sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
samānametad dvayor api codyam, yato bhavatāpi sākārānākārapakṣābhyām avaśyam anya [p.182] taraḥ pakṣo 'ṅgīkartavyo 'nyathārthagrāhijñānaṃ na siddhyet / | The criticism that has been urged applies equally to both parties; as you also will have to accept one or the other of the two views of Cognition having form or being formless otherwise there would be no possibility of the Cognition apprehending an object. |
na cāpyetat pakṣadvayavyatirekeṇānyaḥ prakāro 'sti / yena jñānamarthaṃ grahīṣyati / | Nor is there any other alternative besides these two ways in which the Cognition could apprehend the object. |
yaccobhayor doṣo na tatraikaścodyo yuktaḥ / | When a criticism is applicable to both parties, it should not be urged by one against the other. |
tena yadatrottaraṃ bhavatas tadasmākam api bhaviṣyati / | Thus then the answer that you may be able to make to the criticism shall be our answer also. |
tathā hi sākārapakṣe bhavatāvaśyamākārāṇām alīkatvaṃ sahopalambhaniyamād vaikajñānāvyatirekitvaṃ satyapi bheda ityuttaramupavarṇanīyam / | For instance, under the view that Cognition has some form, the answer that you might make would be either that the forms are unreal, or that they are nothing different from the Cognition itself with which it is found to be invariably concomitant, even though the two appear to be different; |
tadevāsmākaṃ bhaviṣyati, nirākārapakṣe 'pi pūrvahetukṛta eva pratiniyatārthāvabodhakaḥ svabhāvo jñānasyeti varṇanīyam / | and this same answer shall be ours also. Under the view that Cognition is formless, the explanation that could be given would be that that character of the Cognition whereby it apprehends only a particular thing is due to previous Causes; |
tadaitadasmākam api nirākāravijñānavādināṃ bauddhānām uttaraṃ bhaviṣyatītyacodyam etat samādhānam iti parihāraḥ // | and tins same answer shall be available for us Bauddhas also, who hold Cognitions to be formless. Hence our answer to the Opponent’s criticism is that it cannot be urged against us. |
kṛtanāśo bhavedevaṃ kāryaṃ na janayedyadi / heturiṣṭaṃ na caivaṃ yat prabandhe nāsti hetutā // | There would be ‘waste of what is done’, only if the cause did not produce an effect no such view however is held by us, whereby there could be no ‘causal character’. |
akṛtābhyāgamo 'pi syād yadi yena vinā kvacit / | The ‘befalling of what is not done’ also would be there if an effect were produced without a cause; |
jāyeta hetunā kāryaṃ naitanniyataśaktitaḥ // | as the production of the effect is always dependent upon the potency of a particular cause. |
yadi hi paramārthataḥ kaścit kartā bhoktā vābhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadā kṣaṇabhaṅgitvāṅgīkaraṇe kṛtanāśādiprasaṅgaḥ syāt yāvatedaṃ pratyayatāmātram evaviśvaṃ na kenacit kartrā kiñcitkṛtaṃ nābhi{pi---}bhyujyate / | If it load been held by us that there is really a Doer and Experiences then the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ might have involved the anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’; as a matter of fact however, the view held by us is that the Universe is a mere Idea, and there is nothing that is done or experienced by anyone. |
tat kathaṃ kṛtanāśādiprasaṅgāpādanaṃ syāt / | How then could the said anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done, etc.’ be urged against us? |
atha pūrvakuśalādicetanāhiteṣṭāniṣṭaphalotpādanasāmarthyavipraṇāśāt pūrvakarmānāhitasāmarthyaviśeṣāc ca kāraṇataḥ phalotpatter yathākramaṃ kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaprasaṅgo vidhīyate / | It is possible that the anomaly of ‘(a) the Waste of what is done and (b) the befalling of what is not done’ is urged against ns on the ground that our view involves the production of Results from a Cause (a) which has lost that capacity to bring about desirable and undesirable results which is concurrent with a pre-existing Intelligence, and (b) which has acquired that capacity which is not concurrent with the preceding act. |
tadayuktam na hi pūrvakarmāhitasāmarthyānubandhanasya nairātmyena saha kaścid virodhaḥ / | But this cannot be right; because there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of ‘No-Soul’ and the presence of the capacity due to previous acts. |
tathā hi lākṣādirasāvasiktānām iva bījānāṃ santānamanuvartanta eva pūrvakarmāhitāḥ sāmarthyaviśeṣāḥ yata uttarakālaṃ labdhaparipākebhya iṣṭamaniṣṭaṃ vā phalamudeti / | For instance, just like the Seeds soaked in red dye, the particular potentialities due to previous acts do actually continue in the ‘chain’, and it is through these as subsequently developed that the desirable or undesirable result appears. |
nāpi pūrvakarmānāhitasaṃskārāt santānāt phalotpattiriṣyata iti kutaḥ akṛtābhyāgamo doṣaḥ / | Nor do we hold that the Result proceeds from a ‘chain’ not set up by previous acts; thus how could our view involve the anomaly of ‘the befalling of what has not been done’? |
uddyotakarastvāha asthiratvāccittasya na karmabhir vāsanaṃ sambhavatīti / | Uddyotakara has argued that “the Mind being a fleeting entity, there is no possibility of its being affected (impressed) by Actions”. |
tadayuktam na hi sthirasyāparityaktaprāktanasvarūpasya vāsanam asti / | This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no affecting of the permanent thing which has not renounced its previous form; |
asthirasya tu viśiṣṭasvabhāvāntarotpādanam eva vāsanā / yat punaḥ sthiramavyākṛtaṃ vāsyamityuktaṃ śāstre tat prabandhasthiratāmabhipretya / | as for the ‘impermanent (fleeting)’ thing, its being ‘affected’ consists in the very fact of the coming about of a new character. When the Scriptures speak of ‘the Permanent Entity as affected’, it is with reference to the permanence of the ‘Chain’; |
yo hyucchedī santānas tasya ciratarakālabhāviphalaprasavakāle sannidhānābhāvān na kāraṇatvam asti tena tasya tathāvidhaphalotpādaṃ prati vāsanādhāratvam ayuktam ityabhi [p.183] prāyaḥ / | that ‘Chain’ which is liable to be snapped cannot serve as the ‘Cause’, as it cannot be present at the time of the birth of the Result at a long interval; hence it would be clearly wrong to regard such a ‘Chain’ as the substratum of the ‘impression’ leading bo such a result. This is what is meant. |
tasmāt parasiddhāntānabhijñatayā yatkiñcidabhihitamanenetyupekṣām arhati // | Thus what has been urged by Uddyotakara is based upon his ignorance of the doctrines of the other party and deserves to be ignored. |
kumārilastvāha na vayaṃ kenacit kartrā kṛtasya karmaṇo vipraṇāśāt kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamau brūmaḥ nahi bhavatāṃ mate kaścit kartāsti kiṃ tarhi niranvayakarmatat phalayor vināśotpādābhyupagamāt kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamau prasajyeta iti / | Kumārila has argued as follows: “When we speak of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’, we do not mean that the said anomaly is due to the act done by a certain Doer being destroyed, for the simple reason that under your view, there is no Doer; what we mean is that, inasmuch as you hold the destruction of the Act and the production of its Result to be absolute, this is what involves the said anomaly of ‘the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done’,” [See Ślokavārtika, Ātmavāda 12 et seq.] |
tadatraivaṃvidhasya kṛtanāśasyākṛtābhyāgamasya ceṣṭatvān nāniṣṭāpādānaṃyuktam iti darśayann āha kṣaṇabhedavikalpeneti / | In answer to this the Author proceeds to show that the said anomaly in this last form is what is actually admitted by the Buddhist and hence it is not right to put that forward to him as an undesirable contingency: [see verse 540 above] |
pūrvakasya karmakṣaṇasya niranvayaṃ vināśāt kṛtanāśaḥ phalakṣaṇasya vāpūrvasyaivotpādādakṛtābhyāgama ityevaṃ yatkṣaṇabhedavikalpena kṛtanāśādi codyate tadiṣṭam eva / | “The preceding Action-Moment being absolutely destroyed, there is ‘waste of what is done’; and then an absolutely new Result-Moment being produced, there is ‘befalling of what is not done’”, if such is the anomaly that is urged against us, through the setting forth of alternatives relating to the momentary change in things, then what is urged against us is what is quite agreeable to us. |
na hi svalpīyaso 'pi vastvaṃśasya kasyacid anvayo 'stīti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ // | In fact, we are going to show that there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at all. |
ahīnasattvadṛṣṭīnāṃ kṣaṇabhedavikalpanā / santānaikyābhimānena na kathañcit pravartate // | The assumptions based upon the difference among moments do not arise in persons the powers of whose vision have been damaged, because of their idea of the unity of the ‘chain’. |
abhisambuddhatattvās tu pratikṣaṇavināśinām / hetūnāṃ niyamaṃ buddhvā prārabhante śubhāḥ kriyāḥ // | In fact, persons who have fully realised the truth understand the limitations of the causes appearing in a ‘perpetual flux’, and undertake the performance of good deeds accordingly. |
ye tāvad aprahīṇasahajetarasatkāyadarśanādayas teṣām ayaṃ kṣaṇabhedavikalponāstyeva / | Those persons whose powers of seeing things other than the ordinary ones have not deteriorated, for them the assumptions made relating to the difference among Moments do not arise at all. |
tathā hi te santatimekatvenādhyavasāya sukhitā vayaṃ bhaviṣyāma ityāhitaparitoṣāḥ karmasu pravartante / ye 'pi pṛthagjanakalyāṇā evaṃ yuktyāgamābhyāṃ yathāvatkṣaṇikātmatayor avabodhād abhisambuddhatattvās te 'pyevaṃ pratītyasamutpādadharmatāṃ pratipadyante / karuṇādipūrvakebhyo dānādibhyaḥ svaparahitodayaśālinaḥ saṃskārāḥ kṣaṇikāevāparāpare paramparayā samutpadyante / | Because they are fully satisfied by their conviction that by realising the ‘Chain’ to be one they would be quite happy, and hence betake themselves to the performance of actions, Those persons also who are devoted to the welfare of other people, having realised, through reasoning and scriptures, the ‘momentariness’ and ‘soul-less-ness’ of all things, and thus fully realised the Truth, they also accept the ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’; they come to understand that when acts of charity and the like are done, being prompted by sympathy and good will, there come about Impressions tending to the welfare of oneself and also of others, these impressions appearing in a mutually |
na tu hiṃsādibhya ityatas te hetuphalapratiniyamamavadhārya śubhādikriyāsu pravartante / | Having thus realised the exact limitations of Causes and their Effects, they undertake the performance of good deeds. |
yathoktam yāvaccātmani na premṇo hāniḥ saparitasyati{sapadinaśyati---} tāvadduḥkhitamāropyana ca svastho 'vatiṣṭhate /mithyādhyāropahānarthaṃ yatno 'satyapi bhoktari"iti / | This has been thus declared ‘Until the loss of love for one’s own self comes about, the man continues to suffer pain and does not feel comfortable; there should therefore be efforts put forth for the removing of these false impositions, even though there be no such entity as the Experiencer (of the fruits of actions)’. |
kāryakāraṇabhāvas tadadhigantṛ ca pramāṇaṃ yathā sidhyati tathā pratipāditam eva // | How the Relation of Cause and Effect and the Means of Right Cognition thereof are established has already been explained above. |
keṣāñcideva cittānāṃ viśiṣṭā kāryakāryitā / | The peculiar character of ‘cause and effect’ is restricted to some minds only; |
niyatā tena nirbādhāḥ sarvatra smaraṇādayaḥ // | that is how remembrance, etc. come about without obstruction. |
kāryamasyāstīti kāryī kāraṇam ity arthaḥ / | It has been argued above (under Text 493) that “if things are momentary, Recognition cannot be explained”. |
kāryakāryiṇorbhāvaḥ kāryakāryitā / kāryakāraṇabhāva ity arthaḥ / | In the term ‘kāryakāryitā’, ‘kāryī’ is that which has an effect, i.e. a Cause; and thus the compound stands for the character of Cause and Effect. |
na hi kaścit paramārthataḥ smārta 'nubhāvitā vāsti / | In reality, there is no one who is the Rememberer or the Apprehender of things; |
tato yenaivanubhūtaṃ sa eva smaratīti syāt / | for, if there were, then it would mean that the thing is remembered by the same entity that had apprehended it. |
kiṃ tarhiyatra santāne paṭīyasānubhavenottarottaraviśiṣṭataratamakṣaṇotpādāt smṛtyādibījamāhitaṃ tatraiva smaraṇādayaḥ samutpadyante, nānyatra pratiniyatatvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasyeti samāsārthaḥ / | What happens is that Remembrance and the rest come about only in that ‘Chain’ (or Series) in which their seed has been laid by the successive production of more and more specialised ‘moments’ by a specially vivid apprehension; and not anywhere else; as the scope of the relation of Cause and Effect is restricted. |
yathoktam | Such in brief is the sense of the Text. |
"anyasmaraṇabhogādiprasaṅgaś ca na bādhakaḥ / | This has been thus declared: ‘Our theory cannot be vitiated by the possibility of Remembrance and Experience of Results coming to other persons; |
asmṛteḥ kasyacittena hyanubhūte smṛtodbhava" // iti / | because there can be no such remembrance at all: Who is the man whose mind has ever remembered what had been apprehended by another?’ |
smaraṇādipūrvakāś ca pratyabhijñānādayaḥ prasūyanta ityaviruddham / | As for Recognition and the rest, they are always brought about by previous Remembrance; hence there is no incongruity at all. |
na cāpi kvacid ekajñātṛnibandhanāḥ pratyabhijñānādayaḥ siddhāḥ, yenocyate dvibhede tvanibandhanam iti, kāryakāraṇabhāvamātratayā sarvatraiva bhedābhyupagamāt // | Nor has it anywhere been proved that Recognition and the rest are all based upon a single Cogniser, by virtue of which it has been asserted (under Text 494) that “if there were difference between the two, the Recognition would be baseless Because merely on the basis of the relation of Cause and Effect, difference has to be admitted in all cases, (543) |
kāryakāraṇabhūtāś ca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ / bandhas tadvigamādiṣṭo muktir nirmalatā dhiyaḥ // | Ignorance and the rest, in the form of ‘cause and effect’, are held to constitute ‘bondage’, and the cessation of these, as consisting in the purity of the mind, is held to constitute ‘liberation’. |
nahi kvacid asmākamekapuruṣādhikaraṇau bandhamokṣau prasiddhau, kasyacidbadhamānasya mucyamānasya cāsiddheḥ / | For us no ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ have been admitted as belonging to any one entity; as no one is held to be either ‘bound’ or ‘liberated’; |
kevalamavidyādayaḥ saṃskārā jarāmaraṇaparyantā duḥkhotpādahetutayā bandhaiti vyavahriyante / | all that is admitted by us is that ‘Impressions’ in the form of Ignorance and the rest ending with decay and death are spoken of as ‘Bondage’ on the ground of their being the cause of pain. |
tathācoktam "evam asya kevalasya hetor duḥkhaskandhasya samudāyo bhavatīti "/ teṣāṃ cāvidyādīnāṃ tattvajṇyānādvigatau satyāṃ yā nirmalatā dhiyaḥ sānirmuktir ity ucyate / | This has been thus declared: ‘All this is merely an aggregate of the Thought-phase that causes pain’, When the said Ignorance and the rest cease, by virtue of True Knowledge, there comes about purity of the Mind; and it is this purity that is spoken of as ‘Liberation’; |
yathoktam "cittam eva hi saṃsāro rāgādikleśavāsitam / tadeva tair vinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathyata" // | as thus declared ‘When the Mind is beset with the troubles of Attachment and the rest, it constitutes the Cycle of Birth and Death, and when the same is freed from them, it is called the End of Birth (544) |
iti // | as everything is held to be momentary. |
yaccoktam ekādhikaraṇāvityādi, tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti darśayann āha ekādhikaraṇau siddhāv ityādi / | It has been argued (under Text 499) that “Bondage and Liberation appear in the same substratum”. The next Text proceeds to show that in this argument the Corroborative Instance cited is ‘devoid of the Probandum’: [see verse 545 above] |
ekādhikaraṇau siddhau naivaitau laukikāvapi / bandhamokṣau prasiddhaṃ hi kṣaṇikaṃ sarvam eva tat // | When it has been proved that everything perishes immediately after it is born, then nowhere can Bondage and Liberation be accepted as appearing in the same substratum; |
sarvam eva hi vastūdayānantarāpavagīti prasādhitaṃ yadā tadā na kvacid ekādhikaraṇatvaṃ bandhamokṣayoḥ prasiddhamastītyaprasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ // | As the coming in of any peculiarity is entirely impossible, all notions of the ‘doer and the experienced,’, ‘being in bondage’ and so forth, in regard to the soul must be incompatible; or else the soul is something evanescent. |
[p.185] tadevaṃ svapakṣaṃ vyavasthāpya sarvathetyādinā parapakṣaṃ pratiṣedhayati | Having thus established his own doctrine, the Author proceeds to discard the doctrine of the Opponent: [see verse 546 above] |
sarvathātiśayāsattvād vyāhatā svātmanīdṛśī / kartṛbhoktṛtvabandhādivyavasthānityatānyathā // | As the coming in of any peculiarity is entirely impossible, all notions of the ‘doer and the experienced,’, ‘being in bondage’ and so forth, in regard to the soul must be incompatible; |
yadi hi rāgādibhiḥ kleśair bandho bhāvanādibhiścātiśayaḥ kaścid ātmanaḥ kriyeta tadā tasya bandhamokṣādivyavasthā bhavet / | If the Troubles in the shape of Attachment and the rest had really brought about the Bondage of the Soul, or if Contemplation and the rest had really produced certain peculiarities in the Soul, then the idea of the Soul’s ‘Bondage and Liberation’ might have been admitted; |
yāvatā nityatayā na tasyātiśayādhānamastīti neyam īdṛśī niyatakāryakāraṇamaryādālakṣaṇā bandhamokṣādivyavasthā ghaṭate, yathākāśasyeti bhāvaḥ / | as a matter of fact, however, as the Soul is eternal (ex hypothesi), no peculiarities can be produced in it; for the same reason no ideas of ‘Bondage and Liberation’, which presuppose limitations of the relation of Cause and Effect, are possible in regard to the Soul; just as in regard to Ākāśa. |
anyatheti / yadyatiśayotpādo bhavedātmanas tadātiśayasyātmabhūtatvād ātmano 'pi tadavyatirekeṇātiśayavadanityatā syāt / parabhūtastvatiśayo na yuktaḥ sambandhāsiddher iti śatadhā carcitam etat // | ‘Or else’, i.e. if peculiarities were actually produced in the Soul, then as the ‘Peculiarity’ would be of the nature of the Soul, the Soul itself also, being non-different from the Peculiarity, would, like the Peculiarity, be something evanescent. If the ‘Peculiarity’ were something different from the Soul, then, the idea of its being produced in the Soul would be wrong, as no connection would be possible (between the Soul and the Peculiarity). |
iti karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā // | This matter has been discussed times without number. End of Chapter IX. |
idānīṃ guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ / śūnyam ityetat samarthanārthaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣopakṣepaṃ kuvarnn āha jātyāder ityādi | The followers of Akṣapāda (Gautama, naiyāyikas) and of Kaṇāda (vaiśeṣikas) have asserted, solely on the strength of verbal authority, that “the theory of the universal and such things being formless, set forth previously cannot be right; because the six categories of ‘sub stance’ and the rest do really exist”. |
jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prākprakāśitam / | Hence the refutation of these, substance and the rest, is briefly set forth here. |
dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ // ityākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ / dravyādipratiṣedho 'yaṃ saṅkṣepeṇa taducyate // | The Introductory verses have spoken of the Doctrine of ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’ as ‘free from such limiting conditions as those of Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth In support of this the Author proceeds to examine the ‘six categories’ (of the Vaiśeṣikas); |
prāk sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvānnaiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitetyanena" yajjātyādeḥ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ prākprakāśitaṃ" tadayuktam / | “In one of the earlier chapters, that on the ‘Permanence of Things’ (Chapter VIII), it has been asserted (by the Buddhist) that ‘the Universal and such concepts being formless, the momentary character is not attributed to them’ (Text 740). |
yato dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyākhyāḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ santītyāhur ākṣapādādayaḥ / | because the six categories of Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence do really exist”; so say the followers of Akṣapāda and others. |
akṣapādaśiṣyatvād ākṣapādā naiyāyikāḥ / | Naiyāyikas have been called ‘Ākṣapāda’ because they are the disciples, followers, of Akṣapāda; |
kaṇādaśiṣyās tu vaiśeṣikāḥ kāṇādā ucyante / | and similarly the followers of Kaṇāda, the Vaiśeṣikas, have been called ‘Kāṇāda’. |
āgamamātrakā iti / | ‘Solely on the strength of verbal authority’; |
āgamamātramapetayuktikameṣām astītyāgamamātrakāḥ // tatra kṣityādītyādinā dravyapadārthapratiṣedhārthaṃ tāvat tadvibhāgam āha | because the six categories of Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence do really exist”; so say the followers of Akṣapāda and others. Naiyāyikas have been called ‘Ākṣapāda’ because they are the disciples, followers, of Akṣapāda; |
kṣityādibhedato bhinnaṃ navadhā dravyam iṣyate / | Substance has been held to be of nine kinds divided under the different heads of ‘earth’ and the rest; |
catuḥsaṅkhyaṃ pṛthivyādi nityānityatayā dvidhā // | of these, the four beginning with the ‘earth’ are of two kinds eternal and non-eternal. |
vibhaktasya hi bhedena sukhaṃ dūṣaṇasya vaktuṃ śakyatvāditi bhāvaḥ / | The idea underlying this setting forth of the subdivisions is that when the subject has been thus stated, it is easier to find fault with it. |
navadheti / pṛthivyāpastejovāyurākāśaṃ kālo digāntmā mana iti sūtrāt / tatra pṛthivyāpastejovāyurityetaccatuḥsaṅkhyaṃ dravyaṃ nityānityabhedena dviprakāram // | ‘Nine kinds’, as stated in the Sūtra (Vaiśeṣika) ‘Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul and Mind’, From, among these, Substance in the form of the first four i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air is of two lands, being eternal and non-eternal. |
[p.186] tadeva dvaividhyamasya draśayann āha pṛthivyādyātmakās tāvadityādi / | These two kinds are shown in the following [see verse 550 next] |
pṛthivyādyātmakās tāvadya iṣṭāḥ paramāṇavaḥ / | The ‘atoms’ that have been held to be of the nature of ‘earth’ and the rest are eternal; |
paramāṇavātmakā hi pṛthivyādayo nityāḥ paramāṇūnāṃ nityatvāt / | while those made up of the atom and the rest are evanescent. Earth, etc. in the form of the Atom are eternal, the Atoms being eternal. |
tadādyaistu prārabdhā anityāḥ hetumanityam iti nyāyāt / | Those that are made up of the Atom and the rest are non-eternal, according to the Law that what has a Cause must be non-eternal. |
tadādyair iti / te paramāṇava ādyā yeṣāṃ te tadādyāḥ / | ‘Atom and the rest’, i.e. those among which Atoms are the first. |
ākāśādayastu nityā eveti bhāvaḥ // | Ākāśa and the rest are eternal; such is the sense of the Text. |
tatraitaccatuḥsaṅkhyaṃ tāvad dravyaṃ niṣeddhum āha tatretyādi / | The Author proceeds to discard ‘Substance’ of the said four kinds: [see verse 550 next] |
tatra nityāṇurūpāṇām asattvamupapāditam / niḥśeṣavastuviṣayakṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt // | Among these, the non-existence of the eternal (permanent) atoms has already been proved, by establishing the fact of all things being in a state of ‘perpetual flux’. |
tatra ya ete nityāṇurūpāḥ pṛthivyādayo varṇitās teṣām aśeṣavastuvyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanān nityatvarūpeṇāsattvaṃ prasādhitam eva / | Among these, what have been described as Earth and the rest in the form of Permanent Atoms, the non-existence of these in the form of anything permanent has been proved by the establishing of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ of things which pervades over all things; |
yat sattāt sarvaṃ kṣaṇikamakṣaṇikasya yaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ hīyata iti vyāpteḥ prasādhitatvāt // | the Universal proposition having been established in the form ‘Whatever exists must be momentary, because what is not-momentary cannot have any fruitful action either successive or simultaneous; |
atrāpi bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha nityatva ityādi / | hence what is not-momentary cannot exist’. |
nityatve sakalāḥ sthūlāḥ jāyeran sakṛdeva hi / | If atoms were permanent, then all gross substances would be produced at once; |
saṃyogādi na cāpekṣyaṃ teṣām astyaviśeṣataḥ // | as they are equally independent of conjunction and other conditions. |
yadi parvatādīnāṃ sthūlāṃ kāraṇabhūtāḥ paramāṇavo nityāḥ santītyabhyupagamyate tadā tat kāryāṇāṃ sthūlānām avikalakaraṇatvāt sakṛdevotpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If Atoms, which are the cause of all gross things, like the Mountain and so forth, are held to be permanent, then their Products, in the shape of all gross things, should be produced simultaneously, as their cause would be always there in its perfect condition. |
prayogaḥ ye samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇās te sakṛdeva bhavanti / yathā bahavo 'ṅkurās tulyotpādāḥ samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇāś ca / | This argument may be formulated thus: All those things whose causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed form must be produced at once, like many Seeds, when their causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed forms; |
nityāṇukāryatvenābhimatāḥ sthūlā bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | all gross things are held to have permanent Atoms for their cause; so this must be a natural reason (for regarding them as liable to be produced all at once). |
samagrakāraṇasyāpyanutpāde sarvadaivanutpādaprasaṅgo viśeṣābhāvād iti bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | If things were not to be produced even in the presence of their causes in the complete form, then they might never be produced at all, there being nothing to distinguish one case from the other; |
syādetat trividhaṃ kāraṇam iṣṭaṃ samavāyikāraṇam asamavāyikāraṇaṃ nimittakāraṇaṃ ca / | The following argument might be put forward by the other party: “The Cause is held to be of three kinds (1) the Inherent (Constituent) Cause, (2) the Non-inherent Cause, and (3) the Efficient Cause; |
tatra hi yat samavaiti kāryaṃ tat tasya samavāyikāraṇaṃ / | when one thing inheres (subsists) in another, it is its Inherent Cause; |
asamavetaṃ tu yadyasya kāraṇabhāvaṃ pratipadyate tadasamavāyikāraṇaṃ yathāvayavidravyārambhe 'vayavasaṃyogaḥ / | that which acts as the Cause without inhering in a thing is its Non-inherent Cause; e.g. the conjunction of the component parts is such a Cause of the composite object; all the other kinds of Cause are included under the third kind, the Efficient Cause. |
pariśeṣaṃ tu kāraṇaṃ nimittakāraṇaṃ tadyathā dharmādaya ityayameṣāṃ vibhāgaḥ / | Such are the various kinds of Cause that go to produce a thing. |
tatrāpekṣaṇīyasya saṃyogāder asannihitatvāt samagrakāraṇatvamasiddham ato 'siddho hetur ityāśaṅkyāha saṃyogād iti / | All these necessary causal conditions in the form of Conjunction and the rest cannot always be present; and the presence of the complete Cause cannot be admitted at all times. |
yadi hi saṃyogādinā kaścid viśeṣo 'ṇūnāmādhīyeta tadā te tamapekṣeran / | if Conjunction and the other conditions produced a certain peculiarity in the Atoms, then these latter would be dependent upon those conditions; |
yāvatā parair anādheyaviśeṣā evāṇavo nityatvāt / | as it is however, the Atoms, being permanent, cannot have any peculiarity produced in them by anything else; |
tat kathaṃ saṃyogādi teṣām apekṣyaṃ syāt / | under the circumstances, how could they be dependent upon Conjunction and other conditions? |
na ca sakṛd [p.187] eva sthūlānāṃ tanubhavanādīnām udayo 'sti krameṇa tanvādīnām utpattidarśanāt / | As a matter of fact however all such gross things as the Body, the House and the like do not appear at one and the same time; in fact, they are found to be produced one after the other. |
tasmād viparyayaḥ / | Hence the conclusion must be contrary to the one propounded by the Naiyāyika. |
prayogaḥ ye kramavat kāryahetavas te nityā yathā kramavadaṅkurādikāryanirvartakā bījādayas tathā ca paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | This argument may be formulated as follows: The causes that produce things successively must be impermanent, e.g. the Seeds which produce the Sprouts successively; the Atoms also are productive of Effects in succession; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding Atoms as impermanent). |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.