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naca vāyusaṃyogas tasya vināśakāraṇamarvāgeva patanaprasaṅgādityuktam etatsarvatra vāyoraviśeṣeṇa tat saṃyogasyāpyaviśiṣṭatvād iti yatkiñcidetat // | The Contact of Air cannot be destructive of the previous Velocity; as if that were so, then the Arrow should fall down before it does, as pointed out above; the Air being the same all through, its contact also would be there all through. So there is nothing in this explanation. |
bhāvanākhyastu saṃskāraścetaso vāsanātmakaḥ / | The momentum called ‘impression’ is of the nature of an impress on the mind. |
yukto nātmaguṇaścedaṃ yujyate tannirākṛteḥ // | it cannot be a quality of the soul; because this has been rejected. |
yadi hi smṛtyādikāryataḥ sāmānyena bhāvanāmātraṃ tadā siddhasādhyatā / | If Impression is postulated only in a general way as the cause of Remembrance, then the argument proves what is already admitted and is therefore futile. |
tathā hi pūrvānubhavāhitasāmarthyalakṣaṇā cetasaḥ svātmabhūtā bhāvanā smṛtyādiheturiṣyata eva / | Because it is already admitted (by us) that the cause of Remembrance consists in Impression which is a form of the Mind itself, being a potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; |
yasyā vāsaneti prasiddhiḥ / | this is known by the name of ‘Vāsanā’, ‘Conception’. |
athātmaguṇasvabhāvā bhāvanā sādhayitum iṣṭā tadā kvacid api tathāvidhayā saha smṛtyādīnām anvayāsiddheranaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | If what is meant to be proved is Impression as a Quality of the Soul, then, as such an impression will never have been found to be concomitant with Remembrance, the Reason would be Inconclusive; |
pratijñāyāścānumānabādhā / | and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled by Inference. |
ātmanas tadādhārasya pūrvaṃ nirākṛtatvenāsattvāt tasyā apyasattvasiddhiḥ / | And inasmuch as its intended substratum, the Soul, has already been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, its quality also would be non-existent. |
prayogaḥ ye yadāśritās te tasyābhāve sati nāvasthitimaśnuvate, yathā citraṃ kuḍyādyabhāve, āśritaścātmānaṃ saṃskāraḥ paramateneti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdher na ceṣṭāsiddhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When a number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent, e.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there; and under the Opposite party’s view, the Momentum in question is subsistent in the Soul; hence there is found in it a character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Hence what is desired is not proved. |
tasyātmanaḥ pūrvaṃ nirākṛtatvāt / | Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. |
tasmāccetaso vāsanātmaka eva yuktaḥ saṃskāro nātmaguṇa iti pramāṇaphalametat / | Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition bearing upon the matter is that Impression should be regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon the Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. |
ekasya pramāṇasiddhatvād aparasya viparyayād iti bhāvaḥ // | The sense is that while the former view is supported by proofs, the latter is not so supported. |
sthitasthāpakarūpastu na yuktaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ / sthitārthāsambhavād bhāve tādrūpyādeva saṃsthitiḥ // | There can be no such quality as ‘elasticity’, because things are in a ‘perpetual flux’, and hence nothing can be lasting (sthita); if there were any such thing, it should continue to exist in that same form. |
tathā hi yamasau padārthaṃ sthitaṃ sthāpayati kadācid asau svayamasthirasvabhāva eva, yadvā sthirasvabhāva eveti pakṣadvayam / | [The name of this Quality appears throughout in this work in the form ‘Sthitasthāpaka’, though the form in which it is known from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika books is ‘Sthitisthāpaka’. |
yadyasthirasvabhāvas tadā tasya kṣaṇād ūrdhvamabhāvāt kasyāsau sthāpako bhavet / atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā bhāve sattve sthitānām arthānāṃ tādrūpyādeva apracyutasthitarūpatvāt sthitir iti kim akiñcitkareṇa sthāpakena parikalpiteneti pūrvavad dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam // [p.230] athāpi syāt kṣaṇikatve 'pi sarvabhāvānām ekakṣaṇāvasthitau prabandhena cānuvṛttau tasya sāmarthyam ucyata ityatrāpyāha kṣaṇaṃ tvekamityādi / | That the former form is not an error of the copyist or the printer is clear from this Text, where the first term in the compound is clearly stated to be ‘sthita’.] That is to say, the ‘Sthita’, ‘lasting’, thing, of which this Quality is said to be the ‘Sthāpaha’, ‘re-establisher’, is that thing by itself not-lasting? Or is it by itself lasting? Only these two alternatives are possible. If it is not-lasting, then as in a moment it will have ceased to exist, what would be there which the Quality in question would re-establish? On the other hand, if it is, by itself, lasting, then, if the thing in question would be existent, then, as all existing things continue to exist in their own form, i.e. without deviating from it, theng would continue in the same form; |
kṣaṇaṃ tvekamavasthānaṃ svahetor eva jātitaḥ / | The momentary existence of a thing consists merely in its being produced from its cause; |
pūrvapūrvaprabhāvāc ca prabandhenānuvartanam // | and the ‘continuity in the chain’ also (of every succeeding thing) is due to being produced from each preceding thing. |
svahetor evaṃ niṣpadyamānā ekakṣaṇasthāyinaḥ sidhyanti / | Momentary things are admitted to exist only as being produced from their causes; |
tathāhyātmapratilambhalakṣaṇaivāmīṣāṃ sthitir ucyate, natu pratilabdhātmasattākānām uttarakālamātmarūpasandhāraṇalakṣaṇā, svayaṃ calātmana uttarakālamavasthānābhāvāt / | and what is called their ‘sthiti’, ‘status’, consists only in their acquiring their own selves, and not in their taking up their form subsequently to their having acquired their status; as by themselves all things are momentary, and hence incapable of staying at any time subsequent to their coming into existence. |
avasthāne vā kadācid apyanivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ pūrvavat / | Or, if the thing did so exist, it would never cease to exist, it should be there as before; |
paścād apyaviśiṣṭatvāt, atat svabhāvaprasaṅgāc ca / | and even subsequently, it would remain the same; or else, it would have to renounce its own nature. |
pūrvapūrvakāraṇasāmarthyakṛtaścottarottarakāryaprasava iti prabandhe 'pi na saṃskārasya sāmarthyaṃ sidhyati // | In the ‘Chain’, the production of each succeeding Product is due to the immediately preceding cause. So that even here, there is nothing that could be done by the Momentum in question. |
nānyathodayavāneṣa kasyāsau sthāpakas tataḥ / nacāsya dṛṣṭaṃ hetutvaṃ saṃskāro 'nyo 'pi vā bhavet // | [What is not-momentary] does not appear in any other form; of what then could the momentum be the ‘establisher’? Nor has this momentum been found to have causal character; the cause then may consist of this momentum or something else. |
utpannasyaiva ceṣṭo 'yaṃ vastrādeḥ sthāpako guṇaḥ / | Further, the momentum in question has been held to be a quality that re-establishes what has been already produced, such for example, as the cloth. |
guṇasaṃskāranāmaivaṃ sarvathāpi na sambhavī // | What therefore has been called a ‘quality’ and ‘momentum’ is not possible. |
yo hyakṣaṇikas tasyānyathātvāsambhavāt svata eva sthitir iti kiṃ kurvāṇas tasyāsau sthāpako bhavatītyuktam etat / | It has been already pointed out that the thing that is not-momentary can never become otherwise than it is, and hence its status is there always, so that there would be nothing to be established by the quality in question, establisher of status, Elasticity. |
athāpi syāt mābhūdasau sthāpakaḥ kintu kṣaṇasyaivotpādako bhavatītyāha nacātyetyādi / | It might be argued that “The Quality may not be the establisher; it may be the producer of the Moment itself”. The answer to this is that this Momentum has not been found to have causal character; |
pramāṇādhīnā hi prameyasya tattvavyavasthitiḥ, na cāsya prasiddhakāraṇavyatirekeṇa vastrādiṣu pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ cakṣurādivadvā kāryavyatirekato dṛṣṭam niścitaṃ hetutvam, yena tadvyavahāraḥ syāt / | the conviction regarding the reality of the truth aboutngs is always dependent upon the Means of Right Cognition; and as a matter of fact the causal character of Momentum, as something different from well-known causes is not definitely recognised in things like the Cloth, by Perception and Non-apprehension, or as something different from the ordinary effects, as in the organs like the eyes; hence the notion in question cannot be based upon any such character. |
athādṛṣṭasāmarthyasyāpi hetutvaṃ kalpyate tadā saṃskāraḥ, anyo 'pi vā śukabakādirutpatter heturbhavet / kalpanīya iti śeṣaḥ / | If it be argued that “even though its causal potency has not been perceived, yet the fact of its being the Cause might be presumed”. If that be so, then Momentum, or anything else, like the Parrot, the Crane, etc., might be the Cause, i.e. presumed to be as such. |
na hyadṛṣṭaśaktitvena kaścid viśeṣo 'sti yenaikasminneva saṃskārātmanyapariniścitasāmarthye kalpanāparitoṣo bhavatāṃ syāt / nacāpyayam utpādahetur iṣṭo bhavadbhiḥ api tūtpannasya sato vastrāder uttarakālaṃ sthāpako guṇa iṣyate / | The fact of its not being perceived does not constitute a positive peculiar feature, by virtue of which it could be only by presuming the Momentum, and nothing also, even though its potency has not been perceived, that you should be satisfied. As a matter of fact, the Momentum in question has not been held by you to be the cause of production; in fact it is held to be a quality in a thing e.g, the Cloth is already produced, which re-establishes its former status; |
tatra cākiñcitkaratvam asyeti pūrvam upavarṇitam / abhyupagamya tūtpattihetutvaṃ dūṣaṇamidam abhihitam / | and in this it is of no use, as already explained above. And it is on admitting (for argument’s sake) the possibility of its being the cause of production, that the above objection has been urged; |
kadācit kaścit svasamayasīmānam apyatipatyaivaṃ kalpayed iti bhāvaḥ / | the idea being that there may be some one who may cross beyond the limits of even his own doctrine. |
guṇasaṃskāranāmetyādinā pūrvamupasaṃharati // | The Author next points out objections against the Qualities of ‘Merit and Demerit’: [see verse 691 above] |
[p.231] dharmādharmalakṣaṇaguṇadūṣaṇam āha mana ityādi / manoyogātmanāṃ pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nibandhanāt / | Such is the account of the Unseen Force provided by the other party. Inasmuch as the Soul, the Mind, and the contact of these which have been regarded as the cause of the said Force, have been already rejected before, there can be no Cause for the said Force; |
paroktalakṣaṇopetaṃ nādṛṣṭamupapadyate // | Hence objections against it are not repeated here. End of Chapter XI. |
kartṛphaladāyyātmaguṇa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogajaḥ svakāryavirodhyadṛṣṭam / | “The Unseen Force (Destiny) is what brings the fruits of an act to its Doer, it is a Quality of the Soul, is produced by the contact of the Soul and Mind, and is destroyed by its own effect; |
tac ca dvividha dharmādharmabhedāt / | it is of two kinds the two kinds being Merit and Dement; |
tatra dharmaḥ kartuḥ priyahitamokṣahetuḥ / | of these Merit becomes the cause of the Doer’s happiness, welfare and liberation; |
adharmastvapriyāhitapratyavāyahetur iti paroktādṛṣṭalakṣaṇam / | and Demerit becomes the cause of his unhappiness, calamities and sin.” Such is the account of the Unseen Force provided by the other party. |
tadetad ātmano manasas tadyogasya ca tat kāraṇatvenābhimatasya pūrvaṃ niṣiddhatvāt kāraṇābhāvād evāsaditi siddham / | Inasmuch as the Soul, the Mind, and the contact of these which have been regarded as the cause of the said Force, have been already rejected before, there can be no Cause for the said Force; and hence it is concluded that it cannot be existent. |
śabdastvākāśaguṇatayābhīṣṭaḥ sa prāgeva nirasto 'kramādyāpatita ityādineti na punar asya dūṣaṇam ucyate // iti guṇapadārthaparīkṣā // | As regards Sound, that has been held to be the Quality of Ākāśa, it has been already rejected above, when it came under review, apart from its proper place. Hence objections against it are not repeated here. |
KAPITEL KARMAPADAARTHAPARIIK.SAA | End of Chapter XI. |
kṣaṇakṣayiṣu bhāveṣu karmotkṣepādyasambhavi / | In things that are in a ‘perpetual flux’, any action, in the shape of ‘throwing up’ and the like, is impossible; |
jātadeśe cyutereva tadanyaprāptyasambhavāt // | because it ceases at the very place where it is born, and hence it cannot get at any other place. |
utkṣepaṇamapakṣepaṇamākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇīti sūtram / | “The Sūtra on this point is ‘Going up, going down, contracting, expanding and moving are the five Actions’, Of these, going up is that act which is the cause of the Conjunction and Disjunction with upper and lower space (respectively). |
tatrotkṣepaṇamūrdbhādhaḥpradeśābhyāṃ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ yat karmotpadyate / | because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with Action is in nowise admitted (or proved). On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Pro-bandum; |
yathā śarīrāvayave tat sambaddhe vā mūrtimati dravye loṣṭādāvūrdhvadigbhāgopādhibhir ākāśapradeśādyaiḥ saṃyogakāraṇamadhodigbhāgāvacchinnaiś ca vibhāgakāraṇaṃ prayatnādivaśād yatkarmopajāyate tadutkṣepaṇamucyate / | because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also. If a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. For instance, when the Action appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance? It cannot appear in the momentary substance, because it ceases to exist becomes destroyed at the very spot where it comes into existence, and hence it cannot get at any other spot. |
etad viparītaṃ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ karmāvakṣepaṇaṃ / | The Author next proceeds to set forth the objections against the Vaiśeṣika category of ‘Karma’, Action: [see verse 692 above] |
ṛjudravyasya kuṭilatvaheturākuñcanam, yathoktam ṛjuno bāhvādidravyasya ye 'grāvayavā aṅgulyādayas teṣāṃ svasaṃyogibhir ākāśādair vibhāge sati mūlapradeśaiścāṃśādibhiḥ saṃyoge sati yena karmaṇāvayavī bāhvādilakṣaṇaḥ kuṭilaḥ samutpadyate tadākuñcanam iti / | as has been thus described: When of a straight object like the arm, the foreparts in the shape of the Finger and the rest, become disjoined (separated) from the points of Ākāśa with which they have been in contact, while the hind part still remains in contact with those points, then the whole object in the shape of the Arm becomes curved; |
etad viparyayeṇa tu saṃyogavibhāgotpattau yena karmaṇāvayavī ṛjuḥ sampadyatetat prasāraṇam / | and this action is called ‘Contracting’. When the Conjunction and Disjunction appear in a manner contrary to the one thus described, the whole object becomes straightened again; |
utkṣepaṇādikaṃ catuḥprakāraṃ karma niyatadigdeśair ākāśair āśādibhiḥ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇam / gamanaṃ tu aniyatadigbhiḥ sarvatodikkaiḥ pradeśaiḥ saṃyogavibhāgau karoti / | this Action is called ‘Expanding That which becomes the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with several stray objects in diverse places, is the Action called ‘Going The first four forms of Action are the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with well-defined parts of Space and Ākāśa, while Going brings about Conjunctions and Disjunctions with sundry points in space in various directions. |
ata eva pañcaiva karmāṇi sambhavanti / | Thus there are only five kinds of Action. |
bhramaṇasyandarecanādīnāṃ gamana evāntarbhāvāt / | Such other actions as Going Round, Flowing, Evacuating and the like are all included under |
etac ca pañcavidham api karma mūrtimadravyavṛttisaṃyogavibhāgakāryonnītasattvatayā siddham / | All these five kinds of Action are established as having their existence indicated by such effects as Conjunction and Disjunction subsisting in solid objects. |
sarvasyaiva saṃyogavibhāgaviśeṣaḥ [p.232] sādhāraṇaṃ kāryamataḥ kāryataḥ siddhir asya / | Conjunction and Disjunction are the effects common to all Actions; this is what establishes the existence of the effects of Action. |
tathā pratyakṣato 'pi / | It is proved by direct Perception also; |
yathoktam ---"saṅkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavighāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇī"ti / | as has been thus described ‘Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority and Action subsist in coloured (solid) objects, and hence are perceptible to the Eye’ (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra).” |
tadeṣā saṅkṣepāt paraprakriyoktā / | Such in brief is the scheme of the other Party. |
tadatra saṃyogavibhāgayoḥ pūrvaṃ niṣiddhatvāt kāryasiddham / | As regards this, Conjunction and Disjunction having been already rejected, what has been put forward as the ‘Effect’ of Action cannot be admitted. |
atha nairantaryeṇotpādādimātralakṣaṇau saṃyogavibhāgau tat kāryatayā hetutvenocyate, evam apyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | If what is put forward as the Reason for postulating Action is its effect in the shape of such Conjunction and Disjunction as consist of being produced in juxtaposition and so forth, even so, the Reason would be ‘fallible’ (and Inconclusive); |
tathāvidhena karmaṇā tayoḥ kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ / | because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with Action is in nowise admitted (or proved). |
sādhyaviparyayeṇa ca hetor vyāpter viruddhatāpi / | On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Pro-bandum; |
kāraṇamātrāstitve ca sādhye siddhasādhyatā, vāyvādīnāṃ tathāvidhasaṃyogavibhāgakāraṇatvenābhīṣṭatvāt / | If merely the existence of a Cause is meant to be proved, then the Reasoning is superfluous; because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also. |
viśeṣaṃ ca sādhye pratijñāyā apyanumānabādhā / | If a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. |
tathā hi ---kriyāsamāveśo bhavan padārthasya kṣaṇikasya vā{aksaṇikasya vā} / na tāvat kṣaṇikasya tasya janmadeśa eva cyuteḥ nāśāddeśāntaraprāptyasambhavāt / | For instance, when the Action appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance? It cannot appear in the momentary substance, because it ceases to exist becomes destroyed at the very spot where it comes into existence, and hence it cannot get at any other spot. |
prayogaḥ yo yatra deśe cyavate na sa taduttarakālaṃ tadanyadeśamāpnoti yathā pradīpādiḥ / | This Inference may be formulated as follows: When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot, it cannot subsequently get at any other spot, e.g. the Lamp and such things; |
janmadeśa eva cyavante ca sarve bhāvā vivakṣitā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // | all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence; hence there is an apprehension which is contrary to a character wider than the one desired to be proved (by the opposite party). |
janmātiriktakālaṃ hi kriyākālaṃ pare jaguḥ / iṣṭāśutaranāśeṣu dīpādiṣvapi vastuṣu // | The other party also have asserted that the time of action is subsequent to the time of the birth of the object, even in such things as the lamp-flame, which are admitted (by him also) to be fleeting in their character. |
iṣṭa āśutaro vināśo yeṣāṃ te tathā / | Some things are admitted to be fleeting in their character; |
pradīpāder api hi śīghratarakālavināśitayābhīṣṭasyāpi janmottarakālabhāvinyeva kriyā, ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitvenāsyākṣaṇikatvāt // | e.g. the Lamp-flame is admitted to be something which ceases very quickly; and even in these, Action appears only after they are born, i.e. come into existence; and have been held to last only for ‘six moments’, and only to that extent, not-momentary (lasting). |
katham ityādi tathāhītyādi / | The following Text shows how this is so. [see verses 694-695 next] |
tathā hi kāraṇāśleṣaḥ sāmānyasyābhivyañjanam / svāvayave tataḥ karma vibhāgas tadanantaram // saṃyogasya vināśaś ca tato dravyasya saṃkṣayaḥ / | (1) (At the first moment) there is contact with the cause, (2) then the appearance of the generic character, then (3) some commotion in the parts of the object, then (4) the disruption of the parts, then (5) the destruction of the contact, then (6) the destruction of the object; |
ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitaiveṣṭā dīpādāv api vastuni // | in this way, even in the case of the lamp-flame and such things, what has been held is that they last for six moments only. |
tathā hi svakāraṇasambandhakālas tāvat prathamaṃ bhavati / tataḥ paścāt svasāmānyābhivyaktikālas tato 'vayavakarmakālas tadanantaram avayavavibhāgakālas tataḥ svārambhakāvayavasaṃyogavināśas tato dravyavināśaiti ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitaiva dīpāder api vastuno 'bhīṣṭā / | For instance: (1) what comes first is the moment of contact with the Cause, (2) then the moment of the appearance of the generic character of the Thing produced, (3) then action among the component parts, then (4) the moment of disjunction of the Composite, then (5) the destruction of the Conjunction that produced the object, then (6) the destruction of the object itself; in this way, in the case of things like the Lamp-flame, what has been held is that they last for six moments only. |
ataḥ kṣaṇikasya kasyacid gatimataḥ padārthasyābhāvāt sarveṣām eva kriyāvatāṃ janmottarakālabhāvinyeva kriyā / | Thus, there being no momentary object (for the Opponent) which could have any action, the Action of all active objects must be such as appears after the birth of the objects. |
nāpyasiddhatā hetor anyasya kṣaṇikatvāyogāt // | So that our Reason is not ‘unproven’, as there can be nothing else that could be momentary (for the other party). |
[p.233] athāpi syād yadi nāma kṣaṇikatā bhāvānām asmābhir iṣyate / tathāpyamīṣāṃ janmakālabhāvinyeva kriyā kasmān na bhavatītyāha paścimetyādi / | It might be asked “Even if we admit the momentary character of Things, why cannot their action appear at the time of their birth?” The answer to this is provided in the following [see verses 696-697 next] |
paścimāgrimadeśābhyāṃ viśleṣāśleṣasambhave / gantāparo vā sarvaś ca karmādhāraḥ prakalpitaḥ // | It is only when there is separation from the posterior spot, and contact with the frontal spot, that the object may be assumed to be ‘going’ (‘in motion’), or to be the substratum of any other action. |
yo janaḥ kṣaṇamadhyās te naiva jātu calātmakaḥ / tasyāṇvantaramātre 'pi deśasaṃkrāntyasambhavaḥ // | when the mobile person does not last even for a moment, even though such a person be extremely small, there is no possibility of passing over to another spot removed by the minutest point. |
yasya hi pāścāttyadeśaviśleṣaḥ sambhavati, purovartinā deśenāśleṣaḥ sa gantā bhavatyaparo vā prasāraṇādyādhāraḥ, natvanyo yathākāśādi / | When it is possible for an object to become separated from the place behind it, and to come into contact with the place before it, then it can be said to be ‘going’; or for another thing, to be the substratum of such actions as Expanding and the rest; |
nacaikakṣaṇamātrabhāvina iyān parilambo 'sti yena pūrvadeśaparihārapūrvakamaparadeśamākramet / sattākāla evāstamayavaśīkṛtatvād aparyāpto deśāntaramākramitum / | The object that lasts only for one moment however cannot be so long as to admit of its abandoning the place behind it and then passing over to that before it; because at the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such it is unable to pass over to the other place. |
tasmājjanmakālabhāvinyapi kriyā na yuktā / | Hence no Action is possible even at the time of the birth (of the object). |
nāpi pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyos tadānīṃ tasyānupākhyatvāt / | Nor is it possible at either of the two ends; because at the time in question, this cannot be determined. |
ato yaḥ kṣaṇam api nāste tasyāstāṃ tāvad vidūrataradeśāntarāvakramaṇa{nā}sambhavaḥ / | Thus then, as regards the object which does not last even for a single moment, the possibility of its passing over to a remote place may rest awhile; it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space. |
apitu paramāṇumātrapadeśasaṃkramaṇam api nāstīti kutaḥ kṣaṇikasya kriyā // | Under the circumstances, how can there be any Action in what is momentary? (696-697) Nor can there be Action in a non-momentary object; |
nāpyakṣaṇikasyeti darśayati sthairye tvityādi / | this is what is shown in the following [see verse 698 next] |
sthairye tu vastunaḥ sarve durghaṭā gamanādayaḥ / | In case the object is something lasting, ‘going’ and the rest are all impossible; |
ekarūpaṃ hi sadā vastvakṣaṇikam ucyate, tasya sutarām eva kriyāsamāveśo na sambhavati, ākāśavat sarvadā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | because such an object should remain the same under all conditions, (698) That object is said to be ‘non-momentary’ which remains in the same form always; it is all the more impossible for any Action to appear in such an object; |
syād etad yadi nāmāviśiṣṭamakṣaṇikaṃ vastu, tathāpi prakṛtyaiva tasya gantrādirūpatvāt kriyāvattvaṃ bhaviṣyatītyato 'naikāntikatā hetor ityāśaṅkhyāha yadītyādi / | This argument may be thus formulated If an object remains always the same, it can have no Action, as in the case of Ākāśa; the object regarded as ‘ṇon-momentary’ is always of the same condition; hence there is apprehension of something contrary to what is wider (than the Conclusion of the Opponent). |
yadi gantrādirūpaṃ tat prakṛtyā gamanādayaḥ / sadā syuḥ kṣaṇamapyevaṃ nāvatiṣṭheta niścalam // | If the action of going and the rest constituted the very essence of the ‘moving entity’, then, this latter could not stay immobile for even a single moment; |
yasmād gatyādyasattve 'pi prāpnuvantyasya te ghruvam / atyaktapūrvarūpatvād gatyādyudayakālavat // | because even when the going, etc. are not there, they should certainly be there, inasmuch as the object has not renounced its previous form, and is exactly as it was at the time of the appearance of the going, etc. |
yadi hyamī devadattādayaḥ kṣaṇikatvenābhimatāḥ prakṛtyā gamanotkṣepaṇādiyoginas tadā [p.234] na kadācid api niścalamavatiṣṭheran, sarvadā gantrādirūpatvāt / | The answer to this is provided in the following [see verses 699-700 above] If such objects as Devadatta and the like, which are held to be non-momentary, were, by their very nature, connected with the Actions of Going, Throwing up and the rest, then, they should never stand unmoving; as the Going nature would always be there. |
tataścāsya devadattāder gatyādimato gatyādyasattve 'pi niścalāvasthāyām api, te gamanādayaḥ prāpnuvanti / | Hence in the case of these, Devadatta, etc., who are endowed with the action of Going, even when there is no Going i.e. even when they are standing immobile, the said actions of Going, etc. should be there, just as at the time of the appearance of those acts; |
gatyādyutpattikāla ivātyaktapūrvarūpatvāt // | because the objects will not have abandoned their previous form or nature. |
athāgantrādirūpaṃ tat prakṛtyāgamanādayaḥ / sadā syuḥ kṣaṇamapyekaṃ naiva praspandavadbhavet // | If, on the other hand, the objects were, by their nature, of the nature of the ‘immobile entity’, then absence of going should be there always, and there would be no movement of any kind even for a moment. |
yasmād gatyādibhāve 'pi niścalātmakam eva tat / atyaktapūrvarūpatvān niścalātmakakālavat // | because, even when going might be there, the object would still be of the nature of the ‘immobile entity’, because it will not have renounced its previous nature, just as at the time when it was not moving. |
athaitad doṣabhayād agantrādirūpatvam asyāṅgīkriyate / tathāsatyagamanādayaḥ sarvadā syurekarūpatvād ākāśavat / | If, from fear of the above criticism, it be held that the object, by its nature, is immobile, then the absence of going, etc. should be there always; because the object is of the same form always, like Ākāśa. |
ādiśabdād utkṣepaṇādiparigrahaḥ / | The particle ‘ādi’, ‘etc.’; is meant to include the actions of Throwing up and the rest. |
tataś ca gatyādibhāve 'pi tasya niścalatvam eva prāpnoti, aparityaktāgatyādirūpatvād yathā niścalāvasthāyām / | Under such circumstances, even when there would be actual going, etc., the object would be immobile; because it has not renounced its Immobile nature, exactly as in the unmoving condition. |
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