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vasturūpānuvṛttiś ca kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ niṣidhyate // | it only denies the continuity of the particular form of the thing beyond one moment. |
ato vyavasthitaṃ rūpaṃ vihitaṃ nāsya kiñcana / iti nityavikalpo 'smin kriyamāṇo nirāspadaḥ // | thus no lasting form is affirmed in regard to the ‘annihilation’, and there is no room for the alternative that it is eternal (383-384) |
nivṛttir bhavatītyanenāpi vacanenāsmin pradhvaṃse vidhirūpeṇa nivṛttirūpatā nābhidhīyate yato nāsya vidheyaṃ kiñcidrūpam asti / | When it is said that ‘there is cessation’, it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of ‘cessation’ in regard to ‘Annihilation’, for the simple reason that it has no positive form; |
kiṃ tarhi vastusvarūpasay kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ svabhāvānuvṛttir niṣidhyate / | it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. |
tasmād ayam ekāntenābhāvarūpa eveti nityavikalpo 'nāspada eva niḥsvabhāvatvād eva sadā vyavasthitarūpāyogāt / | Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal; because? on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have a permanent form. |
svabhāvapratibaddhatvān nityanityasvabhāvapratibaddhadharmayoḥ / | Specially because the properties of eternality or non-eternality are invariably concomitant with the nature of things. |
yaccoktamakāraṇaṃ bhavatāṃ dvidhā nityamasacceti tatparasiddhāntānabhijñatayā yato nyāyavādināṃ bauddhānām akāraṇamasadeva / yathoktaṃ bhagavatā sadharmeṣu dharmānudarśī viharan bodhisattvo 'ṇumapi dharmaṃ na samanupaśyati / | As a matter of fact, for Bauddhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is without cause must be non-existent; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord ‘The Wise One seeking for the common property among similarngs does not perceive any such property in the slightest form’, As for the Vaibhāsikas (a particular sect among Buddhists), who posit such existentngs as Ākāśa and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as Followers of the Buddha; |
yaḥ pratīya samutpādavinirmukta iti / | hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant. |
evaṃ nāśahetūnāṃ sarveṣāmākiñcitkaratvānnāsiddhatā hetoḥ / | Thus all causes of Destruction being inefficacious, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353-366) cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’, |
tathā hi bhāvaḥ svahetorutpadyamānaḥ kadācitprakṛtyā svayaṃ naśvarātmaivotpadyate anaśvarātmā vā / yadi naśvaras tasya na kiñcinnāśahetutā svayaṃ tat svabhāvatayaiva nāśāt / | For the following reason also the Causes of Destruction should be declared to be inefficacious: When a Thing is produced from its Cause, is it produced sometimes as evanescent by its very nature, and sometimes as not-evanescent (eternal)? If it is produced as evanescent, then it cannot be the cause of Destruction, because it is destroyed through its own nature. |
yo hi yasya svabhāvaḥ sa svahetor evotpadyamānas tādṛśo bhavati na punas tadbhāve hetvantaramapekṣate / | When a certain nature (or character) belongs to a Thing, this thing, when produced, is produced with that same nature; and it does not depend upon any other cause (for producing that nature). |
yathā prakāśadravoṣnakaṭhinādayas tadātmāna utpannā na punaḥ prakāśādibhāva hetvantaram apekṣante / | For instance, the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like when produced are produced along with these properties, and they do not depend upon another cause for the bringing about of these properties. |
syād etat yathā bījādayo 'ṅkurādijananasvabhāvāḥ santo 'pi na kevalā janayanti salilādikāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt tadvadbhāvo 'naśvarasvabhāvo 'pi nāśekāraṇāntarāpekṣo bhaviṣyatīti / tadetadasamyak / | It might be argued that “In the ease of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things, and in the same way, though the Thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other Causes,” This cannot be right; |
antyāvasthāprāptasyaiva janakasvabhāvatvābhyupagamāt nānyasya / tena yo 'sau tat svabhāvaḥ sa janayatyeva nāsau paramapekṣate / | because what is regarded as the ‘cause’ of ang is what brings it about in its final complete form; nong else is regarded as its ‘Cause’, So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another Cause. |
yastu kuśūlādistho na janayati nāsau tat svabhāvaḥ / | If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its ‘nature’; |
kāraṇakāraṇatvāt tu tasyāpi kāraṇavyapadeśo na mukhyata iti nāsti vyabhicāraḥ / athānaśvarātmeti pakṣastadapi nāśahetur akiñcitkara eva / | it may be called ‘the cause of the Cause’ (of the Sprout), not the direct Cause; so that this does not vitiate our position. If the alternative view be accepted, that when the Thing is produced it is produced in the non-evanescent (permanent) form, then, for that also, any Cause of its destruction would be entirely inefficacious; |
tasya kenacit svabhāvānyathābhāvasya kartumaśakyatvāt / | because any change in the nature of such ang would be impossible. |
tathā hi yadi svabhāva utpādānantaraṃ na vinaśyet tadā paścād api sa eva tasya sthidharmā svabhāvas tadavastha iti kiṃ nāśahetunā tasya kṛtam yena vinaśyeta / athāpi syāt yathā tāmrādīnāṃ kaṭhinarūpāṇām api satāmagnyādisamparkādanyathātvaṃ bhavati / | Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of permanent standing would be there, what is there that would be done by the ‘cause of destruction’, by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed? The following might be urged “In the case of Copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on the contact of fire, their condition becomes changed; |
tathā bhāvasyāvinaśvarasvabhāvasyāpi sato vināśahetunānyathātvaṃ kriyate / | similarly even though the thing may be naturally indestructible, the Cause of its destruction may change its condition; |
[p.141] tena vināśahetuṃ prāpya vinaśyatīti / tadetad asamyak / | and by reason of this, it may become destroyed on its coming into contact with that Cause of Destruction This cannot be right; |
na ih sa evānyathā bhavati / | as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes changed; |
svabhāvāntarotpattilakṣaṇatvād anyathātvasya / | because ‘Change’ consists in the production of another nature or character; |
tathā hi yat tadanyathātvaṃ nāma tat kiṃ bhāvādarthāntaramāhosvid bhāvaeva na tāvad bhāva eva tasya svahetor eva pūrvaṃ niṣpannatvāt / | now this ‘change’ that you speak of is it something different from the Thing itself? or is it the Thing itself? It cannot be the Thing itself; as that has been already produced by its own Cause [and hence could not be produced again by the Cause of the change]. |
athārthāntaram tathā sati bhāvo 'cyutidharmā tathaivāvasthita iti na tasyānyathābhāvaḥ / | If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; so that it has not changed. |
tāmrādidṛṣṭānto 'pyasiddha eva tathā hi tāmrādīnāṃ pūrvakasya kaṭhinādikṣaṇasya svarasanirodhitvād vināśe satyagnyādeḥ sahakārikāraṇāntarāt svopādānakāraṇāc ca sāmagryantarād dravākhyamaparam eva svabhāvāntaramutpadyate / | As regards the example.of Copper and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding ‘solid-moment’ of the Copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself, then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as Fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and under other circumstances, a different character in the shape of fluidity; |
punar api dravādisvabhāvasya svarasanirodhitayā vināśe sati sahakārikāraṇāntarāt svopādānakāraṇāc ca kāṭhinyākhyamaparam eva svabhāvāntaramutpadyata iti naikasyānyathātvam asti / | again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing. |
tasmāt sarvathāpyakiñcitkara eva nāśahetur iti nāsiddho hetuḥ / | Thus the ‘Cause of Destruction’ is in every way infructuous; and our Reason is not ‘unproven’. Nor is our Reason ‘Contradictory’; |
nacāpi viruddhaḥ svapakṣe bhāvāt / | Nor is the reason ‘inconclusive’; as it has been already established before. |
nacāpyanaikāntikaḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitatvāt / | as all caused things are held to be evanescent; |
syād etat yathākāśaṃ mūrtatvāya na paramapekṣate atha ca tatra niyataṃ na bhavati tadvadbhāvaḥ kṛtako 'pi yaḥ pareṇānityo neṣyate / hetumataḥ sarvasyānityatvābhyupagamāt / | how then can the Reason be ‘inconclusive’? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be eternal, on account of their indestructibility, these are really included under the category of ‘uncreated things’, and as such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. |
ta eva ceha pakṣīkṛtā nānya iti kuto ' 'naikāntikatā / | Nor is it admitted that Ākāśa and such other things are independent in the matter of their corporeality; |
nāpyākāśāder murttatvādidharmaṃ pratyanapekṣā siddhā yasya hi yo dharmo nāsti sa taṃ prati sāpekṣa eva na hi prāptaṃ dharmaṃ prati kācid apekṣā bhāvānāṃ vyavasthāpyate kiṃ tarhi aprāptam evetyasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ // | because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a things that thing is certainly ‘dependent upon something else’ in regard to that property; things are never regarded as’ dependent on something else’ for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted. |
ye tu vyomādayo bhāvā akṛtatvena saṃmatāḥ / vastuvṛttyā na santyeva te ca śaktiviyogataḥ // kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvādivikalpasteṣvanāspadaḥ / | The ākāśa and other things which have been held to be ‘uncreated’ are really non-existent, in the form of ‘entities’; as they are devoid of all potentiality; hence there can be no room for attributing to them any such alternative characters as that of ‘momentariness’ or ‘non-momentariness’; |
tadā vastveva yena syāt kṣaṇikaṃ yadivānyathā // | whereby they could be regarded even as an ‘entity’ be it either momentary or otherwise. |
yadi hi vyomādayo bhāvāḥ siddhasattākāḥ syus tadā teṣu kṣaṇikatvādidharmacintāvataret na hi dharmāṇāṃ svātantryeṇa siddhirasti anyathā hi dharmatvam eva teṣāṃ hīyate / | If things like Ākāśa were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being momentary, etc.; because Properties have no existence by themselves; if they did, then they would cease to be Properties. |
na cākāśādayo 'kṛtakā dharmiṇas teṣāṃ sarvasāmarthyavirahitvena vandhyāputravadasa [p.142] dvyavahāraviṣayatvāt / prayogaḥ yat sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ tadavastu yathā vandhyāputraḥ sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ cākāśādīti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Nor are Ākāśa, etc. -uncreated things, because, being devoid of all potentiality,. they are to be spoken of as ‘nonexistent’, like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’, This argument may be formulated as follows: A thing that is devoid of all potentiality must be non-existent, like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’; Ākāśa, etc. are devoid of all potentiality; so that this is a natural reason (for regarding them as non-existent); |
vastuto vyāpakānupalabdhir vā / | or in reality, there is absence of the more extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive character). |
na cānaikāntiko hetuḥ etāvan mātranibandhanatvād asadvyavahārasya nāpyasiddhir iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ / | Nor can the Reason adduced be said to be ‘inconclusive’, as this alone is enough to justify the notion of ‘non-existence Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘unproven’; as we shall explain later on. Nor, lastly, can it be said to be ‘contradictory’; |
sapakṣe bhāvānnāpi viruddhaḥ // | as it is found to be present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present. |
kasmāt punaravastuni kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavikalpo nāvataratītyāha kṣaṇāvasthitarūpaṃ hītyādi / | while that thing is said to be ‘non-momentary’ which is endowed with a lasting (permanent) form. Question: “Why cannot the question of momentariness or non-momentariness arise in regard to a non-entity?” |
kṣaṇāvasthitarūpaṃ hi vastu kṣaṇikamucyate / sthirarūpasamākrāntaṃ vastvevākṣaṇikaṃ punaḥ // | The meaning of this is clear. That form of the thing which does not persist after its production is what is called ‘kṣaṇa’, ‘moment’; and that which has this form is held to be ‘kṣaṇika’, ‘momentary (388) |
udyotakarastvāha kṣaṇika iti matvarthīyānupapattiḥ tathā hi yadi niruktanyāyena kṣayaḥ kṣaṇaḥ so 'syāstīti kṣaṇika iti bodhyate tatra yuktaṃ kālabhedāt yadā hi kṣayo na tadā kṣayīti bhinnakālayor na matvarthīyo dṛṣṭaḥ / | Uddyotakara has put forward the following argument: “The term ‘Kṣaṇika’ (‘momentary’) contains the Possessive Affix (‘ṭhañ’, by Pāṇini 5-2-115); how does this affix come in? If, in accordance with the Nirukta, ‘kṣaṇa’ stands for kṣaya, Destruction, and the term ‘kṣaṇika’ means that which has destruction, this cannot be right; because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is Destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); |
atha punarbhāvānantaravināśena viśiṣyamānaḥ kṣaṇa ity ucyate / | and the Possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times. |
tadāpi sa tenaiva tadvātra bhavatīti na yukto matvarthīyaḥ / | and thus also the use of the Possessive affix would be injustifiable. |
atha kṣaṇasthitikālāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ sarvāntyo hi kālaḥ kṣaṇastaṃ ye 'vatiṣṭhante te kṣaṇikāḥ / | If what is meant by things being ‘kṣaṇika’ ‘momentary’, is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the ‘kṣaṇa’, ‘Moment’, as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things ‘momentary’ which continue to exist only during that point of time; |
etad api na yuktam / | then this also cannot be right; |
saṃjñāmātreṇa kālasyābhyupagamāt na ca saṃjñāmātraṃ vastuviśeṣaṇatvena yuktam iti / | because the Bauddha admits of Time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity.” (Nyāyavārtika on 3-2-14, page 418, lines 8-16, Bib. |
tatrāha utpādānantarāsthāyītyādi / | Indica Edition.) This is answered in the following [see verse 388 above] |
utpādānantarāsthāyi svarūpaṃ yac ca vastunaḥ / taducyate kṣaṇaḥ so 'sti yasya tatkṣsaṇikam matam // utpādānantaravināśisvabhāvo vastunaḥ kṣaṇa ucyate sa yasyāsti sa kṣaṇika iti / | What is called ‘moment’ is the character of the thing which is destroyed immediately after it has been produced; and that which has this character is called ‘momentary’, This has been thus declared ‘Moment is that which is destroyed immediately after theng has come into existence, and that which has this is called momentary (388) |
nanvevam api svabhāvasyānarthāntaratvāt so 'syāstīti vyatirekanibandhanaḥ pratyayo nopapadyata ity āha asatyapītyādi / | “Even so, as the ‘nature’ of ang is not-different from the Thing itself, there can be no such idea as that ‘this belongs to that’, which idea is based upon the difference of the two factors concerned.” |
asapyarthabhede ca so 'styasyeti na bādhyate / | Even when there is no difference between two things, there is nothing to prevent the notion of ‘this belonging to that’; |
icchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvi hi vācakam // | as every expressive word is applied in accordance with an arbitrary whim. |
yathā svasya svabhāvaḥ śilāputrakasya śarīram ityādāvasatyapi vāstave bhede buddhiparikalpitaṃ bhedamāśritya vyatirekaṣaṣṭhīvibhaktir bhavati tathehāpi bhaviṣyati na hi vastusvabhāvānuvidhāyinyo vācaḥ / | In such expressions as ‘one’s own nature’, ‘the body of the stone-image’, and so forth, even though there is no actual difference between the two things spoken of, the Possessive ending implying difference is used on the basis of an assumed difference; so would it be in the case in question also. Verbal expressions are used, not always in accordance with the real state of things, but in accordance with the whim of the speaker. |
kiṃ tarhi vakturicchāmanuvidadhate // | and that term may be used either with the affix or without the affix (to which Uddyotaka has taken objection). |
[p.143] apica yāvatyarthe yāvāneva vaktṛbhir viniyujyate dhvaniḥ sa tāvāneva tamarthaṃ saṅketavaśāt pratyāyayati na tu paramārthataḥ prakṛtiḥ pratyayoḥ vāsti / | Further, when a man utters a verbal sound, that sound denotes, in that form alone, only that much of a thing as to which it is applied, such denotation being due to convention; and in reality there is no ‘basic term’ or an ‘affix’; |
kṣaṇika iti cāyaṃ śabda utpādānantarāsthāyini vastumātre niyukto vidvadbhiḥ / | the term (verbal sound) ‘kṣaṇika’ is applied by the learned to only such a thing as does not continue to exist after its coming into existence; |
tatra caivambhūte vastuni kṣaṇikaśabdena vivakṣite kṣaṇikaḥ śabdaḥ sapratyayo vā prayujyatāṃ pratyayarahito veti nātrāsmākam icchāmātrānurodhini sāṅketike vacasyatyādara ityetad darśayati udayānantarasthāyītyādi / | and such a thing being meant to be denoted by the term ‘momentary’ it may be used along with an affix or without an affix, we have no regard for any such use, which is used on the basis of conventions that are purely arbitrary. |
udayānantarasthāyi vastvevaṃ tu vivakṣitam / | This is what is shown in the following [see verse 390 above] |
evam iti / kṣaṇikam ityanena / | ‘Evam’ i.e. by the term ‘kṣaṇika’, ‘momentary.’ |
saha pratyayena matvarthīyena vartata iti sapratyayaḥ // | ‘With the affix’ i.e., with the Possessive affix (Thañ). |
evaṃ vyomādīnām akṛtakatvābhyupagame sati niyamenāsadvyavahāraviṣayataiveti pratipāditam idānīṃ sattvābhyupagame tu kṣaṇikatvamevaiṣāṃ prasajyata itisādhanayannāha yadi tvityādi / | If ākāśa, time and such things are existent, then, being so, they cannot escape from being momentary, just like the created things. Thus it has been shown that if Ākāśa and the rest are regarded as uncreated, they must be regarded as being non-existent; |
yadi tu vyomakālādyāḥ santaḥ syus te tathāsati / | and it is now going to be shown that if they are regarded as existent, they must be momentary: [see verse 391 above] |
kṛtā iveti / kṛtakā ivetyarthaḥ / | ‘Kṛtāḥ’ stands for ‘kṛtakāḥ’, ‘created things’. |
etena sattvādityayaṃ hetuḥ sūcitaḥ // tameva spaṣṭīkurvannāha tathāhītyādi / | This indicates ‘being’, ‘existence’, as the Reason (for regarding things as momentary). This Reason is stated more explicitly: [see verses 392-394 next] |
tathā hi santo ye nāma te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ / tadyathāsaṃskṛtā bhāvās tathāsiddhā anantaram // | For instance, whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux, just as all created things have just been shown to be; |
santaścāmī tvayeṣyante vyomakāleśvarādayaḥ / | these things, ākāśa, time, god, and the rest are held by you to be existent; |
na bhavanti sthirā bhāvā niḥsatvās te tato matāḥ // | these could never have an existence if they were devoid op momentariness; |
prayogaḥ yat sattātsarvaṃ kṣaṇikam yathā samanantaraṃ pratipāditāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ padārthāḥ santaś ca bhavatā vyomādayo bhāvā iṣyante iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The reasoning may be thus formulated: What is existent must be momentary, like the things just shown to be momentary; Ākāśa and other (uncreated)ngs are held by you to be existent; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as momentary). |
tathā siddhā iti / | ‘As have been shown to be’; |
kṣaṇikatvena / | i.e. as momentary. |
etena na sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasyāśaṅkanīyā prasādhitatvād iti darśayati / | This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Probandum, as its presence has been already established. |
tvayeṣyanta ityanena prasaṅgasādhanametad iti darśayati / | ‘Held by you’; this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum. |
anyathā hetor anyatarāsiddhatā syāt / | Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties. |
kathaṃ punar asya hetor vyāptiḥ siddhetyāha kṣaṇikatvaviyoge tvityādi / | Question “In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established?” |
[p.144] arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇamiha sattvaṃ hetotveneṣṭam tacca kṣaṇikatvanivṛttau nivartate / | Answer: ‘If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.’; the ‘existence’ that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in ‘capacity for fruitful action’; |
tathā hi bhāvā arthakriyāṃ kurvantaḥ krameṇa vā kurvīranyaugapadyena vā na hi kramayaugapadyābhyāmanyaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati tayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / | and this ‘existence’ must be absent, if ‘momentariness’ is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously, there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; |
etac ca pratyakṣata eva prasiddham / | as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived; |
tathā hi ghaṭo madhūdakādīṃstadanyadravyavyatibhinnān krameṇāharan svajñānodakāharaṇe na ca yaugapadyena kurvan pratyakṣeṇaiva paricchidyate / tatra yān kāryabhedān krameṇāharan samupalabhyate ghaṭaḥ kulālo vā śarāvodañcanādīn na tadaiva tānyaugapadyena janayituṃ samarthaḥ / | for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the successive functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another, and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively, or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects, all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. |
ghaṭo vā svaviṣaye jñānādīnyaugapadyena janayannupalabhyate na tadaiva tānkrameṇeti pratyakṣāvasitametat sarvam / | When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at one and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those same successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. |
ataḥ kramasya yaugapadyavyavacchedenaiva paricchedādyaugapadyasya ca kramavyavacchedenaivetyekapramāṇavṛttir dvayor anyatarat paricchindatī tataḥ paraṃ pratiyoginaṃ vyavacchinatti prakārāntarbhāvaṃ ca sūcayatīti pratyakṣapramāṇāvasita evānayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitilakṣaṇo virodhaḥ / | Thus succession being excluded by simultaneity, and vice versa, the cognition that precludes both these functions (the successive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong, and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning; thus then there is mutual exclusion ‘contradiction’ between these two succession and simultaneity of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. |
tena tṛtīyasyābhāvāt kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyā vyāptā / | Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either successive or simultaneous; |
sā ca sthireṣu bhāveṣu svavyāpakānivṛttau nivartamānā tallakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ nivartayatīti siddhā vyāptiḥ / | and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of ‘existence’ also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured. |
na caitacchakyaṃ vaktum kramayaugapadye eva bhāvānāṃ na siddhe vyatiriktakālapadārthānabhyupagamād iti / na hi vayaṃ bhāvānām arthāntarabhūtakālapadārthakṛtaṃ kramayaugapadyaṃ brūmaḥ / | It cannot be argued, in answer to this that “The succession and simultaneity of the things themselves have not yet been proved, inasmuch as Time is not postulated by us as a distinct entity.” It will not be right to-argue thus, because we do not say that the ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of Time; |
kiṃ tarhi tathātathotpādakṛtam / | what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. |
tathā hi yadi caikaḥ sattāmanubhavati tadaiva yadā pare tadvadeva tamanubhavanti ta evaṃ sarve tathotpadyamānā akramavyapadeśanibandhanaṃ bhavanti / tadyathā samagrasāmagrīkā bahavo 'ṅkurāḥ samutpadyamānāḥ / | For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also-come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of ‘non-succession’ or ‘simultaneity’; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions; when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as ‘successive’; |
viparyayāt kramavyapadeśabhājo yathāṅkurakāṇḍapatrādayaḥ / | e.g., suchngs as the sprout, the stem, the leaves, and so forth. |
ete ca pratyakṣa eva siddhās tathaiva ca vyapadiśyante janaiḥ / | All these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. |
tathābhūtapadārthaviṣayo 'pi kāraṇavyāpāras tadviṣayakramayaugapadyābhyāṃvyapadiśyata ityacodyam etat / | The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as ‘successive’ or ‘simultaneous Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us. |
nanu ca yadi sthiro bhāvaḥ siddho bhavet tadā tatra kramayaugapadyanivṛttau satyāmarthakriyāyāḥ sāmarthyanivṛttiḥ siddhyet / | Says the opponent: “In case the Thing were proved to be permanent, the preclusion of succession and simultaneity might not imply the preclusion of fruitful activity; |
yathā kvacit pradeśe dharmiṇi vṛkṣanivṛttau śiṃśapānivṛttiḥ / | e.g. when the existence of the ‘Tree’ becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it precludes the particular tree ‘Śiṃśapā’; |
anyathā hyasiddhe pradeśadharmiṇi kutra śiṃśapābhāvaḥ pratīyeta / na cāsau siddhas tasyaiva pratiṣeddhumiṣṭatvāt / | otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could the absence of the shimshapā be cognised? As a matter of fact, the permanent thing itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. |
athāpi siddho 'ṅgīkriyata na tarhi tasya pratikṣepo yuktaḥ tasya dharmiṇaḥ svarūpeṇa siddhyabhyupagamāt / | If, however, you do admit that such a permanent thing does exists then it cannot be right to deny it; since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). |
tataś ca sattvādibhya yamapyanaikāntika eva hetuḥ vipakṣe vṛtter iti / | Thus your reason ‘because it has existence’, becomes ‘inconclusive’, as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum (‘Momentary’).” |
naitadasti / | It is not so, we reply. |
na hyasmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa pramāṇatayā vyatirekasādhinyā asyā vyāpakānupalabdheḥ prayogaḥ kriyate / | When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition; |
kiṃ tarhi prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati kriyate / | we put it forward only in the form of a Beductio ad absurdum against the opponent; |
yadi bhavatā teṣāṃ sthirarūpatāṅgī [p.145] kriyate tadārthakriyāsāmarthyamapi nāṅgīkartavyam tatra kramayaugapadyayogasya tadvyāpakasyābhāvāt / | the sense being if you accept the permanence of the thing, then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity, as ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’, which are of larger extension, and with which the said ‘succession’ and ‘simultaneity’ are invariably concomitant, cannot be present in it; |
nahi vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyamavasthātumutsahate / | because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; |
anyathā vyāpyavyāpakabhāva eva tayor na syāt / | otherwise the two could not be related as being of ‘larger’ and ‘narrower’ extension. |
tataścārthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau satvam api teṣāṃ nāṅgīkartavyam arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāt satvasyeti / | Hence on the preclusion of the capacity for fruitful activity, the presence of existence also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of ‘existence.’ |
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