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prasaktaṃ nirviśeṣatvāt saṃyogāsambhavena tu // | as there would be no ground for differentiation. |
kṣetrabījajalādīni sāpekṣāṇīti gamyate / svakāryakāraṇān nityaṃ daṇḍacakrodakādivat // | As a matter of fact however, the soil, the seed, the water and such things are always found to require something else in the producing of their effects; like the stick, the wheel and water, etc. (in the making of jar). |
yastair apekṣyate bhāvaḥ sa saṃyogo bhaviṣyati / | That thing which they require is conjunction; |
saviśeṣaṇabhāvāc ca bhinna eveti gamyate // | and as it has a particular characteristic, it is regarded as distinct (from other things). |
saṃyukte āharetyukte saṃyogaṃ prekṣate yayoḥ / tadanyaparihāreṇa te evāharati hyayam // | when one is told to ‘bring two conjoined things’, he brings only those two things in which he perceives the conjunction, avoiding everything else.” (654-657) |
sa hyāha yadi saṃyogo nārthāntaraṃ bhavet tadā kṣetrabījādayo nirviśiṣṭatvāt sarvadaivāṅkurādi kuryuḥ, na caivam / | Ind.]: “If Conjunction were not a distinct thing, then, of such things as the soü, the seed, etc. each itself being always there, they would always produce their effects in the form of the sprout, etc. As a matter of fact however, they do not do so. |
tasmāt sarvadā kāryānārambhāt kṣetrādīnyaṅkurādikāryotpattau kāryāntarasāpekṣāṇi, yathā mṛpiṇḍadaṇḍasalilasūtrādayo ghaṭādikaraṇe kumbhakārādisāpekṣāḥ / | Hence from the fact of the non-production of the effects always, it is understood that the soü, etc. require the help of some other thing, in the producing of the effect in the shape of the sprout; just as in the producing of the Jar, the Olay, the Stick, the Water, the Thread, etc. require the help of the Potter. |
yo 'sāvapekṣyaḥ sa saṃyoga iti siddham / | Hence it is established that this something else that they need is Conjunction. |
kiṃ ca yo 'sau saṃyogo dravyayoḥ sa viśeṣaṇabhāvena pratīyamānatvāt tato 'rthāntaratvena pratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ / | “Then again, the Conjunction between two substances is perceived as a qualification of those substances, and hence it is directly perceived as something different from those substances. |
tathā hi kaścit kenacitsaṃyukte dravye āharetyukte yayoreva dravyayoḥ saṃyogamupalabhate / ta evāharati na dravyamātram anyathā yatkiñcidāharet / | For instance, when someone is told by another person to ‘bring two conjoined things’, he brings only those two things in which he perceives the Conjunction, and not any Substance at random. If the Conjunction were not something real and different, he might bring anything. |
etac ca sarvaṃ viparyayādvibhāgasādhane 'pi yojyam // | “All these arguments put inversely are to be used in proving the existence of Disjunction.” (654-657) |
nirantaramidaṃ vastu sāntaraṃ cedamityayam / buddhibhedaś ca kenaiṣa vidyate tau ca cediha // | “If conjunction and disjunction were not there, then to what would such distinct notions be due as ‘this thing is attached to it’ ‘this is detached from it’?” (658) |
[p.219] api cāviśiṣṭe 'pi nirantaramidaṃ vastu sāntaramidam iti buddhibhedaḥ kathaṃ yujyate, yadyetau saṃyogavibhāgāviha vastunyarthāntarabhūtau na syātāṃ, nahiviśeṣapratyayo vastuviśeṣamantareṇa sambhavī bhavitum arhati, sarvadā sarvatra bhāvaprasaṅgāt // | how could there be such diverse notions, if Conjunction and Disjunction did not exist, as something distinct, in the two things? A particular notion in regard to a thing cannot be possible without the presence of something peculiar; otherwise everything would be possible always and everywhere.” (658) “It sometimes happens that even when one thing is really detached from another, it is perceived as attached to it, and when the thing is really close to another, it is perceived as detached from it; |
nirantare 'pi yā cānyā mithyābuddhiriyaṃ dvidhā // mithyābuddhiś ca sarvaiva pradhānārthānukāriṇī / | there are these two misconceptions. and a misconception has always some primary factor as its counterpart. this primary factor has to be pointed out in the two misconceptions cited. |
pradhānaṃ ceha vaktavyaṃ taduktau tau ca siddhyataḥ // | if such a primary factor is asserted, conjunction and disjunction become established.” (659-660) |
kiṃ ca yeyaṃ dūratarāvasthite 'pi dhavakhadirādau vidūradeśavartinaḥ puṃso niratantarāvasāyinī buddhirudayamāsādayati, yā ceyamīṣattaruśikharāvalagne balākādau nirantare 'pi sāntaratvamivāvasyantī jāyate 'nyā seyaṃ dvividhāpyatasmiṃs tathārūpeṇa pravṛttatvān mithyābuddhiḥ na ca mithyādhīr mukhyapadārthānubhavamantareṇa kvacid upajāyate / | “Further, it so happens sometimes that, even the Dhava and Khadira trees are really detached from one another, and to a man standing at a distance, they appear to be close (attached) together; and in the case of the line of Cranes seated on the thin top of a tree, even though they are close together, yet they appear as if detached; both these cognitions apprehending things as they are not, are false, misconceptions. And as a matter of fact, no misconception is ever produced without the apprehension of a primary factor; |
nahyananubhūtagodarśanasya gavayapadārthadarśanād gaurayam iti vibhramo bhavati / | for instance, unless a man has had the perception of the Cow, he cannot have the misconception, as ‘Cow’, of the Gavaya; |
tasmād avaśyaṃ kaścin mukhyaḥ padārtho 'syā vibhramadhiyo nibandhanam abhidhānīyaḥ / tasyābhidhāne ca tau saṃyogavibhāgau sidhyataḥ / | so that there must be some primary factor pointed out as the basis of the said two misconceptions. When such a primary factor is pointed out, the existence of Conjunction and Disjunction would become established. |
nahi tadvyatirekeṇānyad asyā buddher nibandhanamupapādayituṃ śakyate // | Apart from these two, there can be no basis for the said notion.” (659-660) |
kuṇḍalīti matiśceyaṃ kinnimittopajāyate / narakuṇḍalabhāvānno sarvadā tat prasaṅgataḥ // | “Then again, on what basis is the notion of ‘the man with earrings’ produced? It could not proceed from the mere presence of the man and the ear-ring; for in that case, the said notion would be there always. |
anyatra dṛṣṭabhāvasya niṣedho 'nyatra yujyate / | Further, it is only something that has been perceived to be present in one place that is denied in another place. |
saṃyogaś ca bhaved dṛṣṭaḥ sa kathaṃ pratiṣidhyate // caitro 'kuṇḍala ityevaṃ tasmād astyeva vāstavaḥ / yanniṣedhavidhānādi vibhāgena pravartate // | If conjunction has not been perceived, then how does it come to be denied in such expressions as ‘caitra is without ear-rings’? Hence it follows that there is some such real thing in the shape of conjunction, whose affirmation and denial proceed with due distinction.” (661-663) |
apica kuṇḍalī devadatta iti matiriyamupajāyamānā kiṃnibandhanopajāyata itivacanīyam / | “Then again, when there appears the notion that ‘Devadatta is wearing Ear-rings’, on what basis does it appear? This needs to be explained. |
naca puruṣakuṇḍalabhāvamātrabhāvinī bhavitum arhati / | The said notion cannot be due to the mere presence of the Man and the Ear-ring; |
sarvadā tatra devadattakuṇḍalayos tasyāḥ sadbhāvaprasaṅgāt / | as Devadatta and the Ear-ring being lasting entities, the notion should appear constantly (even when Devadatta would not be wearing the Ear-ring). |
kiṃ ca yadeva kenacit kvacid upalabdhasattvaṃ tasyaivānyatra vidhipratiṣedhamukhena lokavyavahārapravṛttir dṛṣṭā / | “Further, it is only when a certain thing has been perceived to be present in a certain place that the notion of the negation of its presence is found to appear in reference to another place; |
yadi bhavatā saṃyogo na kadācid upalabdhas tat katham asya caitro 'kuṇḍalaḥ kuṇḍalī cetyevaṃvibhāgena vyavahāro bhavet / tathāhyatra caitro 'kuṇḍalīnyanena na kuṇḍalaṃ pratiṣidhyate tasya deśakālabhedena sattvādhyā [p.220] sitamūrteḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt, nāpi caitrasya, tat tulyayogakṣematvāt, tasmāccaitrasya kuṇḍalasaṃyogaḥ pratiṣidhyate / | under the circumstances, if you have never perceived Conjunction to be present, then how could you have the distinct notions of Caitra being ‘with Ear-rings’ and ‘without Ear-rings’? What is denied by the expression ‘Caitra is without Earrings’ is not the Ear-ring, because it having been assumed to be existent in another place and at another time, it could not be denied entirely. Nor can it be the denial of Caitra, the man; as he stands on the same footing as the Ear-ring. Hence what is denied must be Caitra’s contact (Conjunction) with the Ear-ring. |
tathā caitraḥ kuṇḍalītyanenāpi vidhivākyena caitrakuṇḍalayor nānyatarasya ---vidhānaṃ tayoḥ siddhatvāt / | Similarly by the affirmative expression ‘Caitra with the Ear-ring’, what is affirmed is neither the Ear-ring, nor Caitra, as both these are well-established entities; |
pāriśeṣyāt saṃyogasyaivāpratītasya vidher jñāyate / | hence, by elimination, all that can be affirmed is the Conjunction between these two, which has not been cognised by any other means. |
tasmād astyeva saṃyogādir vāstavo yadvaśāstraitraḥ kuṇḍalī na bhavatīyādiniṣedhavidhānādi pravibhaktam eva pratīyate / | From all this it follows that, there is such a real thing as Conjunction (and Disjunction), by virtue of which there appear such distinct affirmative and negative notions as ‘Caitra with Ear-rings’ and ‘Caitra without Ear-rings |
ādiśabdena viśeṣaṇatvenopādānamityādi pūrvoktaparigrahaḥ // | “The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the notion of ‘qualification’, as pointed out before.” (661-663) |
ucyate kṣaṇikatvena nāviśeṣā jalādayaḥ / | The answer to the above is as follows: The water and the rest do not remain the same, as all things are momentary. |
sattve 'py avyavadhānādi te 'pekṣante daśāntaram // | Even when existent, they stand in need of that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them. |
yaduktamaviśeṣād bījādayaḥ sadaiva kāryaṃ kuryur iti, tasyāviśiṣṭatvaṃ bījādīnām asiddham, kṣaṇabhaṅgitayā sarvabhāvānāṃ viśiṣṭāvasthānām eva janakatvāt / | It has been argued under Text 654 above that “Seed, etc. would always be producing their effects”; but the reason that has been urged that they are not differentiated i.e. they remain the same, is not true, not admitted by us; because all things being in ‘perpetual flux’, it is only in a particularly differentiated condition that they are productive of their effects. |
yaccoktaṃ kṣetrabījādītyādi tatrāpi sāmānyena sāpekṣatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyateti darśayati sattve 'pītyādi / | It has been argued under Text 655 above, that “The soil, etc. are dependent upon something else, etc.”. If this is meant to prove merely the general fact that they are ‘dependent’, then the argument is superfluous (proving what is already admitted by us); this is what is shown by the words ‘Even when existent, etc. etc.’; |
iṣyanta evāsmābhir avyavadhānādyavasthāntaram apekṣā bījādayo 'ṅkurādikāryanirvartanasamarthā vidyamānatve 'pīti siddhasādhyatā / | that is, it is held by us also that the seed, etc. even when existent, become capable of producing their effects in the shape of the sprout only when they are in that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them and so forth; |
tatrāvidyamānā vyavadhānādayo yatra deśāntare 'vasthāviśeṣe tat tathoktam / ādiśabdena virodhipratyayapratighātādiparigrahaḥ / | so that on this point the argument of the Opponent is superfluous. The term ‘avyavadhāna’ means that condition in which there is nothing intervening and so forth. The phrase ‘so forth’ includes such factors as the absence of obstruction, etc.; |
yatrāvasthāntare vyavadhānaṃ dūradeśāvasthānaṃ virodhinā pratihatirityādikāryotpattipratibandhakaṃ nāstītyarthaḥ / | that is to say, that particular condition in which (a) there is nothing intervening, (b) there is no remoteness among them, (c) there is no obstruction by a contrary force; |
avasthāyāś ca svabhāvāvyatirekānnārthāntarabhūtasaṃyogasiddhiḥ / atha bhavadabhimatasaṃyogākhyapadārthāntarasāpekṣatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ tadā tathāvidhena dharmeṇa hetor anvayāsiddher anaikāntikatā dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalateti bhāvaḥ // | all these being obstacles to the appearance of the effect. And as the ‘condition’ of a thing is nothing different from the thing itself, the argument put forward does not prove the existence of Conjunction as something distinct. If then what is intended by you to prove is the fact of the Seed, etc. being dependent upon a different thing in the shape of what you call ‘Conjunction’, then, as your Reason, not being found to be concomitant with any such character, becomes ‘Inconclusive’; |
syād etat katham idam avagamyate 'vasthāntaraviśeṣasāpekṣāḥ kṣityādayo 'ṅkurādikāryaprasavahetavo na punar arthāntarabhūtasaṃyogasāpekṣā yena sāmānyena sāpekṣatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā bhaved bhavata ityāśaṅkhyāha ---saṃyogamātretyādi / | This is what is meant by the Text. The following might be urged: “How do you know that the soil and the rest are dependent upon a particular condition of their own, in becoming the cause of producing the effect in the shape of the sprout, and they are not dependent upon the Conjunction of something different from themselves? and it is on the strength of this that you urge against us the fact of our argument being superfluous if mere dependence is meant to be proved”. |
saṃyogamātrasāpekṣā yadi tu syur jalādayaḥ / yogānantaram eva syāt kāryam etena vā bhavet // | If the water, etc. needed the conjunction only, then they would appear immediately on their coming together (conjunction), or not appear at all. |
yadi hi saṃyogamātrasāpekṣāḥ syus tadā prathamopanipāta eva kṣityādibhyo 'ṅkurādikāryodayaprasaṅgaḥ paścād vadavikalakāraṇatvāt / | If the Soil, Water and the rest needed only their Conjunction to bring about their effect in the shape of the sprout, then it should come about as soon as they come into contact with one another; because the Cause would be there in its perfect form, exactly as it does later on. |
atha prathamopanipāte na bhavati paścā [p.221] dapyanutpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If the effect does not appear immediately on their first contact, then it should not appear at ah, even later on; |
pūrvavadajanakāvasthāyāṃ vikalakāraṇatāyā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | as the Cause would even then be as defective as on the previous occasion. |
naca kṣityādīnām anupakāriṇi saṃyoge 'pekṣā yuktimatī, atiprasaṅgāt / | Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the soil, etc. are dependent upon Conjunction which does not help them at all; |
nacāpi saṃyogānāṃ kādācitkatvaṃ yuktaṃ tat kāraṇānāṃ kṣityādīnāṃ nityaṃ sannihitatvāt / | Nor again is it right to regard the Con-junction as appearing only occasionally; as the cause (basis) in the shape of the soil, etc. is always there. |
atha tatrāpi saṃyoge janye kṣityādīnāṃ karmādisāpekṣatvam iṣyate / na / | It might be held that “in the bringing about of the Conjunction also, there is need for such forces as those of ‘Destiny’ and the like Rut this cannot be right; |
tatrāpi tulyaparyanuyogatvāt / | because the same objection would be applicable against that view also. |
tathā hi tadapi karma kasmān na janayatīti paryanuyoge kiṃ vaktavyaṃ syāt / tatkāraṇanodanābhāvād iti cet tasyāpi kasmād abhāva iti nityakāraṇābhyupagame sarvatra tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ / | For instance, what would be the answer to the question ‘Why does not the said Destiny bring about the effect at once?’ The answer might be that “it does not do so, because the requisite urge is absent in the Cause”, Then comes the Question why should there be this absence of the requisite urge? Such Questions would be everywhere inevitable under the theory of Causes being permanent entities. |
yasya tu sarvam evānityaṃ vastu tasyānāditvāddhetuparamparāyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ sakṛdutpattiprasaṅgo na bhavati / | For one, on the other hand, who holds all things to be impermanent (momentary), as the chain of all (momentary) causes is beginningless, there can be no possibility of the anomaly of all things being produced at one and the same time; |
pūrvapūrvakāraṇapratibaddhatvād uttareṣām / teṣāṃ ca sarveṣāṃ yugapat kāraṇavaikalyenāsannidhānāt / | because the succeeding causes would all be restricted by the preceding ones (in the same Chain), and hence the Causes of these could not be present at the same time by reason of their own causes not being present in their perfect condition. |
tasmād bhavata eva darśane 'ṅkurādikāryaprasavahetutvaṃ kṣityādīnāṃ sarvadā prasajyata iti na saṃyogārthāntarasāpekṣāḥ kṣityādaya iti siddham // | Thus it is only under your doctrine that there is possibility of the anomaly of the Soil, etc. producing the sprout at all times; hence it becomes established that the Soü, etc. do not require any such distinct thing as ‘Conjunction (665) |
yaccoktaṃ saviśeṣaṇabhāvāccetyādi tatrāha prāptāvasthetyādi / | It has been asserted (under Text 656 above) that “as Conjunction has a particular characteristic it is regarded as distinct”. |
ye paśyatyāharatyeṣa vastunī te tathāvidhe // | This is answered in the following [see verse 666 above] |
nahi saṃyuktapadārthāntarabhūtaḥ saṃyogaḥ pratipattur darśanapathamavatarati yena taddarśanād{tta} viśiṣṭe dravye āharati / | As a matter of fact, what falls within the range of the perceiver’s vision is not any distinct thing in the shape of Conjunction, by noticing which he brings up the ‘Conjoined things’; |
kiṃ tarhi prāgbhāvinī ye sāntarajātāvasthe tato viśiṣṭe ye nirantarotpannevastunī te eva saṃyuktaśabdavācye avasthāviśeṣe prasādhitatvāt saṃyogaśabdasya / | what happens is that he notices that the two things, which were previously in the condition in which there was an interval of space between them, have subsequently come into the condition in which they have come into juxtaposition, these things come to be spoken of as ‘conjoined things’; |
tena yatra tathāvidhaṃ vastunī saṃyogaśabdaviṣayabhāvāpanne paśyati, te evāharati nānye, na hi śabdenābodhite 'rthe śabdāt pravartate prekṣāvān // | So that whenever one finds two things in this particular condition in which they become expressible by the term ‘conjoined things’, one brings these, and none others. No intelligent person ever acts on the strength of words, in regard to what is not expressed by those words. |
yaccoktaṃ nirantaram ityādi, tatrāha vicchinnamityādi / vicchinnamanyathā caiva jātam eti nimittatām / | When a thing is produced in the detached form, it becomes the basis for the notion op being ‘detached’; on the other hand, when it is produced in the attached form, it becomes the basis of the notion of being ‘attached’; |
sāntarānantarajñāne gehavindhyahimādrivat // | just as in the case of the house, the vindhya mountain and the himalaya mountain. |
vastvantaram eva tathotpadyamānaṃ buddhibhedanibandhanamato 'naikam etad iti samudāyārthaḥ / | As a matter of fact, it is a distinct object that is produced in a particular form that becomes the basis of a distinct notion; hence the Reason urged by the Opponent is Inconclusive. |
tatra vicchinnaṃ yajjātaṃ vastu tat sāntarabuddher nimittatām etīti sambandhaḥ / anyathā ceti / avicchinnam yajjātam iti sambandhaḥ / | This is the upshot of the Text as a whole. The construction is ‘the thing that is produced in the detached form becomes the basis for the notion of being detached ’, On the other hand, i.e. when it is produced as not-detached. |
gehavindhyāhimādrivad iti / | ‘Just as in the case of the House, etc, etc.’; |
anayor eva yathāyogam udāharaṇam / | these form examples of the said two notions. |
na hyavicchedenotpannayoḥ svayaṃ saṃyogātmanor gehayoraparaḥ saṃyogo nirantarabuddher nibandhanam asti paramate 'pi, nāpi vicchedenotpannayos ta [p.222] yor eva vibhāgaḥ sāntarapratyayanimittam asti, nirguṇatvād guṇānām ityuktam etat / nahi himavindhyayor eva vibhāgaḥ sāntarabuddher heturasti / prāptipūrvikā hyāprāptir vibhāga iti samayāt // | Even under the doctrine of the opposite party, when two Houses have been produced as attached to one another, and are therefore of the nature of Conjunction itself, there is no other Conjunction which serves as the basis of their being ‘attached’; similarly when two Houses have been produced as detached, there is no other Disjunction which forms the basis of the notion of their being ‘detached In the case of the Himalaya and Vindhy a Mountains also, the notion of their being ‘detached’ is not due to any other thing in the shape of ‘Disjunction’, because your own idea is that ‘Disjunction consists in separation following after Contact’ [and certainly there never has been any contact between the two mountains]. |
mithyābuddhir na sarvaiva pradhānārthānusāriṇī / | A misconception does not appear always in accordance with a primary conception; |
sādharmyanirapekṣāpi kācid antarupaplavāt // anyatra gatacittasya dvicandrādimatir yathā / | for instance, the notion of ‘two moons’ appears independently of its similarity to any other (primary) notion, through some internal derangement, while the mind is turned elsewhere. |
avicchinnādijātaṃ vā pradhānam iha vidyate // | It has been argued (under Text 659, above) that “the notion of being attached that appears with regard to what is detached, etc. etc.” The answer to this is provided in the following [see verses 668-669 above] |
sarvā mithyābuddhiḥ sādharmyagrahaṇād upajāyata ityasiddham etat / | That all Misconceptions appear only through the perception of similarity (to a primary) cannot be admitted; |
kasyāścitsādharmyamanapekṣyāpīndriyavaiguṇyamātreṇotpattidarśanāt / | because there are some misconceptions which are produced, independently of all similarity, merely through some disorder in the sense-organs. |
yathānyatragatavikalpacetaso 'pi puro 'vasthitaikacandrāvipatya{dipratyaya}mātreṇa timiropapāditendriyavaiguṇyāccandradvayākārānusyūtā viśadatarapravibhāsinī kalpanākalaṅkānaṅkitaiva dhīrupajāyate / | For instance, when a man has the fancies of his Mind turned elsewhere, though what is actually before the eyes is a single Moon, yet, on account of the sense-organ concerned (the Eyes) being deranged by disease and darkness, there appears the cognition furnished by the form of two Moons; and this is quite clear and free from all taint of being entirely fanciful. |
anyatra gatacittasyetyanena nirvikalpatvaṃ dvicandradhiyo darśayati / | The phrase ‘while the Mind is turned elsewhere’ shows that the notion of ‘two moons’ is entirely indeterminate in character; |
nahi nirvikalpacetasi sādharmyagrahaṇam asti / | the idea being that in an indeterminate notion, there can be no perception of similarity; |
tasya pūrvāparadṛṣṭapadārthaikatvādhyavasāyātmakatvena pūrvānubhūtārthābhijalpātmakatvāt / | as this latter is always in the form of the cognition of some sort of unity between the thing seen now and that seen previously; and as such, it must be of the nature of some verbal expression relative to the previously perceived thing. |
athavā bhavatu nāma pūrvasyā mithyābuddheḥ pradhānārthānusāritvaṃ tathāpi neṣṭasiddhir bhavata iti darśayati avicchinnādijātaṃ vetyādi / | Or, granting that the previous Misconception is in the wake of a Primary Cognition, even so, what the other party desires cannot be proved. This is what is shown by the words ‘Or, the requisite Primary, etc. etc.’ The phrase ‘and the like’ is meant to include the thing born in the detached form. |
tadeva hi vastu vicchinnam avicchinnaṃ copajāyamānamatajjātīyaparihāreṇa pravṛttyarthaṃ prathamataraṃ viniveśitavibhaktādyabhidhānatayā mukhyam astīti neṣṭasiddhir bhavataḥ //6686--------- | What is meant is that the same thing, produced as attached or detached, when conceived of as precluding things of the other kind, comes to be spoken by a name applied to it in accordance with that (attached or detached) form which has been perceived first; and this may be regarded as the Primary (of the later misconception of the same attached thing as detached, or vice versa). So that the argument adduced by you does not prove what is desired by you. |
yad uktaṃ kuṇḍalīti matiśceyam ityādi tatrāha kuṇḍalītyādi / kuṇḍalīti matiśceyaṃ jātāvasthāviśeṣayoḥ / | The notion of ‘the man with the ear-ring’ arises only with reference to caitra (the man) and the ear-ring, in whom a particular condition has come about; |
caitrakuṇḍalayor eva saṃyoga iva jāyate // | and it only appears as if the cognition were of ‘conjunction’ (between the two). |
yathaiva hi saṃyogāścaitrakuṇḍalayor viśiṣṭāvasthāprāptau satyām upajāyatenahi sarvadā, tadvadiyam api kuṇḍalīti matiravasthāviśeṣanibandhanā bhavantīkimiti sarvadā bhavet / jāto 'vasthāviśeṣo yayoścaitrakuṇḍalayos te tathokte // | Just as what is called ‘Conjunction’ comes into existence only when Caitra and the Ear-ring appear in a certain state, and not always; in the same manner, the notion also of ‘the man with the Ear-ring’ is due to a particular state of things, and as such, why should it appear always? The compound ‘Jātāvasthāviśeṣayoḥ’ is to be explained as ‘the two, Caitra and the Ear-ring, in whom a particular state has been produced’. |
so 'vasthātiśayastādṛgdṛṣṭo 'nyatra niṣidhyate / | It is the one peculiar condition seen in one place which is denied in another place. |
caitre kuṇḍala ityādau na saṃyogastvadṛṣṭitaḥ // | as regards the notion ‘caitra is without the ear-ring’, it is not conjunction that is denied; for the simple reason that this conjunction has never been seen. |
[p.223] yadavasthāviśeṣanibandhaneyaṃ matirupavarṇitā tasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānyasyāmavasthāyām anupalambhe sati pratiṣedho vidhīyate na tu bhavat parikalpitasya saṃyogasya tasya saṃyogipadārthavivekena kvacid api buddhāv apratibhāsanāt / | The notion in question has been explained as being based upon a certain state of things; and when this state of things, which should be perceptible, is not perceived under another state ofngs, then there is its denial (in regard to this latter state of things); and what is denied is not the Conjunction that is assumed by you. For the simple reason that the ‘Conjunction’ has never appeared in any Cognition, apart from the things to which it is held to belong. |
tasmān nāsiddhatā hetoḥ // | Thus our Reason is not open to the charge of being ‘Unproven’. |
na parābhimatādyogājjāyate yuktavastudhīḥ / yuktabuddhitayā yadvat prāsādādiṣu yuktadhīḥ // | The notion of things being ‘conjunct’ cannot be due to the conjunction postulated by the other party, (a) because it is the notion op ‘being conjunct’, like the notion op ‘being conjunct’ in connection with the mansion and such things; |
anekavastusadbhāve jāyamānatayāthavā / vibhaktānekatantvādiviṣayā iva buddhayaḥ // | or (b) because it appears only when there is more than one thing, like the cognitions op several differentiated yarns. |
vibhāge 'pi yathāyogaṃ vācyametat pramādvayam / | The same two arguments may be urged mutatis mutandis, against disjunction also. |
ekasyānekavṛttiś ca na yukteti prabādhakam // | And the reason annulling (both these conceptions op conjunction and disjunction) consists in the pact that it cannot be right for one thing to subsist in more things than one. |
prayogaḥ yā saṃyuktabuddhiḥ sā bhavat parikalpitasaṃyogānāspadavastuviśeṣamātrabhāvinī yathā saṃyuktau prāsādāvityādau saṃyuktabuddhiśceyaṃ caitraḥ kuṇḍalītyādāviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The answer is provided by the following [see verses 672-674 above] The arguments may be formulated as follows: The notion of ‘being conjunct’ is based upon the mere Object, which has nothing to do with the ‘Conjunction’ postulated by you, just like the same notion in such expressions as ‘the conjunct houses’, and the notion of ‘Caitra with the Earring’ is the notion of ‘being conjunct’; |
athavā yānekavastusannipāte satyupajāyate sā bhavat parikalpitasaṃyogarahitānekavastuviṣayamātrabhāvinī yathā praviralāvasthitānekatantuviṣayāḥ pratyayās tathā ceyaṃ saṃyuktadhīr iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the thing itself). Or, that which appears on the coming together of several things follows from the things themselves entirely devoid of the ‘Conjunction’ postulated by you, as the notion of several yarns lying apart from one another; |
saṃyuktabuddhir ity arthaḥ / | the notion of ‘being conjunct’ is a notion of this kind; |
etad eva pramāṇadvayaṃ vibhāgapratiṣedhe vācyam / | hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the things themselves). |
vibhaktabuddhitvād anekapadārthāsannidhānāyattodayatvād vā parābhimatavibhāgarahitapadārthaviśeṣamātranibandhanā meṣādiṣu vibhāgabuddhiḥ yathā dūratarāvasthitameṣadvayaviṣayā vindhyahimavad viṣayā vā dhīr iti / | ‘Yuktadhīḥ’, i.e. the notion of two things being conjunct. These same two arguments may be put forward also for denying ‘Disjunction’: (a) Because it is the notion of ‘being disjunct’, or (b) because its appearance is dependent upon the absence of several things, the notion of ‘being disjunct’, in the case of two rams and such things, must be due to the particular things themselves, irrespectively of the ‘Disjunction’ postulated by the other party, just like the notion of ‘being disjunct’ that appears in relation to two Rams living far apart, or that which appears in relation to the Himalaya and the Vindhya Mountains. |
atha kimatra sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ yena hetor vipakṣe pracārāśaṅkā nivartata ity āha ekasyetyādi / | Question: “What is the reason that annuls the conclusion contrary to the Probandum in the above reasonings, which would preclude the presence of the Reason in something where the Probandum is known to be absent?” |
yathaikasyānekatra vṛttir na yuktā tathā taddhyekavṛttibhājaiva rūpeṇetyādināvayaviniṣedhe pratānitam iti neha punaḥ pratāyate // | Answer: ‘The reason annulling, etc. etc.’ That is, the fact that the subsistence of one thing in several things cannot be right, has been shown in detail in the Chapter on the ‘Composite Whole’, under Text 607 (above); hence it is not set forth here. |
parāparābhidhānādinimittaṃ yac ca kalpyate / paratvam aparatvaṃ ca dikkālāvadhikaṃ na tat // | The name (and idea) of ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’ have been assumed as the basis of the notions of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’, as these notions cannot be determined in reference to space and time. |
yathā nīlādirūpāṇi kramabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / anyopādhiviveke 'pi tathocyante tathāpare // | But just as the blue and other colours, which come into existence in succession (one after the other), come to be spoken of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’, without reference to distinctions due to any other conditions, so would the said notions be in regard to other things also. |
[p.224] idaṃ param idam aparam iti yato 'bhidhānapratyayau bhavatas tatparatvam aparatvaṃ ca yathākramaṃ parāparābhidhyānanimittaṃ siddham / | [The position of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is as follows] “That from which arise the notions ‘this is before’ and ‘this is after’ are the Qualities named ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’, which are the basis of the said notions of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ respectively. |
ādiśabdena pratyayo gṛhyate / prayogaḥ yeyaṃ paramaparam iti saṃvitsā ghaṭādivyatiriktārthāntaranibandhanā tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt sukhādibuddhivad iti / | The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the idea also of ‘fore’ and ‘aft The argument may be formulated as follows: The idea of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ must be based upon something other than the Jar and other things, because it is different in character from the idea of these latter, like the idea of Pleasure, etc. |
tathā hyekasyāṃ diśi sthitayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ param aparam iti buddhipravṛttir na tāvadiyaṃ diṅnibandhanā / | For instance, when two objects are standing towards the same direction’, there appears the notion ‘this is fore and that is aft’; this notion cannot be due to Space (Direction); |
nāpi kālanibandhanā ekasminnapi pravartamāne kāle vartamānayor aniyatadigdeśasaṃyuktayor yuvasthavirayor vibhāgena parāparabuddhipravṛttes tadaviśeṣe 'piviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ / nacānyadasyā buddher nibandhanam abhidhātuṃ pāryate / | nor can it be due to Time; because even when two persons, one old and the other young, are present at the same time, but in uncertain directions, there appears the distinct notion of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ (Senior and Junior); so that this distinction is there even though there is no difference in Time. Apart from these two Space and Time, there is nothing else which could be regarded as the basis of the notions in question. |
tasmād yannibandhaneyaṃ tat paratvam aparatvam iti siddham / dikkālāvadhikaṃ na taditi / dikkālapradeśasaṃyuktasannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭapadārthāvadhikaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ / | Hence it becomes established that what form the basis of these notions are the Qualities of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority ‘These notions cannot be determined in reference to Space and Time’; that is to say, it cannot be held to be in reference to near and far objects in contact with points in Space and Time. |
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