃ saṃskāro vego bhāvanā sthitasthāpakaśceti / | There are three kinds of Momentum: Velocity, Impression and Elasticity. |
tatra vegākhyaḥ pṛthivyaptejoḥvāyumanassu pañcasu mūrtimatsu dravyeṣu prayatnābhighātaviśeṣāpekṣātkarmaṇo jāyate / | Of these the Momentum named ‘Velocity’ subsists in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Mind, and is produced by an action due to Effort and Propulsion. It is the cause of action proceeding in a particular direction; |
sa ca niyatadikkriyāprabandhahetuḥ, sparśavaddravyasaṃyogavirodhī / | and prevents contact with tangible substances. |
tathā hi śarādiṣu prayatnaviśeṣajanitakarmaviśeṣahetuka eva / | For instance, in the Arrow, it is due to action produced by a particular effort; |
yadvaśād antarālaśirasyāpatanaṃ bhavatya evāsau niyatādikriyākārayonnīyamānasadbhāvatayā siddhaḥ / | by virtue of which it falls on the head of a remote object. That is why it is accepted as having its existence indicated by particular effects. |
śākhādau tu loṣṭābhighātajanitakarmajaḥ / | In suchngs as the branch of a tree, the same quality is due to the movement produced by the stroke of the stone hurled at it. |
bhāvanāsaṃjñastvātmaguṇaḥ / | The Momentum called ‘Impression’ is a quality of the Soul; |
yo 'sau jñānajo jñānahetuścocyate, sa ca dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānakāryonnītasattvatayā siddhaḥ / | it has been said to be produced by Cognition, and also to be the Came of Cognition. It is accepted as having its existence indicated by such particular effects as Remembrance and Recognition. |
sthitasthāpakas tu mūrtimaddravyaguṇaḥ, yo hi ghaṇāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭaṃ kālāntarāvasthāyinaṃ svamāśrayaṃ prayatnenānyathākṛtaṃ pūrvavad yathāvasthitaṃ sthāpayati / | As regards the quality of Elasticity, it belongs to corporeal substances; it is the quality that brings its solid and lasting substratum back to its previous position from which it had been torn away by some one’s effort; |
yathā cirakālasaṃveṣṭitasya tālapatrādeḥ prasāryāvamuktasya punas tathaivāvasthānam / | for instance, when the Palm-leaf which has been rolled up for a long time is spread out, and then let off, it reverts to its former (rolled) position. |
dhanuḥśākhāśṛṅgadantādiṣu vastrādiṣu ca bugnāvartiteṣu tasya kāryaṃ lakṣyata eva / | The effect of this quality is seen in such things as the Bow, the Tree-branch, the Horn, the Teeth and also in Cloth and so forth, when they are bent and straightened. |
akhila iti / trividho 'pi / | ‘All this’, i.e. all the three kinds of Momentum. |
tatra vegākhyasya karmasambadhanākhyaṃ kāryam asiddham / | Of the Momentum called ‘Velocity’, any such effect as connection with an action is not admitted; |
aśeṣapadārthajātavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhitatvāt / | because it has been proved that all things are in perpetual flux (momentary); |
tataś ca svabhāvapratilambhād ūrdhvaṃ sarvabhāvānām asattvān na kācit kriyāsti yasyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prabandhasya hetur asau bhavet / | hence immediately upon things coming into existence, they cease to exist; so that no action is possible in them, of the continuity of which action, Velocity could be the cause. |
atha svopādānadeśaparihāreṇa pratīyamāno bhāvānām utpāda eva kriyāprabandho 'bhipretas tathāpyanaikāntikatvam, yataḥ pūrvikā eva hetupratyayā bhāvānāṃ tathā tathotpadyamānānāṃ tathāvidhātmabhūtakriyāprabandhato 'numīyante na yathoktaḥ saṃskāraḥ / | If by ‘continuity of action’ is meant the production of things that is perceived to be separate from its constituent cause, then even so, the Reason remains ‘Inconclusive’ (Fallible). Because what are inferred from the said ‘continuity of action’ are the previous Causal-Ideas of things produced in that way, and not any such thing as the said ‘Momentum’; |
tena saha kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ / | because concomitance with this latter has nowhere been perceived. |
kiṃ ca yadi tathāvidhasaṃskārabalād apatanamiṣvādīnāṃ syāt tadā na kadācid api te pateyuḥ sarvatra pātapratibandhahetor vegasyāvasthitatvāt / | Further, if the not-falling of the arrow were due to the quality of Velocity, then it should never fall at all; as the Velocity preventive of such falling would be always there. |
tataścāviśiṣṭākāśadeśaprasarpiṇo viśikhasyākasmād yadetat patanamupalabhyate tat katham upapadyate / na ca mūrtimatāṃ satāṃ vāyvādīnāṃ saṃyogād upahataśaktitvād vegasya vināśāt patanam iti śakyaṃ vaktum arvāg eva patanaprasaṅgāt sarvatraiva vāyusaṃyogas tadvirodhī vidyata eva / | Under the circumstances, what could be the explanation of the fact of the arrow falling while moving in a particular region of Ākāśa? It cannot be said that “the falling is due to the cessation of Velocity on account of its force having been destroyed by contact with such solid substances as Air and the like”; as, in that case, the falling should come about before it does; as the Air obstructing it is there all along. |
athāpi syād arvāgekāntabalīyastvād vegasya virodhinam api vāyusaṃyogaṃ pratividhyāsau vego nayati deśāntamiṣum iti / | It might be argued that “Before the Arrow actually falls, the force of the Velocity is very strong, it pierces through the obstacle due to the Air, and carries the Arrow further to another place”. |
yadyevaṃ parasmāt kena tasyābalīyastvaṃ yena sudūram api deśaṃ taṃ na nayet / dṛśyate hi sarvatrāviśiṣṭavāyusaṃyogavatyākāśatale prasarpato 'pi śarasyāntarāle patanam / | If that be so, to what is its subsequent weakness due whereby it does not carry the Arrow still further? As a matter of fact, in all cases, it is found that the Arrow falls in the way, while moving through Ākāśa, over the whole of which the contact of Air is equally present. |
naca vegasya paścādanyatvaṃ [p.229] śakyam vaktum, anyathotpattikāraṇābhāvāt / | It cannot be said that the Velocity becomes altered later on; as there is no cause which could produce this alteration in the Velocity; |
sarvatraiva hi tat samavāyikāraṇamiṣvādi nirviśiṣṭam eva / | as its inherent cause in the shape of the Arrow is the same all through. |
naca karmākhyaṃ kāraṇaṃ paścād viśiṣyata iti yuktam abhidhātum tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogatvāt / | It cannot be right to say that what qualifies it subsequently is the cause called ‘Karma’ (‘Action’). Because that also would be open to the same objection. |
anyatve 'pi vā paścād vegasya pūrvakasya vināśakāraṇābhāvāt tādavasthyamevetyapāta eva syāccharasya / | Even if the subsequent Velocity be different (from the initial one), as there would be no cause for the destruction of the former Velocity, it should continue as before and there should be no falling down of the Arrow. |
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