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svātantryeṇa prasaṅgena sādhanaṃ yat pravartate / svayaṃ tadupalabdhau hi satyaṃ saṅgacchate na tu // | “Whenever a reason is adduced, either directly or in the form of a reductio ad absurdum, it becomes truly applicable only when it is itself apprehended; |
[p.204] | not otherwise. |
dṛṣṭau vā kvacid etasyā dravyādāvanivāraṇam / atha tasminnadṛṣṭau tu bhede praśnau na yujyate // | As a matter of fact, subsistence either in whole or in part has never been perceived (by you, buddhists), on the basis of the impossibility of which in the substance, the substance could be held to be non-existent, or something else if, on the other hand, such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it cannot be denied in the case of the substance and such things. |
etāvat tu bhaved vācyaṃ vṛttir nāstīti tacca na / | all that could be asserted would be that ‘the subsistence is not there’, and this would not be right; |
yuktaṃ pratyakṣataḥ siddher ihedam iti buddhitaḥ // | as it is something directly perceived; as is clear in such notions as ‘this subsists here’. |
pratyakṣaṃ na tadiṣṭaṃ ced bādhakaṃ kiñciducyatām / | If it be held that ‘the fact of this being direct perception is not admitted’, then some annulling reasoning should be put forward. |
rūpādicetaso 'pi syān naiva pratyakṣatānyathā // | Otherwise, even such cognitions as those of colour and such things might cease to be of the nature of ‘perception’.” (614-618) |
sa hyāha svātantryeṇa prasaṅgamukhena vā yat sādhanaṃ kriyate tat svayam upalabdhau satyāṃ saṃgacchate anyathā hyasiddhatā doṣaḥ syāt, naca bhavatā kvacid apyekasyānekasmin kārtsnyaikadeśābhyāṃ vṛttir upalabdhaiua yasyā vṛtterasambhavād, avayavidravyamasat syāt / | Śaṅkarasvāmin argues as follows: “Whenever a Reason is adduced, either directly or in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum, it becomes applicable only when it is itself perceived; otherwise it would be open to the charge of being ‘unproven’, As a matter of fact, you have not anywhere perceived the subsistence of anything either in its entirety or in part; hence on the basis of the absence of such subsistence, it does not behove you to regard the (composite) substance as non-existent. |
sati sambhave 'paropi vā bhaved avayavo 'navayavī ceti / | Or if it were possible then there would be something else Component and Composite. |
atha kvacid evambhūtā vṛttir upalakṣitā bhavet tadā tadvadeva dravyādāvapisā bhaviṣyatītyapratiṣedhaḥ / atha na dṛṣṭā sā vṛttis tadā kimekadeśenāhosvit sarvātmanetyevaṃ bhedapraśno na yujyate, siddhe hi dharmiṇi viśeṣapratiṣedho yuktaḥ / | If such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it could be the same in the ease of the Substance, etc. also, which, therefore, cannot be denied. If, however, the said subsistence has not been perceived, then there does not arise any question regarding the distinction as to whether the subsistence is in entirety or in part; because it is only when the object itself has been admitted that anything can be denied in regard to it. |
yadā tu dharmyevāsiddhas tadā tasyaiva pratiṣedhā jyāyān, tenaitāvadeva vaktavyaṃ vṛttir eva nāstīti natu viśeṣapratiṣedhaḥ tac ca na yuktaṃ pratyakṣata evāvayaveṣvayavavino vṛttisiddheḥ / | When however the object itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny the object itself, so that the assertion should be in the form that ‘there is no subsistence’, and not the denial of any particular character in regard to it. But such an assertion as that ‘there is no subsistence at all’ would not be proper; |
kimbhūtātpratyakṣādityāha ihedam iti buddhita iti / | because the subsistence of the Composite in the components is vouched for by direct Perception. Question: What is that Perception? |
iha tantuṣvidaṃ vastrādītyevambhūtātpratyakṣād ity arthaḥ / | “Answer: It is in the form ‘This subsists here’; i.e. the Perception is in the form ‘This Cloth subsists in the yarns’, |
athāpi syāt pratyakṣatvamasyā buddher asiddham iti / yadyevaṃ kiñcidatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vaktavyam / | “It might be argued that this notion cannot be regarded as Perception. “In that case, it behoves you to put forward some reasoning in annulment of the said notion; |
yato 'pratyakṣatā syāt / | whereby its perceptional character could be rejected. |
athāsatyapi bādhake pramāṇe pratyakṣatvam asyā na bhaved evaṃ tarhi rūpādivijñānasyāpi bhavadīyasya pratyakṣatvaṃ na bhaved viśeṣābhāvāt // | If, even in the absence of such annulling Reason, the notion be not accepted as ‘Perception’, then, your cognition of even such things as colour and the like would not be Perception; as there can be no difference between the two cases.” (614-618) |
tadatretyādinā pratividhatte | The Author answers the above in the following [see verse 619 next] |
tadatra vṛttir nāstīti prāgabhedena sādhitam / | That ‘the subsistence is not there’ has already been established above, in a general way. |
ihetyasti naca jñānaṃ tadrūpāpratibhāsanāt // | as this exact form does not appear in any cognition. |
tadvyekavṛttibhājaivetyādinā prāk sāmānyenaivānekasminnekasya vṛttir apāstā / | Under Text 607 the subsistence of one thing in several things has already been rejected above in a general way. |
yaccedam ucyate pratyakṣata eva vṛttiḥ siddhā"ihedam iti buddhita" iti, tadapyalaukikam / | As regards the assertion that “the notion that this subsists herein is vouched for by Perception”, this also is something out of the common; |
nahīha śṛṅge gauriha tantuṣu paṭa ityeva loke vikalpikāpi dhīḥ pravartate / | because, as a matter of fact, among people, no such notion as ‘the Cow subsists in this Horn’, or that ‘the Cloth subsists in the yarns’, ever appears even in men’s imagination; |
kiṃ tarhi[p.205] iha gavi śṛṅgaṃ paṭe tantava iti / | the notion that appears is that ‘the Horn is in the Cow’, ‘the yarns are in the Cloth’. |
nāpyadhyakṣacetasi tantvādisamavetaṃ tadvyatireki vastrādirūpamābhāsate / naca vivekenāpratibhāsite satīdam iha vartata iti dhīr bhavet / nahi kuṇḍādau vivekināmapratibhāsamāne payasi bhavati salilamiheti pratyayaḥ // | Nor in any Perception does the Cloth ever appear as something different from the yarns; and unless the two were distinguished, there could be no such notion as that ‘this subsists in that’, For instance, until discriminating persons have actually perceived the water as something distinct from the Pond, they do not have any such notion as ‘there is Water in the Pond’. |
kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdābhyāmayaṃ cārthaḥ prakāśyate / nairaṃśyenāsya kiṃ vṛttiḥ kiṃ vā tasyānyathaiva sā // yathā pātrādisaṃsthasya śrīphalāder yathāthavā / | What is meant by (the question containing) the terms ‘in entirety’ and ‘in part’ is does the substance subsist as an impartite whole, in the way in which the bilva-fruit lies in a dish? Or does it subsist in some other way as a certain person, caitra, does when lying down on several seats? (620-621) |
anekāsanasaṃsthasya caitrāder upalakṣitā // | It has been argued (under Text 615 above) that “subsistence either in entirety or in part has not been perceived by you, etc. etc.” This is answered in the following [see verses 620-621 above] |
kṛtsnaśabdena hi yādṛśaṃ svarūpamanaṃśaṃ kiṃ tathaiva nairaṃśyena sarvāvayaveṣu tasya vṛttir yathā kvacid bhājanāvasthitasya śrīphalāder upalakṣitetyayam arthaḥ prakāśyate, āhosvid anyathā yathānekapīṭhādhiśayitasya caitrāder upalakṣitetyayam ekadeśaśabdena prakāśyata iti / | What is meant by the term ‘in entirety’ is whether the substance subsists in all its Components in its impartite form, as is found in the case of the Bilva-fruit lying in a dish? or in some other way? in the way, for instance, in which a person like Caitra lies down upon more than one couch. This is what is meant by subsistence ‘in part’. This is only by the way. Uddyotakara has argued as follows [in Nyāyavārtika on 2, 1. |
yatkiñcidetat / | 32, page 216, Bib. |
yadapyudyotakāreṇoktam ekasminnavayavini kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdapravṛttyasambhavādayukto 'yaṃ praśnaḥ kimekadeśena vartetātha kṛtsno vartata iti / | Ind.): “Inasmuch as the terms entire and a part cannot be applied to one and the same Composite, the question raised as to whether it subsists in its entirety or in part is an improper one; as a matter of fact, the term ‘entire’ stands for all, excepting nothing, while the term ‘a part’ stands for one among several; |
kṛtsnam iti khalvaśeṣābhidhānam, ekadeśa iti cānekatve sati kasyacidabhidhānam, tāvimau kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdāvekasminnavayavinyanupapannāviti tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam / | As a matter of fact, in common parlance, the terms whole and in part are found to be applied to such things as the Foot and the like, in such expressions as ‘Does the whole foot lie in the pond, or only in part?’ Nor can it be right to say that such use is figurative; because it is never found to fail or falter; |
tathā ca loke kṛtsnaḥ padaḥ kuṇḍe vartate ekadeśena vetyevaṃ padādiṣu kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdapravṛttir dṛśyata eva / | as has been pointed out before. “Sounds must subsist in something, because of their perishability and such other characters; like the jar, the lamp-flame and such things; |
naceyam upacariteti yuktam, askhalad gatitvād iti prāgabhihitam etat // | and this something must be ākāśa”. |
evaṃ vāyuparyantaṃ caturvidhaṃ dravyam apāstam / | So far the four kinds of Substance, ending with Air [i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air] have been discarded; |
ātmākhyaṃ tu prāg evātmaparīkṣāyāṃ nirastam / | the Substance called ‘Soul’ has already been discarded in the chapter on ‘Soul’; |
idānīm ākāśakāladiṅmanasāṃ pratiṣedhārtham āha samāśritā ityādi / samāśritāḥ kvacicchabdā vināśitvādihetutaḥ / | the Author next proceeds to deny the remaining four kinds of Substance viz.: Ākāśa, Time, Space and Mind; [and to that end, sets forth the arguments whereby the other party seeks to establish their existence]: [see verse 622 above] |
tatrākāśākhyaṃ tāvad dravyaṃ pareṇa sādhyate astyākāśākhyaṃ dravyaṃ nityam ekaṃ bhuviśabdaliṅgaṃ, śabdo 'sya guṇatvaliṅgam / | The existence of the substance called ‘Ākāśa’ is sought to be proved by the other party in the following manner: “There must be a Substance named Ākāśa, permanent, one and all-pervasive, having sound for its indicative; sound is its indicative in the sense that it is its quality. |
prayogaḥ ye ye vināśitvotpattimattvādidharmopetās te kvacid āśritāḥ yathā ghaṭadīpādayaḥ tathācāmī śabdāḥ, tasmāt kvacidāśritari ebhir bhavitavyam yo 'sāvāśrayo 'mīṣāṃ sa sāmarthyādvyoma ākāśaṃ bhaviṣyati / | This argument may be formulated as follows: Those things that are equipped with qualities like perishability and producibility, must subsist in something else; and the ‘substratum’ of sound can only be Ākāśa, as that alone has the requisite capacity. |
[p.206] tathā hyayaṃśabdo na pṛthivyādīnāṃ caturṇāṃ guṇo yuktaḥ, pratyakṣatve satyakāraṇaguṇapūrvakatvāt, ayāvad dravyabhāvitvāt, āśrayādanyatropalabdheś ca / | Because, the said sound cannot be the quality of the four substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air, (a) because, while being perceptible, it is not preceded by any quality in its Cause, (b) because it does not last as long as the Substance lasts, and (c) because it is perceived in a place other than its substratum; |
yathoktadharmaviparītā hi sparśavatāṃ guṇā dṛṣṭāḥ / | and the qualities of all tangible things have been found to be otherwise than all this. |
pratyakṣatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ pākajaiḥ paramāṇugatair anekāntatvaparihārārtham / | The qualification ‘while being perceptible’ has been added with a view to those qualities in the Atom which are produced by Fire-contact. |
bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvād ātmāntaragrāhyatvād ahaṅkāreṇa vibhaktagrahaṇāc ca nātmano guṇaḥ / | Nor can Sound be a quality of the Soul; (a) because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ, (b) because it is perceptible by other Souls, (c) because it is perceived as distinct from the ‘I-notion’; |
ātmaguṇānāṃ hi sukhādīnām etad vaiparītyadarśanāt / | while all qualities of the Soul, such as pleasure and the rest are otherwise than all this. |
śrotragrāhyatvāc ca na dekkālamanasām / | Sound cannot be a quality of Space, Time and Mind, because it is apprehended by the Auditory Organ. |
ataḥ pāriśeṣyād guṇo bhūtvākāśasya liṅgam / | Thus, by elimination, Sound can be the quality of Ākāśa, of which, therefore, it becomes the indicative. |
taccākāśaṃ śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvād ekaṃ sarvatropalabhyamānaguṇatvāt vibhuguṇavattvāt / | This Ākāśa, having Sound as its only common Indicative, and having no other specific indicatives, must be one; and as having its qualities perceptible everywhere, it must be all-pervading; |
anāśritatvāc ca dravyam / akṛtakatvān nityam ityeṣā prakriyā pareṣām // | and having a quality, and itself not subsisting in anything else, it must be a substance; and as it is not created (by any one), it must be permanent.” |
ādityādītyādinā kālasādhanamāha | Such is the process of reasoning put forward by the other party (in proof of Ākāśa as a Substance). |
ādityādikriyādravyavyatirekanibandhanam / parāparādivijñānaṃ ghaṭādipratyayo yathā // valīpalitakārkaśyagatyādipratyayādidam / | “The notion of priority, posteriority and so forth must have for its basis something other than mobile substances like the sun, like the notion of the jar and such things, because it is entirely different in character from the notion of wrinkles, grey hairs, emaciation and so forth; |
yato vilakṣaṇaṃ hetuḥ sa ca kālaḥ kileṣyate // | and it is this basis, cause, which is held to be ‘time’.” (623-624) |
dravyaśabdena valīpalitādayo grahītavyāḥ / | “The term ‘mobile substances’ should be taken as standing for ‘wrinkles’, etc. “Such notion as ‘Prior’, applied to the Father; |
paraḥ pitā, aparaḥ putraḥ, yugapat, ciraṃ, kṣipraṃ, kriyate, kṛtaṃ, kariṣyate ceti yadetat parāprādijñānaṃ tadādityādikriyādravyavyatiriktapadārthanibandhanam, alīpalitādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, ghaṭādipratyayavat / yo hetur asya sa sāmarthyātkālaḥ / | ‘Posterior’, to the Son; ‘simultaneous’, ‘for a long time’, ‘soon’, ‘is being done’, ‘was done’, ‘will be done’, and so forth all this notion of Priority and Posteriority, etc. must be based upon (due to) some substance other than the Sun and other mobile substances; because they are different in character from the notion of ‘wrinkles’, ‘grey hairs’ and so forth, like the notion of the Jar and suchngs: and that which is the basis of the said notions must be Time, as that alone has the requisite capacity. |
tathā hi na tāvad deśakṛto 'yaṃ parāparādipratyayaḥ / paradigbhāgāvasthite 'pi sthavire para iti jñānotpatteḥ / | For instance, the said notion of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’ cannot be due to Space, because when the old man is standing in space at the back of the younger man, he is said to be ‘posterior’; |
tathāparadigbhāgāvasthāyinyapi putre 'para iti / nāpi valīpalitādikṛtaḥ, tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt / | and similarly when the Son is standing in space in front of the Father, he is said to be ‘prior’, Nor can the said notion be due to wrinkles, grey hairs and such causes; because it is entirely different from the notion of these. |
nāpi kriyākṛtaḥ, tajjñānavilakṣaṇatvād eva / | Nor can it be due to any Action (Movement), because it is different in character from that also. |
tathā ca sūtram | To this end is the Sūtra (of the Vaiśeṣikas) |
aparaṃ paraṃ yugapad ayugapacciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgānīti / | ‘Such notions as Prior, Posterior, Simultaneous, for Long Time, and Soon are the indicatives of Time’, |
nityatvaikatvādayo dharmā ākāśavad evāsya boddhavyāḥ // | “The character of being permanent, one and so forth has to be understood in regard to Time in the same way as in regard to Ākāśa.” (623-624) |
pūrvāparādibuddhibhyo digevamanumīyate / | “Similarly space is inferred from such notions as ‘fore’ and ‘aft’.” (625a) |
krameṇa jñānajātyā ca manaso 'numitir mama // | “The mind has been held to be inferred from the successive appearance of cognitions; |
cakṣurādivibhinnaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ samapekṣate / | which requires a cause different from the eye and other sense-organs. |
krameṇa jātā rūpādipratipattī rathādivat // | as a matter of fact, the cognitions of colour and such things appear successively, like the chariot and such things.” (625b-626) |
[p.207] mūrttaṃ darvyam avadhiṃ kṛtvā mūrteṣveva dravyeṣu tasmād idaṃ pūrveṇa, dakṣiṇena, paścimena uttareṇa, pūrvadakṣiṇena, dakṣiṇāpareṇa, aparottareṇa uttarapūrveṇa, adhastād upariṣṭād iti daśa pratyayā amī yato bhavanti sa digiti / | [see verse 625a above] Taking one corporeal substance as the starting point, there are, in regard to other corporeal substances, the ten notions as ‘this is to the East to the South to the West to the North to the South-East to the South-West to the North-West to the North-East, above below of that’; and that upon which these are based is Space. |
tathāca sūtram ita idam iti yatas taddiśo liṅgam iti / | Says the Sūtra: ‘That to which the notion that this is from that is due is the indicative of Space’; |
yata ete viśeṣapratyayāḥ, naca viśeṣapratyayā ākasmikā yuktāḥ naca, paramparaṃ mūrtadravyavyapekṣā, itaretarāśrayatvenobhayābhāvaprasaṅgāt, tasmād anyanimittāsambhavād diśa etāni liṅgāni tasyāś ca diśaḥ kālavadekatvavibhutvādayo guṇā boddhavyāḥ / | because these are peculiar notions, and peculiar notions cannot appear in a haphazard manner; nor are they dependent upon the corporeal substances themselves; as such mutual interdependence would nullify both; hence, there being no other cause for them, these are regarded as indicatives of Space. Of this Space, the qualities of one-ness, all-pervasiveness and other qualities are to be understood to be like those of Time. |
ekatve 'pi diśaḥ kāryaviśeṣaṇāt prācyādibhedena nānātvam / | Though Space is one only, it comes to he regarded as diverse by reason of the diversity of its effects. |
prayogaḥ yaditat pūrvaparādijñānaṃ tan mūrtadravya{bhinna---}padārthanibandhanam, tatpratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt sukhādijñānavad iti / | The argument may be formulated as follows: The notions of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ and the like must be based upon a Substance other than the corporeal substances, because they are different from the notions arising from these, like the notions of pleasure, etc. |
manaso liṅgam āha krameṇetyādi / | The indicative of Mind is next stated: [see verses 625b-626 above] |
yugapad anekendriyārthasannikarṣasānnidhye 'pi krameṇa jñānotpattidarśanādād astīndriyārthavyatiriktaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ yasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṃ jñānasyotpattyanutpattī bhavata iti / | Even when the contact between the object and several sense-organs is present at the same time, the cognitions are found to appear one after the other; which shows that there is some other cause, distinct from the object and the sense-organ, the presence and absence of which leads to the appearance and non-appearance (respectively) of the cognition. |
tasmāt krameṇa jñānajātyā jñānotpattyā manaso 'numitiḥ kriyate / | Thus from this appearance of cognitions, in succession, the inference of Mind is got at. |
tathāca sūtram yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam iti / prayogaḥ yeyaṃ rūpādipratipattiḥ sā cakṣurādivyatiriktakāraṇāpekṣiṇī krameṇa jāyamānatvāt, rathādivad iti / | To this effect we have the Sutra ‘The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously indicates the Mind The argument may be formulated thus: The Cognition of colour and such things is dependent upon a cause other than the Eye and the other organs, because it appears in succession, like the Chariot and such things. |
upāttādītyādinā pratividhatte upāttādimahābhūtahetutvāṅgīkṛter dhvaniḥ / siddhā evāśritāḥ śabdās teṣvityādyamasādhanam // | Inasmuch as sound is already accepted as having its cause in the ‘great elements’ that have been acknowledged (or not-acknowledged), it is already admitted that sounds subsist in those elements. So that the first reason put forward (for the existence of ākāśa) cannot prove (what it is meant to prove). |
yadi sāmānyenāśritatvamātrameṣāṃ sādhyate śabdānāṃ tadā siddhasādhyatā hetoḥ / tathā hi śabdā upāttānupāttamahābhūtahetukā iṣyante / | If it is only the fact of Sounds being subsistent in a general way in something that is sought to be proved, then the Reason is superfluous (proving what is already admitted). Because, as a matter of fact, Sounds are already admitted as having their cause in the Great Elements that have been acknowledged (by all parties) and those that have not been so acknowledged; |
teṣu ca bhūteṣu tatkāryatayā samāśritā eva / | and Sounds are certainly subsistent in these elements which are their cause (source); |
tat pratibaddhātmalābhatayā kāryāṇāṃ kāraṇāśritatvāt / | because effects are always subsistent in their cause, having their appearance (production) inseparably connected with the Cause. |
upāttāni cittacaittaiḥ svīkṛtāni / | The ‘acknowledged’ elements are the Citta (Idea) and the Caitya (the Ideal), which are accepted (by Buddhists also). |
ādiśabdenānupāttamahābhūtahetukatvaparigrahaḥ / | The term ‘ādi’ includes the causality of such elements as are not acknowledged (i.e. Earth etc., which though not-acknowledged by the Buddhist, are accepted by the other party). |
teṣviti / | ‘Teṣu’ i.e. in those elements. |
itīti / tasmād ity arthaḥ / | ‘Iti’ i.e. therefore. |
ādyam iti "samāśritāḥ kvacicchabdā" ityādinā yaduktaṃ tadasādhanaṃ siddhisādhyatādoṣād iti bhāvaḥ // | ‘The first Reason’, i.e. the one put forward under Text 622; it cannot prove what it is desired to prove; that is, because it is open to the objection of being ‘superfluous (627) |
ekavyāpidhruvavyomasamavāyastu siddhyati / | The subsistence of sounds in ākāśa, which is one, all-pervading and eternal, cannot be proved (by the reason adduced), because it is devoid of ‘positive concomitance’; |
naiṣāmanvayavaikalyād akramādyāptitas tathā // | and also because there would be absence of succession and so forth; as also universal contact. |
[p.208] naiṣām iti / | ‘Na-eṣām’ goes with the preceding line. |
pratijñāyāścānumānavirodhitvam iti darśayati akramādyāptitastatheti / | That the Opponent’s conclusion is contrary to Inference is shown in the Text by the words ‘and also because, etc.’; |
yathoktaṃ nabhaḥsamavāyitvam eṣaṃ na siddhyatīti sambandhaḥ / yadi hi nityaikanabhodravyasamavetā amī syuḥ, tadā sakṛdutpannānekaśabdavadatatkālā api śabdā abhimata eva kāle syuḥ, avikālakāraṇatvāt, ekāśrayatvācca / | i.e. what has been said in the foregoing sentence to the effect that ‘the subsistence of sounds is not proved’, is so also because of the following reason: If the Sounds were subsistent in the eternal, one substance, Ākāśa, then like the several Sounds produced at the same time, even Sounds produced at other times would be there at the same time in question, as their cause would be present there always in its perfect condition, and also because they would all be subsisting in the same substratum; |
naca nityasya parāpekṣāstīti pratipāditam etat / nacāpyanupakāriṇaḥ samavāyitvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | and it has already been explained that what is eternal cannot be dependent upon anything else; nor would it be right to regard that as ‘subsistent’ which is of no use. |
tadevamakramatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | So that the appearance of all Sounds would cease to be successive. |
ādiśabdena sarvapuruṣair grahaṇādidoṣaprasaṅgaś ca / | The phrase ‘and so forth’ includes the anomaly of all Sounds being heard by all persons. |
tathāhyākāśātmakam eva śrotraṃ nabhaścaikam eva, tataś ca tat prāptānāṃ sarveṣām api śabdānāṃ śravaṇaṃ bhavet, nahi nirvibhāgatvena tasyāyaṃ pratiniyamo yuktaḥ, idam ātmīyaṃ śrotram idaṃ parakīyam iti / | Because the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa, and Ākāśa is one only, all Sounds would reach the organ of all men and hence become heard; and on account of the impartite nature of Ākāśa, any such restriction would be impossible as that ‘this is my own Auditory Organ and that is of another person’. |
syān matam tadīyādṛṣṭābhisaṃskṛtā yā karṇaśaṣkulī tat paricchinnasyaivākāśasya śrotratvam ata eva na mukhanāsikādivivarāntareṇa śabdopalambho jāyate, tasyā eva ca karṇaśaṣkulyā upaghātād bādhiryādir vyavasthāpyata iti / | The following argument might be urged: “When the tympanum of one has been affected by his Destiny, then that portion of the Ākāśa alone which is circumscribed by that tympanum forms the Auditory Organ of that person; that is why Sound is not perceived through other openings, such as the mouth, the nostrils and the like. And when that same Tympanum is hurt, there is deafness”. |
etad ayuktam eva niraṃśatayākāśasyaivaṃvidhavibhāgasyāyogāt / | This cannot be right; because Ākāśa being impartite, any such partition of it would be impossible. |
naca parikalpitā avayavavibhāgā bhāvikavastuvibhāgasaṃsādhyām arthakriyāmāropavaśāt sampādayitum īśate / | Nor can imaginary component parts bring about, through mere imagination, any effective action which can be done only by real positive entities; |
nahi jalamanala ityupacaryamāṇaṃ jvalati dahati vā / | merely imagining Water to be Fire does not make the former to burn or ñare up. |
atha matamākāśasya{syaika---} deśa iti saṃyogasyāvyāpyavṛttitvam{tvādu---} ucyata iti / | It might be said that: “what is meant by Ākāśa having a part is that contact with it is not pervasive”. |
etad api pratyuktam eva / | This also has been already answered. |
kiṃ ca ghaṭakarṇaśaṣkulyādayo 'pyabhinnaikavyomasaṃsargitayā samānadeśā bhaveyuḥ / | Then again, under the theory in question, the Jar, the Tympanum and all such things, as being in contact with one and the same Ākāśa, would come to occupy the same point in space; |
yenaiva hi vyomasvabhāvenaikaḥ saṃyujyate tenaivāpare 'pīti, tataścābhimatadeśabhāvina evāpare 'pi ghaṭādayaḥ syuḥ, tat saṃyuktasvabhāvākāśasaṃyogitvāt, taddeśāvasthitaghaṭādivat / | because when one thing comes into contact with Ākāśa in one form, the otherng also comes into contact with it in the same form; so that other Jars and other things also would appear at the same place; because these would be in contact with Ākāśa which is in contact with the former thing; just like the Jar already existing there. |
ata eva śabdānām apyekadeśatvaṃ bhavet, tataś ca dūrāsannataradeśabhdeāvasthātipratītā yeyaṃ padārthānāṃ keṣāñcit sā virodhinī syādityevam ādayo doṣā bahavaḥ prasarpanti // | īn this way, all Sounds also would appear at one and the same place; and this would be contrary to the generally accepted notion regarding Sounds appearing far off or close by. These are the difficulties that appear against the Opponent’s theory. |
kālādiksādhanayor api sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇānvayāsiddhir hetoḥ pratijñāyāś cānumānabādheti darśayati viśiṣṭetyādi / | The notions of ‘priority and posteriority’ (and of ‘fore and aft’) are based upon a conception arising out of particular conventions; |
parāparādivijñānaṃ na kālān na diśaś ca tat // | they are not due to ‘time’, nor to ‘space’. |
niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ / | Inasmuch as these are impartite, one, ‘priority’, ‘posteriority’ and the like are not possible in them. |
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