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dvibhede tu dvayor jñātṛjñeyayor bhedo dvibhedaḥ, tasmin satyanibandhanam eva pratyabhijñānam / api ca yadi na kaścid ekaḥ pratisandhātā puruṣo bhavet tadā yadetan mātuluṅgaphalādirūpe dṛṣṭe tadrūpāvinābhāviṣu rasādiṣu smaraṇāpūrvamabhilaṣaṇaṃ paribhogāya ca pravṛttis tat kathaṃ bhavet / | When however there is difference of both, i.e. when the cognisers as well as the cognised things in the two cases are different, there would be no basis for the Recognition, Then again, if there were no single cogniser correlating the two cognitions, then how could there be such phenomenon as that when one sees the colour of the citron-fruit, he remembers the taste concomitant with that colour and evinces a desire for experiencing that taste and undertakes activity towards securing it? Certainly no one could have a longing, etc. for what has been seen by another person. The mention of ‘one person’ is only by way of illustration; |
na hyanyena dṛṣṭe 'nyasyābhilāṣādir bhavet // | it is also to be understood that the object also which has been seen by one person cannot be ‘recognised’ by another person. |
rāgādinigaḍair baddhaḥ kṣaṇo 'nyo bhavavārake / | “What is bound up with chains of attachment, etc. in the prison-house of the world is one ‘moment’, while the ‘moment’ that is liberated is another, who has not been in bondage; |
abaddho mucyate cānya itīdaṃ nāvabudhyate // | this is incomprehensible.” (496) |
anyo hi kṣaṇo rāgādibhir baddho 'nyastu mucyata ity etan nāvabudhyate na sambhāvyata iti yāvat / | The following Text proceeds to show that ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ also would not be possible (under the doctrine of Perpetual Flux): [see verse 496 above] One ‘Moment’ is bound up with Attachment while another is liberated, this is incomprehensible; |
bhavavāraka iti / | i.e. impossible. |
bhavaḥ saṃsāraḥ, sa eva vārakam bandhanāgāram // | ‘Bhava’ is world, Cycle of Birth and Rebirth, which is the ‘prison-house’, the place where persons are kept in bondage. |
prayatnaś ca mokṣārtho vyartho mokṣābhāvād iti darśayannāha mokṣo naiva hītyādi / | The following Text proceeds to show that any attempt at Liberation would be useless, as no Liberation can be possible: [see verse 497 above] |
mokṣo naiva hi baddhasya kadācid api sambhavī / | “The person securing liberation has always been found to be one who has been bound up in chains, etc.; |
nanvabuddhasyaiva mokṣo bhaviṣyati, tat ko 'tra virodha ity āha mokṣamityādi / mokṣamāsād ayandṛṣṭo baddhaḥ sa nigaḍādibhiḥ / | any such assertion therefore as that ‘the unbound person becomes liberated’ is contrary to a well-perceived fact.” (498) It might be argued that there would be Liberation for one who has not been in bondage; where is the incongruity in that? |
abaddho muktimetīti dṛṣṭavyāhatamīdṛśam // | The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 498 above] |
ya eva hi baddhaḥ sa eva mucyata iti loke pratītaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ca / | That the person who is liberated is the same that had been in bondage is a fact well recognised and seen in the world. |
abaddhasya tu mokṣapratijñānaṃ lokapratītyā pratyakṣeṇa ca bādhyata iti pratyakṣapratītivirodhaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ // | The assertion therefore of the Liberation of the Person who has not been in Bondage is one that is annulled by popular notion and also by a perceptible fact. The following Text points out that the said idea is annulled by Inference also [see verse 499 next] |
anumānabādhāmapyāha ekādhikaraṇāvityādi / ekādhikaraṇāvetau bandhamokṣau tathā sthiteḥ / | “‘Bondage’ and ‘liberation’ must belong to the same person, because they are of that nature, like bondage and liberation in the ordinary world. |
laukikāviva tau tena sarvaṃ cārutaraṃ sthitam // | Thus everything becomes thoroughly well-established.” (499) |
prayogaḥ yau bandhamokṣau tāvekādhikaraṇau, yathā laukikau bandhamokṣau, bandhamokṣau ca vivādāspadībhūtāvetāvanuśayatadvisaṃyogalakṣaṇau bandhamokṣāviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be thus formulated: Bondage and Liberation must subsist in one and the same person, like the Bondage and Liberation in the world, the ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ under dispute are Bondage and Liberation in the form of Attachment and Dissociation therefrom; this is a reason based upon the nature of things. |
tathā sthiter iti / | ‘Because they are of that nature’; |
bandhamokṣātmanā sthiteḥ, bandhamokṣarūpatvād ity arthaḥ / | i.e. because they are in the form of Bondage and Liberation, i.e. because they have the character of Bondage and Liberation. |
[p.172] tāviti bandhamokṣau / | ‘Tau’, ‘these two’ i.e. Bondage and Liberation. |
ataścaikasyādhikaraṇasyātmanaḥ siddheḥ sarvakarmaphalasambandhādi cārutaraṃ sthitam śobhanataramavasthitam ity arthaḥ / | Thus the single substratum in the shape of the ‘Soul’ being established, all the doctrines relating to the Relation between Actions and their Results and so forth become thoroughly established; i.e. are beautifully proved; |
yathoktadoṣābhāvāt // | there being no room for the criticisms directed against them. |
etenaiva prakāreṇa smṛtyādīnām asambhavaḥ / ekādhikaraṇābhāvāt kṣaṇakṣayiṣu vastuṣu // | “In this same manner it may be shown that, if all things are in ‘perpetual flux’, remembrance and such other phenomena would be impossible, as there would be no single substratum (under that theory).” (500) |
ekasya karturabhāvāt / pūrvoktānāṃ smṛtiniścayasvayaṃnihitapratyanumārgaṇādīnām asambhavo boddhavyaḥ / | As any single Agent would be impossible, it should be understood that there would be no possibility of any such phenomena as the following s Remembrance, well-ascertained cognition, seeking for a thing hidden by oneself and so forth. |
tatrāpi bhinnādhikaraṇatve dṛṣṭādivorodhaprasaṅgāt / | Because in all these, the substratum being different, there would be incongruities; |
nahi caitre 'nubhavitari sandihāne nidhātari vāñchāvati ca sati maitrasya smṛtiniścayānumārgaṇakutūhalaviratyādayaḥ sambhavanti // | e.g. when Caitra is the original apprehender, doubter, hider and seeker, Maitra could not be the rememberer, the ascertainer, seeker, and so forth. |
atrābhidhīyata ityādinā pratividhatte atrābhidhīyate sarvakāryakāraṇatāsthitau / satyāmavyāhatā ete sidhyantyevaṃ nirātmasu // | We proceed to answer the above criticisms as follows: Things being without ‘soul’, in reference to these also, the relation of cause and effect being there, all the said notions become established without any difficulty. |
satyapi hi bhāvānāṃ nairātmye kāryakāraṇatāprabhāviteyaṃ karmaphalasambandhādivyavasthā sati ca kāryakāraṇabhāve sarvamaviruddham eveti na kiñcit kṣīyate // | Even whenngs are regarded as being ‘without Soul’, all such notions as those relating to ‘the Relation between Acts and their Results’ and so forth, are based upon the relation of ‘Cause and Effect’; so that when the relation of Cause and Effect is there, all those notions become established and there is no incongruity at any point. |
syād etat sa eva kāryakāraṇabhāvapratiniyamo nāntareṇātmānam upapadyata ity āha yathā hītyādi / | Says the Opponent “This definite Law of Cause and Effect itself is not possible without a ‘Soul’.” The answer is provided in the following [see verse 502 above] |
yathaiva hi bījāder aṅkurādiṣu niyatā śaktir antareṇāpyātmānam adhiṣṭhātāraṃ tathādhyātmike 'pi vastuni bhaviṣyati / | Just as the potency of the Seed and such things is restricted to the Sprout and such things, even without a controller in the form of the ‘Soul’, so would it also be in the case of every psychical concept. |
na hi bījādiḥ śarīravad upabhogāyatanatvenātmanādhiṣṭhitaḥ / | Such things as the Seed and the rest are not controlled by the ‘Soul’, in the way that the Body, as the receptacle of experience, is held to be controlled. |
anyathā hi nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīramaprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgādityetannopapadyate / | Otherwise, there would be no sense in the (Naiyāyika’s) argument that “the living body cannot be without soul, as, if it were, then there could be no breathing and other functions”; |
ghaṭādau kilātmanivṛttau prāṇādi nivartamānaṃ dṛṣṭam iti vyatirekitā hetoḥ siddhyet / yadi tu ghaṭāder api sātmakatvaṃ bhavet tat katham ayaṃ hetur vyatirekī bhavet / | in the case of the Jar and such things, if the absence of ‘Breathing, etc.’ were found to follow from the absence of the ‘Soul’, then alone could the negative concomitance involved in the argument be admissible; if the Jar, etc. also were with Soul, then how could the Reason adduced have the requisite negative concomitance? |
anvayinaḥ kasyacit svabhāvasya viyoge 'pītyarthaḥ // | ‘Even in the absence of a permanent Soul’, i.e. even when there is no character which is common to them all. |
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kvacit kiñciddhi śaktimat / | Either indirectly or directly, it is only a certain thing, and in only certain gases that has the potentiality in regard to another thing; |
tataḥ karmaphalādīnāṃ sabandha upapadyate // | thus alone are such relations as that between actions and their results possible. |
[p.173] ta{yattai---}thaiva hi bāhye niyatā hetuphalavyavasthā tathaivādhyātmike saṃskārarāśāviyam, kāraṇaśaktiniyamāt / | Question “How does the Causal relation become established?” Answer: [see verse 503 above] Just as, in regard to external things, the law of Action and Reaction is restricted, so is it in regard to the group of Psychical Concepts also; |
kutaścidevahi śubhāśubhakarmaṇaḥ kṣaṇaparamaparayā niyata phalam iṣṭamaniṣṭaṃ vāvirbhavati, rūpādyanubhavāt smaraṇam, vimarśānnirṇayaḥ, sthānād anveṣaṇam, abhivāñchato 'rthadarśanam, tataḥ kutūhalaviratiriti sarvam aviruddham / | as the causal potency is everywhere restricted; it is only from certain good and bad acts that particular results, agreeable or disagreeable, follow, through a chain of ‘moments’; e.g. from the apprehension of Colour follows its Remembrance, from cognition follows definite conclusion, from the act of depositing follows the subsequent seeking for it, from the longing for a thing follows the actual sight of it, thence the cessation of the eagerness for it. |
na hi kvacid ekapadārthānvayitvena smaraṇādayo bauddhasya prasiddhāḥ / | In no case do the Buddhists admit of all these Reactions of Remembrance and the rest as connected with any one single entity; |
kiṃ tarhiidaṃ pratyayamātram / | for them, it is mere Conception, a mere Idea. |
yathoktam ---"asti karmāstiphalaṃ kārakastu nopalabhyate, ya imān skandhānnikṣipati, anyāṃś ca skandhānupādatte, anyatra dharmasaṅketāt / | This has been thus declared ‘The Action is there, the Result is there, but the Maker (Agent) is not perceived, one who abandons these thought-phases and takes up others; nothing apart from the Law of Things; |
tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṅketaḥ, yadutāsmin satīdaṃ bhavati, asyotpādādidam utpadyata iti / | tills Law of Things being that where such and such a thing appears when such and such another thing is present the former is said to be produced from the production of the latter.’ |
karmaphalādīnām ityādiśabdena smṛtyādiparigrahaḥ / | ‘Such relations as between Actions and their Reactions’; this is meant to include Remembrance and the rest; |
sambandhas tu janyajanakabhāvaḥ // | the ‘relation’ meant is that of ‘Cause and Effect’ (‘Producer and Product’) (503) |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi loke śāstre ca tat tatpudgalamadhikṛtyocyate, anenaiva kṛtaṃ karma ko 'nyaḥ pratyanubhaviṣyatītyāha kartṛtvādītyādi / | Objection “If that is so, then how is it that among people and in the scriptures it is said in reference to the Soul ‘When the action has been done by him, who else will experience its Reaction?’” Answer: [see verse 504 next] |
kartṛtvādivyavasthā tu santānaikyavivakṣayā / kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṃ sā tattvasaṃsthiteḥ // | The notion of the ‘doer’ and the rest is in reference to the unity of the ‘chain’; and that too is held to be only a figment of the imagination; it is not a fart of the real state of things. |
pracuratarājñānatimirasaṅghātopahatajñānāloko loka ātmani tattvānyatvāsattvādivicāramavadhūya viśiṣṭahetuphalabhāvaniyatarūpāṇāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhamekatvenādhyavasāya sa evāhaṃ karomīti vyavaharati, muktaye ca pravartate / | People have the light of their wisdom bedimmed by a mass of deep-ignorance; hence they ignore all considerations regarding their being this or that, being existent or non-existent, and so forth, and come to regard the chain of impressions in the shape of particular causes and effects as ‘one’, and thus come to make use of such expressions as ‘The same I am doing this act’, and proceed to make attempts to bring about their Liberation. |
tadabhimānānurodhena ca bhagavantas tathāgatāḥ samucchedadṛṣṭiprapātato vineyajanarirakṣayiṣayā santānaikatāṃ darśayantaḥ kartṛtvādi vyavasthāpayanti / | It is in view of this (popular) egotism that the Blessed Enlightened Ones, desirous of saving their disciples from the pitfalls of Nihilism, propound the theory of the ‘Unity of the Chain’ and thereby explain the notions of the ‘Doer’ and the like. |
tathāvidhāyā eva vyavasthāto vastusiddhir iti cedāha nāṅgaṃ setyādi / | Says the Opponent “The said Explanation is enough to establish the-reality of the matter under dispute”. Answer: “It is not a part of the real state of things”; |
na hi tattvaparīkṣāparāṅmukhamatīnāṃ saṃvṛtipatitānāṃ bālajanānām abhiniveśavaśena śakyaṃ tattvaṃ vyavasthāpayitum, tadabhiniveśasya nairātmyakṣaṇabhaṅgavihitapramāṇabādhitatvāt // | as a matter of fact, the real state of things cannot be determined on the basis of the notions entertained by childish persons enmeshed in illusion and averse to the investigation of truth; specially as the said notion is negatived by the evidences of ‘Soullessness’ and ‘Perpetual Flux’ of Things. |
anvayāsambhave saiva kāryakāraṇatā bhavet / viśiṣṭā yujyate yadvat santānāntarabhāvibhiḥ // | In the absence of continuity, the relation of ‘cause and effect’ would be of the particular hind just pointed out, this alone is possible among things appearing under different ‘chains’. |
nanu bījāṅkurādīnāṃ kāryakāraṇatekṣyate / niyatā tatra sūkṣme 'ti nāṃśo 'styanugamātmakaḥ // | In the case of the seed, sprout and such things, the relation of cause and effect is found to be definitely certain, and yet there is not the slightest trace of continuity. |
anvayo 'nugamaḥ kasyacit svabhāvasyeti śeṣaḥ // | The term ‘anvaya’ stands for ‘anugama’, continuity, i.e. of any particular character. |
[p.174] syād etat bījādiṣvapyanvayo 'styeva / | The following might be urged by the Opponent: “Continuity is certainly present in the case of the Seed and such things; |
yathoktam udyotakāreṇa tatrāpi ye bījāvayavās te pūrvavyūhapartiyāgenavyūhāntaramāpadyante, vyūhāntarāpattau ca pṛthivīdhāturapdhātunā saṃgṛhītamāntareṇa tejasā pacyamāno rasadravyaṃ nirvartayati / | as has been declared by Uddyotakara: What happens in the case of the Seed and Sprout is that the components of the Seed relinquish their previous formation and become arranged in a different formation, when they have taken this formation, the Earth-element in it becoming mingled with the water-element, and heated by the Fire-element, produces a substance in the shape of the Sap; |
sa rasaḥ pūrvāvayavasahito 'ṅkurādibhāvamāpadyata iti / | and this Sap, along with the previous components assumes the form of the Sprout. |
tat kathaṃ tatra sūkṣmo 'pi nāṃśostītyucyata ity āha kṣityādīnām ityādi / | Such being the case, how can it be true that there is not the slightest trace of continuity?” The answer to this is provided in the following [see verses 507-508 above] |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi pṛthivyādaya uttarasmin sanniveśe vartamānā aparityaktaprāktanasvabhāvā eva vartante, tadā na teṣāṃ pūrvavyūhatyāgo vyūhāntarāpattiścopapadyate tādātmyāt / pūrvavat / | The sense of this is as follows: If the Earth and other elements present in the later formation continue without surrendering their previous forms, then there can be no surrendering of the previous formation and the assuming of the later formation; because both the formations would be exactly of the same nature as before; |
tataś ca bījāṅkurādīnāṃ parasparaṃ bhedo na prāpnoti / | so that there would be no difference among the Seed, the Sprout, and the Creeper, all being of the same nature. |
atha bhedo 'ṅgīkriyate 'ṅkurādīnāṃ tadā niyamena prāktanasvabhāvaparityāge sati kṣityādīnāṃ pūrvavyūhatyāgo vyūhāntarāpattiścāṅgīkartavyā / | In case you admit of difference among the Seed, etc., then, as there would always be the abandoning of the preceding form, it must be admitted that the Earth and other elements also abandon their own respective formations and assume other formations. |
anyathā bheda eva na syād ityuktam / | Otherwise, there would be no difference at all; as already explained. |
tataścāparāparasvabhāvānām utpatteḥ kuto 'nvetṛtvam / | Thus there being an appearance of several forms, one after the other, where would there be any ‘continuity’? |
yataścaivaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāve sādhite sarvaṃ karmaphalasambandhādi ghaṭate, dūṣite ca vighaṭate, tasmāt karmaphalādīnāṃ bhāvasiddhaye kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau yatno vidhātavyaḥ / | Inasmuch as on the proving of the true character of the causal relation, all such notions as the relation between Action and its Result become explicable, and on the disproving of it, the said notions become dispelled, for the purpose of determining the existence of Actions and their Results, etc., efforts should be put forth for the proving of the Causal Relation, by the superior philosophers, i.e. by the Buddhists, who are ‘Superior philosophers’ on account of their being followers of the best doctrines. |
paraiḥ uttamadarśanānusāritayotkṛṣṭair boddhair iti yāvat / | And for the purpose of disproving the same notions, effort should be put forth by other philosophers, i.e. the followers of other philosophical doctrines. |
kāryakāraṇatāsiddhāv ityetaddvirāvartanīyam / ekatrākārapraśleṣaḥ kāryaḥ // | The term ‘Kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau” has been construed twice over, the last term in one case being ‘asiddhau’. |
atrocyate dvitīye hi kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate / | Our explanation is as follows: The effect gomes into existence at the second moment; |
prathame kāraṇaṃ jātam avinaṣṭaṃ tadā ca tat // | the cause had come into existence at the first moment; and during that moment it is not destroyed. |
kṣaṇikatvāt tu tat kāryaṃ kṣaṇakāle na vartate / | but being momentary, it does not exist at the moment at which the effect is there; |
vṛttau vā viphalaṃ kāryaṃ nirvṛttaṃ tadyatas tadā // | even if it were there, it would be useless, as the effect will have already come into existence. |
avinaṣṭādeva kāraṇāt kāryaṃ bhavatīti naḥ pakṣaḥ, na caivaṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgaḥ / | Our view is that the effect comes out of the Cause while this latter is still undestroyed; and there is no possibility of the two being simultaneous; |
[p.175] tathā hi prathamakṣaṇabhāvikāraṇatāsāditātmalābhamavinaṣṭam eva pratītya dvitīye kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate / | because what happens is that the Effect comes into existence at the second moment, through its dependence upon the Cause which has come into existence at the first moment and has not yet become destroyed; |
tac ca tathā jāyamānam avinaṣṭād eva jāyate / | so that when the Effect comes into existence it does so from the Cause while it is still undestroyed; |
prathame kṣaṇe tasyāvinaṣṭatvāt / | as it has not been destroyed at the first moment. |
kāryasattākālaṃ ca na kāraṇamanuvartate / kṣaṇikatayānavasthānāt / | And yet the Cause does not continue to exist at the moment that the Effect is in existence, as, being momentary, it cannot so continue to exist. |
satyām api cānuvṛttau na tadānīṃ tasya kāraṇatvam niṣpanne kārye tasyākiñcitkaratvāt // | Even if it were to continue, it would not have the nature of the Cause; because when the Effect has already come about, it would be absolutely useless. |
tadevākiñcitkaratvaṃ darśayati nacetyādi / | The following Text shows this same uselessness: [see verse 511 next] |
na ca jātaṃ purastena śakyaṃ janayituṃ punaḥ / | What has already come into existence cannot be produced by it over again; |
abhūtabhāvarūpatvāj janmato nānyathā sthitiḥ // | because what is meant by a thing ‘coming into existence’ is that there should comb about something that did not exist before. |
nānyathā sthitir iti / anyathā, sthitiḥ niyamo na bhaved iti yāvat / | If it were not so, then there would be no resting at all. ‘If it were not so, then there would be no resting’; i.e. if it were not as stated, then there would be no resting, i.e. there would be no limit; |
anavasthā bhaved iti yāvat / | i.e. there would be an infinite regress. |
yadi hi jātam api janyeta, tadā punar apyaviśeṣāt tasya jananaprasaṅgaḥ / | If what has come into existence were to be produced again, then there would be an equal possibility of its being produced over again; |
tataś cānvasthā janmanāṃ syāt / kāraṇānāṃ ca vyāpārānuparatiḥ kāraṇasyāpi anyatvaprasaṅgo viśeṣābhāvāt / | and in this way there would be an infinite regress of productions, there would be no cessation in the activity of the Cause, and the Causes themselves would be liable to be produced; as there would be nothing to distinguish them; |
tataścedaṃ kāraṇam idaṃ kāryam iti vyavasthā na syāt // | and the result would be that there could be no such distinction as ‘this is the Cause and that the Effect’. |
tasmād anaṣṭāt taddhetoḥ prathamakṣaṇabhāvinaḥ / kāryamutpadyate śaktād dvitīyakṣaṇa eva tu // | Thus we conclude that it is at the second moment that the effect comes into existence out of an efficient cause which came into existence at the first moment and has not yet been destroyed. |
vinaṣṭāt tu bhavet kāryaṃ tṛtīyādikṣaṇe yadi / | If it had been held that the effect comes into existence at the third moment, then it would come out of the destroyed cause; |
vipākahetoḥ pradhvastād yathā kāryaṃ ca vakṣyate // | as the cause of the development will have been destroyed, like the effect itself, as is going to be explained later on. |
yaugapadyaprasaṅgo 'pi prathame yadi tadbhavet / sahabhūhetuvat tac ca na yuktyā yujyate punaḥ // | There would be simultaneity only if the effect had come at the first moment. but this cannot be right, being just like the doctrine of the effects coming into existence along with the cause. |
vinaṣṭavikalpastvanabhyupagamād evāyuktaḥ / | As regards the alternative of the Effect coming out of the destroyed Cause, that is improper, as it is not held by us. |
tathā hi yadi tṛtīyādiṣu kṣaṇeṣu kāryaṃ bhavatītyabhyupetaṃ bhavet, yathā vaibhāṣikair aṅgīkṛtam eko 'tītaḥ prayacchatīti / | As that alternative would mean that the Effect comes at the third and subsequent moments, as has been held by the Vaibhāṣikas, in such assertions as ‘the one presents (the effect) when it is past’; |
tadā vinaṣṭāt kāraṇāt kāryotpādo 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt / | if this view were held, then it would mean the admission of the view that the Effect comes from the destroyed Cause; |
na cāyaṃ pakṣo 'smākam / | but such is not the view held by us; |
ayuktyupetatvāt / | because it is devoid of reason. |
yaugapadyaprasaṅgo 'pi kadācid bhavet, yadi prathama eva kṣaṇe kāryam iṣyate / | There might have been some chance of the anomaly of the Cause and Effect being simultaneous if the view were that the Effect comes at the first moment; |
yathā taireva vaibhāṣikaiḥ sahabhūr hetur iṣyate / | as these same Vaibhāṣikas regard the Cause as ‘born along with the Effect This is entirely unreasonable. |
taccaitadayuktam // kasmād ity āha asata ityādi / | Why this is unreasonable is shown in the following [see verse 515 next] |
asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt sāmarthye kāryasambhavāt / kāryakāraṇayoḥ spaṣṭaṃ yaugapadyaṃ virudhyate // | What did not exist could have no potency; if the potency were there, the effect would surely be produced; hence simultaneity between cause and effect is clearly incongruous. |
[p.176] sahabhūtaṃ hi kāryaṃ janayan heturanutpanno vā janayedutpanno vā / | When the co-born Cause (i.e. the Cause that comes into existence along with its Effect) produces its Effect, it can do so either while it is itself unborn, or when it is itself born; |
na tāvad anutpannaḥ tasya kāryotpatteḥ prāgasattvāt / asataścāśeṣasāmarthyaśūnyatvāt / | the former alternative cannot be right; as the Cause does not exist prior to the production of the Effect, and as such, is devoid of all potentiality. |
yadā tarhyutpannas tadā samarthatvāj janayiṣyatīti cedāha sāmarthye kāryasambhavād iti / yadā hi tasyotpannāvasthāyāṃ sāmarthyaṃ tadā kāryam iti tatsvabhāvavadevotpannam iti kvāsya sāmarthyam upayogamaśnuvīta / | If it be said that “It produces the effect when it is born, and then, being endowed with potentialities, it produces the Effect”, the answer is ‘if the Potency were there, etc.’; i.e. if the Cause has its potency while it is in the state of having been born, then, like the character of the Cause, the Effect also would be already born; |
tasmād anumānapramāṇaviruddhaḥ kāryakāraṇayaugapadyābhyupagamaḥ // nanu kāryakāraṇabhāvo hi karmakartṛbhāvaḥ sa ca bhinnakālo viruddhyate / na hi ghaṭakulālayor ayaugapadye sati karmakartṛbhāvo dṛṣṭa ity āha nahītyādi / | and under the circumstances, on what would the potency of the Cause operate? Thus the doctrine that Cause and Effect are simultaneous is clearly contrary to the authority of Inference. As a matter of fact, when the cause produces its effect, it does hot do so by holding the effect in the manner of the pair of tongs, by reason of which there would be simultaneity between the two, nor does the effect come into existence, by firmly embracing its cause, in the manner of the lover embracing the beloved, by reason of which the two could be regarded as coming into existence at one and the same time. |
na hi tat kāryamātmīyaṃ saṃdaṃśeneva kāraṇam / | Says the Opponent: “The relation of Cause and Effect is the same as the relation of ‘Agent and Object’; |
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