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tayoḥ sambandhibhedāccedevaṃ tau niṣphalau nanu // | If the notions be said to be based upon the things related to them, then they themselves become useless. |
viśiṣṭasamayaḥ paurvāparyādinotpanneṣvevārtheṣu pūrvāparādisaṅketaḥ, tadudbhūto mana [p.209] skāraḥ ābhogaḥ sa nibandhanamasyeti tathoktam / | ‘Particular Conventions’, i.e. the understanding that the epithets ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are to be applied to things produced before and after, and so forth; the conception that arises out of such conventions, is the basis of the notions in question. |
ata eva netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, viśiṣṭapadārthasaṅketanibandhanatvādasya jñānasyeti / | Thus it is that there is no mutual interdependence; as the notion is based entirely upon a particular convention. |
ataḥ kāraṇamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa sādhane 'numānabādhā, ananvayadoṣaś ca pūrvavad iti sūcayan hetośceṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatetidarśayati niraṃśetyādi / | Thus then, if the other party has set out to prove only that the said notions have a cause, then it is superfluous (as it is admitted by all parties). If however he intends to prove that a particular Substance is that cause, then (1) there is annulment by Inference, (2) absence of concomitance, as before; and (3) the Reason is ‘contradictory’, as it proves what is contrary to the desired conclusion; |
tayor iti dikkālayoḥ / | ‘Related to them’, i.e. to Space and Time. |
parāparādijñānasya niraṃśaikadikkālākhyapadārthanibandhanatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ, tac ca na sidhyati / | As a matter of fact, what is desired to be proved is that the notion of ‘Priority and Posteriority’ and so forth is based upon the impartite and single substances, Time and Space this is not proved (by the Reason adduced). |
tathā hi svākārānurūpaṃ pratyayamutpādayan viṣayo bhavati / | Because a thing becomes the ‘object’ (of cognition) when it produces a cognition exactly of the same form as itself; |
na ca niraṃśasya paurvāparyādivibhāgaḥ sambhavati, yena tatkṛtaṃ paurvāparyādijñānaṃ bhavet / | in the case of an impartite substance, there cannot be any differentiation between ‘fore’ and ‘aft’, to which the notion of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ could be due; |
ata iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddho hetuḥ / | thus by proving the contrary of what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes ‘Contradictory’, |
sambandhibhedācced ityanena parasyottaramāśaṅkate / | ‘If the notions be said to be based, etc. etc.’; This anticipates the answer of the Opponent. |
atha matam dikkālasambandhino bhāvā bāhyādhyātmikāḥ pradīpaśarīrādayaḥ, teṣāṃ paurvāparyādi vidyate, tatas tayor api dikkālayoḥ sambandhigatametat paurvāparyādi nirdiśyate, tasmān na viruddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ / | It might be argued (by the Opponent) that “Such external and internal things as the Lamp and the Body and the like are related to Space and Time, there is ‘priority and posteriority’ among these, and it is this ‘priority and posteriority’ of their relatives that is attributed to Space and Time, hence the Reason is not Contradictory |
evaṃ hi kalpyamāne tau dikkālau niṣphalu syātām / | The answer to this is as follows: ‘Then they themselves become useless’, Under the said assumption, Space and Time themselves would be useless; |
tat sādhyābhimatasya kāryasya tair eva sambandhibhir niṣpāditatvāt / | as what is meant to be brought about by them will have been brought about by the things related to them. |
tathā hi kālaḥ pūrvāparakṣaṇalavanimeṣakāṣṭhākalāmuhūrtāhorātrārddhamāsādipratyayaprasavahetuḥ / dik ca pūrvottarādivyavasthāheturiṣyate / | For instance, Time is held to be the cause of such notions as those of the various divisions of priority and posteriority as are denoted by the terms ‘Kṣaṇa’, ‘Lava’, ‘Kāṣṭha’, ‘Kalā’, ‘Muhūrta’, ‘Ahorātra’, ‘Ardhamāsa’ and so forth (the various divisions of Time) and Space is held to be the cause of the notions of ‘East’, ‘North’ and so forth; |
ayaṃ ca bhedaḥ sakalastayor na svātmani vidyate / bhedeṣu punar astīti vyarthaiva tat parikalpanā // | and as a matter of fact, all this diversity does not belong to Space and Time; it is present in the divisions themselves; so that the assuming of Time and Space is entirely useless. |
cakṣurādyatiriktaṃ tu mano 'smābhir apīṣyate / | ‘Mind’ as distinct from the ‘eye’, etc. is admitted by its also; |
ṣaṇṇāmanantarodbhūtapratyayo yo hi tan manaḥ // | that idea being regarded as ‘mind’ which appears immediately after the six (cognitions). |
nitye tu manasi prāptāḥ pratyayāḥ yaugapadyataḥ / | If however the mind is regarded as permanent, then there comes the anomaly of cognitions being simultaneous; |
tena hetur iha prokto bhavatīṣṭavighātakṛt // | thus the reason put forward by you becomes destructive of what is desired. |
viśeṣeṇa tu nityaikamanassādhane 'nanvayaḥ pratijñāyā anumānabādhā viruddhatā ca hetor darśayati nitye tvityādi / | If what is meant to be proved is the eternal and one Mind, then the conclusion is one that is annulled by Inference, and the Reason is ‘Contradictory’. This is what is shown by the words ‘If however, etc. etc.’ |
iṣṭavidhātakṛd iti / | ‘Destructive of what is desired’; |
cakṣurādivyatiriktānityakāraṇasāpekṣatvasādhanāt anyathā nityakāraṇatve satyavikalakāraṇatvāt kramotpattir viruddhyeta cetasām // | because what it proves is only the dependence (of the notions cited) upon an impermanent (fleeting) cause which is distinct from the Eye and other organs. Otherwise, if they had an eternal Cause, as the Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the successive appearance of Cognitions would be incongruous. |
tāmeva ca viruddhatāṃ hetor upahāsapūrvakaṃ dṛḍhīkurvann āha saugatetyādi / | The following Text jokingly confirms the same ‘contradictory’ character of the opponent’s Reason [see verse 633 above] |
[p.210] saugatāparanirdiṣṭamanaḥsaṃsiddhyasiddhaye / | I think as follows: The Sūtra ‘Yugapajjñānnāupapattirmanasoliṅgam’ (‘The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously is and is not indicative of the Mind’, Nyāya-sūtra 1. |
sākāramanyathāvṛttaṃ manye sūtram idaṃ kṛtam // | for the latter purpose an additional ‘a’ (‘not’) being read (before ‘liṅgam’, ‘indicative Such is the sense of the Text as a whole. |
etadevaṃ manye saugatatīrthikayor abhīṣṭasya manasaḥ siddhyasiddhyartham idaṃ "yugapat jñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam" iti sūtraṃ / | The meaning of the words is now described: The compound ‘Saugata siddhaye’ is to be expounded as ‘for the purpose of the proving and disproving, respectively, of the Mind, as postulated by the Bauddha and the other Philosopher’, |
ekasmin pakṣe 'kārapraśleṣād iti samudāyārthaḥ / | Question: “How can one and the same expression be with, and also without, the syllable ‘a’ (‘not’)?” |
avayavārthas tūcyate saugatāścāpare ca tīrthikāstair nirdiṣṭe ca te manasī ceti vigrahaḥ / | I think that the sūtra (nyāya-sūtra 1.1.36) has been composed for the purpose of proving and disproving the mind as postulated by the Buddha, and the other philosopher (respectively), and hence it has been repeated with an additional ‘a’ (‘not’). |
tayor yathākramaṃ saṃsiddhyasiddhī, saṃsiddhisahitā vāsiddhiḥ tadarthaṃ tannimittam / | The following Text jokingly confirms the same ‘contradictory’ character of the opponent’s Reason [see verse 633 above] |
kathaṃ punar ekaṃ sūtraṃ viruddhamarthadvayaṃ gamayatītyāha sākāramityādi / | Question: “How can one and the same Sütra express two mutually contradictory meanings?” |
sahakāreṇa vartata iti / | Answer: ‘With an additional a (not)’; |
parakīyamano 'siddhyarthamaliṅgam iti praśliṣṭākāro nirdeśaḥ / saugatamanassiddhaye 'nyathā bhavati anakāram ity arthaḥ / | that is to say, as applied to the view of the other philosopher, the words of the Sütra are to be construed as ‘for the disproving asiddhi of the Mind postulated by the other philosopher’, with an ‘a’ (before ‘liṅgam’); |
sākāratvānakāratve katham ekasya siddhyata ity āha āvṛttam iti / | Question: “How can one and the same expression be with, and also without, the syllable ‘a’ (‘not’)?” |
āvṛttis tatra nyāyyeti yāvat // | Answer: It is ‘repeated’; |
iti dravyapadārthaparīkṣā // | i.e. in such a case, the repetition of the expression is justified. |
KAPITEL GU.NAPADAARTHAPARIIK.SAA | End of the Chapter on ‘Substance’, |
guṇādīnāṃ niṣedham āha dravyāṇām ityādi / dravyāṇāṃ pratiṣedhena sarva eva tadāśritāḥ / | By the rejection of ‘substance’, ‘quality ‘action’ and the rest, which are held to be subsistent in substance, all become discarded. The Author now proceeds to discard the categories of ‘Quality’ and the rest: [see verse 634 above] |
guṇakarmādayo 'pāstā bhavantyeva tathā matāḥ // | For instance, Quality and Action are held to be directly subsistent in Substance; |
guṇakarmādayo viśeṣaparyantā dravyāṇāṃ pratiṣedhād evāpāstāḥ, tadāśritatvād eṣām / | The Genus and the Specific Individuality subsist, some of them, in Substances only; e.g. such genuses, as ‘Earth’ and the like; while such genuses as ‘Quality’, ‘Action’ and so forth subsist in Qualities and Actions related to Substances. |
āśrayābhāve cāśritānāṃ paratantratayāvasthānupapatteḥ / | What is meant by this is that the final upshot of the examination of the other Categories has been achieved under the examination of Substance itself. |
tathā matā iti / | Answer: [see verse 635 next] |
tathā sākṣātpāramaparyeṇa vā dravyāśritatveneṣṭāḥ / tathā hi guṇakarmaṇī sākṣād eva dravyāśritatvenābhīṣṭe / | By the rejection of ‘substance’, ‘quality ‘action’ and the rest, which are held to be subsistent in substance, all become discarded. The Author now proceeds to discard the categories of ‘Quality’ and the rest: [see verse 634 above] |
"ekadravyamaguṇaṃ saṃyogavighāgeṣvanapekṣaṃ kāraṇam" iti karmalakṣaṇam / | ‘Quality’, ‘Action’, ending with ‘Specific Individuality’, become rejected by the rejection of Substance’; because they subsist in this latter; |
ekadravyam iti ekadravyāśritam ity arthaḥ / guṇās tu kecidanekadravyavartino bhavanti, yathā saṃyogavibhāgādayaḥ / sāmānyaviśeṣāś ca kecid dravyavṛttaya eva, yathā pṛthivītvādayaḥ / | which is the definition provided of Quality; similarly the definition of Action provided is “It subsists in one Substance, is devoid of Qualities, the independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions The term ‘ekadravyam’ in this last Sūtra means ‘subsisting in one Substance Qualities, on the other hand subsist, some of them, in several Substances; |
guṇatvakarmatvādayaś ca dravyasambaddhaguṇakarmapadārthavṛttayaḥ, mahāsāmānyaṃ tu sattākhyaṃ dravyādipadārthatrayavṛtti / | while such genuses as ‘Quality’, ‘Action’ and so forth subsist in Qualities and Actions related to Substances. The Summum genus which is ‘Being’ subsists in the three categories beginning with ‘Substance’ [i.e. in Substance, Quality and Action]. |
tasmād dravye pratiṣiddhe satyayatnenaiva guṇādayo 'pi niṣiddhā bhavantīti / | Thus, when Substance has been rejected, Quality and the rest become rejected without any effort. |
pariśiṣṭapadārthaparīkṣāphalaṃ dravyaparīkṣāyām eva samāptam iti darśitambhavati // | What is meant by this is that the final upshot of the examination of the other Categories has been achieved under the examination of Substance itself. |
samavāyapratiṣedhas tarhi pṛthagārabdhavya iti cedāha kva kasyetyādi / | Opponent: “If that is so, then the Denial of Subsistence should be proceeded with separately.” |
[p.211] | Answer: [see verse 635 next] |
kva kasya samavāyaś ca sambandhinyapahastite / viśeṣapratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathāpi punar ucyate // | The ‘relative’ (wherein the relation could subsist) having been discarded, whose ‘subsistence’ would it be? and where? still a detailed denial of each (category) is going to be set forth. |
pañcapadārthavṛttirūpo hi samavāyo varṇyate / | ‘Subsistence’ is described as ‘inherence of the five categories’; |
dravyādau ca sambandhini pañcaprakāre 'pahastite kva kasya samavāyo naiva kasyacit kvacid ity arthaḥ / | so that when the Substance and other (four) categories wherein alone the said Relation could subsist, have been rejected, whose ‘subsistence’ would it be? and where? That is, of nothing and nowhere; |
sarveṣām āśrayāśritānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvāt tatra guṇānāṃ tāvad viśeṣapratiṣedha ucyate // | for the simple reason that all that could be the substratum and the subsistent have been rejected. (635) The detailed denial of Qualities is now set forth. |
"tatra rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṭkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ"iti sūtram / | In this connection, the Sūtra (Vaiśeṣika) is as follows: “The following are. the Qualities: Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Cognitions, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Exertion”; |
caśabdād gurutvadravatvasnehatvasaṃskāradharmādharmaśabdāś ca parigṛhyante / | the particle ‘ca’, ‘and’, including Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit and Sound. |
tatra rūpaṃ cakṣur grāhyaṃ pṛthivyādakajvalanavṛtti / | Colour is what is apprehended by the Eye, and subsists in Earth, Water, and Fire; |
gandho ghrāṇagrāhyaḥ pṛthivīvṛttiḥ / sparśastvagindriyagrāhyaḥ kṣityudakajvalanavāyuvṛttiḥ / | Taste is apprehended by the Gestatory Organ, and subsists in Earth and Water; Odour is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ and subsists in Earth; Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, and subsists in Earth, Water, Fire and Air”, |
eṣāṃ caturṇām ādyānāṃ rūpādīnāṃ pratiṣedhamāha dravye mahatītyādi / | From among these Qualities, the Text sets forth the denial of the first four Colour and the rest: [see verse 636 next] |
dravye mahati nīlādireka eva yadīṣyate / randhrālokena tadvyaktau vyaktir dṛṣṭiś ca nāsya kim // | If in a large substance, the blue colour is held to be one only, then how is it that there is no manifestation and perception of it when it is seen in light coming through an aperture? (636) |
mahatyena hi dravye samavetānām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvam ato mahatītyāha/tatra ca dravye yadyekamevānavayavaṃ nīlādi caturvidhamiṣyate, tadā sūkṣmeṇāpi kuñcikādivivaravartinā pradīpādyālokena tvapavarakādisthitapṛthutaraghaṭādidravyasamavetasya nīlādirūpasyābhivyaktau satyāṃ sakalasyaiva yāvad dravyavartino rūpāderabhivyaktirupalabdhiś ca prāpnoti niravayavatvāt / | Qualities are perceptible only when they subsist in a large substance; that is why the Text has added the epithet ‘large’. If it is held that the Blue Colour, in all its four forms, that subsists in a Large Substance is one only and without parts, then, at the time that there is manifestation of the Blue Colour as subsisting in a large substance like the Jar placed in a small room, through lamp-light coming through an aperture in the split bamboo or some such thing, the whole of the Blue Colour subsisting in the whole Jar should be manifested and perceived because it has no parts; |
nahyekasyāvayavāḥ santi yenaikadeśābhivyaktir bhavet / | as a single entity cannot have parts, by virtue of which there would be manifestation of one part only. |
randhrālokenetyupalakṣaṇam / | ‘Light coming through an aperture’ has been, mentioned only by way of illustration. |
bhuva ekadeśe jalena gandhasyābhivyaktau pradeśāntarepyabhivyaktyupalabdhyoḥ | Similarly when odour in a part of the Earth is manifested by Water, the odour in other parts of it also should become manifested and perceived. |
jvālāder āmraphalādeścaikadeśasya spṛṣṭāvāsvādane ca taddravyasamavāyinas tāvataḥ sparśasya rasasya copalabdhiḥ syāt // | Similarly in the case of Flames and the Mango and other fruits, the Touching and Tasting of one part should lead to the perception of the Touch and Taste subsisting in the whole of those substances. |
na ca deśavibhāgena sthito nīlādir iṣyate / | The blue colour is hot held to exist in well-defined parts; |
vyajyate yas tadā tena tasya bhedo 'ṇuśastataḥ // | hence what is manifested then by that (light) must, on that account, vary with each atom. |
tadeti tasmin kāle. | ‘Then’ at that time. |
tasyeti nīlādeḥ. | ‘What’ i.e. the Blue Colour. |
aṇuśaḥ svabhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe pṛthivyādiparamāṇudravyavad aṇuparimāṇayogitvena guṇavattvād dravyarūpataiva syāt, na guṇatvam / evambhūtānāṃ cāṇuśo bhinnānāṃ guṇa iti saṃjñākaraṇena [p.212] nāmni vivādaḥ / | In case it is admitted that the Blue Colour in its entirety varies with each atom, then that would imply the presence of the Atomic Dimension in the Blue Colour, just as in a Substance; which would mean that the Blue Colour has a quality (Dimension); so that it would have the character of ‘Substance’ (which alone can have a quality), and not that of ‘Quality If things varying like this with each atom, were called ‘Quality’, then the dispute (between us) would be only in regard to names. |
na cāṇutve 'pyāśritatvād guṇatvaṃ yuktam / | When the thing is possessed of the Atomic Dimension, it cannot be right to regard it as a ‘Quality’, simply on the ground of its subsisting (in a Substance); |
sadasatorāśrayānupapatter atiprasaṅgāt / | if there were, it would lead to absurdities. |
tathā hyaviyavidravyamavayavadravyāśritam iti tadapi guṇaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ // | That is to say, in that way, on the ground that it subsists in the Component substance, the Composite Substance would also have to be regarded as a ‘Quality’. |
tatraikadivyavahāraheturekatvādilakṣaṇā saṅkhyā sā punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca tatraikasaṅkhyaikadravyā / | “As regards the Quality of ‘Number’, it has been defined as ‘the basis of the notions of one and so forth Number subsists in one substance and also in several substances; the Number ‘one’ subsists in one substance; |
anekadravyā tu dvitvādisaṅkhyā / | and the numbers beginning with ‘Two’ subsist in several substances. |
tatraikadravyāyāḥ salilādiparamāṇvādigatarūpādīnām iva nityatvaniṣpattayo boddhavyāḥ / | Of the Number subsisting in one substance, the eternality and the appearances should be understood to be like those of the Colour and other qualities subsisting in the atoms of Water, etc.; |
anekadravyāyās tu ekatvebhyo 'nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattirapekṣābuddhivināśād vināśaḥ kvacid āśrayavināśād iti / | while of Number subsisting in several substances, the appearance is due to the unities associated with the cognition of several things; and its destruction (disappearance) follows from the disappearance of the unitary conception; and in some cases, the disappearance is also due to the destruction of the substratum. |
iyaṃ ca dvividhāpi saṅkhyā kila pratyakṣata eva siddhā / | Number of both these kinds is vouched for by Perception. |
viśeṣabuddheś ca nimittāntarāpekṣatvād anumānatopīti paro manyate / | Others have held it to be established by Inference also, on the ground that all specific cognitions are dependent upon diverse causes.” |
tatrāsyāḥ pratiṣedham āha atadrūpetyādi / | The denial of this Number is set forth in the following [see verse 638 above] |
yeṣu hi samuccayādivyāvṛtteṣu gajādiṣu saṃjñā niveśitā na tadvyatirekeṇopalabdhir lakṣaṇaprāptā saṅkhyā khyātāstīti sā śaśaviṣāṇavad asadvyavahāraviṣayā / | Such names as ‘elephant’ are applied to the animals as being the negation of what is not-elephant, such things as the Aggregate and the like; apart from such names, there is no such thing as ‘Number’ which is perceptible; hence it must be non-existent, like the ‘Hare’s Horns’, And yet it has been held (by the other party) to be perceptible; |
tathāhyasau dṛśyatveneṣṭā / tathā ca sūtram ---"saṅkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇi" iti // | as declared in the following Sutra “Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, as subsisting in coloured things, are perceptible by the Eye”, (638) |
icchāracitasaṅketamanaskārānvayaṃ tvidam / ghaṭeṣvekādivijñānaṃ jñānādāviva vartate // | As in cognition, so in things like the jar also, the notion of ‘one’ and the rest is one that follows only from an imaginary convention set up by a mere whim. |
adravyatvān na saṅkhyāsti teṣu kācid vibhedinī / tajjñānaṃ naiva yuktaṃ tu bhāktamaskhalitatvataḥ // | there can be no differentiating number in these (cognitions), because they are not ‘substance nor can the notion be said to be ‘figurative’, as it is not found to be fallible. |
yathā hyekaṃ jñānaṃ dve jñāne ityādau saṅkhyāmantareṇāpyekādibuddhir bhavatyevaṃ ghaṭādiṣvapyasahāyādiṣu padārtheṣveka ityādiḥ svecchayā yaḥ saṅketo vihitas tatra yo manaskāra ābhogas tadanvayamekādijñānaṃ bhaviṣyatītyanaikāntikam etat / | There are such notions as ‘one cognition’, ‘two cognitions’ and so forth, in which the notions of one, two, etc., appear even though there are no such Numbers actually present (in the Cognitions); in the same manner, in the case of a Jar also when it is not accompanied by anything else, there is the notion of its being ‘one’; and this must have its source in the imaginary convention that has been set up by people. |
nahi teṣu jñānādiṣu saṅkhyāsti eṣām adravyatvāt / | Consequently the argument based upon such notions cannot be conclusive. |
saṅkhyāyāś ca guṇatvena dravyāśritatvāt / atha mataṃ gauṇamidaṃ teṣu jñānamekamivaikaṃ sādharmyaṃ cātrāsahāyatvādi {tatraha---} tajjñānam iti / | That in Cognitions, no Number exists follows from the fact that Cognitions are not Substance, while Number is a Quality and as such must subsist in a Substance. It might be argued that “in the case of Cognition, the sai d notion may be regarded as figurative, the sense being that ‘Cognition is as if it were one’, and the absence of companion may be taken as the similarity on which the figurative expression is based |
naiva hyetajjñānaṃ bhāktaṃ yuktamaskhalad gatitvād asya pratyayasya / | that is, the notion in question cannot be rightly held to be figurative; as it is not found to be fallible. |
nahi yathā vāhīko gaur iti [p.213] skhalati pratyayaḥ, gauriva gaur natu gaureva sāsnādyabhāvād iti, na tathāyaṃskhalati, ekam ivaikaṃ jñānādi natvekam eveti / | Such figurative expressions as ‘the Ploughman is an ox’ mean that ‘the man is as if it were an ox’, and not that he is ‘an ox itself’ as he does not have the dewlap and other distinguishing features of the ox; there is no such failure (negation) in the case in question, the notion being that ‘the cognition is one’, not that ‘it is as if it were one’; |
kiṃ tarhi yādṛśī ghaṭādiṣvaskalitā buddhir bhavati tādṛśī jñānādiṣvapi // | as a matter of fact, the notion in regard to the Cognitions is just as infallible as that in regard to the Jar and such things. |
syād etan na sādṛśyāpekṣametajjñānamupavarṇyate / kintu yat teṣām āśrayabhūtaṃ dravyaṃ tadgataikatvādikādekārthasamavāyitvād etadguṇakarmasamavāyādiṣvekādijñānaṃ bhavatīti tadetad āśaṅkayann āha taddravyetyādi / taddravyasamavetāc ced ekatvāt parikalpyate / guṇādiṣvekavijñānam ekārthasamavāyataḥ // | “The notion of one in regard to cognitions is assumed on the basis of the one-ness subsisting in that same substance, on account of their subsisting in the same thing”, if this is asserted [then the answer is as in the following text]. The Opponent may urge the following “The notion is described as ‘figurative’, not on the basis of similarity’, but what is meant is that the notion of ‘one’, etc. in regard to Quality, Action, Subsistence and so forth is based on the ground that these subsist in the same substratum as the ‘oneness’, etc. subsisting in the Substance that forms their own substratum”. |
atrottaram āha astunāmetyādi / | The answer to the above is provided in the following: [see verses 642-643 next] |
astunāmaivam ekatra jñāne vyāpti{dvyāhi---}matistu kam / eteṣvapekṣate hetuṃ ṣaṭpadārthādikeṣu vā // ekārthasamavāyāder gauṇo 'yaṃ pratyayo bhavan / | The number ‘one’ may subsist in the one cognition; but on what basis does the notion of ‘two’ proceed, in reference to cognitions? Or even in regard to the ‘six categories’ and the rest? The notion too of its ‘subsisting in the same thing’ can only be figurative, and hence fallible, like the notion of ‘fire’ in regard to the boy. |
yadi hi tad dravyasamavetād ekatvāder etajjñānaṃ tadāstu nāmaikatra jñāne sukhādau caikātmadravyasamavāyinyekamekam iti jñānam / | If the notion of ‘one-ness’ is due to subsistence in the same substance,. then it may be so in regard to one Cognition, as also to Pleasure and the rest, in which case the notion of ‘one’ is due to their subsisting in the same substance ‘Soul’ (which is one); |
dve trīṇi catvāri jñānānītyādijñānasya tu ko hetuḥ, nahi tatraikātmagataṃ dvitvādyasti / | but what would the basis of such notions as ‘two cognitions’, ‘three Cognitions’ and the like? Certainly duality, etc, do not subsist in the Soul (in which the Cognition subsists). |
yaccaitad ucyate ṣaṭpadārthāḥ, sukhaduḥkhe, icchādveṣau, pañcavidhaṃ karma, sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ paramaparaṃ ca, eko bhāvaḥ, ekaḥ samavāya iti, tatra ko ---hetuḥ / | The assertion too that is made, such as ‘Six Categories’, ‘the two, Pleasure and Pain’, ‘the two, Desire and Hatred’, ‘Five kinds of Action’, ‘Two kinds of Genus, the Higher and the Lower’, ‘One Being’, ‘One Subsistence’ and so forth, what would be the basis for such notions ? In these cases, there is no Number subsisting in the same thing. |
nahi tatraikārthasamavāyinī saṅkhyāsti, tasmād avyāpinītvādiyam api kalpanā na yuktā / | So that this assumption also is not comprehensive enough; hence it cannot be right. Further, ‘Subsistence in the sameng’ and such other basis, are asserted; |
tathāpyekārthasamavāyāder ayaṃ bhavan pratyayo gauṇaḥ syāt dvastvantarābhāvāt / | and yet the notion of such subsistence, even if it appeared, could be only figurative, because there are no other things; |
tatas tu skhalitaḥ syād yathā māṇavake 'nalapratyayas tat pravṛttinimittābhāvāt, nacaivaṃ bhavati tasmāt pūrvoktadoṣānivṛttir eva // | and hence the notions would be fallible; just like the notion of ‘Fire’ in regard to the Boy, where there is no real ground for applying the word to him. And, yet the notion is not fallible. So that the objection urged above still remains in force. |
gajādityādināviddhakarṇoktaṃ saṅkhyāsiddhaye pramāṇam āśaṅkate gajādipratyayebhyaś ca vailakṣaṇyāt prasādhyate / | “The notion of number is established on the basis of its being different from the notion of the ‘elephant’ and other things; |
saṅkhyābuddhis tadanyotthā nīlavastrādibuddhivat // | the said notion (of number) must arise from things other than those, just like the notion of the ‘blue cloth’ and the like.” (644) commentary. |
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