sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
syād etad yadi nāma sāmarthyamasya nivṛttaṃ tathāpi sattvamanivṛttam eva / | Bays the Opponent “Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disappeared, the existence of the Thing is still there (it still exists); |
tataś ca sattvādityanaikāntika eva hetur ity āha asanta ityādi / | Answer: ‘Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc.’ The only characteristic of an existing thing is that it should have the capacity for effective action; |
idam eva hi vastulakṣaṇaṃ yadarthakriyāsāmarthyaṃ taccennivṛttaṃ tat kathaṃ vastutvaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ teṣvavasthāṃ labhate / | if this capacity has disappeared, how could existence, the characteristic feature of the entity, remain there? |
tadevaṃ kramākramābhyām arthakriyāsāmarthyaśūnyatvād vandhyāputrādivad asadvyavahārayogyā akṣaṇikatvenābhimatā ākāśādaya iti siddham // | Thus it is established that Ākāśa and other things which are held to be non-momentary (permanent) can only be regarded as ‘non-existent’, like ‘the son of the Barren Woman’, because they are devoid of the capacity for effective action, functioning either successively or simultaneously. |
atha nāṅgīkriyetedaṃ vastutvaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam / yadevam anyannirdiśyaṃ vastūnāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ paraiḥ // | If, then, capacity (for fruitful action) be not admitted to be the characteristic feature of the ‘entity’, then, under the circumstances, it behoves the other party to point out some other characteristic feature of ‘entities’. |
athāpi syād yadyarthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam eva vastulakṣaṇaṃ bhavet tadaitat sarvaṃ śobheta / yadyevaṃ kimanyad vastulakṣaṇam iti vaktavyam / | It might be argued that “If capacity for effective action were the characteristic feature of entities, then alone all this would be very well In that ease it should be explained what their characteristic feature is. |
tathā hi śaśaviṣāṇādau yadavastutvamiṣṭaṃ tatrārthakriyāsāmarthyaviraha eva nibandhanam / | As a matter of fact, when it is said that the ‘Hare’s Horn’ and such thing are ‘nonentities’, this idea is based entirely upon the absence in them of the capacity for effective action. |
vastvavastunoścānyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / sāmarthyād avastulakṣaṇaviparītamarthakriyāsāmarthyam eva vastulakṣaṇamavatiṣṭhata iti bhāvaḥ // | Then, inasmuch as ‘entity’ and ‘non-entity’ are mutually exclusive, it follows, by implication, that the characteristic feature of ‘entity’, as distinguished from ‘non-entity’, consists in its capacity for effective action. |
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkate sattetyādi / | The following Text anticipates the opponent’s answer to the above: [see verse 418 next] |
sattāsambandha iṣṭaśced vastūnāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ na tat / | If the characteristic feature of ‘entities’ be held to consist in being related to existence (being), that cannot be right; |
asiddheḥ samavāyādeḥ kathaṃ vānyonyalakṣaṇam // | how too could they be the characteristic feature of one another? (418) |
na hyarthakriyāsāmarthyaṃ vastulakṣaṇam kiṃ tarhi sattāsambandhaḥ sattāsamavāya iti yāvat / | [Says the Opponent] “Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic feature of entities; it is ‘being related to existence’, i.e., the ‘Inherence of existence (Being)’, that is their characteristic feature.” |
na taditi / | The answer to this is That cannot be right; |
vastulakṣaṇaṃ yuktamiti śeṣaḥ / | i.e. that cannot be the right characteristic feature of entities; |
samavāyāder asiddhatvāt / | because no such relation as that of ‘Inherence’ and the like is known to subsist between them; |
ādiśabdena sattāparigrahaḥ / | the phase ‘and the like’ is meant to include ‘existence’. |
yadi samavāyādiḥ siddho bhavet tadā samavāyo vastulakṣaṇaṃ syāt / yāvatā teṣām eva sādhyatvena prastutatvāt / | If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then ‘Inherence’ might be the characteristic feature of ‘entities as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; |
vakṣyamāṇabādhakapramāṇasadbhāvāc ca / | and also because there are valid proofs to the contrary. |
yadi vā pūrvoktād eva bādhakāt pramāṇāt sattāyāḥ samavāyasya cāsiddhiḥ / kenacit saha sattāyāḥ sambandhāsiddhes tasyānupakāryatvāt / | Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside ‘existence’ (Being) as well as ‘Inherence The reason for this lies in the fact that ‘Existence’ or ‘Being’ can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; |
na hyanupakāriṇoḥ parasparaṃ sambandho 'tiprasaṅgād ityuktam / | and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; |
kiṃ ca tayor api sattāsamavāyayor antyānāṃ ca viśeṣāṇāṃ vastutve kiṃ lakṣaṇam iti vaktavyam / na hi samavāye viśeṣeṣu ca sattā samavaiti / | Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of ‘Being’ (Existence), ‘Inherence’ and of the ‘ultimate specific Individualities’, which feature marks them out as ‘entities’, As a matter of fact ‘Existence’ (or ‘Being’, does not inhere (subsist) in either ‘Inherence’ or in ‘the ultimate specific Individualities nor does it subsist in ‘Being’ or ‘Existence’ itself. |
nāpi sattāyām kiṃ tarhi dravyaguṇakarmasu tripadārthasatkarī satteti samayāt / | In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the presence of existence (or Being) marks out as ‘entities’ are only the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action. |
tasmād avyāpīdaṃ [p.151] vastulakṣaṇam /]bhavatu nāma sattādeḥ siddhiḥ / | Thus the characteristic feature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question). |
tathāpi na sattāsamavāyo lakṣaṇo yuktam arthāntaratvāt / | the ‘inherence of existence’ cannot be the characteristic feature of entities; because it is an entirely different thing; |
na hy arthāntaram arthāntarasya svarūpam yena tasya tallakṣaṇaṃ bhavet / | when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. |
tathā hi vastusvarūpāparijñānān mūḍhadhiyaṃ prati tallakṣaṇe prakṛte tatsvabhāva eva kutaścid vyāvṛttyā pratīto lakṣaṇatvena vācyo yena tadeva vastusvarūpatvenāvadhārayati yathā pṛthivī kharakaṭatvena / | Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of ‘entities’, if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by roughness of surface. |
na cānyaḥ padārtho 'nyapadārthasvarūpamanyatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing; for if it did, then it would not be anotherng at all; |
tat kathaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ bhavet / lakṣaṇaśabdasya svabhāvavacanasya prastutatvāt // | how then could it form its characteristic feature? Specially because the term ‘characteristic feature’ in the present context stands for the nature or character ofngs. |
sarvaścārthavicārādivyāpāro 'rthakriyārthinaḥ / nirākuladhiyo yukto nonmattakatayā punaḥ // | All operations bearing upon the consideration of things are to be carried on by one who has an undisturbed intellect and seeks to accomplish a useful purpose, not by one who is demented. |
tatra yannāma keṣāñcit kathañcidupayujyate / kvacitkadācittatraiva yuktā sattāvyavasthitiḥ // | hence it would be right to determine the existence of only such a thing as would be of use to some people, at some place, at some time and in some way. |
tadrūpasyaiva cārthasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhyate / | it is in reference to such a thing that we are proving the momentariness; |
vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā tasminnevābhidhīyate // | and it is only with reference to such things that the universal premiss has been asserted. |
athasya hi vastumātrasya yo 'yam astitvanāstitvena vicāraḥ sa sarvo 'rthakriyārthinaḥ na vyasanitayā / | Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose, and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things; |
anyathā hyunmattaḥ syāt / | as otherwise he would be regarded as a demented person. |
tena yadeva padārthajātaṃ keṣāñcidarthakriyārthināṃ kathañcitsākṣātpāramparyeṇa vā kvacid deśe kadācitkāla upayujyate tatraiva vastuvyavasthā yuktāprekṣāvataḥ / | Hence an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time; |
na tvanyatra nibandhanābhāvānniṣparayojanatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | and not anything else; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it. |
ādigrahaṇenārthaviśeṣāṇāṃ dahanasalilādīnāṃ vicāro gṛhyate / | The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Water and the like. |
tataś ca prekṣāpūrvakāriṇāṃ yadevārthakriyākāri tadeva vastviti yadetat prasiddham tasyaiva tadrūpasya arthakriyākārirūpasyāsmābhiḥ kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhyate / | Thus what we are trying to prove is the momentary character of only thosengs which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as ‘entity’, ‘thing’, and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a useful purpose. |
yato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇasya hetutvenābhīṣṭatvān nāsti vyabhicāraḥ / tasyaivambhūtasya hetoḥ sarvopasaṃhārāt sādhyena vyāptisiddheḥ / | And as what we have cited as the Reason is the ‘capacity for fruitful action’, there is no fallibility in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentarrness). |
yā hi pakṣasapakṣavibhāgamakṛtvā sāmānyena hetor vyāptiḥ pradarśyate sā sarvopasaṃhārā vyāptiḥ //419- | That Premiss is said to be ‘universal’ which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinction between what is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so known. |
[p.152] athārthakriyāsāmarthyaśūnyasyāpi kasmād vastutvaṃ neṣyata ity āha niḥśeṣetyādi / | The following texts answer the question why the character of ‘entity ‘thing,’ cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the capacity for effective action: [see verses 422-424 next] |
niḥśeṣaśaktiśūnyaṃ tu yadvandhyāsutasannibham / sarvajñacetaso 'pyeti hetutvaṃ na kadācana // | That which is devoid of all capacity, and is like ‘the son of the barren woman’, never becomes a cause (basis) even for the mind of the omniscient person. |
kriyate tatra naivedaṃ kāryarūpādyadṛṣṭitaḥ / | and as in such a thing, intelligent men do not perceive an effect or character and so forth, they do not seek to establish its existence; |
na tasmin sādhitenārthaḥ kṣaṇikatvena kaścana / tatra paryanuyogaś ca kriyamāṇo 'pi niṣphalaḥ // | as any such attempt would be absolutely baseless. there can be no useful purpose served by proving the momentariness of such a thing. so that any objection taken to this is also absolutely futile. |
sarvajñacetaso 'pīti / | ‘Even for the mind, etc.’; |
na kevalaṃ samānajātīyasya kṣaṇasya jaladhāraṇādeś ca kāryasyetyapiśabdaḥ / | the term ‘even’ is meant to indicate that it is so, not only in regard to the ‘moments’ of the same ‘series’ as the said kind, but also in regard to such other purposes as the holding of water and the rest (in the case of the Jar). |
kāryarūpādyadṛṣṭita iti / | ‘Do not perceive the effect or character and so forth’; |
kāryam tadīyaṃ phalam rūpam tasya svabhāvaḥ ādiśabdena tasya deśaḥ kālo 'vasthāviśeṣaś ca gṛhyate / | the term ‘kārya ‘effect’, stands for the fruit, result; the term ‘rūpa’ for nature, character, and ‘so forth’ includes the particular time, place and condition; |
tasya caivaṃrūpasya śaśaviṣāṇādibhyo na kaścid viśeṣo 'stīti bhāvaḥ / | what is meant is that such a thing does not differ in any way from absolute nonentities like the ‘Hare’s Horns’, |
nacāpi tasmiṃstathābhūte vastuni kṣaṇikatvena sādhitenārthakriyārthinaḥ kiñcit prayojanam asti / | Nor is there any useful purpose to be served for the person seeking to accomplish a purpose, by proving the ‘momentariness’ of such ang; |
tasya dṛṣṭādṛṣṭayor hitāhitaprāptiparihārāyogyatvāt / | because the perception or non-perception of such a character in it would not help in accomplishing any good, nor in avoiding an evil. |
yathoktam arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinā / ṣaṇḍasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāḥ kiṃ parīkṣayā // % QUOTE Pramāṇavārttika v.211 | This has been thus declared ‘For one seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, what would be the use in discussing a thing which is incapable of accomplishing a useful purpose? What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in virility is handsome or ugly?’ |
iti / ata eva katham idaṃ gamyate tatkṣaṇikamityādiparyanuyogaḥ prativādinā kriyamāṇo viphala eva tasya vādinā kṣaṇikatvena sādhayitumaniṣṭatvāt //422- | For these reasons, when the disputant raises such questions as “How is it known that it is momentary?” it is entirely futile; because his opponent does not wish to prove the momentariness of suchngs. “Such things as the sky-lotus are found to be capable of fruitful activity, in so far as they serve as the cause of their own cognition; |
idānīṃ paro 'rthakriyāsāmarthyam api vastulakṣaṇamayuktam ativyāpitvāditi darśayati nanu cetyādi / | The opponent now proceeds to show that ‘capacity for fruitful activity’ also cannot be the right differentia of ‘entity’, as it would be too wide: [see verse 425 above] |
tathā hi nabhastāmarasādayo nabhastāmarasaṃ nabhastāmarasamityādijñānotpādalakṣaṇāyām arthakriyāyāṃ samarthāḥ naca te paramārthataḥ santi ato 'tivyāpīdaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ śaktir bhāvalakṣaṇam iti // | That is to say, things like the ‘sky-lotus’ are found to be capable of such fruitful action as the bringing about of such cognitions as ‘the sky-lotus’, ‘the sky-lotus’; and yet they do not really exist; hence the definition that ‘Efficiency is the characteristic feature of the entity’ (as put forward by the Buddhist under Text 416) is found to be ‘too wide’. |
atra parihāram āha nirālambanamevetyādi / | The following Text supplies the answer to this: [see verse 426 next] |
nirālambanamevedam ambarāmbhoruhādiṣu / | The character in question as attributed to the ‘sky-lotus’ is entirely baseless; |
tajjalpavāsanāmātrabhāvi jñānaṃ pravartate // | its idea is there only as the result of one’s eagerness for wrangling. |
asiddhamākāśāmbhoruhādīnām arthakriyāsāmarthyam tadvikalpānāṃ svavikalpavāsanāparipākamātreṇaivotpattir nirālambanatvāt // | As a matter of fact, the capacity for fruitful activity is not admitted in the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things. The idea of it is merely an outcome of the opponent’s imagination and is utterly baseless. |
abhāvakāraṇatve tu nairantaryeṇa sambhavet / nābhāvo 'pekṣate kiñcin nirviśeṣatayā sadā // | If the said idea had a non-entity for its cause, then it would be produced constantly; as the non-entity cannot need anything else, being always devoid of distinctions. |
abhāvo nabhastāmarasādi kāraṇaṃ yasya tat tathoktam tadbhāvas tattvam tasmin sati tannabhavastāmarasādijñānaṃ sarvadaiva bhavet utpadyeta nityasannihitavikalakāraṇatvāt / | The compound ‘abhāvakāraṇatve’ is to be expounded as ‘the character of having a non-entity, like the sky-lotus, for its cause’, If the idea had such a non-entity for its cause then the idea of the skyāotus and suchngs would be produced constantly; because its cause would be always present in its perfect form. |
nacāpi tasya parairanupakāryasya tadapekṣā yuktā yena sahakārivaikalyāt kadācijjanayed iti syāt // kṣaṇikeṣvapītyādinā bhadantayogasenamatamāśaṅkate | Nor can it be said to be dependent upon the help of other things, as by its very nature it is incapable of being helped by anything else; hence its activity towards producing its effect could not be hold to bo occasional on account of the occasional absence of such aids. |
kṣaṇikeṣvapi bhāveṣu nanu cārthakriyā katham / viśeṣādhāyino 'nyonyaṃ na hyādyāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ // | “Even if things are momentary, how can there re any effective action? The initial auxiliaries could not be productive of peculiarities in one another; |
jātau sarvātmanā siddhair ajātāvastvabhāvataḥ / | because if they have come into existence, they must be there already in their complete form; |
nirviśeṣādviśeṣasya bhāve kāryaṃ na kiṃ bhavet // nacānyato viśiṣṭās te tulyaparyanuyogataḥ / | if they have not come into existence, as the entities would not be there, as this absence would be without differentiation, wherefore could not the effect itself be produced therefrom (for the bringing about of which the auxiliaries are posited)? Specially as they could not be differentiated from anything else, being equally open to question. |
sahakārikalāpānām anavasthā ca te bhavet // | Thus too there would be an infinite regress of auxiliaries for you. |
na bhavanti tatas teṣāṃ vyarthaḥ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ // sahakārikṛtaścaivaṃ yadā nātiśayaḥ kvacit / sarvadā nirviśeṣaiva tadā santatiriṣyate // | Then again, as they could not have an effective action either successively or simultaneously, it is useless to regard them as ‘momentary’; specially when no peculiarity can be brought about by any auxiliaries, the entire series is rightly held to be wholly undifferentiated (uniform). |
vināśe yadyahetuḥ syād ādāveva bhavedayam / | If then the destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning; |
sambhavo yadi nāsyādāvante 'pi sa kathaṃ bhavet // svahetor yadi bhāvānām iṣyate 'nyan na kāraṇam / vināśasya kathaṃ teṣāṃ kvacid eva viruddhatā // | and if there be no possibility of it at the beginning, how could it come at the end also? If again, no cause is admitted except the cause of the entities themselves, then why should there be any incongruity in their destruction coming about in certain cases only (not always)?” (428-434) |
sa hyāha kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodha eva / yatas te svayaṃ samarthā bhaveyur asamarthā vā yadi samarthās tadā sahakārikāraṇaṃ nāpekṣeran / | Yogasena has argued as follows: “Even if things were momentary, any activity of theirs, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible. Because, by themselves, they could be either capable, or incapable, of such action. If they are capable, then they cannot need auxiliaries; |
nahi samarthasya kācid apekṣā yuktā / | as what is itself capable does not need anything else. |
tathā hi ye prathamakalāpāntaścariṣnavas te na parasparato viśeṣamāpnuvanti / | For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another; |
utpannānu [p.154] tpannāvasthāyāḥ sadasattvenānupakāryopakārakatvāt / | because things that are produced and not produced being existent and non-existent, cannot stand in the relation of Helper and the Helped. |
tataś ca prathamāvasthāyāṃ teṣāṃ nirviśiṣṭatvāt tebhyo viśiṣṭakṣaṇāntarotpādo na syāt / | Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular ‘moment’; |
nirviśeṣebhyaś ca tebhyaḥ kṣaṇāntarasya viśiṣṭasyotpattau kāryam api kiṃ notpadyeta / na cāpi pūrvakātkalāpād viśiṣṭāt te samutpannā iti yuktam vaktum tatkalāpāntargatāmapyata eva paramparato viśeṣābhāvāt / | for, if such a ‘moment’ could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial ‘series’; as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the ‘series’ themselves. |
teṣām apyanyato viśeṣotpattau satyāmanavasthā syāt / | If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinite regress. |
tadevaṃ viśeṣābhāvāt katham aviśiṣṭātkāraṇakalāpāt kāryamutpadyeta / aviśiṣṭāccotpattau sarvaṃ sarvasmād bhavet / | Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated ‘series’ of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things. |
tataś ca kramayaugapadyābhyām evam arthakriyāvirodhe 'pi yathaite bhavantyevārthakriyākāriṇas tathā nityā api santo bhaviṣyantīti vyarthas teṣāṃ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ / | “Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously, things do have effective activity, and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things are momentary. |
tena sattvād iti hetur anaikāntika iti bhāvaḥ / | “Thus the Reason put forward (by the Buddhist) ‘because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)’ is found to be Inconclusive. |
na cāpi santater avasthāviśeṣaprāptāyāḥ kāryotpattir bhaviṣyati na sarvadeti vaktuṃ yuktam / | “Nor can it be said that ‘the production of the effect is due to the “series” in a particular condition, and not always’; |
yathoktayā nītyā sahakārikṛtasya viśeṣasyābhāvāt sarvadaiva santater aviśiṣṭatvāt / | because in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always undifferentiated. |
nacāpi svopādānakāraṇamātrapratibaddho viśeṣaḥ santatiriti yuktam vaktum / | Nor can it be right to assent that ‘the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause’; |
dṛṣṭavirodhāt / | as this would be contrary to a. perceived fact. |
tathā hi sahakāriṇām upāyāpāyayoḥ kāryavyaktivirāmau dṛṣṭau / yadi ca svopādānakāraṇamātrapratibaddho viśeṣaḥ syāt tadā sahakārinirapekṣasyaiva janakatvaṃ bhavet / | For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearance (respectively) of the Auxiliaries, If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to theng independently of auxiliaries. |
api ca yathoktayā nītyā santateḥ sarvadā nirviṣiṣṭatvāt / ghaṭādīnāṃ kapālādiviśeṣotpattyasambhavāt / | “Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the Potsherd and the rest could not be produced out of the Jar. |
sajātīyakṣaṇasantānocchedalakṣaṇo vināśo yadi nirhetukaḥ syāt tadā nirapekṣatvāt prāgeva bhavet / | “Then again, if the Destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the series of its homogeneous moments, were without Cause, then, as independent of all else, it should come about at the very outset; |
athādau na bhavet paścād api na bhavet prāgvadviśeṣābhāvāt / | and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; |
kiṃ ca yadi bhāvānāṃ vināśaṃ prati svahetuvyatirekeṇānyatsantānāntaraṃ kāraṇaṃ neṣyate tadānalādayaḥ śītādīnāṃ kathaṃ virodhino bhaveyuḥ nahyakiñcitkaro virodhī yukto 'tiprasaṅgāpatteḥ evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvasya virodhī prasajyeta / | because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before. If then, for the destruction ofngs, no such Cause is admitted as another ‘series’ distinct from the Cause of the things themselves, then why should Fire be the destroyer of Gold? because what is ineffective cannot be a destroyer, simply because it is incapable of doing anything; and even so if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. |
tataś ca virodhadvāreṇānupalabdhiprayogaḥ prāṇātipātādivyavasthānaṃ cātidurghaṭamiti bhāvaḥ //428- | Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term ‘non-apprehension’ and the ‘destroying of life’ as being due to opposition (or destruction).” (428 434) |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte | The above arguments are answered in the following [see verses 435-436 next] |
ucyate prathamāvasthā naivānyonyopakāriṇaḥ / | Our answer to the above is as follows: There can be no mutual help in the case of things appearing at the ‘initial stage’; |
ekārthakriyayā tvete bhavanti sahakāriṇaḥ // | they become auxiliaries only by virtue of having the same effective action. |
anyonyānupakāre 'pi nāviśiṣṭā ime yataḥ / | even when there is no help rendered to one another, these are not entirely undifferentiated; |
svopādānabalodbhūtāḥ kalāpotpādakaḥ pṛthak // | because when they are themselves produced out of their own constituent cause, they become productive of their own several distinct ‘series’. |
samarthād eva hi kāryotpattiḥ na ca sahakārivaiyarthyam / | The effect is produced only from a cause that is efficient; and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless. |
tathā hi dvividhaṃ sahakāritvaṃ ekārthakriyākāritayā parasparopakāritayā ca / | Because the Auxiliary is of two kinds (1) that which serves the same purpose, and (2) that which renders mutual help; |
tatra{a---} vyavahitakāryāpe [p.155] kṣayā ekārthakriyākāritvam eva na parasparopakāritvam / | in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the latter kind; |
ekasmin kṣaṇe nirvibhāgatayā viśeṣasyādhātumaśakyatvāt / | because at one and the same moment one could not produce any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated); |
vyavahitakāryāpekṣayā tu parasparata uttaraviśiṣṭakṣaṇotpatteḥ santānāpekṣayā parasparopakāreṇa vyavahitakāryajanakatvāt parasparopakāritvalakṣaṇaṃ sahakāritvam / | in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of that kind where there is mutual help; as the qualified succeeding moment is produced mutually out of both, and the remote effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own ‘series Thus then, as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; |
tatra prathamāvasthābhāvināṃ yadyapi parasparato viśeṣo nāsti tathāpi teṣāṃ sahakāritvam aviruddham eva ekārthakriyākāritvāt / | and yet there can be nothing incongruous in their rendering mutual help; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.