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tataś ca ṣaṭpadārthābhyupagamo hīyata iti bhāvaḥ // | and this would militate against the doctrine of the ‘Six Categories’. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ ṣaṭpadārthā iti proktamityāha ṣaḍeta iti / ṣaḍete dharmiṇaḥ proktā dharmās tebhyo 'tirekiṇaḥ / iṣtā eveti cetko 'yaṃ sambandhastasya tairmataḥ // | “The six that have been postulated are things with properties, and the properties are certainly admitted by us to be distinct from them.” If this is said (by the other party), then (we ask) what is the relation that is held to subsist between the categories and the properties? This relation cannot be that of ‘conjunction’, as this is restricted to substances alone (under the nyāya-view); |
samavāyosti nānyaś ca sambandho 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ paraiḥ // | nor is the other relation, that of ‘inherence’, possible; and no other relation is accepted by the other party. |
dharmirūpā eva ye bhāvās te ṣaṭpadārthā iti proktāḥ, dharmarūpās tu ṣaṭpadārthā vyatiriktā iṣṭā eva / | “The ‘Six Categories’ that have been postulated are only those that have Properties; while the ‘Six Categories’ in the shape of the Properties are held to be quite distinct; |
tathā hi padārthapraveśake granthaḥ ---" evaṃ dharmair vinā dharmiṇām eṣa nirdeśaḥ kṛta" iti / | as is found in the following words of the Padārthapraveśaka ‘This mention has been made of only the things with properties, without any mention of the Properties’.” |
koyam ityādinottaram āha tasya astitvāder dharmasya / | The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words ‘Then what is the relation, etc., etc.’; |
[p.193] kaḥ sambandho yena teṣām asau dharmo bhavati / nahi sambandhamantareṇa dharmidharmabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | with ‘those’ i.e. the Categories what is that relation by virtue of which Existence becomes the ‘property’ of the Categories? Without some sort of relation the character of ‘Property and With Properly’ would not be possible; |
evaṃ hi sarvasya sarvadhrmatvaṃ syāt, nahi kaścit taiḥ saha sambandho 'sti / | otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of Existence and the Categories. |
tathā hi dvividha evas sambandhaḥ saṃyogalakṣaṇaḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaś ca, tatra na tāvat saṃyogalakṣaṇas tasya guṇatvena dravyeṣveva niyatatvāt / | Because there are only two kinds of Relation Conjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of Quality, Conjunction is restricted to Substances only [and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; |
na ca samavāyātmakas tasya bhāvavadekatveneṣṭatvāt / | Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like ‘Existence’ itself; |
samavāyena ca samavāyātmake sambandhe sati dvitīyaḥ samavāyo 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt // | while if the relation of ‘Inherence’ subsisted between Inherence and the Categories, then the former ‘Inherence’ should have to be regarded as different from the latter [and this would involve self-contradiction]. |
vinaiva sambandhaṃ dharmadharmibhāvo bhaviṣyatīti cet prāha sambandhānupapattāvityādi / sambandhānupapattau ca teṣāṃ dharmo bhavet katham / tadutpādanamātrāccedanye 'pi syus tathāvidhāḥ // | If no relation is possible, then how could the property belong to the categories? If it were held to belong to them merely on the ground of its being produced by them, then there would be others also like it. It might be argued that “the Property of Existence could belong to the Categories without any relation”. |
evaṃ hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syād ityuktam / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 576 above] So that it would lead to an absurdity. |
atha taiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ padārthair dharmasyotpādanāt teṣām ayaṃ dharmaḥ sambandhītyucyate / yadyevam anye 'pi tarhi jalādayas tadutpattilakṣaṇasambandhamātrād eva tathāvidhāḥ kuṇḍādisambandhinaḥ syuḥ bhaveyuḥ / | If it be held that the Property is said to be related to the Six Categories, on account of its being produced by them, then, there are other things also, such as Water and the like which would be ‘like it’ i.e. related to things like the Tank and such things, merely on that ground ‘of being produced by them’; |
tataś ca saṃyogasamavāyākhyasambandhāntarakalpanā teṣu vyarthā syāt // | and under the circumstances, the postulating of Relations in the shape of ‘Conjunction’ and ‘Inherence’ would be futile. |
tasyāpyastitvam ityevaṃ vartate vyatirekiṇī / vibhaktis tasya cānyasya bhāve 'niṣṭhā prasajyate // | Further, as there would be ‘existence’ of the existence also, the incompatible (genitive) ending would be incompatible with it; and if there were existence of that existence also, and so forth, there would be no end to it. |
kiṃ ca bhavatu nāma ṣaṇām astitvaṃ nāma dharmāntaraṃ tathāpi vyabhicāra eva / | Further, even granting that the Property of ‘Existence’ belongs to the Six Categories, your Reason remains defective (false, inconclusive). |
tathā hi tasyāpyastitvam astyeva vastutvāt / | For instance, that Existence itself would have existence, as it is an Entity; |
tataś ca tatra vyatirekanibandhanā vibhaktiḥ kathaṃ bhavet / atha tatrāpyaparamastitvamaṅgīkriyate tadānavasthā syāt // iṣṭatvān nānavasthā bādhiketi cedāha anyetyādi / | how then could there be the Genitive ending in the expression ‘existence of Existence’, which (as you say) is based on difference? If it be held that there is yet another existence of the Existence, then there is an Infinite Regress. Thus in all these ‘existences’, the character of ‘being with property’ would be due to the presence therein of another property; |
dravyāder api dharmitvam asmādeva ca saṃmatam // | and in the case of substance and the rest also, the character of ‘being with property’ has been accepted on the same basis. |
sarveṣām eva hyuttarottaradharmasamāveśād dharmitvaṃ syāt / | In each one of these Existences (ad infinitum), the character of ‘being with property’ would be due to the presence therein of the properties coming one after the other; |
tataś ca ṣaḍete dharmiṇa eva proktā ityetannopapadyate, ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇānyeṣām api dharmiṇāṃ vidyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | and under the circumstances, the assertion that ‘these Six Categories alone are with property’ would not be correct; as there would be many otherngs also (in the shape of the Existences), apart from the Six Categories, which would be with property. |
athāpi syāt ye dharmirūpa eva ta eva ṣaḍtvenāvadhāritāḥ, ityetadapyasāram / | It might be argued that “what are said to be six only are those things that are always with property only [while others are with property and also are themselves property]”. |
evaṃ hi guṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām anirdeśaḥ syāt / nahyeṣāṃ dharmirūpatvam eva, kiṃ tarhi, dharmarūpatvam api, dravyāśritatvād eṣām / | As, under this explanation, Quality, Action, Universal, Individuality and Inherence could not be mentioned therein, as these are not always with property only, they are of the nature of property also, as all these subsist in the Substance. |
asmādeveti / | ‘On the same basis’; |
anyadharmasamāveśāt / | i.e. because of the presence of other properties. |
anyaḥ punar āha ṣaṇṇām astitvaṃ hi sadupalambhakapramāṇagamyatvam / gamyatvaṃ ca ṣaṭ [p.194] padārthaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ, tasmin sati sadvyavahārapravartanāt / | The Opponent says: “The existence of the Six Categories consists in their Cognisability by the Means of Cognising existing things; and this Cognisability is in the form of the Cognition which has the Six Categories for its object; as it is only when this Cognition is present that they are regarded as ‘existent’. |
tathā jñānajanitaṃ jñeyatvam, abhidhānajanitamabhidheyatvam iti / | Thus ‘cognisability’ is produced by Cognition and ‘predicability’ is produced by Predication; |
ato vyatirekanibandhanā ṣaṣṭhī bhavatyeva / | so that the use of the Genitive Ending based upon difference, becomes quite possible. |
nacāpyanavasthā, nāpi ṣaṭpadārthāntaraprasaṅga iti / | Nor is there an Infinite, Regress; nor the contingency of Categories other than the six (postulated by us).” |
tasyāpīdaṃ kalpanāmātram eva / | This also is a mere figment of the Opponent’s imagination. |
yadi hyarthakriyāsamarthapadārthātmakamātmatattvameṣāmastyeva tadā te 'rthakriyāsamarthāḥ padārthā eva bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ teṣāmastitvamityevaṃ yadi vyatirekavibhaktyā vyapadiśyeraṃs tadā ko virodhaḥ / tadavyatiriktam api hi svarūpaṃ buddhyā tato 'vakṛtya vyatiriktamivābhidhīyamānamavirodhyeva, vācāmicchāmātravṛttitvād utpādyakathoparaciteṣu bāhulyasaundaryādidharmaparikalpanavad iti yatkiñcid etat // | If the things in question are in their essence of the nature of a Category (Thing) capable of effective action, then, as being capable of effective action, they must be Categories (Things); this being conceded, if they are spoken of by words with case-endings connoting difference, in such expressions as ‘the existence of these’, only to meet the enquiry as to their being other forms of Categories, then what is the dispute between us? Because though its character is really not-different, yet having withdrawn that character from it, if the speaker were to speak of it as if it were different, then there would be no dispute; because the use of words depends entirely upon the speaker’s whim, as is found in the case of characters created in concocted stories, where extreme degrees of beauty and other qualities are assumed and described. |
prathamebhyaś ca tantubhyaḥ paṭasya yadi sādhyate / bhedaḥ sādhanavaiphalyaṃ durnivāraṃ tadā bhavet // | If it is the difference of the cloth from the very first yarns that is sought to be proved, then there is the irresistible defect of ‘futility’. |
prāptāvasthāviśeṣā hi ye jātās tantavo 'pare / viśiṣṭārthakriyāsaktāḥ prathamebhyo 'vilakṣaṇāḥ // | those other yarns also that appear later on, in another state (form), capable of a particular kind of useful action, are not entirely different in character from those first yarns. It has been argued by the other party (under Text 561, above) that “the Yarns and the Cloth are distinct things, because their makers and potencies are different, etc. etc.” |
yadi prathamāvasthābhāvibhyo 'samadhigatapaṭākhyānebhyastantubhyaḥ paṭasya bhedaḥ sādhyate tadā siddhaṃ sādhyate / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 579-580 above] If what you are seeking to establish is the difference of the Cloth from those first yams which have not yet acquired the name of ‘Cloth’, then you are proving what is already admitted. |
sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvena pūrvakebhyas tantubhyaḥ paṭaśabdavācyānāṃ tantūnāṃ tadvilakṣaṇapadārtha{rthatvā---}sambhave 'pyutpādasyāṅgīkaraṇāt // | In fact, all things being momentary, it is admitted by us that the later yams which subsequently come to be called ‘Cloth’ are actually produced from those first yarns, though (as a matter of fact) it is not possible for one thing to be produced out of another totally different from it. |
atha paṭasamānakālabhāvino ye tantavas tebhyaḥ paṭasyānyatvaṃ prasādhyate tadā hetūnām asiddhateti darśayann āha eketyādi / | If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is the difference of the Cloth from those yarns that have come into existence at the same time as the Cloth, then, the Reasons adduced are such as are not admitted, ‘Unproven’. |
ekakāryopayogitvajñāpanāya pṛthakśrutau / gauravāśaktivaiphalyadoṣatyāgābhivāñchayā // sākalyenābhidhānena vyavahārasya lāghavam / manyamānaiḥ kṛtā yeṣu vāgekā vyavahartṛbhiḥ // tebhyaḥ samānakālastu paṭo naiva prasiddhyati / | The intention being to indicate their use in the accomplishment of a single purpose, if each yarn were spoken of separately, then there would be the defects of (a) prolixity, (b) incapacity, and (c) futility with a view to avoid these, thinking that there would be simplicity of usage if all the yarns were mentioned by a single name, people making use of words have brought forth the single term and applied it to the yarns, but these (yarns) do not serve to prove the cloth, which is synchronous with those yarns, as having a different maker and different potencies and different size. |
yadi tadānīṃ tantuvyatiriktas tat samānakālabhāvī paṭaḥ prasiddho bhavet tadā tasya tantuvyapekṣayā vibhinnakartṛtvādayo dharmaḥ siddhyeyur yāvatā saevāyaṃ tantuvyatirekī [p.195] paṭo na siddhaḥ / | If the Cloth existing at the same time as the yarns were at the time actually known as something different from the yarns, then, in comparison with the yarns, it might be recognised as having the characters of having a different maker and the rest (which have been put forward by the other party); as it is, however, that Cloth itself is not known as something different from the yarns; |
tadbhedasyaiva prasādhayituṃ prastutatvāt / | as it is this very difference that the other party has proceeded to establish. |
na ca paṭas tantava iti saṃjñāmātrād vastūnāṃ bhedaḥ, prayojanāntaravaśenāpi saṃjñāntarasya niveśāt / | The mere presence of the two different names ‘Cloth’ and ‘Yarns’ does not necessarily prove the two things to be different, as different names may be applied to the same thing for various other purposes. |
tathā hi kecit tantavo viśiṣṭāvasthāprāptāḥ śītāpanodanādyekārthakriyāsamarthā bhavanti, nāpare ye yoṣitkartṛkāḥ / | For instance, some particular yarns, having reached a certain condition, become capable of accomplishing the useful purpose of keeping off cold; and there may be other yarns which, for instance, have just left the hands of the spinning women, which are not so capable. |
tatraikārthakriyopayoginas tantūn viśiṣṭān pratipādayituṃ paṭa ityekā śrutir viniveśyate vyavahartṛbhir asāṅkaryeṇa vyavahārāyāsatyapyarthāntaratve / | And with a view to indicate that the former yarns are capable of accomplishing a single purpose, the single term ‘Cloth’ is applied to them by people speaking of them, specially for the purpose of avoiding confusion; |
kasmāt punar ekā śutir viniveśyata ity āha pṛthakśrutāvityādi / | even though, in reality the Cloth is not anything different from the yarns. Question: “Why, then, is a single term applied at all?” |
pṛthakpṛthak pratyekaṃ śrutau abhidhāne sati gauravadoṣaḥ / tathā hi tatra yāvantaḥ padārthā vivakṣitaikakāryasādhanayogyās tāvantaeva śabdāḥ prayoktavyā iti gauravadoṣaḥ / | Answer If each of the yarns were spoken of separately, i.e. if each yarn were spoken of one by one, then, there would be the following defects: (a) Prolixity; i.e. as many words will have to be used as there are things capable of accomplishing the same purpose; and this would be too prolix; |
nacāpyeṣām asādhāraṇaṃ rūpaṃ śakyaṃ nirdeṣṭumityaśaktidoṣaḥ / | (b) Incapacity; it will not be possible to ascertain the specific forms of each individual; this is what is meant by incapacity; |
utprekṣitasāmānyākāreṇa ca nirdeśe varamekayaiva śrutyā pratipādanaṃ, na cāsya pṛthakpṛthakpratipādanaprayāsasya kiñcitphalamupalabhyata iti naiphalyadoṣaḥ / | (c) Futility: speaking of them as having some imaginary common form, it is better to speak of them by a single word; and hence there is no use in speaking of each of them separately. |
sāmastyena tvabhidhāne kṛte sati vyavahāralāghavaṃ guṇaḥ / | On the other hand, if they are all spoken of as a whole, there is the distinct advantage that usage becomes simplified. |
samastavastuvivakṣāyāṃ jagattribhuvanaviśvādiśabdavad ekā vāgiti / | Just as single comprehensive words are used in speaking of all things by such all-comprehensive names as ‘World’, ‘Three-Worlds’, ‘Universe’ and so forth. |
paṭa ityevaṃ vacanam ity arthaḥ / | Exactly of the same kind is the name ‘Cloth’ (as comprehending all the yarns). |
kartā ca sāmarthyaparimāṇādidharmaśceti tau tathoktau, tato vibhinnaśabdena viśeṣaṇasamāsaṃ kṛtvā matup kāryaḥ // | The compound ‘vibhinna, etc.’ is to be expounded by making a copulative compound between ‘Kartṛ’ and ‘Sāmarthya, etc.’, and then taking this copulative compound as qualified by the term ‘vibhinna’. |
yaccoktaṃ sthūlārthāsambhava ityādi tatrāha anyonyābhisarā iti / | It has been argued (under Text 462, above) that “if there were no gross Substance, the perception of the Tree and such things would not be possible; |
asiddhamaṇūnām atīndriyatvaṃ viśiṣṭāvasthāprapatānām indriyagrāhyatvāt / | The fact of Atoms being beyond the reach of the senses is not admitted; because such Atoms as have attained a certain condition are actually perceptible by the senses. |
yasya hi nityāḥ paramāṇava iti pakṣas taṃ pratyaṇūnāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt sarvadaivātīndriyatvaṃ, syāt nāsmān prati / | In fact, it is for people who regard Atoms as eternal, that the appearance of peculiar features in the Atoms being impossible, they would be always beyond the reach of the senses; not so for us. |
anyonyasahāyā ity arthaḥ // | ‘Anyonyābhisarāḥ’ ‘as mutually helpful’, i.e. as helping each other. |
nīlādir ityādinā tadevākṣagocaratvaṃ darśayati nīlādiḥ paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ kalpito nijaḥ / nīlādipratibhāsā ca vedyate cakṣurādidhīḥ // | The ‘blue’ and other shapes have been postulated in regard to the atoms themselves; and the visual and other cognitions also serve to manifest only those blue and other shapes. The following text also shows that Atoms are perceptible by the senses: [see verse 585 above] |
nanu ca paurvāparyādidigbhedena paramāṇavo 'vasthitā iṣyante naca tena rūpeṇopalakṣyante / | Though they are not perceived in the sequential form, yet their perceptibility cannot be denied, it being similar to that of drinks and other things. Question: “Atoms are held to exist in a sequential form one after the other; and certainly they are not ‘perceived’ in that form; |
tat katham eṣāṃ pratyakṣatetyāha paurvāparyavivekenetyādi / | then how can they be said to be perceptible?” Answer: [see verse 586 above] |
paurvāparyavivekena yadyapyeṣām alakṣaṇam / tathāpyadhyakṣatābādhā pānakādāviva sthitā // [p.196] adhyakṣatāyā abādhā adhyakṣatābādheti samāsaḥ / | The term ‘adhyakṣatābādhā’ may foe taken as a genitive Tatpuruṣa compound, meaning ‘non-denial of Perceptibility’; or it may not be treated as a compound but two separate words ‘adhyakṣatā’ and ‘abādhā’, the meaning being ‘Perceptibility is undeniable’; |
avidyamānabādhatvād abādhā / | i.e. there being no annulment of it, it cannot be denied. |
pānakādiṣvivādhyakṣatāvasthitetyarthaḥ / tathā hi pānake taptopalesūtahemādau ca miśre paramāṇava eva tathopalabhyante / | For instance, in the case of a ‘Drink’, the ‘Taptopala’ (? Heated or Burnt, Stone, a medicinal preparation), the ‘Sūtahema’ [? Quick-silver and gold, another medicinal preparation, the Makaradhvaja?], and such things, where the constituent atoms are of mixed characters (tastes), they are actually perceived as such. |
nahi tatrāvayavidravyam asti, vijātīyānāṃ dravyārambhakatvāt / | In the case of these things, there is no ‘composite substance’ (apart from the constituent Atoms), the things consisting of heterogeneous elements. |
nacāpi paramāṇuśodhyati{bhyovayavi---}bhede saṃyogo dṛśya upapadyate, adṛṣṭāśrayatvāt / yatra hyeko 'pi saṃyogī na dṛśyas tatra saṃyogo na dṛśyate / | In fact, if the Composite were something different from the Atoms, no conjunction among them could be visible; because the substratum of such conjunction i.e. the Atoms are unseen (ex hypothesi); and if even one of the factors of the Conjunction is not visible, the Conjunction cannot be perceived; |
yathā piśācaghaṭasaṃyogaḥ sūryamaṇḍalākāśadigdeśasaṃyogaś ca / | e.g. the conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost; and the conjunction between the Solar Disc and parts of space and of Ākāśa. |
yatra punaḥ sarva eva saṃyogī paramāṇvātmako na dṛśyate, tatra kathaṃ saṃyogastadāśrito dṛśyaḥ syāt // yadyevaṃ sarvaprakāreṇāniścaye sati kathaṃ nāma pratyakṣatā teṣāṃ yuktimatītyāha sarveṣām ityādi / | Such being the case, where all the conjuncts in the shape of Atoms, are imperceptible, how can the Conjunction subsisting in them be perceptible? (586) Question: “Thus then, the whole matter being uncertain, how can the perceptibility of Atoms be accepted as reasonable?” |
sarveṣām eva vastūnāṃ sarvavyāvṛttirūpiṇām / dṛṣṭāvapi tathaiveti na sarvākāraniścayaḥ // nahyaparadarśanānāṃ kvacid api vastuni pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte 'pi sarvākāraniścayo 'sti / | As a matter of fact, in the matter of the perception of all things, which exist only in the form of mutual exclusion (negation), there is the same uncertainty in regard to all their characters and forms. Under the view of the other Philosophers also, whenever anything is apprehended by Perception, there is no certainty in regard to all the forms and characters of that thing; |
yāvatā tu rūpeṇārthāntaravyāvṛttikṛtena na niścīyate, tāvatā tat pratyakṣam iti vyavasthāpyate / na sarvākāreṇa / | what happens is that it is regarded as perceived to that extent which serves to differentiate it from other things, and not all its forms and characters. |
gṛthītasyāpo prakārāntarasya niścayānutpatter vyavahārāyogyatvenāgṛhītakalpatvāt / | Because even if other factors were perceived, there would be no certainty regarding them, and these would be of no practical use, and as such, would be as good as not-perceived. |
tathaiveti / | ‘The same uncertainty’; |
yathā tadvastvanubhūtam // | i.e. as in the case of the apprehended thing. |
nanu ca niraṃśatayā sarvātmanaiva pratyakṣeṇānubhūtatvād vastunaḥ kasmāt sarvātmanā niścayo na bhavatītyāha akalpanākṣagamye 'pītyādi / akalpanākṣagamye 'pi niraṃśe 'rthasya lakṣaṇe / yadbhedavyavasāye 'sti kāraṇaṃ sa pratīyate // | Even though, the thing being impartite, its character is apprehensible only by indeterminate perception, yet there is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation (from other things); and it is this definite cognition that is understood to be the cause (of certainty). Says the Opponent: “Inasmuch as things are impartite, and everything is actually perceived in its complete form, why should there be no certainty regarding the whole Thing?” |
akṣe bhavam akṣamindriyajñānam ity arthaḥ / | Answer: [see verse 588 above] ‘Ākṣa’ is that which pertains to the senses; |
akalpanamavidyamānakalpanaṃ ca tadākṣaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / tena gamye 'pi nirvikalpendriyajñānagamye 'pītyarthaḥ / | i.e. perceptional cognition; and this is qualified by the term ‘akalpana’, ‘indeterminate’; though it is apprehensible by indeterminate Sense-perception, yet etc., etc. ‘There is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation’; |
yadbhedavyavasāya iti / | i.e. certainty as regards its being different; |
yasmād bhedo vyāvṛttir yadbhedas tatra vyavasāyo niścayas tasya kāraṇamabhyāsaḥ pratyāsattis tāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ cetyādi / | the cause of this consists in Repetition, Close Proximity, vividness of conviction of difference, and so forth. |
tarhyanubhavamātram eva niścayakāraṇaṃ kiṃtvabhyāsādayo 'pi / | As a matter of fact, mere Apprehension by itself does not bring about certainty, which is brought about with the help of repetition, etc. also. |
tena yatra te santi tatra niścayaḥ prasūyata ity arthaḥ / etac ca sarvaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ siddhiṃ bāhyasya cārthasya pratyakṣatvasiddhimabhyupagamyoktam / | Hence the meaning is that there is certainty where all these conditions are present. All this we have said on the supposition (for the sake of argument) that Atoms exist and also the external object is actually cognised by Perception; |
yasya tu vijñānavādino na bāhyo 'rtho nīlādirūpatayā pratyakṣāsiddhaḥ, svapnādau vināpi bāhyamarthaṃ tathāvidhanīlādipratibhāso 'palambhena saṃśayāt tasya ca nīlādi [p.197] pratibhāsopalambhena tasya ca nīlādirūpasyaikānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvena bhrāntajñānapratibhāsātmakatvāt, nāpiparamāṇavaḥ siddhās teṣāṃ paurvāparyāvasthāyitayā digbhāgabhedinām ekatvāsiddheḥ / | as a matter of fact however, for the Idealist, there is no external object, in the shape of Blue and the like, cognised by Perception; because in dreams and other such conditions, there is perception of such things as the Blue, even though such things have no existence at the time; and this fact makes the ordinary perception of such things also at least doubtful; specially as the form of the ‘Blue’ being devoid of the nature of one or many, its cognition must be of the nature of an illusory appearance. Nor are the Atoms admitted as existent; |
taṃ prati kathaṃ nīlādirūpatayā paramāṇūnāṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ paurvāparyasyavānupalakṣaṇaṃ bhrāntinimittenārthāntarasamāropād iti śakyaṃ vaktum // | because they exist in sequential succession, and as they vary in regard to the point of space occupied by them, they cannot be regarded as one. Under the circumstances, in view of such an Atom, how can it be asserted that Atoms are perceptible as having the Blue Colour, and that the sequence has no significance, being imposed upon it from outside through illusion? (588) |
syād yedyavayavī na syāt tadā kathaṃ bahuṣu paramāṇuṣvekaḥ parvata iti vyavasāyo vyāpṛtākṣasya bhavatītyāha samānetyādi / samānajvālāsambhūter yathā dīpena vibhramaḥ / | so [in the case of the mountain also], there is an illusion of unity, even though what are really cognised are several subtle entities appearing in close juxtaposition. The Opponent might argue that “if there were no Composite substance, how could a man with open eyes have the notion of ‘one mountain’ in reference to what are only so many Atoms?” |
nairantaryasthitānekasūkṣmavittau tathaikadhā // yathāhi dīpādau nairantaryeṇa sadṛśāparāparajvālāpadārthasambhavāt satyapi bheda ekatvavibhramo bhavati tathā nairantaryeṇānekasūkṣmatarapadārthasaṃvedano 'yam ekatvavibhrama ityadoṣaḥ // | In such things as the Lamp, it is the series of successively appearing similar flames that give rise to the illusion of there being ‘one lamp’, though in reality there are several flames, in the same manner, in the case of the mountain, what are really cognised are many small and smaller entities appearing in close juxtaposition, and this gives rise to the illusion of ‘oneness’, So that there is no incongruity at all. |
yadyevaṃ bhedenānupalakṣyamānāḥ katham aṇavaḥ pratyakṣāḥ sidhyantītyāha viveketyādi / vivekālakṣaṇāt teṣāṃ no cet pratyakṣateṣyate / | If the perceptibility of atoms is not admitted because of their being not-differentiated, then how is it seen in the case of the lamp and such things? or, is the composite held to be of that kind? (590) Question: “If then, the Atoms are not perceived as distinct from one another, how do they become perceptible?” |
yadi hi vivekenānavadhāryamāṇāṃ na pratyakṣamiṣyate, tadā dīpādau pūrvāparavibhāgenānupalabhyamāṇo sā pratyakṣatā kathaṃ dṛṣṭā / avayavī vāvayavavivekenāgṛhyamāṇo 'pi kiṃ tathā pratyakṣatveneṣṭa ityanaikāntikametat // | If it is held that what cannot be cognised in differentiated form cannot be perceptible, then, how is it that perceptibility is found in the Lamp, wherein also the individual flames appearing in quick succession cannot be differentiated? Or is it that the Composite only is a thing that is perceptible, even though its components are not differentiated? The reason thus put forward by the Opponent is inconclusive. |
etāvadityādinā paraṃ codayituṃ śikṣayati | The following Text advises the other Party as to the way in which he should level his criticism: [see verses 591-592 next] |
etāvat tu bhaved atra katham eṣāṃ na niścaye / nīlādiparamāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate // | All, that can be urged is “on the definite cognition of these (atoms), how is it that it is not realised that what is perceived as blue is the form of the atoms?” But that also cannot be the cause; |
tadapyakāraṇaṃ yasmān naiva jñānamagocaram / | because the cognition in question cannot be without an object; |
nacaikasthūlaviṣayaṃ sthaulyaikatvavirodhataḥ // | and yet it cannot have for its object a single gross object, as there is incompatibility between grossness and one-ness. |
eṣām iti paramāṇūnām / | Answer: [see verses 591-592 above] ‘These’ i.e. of the Atoms. |
tadapīti paramāṇūnāṃ vivekenālakṣaṇaṃ yat tadakāraṇam, paramāṇugatanīlādyagrahaṇasyānyato 'pi niścayotpatteḥ / | i.e. the fact of the Atoms being perceived as differentiated from one another cannot be the cause of the fact that the Blue colour is not perceived as belonging to the Atoms; because the certainty regarding this can be got at from other sources. |
tathāhīdaṃ jñānamaviṣayaṃ tāvad bahirarthavādinā satā naiveṣṭavyamanyathā hi vijñānamātratādarśanam eva syāt / | For instance, the upholder of the ‘External Thing’ cannot hold a Cognition to be devoid of an object; if he did admit it, then his view would come to be the view of pure ‘Idealism’. |
sa cāyaṃ rūpādiviṣayaḥ sthūlarūpatayāvabhāsamāna eko vā syād aneko vāeko 'pi bhavannārabdho vā syād avayavairanārabdho vā / tatra na tāvad ubhayātmāpyayam eko yuktaḥ pratyakṣādivirodhāt // | Under the circumstances, the Colour, etc. which form the objects of the Cognition, and appear therein in the gross form, is it one or many? If one, is it composed of the components, or not so composed? In either of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception. |
[p.198] ko 'sau virodha ity āha sthūlasyaikasvabhāvatva ityādi / | Question: “What is that ‘incompatibility (with Perception)?” Answer [see verses 593-594 next] |
sthūlasyakasvabhāvattve makṣikāpadamātrataḥ / pidhāne pihitaṃ sarvamāsajyetāvibhāgataḥ // | If the gross object were op the nature of one only, then on even part op it being covered by the little leg op a plea, all of it would become covered, without any distinction; |
rakte ca bhāga ekasmin sarvaṃ rajyeta raktavat / | and on one part op it being reddened, all of it would become coloured red. |
viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvamanuṣajyate // | Or, on the contrary, the presence op incompatible properties would indicate multiplicity. |
yadi hi sthūlamekaṃ syāt tadaikadeśapidhāne sarvasya pidhānam, ekadeśarāge ca sarvasya rāgaḥ prasajyeta, pihitāpihitayo raktāraktayoś ca bhavan matenābhedāt / | If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of one part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. |
nacaikasya parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāso yuktaḥ, atiprasaṅgāt / | And yet it is not possible for any single object to be possessed of contradictory properties, as that would lead to absurdities. |
evaṃ hi viśvamekaṃ dravyaṃ syāt, tataś ca sahotpādādiprasaṅgaḥ / | Thus the whole universe would become a single substance; and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. |
nacaikadeśapidhāne sarvaṃ pihitamīkṣyata iti pratyakṣavirodhaḥ / | As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. |
tathānumānavirodho 'pi / tathā hi yatparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ na tadekaṃ bhavati, yathā gomahiṣam, upalabhyamānānupalabhyamānarūpaṃ pihitādirūpeṇa ca viruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ sthūlam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts. It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one, e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo; the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being ‘covered’ and ‘not covered’; hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, [which makes one-ness impossible]. |
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