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sarvasyaikatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // udyotakarastvāha ekasmin bhedābhāvāt sarvaśabdaprayogānupapattir iti / | “Inasmuch as the object is of one uniform character, to what would the use of the term ‘sarva’ (‘all’) be due? Because that term denotes more than one individual thing, while the composite is not of the nature of many individuals.” (595) |
tadetannanu cetyādinā śaṅkate | This objection is expounded in the following [see verse 595 above] |
nanu caikasvabhāvatvāt sarvaśabdo 'tra kiṃkṛtaḥ / | “As a matter of fact, the term ‘all’ denotes many more than one things; while the Composite is not many; |
tathā hi sarvaśabdo 'nekārthaviṣayaḥ, na cāvayavī nānātmeti, tat kathaṃ sarvaśabdaprayogo yenocyate sarvaṃ pihitamāsajyata iti // | how then can the term ‘all’ be used in reference to it in such an assertion as ‘all of it would become covered’?” (595) |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte | This argument is answered in the following [see verses 596-598 next] |
nanu ye lokataḥ siddhā vāsodehanagādayaḥ / ta evāvayavitvena bhavadbhir upavarṇitāḥ // | It is only such things as are well known in the world, such as cloth, body, mountain and so forth, that have been mentioned by you as ‘composites’; |
raktaṃ vāso 'khilaṃ sarvaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ nikhilaṃ tathā / tatrecchāmātrasambhūtam iti sarve prayuñjate // | and as a matter of fact, all men make use of such expressions as ‘the cloth is red all of it whole of it in its totality completely’, entirely on the basis of their whim. |
tathāvidhavivakṣāyām asmābhir api varṇyate / sarvaṃ syād raktamityādi nirnibandhā hi vācakāḥ // | Thus the use of verbal expressions being dependent upon the whim of the speaker, we also make use of the expression ‘all of the object would be reddened’; because there can be no check upon speakers. |
ya eva hi loke vāsādehaprabhṛtayaḥ prasiddhās ta eva bhavadbhir avayavitvenāvakalpitāḥ / | It is just the well-known things, like the Cloth, the Body and so forth, that have been put forward by you as ‘composites’; |
[p.199] tatra ca loke sarvaikadeśaśabdayoḥ pravṛttiḥ prasiddhaiva / tathā ca vaktāro bhavanti sarvaṃ vāso raktamityādeḥ / | and in regard to all these things the use of such terms as ‘one’ and ‘all’ is also well known; e.g. people are found saying ‘all of this cloth has been coloured’ and so forth. |
tathāvidhāyāṃ ca vivakṣāyāṃ yeyaṃ loke pṛthutaradeśavakrāntivyavasthitaśāṭakādipadārthagataraktādipratipādanecchā, tasyāṃ satyāmasmābhir api pratītimanusṛtya bhavato virodhapratipādanāya svarvādiśabdaprayogaḥ kriyate / | Such being the whim of speakers, when there is a desire to speak of the colouring of things like the cloth-piece which occupy a larger space, we also, on the basis of the ordinary notion, make use of the said expression, for the purpose of bringing out the incongruity involved in your view. Further, tins criticism is applicable to yourself, who regard the gross object as one, not to us; |
api ca bhavata evāyaṃ sthūlasyaikatvamabhyupagacchato doṣo nāsmākam, nahyasmābhiḥ sthūlasyaikatvamiṣyate, syād etan mamāpyadoṣa eva yasmād bhāktam upacaritametat tantvādivayaveṣu tat kāraṇatayā paṭādyabhidhānam tena sarvādiśabdaprayogo bhaviṣyatīti // | because we do not regard the gross object to be one. |
bhāktaṃ tadabhidhānaṃ ced vacobhedaḥ prasajyate / | If the name be said to be figurative (indirect), then there should be difference in number. |
naca buddher vibhedo 'sti gauṇamukhyatayeṣṭayoḥ // | there is also no difference in the cognition, which is admitted by both (though directly and indirectly). |
na ca bhavanto bahuṣvekavacanam icchanti / athāpi syād avayavigatāṃ saṃkhyāmādāyāvayaveṣu vastrādiśabdo 'parityaktātmababhidheyagataliṅgasaṃkhya eva vartata iti / | The following might be urged “The said criticism cannot apply to us either, because (according to us) the application of the name ‘Cloth’ to its component yarns is only indirect, figurative, based upon their being its cause; so that the use of terms like ‘all’ would be all right”. |
tadapyayuktam iti darśayann āha nacetyādi / | this is what is shown in the second line ‘There is also no difference, etc. etc.’; |
yadi hi bhākto 'yaṃ vyapadeśaḥ syāt tadā gauṇamukhyārthaviṣayāyā buddher vibhedo vailakṣaṇyaṃ skhaladgatitvena prāpnoti, naca bhedo 'sti / | if the applying of the name ‘Cloth’ is figurative (indirect), then the distinction between the cognition of what is direct and what is indirect would be only a halting one; |
tathā hi sarvaṃ vāso raktamityatra naivaṃ buddhiḥ pravartate "na ca vastraṃ raktaṃ kiṃtu tat kāraṇabhūtās tantavo raktā" iti / | because as a matter of fact, there is no difference.. For instance, when the expression is used as ‘all of the cloth is coloured’, the idea that it produces is not that ‘what is coloured is not the Cloth, but the yarns that are its constituent cause |
cakārān na ca sarvaśabdavācyaṃ vāso yuṣmābhir iṣyate tasyaikatvāt, tat kathaṃ tat saṃkhyāmādāya sarvasabdo vastradishabdarahitovayaveṣu vartate/ | The particle ‘ca’ in the Text implies, the following argument: You do not admit that the Cloth, being only one, is denoted by the term ‘all’; how then can the term ‘all’, without the term ‘Cloth’, be applied to the components, on the basis of the Number of the Cloth? |
athavā buddherbhedo nānātvaṃ sosmin gauṇamukhyatveneṣṭayor na vidyate / | Or, the second line may be explained as follows: The ‘bheda’, diversity, of the Cognition, is not present in what are regarded as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’; |
nahi tantuvastrayor bhinnaṃ rūpaṃ samupalabhyate rūparasādivat, nacānupalabdhibhinnarūpayor gauṇamukhyabhāvaḥ sambhavati // | i.e. different colours are not found in the yams and the Cloth, in the way in which they are found among Colour, Taste, and other things; and when the forms of the two are not found to be different, they cannot be regarded as direct and indirect. |
nanu cetyādinā śaṅkarasvāminaḥ parihāramāśaṅkate --- | The following Text introduces the answer given by Śaṅkarasvāmin: [see verse 600 below] |
nanu cāvyāpyavṛttitvāt saṃyogasya na raktatā / | “Inasmuch as conjunction is not all-embracing in its character, the colouring cannot belong to all the cloth; |
sarvasyāsajyate nāpi sarvamāvṛtamīkṣyate // | nor is the whole found to be covered.” (600) |
sa hyāha rāga ucyate vāsasaḥ kaṣāyakuṅkumādidravyeṇa saṃyogaḥ / | He argues as follows: “The colour spoken of as belonging to the Cloth is of the nature Conjunction (contact) with such colouring substances as the red dye, saffron and so forth; |
saṃyogaś cāvyāpyavṛttis tato na rakta ekasmin sarvasya rāgo bhavati / naca vastrādibhiḥ śarīraikadeśasyāvaraṇe sarvasyāvaraṇam iti // | and Conjunction is a quality that is not all-embracing; hence when one (part) is coloured, the whole does not become coloured. Similarly when one part of the body is covered by the Cloth, the whole body does not become covered. |
tadetad ayuktam ityādarśayati nanu cānaṃśaka ityādi / | The following Text shows that this explanation is not right: [see verses 601-602 next] |
nanu cānaṃśake dravye kimavyāptaṃ vyavasthitam / svarūpaṃ tadavasthāne bhedaḥ siddho 'ta eva vā // | When the substance has no parts, what form would be there that would not be embraced (by the conjunction)? If such an (unembraced) form of the substance remained there, then diversity becomes established. |
bahudeśasthitistena naivaikasmin kṛtāspadā / | Existence in several places is not possible for any single object. |
tataḥ siddhā paṭādīnām aṇubhyo 'nekarūpatā // | hence it becomes established that things like the cloth are different in form from the atoms (composing them). |
yadi hi paṭādirekam eva dravyaṃ, tadā kiṃ tatra niraṃśake dravye kaṣāyādibhiravyāptaṃ, yenāvyāpyavṛttiḥ saṃyogaḥ syāt / athāvyāptasvarūpasyāvasthānamaṅgīkriyate tadā tadavasthāne bhedo 'ta evasiddhaḥ vyāptāvyāptayor virodhenaikasvabhāvatvāyogāt / | If the Cloth is a single substance, then in such an impartite substance, what is it that would not be embraced by the Red Colour, by virtue of which the contact of the colour would be not-pervasive? If it is admitted that there is something left unpervaded by the colour, then that alone suffices to establish difference between the two parts, as it would be impossible for the mutually contradictory pervaded and unpervaded parts to belong to one and the same thing. Nor would it be possible to explain that one part the one covered by the Colour, is larger than the other; because the thing has no parts. Otherwise, as all such diverse things as Water, Animal, Elephant and the like would be equally one only, there would be no difference among them and hence there could be no such differentiation as that between ‘large’ and ‘small’. |
nacaikasya pṛthutaradeśāvasthānaṃ yuktam anaṃśatvāt / | “The difference would be due to the one being made up of a larger number of component parts than the other.” |
alpabahutarāvayavārambhānārambhādikṛto viśeṣa iti cet avayavā eva tarhyalpabahutarās tathātathotpadyamānāḥ sthūlasūkṣmādivyavasthānibandhanaṃ santu kiṃ tadārabdhenāvayavinā tasyādṛṣṭasāmarthyāt sthūlasūkṣmādipyavayavālpabahutve 'vayavināṃ niraṃśatayā parasparaṃ kaścid viśeṣo 'sti yena sthūlasūkṣmādibhedo bhavet teṣām avayavālpabahutvagrahaṇakṛte viśeṣe 'vayavamātramevābhyupagataṃ syāt tatraiva sthūlādivyavahārāt tataścāṇumātram eva dṛśyatvenābhyupetaṃ syāt / | In that case, those parts themselves, appearing in larger or smaller numbers, may be the basis of the notions of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’, what is the use of postulating a ‘composite’ made up of those components, specially when these latter have not been found to be effective at all? As a matter of fact, even when there are large and small number of component parts in things, that cannot constitute a difference among the composites themselves, as these latter are impartite; so that there can be no basis for differentiation into ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’. If the difference were held to be based upon the larger and smaller number of components, that would only imply the admission of the components, as the notion of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’ would be applicable to these alone; and that would mean that the Atom is the only entity; |
sthūlasūkṣmāvyatirekeṇānyasya dṛśyamānatvāt / | nothing apart from the Atom, either gross or subtle, being perceived at all. |
api cāvyāpyavṛttiḥ saṃyoga iti ko 'rthaḥ / yadi sarvaṃ dravyaṃ na vyāpnotīyarthaḥ tadayuktam / | Then again, what is the meaning of the assertion that “Conjunction is not all-pervasive”? If it means that it does not pervade over all (whole) of the substance, then it cannot be right; |
dravyasya sarvaśabdāviṣayatvābhyupagamāt / | because it has been held that the term ‘all’ cannot apply to the substance. |
athāśrayasyaikadeśe vartata iti tadapyayuktaṃ tasyaikadeśāsambhavāt / | If it means that “Conjunction subsists only in a part of its substratum”, that also cannot be right; as there can be no ‘part’ of it. |
tadārambhake 'vayave vartata iti cet yadyevam avayavānām eva raktatvād avayavirūpamaraktam iti raktāraktaṃ samaṃ dṛśyeta / | It may be said that what is meant is that “it subsists in a component making up the substance”; if that be so, then, inasmuch as what has been coloured are only the components (where alone the contact of the Dye subsists), the colour of the composite would not be red at all; |
kiṃ ca yo 'pyasau tadārambhako 'vayavaḥ sa yadyavayavirūpas tadā tatrāpyekadeśavṛttitvaṃ saṃyogasyeti tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ / | Further, what is called ‘the component making up the substance’, if that is of the same form as the composite itself, then the Conjunction that would subsist there would also subsist only in a part of that component (as Conjunction is non-pervasive, ex hypothesi); |
athāṇurūpas tadātīndriyatvād aṇūnāṃ tadāśrito 'pi saṃyogo 'tīndriya eveti raktopalambho na syāt / | If, on the other hand, the component be held to be of the form of the Atom, then, inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, the Conjunction subsisting therein would also be beyond the reach of the senses; |
syān mataṃ yathā vyāptiraṅgulirūpasyāśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhirucyate naivaṃ saṃyogasyāśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhir iti tato 'sāvavyāpyavṛttir ucyata iti / | The Opponent might argue thus: “Pervasion is the name given to that character whereby the shape of the finger is perceived only on the perception of the whole finger; hence when Conjunction is said to be not-pervasive, what is meant is that in its case it is not that it is perceived only on the perception of its substratum”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right. |
na hi saṃyogasyāśrayānupalabdhāvupalabdhirasti / | As a matter of fact, Conjunction is never perceived while its substratum is not perceived; |
yathā ghaṭapiśācasaṃyogasya, tataś ca rāgasyāpyadṛṣṭāśrayasyānupalabdher āśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhir iti so 'pyevaṃ vyāpyavṛttir bhavet / | e.g. the Conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost (which is not perceived because the Ghost is not seen). Thus then, under this explanation, the colour also would not be perceived; it should be regarded to be perceptible only when its substratum is perceived; |
syād etat avayavāntareṣvarakteṣu samavetasya dravyasyopalabdhāv api na saṃyogātmakasya rāgasyopalabdhis tena nāsyāśrayopalabdhir iti tadapyayuktam / | and hence that also would be pervasive in character. Says the Opponent: “Even when the substance inhering (subsisting) in the other un-coloured components is perceived, there is no perception of the colour, which consists in Conjunction; hence even when its substratum (in the form of the substance) is perceived, the Conjunction is not perceived [and this is what makes it non-pervasive in character] |
evaṃ hi raktāraktasamavetasyāvayavina ekatvād rakte 'pyavayave rāgasya taddvāreṇānupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ, āśrayopalambhe 'pi tasyānupalambhāt / | In this way, there being only one substance inhering in, components some of which are coloured and some un-coloured, even though a component might be coloured, the Colour would be not-perceived (in the Thing) through that perception of colour; |
na cāśrayopalambhād anyasaṃyogagrahaṇābhyupāyo 'sti / | Nor is there any other way of perceiving the Conjunction, except the perception of its substratum. |
tasmān naikarūpo [p.201] viṣayo yuktaḥ / | From all this it follows that there is no ‘object’ which is of one form. |
anekarūpo 'pi bhavanasāmarthyādaṇusañcayātmaka evāvabhidyate / sambhavadavayavasyaikatvāyogāt / | Even when of various forms, on the strength of being itself, the difference can lie only in the form of the aggregation of Atoms; specially as the number of possible components can never be one. |
ataḥ siddhā ghaṭādīnām aṇurūpatā tena nīlādi paramāṇūnām ākāra iti siddham / | Thus it is proved that the Jar and such things exist only in the form of Atoms; and hence the Blue and the rest form the shape of the Atoms; |
anyasyaikarūpasya viṣayasyāsambhavāt // | there being no other ‘single object’ possible. |
yaccoktaṃ "na cāṇu vacanaṃ bhaved" iti tatrāha avijñātārthatattva ityādi / | It has been argued above (under Text 562) that “there could be no such word as Atom”. The following Text supplies the answer to this: [see verse 603 above] |
lokas tatkalpitāpekṣaḥ paramāṇurihocyate // tatkalpitāpekṣa iti / | ‘It is on the basis, etc., etc.’ i.e. these people are dependent upon the slight thread of the said assumption. |
parihārāntaram āha nimittetyādi / | Another answer is supplied in the following [see verse 604 next] |
nimittanirapekṣā vā saṃjñeyaṃ tādṛśi sthitā / saṅketānvayinī yadvannirvitte 'pīśvaraśrutiḥ // | Or, the name ‘atom’, as applied to what has been described, may be taken as baseless, dependent upon mere convention; just as the name ‘lord’ is applied to one who has no property at all. |
tādṛśīti / anaṃśe 'pratighe / | ‘As applied, etc. etc’, i.e. to what is impartite, and has no resistance. |
yathā daridre 'pīśvaraśrutiḥ saṅketavaśād aiśvaryākhyaṃ nimittamantareṇa pravartate, tadvadiyamapyaṇuśrutir ityadoṣaḥ // | Just as even the poor man is praised as ‘the Lord’, where the name ‘lord’ is applied without any basis, on the strength of mere convention or custom, so also is the use of the name ‘Atom So that there is no incongruity at all. |
evaṃ tāvat sāmānyenaivāvayavair ārabdhamānārabdhaṃ vā sthūlamekaṃ dravyaṃ na yujyata iti pratipāditam / | It has thus been established in a general way that there can be no single gross substance, either made up, or not made up, of component parts. |
idānīṃ yenāvayavī prārabdha iṣyate, tasya viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha eketyādi / | The Author now proceeds to point out the weak points in the notion of that of which the composite is held to be made up: [see verses 605-606 above] The arguments are to be formulated as follows: |
ekāvayavyanugatā naiva tantukarādayaḥ / | (A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a single substance, e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are many are not permeated by any single substance; |
anekatvādyathāsiddhāḥ kaṭakuṭyakuṭādayaḥ // | the components in question, such as the yams, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse; |
athavā yadekaṃ tadekadravyāśritaṃ yathaikaḥ paramāṇuḥ ekaṃ cāvayavisaṃjñitaṃ dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / | hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent’s proposition (i.e. to the components being permeated by the single composite). Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance, like the single Atom; |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ caitat / | and the substance called ‘composite’ is one; |
prayogadvaye 'pi viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha vṛtter ayuktir bādhikā prameti / | (C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist’s conclusion ‘Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.’; |
avayaveṣu yāvayavino vṛttis tasyā ayogaḥ pramāṇair aghaṭanaṃ tadatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | i.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party). |
kathaṃ punar ayoga ity āha taddhītyādi / | Question: “Why should there be this impossibility?” Answer: [see verses 607-608 next] |
taddhyekavṛttibhājaiva rūpeṇāvayavāntare / varteta yadi vānyena na prakārāntaraṃ yataḥ // | [If the composite subsisted in the components] it could subsist in one component, either exactly in the form in which it subsists in another component, or in some other form. |
[p.202] tatra tenaiva nānyatra vṛttir asyāvakalpate / | No third way is possible. It is not possible for it to subsist in one exactly in the form in which it subsists in another; |
tena kroḍīkṛtatvena nānyathā tatra vṛttimat // | If it were not so, then it would not be subsisting in that either. |
tadekaṃ dravyam ekavayavakroḍīkṛtaṃ yat tasya rūpaṃ tenaivāvayavāntareṣu vartate, yadvānyeneti pakṣadvayaṃ, nahi vastutastattvānyatvābhyāmanyatprakārāntaram asti / | When the one Composite which is embraced subsists in one of its components in one form, is it in the same form that it subsists in another of its components? Or in some other form? There are only these two alternatives possible; in fact in any case, there can be no other alternative than the thing being one or the other. |
tatra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣas tenaivāvayavena tasya kroḍīkṛtatvāt kuto 'vayavāntare vartitum asyāvasaras tadānīm eva syāt / anyathā hi yadyanyatrāpi varteta, tadātrābhimate dravye tasya vṛtti sarvātmanā na bhavet / | The former alternative cannot be accepted; as it is entirely embraced within the folds of the first component, how can it have any opportunity of subsisting in the other component at the same time? Otherwise, if it subsisted at the same time in the other component also, then it could not have subsisted in the first component in its entirety. |
nahi tasyāparaḥ svabhāvo 'sti, yenānyatrāpi varteta, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt //607- | It can have no other form in which it could subsist in the other component also; because in that case, it could not be regarded as ‘one (607-608) |
pramāṇaṃ racayannāha naivetyādi / | The following Text formulates the argument: [see verse 609 next] |
naiva dhātryantarakroḍamadhyās te hi yathā śiśuḥ / | Just as the baby does not occupy the lap of a second nurse, so a substance embraced in one could not subsist in another (component). |
ekakroḍīkṛtaṃ dravyaṃ nāśrayeta tathāparam // | e.g, when a baby is occupying the lap of one nurse, it cannot occupy the lap of another nurse; the substance (composite) is embraced by one component; |
prayogaḥ yadekavastukroḍīkṛtaṃ vastu na tat tadānīm evānyatra vartate / yathaikadhātrīkroḍīkṛtaḥ śiśur na dhātryantarakroḍamadhyāste ekāvayavakroḍīkṛtaṃ ca dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | If the composite substance, which has its form and character connected with one Component, subsisted in another Component which occupies another point in space, then the components in question would have to be regarded as occupying the same point in space; which would mean that they are essentially one and the same, being of the same nature. “Why so?” Because they are not differentiated; |
tatsambaddhasvabhāvasya hyataddeśe 'pi vṛttitaḥ / | because they exist without being differentiated from one another. |
anyenaivātmanā vṛttau naiko 'nekavyavasthitaḥ / | Otherwise, if they existed in their differentiated forms, they could not occupy the same point in space. |
abhimatāvayavasambaddhasvabhāvasya hi dravyasyātaddeśe 'pyavayavāntare yadi vṛttiḥ syāt, tadā teṣām avayavānām ekadeśatā syāt, tataścaikātmyamekasvabhāvatāvayavānāṃ prāptā / | If the second alternative is accepted, i.e. the Composite subsists in the second component in a different form, then it means that one thing subsists in several components, which would be inadmissible; because, as a matter of fact, when oneng differs from another in its nature, it must be different from this latter; |
kasmātavibhāgataḥ avibhaktarūpatayāvasthitatvāt / | as difference in things is always of the nature of difference in their character (and form). |
udyotakarastvāha āśrayāśritadharmanirdeśamātram etat, avayavyavayaveṣu pravartata, iti āśritabhāvalakṣaṇā hi samavāyarūpā prāptirucyata iti tatrāha samavāyātmiketyādi / | Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “All that the assertion ‘The Composite subsists in the components’ does is to mention two objects, one of which is the substratum (container) and another the subsistent (the contained), which means that the latter becomes the subsistent, this ‘subsistence’ being of the nature of the contact called ‘Inherence’”. |
[p.203] | (Nyāyavārtika, 2. |
tasyām api vicāro 'yaṃ kopenaiva pradhāvati // | 32, page 217, Line 4, etc.). The answer to this is provided in the following: [see verse 612 above] |
tasyām apyevaṃrūpāyāṃ vṛttāvayavamanantaroditaḥ kimekāvayavasamavetenaiva svabhāvenāvayavāntareṣu vartate, athānyeneti vicāraḥ kumatiracitadoṣajālamasahamānakopādivābhidhāvati // | Even in regard to this form of subsistence, the considerations just urged are applicable, such as ‘does it subsist in another component in the same form and character as in one component, or in some other form?’; they follow this idea also as if in ferocity, in anger not tolerating the criticisms emanating from the poor intelligence of the other party. |
yadvā sarvātmanā vṛttāvanekatvaṃ prasajyate / | Or again, if it (the composite) subsists (in the component) in its entirety, then it becomes liable to being regarded as many; |
ekadeśena cāniṣṭā naiko vā na kvacic ca saḥ // | and the composite would (in that case) not be one; and it would not subsist anywhere at all. |
kadācit taddravyaṃ pratyekamavayaveṣu sarvātmanā vartate, ekadeśena vā / yadi sarvātmanā tadā yāvanto 'vayavās tāvantas tasyātmānaḥ prāpnuvanti, nahi pratyavayavaṃ tasya svabhāvābhede 'sati sarvātmanā vṛttir asti / | When the substance (Composite) subsists in its components, does it subsist in each one of them in its entirety? or in part? If in its entirety, then the entire form of the Composite should be as many as there are components. Unless it had the same form in each component, it could not be present in each component in its entirety; |
asaṃvidyamānenātmanā vṛttyasambhavāt / | as there can be no subsistence except in a form that is fully recognised. |
tataś ca sarvātmanā vṛtter yugapadanekakuṇḍādivyavasthitakuvalayādivad anekatvamayavinaḥ prāpnoti / | Such being the case, if the Composite subsisted in each component simultaneously in its entire form, then it would have to be regarded as many, several; just like the Lotuses blooming in several ponds. |
athaikadeśeti pakṣas tadānavasthā syād ekadeśānām / tathā hi yair ekadeśais taddravyamavayaveṣu vartate te 'pi tasyaikadeśā iti, teṣvapyanena vartitavayam, tathaivāpareṣvityaniṣṭhā / | If the other view be held, that it is in part that the Composite subsists in each component, then there would be an infinity of such ‘parts’ of the Composite. For instance, those of its parts in which this Composite subsists in each of its components would themselves be its ‘parts’, in which also the Composite would subsist in part; |
athāpi syād yairasāvekadeśair avayaveṣu vartate / | and so on and on ad infinitum. |
te tasya svātmabhūtā eva nārthāntarabhūtās tadvyatirekeṇa cāpareṣām ekadeśānām abhāvādato nāniṣṭhā bhaviṣyatītyāśaṅkyāha naiko veti / | It might be argued that “Those of its parts through which the Composite subsists in the Components are all its own forms, and not different things; as apart from the Composite itself, there can be no parts of its own. Hence there can be no such infinite regress.” The answer to this is as follows: ‘The Composite would not be one (in that case)’; |
evaṃ hi satyeko 'vayavī na syād avayavapracayamātrarūpatvāt tasya / | i.e. if such were the case, then, the Composite would not be one only; as it is only a conglomeration of the components (and these latter are many); |
tathāca sati dṛṣṭapāṇyādisamudāyamātrātmaka evāstāṃ vastu kimaparais tasya svātmabhūtairavayavaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ / | and under the circumstances, the thing (man) may be regarded as consisting only of such of his limbs, Hand and the rest, as are actually seen; what use then would there be of assuming any others? |
doṣāntaramapyāha na kvacic ca sa iti / | The Author points out another defect in the Opponent’s theory: ‘And it would not subsist anywhere at all’; |
vṛttaḥ syād iti śeṣaḥ / | the term ‘vṛttaḥ syāt’, ‘would subsist’, has to be supplied. |
etaduktaṃ bhavati yadyekadeśāḥ pratyekāvayavinaḥ syus tadāvayave hyavayavī vṛttaḥ syāt / yāvatā naikadeśāḥ pratyekamavayavinaḥ, teṣām ekadeśatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | What is meant is as follows: If each of the Composites present in each of the components had occupied the same point in space, then alone could the Composite be subsistent in the Component; as a matter of fact, however, each of the Composites does not occupy the same point in space; because if they did subsist in each of the Components, then they could not occupy the same point in space; |
nacāparo 'vayavī svarūpeṇāsti / | specially as there is no other ‘Composite’ of the same form. |
tat katham avayaveṣvasau vṛtto nāma // | How then could it be said to be subsistent in the Components? (613) |
svātantryeṇetyādinā śaṅkarasvāminaḥ parihāram āśaṅkate | In the following Texts, the author sets forth the answer made by Śaṅkarasvāmin: [see verses 614-618 next] |
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