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nāpi te samanataraviśiṣṭakṣaṇotpādanaṃ pratyaviśiṣṭāḥ pūrvakebhyaḥ eva svahetupratyayebhyas tathāvidhottarakāryakalāpotpādanaṃ prati pratyekaṃ samarthānām utpannatvāt / | But they are not undifferentiated in regard to the producing of the immediately following particular ‘moment’; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding ‘causal ideas’, and each member of this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. |
teṣām api hetupratyayānama aparebhyaḥ svahetupratyayebhyaḥ teṣām apyaparebhyaityanāder hetuparamparāyā iṣṭatvād anavasthāpyaduṣṭaiva / | These ‘Causal Ideas’ are produced from their own ‘Causal Ideas’, these again from other Causal Ideas’ of their own; and thus there is an endless series of causes. Even if there is an Infinite Regress, that is nothing undesirable. |
pratyekaṃ ca sāmarthye 'pi nāpareṣāṃ vaiyarthyam svahetubalena teṣāṃ tathotpannatvāt / nāpi teṣāṃ pṛthagbhāvaḥ sambhavati tathāvidhakāraṇābhāvāt / | Even though each member of the series is efficient, yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so efficient, through the potency of their own causes. Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence, as there is no cause for it. |
nāpi paścāt kṣaṇikatvāt / | Nor can it come later on, as all things are momentary. |
kalāpotpādakāḥ pṛthag iti / | ‘They become productive of their own several distinct series’; |
pratyekaṃ dvitīyakṣaṇabhāvikalāpotpādanasamarthā ity arthaḥ / svopādānagrahaṇaṃ prathamāvasthābhāvisahakārikṛtopayoganiṣedhaparaṃ draṣṭavyam / | that is, they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment. The term ‘their own constituent cause’ should be understood to have been added for the purpose of precluding the usefulness of an auxiliary that appears at the initial stage. |
natu svopādānamātrabhāvi kiñcitkāryaṃ sambhavati sāmagrītaḥ sarvasya sambhavāt / | And it is not possible for any effect to be produced entirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. |
yathoktam na kiñcid ekamekasmāt sāmagryāḥ sarvasambhava iti //435- | This has been thus declared ‘Nothing can come out of any singleng, all is possible out of the attendant circumstances’. |
tataḥ prabhṛti ye jātā viśeṣās te tu tatkṛtāḥ / | Thenceforward the particular entities that come into existence are brought about by that; |
tadrūpaprakṛtitvena teṣāṃ tadupayoginām // | on account of the fact that those that help towards them are of that nature. |
tataḥ prabhṛti dvitīyakṣaṇottaramārabhetyarthaḥ / | ‘Thenceforward’; i.e. since the moment following the second ‘moment’. |
tatkṛtā iti / | ‘Are brought about by that’; |
sahakarikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇakṛtāḥ / | that is, produced by the particular causes brought about by the auxiliaries. |
kasmāt tadrūpaprakṛtitvāt teṣām tadrūpā viśiṣṭasahakārikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇajanyā prakṛtiḥ svabhāvo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | “How so?” ‘On account of, etc. etc.’; i.e. because their nature is of that character, i.e. produced by particular causes brought about by particular auxiliaries, ‘Those that help towards them’; |
tadrūpaprakṛtitvād iti sambandhanīyam / | this should be construed with the preceding phrase ‘because their nature is of that form’; |
tatra tṛtīyāvasthābhāvini kārye ye dvitīyakṣaṇabhāvino viśeṣā upayujyante kāraṇabhāvena teṣāṃ ca tadupayogināṃ sahakārikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇajanyakāryotpādanayogyaprakṛtitvāt tṛtīyādikṣaṇabhāvino viśeṣās tatkṛtā bhavantīti // | and the particle ‘ca’ has to be understood as before the phrase ‘Those that help towards them’, The meaning thus is as follows: Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment are helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these. |
ayam api niyamaḥ katham eṣāṃ bhavatītyata āha niyatetyādi / | Question “How does this restriction become applicable to these?” Answer. |
[p.156] | [see verse 438 next] |
na hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvāḥ paryanuyogam arhanti teṣāṃ svahetupratyayaparamparāsamāyātatvātsvabhāvabhedasya yathāgner dāhakatvam yasmād ete parāparapratyayopayogena pratikṣaṇaṃ bhinnaśaktayaḥ samutpadyante / | Every moment, entities go on coming into existence, with definite undefinable potentialities, and no objection can be taken to them, just as to the fire’s capacity to burn. The nature of things cannot be criticised (or objected to); because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of ‘ideas’ bringing the things into existence; |
ato yadyapyete kutaścit sāmyāt samānarūpāḥ pratīyante tathāpi bhinna evaiṣāṃ svabhāvaḥ / | Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity, yet, in reality, their nature is entirely different. |
tena kiñcid eva kasyacit kāraṇaṃ na sarvaḥ sarvasyeti yatkiñcidetat / | That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything. Hence there is no force in the objection urged. |
bhavantīti / jāyanti ity arthaḥ // | ‘Bhavanti’, ‘go on coming into existence’, i.e. are produced. |
santānocchedarūpastu vināśo yo na hetumān / | It is ‘destruction’ in the shape of the ‘breaking up of the series’ which is without cause; |
tasyānte 'pi na bhāvo 'sti tathā janma tu vāryate // | and this does not come about even at the end; what is denied is its coming into existence in that form. |
vilakṣaṇakapālāder utpādas tu sahetukaḥ / | As for the coming into existence of such dissimilar things (series) as the potsherd and the like, this certainly has a cause; |
so 'pyādau jāyate naiva tadā hetor asambhavāt // | but this also is not produced at the beginning, because at that time its cause is not there. |
dvividho hi vināśaḥ santānocchedarūpo visadṛśasantānotpādalakṣaṇaś ca / | ‘Destruction’ is of two kinds (1) in the form of the ‘Breaking up of the series’, and (2) in the form of the coming into existence of a ‘dissimilar series’, If then what has been urged refers to ‘Destruction’ in the form of the ‘Breaking up of the series’, then that cannot be right; |
tatra yadi santānocchedarūpaṃ vināśamadhikṛtyocyate tadayuktam nahi tasmāt tasya bhāvo 'stīti nīrūpatvāt tat kimucyate ante 'pi sa kathaṃ bhaved iti / tasmāt tasya kadācidapi bhavanānabhyupagamād ādāvante ca yadbhāvābhāvaprasañjanaṃ tadasaṅgatam eva / | for the simple reason that it has no form; then what do you mean when you ask ‘How does it come about at the end?’ Thus then, inasmuch as we do not admit of its coming into existence at any time, the argument based upon its presence or absence at the beginning or at the end is entirely irrelevant. All that is done by us is that its coming into existence in that form is denied; ‘in that form’, i.e. by the appearance of another similar series. |
ghaṭāder ucchedo bhavati{ityasya---} sa eva na bhavatītyarthaḥ / | When it is said that ‘there is destruction of the Jar’, what is meant is that ‘another similar Series does not come into existence’; |
na tu tatra kiñcid vidhīyate / | and there is no affirmation of anything. |
atha visadṛśakṣaṇotpādalakṣaṇo dvitīyo vināśo 'bhipretas tasyāhetukatvam asiddham / | If the ‘Destruction’ meant by the opponent is that in the form of ‘the coming into existence of a dissimilar series’, then the fact of its being without cause is one that is not admitted (by anyone); |
vastutayā tasya mudgarādikāraṇābalenotpādanābhyupagamāt / | because it is not admitted by any one that the stroke of the Bludgeon produces anything of the nature of a positive entity. |
ata evāsāvādau na jāyate svahetor mudgarādes tadānīm abhāvāt //439- | That is the reason why it cannot come into existence even at the beginning; as at that time its cause, in the shape of the Bludgeon, is not there. |
virodhavyavasthāsamarthanārtham āha dvividha ityādi / dvividhāḥ kṣaṇikā bhāvāḥ keciddhrāsasya hetavaḥ / | There are two kinds of ‘momentary things’ some are causes of decadence, e.g. fire is the cause of the decadence (diminution) of cold; |
śītādereva vahnyādyā apare na tathāvidhāḥ // | and others are not so. |
adṛṣṭatattvo lokas tu virodhamabhimanyate / kāryakāraṇabhāve 'pi prathamokteṣvanekadhā // bādhyabādhakabhāvas tu vastuno naiva tāttvikaḥ / | People, not perceiving the truth, think that there is antagonism of various kinds among things, even when the relation of cause and effect is there, as a matter of fact however there is no real ‘antagonism’ among things, in the shape of the relation of the destroyer and destroyed. |
vidyate tata evoktaṃ virodhagatirityapi // | It is in this sense that the expression ‘notion of antagonism’ has been used. |
keciddhiḥ bhāvāḥ keṣāñcin mandatara{ta}makṣaṇotpattikrameṇa yo hrāsas tatra hetavo [p.157] bhavanti / | There are certain things which become causes of the ‘decadence’ of certain other things, the ‘decadence’ consisting in the production of ‘moments’ of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity; |
yathā vahnyādayaḥ śītādīnām apare na tathāvidhāḥ nāpakarṣahetavaḥ tadyathā ta eva vahnyādayo dhūmādīnām / | for instance fire is the cause of such a ‘decadence’ of Cold; while there are other things which are not so, i.e. not causes of the decadence of things; e.g. Fire is not the cause of the ‘decadence’ of smoke. |
tatra prathamokteṣu hrāsahetuṣu kāryakāraṇabhāve 'pi satyajñānatimiratirodhīyamānajñānāloko loko viruddhatvam abhimanyate / anekadheti / śītasyāgnir viruddhaḥ pradīpasya vāyurāloko 'ndhakārasyetyādinā bhedena / | Among the former i.e. among the causes of decadence, even though there is the relation of cause and effect, yet people, having their powers of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is ‘antagonism’ (between the said cause and the thing whose decadence has been brought about), of various hinds, e.g. Fire is antagonistic to Gold, Air is antagonistic to the Lamp, Light is antagonistic to Darkness and so forth. |
natu vastūnāṃ paramārthataḥ kaścid bādhyabādhakabhāvo 'sti sataḥ sarvātmanā niṣpatteḥ svabhāvānyathātvasya kartumaśakyatvāt tasya vyatirekāvyatirekavikalpe satyubhayathāpi karaṇāsambhavāt / | In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that between the destroyer and the destroyed; because when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form, and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of a thing; there can be no cause for any such change, whether it be different or non-different from the thing. |
asato 'pyavastutvād eva na kiñcitkriyate ityubhayathāpyakiñcitkaro virodhī / | As regards the non-entity, nothing can be done to it, simply because it is non-existent. So that in both ways, the ‘antagonist’ can do nothing. |
ata evāvikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatirityācāryeṇoktam / virodhagatiḥ virodhavyavasāyaḥ na tu virodhas tātvika iti bhāvaḥ / apiśabdaścārthe / | It is for this reason that the Teacher has declared that ‘When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as antagonism’; |
bhinnakramāś ca / | it is only a notion of antagonism; |
nanu ca pratyabhijñānaṃ sa evetyupajāyate / | i.e. there is no real antagonism. |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyarthamupātteṣu prasajyate // | The particle ‘api’ stands for ‘ca’, and should be construed after ‘eva’. |
nahi timiropahatalocanopajanitaṃ keśavijñānapramapramāṇam upalabdham ityetāvatā svacchanetrajanitam api satyakeśaviṣayaṃ cakṣur vijñānamapramāṇam iti yuktaṃ svacchacetaso 'bhidhātum iti bhāvaḥ / | “As a matter of fact, there is always the recognition of a thing in the form ‘this is that same’, when the sense-organ concerned is rightly functioning; and this recognition is quite firm and undeniable. This therefore is an irrepressible fact of perception, which annuls all the reasons that have been adduced for proving the ‘perpetual flux’ of things.” (444-445) |
tatra niṣprakampatvenāsaṃśayarūpatāmāha sa evāyam athānya ityevaṃvidhasya saṃśayasyābhāvāt / | The epithet ‘firm’ implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character, there being no such doubt as to whether this is really the same or something else. |
abādhitamityanenāviparyastatvam //444- | The epithet ‘undeniable’ implies the fact of its not being wrong” (444-445) |
na khalvityādinā pratividhatte | The Author answers these arguments in the following [see verses 446-447 next] |
na khalu pratyabhijñānaṃ pratyakṣam upapadyate / | In fact, recognition can never be of the nature of direct sense-perception; |
vasturūpamanirdeśyaṃ sābhilāṣaṃ ca tadyataḥ // | because the form of the thing itself is inexpressible, and the recognition is expressed in words. |
bhrāntaṃ ca pratyabhijñānaṃ pratyekaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam / abhedādhyavasāyena bhinnarūpe 'pi vṛttitaḥ // | Recognition must be wrong, and sense-perception is entirely different from it. That recognition is wrong is clear from the fact that it appears in the form of the notion of ‘non-difference’ where, in reality, there is difference. |
tatra pratyakṣatvaṃ tāvad asiddhamasyās tathā hi vastutvalakṣaṇasyānanvayitvenāśakyasamayatvāt / | The very fact of the said Recognition being of the nature of Perception is not admitted. Because the real character of a ‘Thing’ is inexpressible in words, because of the absence of contiguity; |
tadgrāhijñānaṃ manasi jalpam eva / | hence its real cognition can only be in the form of a mental apprehension; |
avagṛhītasambandhasyārthasya śabdena saṃyojyagrahaṇā{ṇa} sambhavāt / | specially because when the Thing has not been apprehended as related to any words, it cannot be possible to apprehend it along with a verbal expression. |
ato 'vaśyaṃ pratyakṣeṇa satā svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvātkalpanāpoḍhena bhavitavyam / | Hence a Real Perception, pertaining as it does to the specific individuality of things, must be beyond all imposition, indeterminate. |
pramāṇatvāccābhrāntena / | And as such Perception would be entirely valid, it cannot be wrong. |
tataś ca pratyekaṃ kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam iti nyāyānuyātam idaṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇamācakṣate kuśalāḥ / na ca pratyabhijñānaṃ kalpanāpoḍham sa evāyam ityevam atijalpākāratayā saṃvedyamānatvāt / | This is the reason why wise men have declared the definition of Perception to be that ‘it is free from all determination, and not mistaken’, which is perfectly logical. Recognition, on the other hand, is not ‘free from determination’, as it is always conceived in the verbal form ‘this is that same’; |
nāpyabhrāntam bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ //446- | nor is it unmistaken, because it apprehends, as non-different, things that are really different. |
katham ity āha pūrvam ityādi / | Question: “How is it so?” Answer [see verse 448 next] |
pūrvaṃ saṃvihitākāragocaraṃ cedidaṃ bhavet / jāyeta pūrvam evedaṃ tādarthyāt pūrvabuddhivat // | If the recognition did apprehend the form of the thing as previously cognised, then it would have appeared at that same time, as its object would be the same, like the previous cognition. |
yadi hi pūrvopalabdhārthaviṣayamidam abhaviṣyat tadā pūrvamevodaśiṣyata tadviṣayatvenāvikalakāraṇatvāt / | If the Recognition had the same object that has been cognised before, then it would have appeared at that same time, because as having the same object, its cause would be there in its perfect form; |
pūrvajñānavat tādarthyād iti / | like the previous cognition; |
sa pūrvasaṃvidito bhāvo 'rtho viṣayo 'syeti tadartham tadbhāvas tādarthyam // | ‘as its object would be the same’; i.e. the object of the Recognition would be that same object which has been cognised before. |
nacaivaṃ tena naivedaṃ tadarthagrāhakaṃ matam / | As a matter of fact, however it is not so; then the recognition has not been regarded as apprehending the same object; |
tajjñānakāla utpādād viṣayāntarabuddhivat // | because it is produced at its own time, like the cognition of another thing; |
abhedādhyavasāyena bhinnarūpe 'pi vṛttitaḥ / māyāgolakavijñānam iva bhrāntam idaṃ sthitam // | and inasmuch as it apprehends as non-different what is really different, it must be mistaken, like the notion of the illusory ball. The following Text puts forward reasonings in the indirect form of a reductio ad absurdum: [see verses 449-450 above] |
prayogāḥ yadyasmin vikale 'pi sati na bhavati na tat tadviṣayam yathā rūpe 'vikale 'pi sati tatrābhavacchrotravijñānam bhavatyavikale 'pi vajrādau tadvijñānavelāyāṃ pratyabhijñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | The arguments may be thus formulated; (a) When a cognition does not appear even when the thing is there in its perfect form, that Cognition cannot have that thing for its object; e.g. even when Colour is there in its perfectly perceptible form, the auditory perception is not there; even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; |
tadevaṃ nityatve sati vajrāder anaparāpekṣasya tadviṣayaṃ pratyabhijñānamavikalakāraṇatvāt pūrvam eva bhavet na ca bhavati tasmād anityatvam asya siddham / | (b) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form; and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time; |
ata evābādhitaviṣayatvamapyasiddham / | hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. |
yathoktādbhrāntatvaprasādhakād eva hetor bādhitaviṣayatvāt //449- itaś ca gṛhītagrahaṇān nāsyāḥ prāmāṇyam yathā smṛter iti darśayann āha ---niṣpāditetyādi / | Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as non-different what is different, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied; |
[p.159] | [hence it is invalid]; |
niṣpāditakriye cārthe pravṛtteḥ smaraṇādivat / na pramāṇam idaṃ yuktaṃ karaṇārthavihānitaḥ // | because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong. It cannot be right to regard recognition as valid, because it operates towards an object whose purpose has been already accomplished, like remembrance and such other cognitions; |
yad eva hi pramitikriyāsiddhau prakṛṣṭamupakaraṇaṃ tadeva sādhakatamaṃ kārakampramāṇamucyate / | That active agent alone is called the ‘Means of Right Cognition’ which is the best implement and the most effective instrument in the bringing about of the action of valid Cognition. |
yadi ca pratyabhijñā pūrvapramāṇagṛhītārthaviṣayā syāt tadā niṣpannapramitikriye 'rthe pravṛttyāsādhakatamatvāt katham iva pramāṇatāmaśnuvīta / anyathā hi smṛter api prāmāṇyaṃ syāt / | If then, Recognition has for its object something that has been already apprehended by a previous Cognition, then, inasmuch as it would be operating towards a Cognition that has been already brought about, it could not be ‘the most effective instrument’, and under the circumstances, how could it have the character of the ‘Means of Right Cognition’? If it did, then Remembrance also would be a means of Right Cognition (which no one admits). |
na cānadhigatapramāṇābhāvā satī bādhakatvāya kalpate atiprasaṅgāt / | And when it has not acquired the character of a ‘valid means of Right Cognition’, it cannot be effective in annulling any notion. |
syād etat mā bhūd asyāḥ pṛthakprāmāṇyam tathāpyanayā pūrvārthaviṣayatayā kṣaṇabhaṅgitvam bādhyata eveti / | If it did so, it would lead to an absurdity. “Recognition may not be a separate Means of Right Cognition; and yet the mere fact of its having for its object something that existed at the previous time does annul the notion of the ‘Perpetual Flux’ ofngs.” |
tad asamyak / | This is not right; |
na hy asyāḥ paramārthataḥ pūrvārthaviṣayatvam asti mābhi{mati}jalpatvāt kevalam{ti}aviṣayāpi satī vibhramabalāt pūrvadṛṣṭārthādhyavasāyinī samutpadyata ity adhyavasāyavaśāt pūrvadṛṣṭārthaviṣayety ucyate tatkuto 'smāt pratyabhijñānāt prakṛtibhrāntāt kṣaṇabhaṅganirākriyā sidhyet // | because in reality, its object is not the same as the previous thing; in fact it is a figment of the imagination, and even though purely imaginary, it apprehends, through illusion, the previously perceived thing; and by reason of this illusory apprehension, it is said to have the previously perceived thing for its object. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ be discarded on the strength of the said ‘Recognition’ which is illusory in its very source? (451) |
idānīntaramastitvaṃ na hi pūrvadhiyā gatam / | “As a matter of fact, the existence of the thing at the present time (of recognition) has not been included under the previous cognition; |
tadastyasya viśeṣaścet smaraṇe yo na vidyate // | this is a peculiar feature in recognition, which is not present in remembrance. |
pūrvapramitamātre hi jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ / | Remembrance is in the form of ‘that’ and appertains only to that which has been already cognised before; |
sa evāyam itīyaṃ tu pratyabhijñātirekiṇī // | recognition however is in the form ‘this is that same’, which is something totally different (from the previous cognition).” (452-453) |
sa hy āha na hi pūrvapratyakṣeṇārthasyedānīntaramastitvamadhigatam tasya sa evāyam ity evamākāropagrāheṇānutpatteḥ / | Kumārila has argued as follows: “The previous Cognition has not apprehended the existence of the Thing at the present time (of Recognition); as it could not appear in the form ‘this is the same as that’; |
tasmād asya pratyabhijñānasya smaraṇād asti viśeṣaḥ / | hence there is a difference between Recognition and Remembrance. |
katham ity āha pūrvetyādi / sa iti hi pūrvajñānākāropagraheṇaiva smṛtiḥ pravartate / pratyabhijñā tvayam atiriktam apyarthākāraṃ gṛhṇāti / | “How?” Remembrance always appears in the form of ‘That’ which takes in only that much of the Thing as has been cognised before; while Recognition takes in the idea of ‘This’ also (being in the form ‘This is the same as that’), which is an additional feature of theng concerned. |
smṛteḥ sakāśād atirekiṇī viśiṣṭetyarthaḥ / | To this extent, Recognition is something different from Remembrance. |
tasmādyau saṃśayaviparyayau tau bādhitvā pratyabhijñā pramāṇatāṃ labhate // | Thus Recognition acquires the character of a real ‘Means of Right Cognition’, after having shaken off the Doubt and Mistake in regard to it.” (452-453) |
jñāte cāvidyamānatvād yau saṃśayaviparyayau / bādhitvā tau labhetaiva pratyabhijñā pramāṇatām // | “Inasmuch as there is no doubt or mistake in regard to what is cognised (by recognition), recognition acquires the character of the ‘means of right cognition’ after having set aside both.” (454) |
jñāte 'rthe tayor avidyamānatvād bahalavahniśikhākalāpaparigata iva deśe śītasya // | Inasmuch as Doubt and Mistake do not exist at all in regard to the thing recognised, having been dispelled, like cold in a place surrounded by a large mass of flaming fire. |
[p.160] nanu yathānumānaprasiddhasyātyarthasya putrādigataśyāmatvādeḥ punaḥ kālāntareṇa pratyakṣeṇa bādhyamānasyānyathātvṃ bhavati tathātrāpi yadi nāma pratyabhijña{na}ato nityatvamarthasya siddham, tathāpyuttarakālaṃ tatkāryeṇa kramiṇā kramasyānumānataḥ siddher anyathātvaṃ siddhameva, tat kathaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgitvaṃ bādhyata ityāśaṅkyāha vijñāto 'pītyādi / | The following argument has been urged against Kumārila’s position: In the case of an object cognised through Inference, such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its being born of a dark woman), it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Perception (when the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned); in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the permanence of Things might be cognised through Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the successive (fluctuating) character ofngs may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the thing being successive; |
vijñāto 'pītarairarthaḥ pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhavet / | and the said permanence vouched for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inference. |
pratyakṣeṇāvaruddhe tu netarotpattisambhavaḥ // | Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of ‘Perpetual Flux’ be held to be discarded (by Recognition)? |
itarairiti / | This is answered (from Kumārila’s point of view) in the following: [see verse 455 above] |
anumānādibhiḥ / | ‘Other means of Cognition’ i.e. Inference and the rest; |
yathā kila śyāmastatputrātvād dṛśyamānatat putravad ityādi / | such as ‘The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so’ and so forth. |
pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhavediti / pratyakṣeṇa karaṇabhūtena, anyathā anumānādipramitākāraviparīto bhavedity arthaḥ / | ‘Could be accepted as otherwise’, through the instrumentality of Sense -perception; ‘otherwise’, i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc. ‘Already taken up’, i.e. apprehended. |
netarotpattisambhava iti / | ‘There can be no appearance, etc.’; |
pratyakṣāditarasyānumānāder naiva bādhakatvenotpattiḥ sambhavatītyarthaḥ // | Means of Cognition other than Sense-perception, i.e. Inference and the rest cannot set aside Sense-perception. |
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