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kasmād ityata āha ko hītyādi / | Why so? Answer: [see verse 456 next] |
ko hi jyeṣṭhapramāṇena dṛḍhenārthe 'vadhārite / durbalair itaraiḥ paścād adhyavasyedviparyayam // | “When a thing has been duly apprehended through the firmly established highest means of cognition, how could one ever have a cognition to the contrary, on the strength of the other weaker means of cognition?” (456) |
yuktaṃ hi yadanumānaprasiddhasyārthasya pratyakṣeṇānyathātvaṃ kriyata iti / | It is only right that what has been ascertained through Inference should be concluded to be otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception; |
tasya sarvapramāṇajyeṣṭhatvāt / | because this latter is the highest among the Means of Cognition; |
na tu pratyakṣaprasiddhasyānyathātvam anumānādayaḥ kartum īhante, teṣāṃ durbalatvāt / | but Inference and the rest can never alter the nature of ang as cognised through Sense -perception; |
dṛḍheneti / | as they are weaker. |
saṃśayaviparyayābhyāṃ rahitena / viparyayam iti / | ‘Firmly established’, i.e. free from Doubt and Mistake. |
anyathātvam // nanvityādinā pratividhatte | ‘To the contrary’, i.e. otherwise than that cognised through Sense-perception. |
nanvidānīntaranāstitvaṃ yadi bhinnaṃ tvayeṣyate / pūrvabhāvāt tadā bhedastvayaiva pratipāditaḥ // | If existence at the present time is held by you to be distinct from the previous existence, then difference between them becomes proved by yourself. |
yattadidānīntanamastitvaṃ pratyabhijñānasya viṣayaḥ, kiṃ tat pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītādastitvād bhinnamāhosvit tadeva, yadi bhinnaṃ tadā svavacanenaiva bhedasya pratipāditatvād abhyupetahānir bhavato bhavet / | It has been asserted that the object of Recognition is existence at the present time; is this present existence different from the existence apprehended by the previous Perception? Or, is it the same? If it is different, then difference being proved by your own assertion, there is contradiction of your own doctrine; |
asmākaṃ punar iṣṭasiddhiḥ // | while for us, it is what is desired by us. |
ananyatve 'pi sattvasya kathaṃ pūrvadhiyāgatam / tasyāgatau hi vastveva nopalabdhaṃ prasajyate // | If the present existence is not-different (from the previous existence), then how is it that it is ‘not included in the previous cognition’? In fact, if it were not included therein, then it would come to this that the thing itself was not apprehended at all. |
athānanyad iti pakṣas tadā kathaṃ pūrvadhiyā tadagataṃ yenocyeta ", na hi pūrvadhiyā [p.161] gatam" iti / | If the ‘present existence’ is something different from the ‘previous existence’, then, how could it have been not-included in the previous Cognition, on account of which you have asserted (under Text 452) that ‘it is not included in the previous Cognition’? |
syād etat yathā kṣaṇikatvaṃ śabdāder avyatiriktam api sattadgrahaṇe satyapyagṛhītam ucyate, tadvad idam api bhaviṣyatīti / | The following might be urged “The momentary character of Sound and other things, though not anything different from these things, is said to be not-apprehended when the things are apprehended; the same may be true in the case in question also.” |
tadayuktam / | This is not right. |
na hi śabde dharmiṇi gṛhīte 'pi tadavyatireki kṣaṇikatvam agṛhītam iti vyavasthāpyate / | It is not true that while the object, Sound, is apprehended, its momentary character, though not-different from it, is held to be not apprehended; |
kiṃ{tarhi---} gṛhītam api tanniścayotpattikāraṇābhāvād aniścitamityabhidhīyate / | what is held is that, though the momentary character is apprehended, yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there; |
nanhyanubhavamātrād eva niścayo bhavati / tasyārthitvābhyāsasādguṇyādisāpekṣatvāt / | because mere apprehension does not bring about certain Cognition; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension. |
na caivaṃ bhavataḥ sambhavati / | This explanation is not available for you; |
pūrvapratyakṣasyāpi vyavasāyātmakatvāt / | because for you, even the previous perception is determinate (certain) in character; |
tena ca vasturūpe niścīyamāne tadavyatiriktamidānīntaramastitvaṃ niścitam eva / tadaniścaye vastusvarūpasyāpi tadvadevāniścitarūpānyatirekādaniścitatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its present existence also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception; if this latter were not definitely certain, the form of the thing also, as non-different from this present existence, would have to be regarded as not definitely ascertained. |
ye 'pyāhuḥ sandigdhavastunirṇayanibandhanaṃ pratyabhijñāne prāmāṇyam iti tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam / | Some people have held that “The validity of the Recognition is based upon the definite ascertainment of the Thing that has been in doubt.” This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. |
na cāpyatra sandigdhavastusadbhāvanirṇayo 'sti sadṛśāparāparotpattāv api keśādivat pratyabhijñānadarśanena sandehāt // | Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertainment of a Thing in doubt; because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come out one after the other, there is Recognition; |
yaccoktaṃ vijñāto 'pītarair artha ityādi tatrāha pratyakṣeṇa cetyādi / | It has been argued (under Text 455) that “what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception”. |
nānumānādimānaṃ syād bādhātas taimirādivat // yasya tvatputratvādityādikasyānumānāder gocare viṣaye pratyakṣeṇa bādhā sambhavet tasya prāmāṇyam eva nāsti bādhyamānaviṣayatvenārthasaṃvādābhāvāt taimirikādijñānavat / | If the subject-matter of an Inference, such as ‘because it is your child [it must be dark-complexioned]’, could be annulled by Sense-perception, then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject-matter being annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtained through defective vision. |
tenetarair vijñāto 'pyarthaḥ pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhaved iti yaduktaṃ tadasaṅgatam eva, asambhavāt // | Hence the assertion that “What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception” is irrelevant, being entirely impossible. |
yac ca pratyakṣasya jyeṣṭatvam uktaṃ tadapyasadbhūtam eveti darśayann āha arthasaṃvedakatve cetyādi / arthasaṃvādakatve ca samāne dveṣyatāsya kā / tadabhāve tu naiva syāt pramāṇam anumādikam // | The character of ‘being in accordance with the real state of things’ being equally present in all forms of valid cognition, why should there be a prejudice at all? In case the said character be not present in inference and the rest, then these latter would not be valid means of right cognition at all. It has been argued (under Text 456) that “Sense-perception is the highest among the Means of Right Cognition”; that also is not true. |
idam eva hi pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvam, yadutārthapramāṇam asāmarthyam / | This is shown in the following [see verse 460 above] The ‘validity’ of the Means of Right Cognition consists only in their having the capacity to bring about the right notion of things; |
taccetsarvapramāṇānām abhyupagamyate tat kenāsya pratyakṣasya jyeṣṭhatā bhavet / athāpi syāt pratyakṣasyaivārthasaṃvādakatvaṃ nānumānāder ity āha tadabhāva ityādi / tasya arthādisaṃvādakatvasya abhāve sati naiva pramāṇam anumānād iti syāt / | and if this is admitted as belonging to all the Means of Right Cognition, then, why should Perception be regarded as the ‘highest’ among them? It might be said that “it is Perception alone that is in strict accordance with the real state of things”, then, this character of being in strict accordance with the real state of things being absent in Inference and the rest, these latter would not be ‘Means of Right Cognition’ at all; |
arthāvisaṃvādakanibandhanatvāt pramāṇavyavahārasya, tasya cātra bhāvāt // | because the very idea of being a ‘Means of Right Cognition’ is based upon accordance with the real state of things; |
natvanenetyādinā bhāviviktoktāni pramāṇānyāśaṅkate nanvanenānumānena bādhyate sarvahetuṣu / | “The all-comprehensive invariable concomitance (premiss) that has been asserted in all the reasonings (propounded by the buddhist) becomes annulled by the following inference; |
vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā pratijñārthasya vā kṣatiḥ // [p.162] kiṃ tadanumānam ity āha vivakṣitetyādi / | or else, the proposition (asserting the doctrine in question) itself becomes rejected.” (461) The following Text introduces the arguments advanced by Bhāvivikta (against the doctrine of Perpetual Flux). [see verse 461 above] |
vivakṣitārkacandrādiviṣayaṃ yat pravartate / jñānaṃ tatkālasambaddhasūryādiviṣayaṃ param // pārthivāviṣayatve hi tajjñānatvābhidhānataḥ / | “The subsequent cognition of the sun and other things must appertain to the same sun and other things that exist at the time of the cognition that appears in connection with the sun and moon, etc., because while it is not a cognition of anything related to the earth and other things, it is spoken of as the cognition of those things (sun, etc,), just like the previous cognition of the sun at that time.” (462-463) Question: “What is that Inference?” |
tadyathā prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tat kālārkādigocaram // | Answer: [see verses 462-463 above] |
taduktam vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāni candrārkagrahanakṣatrādijñānāni vivakṣitacandrārkagrahatārakādiviṣayaṃ yaddevadattādivijñānaṃ tat kālāvacchinnacandrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādiviṣayāṇyeva, pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve sati candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādijñānaśabdavācyatvāt, prathamakālabhāvidevadattatārakādijñānavad iti / | “The Cognitions in dispute of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and such objects must appertain to the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest as associated with the time at which appeared the cognition of these Sun and the rest in Devadatta and other persons, because while not apprehended as related to the Earth, they are spoken of by means of the term ‘the Cognition of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest’, like Devadatta’s Cognition of these things on the first occasion.” |
vivakṣitārkacandrādiviṣayam iti / | ‘Must appertain to, etc.’ i.e. to luminous substances. |
pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ citrādigatādityādiviṣayair jñānair vyabhicāraparihārārtham / | ‘While not apprehended as related to the Earth’; this qualification has been added in order to avoid the invalidity that might apply to it on the basis of the Cognition of the Sun, etc. as painted in pictures. |
tasmād anyat / atatkālam ity arthaḥ // | ‘Subsequent’, i.e. a Cognition other than Devadatta’s; |
idam aparaṃ tadīyam eva pramāṇam / | i.e. appearing at a different time. |
ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ ye ca tadāśrayāḥ tadviṣayāś ca ye pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānārthasiddhadarśanārekaviparyayānuvyavasāyasvapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣāḥ te sarve svātmalābhānantarapradhvaṃsino na bhavanti jñeyatvaprameyatvābhidheyatvasadasadanyataratvasadasadvyatiriktajñeyaviṣayajñānāvacchedyatvāgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇāgrāhyatvānabhidheyābhidhāyakānabhidheyatvasamānāsamānajātīyadravyasaṃyogavibhāgajanitaśabdakāryaśabdābhidheyatvebhyaḥ prāgabhāvād iti / | “All those things that are the substrata of colour, etc., and the substrata of these things, as also the cognitions that appear in regard to these, all these are not, like the sky-lotus, liable to destruction immediately on coming into existence, because they are cognisable and expressible.” (464-465) The following is an argument put forward by Bhāvivikta: “The substrata of Universals like ‘Colour’, the substrata of those substrata, and the particular Cognitions of all these, in the form of Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Remembrance, Recognition, Mystic Vision, Doubt, Wrong Cognition, Representative Cognition, Dream, and Dream-end, all these cannot be liable to destruction immediately on coming into existence, because they are spoken of by such verbal expressions as ‘knowable’, ‘rightly cognisable’, ‘expressible’, ‘either existing or non-existing’, ‘not characterised by cognitions whose object is something different from Being and Non-being’, ‘not apprehensible by cognitions whose objects are non-apprehensible’, ‘not expressible by words which are inexpressive’, ‘expressible by such words as are the products of sounds produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances’, like ‘Previous Negation’ and such things.” |
tatra rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayā rūpādayaḥ teṣāṃ ca rūpādīnām āśrayās tadāśrayāḥ ke te---/ | ‘Substrata of Universals like Colour’, etc. are the Colour, etc. themselves. ‘The substrata of these substrata’. What are these? Such things as the Jar, (which are the substrata of Colour, etc.). |
ghaṭādayaḥ siddhadarśanaṃ yogivijñānam śeṣaṃ pūrvam eva vyākhyātam / | ‘Mystic vision’, perception by mystics. The others have been explained before. |
sadasadanyataratvaṃ sattvamasattvaṃ vā / | ‘Either existence or non-existence’ i.e. Being or Non-being. |
sadasadbhyāṃ vyatiriktasya jñeyasyābhāvād eva tadviṣayajñānaṃ nāsti tasya cāsattvādeva tenāparicchedyatvaṃ siddham / | Inasmuch as there is nong that is ‘neither Being nor Non-being’, there can be no cognition of which that could be the object; and its ‘non-characterisation’ follows from its very non-existence. |
tathā na vidyate 'bhidheyaṃ yasyāsāvanabhidheyo yobhidhāyakas tenānabhidheyatvamanarthakatvād eva siddham / | Similarly, the apprehension of an inapprehensible object being impossible, inapprehensibility by such apprehension follows as a matter of course. |
samānajātīyāni dravyāṇyadharadaśanādīni kṛtakatvādisāmānyāt asamānajātīyānyākāśādīni teṣāṃ yau mithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgau tābhyāṃ janito yaḥ prathamaḥ śabdas tasya paramparayā yaḥ kāryabhūtaḥ śrutipathamavatīrṇas tenābhidheyatvam / | Similarly inexpressibility by words which are inexpressible also follows from the fact that such words are meaningless. ‘Homogeneous things’ are substances, like the lips, teeth and so forth, all these having the common character of being products; |
tathāhyeṣām iyaṃ prakriyā prathamaḥ kila śabdaḥ saṃyogavibhāgayonis tasmācchabdāntarāṇI kadambagolakanyāyena prādurbhavanti / | the mutual conjunction and disjunction of these homogeneous and heterogeneous substances produce the first Sound, and this first Sound brings about, in due succession, its product in the shape of the Sound that reaches the Ear; |
tadeva pramāṇakadambakaṃ darśayati rūpatvādyāśrayāḥ sarve ityādi / | and it is by this Sound that things are expressed. |
ye ca tadviṣayāḥ kecijjāyante pratyayās tathā // utpādānantaraṃ dhvaṃsabhājo naiva bhavanti te / prameyatvābhidheyatvahetutaḥ khāravindavat // | The process of sound-production, according to these people, is as follows: The initial sound arises from Conjunction and Disjunction; thence proceed other sound waves, in the manner of the filaments of the Kadamba fiower; that Sound which reaches the Ākāśa in the Ear, that alone is heard, not any other.” |
prameyatvābhidheyatvagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / | The two reasons ‘cognisability’ and ‘expressibility’ have been mentioned by way of illustration; |
tadanye 'pi hetavo draṣṭavyāḥ / | the other reasons also are meant to be applicable. |
khe nabhasi aravindam ākāśakamalam iti yāvat // | ‘Khārabinda’ is the ‘arabinda’, Lotus, in ‘kha’, the Sky, i.e. the ‘Sky-lotus’, (464-465) |
udyotakarastvāha vipratipannā ayu{ga}patkālāḥ pratyayā ekaviṣayāḥ avyutthāyitat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇye sati samānaśabdavācyatvāt, vartamānalakṣaṇānekapuruṣapratyayavat / | “Our proclamation is that the cognitions under dispute which appear in succession, all appertain to one and the same thing, because the fact of their being based upon one thing is never annulled, and they are all spoken of by the same terms; just like the cognitions of several men appearing at the present single moment.” (466-467) |
tatra vyutthātum anyathābhavituṃ bādhakapramāṇavaśāt śīlamasyeti vyutthāyi na vyutthāyi, avyutthāyi teṣāṃ ghaṭādipratyayānāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ, tat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyam avyutthāyi ca tat tat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ceti tathoktam / | Uddyotakara [in Nyāyavārtika on 3. 14, page 421, Bib. Ind. Edn.] has stated the argument (against Perpetual Flux) as follows: “The Cognitions under dispute, appearing at diverse times, must appertain to the same thing, because while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing, it is expressible by the same terms, like the present cognition of ang as appearing in various persons”. Here the term ‘avyutthāyi’ stands for what is not ‘vyutthāyī’, wrong, i.e. what is right; |
abādhitasāmānādhikaraṇye satītyarthaḥ / | and the epithet ‘right’ is meant to qualify this ‘co-extensiveness’; |
idaṃ ca viśeṣaṇaṃ pradīpādipratyayair vyabhicāraparihārārtham / | This qualification has been added in order to avoid the falsity that might attach to it on the basis of the example of the Lamp-light and such things. |
samānaśabdavācyatvaṃ caitrajñānaṃ caitrajñānam ityādi / | ‘Expressible by the same terms’ such as ‘Caitra’s Cognition’, ‘Caitra’s Cognition’ and so forth. |
tadetad darśayati vivādaviṣayā ityādi / | This argument of Uddyotakara’s is set forth in the following [see verses 466-467 above] |
avaghoṣaṇeti / pratijñā / | ‘Proclamation’ our conclusion, declaration. |
ekāśrayatvam sāmānādhikaraṇyam abādham avidyamānabādhaṃ ca tadekāśrayatvaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ // | ‘Co-extensiveness’, the character of subsisting in the same thing this is not annulled. Such is the analysis of the compound. |
atra pratividhatte sādhyenetyādi / | The above argument is answered in the following [see verse 468 next] |
sādhyena vikalaṃ tāvad ādye hetau nidarśanam / hetutvād viṣayaḥ sarvo na hi svajñānakālikaḥ // | In the first reasoning, the corroborative instance is devoid of the probandum, as it is all included under the probans; and all objects of cognition are not always synchronous with their cognition. |
ādye hetāv iti / tajjñānatvābhidhānata ityatra / | ‘In the first reasoning’, where the Reason (Probans) is stated in the form ‘because it is spoken of as the Cognition of that’ (under Texts 462-463). |
prathamam api hi candrādijñānaṃ satkā{svakā}lāvacchinnacandrādiviṣayaṃ nabhavati / | As a matter of fact, the first Cognition of the Moon, etc. also does not appertain to the Moon, etc. as existing at the time of the Cognition; |
hetubhūtasyaiva viṣayatvāt / | because what forms the object of the cognition is what is included under the Probans itself. |
samā [p.164] nakālaṃ ca kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatteḥ / | Further, it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. |
yathoktam ---"asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt paścād anupayogataḥ / | It has been thus asserted: ‘What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on; |
prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnāṃ nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saheti // | all causes must exist before (these effects); hence the object cannot exist along with its own cognition’. |
yadetyādinā pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve satīti saviśeṣaṇe 'pi hetāvanaikāntikateti darśayati / | The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason is ‘inconclusive’, even with the qualification ‘though not apprehended as related to the Earth’ (under Text 463): [see verse 469 next] |
yadā sūryādiśabdāś ca vivakṣāmātrabhāvinaḥ / dīpādau viniveśyante tajjñānair vyabhicāritā // | When terms like ‘sun’ and the rest, whose use depends upon the speaker’s whim, are applied to the lamp and such things, the cognition of the sun that appears proves the falsity of the reason in question. |
dvitīye 'pi hetukadambake jātyāder dharmiṇoḥ sattvād eva kṣaṇabhaṅgitvasyāniṣṭatvāt tatra tadabhāvasādhane siddhasādhyateti darśayati jātyāder ityādi / | In the second set of arguments also (set forth in the Introduction to Texts 464-465), for the simple reason that things like the ‘Universal’ do not exist at all, no one holds them to be ‘momentary’; if the Opponent proceeds to prove the absence of such momentariness in those things (like the ‘Universal’, etc.), then his effort is entirely futile. |
jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvān naiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitā / | Things like the ‘universal’ have no character at all (being non-existent), hence the ‘momentariness’ of such things cannot be postulated by anyone; |
tadabhāvaprasiddhyarthaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ sādhanaṃ vṛthā // | so that any reasons adduced for the proving of the absence of ‘momentariness’ in the said things is entirely futile. |
ādiśabdena tadāśrayāṇāṃ rūpaghaṭādīnāṃ tadviṣayāṇāṃ ca pratyayānāṃ ca grahaṇam / | The term ‘like’, in the Expression ‘Things like the Universal’ is meant to include the substrata of the Universal, in the shape of Colour, Jar and the like, and also the Cognitions of these. |
eṣām api hi yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭānām asattvam eva tasmāt teṣu tasyāḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgitāyā abhāvasiddhyarthaṃ yaduktaṃ sādhanaṃ tadvṛthā, tatra vivādābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ / | These also, even as qualified by the said qualification, do not exist at all; hence the reason that has been adduced for the purpose of proving the ‘momentariness’ of such things is entirely futile; that is to say, there can be no dispute on that point at all. |
atrāpi sūkṣmekṣikā na kṛtā / | The Author has not gone into the minute details of the reasoning in question. |
yadi sā kriyate tadā bahutaramatra doṣajālamavatarati / | If we go into the minute details, we come across a large number of defects. |
tathā hi yadetat sadasadanyataratvaṃ sādhanamuktaṃ tat sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi cāsiddham vikalpaviṣayatvād anyataraśabdasya vikalpaścānekapadārthasambhave sati bhavati naikasmin / | For instance, the reason that has been adduced in the form that ‘it is either existent or non-existent’, is found to be absent in the Probandum and also in the Corroborative Instance; as the term ‘either or’ signifies option, and option is possible only when there are more things than one, and not when there is only one thing; |
na ca sādhyadharmiṇi dvayoḥ sadasattvayoḥ sambhavo 'sti / | and it is not possible for both existence and non-existence to be present in the object that forms the Probandum; |
tasya vasturūpatvena sattvasyaiva sambhavāt / | because it being of the nature of ‘entity’, it is only existence that can belong to it. |
nāpi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi dvayasambhavaḥ / | Nor are both possible in the Corroborative Instance; |
tasyāvastutvenāsattvasyaiva sambhavāt / | because, as it is a ‘non-entity’, it is non-existence alone that can belong to it. |
hetuś ca vyarthaviśeṣaṇaḥ / | The Reason also as stated has been loaded with a useless qualification; |
tathā hi śabdābhidheyatvādityevam api tāvad atra prayogo na yukto 'bhidheyatvavacanād eva śabdasya siddheḥ / | For instance, the expression ‘because it is expressible by words’, even by itself, is highly improper, as the term ‘expressible’ itself implies the qualification ‘by words’. |
yatpunaḥ samānajātīyādipadair viśeṣaṇaṃ tadatipelavam eva / | Similarly, the qualification put forward by the words ‘homogeneous, etc.’ is too childish. |
evam anyadapi hetuviśeṣaṇamanarthakam eveti grahītavyam / | Similarly the other qualifications of the Reason should be regarded useless. |
sarve cāmī hetavo 'naikāntikāḥ / sādhyaviparyaye 'mīṣāṃ bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt / | Further, all the Reasons put forward are ‘inconclusive’, because no evidence has been adduced in denial of a conclusion contrary to the desired conclusion. |
etac ca paścād abhidhāsyata eva // | This is going to be explained later on. |
samānaśabdavācyatvaṃ dīpādipratyayeṣvapi / | As regards the character of ‘being expressed by the same term’ this is present in the cognitions of things like the lamp also. |
vartate vyabhicāryeṣa hetus tena bhavatyataḥ // | Hence this reason becomes ‘inconclusive’. |
dīpajñānam iti dīpādipratyayeṣu bhinnaviṣayeṣvapi samānaśabdapravṛttidarśanād atastena dīpādipratyayaviṣayeṇa śabdavācyatvenaiva samānaśabdavācyatvād iti hetur vyabhicārī / | In the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp, we find that the same expression ‘Cognition of Lamp’ is applied to the cognitions which have different things (in the shape of the flickering flames) for their object; hence the character of ‘being expressed by the same term’, which has been adduced as the Reason for sameness, is found to be ‘fallible’ in the case of the ‘Cognitions of the Lamp’, |
atas teṣu vartamānatvād eva hetus te tava na vyabhicārī bhavati, api tu bhavatyevetyarthaḥ // | Or the Text may be read with a taunting intonation, the sense being ‘the said character subsisting in the Cognitions of the Lamp is, on that very account, a very Bound reason, and for you, indeed, it is infallible; but in reality, it is not so’, (471) |
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cediti paramatamāśaṅkate / | In the following Text the Author anticipates the view of the other party: [see verse 472 next] |
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cedbādhitaṃ kalpyate / vivakṣite 'pi vispaṣṭā bādhaiṣā kiṃ na vīkṣyate // | If it be held that “in the case of the cognitions of the lamp, the ‘co-extensiveness’ is subsequently annulled”, then how is it that you do not perceive the clear annulment of the same in your proposed conclusion also? (472) |
avyutthāyitatpratyayasāmānādhikaraṇye satīti hetor viśeṣaṇaṃ dīpādipratyayair vyabhicāraparihārārtham kṛtam, eṣāṃ hi dīpādipratyayānām ekaviṣayatvasya bādhitatvāt / | “In fact, the qualification ‘while being rightly co-extensive with the Cognition of that thing’ has been added (by Uddyotakara), solely for the purpose of excluding such cases as that of the ‘Cognitions of the Lamp’, as the one-ness of the object of these latter Cognitions is annulled; |
tathā hi tatkṣaṇam eva dīpo dīrghaśikho tamraśikhaś ca dīpro dīprataraścopalabhyate / | because the Lamp is at one moment with a high flame, and the next moment with a low flame, it is at one moment very bright and at the next moment, less bright. |
tat kuto vyabhicāritā hetor iti parasya bhāvaḥ / | How then can our Reason be false?” Such is the sense of what the Opponent says. |
tadetadviśeṣaṇamapyasiddham iti darśayannāha vivakṣite 'pītyādi / | In answer to this, the Author adds ‘How is it, etc.’ That is, the qualification also is one that is not admitted. |
vivakṣitasādhyadharme tatrāpi bādhā kiṃ na vīkṣyate / | As a matter of fact, even in regard to the character of the Opponent’s intended Probandum, there is annulment; |
tathā hi caitrādāvapi bālakumārataruṇādibhedena vyāvartamānākāra eva pratyayo jāyate parvatādau śītoṣṇādibhedena tataḥ spaṣṭataramevānyathātvam eṣāṃ pradīpādivat prasiddham / | why is that also not perceived? For instance, in regard to Caitra and other persons, the Cognition of them that is produced is in such diverse forms as ‘infant’, ‘boy’, ‘youth’ and so forth, in regard to the mountain and such things, the notions are diverse in the shape of ‘cold’, ‘hot’, etc. So that, as in the case of the Lamp, so in the case of these things also, the diversity of the cognised thing is clearly perceived. |
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