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na hyekasya svabhāvadvayam asti yenāṃśena niṣpattiḥ syāt kiṃ tu niraṃśa eva bhāvaḥ sa ca svahetor utpadyamānaḥ sarvātmanaivotpanna iti kathaṃ tasyottarakālaṃ kāraṇāntaraiḥ svabhāvāntaramādhīyeta /	A single thing cannot have two natures, by virtue of which it could be produced in parts; on the contrary, the thing is without parts; and when a thing is produced from its Cause, it must be produced in its entire form; how then can another nature be imposed upon it, later on, by other Causes? In fact, what is not produced at the time that a thing is produced, cannot form the nature of that thing;
na hi yanniṣpattau yo na niṣpannaḥ sa tasya svabhāvo yuktaḥ ekayogakṣemalakṣaṇatvād abhedasya tasmād yo 'sāvuttarakālamutpadyate nāśātmā bhāvaḥ so 'paraḥsvabhāvaḥ yaścāparaḥ sa kathaṃ tasya bhaved iti yatkiñcid etat //	Hence that which comes about at a later time, in the form of ‘Destruction’, must be a different ‘nature’ (character); and how can this, which is thus different, belong to the thing itself? Hence there is nothing in this theory.
athārthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tatrāpyakiñcitkara eva vināśahetur bhāvasyeti darśayati padārthavyatirikta ityādi /	If the other alternative be accepted that ‘the Destruction produced is something different from the thing’, even so, the cause of the destruction of the thing would be useless. This is what is shown in the following [see verse 360 next]
padārthavyatirikte tu nāśanāmni kṛte sati / bhāve hetvantarais tasya na kiñcidupajāyate //	If the destruction that is brought about is something different from the thing, then there is nothing produced in the thing itself by those other causes (of the said destruction);
tenopalambhakāryādi prāgvadevānuṣajyate /	so that the effects, like the apprehension of the thing and other phenomena, should continue as before.
tādavasthyāc ca naivāsya yuktamācaraṇād api // na hyanyasya karaṇe 'nyadupakṛtaṃ nāma atiprasaṅgāt /	and as the thing continues to remain in the same condition, it is not possible that there should be any ‘concealment’ etc. of it. The bringing about of one thing cannot confer any benefit on another thing;
nāpi tat sambandhino nāśasya karaṇād bhāva upakṛto bhavatīti yuktaṃ vaktum sambandhāsiddheḥ /	Nor can it be right to assert that ‘the bringing about of the Destruction related to ang helps the thing itself’; because no relation is known to subsist bet ween them.
tathā hi bhedābhyupagamān na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ vināśahetor eva tadutpatteḥ nacānyo vāstavaḥ sambandho 'sti /	For instance, inasmuch as the two are, ex hypothesi, different, the relation between the two cannot be one of ‘identity’; nor can the relation be that of ‘being produced from it’, as the destruction is produced only from the ‘Cause of destruction’; and there can be no other real relation between the two.
satyapi vā sambandhe bhāvasyāvasthitatvāt tathaivopalambhādikāryaprasaṅgaḥ / upalambha eva kāryam /	Even if there were some relation between the two, as the Thing is (ex hypothesi) an established positive entity, the apprehension and other effects produced by it must also be positive entities (and Destruction is not positive): In the compound ‘Upalambhakāryādi’, the ‘Upalambha’, ‘Apprehension’, itself is meant to be the ‘Kārya’, ‘effect’;
ādiśabdena jalasaṃdhāraṇajaṅgābhaṅgādiparigrahaḥ /	and the term ‘ādi’, ‘and the other phenomena’, is meant to include the containing of water (of the Jar), the breaking of the thighs, and so forth.
tena vyatiriktena nāśenāvṛtatvāt pratibaddhatvād vā nopalambhādikāryaṃ karotīti cedāha tādavasthyād ityādi / na hi bhāvasya svabhāvātiśayamakhaṇḍayannanutpādayan vā tasyāvārakaḥ pratibandhako vā yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /	It might be argued that “when the thing becomes concealed or obstructed by the destruction, which is something different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like.” In answer to this it is added ‘As the thing continues to remain in the same condition, etc, etc.’ Nothing is possible as a ‘concealer’ or ‘obstructor’ of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them;
tasmātyaktānāvṛtāpratibaddhapūrvasvabhāvatvāt tasyāvaraṇaṃ pratibandhaś ca na yujyate //	Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no ‘concealment’ or ‘obstruction’ of the thing.
syād etan na prāgvadupalabdhyādiprasaṅgaḥ tena vyatiriktena nāśena bhāvasya vināśyamānatvād ity āha nāśanāmnetyādi /	It is not true to assert that “the thing is destroyed by another thing named ‘destruction’”, because the arguments based upon the alternatives of its being ‘different’ or ‘non-different’ and so forth are applicable, by implication, to such an assertion also.
nāśanāmnā padārthena bhāvo nāśyata ityasat / anyatvādivikalpānāṃ tatrāpyarthānuvṛttitaḥ //	“It is not possible for the thing (whose destruction has been brought about) to bring about its apprehension and other phenomena; because the destruction of the thing being different from it, has destroyed it.”
nāśo hi bhāvaṃ nāśayan kimanyamānanyaṃ vā yadvā pradhvamsalakṣaṇaṃ nāśaṃ kurvāṇo [p.135] nāśayati mudgarādivaditrāpi tulyā eva vikalpāḥ punar āvartante /	When the Destruction destroys the thing, is the thing destroyed different or not-difîerent (from the Destruction)? Or again, if it be asserted that ‘it brings about that destruction of the thing which consists of its annihilation, like the Bludgeon and otherngs’, the same alternatives may be put forward.
tatra cokto doṣaḥ vakṣyate ca tatrāpīti /	And the objections urged above would all become applicable; as is going to be explained later on.
yo 'sau nāśanāmnāparo nāśaḥ kriyate tatrāpi / arthānuvṛttita iti / anyatvādivikalpānām anuvṛtter ity arthaḥ /	i.e. even against the assertion that what is called ‘destruction’ brings about another destruction. ‘Are applicable by implication’, i.e. the alternatives of being different or non-different and so forth are applicable to this also.
evaṃ tāvad vastubhūto na kriyata iti pratipāditam // nāpyavastubhūta iti darśayann āha bhāvābhāvātmaka ityādi / bhāvābhāvātmako nāśaḥ pradhvaṃsāparasaṃjñakaḥ /	Thus it is established that the Destruction of ang cannot be an entity, [the first alternative put forward above, under Text 358]. If it be held that “the ‘destruction’ (‘nāśa’) brought about is of the nature of the ‘negation of entity otherwise called ‘disruption’ (pradhvaṃsa’), there can be no reasonable cause for that also.
abhāvasya ca kāryatve vastunaivāṅkurādivat /	If negation were an effect, then it would be an entity, like the sprout and other effects;
prasaktājanyarūpasya hetuśaktyā samudbhavāt //	because while there is possibility of its being regarded as something ‘not-produced’, it is found to come about through the potency of a cause.
bhāvasya hi karaṇaṃ bhavati nābhāvasya nimittīkartavyasakalasvabhāvirahalakṣaṇatvān na kiñcid utpādyaṃ rūpam asti /	What is brought about, produced, is always an entity, not a non-entity, because of the latter, which is of the nature of the absence of positive character that could be predicated of it, there is no form that could be produced.
ato bhāvābhāvātmakaḥ bhāvaniṣedhātmako nāśo na kenacit kriyate avastutvāt kharaviṣāṇavat / anyathā hi kāryatvād aṅkurādivad vastutvam eva syāt / prayogaḥ yat kāryaṃ tadvastu yathāṅkurādayaḥ kāryaś ca nāśa iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	Hence what is of the nature of the negation of entity, i.e. what consists of the denial of existence, cannot be brought about by anything, simply because it is a non-entity, like the ‘Hare’s Horns’, Otherwise (if it were something produced) then it would be an ‘effect’, and as such an entity, like the sprout and other effects. This argument may be formulated as follows: What is an effect must be an entity, as the sprout and other things, and Destruction is an effect (ex hypothesi), hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as an effect).
vyāptimasya sādhayann āha hetuśaktyā samudbhavād iti / tadeva hi kāryam ucyate / yatkāraṇaśaktyā viśiṣṭamātmātiśayamāsādayati /	The author states the ‘invariable concomitance’ (Premiss) of this reasoning Because it is found to come about through the potency of a Cause. As a matter of fact, that alone is said to be an ‘effect’ which acquires an accretion to its nature through the potency of a Cause;
samāsāditātmātiśayam eva ca vastu /	and it is only an entity that can acquire such accretion to its nature.
atra cārthe naiyāyikāderapyavivādaḥ / tathā hi sattāsamavāyāḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā kāryatvam ucyate /	This point is not disputed even by the Naiyāyika and others: As these people also declare the character of the ‘effect’ to be either ‘inherence in Being’ or ‘inherence in a Cause’;
na ca nāśe sattāsamavāyaḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā tasya dravyādivadastitvāśrayatvaprasaṅgāt //	and Destruction cannot inhere either in Being or in its Cause; for, if it did, then, like Substance and otherngs, it would have to be regarded as a substratum of ‘existence’ (i.e. an entity).
yadyevaṃ bhavatu vastutvaṃ nāśasya tatra ko doṣa ity āha vidhinaivam ityādi /	Says the opponent “If that is so, let the Destruction be an entity, what is the harm in that?” Answer: [see verse 365 next]
vidhinaivam abhāvaś ca paryudāsāśrayāt kṛtaḥ /	The view that ‘negation’ is brought by an ‘affirmation’ has been sought to be supported by haying recourse to ‘preclusion’ (as the form of the negation so brought about);
yas tatra vyatirekādivikalpo vartate punaḥ //	but the argument based upon the alternatives possible regarding difference or non-difference, all become applicable to this view.
kathaṃ punar abhāvasya vidhinā karaṇam ityākāṅkṣāyām idam uktam paryudāsāśrayād iti / paryudāsasyāśrayaṇād ity arthaḥ /	‘How is Negation brought about by Affirmation?’ In answer to this question the other party has recourse to ‘Preclusion’, i.e. the assertion that it is Negation in the form of ‘Preclusion’ that is so brought about;
vivakṣāvaśāddhi kutaścana bhāvād vilakṣaṇo bhāva evābhāva ityākhyāyate tatra ca vyatirekādivikalpe prāktano doṣaḥ punar āvartate //	that is to say, through the speaker’s choice sometimes even an entity is spoken of as a different form (negation) of some other entity.
tatrāpi vināśahetoḥ sphuṭataramevākiñcitkaratvaṃ pratipāditamiti darśayann āha athetyādi /	With this explanation also the view is open to all those arguments that have been urged above as based upon the alternatives of ‘difference’ or ‘non-difference’ etc.
atha kriyāniṣedho 'yaṃ bhāvaṃ naiva karoti hi / tathāpyahetutā siddhā kartur hetutvahānitaḥ //	If it be held that “what is meant by ‘destruction’ is the negation of effective action, and this does not bring about a positive entity”, even so, it becomes established that what brings about the destruction cannot be its ‘cause because it is devoid of the character of ‘cause’.
tathā hi prasajyapratiṣedhe sati naṭaḥ karotinā sambandhādabhāvaṃ karoti bhāvaṃ na karotīti kriyāpratiṣedhādakartṛtvaṃ nāśahetoḥ pratipāditaṃ bhavetyaścākartā sa kathaṃ hetuḥ syād ityato na vināśahetuḥ kaścit //	For instance, if ‘Destruction’ means the ‘negation absolute’ as in the expression ‘brings about Destruction, i.e. Negation’ the negative term would be related to the term denoting action, and the meaning would be that it does not bring about an entity (in the form of Action); and as this would be the denial or negation of Action, what it would imply is the fact of the ‘Cause of Destruction’ not being a ‘Cause’; for how can a thing devoid of action be a ‘cause’? So that nothing can be the Cause of Destruction.
atrāviddhakarṇoktāni vināśasya hetumatvasādhane pramāṇāni nirdidikṣur āha nanvityādi /	In this connection, the Author proceeds to set forth those arguments in proof of Destruction having a Cause which have been propounded by Aviddhakarṇa: [see verses 367-368 next]
nanu naiva vināśo 'yaṃ sattākāle 'sti vastunaḥ /	“This destruction of the thing is not present at the time that the thing is in existence;
na pūrvaṃ na cirātpaścād vastuno 'nantaraṃ tvasau //	nor is it present before (the thing has come into existence); nor very long after (the thing has come into existence), in fact, it comes immediately after (the thing has come into existence);
evaṃ ca hetumāneṣa yukto niyatakālataḥ /	thus, inasmuch as it comes into existence only at a particular time, it must have a cause.
kādācitkatvayogo hi nirapekṣe nirākṛtaḥ //	If it were independent (of all causes), then this occasional character would be impossible, as shown before (367-368)
tathā hi na vastunaḥ sattākāle vināśaḥ kṣaṇamātrāvasthāyino 'pyabhāvaprasaṅgāt nāpyutpādāt pūrvam ajātasya vināśāyogāt na hi vandhyāputrādayo 'nutpannā eva vinaśyanti paścād api bhavannacirād bhavati tṛtīyādiṣu kṣaṇeṣuvinaṣṭasya punar vināśāyogāt bhasmīkṛtajvalanavat kintu vastvanantaraṃ dvitīye kṣaṇe vināśaḥ /	That is to say, the Destruction of a thing cannot be present at the time that the thing is in existence, as if it did, then the momentarily existent thing could never exist. Nor can it be present before the thing has been produced, as what has not been born cannot be destroyed; e.g. the ‘son of the Barren Woman’ and such non-entities are not destroyed while unborn. Even when coming after the thing has come into existence, it cannot come very long after it; because all things (ex hypothesi) being destroyed at the third moment (of existence), there cannot be another destruction very long afterwards, as is found in the case of Eire that has become reduced to ashes.
tataś ca niyatakālatvāddhetumān vināśo 'ṅkurādivad iti siddham / niyatakālata iti /	Thus it is established that, as it has the time of its coming definitely fixed, the Destruction must have a Cause, just as the sprout has ‘as it has the time, etc. etc.’;
kādācitkatvād ity arthaḥ /	i.e. because it appears only occasionally.
vyāptimasya sādhayann āha kādācitkatvayogo hītyādi /	The invariable concomitance of this reason is next shown ‘If it were independent etc. etc.’;
na hyanapekṣe kādācitkatvaṃ yuktam nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgāt /	if it were independent of all Cause, then its occasional character could not be possible; as in that case its existence would be there at all times.
tasmāt kādācitkatvāt siddham asya sahetutvam //	Hence, from its occasional character, it is deduced that it must have a Cause.
ito 'pi siddham iti darśayati vastvanantarabhāvāccetyādi /	Another reason for the same conclusion is set forth in the following [see verses 369 next]
vastvanantarabhāvāc ca hetumāneva yujyate /	“As it comes immediately after the thing, the destruction must have a cause;
abhūtvābhāvataścāpi yathaivānyaḥ kṣaṇo mataḥ //	also because, not having been in existence, it comes into existence, just like the following moment.” (369)
tadevam ete trayo hetava uktāḥ / sahetuko vināśaḥ kādācitkatvāt vastūtpattyanantarabhāvitvena bauddhair abhyupagamyamānatvāt prāgabhūtvātmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat /	Thus three reasons have been stated: Destruction must have a Cause, (a) because it is occasional, (b) because it comes immediately after theng, as admitted by the Bauddhas, and (c) because not having been in existence, it comes into existence, like the following Moment.
vaidharmyeṇa śaśaviṣāṇādaya iti //	The ‘Hare’s Horn’ and such other non-entities serve as Corroborative Instances per dissimilarity.
ahetukatvāt kiñcāyam asanvandhyāsutādivat / athavākāśavannityo na prakārāntaraṃ yataḥ //	“Then again, if destruction had no cause, it would be either a non-entity, like ‘the son of the barren women’ and other non-entities, or an eternal entity, like ākāśa;
[p.137]	as no other alternative is possible.
asattve sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaṃ syād anāśataḥ /	If destruction were a non-entity, then all things would be eternal, as there would be no destruction (of anything);
sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayaścānimittakaḥ //	and the idea of the destructibility (fleeting character) of all properties would be baseless.
nityatve 'pi saha sthānaṃ vināśenāvirodhataḥ /	If destruction were eternal (existing at all times), then it would be possible for the thing to exist along with its own destruction;
ajātasya ca nāśoktir naiva yuktyanupātinī // sa hyevam āha vināśasya hetur nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ paryanuyojyaḥ /	as there could be no incompatibility in this case; and the assertion of the ‘destruction’ of what has not been produced would not be in keeping with reason.” (370-372) The author next states the reasons adduced by Uddyotakara [in Nyāyavārtika on 3.2.14, page 415, Bib.
kimakāraṇatvādvināśo nāsti vyomotpalādivat athākāraṇatvān nityo vyomādivad iti / bhavatāṃ hi pakṣe akāraṇaṃ dvidhā dṛṣṭaṃ nityamasacca na hi sattvāsattvavyatirekeṇa prakārāntaram asti /	“One who declares that ‘there is no Cause for Destruction’ should be questioned as follows: Does this mean that there being no Cause for Destruction, Destruction does not exist (come into existence) at all, like the ‘sky-lotus’? or that having no Cause, it is eternal (ever-lasting), like Ākāśa and other things? According to your view what is causeless is found to be of two kinds eternal and non-existent, there is no other alternative to these two existence and non-existence: Now, if being without a Cause, Destruction is non-existent, then all things must be eternal;
tatra yadyakāraṇatvād asat vināśaḥ tadā sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaprasaṅgaḥ vināśābhāvāt /	as there is no Destruction at all. And the idea that ‘all properties become destroyed’ becomes, in this case, baseless; because when there is no movement, the idea of anything ‘moving’ is impossible.
atha nityaḥ tadā bhāvasya vināśena sahāvasthānaṃ prāpnoti sarvadāvasthānāt /	If, on the other hand, having no Cause, Destruction is eternal, then it becomes possible for it to co-exist with the Thing (destroyed), as the Destruction would be always there.
na caitadyuktaṃ bhāvābhāvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt /	And this would be highly improper, as the Presence and Absence of a Thing are mutually negatory.
atha sahāvasthānaṃ neṣyate tadā kāryasyotpādo na prāpnoti tat pratyanīkabhūtasya nāśasya sadāvasthitatvāt /	If then the said co-existence is not admitted, then there can be no producing of any effect, as its contrary, the Destruction of the effect would be there always: and when a thing is not produced at all, there can be no Destruction of it;
tataścājātasya vināśo 'pi na saṃgacchate na hyajātāḥ śaśaviṣāṇādayo vinaśyantīti loke pratītam tenājātasya vināśa iti vacanaṃ naiva yuktyanupāti //	for instance, such unproduced things as the ‘Hare’s Horns’ are not known among people to be destroyed; hence any such assertion as that ‘there is destruction of what has not been produced’ cannot be in keeping with Reason.” (370-372)
tadatretyādinā sarvaṃ pratividhatte	The Author answers all these criticisms in the following Texts: [see verses 373-374 next]
tadatra katamaṃ nāśaṃ paraṃ paryanuyuñjate / kiṃ kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇaṃ bhāvam eva tathoditam // atha bhāvasvarūpasya nivṛttiṃ dhvaṃsasaṃjñitam / pūrvaparyunuyoge hi naiva kiñcidvirudhyate //	What sort of ‘destruction’ is it (the causelessness of) which the other people object to? (a) Is it the ‘momentary existence’ of things, as explained by us? Or the ‘cessation of the form of the entity’, called ‘disruption’ (dhvaṃsa, annihilation)? If it is the former, then there is no quarrel.
dvividho hi vināśo vidheḥ pratiṣedhalakṣaṇaḥ /	Destruction is of two sorts positive and negative.
tathā hi kṣaṇasthitidharmā bhāva eva calo vinaśyatīti kṛtvā vināśa ityākhyāyate /	For instance when, on account of the thing being mobile and having only a momentary existence, it becomes ‘destroyed’, this is called ‘Destruction’ (of the Positive kind);
yadvā bhāvasvabhāvapracyutilakṣaṇapradhvaṃsāparanāmā vinaśanaṃ vināśa iti / tatra pūrvasminnāśe hetumatvasādhanaparyanuyogaḥ kriyate yathoktair hetubhiḥ tadā siddhasādhyatā //	and there is the other kind of Destruction which consists in the thing losing its positive character and becoming what is called ‘disruption’, ‘annihilation’, If it is in reference to the former kind of ‘Destruction5 to whose ‘causelessness’ objection has been taken (by other people) on the ground of the reasons adduced above, then it is entirely futile (as what is objected to is denied by us also).
tām eva siddhasādhyatāṃ yo hītyādinā darśayati	The futility of the arguments is further explained: [see verse 375 next]
yo hi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇasthāyī vināśa iti gīyate /	That thing which, having a momentary existence, is called ‘destruction’, this destruction we also admit as having a muse;
taṃ hetumantamicchāmaḥ parābhāvāttvahetukam //	it is only the other kind of destruction which we regard as without cause, on the ground of there being nothing else (which could be its cause).
[p.138] yadyevaṃ kathamahetuko vināśo bhavatāṃ pratīta ity āha parābhāvāttvahetukam iti /	“If that is so (and you admit what we have argued), then why have you held Destruction to be ‘without cause’?” The Answer is ‘It is only the other kind etc. etc.’;
parasya svakāraṇavyatiriktasyottarakālaṃ mudgarāder nāśakasyābhāvād ahetukamicchāma iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ //	i.e. there being nothing else, apart from the Cause that brought the thing into existence, coming later on, in the shape of the Bludgeon and such things, that we regard the Destruction to be without cause.
atra caivambhūte vināśe dharmiṇi kādācitkatvāt prāgabhūtvātmalābhāditīmau hetūsiddhau /	because the destruction in the form of the mobile (momentary) thing appears along with the thing itself. The Subject (of the inference) in the form of ‘Destruction’ being as explained, the two Reasons, ‘because it is occasional’ and ‘because not having been in existence, it comes into existence’, are duly admitted (by us also).
vastvanantarabhāvitvam api yadi sāmānyena vivakṣitaṃ tadā siddham eva kāraṇabhūtastvanantaram asya bhāvaprasiddheḥ / athātmabhūtavinaśvaravastvanantarabhāvitvam asya vivakṣitaṃ tadā hetur asiddha iti darśayati vastvanantarabhāvitvam ityādi /	As regards the character of ‘coming immediately after the thing’, if that is intended to be true only in a general way, then that too is duly admitted (by us), because its existence immediately after that thing which is the Cause is admitted by us. If, however, what the other party means by ‘the Destruction coming immediately after the thing’ is that it comes immediately after that thing which forms its own self (essence), then such a Reason is not admitted.
calabhāvasvarūpasya bhāvenaiva sahodayāt //	‘In the Destruction as described’, i.e. in the form not different from the nature of the mobile thing itself.
na hi niraṃśavastuno bhago 'sti yena tadanantarabhāvitvam asya bhavet / tatsvabhāvavat tadavyatirekiṇo nāśasya tanniṣpattāveva niṣpannatvāt /	There can be no ‘parts’ of a thing which is devoid of parts, by virtue of which such Destruction could come immediately after such a thing: because, like the nature of the Thing itself, its Destruction also comes about on the coming about of the thing itself;
anyathā tat svabhāvatvam eva tasya na syād ityuktam //	otherwise its forming the very nature of the thing would not be true;
yaccoktaṃ sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayaścānimittaka iti tadapyata eva pratikṣiptam iti darśayati ata iti /	as already explained. It has been argued above that ‘There is no basis for the notion that all Properties are destructible’ (under Text 371); this also becomes rejected by what has been just said. This is what is shown in the following [see verse 377 next]
ato vināśasadbhāvān na nityāḥ sarvasaṃskṛtāḥ /	Thus then, the destruction being there, things cannot be eternal;
na vināśītibuddhiś ca nirnimittā prasajyate //	and the notion that ‘things are destructible’ cannot be baseless.
yata eva hi kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇaḥ padārthās tathādhyavasīyamānatanavastasyā buddher nimittamato nānimittatvaprasaṅgaḥ //	Simply because all things have the character of existing for a moment, and those very things that are regarded as so destructible form the basis of the notion of ‘destructibility of things’, this notion therefore, cannot be baseless.
atha pradhvaṃsalakṣaṇo vināśo dharmyabhipretas tadā trayo 'pi hetavo 'siddhā iti darśayati pradhvaṃsasyetyādi / pradhvaṃsasya tu nairātmyān nāstyanantarabhāvitā /	If then the ‘Destruction’ intended to be the Subject of the arguments adduced by the other party is that in the form of ‘Disruption’ (Annihilation), then all the three Reasons adduced are ‘unproven’, ‘not admitted’ (by us). This is what is shown in the following [see verse 378 next]
nābhūtvābhāvayogasya gaganendīvarādivat // vastunyeva hyanantarabhāvitvādayo dharmāḥ samāśritā nāvastuni yathā śaśaviṣāṇādau pradhvaṃsaś ca nirātmā niḥsvabhāvaḥ tat katham asyānantarabhāvitvādayaḥ sambhaveyuḥ /	As regards ‘annihilation’, as it can have no essence (character), it cannot ‘come into existence immediately after the thing’; and as regards the presence of the character of ‘coming into existence after having not existed before’, this is precisely like the ‘sky-lotus’ and other things. Such characters as ‘coming into existence immediately after theng,’ and the like can exist in things only, never in a non-entity, like the ‘Hare’s Horns’;
nābhūtvā bhāvayogaśceti /	and ‘Annihilation’ has no ‘essence’, no character;
cakārātkādācitkatvaparigrahaḥ //	the particle ‘ca’ includes the character of being occasional.
yadyevam yadi dhvaṃsasyānantarabhāvitvaṃ nāsti tadā bhāvasya dhvaṃso bhavatīti / na hi yo na bhavatyeva tasya bhavatīti syād ityāśaṅkyāha pradhvaṃsa ityādi /	“If that is so, if Annihilation has not the character of coming into existence immediately after the thing, then what can be the meaning of the assertion that ‘there is Annihilation of the thing’? When something does not belong to a thing, it can never be attributed to it.”
[p.139]	The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 379 next]
pradhvaṃso bhavatītyeva na bhāvo bhavatītyayam / arthaḥ pratyāyyate tvatra na vidhiḥ kasyacin mataḥ //	When it is said that ‘there is annihilation of the thing’, what is meant is that ‘the thing is not there’, and it is not meant to convey the affirmation (predication) of any thing.
yadyapi dhvaṃso vidhīyamānatayā nirdiśyate tathāpi bhāvaniṣedha eva pratīyate na paramārthataḥ kasyacidvasturūpasya vidhiḥ //	Even though the assertion ‘there is Annihilation of the thing’ appears to be affirmative of Annihilation, yet what is really meant is only the negation of the Thing itself, and not the affirmation of any positive entity.
nanu caitasya putro bhavatītyādivad bhavatiśabdaprayogād atrāpi bhavanam evavidhīyata ity āha na hītyādi / na hi bāleya ityevannāmamātre kṛte kvacit /	The mere naming of a person as ‘donkey’ does not lead to the attribution of the whole character of the ass to that person. “In such expressions as ‘It is Caitra’s Son’, it is the existence of the son that is affirmed; so in the expression ‘There is Annihilation of the thing’, it must be the presence of the Annihilation that is affirmed.”
na hi vastūnāṃ śabdaprayogamātrānuvidhāyinī sadasattve tasyecchāmātrapratibaddhapravṛttitvāt /	The existence and non-existence of things are not dependent upon the use of mere words, as the using of words depends upon the whim of the speaker;
anyathā hi kvacit puṃsi kenacid icchāvaśād bāleya iti nāmni niveśite sarvasya gardabhadharmasya tatra prasaṅgaḥ syāt /	if it were not so, then if, through a whim, the name ‘Donkey’ were given to a man, the entire character of the Ass would have to be attributed to that man.
bāleyarāsabhaśabdau gardabhaparyāyau //	The term ‘bāleya’ (in the Text) is a synonym for ‘rāsabha’ (Ass).
avaśyaṃ caitad vijñeyam yaduta vastusvabhāvaniṣedha eva na tu kiñcid vidhīyata iti	If the category named ‘annihilation’ were affirmed in reference to a thing, there being nothing actually produced in the thing, how is it that the thing ceases (to exist)? (381)
vastuno jāyate kiñcid ityetat kiṃ nivartate // anyathā dhvaṃsākhyasya padārthāntarasya vidhāne sati na kiñcid vastuno jātam iti tadvastu kimiti nivartate //	If it were not as declared by us, and if the category of ‘annihilation’ were regarded as affirmed in reference to theng, then, as there is nothing actually produced in the thing concerned, why should that thing cease to exist? (381)
yaccoktam asatve sarvabhāvānām ityādi tatrāha bhāvadhvaṃsātmanaścaivam ityādi /	Thus it is that the existence of any ‘destruction of things’ of the nature of ‘annihilation’ is not admitted;
vasturūpaviyogena na bhāvābhāvarūpataḥ //	because the ‘destruction of a thing’ consists in the dissociation of a particular form, and not in the negation of its existence.
vastusvabhāvaviyogarūpatvāt na tu bhāvasvabhāvasya sataḥ svarūpanivṛtter asattvam tat kathaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaṃ syāt yadi hi svabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇo vināśas teṣām asan syāt tadā nityatvam eṣāṃ syāt / yāvatā svabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇo nāśaḥ svayam asadrūpasteṣām astyeveti kathaṃnityā bhaveyuḥ /	Thus: because it is really of the nature of the dissociation of a particular form of the Thing, and it is not of the nature of the negation of the Thing due to the cessation of the existence of the nature of the Thing itself, Why then should our doctrine involve the absurdity of all things being eternal? If the ‘Destruction of things’, in the form of the negation of their character, were non-existent, then alone thengs would be eternal; as a matter of fact, however, the Destruction in the shape of the negation of character, though itself negative in character, is actually there; how then could the things be eternal?
sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayasya tu nimittamabhihitam eva //	As for the notion of all properties being destructible, the basis for this has been already explained.
yaccoktaṃ nityatve 'pi sahasthānam ityādi tatrāha nivṛttirūpatetyādi / nivṛttirūpatāpyasmin vidhinā nābhidhīyate /	When it is asserted that ‘destruction is of the nature of cessation’, it does not mean the affirmation of its positive character;

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