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kimatra pramāṇam ity āha grāhyetyādi / | Question: ‘What is the proof of this?’ The answer is given in the following [see verse 329 next] |
grāhyalakṣaṇasaṃyuktaṃ na kiñcidiha vidyate / | “There is nothing in this world which is endowed with the character of apprehensibility; |
vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ tasmāt sarvaḥ samīkṣyate // | and all this is held to be the illusory modification of consciousness.” (329) |
na hi kṣityādayo jñānavyatirekeṇa grāhyalakṣaṇāpannāḥ santi yena te pratibhāserann avayavinaḥ / | Apart from Consciousness (Cognition), Earth etc. are not found to fulfil the conditions of ‘apprehensibility’, whereby they could appear (be perceived) as composites; |
paramāṇūnāṃ cāsattvāt / | and Atoms do not exist (for the Vedāntin); |
tasmāt sāmarthyād vijñānapratibhāsarūpā evāmī kṣityādaya iti vyavasīyante / | hence, by implication, it is concluded that Earth etc. are merely so many reflections in Consciousness. |
ayam iti kṣityādiḥ // | ‘This’ i.e. Earth and the rest. |
teṣām ityādinā pratividhatte | The above view of the Vedāntin is controverted in the following [see verses 330-331 next] |
teṣām alpāparādhaṃ tu darśanaṃ nityatoktitaḥ / | The error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one, due only to the assertion of eternality (of cognition); |
rūpaśabdādivijñānāṃ{ne---}vyaktaṃ bhedopalakṣaṇāt // | as diversity is clearly perceived in the cognitions of colour, sound and other things. |
ekajñānātmakatve tu rūpaśabdarasādayaḥ / sakṛdvedyāḥ prasajyante nitye 'vasthāntaraṃ na ca // | If all these cognitions were one, then, colour, sound, taste and other things would be cognisable all at once; as in an eternal entity there can be no different states. |
alpāparādham iti / | ‘The error is a slight one’; |
jñānamātrasya yuktyupetasyābhyupagamāt / | as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable. |
yadyevaṃ svalpo 'pi kimiti tatrāparādha ucyata ity āha nityatoktita ityādi / | “If that is so, then what is even the ‘slight error’ in their view?” It is due to the assertion of ‘eternality’, |
kasmāt punar nityatvābhyupagamo na yukta ity āha rūpaśabdādītyādi / | “But why should not the acceptance of ‘eternality’ be reasonable?” Answer Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.; |
nityatā hi nāma tādavasthyamucyate atādavasthyaṃ tvanityatā na ca rūpaśabdādipratibhāsivijñānam ekāvasthaṃ sarvadānubhūyate kintu krameṇa kadācidrūpapratibhāsamanyadā ca śabdādipratibhāsam / tadyadi nityaikajñānapratibhāsātmakā amī śabdādayaḥ syus tadā vicitrāstaraṇapratibhāsavat sakṛdeva pratibhāseran / | ‘Eternality’ connotes remaining in the same state always, and ‘non-eternality’ connotes not remaining in the same state always; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always; actually it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; |
tatpratibhāsātmakasya jñānasya sarvadāvasthitatvāt / | as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there. |
athāpi syād avasthāntaram etat krameṇa śabdādipratibhāsaṃ jñānasyotpadyate / tena sakṛdeva śabdādisaṃVedanaṃ na bhaviṣyatītyāha nitye 'vasthāntaraṃ na ceti / | It may be held that “the Cognition of Sound and other things are different ‘states’ of it appearing one after the other, so that the apprehension of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous”. The answer to this is ‘In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states’; |
avasthānām avasthātur ananyatvādavasthāvadavasthātur api nāśotpādau syātām / | because the ‘states’ are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to ‘production and destruction’, appearance and disappearance, in the same way as the States are liable; |
avasthātṛvadvāvasthānam api nityatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | or, conversely, the states also would be eternal, like the Entity to which they belong. |
[p.124] vyatireke cāvasthānāṃ tazsyaitā iti sambandhāsiddhiḥ upakārābhāvāt / | If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; |
nityaikavijṇyānamātrābhyupagamavirodhaś ca // | as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity. |
kiñca nityasya jñānātmanaḥ pratyakṣato vā siddhir bhavedanumānato vā na tāvat pratyakṣata iti darśayati rūpetyādi / | Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following [see verse 332 next] |
rūpādivittito bhinnaṃ na jñānamupalabhyate / | Cognition or consciousness is never apprehended as anything distinct from the cognitions of colour and other things; |
tasyāḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ bhede kimabhinnaṃ vyavasthitam // | and inasmuch as these latter undergo variations every moment, what remains there that could be lasting (permanent, eternal)? (332) |
na hi kramapratibhāsirūpādisaṃvidvyatirekeṇa nityaikarūpamavasthātṛ jñānamanubhūyate yena pratyakṣataḥ siddhiḥ syāt / | As a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend, any lasting Consciousness, eternal and one, whereby it could be held to be known through Perception. |
tasyāśca rūpādisaṃvitte krameṇānubhūyamānāyāḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ dhvaṃse siddhekimaparamabhinnamastīti vācyam / tasmād upalabdhikṣaṇaprāptasya tathāvidhajñānātmano 'nupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayataiveti bhāvaḥ / | Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the Cognitions of Colour and otherngs are apprehended one after the other, and are destroyed every moment it has to be explained what remains there that is non-different from those Cognitions? Thus, inasmuch as there is no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it were there, it cannot but be regarded as ‘non-existent This is what the Text means. |
na cāpyanumānataḥ siddhir iti manyate / | Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through Inference. |
tathāhyanumānaṃ bhavatyabhāvaliṅgaṃ vā bhavet kāryaṃ vā na tāvat svabhāvas tathābhūtasya jñānātmanaḥ sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti bādhakaṃ tu pratyakṣādi vidyata ityayukto nityajñānavivartaḥ // | Because such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot he the former, as there is nothing which can prove that such is the nature of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion. Thus the doctrine that ‘the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness’ is not right. |
kiñcāsmin pakṣe bandhamokṣavyavasthā na prāpnotīti darśayati viparyastetyādi / | Then again, under this doctrine, the notions of ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ are not possible. This is what is shown in the following [see verse 333 next] |
viparyastāviparyastajñānabhedo na vidyate / ekajñānātmakaṃ puṃsi bandhamokṣau tataḥ katham // | There can be no distinction in cognition as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ if the ‘soul’ consists of a single (eternal) cognition; how then can there be any ‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’? (333) |
yasya hi pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsi pratipuruṣamanekameva vijñānaṃ santānabhedi pravartata iti pakṣas tasya viparyastāviparyastajñānaprabandhotpādavaśād bandhamokṣavyavasthā yuktamatī / | For one who holds the view that Cognition is in perpetual flux, different with different persons, undergoing variations in a series, the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is quite reasonable, as being due to the coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; |
yogābhyāsakrameṇa ca pariśuddhataratamajñānotpādādapariśuddhajñānasaṃtānanivṛtter apavargaḥ prāpyata iti saphalo mokṣaprāptaye prayāsaḥ / | and through the practice of yoga, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of impure cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained; and thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful. |
yasya tu punarbhavato nityaikajñānasvabhāva ātmeti pakṣas tasya katham ekajñānātmake puṃsi bandhamokṣau bhavataḥ / tathā hi yadi viparyastasvabhāvam ekaṃ jñānaṃ sadā tadāparasyāvasthāntarasyābhāvān na mokṣavyavasthā syāt / | For you, on the other hand, the ‘Soul’ is of the nature of one Eternal Cognition; how then can there be any ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ for such a Soul? Because if the one Cognition is eternally wrong, then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no possibility of ‘Liberation’; |
athāviparyastaṃ tadā nityaṃ pariśuddhasvabhāvatvān na bandhaḥ syāt / | on the other hand, if the one Cognition were eternally right, then as it would be always pure, there could be no ‘Bondage’. |
asmākaṃ tu santānabhedena vijñaptiḥ saṃkliṣṭā śuddhā ceṣyata iti yuktā bandhamokṣavyavasthā / yathoktam | As regards our doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right), in accordance with the varying character of the Series (in which it appears), and hence the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is entirely reasonable. |
saṃkliṣṭā ca viśuddhā ca samalā nirmalā ca sā / | This has been thus declared ‘Cognition is defective and free from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities; |
saṃkliṣṭā cedbhaven nāsau muktāḥ syuḥ sarvadehinaḥ // | if it were never impure, then all embodied beings would be always liberated; |
viśuddhā cedbhavennāsau vyāyāmo niṣphalo bhavet / | if it were never pure, then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless’. |
kiṃ vā nivartayedyogī yogābhyāsena sādhayet / kiṃ vā na hātuṃ śakyo hi viparyāsas tadātmakaḥ // | What could the mystic set aside or accomplish by the practice of yoga? What too is there that could be rejected? As wrong cognition also is of the nature of the same (eternal cognition). |
tattvajñānaṃ na cotpādyaṃ tādātmyātsarvadā sthiteḥ / | The knowledge of truth also cannot be something to be brought about; as, being of the nature of cognition, it is always there. |
yogābhyāso 'pi tenāyamaphalaḥ sarva eva ca // | So that the entire practice of yoga also is entirely fruitless. |
yadi hi tattvabhāvanayā yogī kiñcinnivartayet pravartayed vā tadā syād asya saphalaḥ prayāsaḥ yāvatā na tāvad asau viparyāsaṃ nivartayati yasmād asau viparyāsas tadātmakaḥ nityajñānātmakaḥ tasmān na hātuṃ śakyaḥ / | If, by the contemplation of Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong Cognition, because it is of the nature of the same, i.e. of the nature of Eternal Cognition. For the same reason it cannot be rejected; |
nityasyāvināśitayā tyāgāsambhavāt / | because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible. |
nāpi tattvajñānaṃ bhāvanayā sādhayati nityajñānātmatayā sarvadā tattvajñānasyāvasthitatvāt / | How can the Yogin accomplish bring about the Knowledge of Truth? Being of the nature of Eternal Cognition, the Knowledge of Truth would be always there. |
tasmān na yuktam etat // | Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right. |
kecit tu saugatammanyā apy ātmānaṃ pracakṣate / pudgalavyapadeśena tattvānyatvādivarjitam // | Some people who regard themselves as ‘Bauddhas’ describe the soul by the name of ‘pudgala’, and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from (the skandhas, thought-phases). |
kecid iti vātsīputrīyaḥ. | ‘Some people’, the Vātsīputrīyas. |
te hi sugatasutamātmānaṃ manyamānā api pudgalavyājena skandhebhyastattvānyatvābhyāmavācyamātmānaṃ kalpayanti / ye hi nāma bhagavato nairātmyavādinas sugatasya sutatvamabhyupagatās te katham iva vitathātmadṛṣṭimabhiniviṣṭāssyuriti darśayannupahāsapadamāha saugatammanyā apīti / | Though these people regard themselves as ‘Saugatas’, sons of Sugata, Buddha, yet, under the pretended name of ‘Pudgala’, they postulate the ‘Soul’, which cannot be said to be either the ‘same as’, or ‘different from’, the ‘thought-phases The question arising as to how persons, who admit their being ‘Sons’ of the Blessed Buddha who has taught the doctirne of ‘No-Soul’, have wedded themselves to a false view of ‘Soul’, the Author answers it in a joking spirit, by the term ‘who regard themselves as Bauddhas’. |
tathāhīdam ātmano lakṣaṇam yo hi śubhāśubhakarmabhedānāṃ kartā svakṛtakarmaphalasya ceṣṭāniṣṭasya ca bhoktā yaś ca pūrvaskandhaparityāgād aparaskandhāntaropādānāt saṃsarati bhoktā ca sa ātmeti / | The character of the ‘Soul Vis held to be as follows: (a) He who is the doer of the diverse good and bad deeds, (b) the enjoyer of the agreeable and disagreeable fruits of his deeds, and (c) who moves from the point of the abandonment of the preceding Thought-phase to the point of the assuming of another Thought-phase, and is also the Experience, is the Soul. |
etac ca sarvaṃ pudgalo 'pīṣṭam iti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ // | All this is held to be true (by the Vātsīputrīyas) of their ‘Pudgala’ also; the only difference is in regard to the name. |
atha pudgalasyāvācyatve kā punar yuktir ity āha skandhebhya ityādi / skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ / | The ‘pudgala’ cannot be spoken of as ‘different’ from the thought-phases, as in that case this doctrine would be the same as those of the ‘tairthika philosophers’; nor can it be spoken of as the ‘same’ (non-different); |
nānanyo 'nekatādyāseḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā // | hence it is best to regard it as ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (as either the one or the other). |
[p.126] yadi skandhebhyo 'nyaḥ pudgalaḥ syāt tadānīṃ tairthikaparikalpitātmadṛṣṭir bhavet tataś ca śāśvatātmaprasaṅgaḥ / na ca śāśvatasyātmanaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvādi yuktam ākāśavat tasya sarvadā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | If the Pudgala were held to be different from the Thought-phases, then it would come to be the view of the ‘Soul’ propounded by the Tairthika Philosophers, which would mean the acceptance of the doctrine of the Eternal ‘Soul and it is not possible (as shown above) for the Eternal Soul to be the doer and the enjoyer, because it is always undifferentiated, like Ākāśa; |
pratiṣiddhaś ca bhagavatā śāśvatā ātmā nirātmānaḥ sarve dharmā iti ca vacanaṃ vyāhanyeta / | and the Blessed Lord also has denied the Eternal Soul; whose words ‘all entities are devoid of the Soul’ would thus become contradicted. |
ananyas tarhi bhavatviti cedāha nānanya ityādi / | Nor can it be spoken of as ‘non-different’ from the Thought-phases. |
yadi hi skandhā eva rūpādayaḥ pudgalaḥ syāt tadā bahubhyaḥ skandhebhyo 'nanyatvāt tatsvarūpavadanekatā prāpnoti pudgalasya / | If the Thought-phases, Colour and the rest, were the Pudgala, then, as it would be non-different from many Thought-phases, the Pudgala itself would have to be regarded as many, like the various forms of the Thought-phases; |
ekaśceṣyate / | and the Pudgala is held to be one; |
yathoktam ekaḥ pudgako loka u{tpa}dyamāna utpadyate yadvat tathā gata iti / | as has been asserted in the sentence ‘The Pudgala is one, and is born in the world as one; and so also the Tgthāgata’. |
ādiśabdenānityatvādiparigrahaḥ / | The phrase ‘and so forth’ is meant to include ‘non-enternality’ and such other characters. |
evaṃ ca sati uccheditvaṃ skandhavat pudgalasyāpi syāt / | Under the circumstances, the Pudgala would be something liable to destruction, like the Thought-phases; |
tataś ca kṛtakarmavipraṇāśaprasaṅgaḥ pratiṣiddhasya bhavatocchedavāda ityato 'styavācyaḥ pudgala iti siddham // | which would mean that there is ‘destruction of what has been done’ [i.e. there would be no accruing of the fruit of one’s deeds to the man, who would be disappearing every moment]; |
te vācyā ityādinā vastuvatpudgalo na bhavatyavācyatvād iti svavacanād eva bhavadbhiḥ pratipāditam iti darśayati te vācyāḥ pudgalo naiva vidyate pāramārthikaḥ / | From all this it follows that the Pudgala is ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases). These people should be told that (according to what they have said), the pudgala cannot be regarded as existing in reality; |
tattvānyatvād avācyatvān nabhaḥkokanadādivat // | because it is incapable of being spoken of either as the same or as different (from thought-phases); just like the ‘sky-lotus’ and such non-entities. |
prayogaḥ yadvastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhyāṃ vācyaṃ na bhavati na tadvastu yathā gagananalinam na bhavati ca vācyaḥ pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | The argument may be formulated, as follows: That which is incapable of being spoken of either as the same as, or as different from, a thing cannot be an entity, as the sky-lotus; and the Pudgala is (ex hypothesi) incapable of being so spoken of; hence the wider character being absent (the narrower character must be absent); |
vaidharmyeṇa vedanādi // | the corroborative instance per dissimilarity is supplied by Feelings etc. |
kathaṃ punar atra vyāptiḥ siddhetyāha anyatvam ityādi / | Question ‘How is the invariable concomitance (Premiss) urged here arrived at?’ The answer is provided by the following [see verse 339 next] |
anyatvaṃ vāpyananyatvaṃ vastu naivātivartate / | A thing cannot escape being either ‘same as’ or ‘different from’, another thing; |
vastuto yat tu nīrūpaṃ tadavācyaṃ prakalpyate // | in fact, it is only what is entirely formless that can be regarded as ‘incapable of being so spoken of (339) |
vastuno hi sakāśād vastu naiva tattvānyatve vyatikrāmati gatyantarābhāvāt / | A thing cannot escape from being either the same as, or different from another thing, as there is no other third alternative possible. |
anyathā rūpādīnām api parasparato 'vācyatvaṃ syāt / | If that were not so, then Colour and the rest also would be ‘incapable of being spoken of’ (either as the same as or different from one another). |
tasmānnīrūpamasvabhāvamevāvācyaṃ prakalpyate na tu vastu // | It is for this reason that it is only what, by its very nature, is formless that is regarded as ‘incapable of being spoken of’, not so any Entity. |
katham ity āha bhedābhedavikalpasyetyādi / | “How is that”? The answer is given in the following [see verses 340-342 next] |
bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhiṣṭhānabhāvataḥ / | It is only an entity that can be liable to the alternatives of being ‘different’ or ‘non-different’; |
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yujyate // | hence it is only in regard to things that are formless (i.e. non-entities) that it can be correct not to speak of them either as ‘different’ or ‘non-different’ (from one another); |
na vastuni yadetaddhi tanneti pratiṣedhanam / tadvastvantaravat tasmād vyaktamanyatvamucyate // | not so in regard to an entity; because in the case of the denial ‘this is not what that is, like a different thing’, it is difference that is clearly spoken of; |
atadbhāvaniṣedhaś ca tattvamevābhidhīyate / nātikrāmati tadvastu tattvaṃ bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ // | similarly when there is denial ‘this is not what that is not’, what is clearly spoken of is non-difference (between the two); thus it is that an entity can never escape from being either different or non-different from another entity. |
vastveva hi bhedābhedavikalpayor adhiṣṭhānam nāvastu / | As a matter of fact, an Entity alone can be the substratum of difference and non-difference; |
tena tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣveva svabhāvavirahiteṣveva yujyate / | hence the non-mention of both difference and non-difference is possible only in regard tongs that are formless, i.e. have no character of their own; |
na vastuni tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo yujyata iti sambandhaḥ / | such non-mention is not right in regard to an Entity; such is the construction of the sentence; |
tatra bhedābhedābhyāṃ gatyantarabhāvāt / | and the reason for this lies in the fact that no third alternative is possible. |
kathaṃ punar gatyantarābhāva ity āha yadetaddhītyādi / | “Why is no third alternative possible?” Answer: Because in the case of the denial etc. etc.; |
tathā hi rūpādisvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavatīti yadetat tanniṣedhanam tat tasmād rūpādeḥ sakāśād anyatvamevābhidhīyate / svabhāvāntaravidhināntarīyakatvā dvastuno rūpaṃ vedanātaḥ rūpādisvabhāvavirahi ca pudgalākhyaṃ vastu iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | that is, when there is the denial, ‘The Pudgala is not of the nature of Colour and other things’, what is mentioned is the difference of the Pudgala from Colour and other things; because the denial of the fact of one thing being the same as another is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of a different character for the former. This argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is devoid of the character of another thing, it is different from it, e.g. Colour is different from Feeling; |
yaścāyaṃ vastuno 'tadbhāvaniṣedhaḥ atadrūpaniṣedhaḥ sa tattvamavyatireka evābhidhīyate / | Similarly where there is denial ‘this is not what that is’, i.e. the denial of its not being of the same character as the other thing, what is meant is its non-difference from thatng; |
tattvavidhināntarīyakatvād vastusato 'rthāntarabhāvaniṣedhasya / | because the denial of a real Entity being different from another thing is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of its being the same as that thing; |
anyathā hi yadi tasya na kaścitsvabhāvo vidhīyate tadā sarvasvabhāvaniṣedhādavastutvam eva syāt / | if it were not so, and no character is affirmed regarding that thing, then all character being denied of it, it would become a non-entity; |
sarvasvabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti / | because a non-entity is characterised by the denial of all character in regard to it. |
prayogaḥ yadvastu yato 'rthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvaṃ tat tadeva yathā rūpaṃ svasvabhāvād arthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvam / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When one thing is denied the character of being something other than another thing, it must be the same as this latter, just as Colour is denied the character of being something different from itself; |
pratiṣiddhātmatattvaś ca rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena pudgala iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | the Pudgala (according to the opposite party) is denied the character of being something other than Colour and the rest; |
tat tasmād vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatve vastu nātikrāmatīti siddhā vyāptir maulasya hetoḥ // | hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as non-different from the latter) based upon the nature of things. Thus we conclude that an Entity cannot escape from the alternatives of being different or non-different from another thing; |
evaṃ tāvad avācyatvābhyupagame prajṇaptisatvampudgalasya prāptaṃiti pratipāditaṃ/ | so that the Premiss of one main reason (against the doctrine of the Vātsīputrīyas) is fully established. |
skandho na pudgalaśceti vyaktā tasyeyam anyatā // api cāvācyaḥ pudgala iti bruvāṇair bhavadbhiḥ sphuṭataram eva skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasyānyatvamuccairudghoṣitam iti darśayati viruddhadharmasaṅgo hītyādi / | Your words that “the pudgala is not different from the thought-phases’ are a clear assertion of its non-difference; while the words ‘the thought-phase is not the pudgala’ clearly asserts its difference. Further, when you assert that ‘the Pudgala is incapable of being spoken of’, you loudly proclaim quite clearly that the Pudgala is different from the Thought-phases. |
viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi vastūnāṃ bheda ucyate / | The presence of contrary properties is spoken of as constituting ‘difference’ among entities; |
skandhapudgalayoścaiva vidyate bhinnatā na kim // | is there no such ‘difference’ between the pudgala and the thought-phases? (344) |
prayogaḥ yau parasparaparihārasthitadharmādhyāsitau tau parasparabhinnau yathā rūpavedane mūrtatvāmūrtatvayukte vācyatvāvācyatvādiparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitau ca skandhapudgalāv iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | This argument may be formulated as follows: Where twongs are possessed of properties that are mutually exclusive, they must be different from one another, e.g. between Colour and Feeling, the former being endowed with material shape and the latter being devoid of material shape; Pudgala and Thought-phase are (according to you) possessed by such mutually exclusive properties as ‘capable of being spoken of’ and ‘incapable of being spoken of hence this is a natural reason (for regarding the two as different). |
[p.128] na cāyam asiddho hetur iti darśayann āha tathā hītyādi / | The following Text proceeds to show that the reason here put forward is not ‘unproven’: [see verse 345 next] |
tathā hi vedanādibhyaḥ pudgalo 'vācya ucyate / tattvānyatvena vācyāstu rūpasaṃjñādayas tataḥ // tathā hi pudgalo vedanāsaṃjñādibhyas tattvānyatvābhyāmavācya iṣyate / | For instance, the pudgala is said to be ‘incapable of being spoken of’ as different or non-different from feeling and the rest, while colour, name and other things are said to be ‘capable of being spoken of’ as different from them. That is to say, the Pudgala is said to be ‘incapable of being spoken of’ as different or non-different from Feeling, Name and the rest; |
rūpavedanādayastu tataḥ vedanādibhyaḥ parasparamanyatvena vācyā ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ // | while Colour, Name, and the rest are spoken of as quite ‘capable of being spoken of’ as different from each other; |
ito 'pi viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ siddha ityādarśayati anityatvenetyādi / | so that our Reason is not ‘unproven’, (345) |
anityatve na vācyāś ca rūpaskandhādayo matāḥ / | The ‘colour-phase’ and the rest are held to be ‘capable of being spoken of’ as ‘non-eternal’; |
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