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anenopāyena teṣām abhāva eva pratipādyate / | By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established. |
na cāpi vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte 'vaśyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ dharmyāśrayaṇīyaḥ tatra sādhyanivṛttau sādhananivṛttimātrasya sādhayitumiṣṭatvāt / tac ca vyāpyavyāpakabhūtayor dharmayor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasiddhau satyāṃ dharmiviśeṣaparigrahamantareṇaiva sāmānyena vyāpakābhāve vyāpyam api na bhavatīti vacanamātrād eva pratīyate / | Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such instance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the mere assertion, without admitting the real existence of any object, that when the widerng is absent the narrower thing also must be absent, after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; |
yathā vṛkṣābhāve śiṃśapā na bhavatīti yathoktam tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ / | e.g., the assertion ‘when the Tree is absent, the Śiṃśapā cannot be there’, This has been thus declared: ‘In the case of the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted; |
tadabhāve{tu} tanneti vacanād api tadgateḥ // iti // | as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there’. |
kāryāṇi hi vilambante kāraṇāsannidhānataḥ / | Effects are delayed on account of the non-proximity of the cause. |
samarthahetusadbhāve kṣepas teṣāṃ hi kiṅkṛtaḥ // | if the efficient cause were there, to what would that delay be due? (395) |
nahi kāryasya svecchayā bhavanamabhavanaṃ vā kintu kāraṇasadasattānuvidhāyinī tasya sadasattve / | It is not by their own wish that the effects come into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their being and not being depend upon the presence or absence of the Cause. |
tatra yadyasau sthiraikarūpo bhāvaḥ sarvadā sarvakāryāṇāṃ hetubhāvenāvasthitas tadā kimiti tat sattāmātrākāṅkṣiṇī sakṛdeva sarvāṇi notpadyante yena krameṇa bhaveyuḥ / kṣepa iti / | Under the circumstances, if the Thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things, then how is it that all effects are not produced at once, being dependent as they are upon the mere presence of the said Cause? and why should they appear successively one after the other? ‘Kṣepa’ is Belay. |
tena pāścātyam api tadīyaṃ kāryaṃ prāgeva bhavet / apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇatvād abhimatakāryavad iti bhāvaḥ // | So that even the subsequent effect should come into existence beforehand, because its Cause would be there in its untrammelled form, just like the effect that the Opponent has in view. |
athāpītyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | In the following Text, the Opponent offers an explanation: [see verse 396 next] |
yadyapi sthiraḥ padārthaḥ sarvadā sannihitas tathāpi krameṇa sahakārīṇi tasya saṃnidhīyante / | “Even of the eternal thing, there are certain auxiliaries, on account of whose help, the former brings about the large number of its effects, in succession”. “Even though the Permanent Entity is always there, yet its auxiliaries come up to it only in succession; |
atas tadapekṣayā krameṇāsau kāryāṇi janayiṣyatīti // | hence on account of these latter, the Permanent Entity will naturally produce its effects only in succession”. |
sādhvityādinā pratividhatte | The following Text answers this argument: [see verses 397-399 next] |
sādhv etat kiṃtu te tasya bhavanti sahakāriṇaḥ / kiṃ yogyarūpahetutvād ekārthakāraṇena vā // yogyarūpasya hetutve sa bhāvas taiḥ kṛto bhavet / | but when those other things become its ‘auxiliaries’, is it because they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the permanent thing)? Or because they also serve the same purpose? If they are the cause of the causal efficiency (of the permanent thing), then this thing itself would be produced by them; |
sa cāśakyakriyo yasmāt tatsvarūpaṃ tadā sthitam // | and yet this is incapable of being produced, as it is always there (being permanent). |
kṛtau vā tat svarūpasya nityatāsyāvahīyate / | Or, if the very form of the permanent thing were held to be produced (by the auxiliaries), then its eternality (permanence) disappears. |
vibhinno 'tiśayas tasmād yady asau kārakaḥ katham // | If the ‘peculiarity’ (produced in the permanent thing) be regarded as something distinct from the thing itself, then, how can this (thing) be regarded as the ‘cause’? (397-399) |
na hi tasya nityasya kaścit sahakārī sambhavati. | As a matter of fact, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any auxiliary. |
tathā hi atiśayādhānād vā sahakārī bhavet yathā bījasya kṣityādaya ucchūnādyavasthāviśeṣamādadhānāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ / ekārthakriyayā vā yathonmiṣitamātreṇa rūpadarśane cakṣuṣo rūpādayaḥ. | Because (a) would that be an ‘auxiliary’ by virtue of creating peculiar conditions in the thing as the Earth, Water and other things become auxiliaries of the seed through producing in it such conditions as swelling and the like? Or (b) would it by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the thing as Colour etc. become auxiliaries to the Eye in producing the visual perception of Colour, by mere appearance? The former view cannot be maintained; |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ. | The first of these alternatives is not tenable; |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tat svarūpavat tadavyatirekitayā tasyāpi sadāvasthitatvāt, sataś ca karaṇāyogāt, karaṇe vā tadvad eva bhāvasyāpi karaṇaprasaṅgāt / | as in this case, the condition, being non-different from the thing, would be, like it, always there, and what is always there cannot be produced, or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be produced in the same way; |
tataś ca nityatvahāniḥ / | and that would deprive it of its permanence. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadātiśayād eva kāryotpatter bhāvasyākārakaprasaṅgaḥ / | If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the Cause. |
asāviti / nityaḥ padārthaḥ // | The term ‘asau’ (in the fourth line of the Text) stands for the Permanent Thing. |
etad eva spaṣṭayati tasmin satītyādi / | The same argument is further clarified in the following [see verse 400 next] |
tasmin sati hi kāryāṇāmutpādas tadabhāvataḥ / anutpādāt sa evaivaṃ hetutvena vyavasthitaḥ // tasminniti / | The effects would in that case be produced only when the said ‘condition’ is there, and they would not be produced when the ‘condition’ is not there and thus it would be this ‘condition’ that would have to be regarded as their cause. |
atiśaye satītyarthaḥ / | When ‘it’ i.e., the said condition is there. |
evam iti / tadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt // | ‘Thus’, i.e., from the positive and negative concomitance just pointed out. |
athāpi tena sambandhāt tasyāpyastyeva hetutā / | It might be argued that “On account of its (the condition’s) relation to the thing, the causal character does belong to that (thing) also”. |
kaḥ sambandhas tayoriṣṭas tādātmyena vibhedataḥ // | What ‘relation’ can be held to subsist between these two? It cannot be identity; |
na ca tasya tadutpattir yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ / tataś ca yaugapadyena kāryāṇāmudayo bhavet // | nor can the relation be held to consist in the fact that it is produced from it; as in that case, there should be simultaneity; and then the appearance of the effects also would be simultaneous. |
teneti / atiśayena / | ‘Its’ i.e., of the condition. |
tasyāpīti / nityasya / | ‘That’ the permanent thing. |
kaḥ sambandha ityādinottaramāha kaḥ sambandhaḥ naiva kaścid ity arthaḥ / | With the words ‘what relation, etc.’ the Author replies to the answer of the Opponent. The meaning is that no relation is possible between the two. |
dvividha eva hi sambandhas tādātmyaṃ tadutpattiś ca / tatra na tāvat tādātmyalakṣaṇo bhedasyāṅgīkṛtatvāt / | There are only two kinds of relation possible: Identity and Being Produced out of it: the relation between the thing and the condition cannot be that of Identity; as the two have been admitted to be different. |
nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ sahakāribhya eva tasyotpatteḥ / | Nor can the relation be that of being produced out of it; because, in fact, the effects are produced out of the auxiliaries themselves. |
tatas tasyotpattiraṅgīkriyate tadā tanmātrabhāvitvād atiśayānāṃ yugapad evotpattiḥ syāt / tataś ca sarvakāryāṇāṃ yugapadutpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If then, it be accepted that the conditions are produced out of the thing, then, as the appearance of the conditions would be contingent upon the thing itself, all the conditions would be produced simultaneously, and this would imply the simultaneous appearance of all the effects also; |
atiśayavataḥ kāraṇasya sarvadāvasthitatvāt // | as the Cause (in the shape of the Permanent Thing) along with the conditions would be always present. |
tatrāpyanyavyapekṣāyām anavasthā prasajyate / | If it be held that there is need for a further auxiliary, then there would be an infinite regress. |
ekadāpi tataḥ kāryaṃ nāsambandhāt prakalpyate // | from this it follows that, on account of the absence of relation, the effect cannot be produced even once. |
[p.147] atha tatrāpyatiśayotpattau sahakārikāraṇāpekṣaṇāt krameṇātiśayotpatter na kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyaṃ bhavatīti syāt tadayuktam evaṃ hyanavasthā syāt / | If it be held that “for the producing of the said ‘conditions’ also there is need for other auxiliaries; so that the conditions appear successively and hence there can be no simultaneous appearance of the effects”, this cannot be right; as in this way, there would be an Infinite Regress. |
tathā hi tatrāpi sahakāriṇām atiśayāntarakaraṇāt sahakāritvaṃ vaktavyam tasya cātiśayasya vyatirekitvāt sambandhāsiddhiḥ tadutpattau sakṛdutpattiprasaṅgaḥ tatrāpi sahakārivyapekṣāyāṃ punar iyam eva cintāvatarati / | For instance, for these auxiliaries also, there would have to be postulated further auxiliaries for the bringing about of other conditions; of that condition again, which would be different, there would be no relationship, and if it were to be produced out of the same, then all effects would be produced simultaneously; and if a further auxiliary were needed for that, the same difficulties would again present themselves. |
tataścānavasthāyāṃ na kadācid atiśayena saha tasya sambandhaḥ siddhyet / | Thus there being this infinite regress, no relationship between the Thing and the Condition could be established; |
tadasiddhau na tasmāt kāryotpattiratiśayād eva kāryotpatteḥ // | and when this cannot be established, then the effect would be produced not from the Permanent Thing, but from the Condition itself. |
sambandhaḥ samavāyaścet tatrāpyevaṃ vicintyate / upakārībhavaṃs tasya samavāyīṣyate sa kim // na vā tatheti prathamo vikalpo yadi gṛhyate / saiva prāptā tadutpattir vyapāstā sāpyanantaram // | If the relation between the two (the permanent thing and the conditions) were held to be that of ‘inherence’ (subsistence), then also the following has got to be considered: Is the ‘inherent’ thing so regarded because it is helpful? Or not so? If the former alternative is accepted, then it comes to be the same as the relation of ‘being produced from it’, and this has just been rejected. |
athāpi syān na tadutpattilakṣaṇas tasyātiśayena saha sambandhaḥ / | It might be argued that “the relation between the condition and the Permanent Entity is not that of being produced from it, but that of inhering |
kiṃ tarhi tat samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ tatra nitye dharmiṇi tasyātiśayasya samavetatvāt / | in it, the condition being inherent (subsisting) in the Permanent Thing”, This cannot be right; |
tadetad ayuktam iti darśayann āha tatrāpītyādi / na vā tatheti / | this is shown in the Text with the words ‘Then also, etc.’ ‘Or not so’; |
tatra prathamapakṣe upakārasyopakriyamāṇapadārthāvyatirekāt sa eva tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt / | the construction being ‘it is held to be inherent without being helpful’, Under the first alternative, the help rendered being non-different from the Thing helped, it would come to be the same relation which has been spoken of above as that of being, produced from it; |
sa cānantaram eva nirastaḥ // | and this has been just rejected. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viśeṣābhāvāt sarvaḥ sarvasya samavāyī syāt / | If the second alternative is accepted, then there being no distinction, everything would be ‘inherent’ in everything. |
taddarśayati anye 'pītyādi / | This is what is explained in the following [see verse 406 next] |
anye 'pi sarvabhāvāḥ syus tathaiva samavāyinaḥ / aviśeṣān na tasyāyamupakārī mato yadi // | In case the ‘inherent’ be not something helpful to that wherein it inheres, then all things would be equally inherent, as there could be nothing to differentiate one from the other. |
abhimatapadārthavadanupakāritvenāviśiṣṭatvāt // | ‘Equally’, because, in the matter of being not helpful, it could not be differentiated from the thing that is meant by the opponent (to be inherent). |
ubhayānubhayapakṣāvadhikṛtyāha bhedābhedetyādi / bhedābhedavikalpasya pratyekaṃ pratiṣedhanāt / dvirūpo 'tiśayas tasya vyasto bhavati vastunaḥ // | Each of the two alternatives that the two are different and non-different having thus been severally rejected, the idea that the condition is both (different and non-different) also becomes discarded. The Author next takes up the views that both (the Permanent Thing and the Conditions) are both different and non-different: [see verse 407 above] |
pratyekapakṣanirākaraṇād evobhayātmakapakṣasya nirākaraṇam tadvyatirekeṇobhayātmakapakṣābhāvāt / | The rejection of each of the two alternatives naturally implies the rejection of both alternatives; as the two alternatives together do not differ from the two alternatives treated severally. |
kiñcaikākāratyāgaparigrahayor aparākāraparigrahatyāgānāntarīyakatvād ayuktaṃ vastusata ubhayānubhayarūpatvam na hyekasyaikadā vidhipratiṣedhau parasparaviruddhau yuktāvekatvahāniprasaṅgāt // | Further (between two contradictories), the acceptance or rejection of one must imply the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the other; hence it cannot be right to regard the existing thing as being both different and non-different (from the Conditions); as the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time; otherwise it would cease to be one. |
[p.148] etac ca pudgalādiparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditaṃ taddarśayati pudgalādītyādi / | The following Text shows that this has already been explained before, in course of the examination of the doctrine of the ‘Pudgala’ (section F, chapter VII) and the rest. |
pudgalādiparīkṣāsu dvaurāśyapratiṣedhanāt / | In course of the examination of the ‘pudgala’, etc. it has been explained that both alternatives cannot be accepted. |
dvirūpo 'tiśayo nāsti na vāpyanubhayātmakaḥ // | nor can it be neither ‘different’ nor ‘non-different (408) |
athaikārthakriyākāritvena sahakāriṇas tasyeti dvitīyaḥ pakṣa āśrīyate / | The other party now puts forward the view that the ‘Auxiliaries’ of the Permanent Thing become so by reason of their serving the same purpose as the latter [the second alternative suggested under Text 397]. |
yathāhur eke naivāsau sahakāriṇo 'pekṣate na cāpi sahakāriviyuktaḥ kāryasya kārakaḥ yata īdṛśas tasya nisargasiddhaḥ svabhāvo yat sannihitasakalasahakārikāraṇa eva kārako 'ntyahetuvan na kevalaḥ / tena tasya bhāve 'poi na kāryasya sarvadotpattiprasaṅga iti / | To this effect, some people argue as follows: “The Permanent Thing does not require the Auxiliaries, and yet apart from the Auxiliaries, it cannot bring about its effect; the fact of the matter is that its very nature is such that it produces its effect only when all its auxiliaries are close to it, and never by itself, like the Final Cause, Hence even though the thing be always present, there is no possibility of all its effects being produced simultaneously.” |
tadetad darśayati athetyādi / | This is the view set forth in the following [see verses 409-410 next] |
atha nāpekṣate nityaḥ pratyayānsahakāriṇaḥ / tathāpi tadviyukto 'yaṃ kārako nāntyahetuvat // | “Even though the permanent thing may not actually need the auxiliary agencies, yet, apart from these latter, it cannot produce its effect, like the final cause; |
nijas tasya svabhāvo 'yaṃ teṣām eva hi sannidhau / | its own nature is such that it becomes an efficient cause only when in close proximity to the auxiliaries; |
kārakatvamataḥ kāryaṃ tadbhāve 'pi na sarvadā // neti / | hence it is that even though the permanent thing is always present, its effect does not come about always.” (409-410) |
kāraka ityanena sambandhanīyam / | this is meant to be the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity; |
antyahetuvad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /yadvottareṇa kārakatvamityanena sādharmyadṛṣṭāntatayā sambadyate / ṣaṣṭhyantāc ca vatiḥ kāryaḥ / tadbhāve 'pīti / tasya nityasya padārthasya sadbhāve 'pi // | or it may be taken as the Corroborative Instance per similarity in support of the proposition stated in the last line ‘it becomes an efficient came, etc,’ The term ‘hetuvat’ is to be analysed as ‘hetoḥ’ (with the genitive ending) ‘iva’, ‘Even though the Permanent thing, etc.’ i.e., even though the Permanent Thing is always there. |
astvevam ityādinā pratividhatte / | The above view is answered in the following [see verse 411 next] This may be so; |
astvevaṃ kintu sākalye yā tasya prakṛtir matā / vaikalye saiva ced iṣṭā nityāḥ syuḥ sahakāriṇaḥ // | but if the character of the permanent thing in its complete form (along with its auxiliaries) be held to be the same as that of it in its incomplete form (without the auxiliaries), then the auxiliaries also should be permanent (eternal). |
bhavatvevaṃ kalpanā kiṃtvidam iha nirūpyate yā tasya sahakārisākalyāvasthāyāṃ prakṛtiḥ kiṃ saiva vaikalyāvasthāyām āhosvidanyā yadi saiva tadā sahakāriṇo 'pi nityāḥ prāpnuvanti // | but what has to be examined here is this The character that belongs to the Permanent Thing in its complete form as fully equipped with its auxiliaries, is this character the same as that of the sameng in its incomplete form (without the Auxiliaries)? Or is it different from this latter? If it is the same, then the auxiliaries should be regarded as permanent. |
katham ity āha tatsambaddhasvabhāvasyetyādi / | The following Text shows how that is so [see verses 412-413 next] |
tat sambaddhasvabhāvasya bhāve teṣām api sthiteḥ / | Because they must exist while that thing exists whose character is connected with them. |
anyaccedvikalaṃ rūpam ekatvamavahīyate // | If, on the other hand, the incomplete form be held to be different (from the complete form), then the unity of the thing becomes lost. |
vyapekṣayāpyataścaivaṃ na kāryāṇāṃ kramodayaḥ / | Thus the successive appearance of effects is not possible, even when the cause is dependent (upon auxiliaries). |
taiḥ sahakāribhiḥ sambaddhaḥ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | The term ‘tatsambaddha, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘that whose character is connected with them,’ i.e. the Auxiliaries. |
teṣām apīti / sahakāriṇām / | ‘They must exist’ i.e. the Auxiliaries must exist. |
nigaḍabaddhapuruṣākarṣaṇe nigaḍākarṣaṇavat teṣām apyanuvṛtteḥ / | Just as when a man tied to a chain is dragged, the chain also becomes dragged, the auxiliaries must follow the Permanentng with which they are connected. |
evaṃ hi sa eva pūrva [p.149] svabhāvāparityāgenānuvṛtto bhavati / | Thus alone does the Thing become saved from renouncing its previous character. |
yadi hi sahakāriṇā sambaddhaṃ svabhāvaṃ na jahāti tat sambaddhasvabhāvāparityāgena sāmarthyāt sahakāriṇāmapyaparityāgaḥ / | If it does not renounce its character which is connected with the auxiliaries, then on account of the non-relinquishment of the character connected with the auxiliaries, the implication is that it does not relinquish the auxiliaries also; |
pratiyogisavyapekṣatvāt sambandhitvasya / | because the ‘connection’ is always dependent upon the connected factor. |
anyathā saiva tasya prakṛtir na bhavet / | Otherwise the character of the thing would not be the same as the previous one. |
yadi hi sahakārivikalaṃ rūpamasyānyaditīṣyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ rūpasya bhāvāvyatirekāt / | If the form of the thing as without the auxiliaries be held to be different from its form as with the auxiliaries, then it loses its permanence; as the form is nothing different from the thing itself. |
tasmāt sahakāriṇo 'pekṣāyām api na sthirāṇāṃ krameṇārthakriyā yuktā // | Thus, even if the action of the cause be dependent upon auxiliaries, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any successive fruitful activity. |
parairapi nityapadārthakāryāṇāṃ naiva yaugapadyamiṣṭam / tathā hi nityatāmetāni kāryāṇi varṇyante / | The following Text shows that even simultaneous action is not possible: [see verse 413b above] Even the other party do not favour the idea of the effects of the Permanent Thing being simultaneous. |
ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhādīni nabhasaḥ śabdāḥ manasaḥ kramavartīni vijñānāni aṇūnāṃ dvyaṇukādikrameṇa sthūlāḥ kāladigīśvarādīnāṃ sarvāṇyevotpattimantīti / | For instance, the following are described as the effects of Permanent Things: (a) Pleasure, Pain and the Rest, of the Soul; (b) Sound of Ākāśa; (c) the successive cognitions of the Mind; (d) the gross substances, from the Diad onwards, of the Atoms; (e) all products of Time, Space, God and so forth. |
eṣāṃ ca pratyakṣād eva kramodayaḥ prasiddhaḥ // | And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear in succession. |
tadevaṃ yaugapadyābhyupagame pratyakṣavirodho 'bhyupagamavirodhaścokto bhavati / | What is meant is that the theory of simultaneity is contrary to perceived facts, and also contrary to the opponent’s own doctrines. |
idānīm anumānavirodhaṃ pratipādaynn āha niḥśeṣāṇītyādi / | The author now proceeds to show that it is contrary to Inference also: [see verse 414 next] |
niḥśeṣāṇi ca kāryāṇi sakṛtkṛtvā nivartate / sāmarthyātmā sa cedārthaḥ siddhāsya kṣaṇabhaṅgitā // | If the thing possessed of the causal potency disappears, after having brought about all its effects simultaneously, then its momentariness becomes established. |
tathā hi yugapad aśeṣāṇi kāryāṇi kṛtvā sa kiṃ tasyārthakriyāsamarthaḥ svabhāvo nivartate āhosvid anuvartata iti pakṣadvayam / | That is, does the nature of the thing consisting in its capacity for effective action disappear, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously? Or does it continue to exist? These are the only two alternatives possible. |
tatra yadi nivartata iti pakṣas tadā tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgitvaṃ siddham / | If it is held that it disappears, then that establishes its momentary character; |
pratikṣamaparāparasvabhāvotpatteḥ pūrvapūrvasya ca svabhāvasya svarasavināśāt // | as at each moment fresh natures would be appearing, one after the other, each preceding nature becoming destroyed by itself. |
tadrūpasyānuvṛttau tu kāryamutpādayet punaḥ / | If, on the other hand, the form of the efficient cause continues (after having brought about the effects), then it should produce the effect over again; |
akiñcitkararūpasya sāmarthyaṃ ceṣyate katham // sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvāt tārāpathasarojavat / | because, how could any efficiency be attributed to what is not effective in bringing about due effects? Thus all things would be non-existent and momentary, like the ‘sky-lotus’, on account of their being devoid of all efficiency; |
asanto 'kṣaṇikāḥ sarve śaktir yadvastulakṣaṇam // | because it is efficiency (for effective action) that constitutes the characteristic of (existing) ‘things’. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣa āśrīyate tadā tadrūpasya samarthāt mano 'nuvṛttau satyāṃ punaḥ kāryamutpādayet atyaktapūrvarūpatvāt prāgavasthāvat / | If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing, in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue, it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition; and thus there would come about the same succession of effects. |
tataś ca sa eva kramo jāta iti yaugapadyābhyupagamo 'numānaviruddhaḥ / | This shows that the doctrine of simultaneity is contrary to Inferential Reasoning. |
athāpi syān mābhūt tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām [p.150] arthakriyā tatha 'pi sāmarthyamasyāstyevetyāha akiñcitkararūpasyetyādi /karyotpādanibandhanaṃ hi bhāvānāṃ sāmarthyaṃ vyavasthāpyate / | It might be argued that “It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither successive or simultaneous; and yet its efficiency may be there all the same,” In answer to this, it is said ‘How could any efficiency, etc. etct.’ When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects; |
yaś ca na kiñcitkaroti sa kathaṃ samarthaḥ syāt / anyathā hyākāśakuśeśayāderapi sāmarthyaṃ kiṃ na vyavasthāpyeta / | so that when ang does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient? Otherwise, why could not efficiency be attributed to the ‘sky-lotus’ and other such things also? |
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