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prayogaḥ yasya sadbhāvavyavasthānibandhanaṃ nāsti nāsau prekṣāvatā tadbhāvena vyavasthāpyaḥ yathākāśaṃ mūrtatvena / nāsti ca bhoktṛvyavasthānibandhanaṃ puruṣādidṛkṣādīti kāraṇānupalabdheḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When there is no basis for any restriction regarding the existence of a thing, that thing should not be so restricted by any intelligent person, e.g. Ākāśa as having a material shape; in the case of the Spirit there is no basis, in the shape of ‘Desire to see’ and the rest for restricting the character of ‘being the experiencer’ to it; so that no reason is perceived for such restriction. |
na cāyam asiddho hetur iti pratipāditam // | This Reason cannot be said to be ‘unproven’; as has been explained already. |
śubhāśubhaṃ ca karmāsti naiva cedātmanā kṛtam / tadeṣa bhogabhedo 'sya kutaḥ samupajāyate // | If good and bad deeds are not done by the soul, then wherefrom does this diversity in his experiences proceed? (291) |
na hyakṛtasya karmaṇaḥ kaścit phalamupabhuṅkte akṛtābhyāgamādidoṣaprasaṅgāt // | As a matter of fact, no one enjoys the fruit of the act that he has not done; for if he did, then this would involve the incongruity of the ‘accruing of what has not been done’, etc. etc. |
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkate abhilāṣānurūpeṇetyādi / | The following Text states a likely answer from the other party: [see verse 292 next] |
abhilāṣānurūpeṇa prakṛtiścetprayacchati / | If it be held that “it is primordial matter that bestows the fruits, in accordance with the desires of the soul; |
paṅgvandhavaddhi sambandhas tayor eṣa vyavasthitaḥ // | and this relationship between the two stands like that between the lame and the blind persons”, [then the answer is as given in the following text]. |
[p.113] yadyapi puruṣaḥ karmaṇāṃ kartā na bhavati tathāpi prakṛtir asya yathābhilaṣitam arthamupanayati tamasau bhuṅkta ityadoṣaḥ / | Though the Soul is not the doer of deeds, yet it is Primordial Matter that presents to him things, in accordance with his desires, and then he enjoys these things. So that there is none of the incongruity that has been urged. |
nanu prakṛtir acetanā satī kathaṃ śubhādikarmaṇāṃ kartrī bhavati yenāsau yathābhimataṃ karmaphalaṃ puruṣasya sampādayatītyāha paṅgvandhavaddhītyādi / | Question: “Primordial Matter being insentient, how can it be the Doer of good and bad deeds, by virtue of which it brings about the fruits of deeds for the Soul according to his desires?” |
yathā kilāndhasya cakṣuṣmatpuruṣasambandhād artheṣu pravṛttir bhavati tathā mahadādikaṃ liṅgaṃ cetanapuruṣasamparkāccetanāvad iva dharmādiṣu kāryeṣvadhyavasāyaṃ karotītyadoṣaḥ / | Answer: This relationship, etc.; just as the Blind man acts towards things, through his connecti on with the man with eyes, so do the Cosmic Intellect and other ‘divergent’ngs perform the functions of ‘determining’ and the rest towards such effects as Merit, etc,, through their contact with the Soul, which is sentient. |
tathā coktam puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya / | This has been thus asserted “The Soul serves the purpose of bringing about Perception (of Matter), and Primordial Matter serves to bring about Liberation (of the Soul); |
paṅgvandhavadubhayor api saṃyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ iti // | the connection between these two thus is like that between the Lame and the Blind; and creation (evolution) proceeds from this connection” (Sāṃkhyakārikā, 21’, (292) |
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte / | The above argument is answered in the following [see verse 293 next] |
yadyevam iṣṭavāñchāyāṃ satyam api na siddhyati / kimiti prakṛtir naiva kiñcidanyadapekṣate // | If that is so, then how is it that even when the desire for the desired thing is there, it is not fulfilled? primordial matter cannot stand in need of anything else. |
yadi hi prakṛtirakṛtasyāpi karmaṇaḥ phalam abhilaṣitamupanayatīti syāt tadā sarvadaiveṣṭavāñchāyāṃ sarvasya puṃso 'bhilaṣito 'rthaḥ kimiti na siddhyet / | If what is meant is that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul the desired fruit of even such acts as he has not done, then how is it that, at all times, on the desire appearing for anything, the desires of all men do not become fulfilled? |
syān matam tatkāraṇasya dharmasyābhāvān na siddhyatīti āha prakṛtir naivetyādi / | It might be argued that “It does not become fulfilled because its cause, in the form of Merit, is not present”. |
prakṛtir hi dharmaḥ kāryam sa ca tadavyatiriktatvāt sadaivāstīti bhavedevābhimataṃ phalam / | Merit is a product of Primordial Matter, and as such non-different from it; consequently it must be always present; and the desired fruit must therefore always appear. |
tathā hi etad eva sarvaṃ yaduta prakṛtipuruṣau tau ca sadā sannihitāv iti /ato nityam eva phalaṃ bhavet / | For instance, all things (for the Sāṃkhya) are included under the two categories of ‘Primordial Matter’ and ‘Soul’, and these are always close to one another; so that the fruit should be always there. |
kiṃ ca yadyabhilaṣitam arthaṃ prakṛtiḥ prayacchati tadāniṣṭaṃ kimiti prayacchet na hyaniṣṭaṃ kaścid abhilaṣati // | Then again, if it is the desired fruit that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul, why then does it present to him what is undesirable? For certainly no one desires what is undesirable. |
arthopabhogakāle ca yadi naivāsya vikriyā / | If, at the time op his enjoying a thing, there is no modification in the soul, then he cannot be the enjoyer; |
naiva bhoktṛtvam asya syāt prakṛtiścopakāriṇī // | nor can primordial matter be of any service to him. |
vikriyāyāś ca sadbhāve nityatvamavahīyate / | If (on the other hand) there is modification in him, then his eternality disappears; |
anyathātvaṃ vikāro hi tādavasthye ca tat kathaṃ // | and how could any such change be possible if the soul remained in the same condition always? (294-295) |
yadi hi sukhaduḥkhādināhlādaparitāpādirūpāṃ vikṛtiṃ nopanīyate tadākāśavad abhoktṛtvam eva syāt / | If the Soul is not made to undergo ‘modification’ into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth, then he would be just like Ākāśa, and hence he cannot be the Enjoyer; |
prakṛtiścopakāriṇī na syād iti sambandhaḥ / | and Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him, [such is the construction of the Sentence]; |
avikṛtātmanyupakārasya kartumaśakyatvāt / | because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable. |
atha vikāritvamasyābhyupagamyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ / | If then, it be admitted that the Soul is modifiable, then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his etemality; |
yato 'tādavasthyamevānityatāṃ brūmaḥ / | because what we mean by the ‘Non-eternality’ of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; |
tac ca vikāritve satyastīti katham asya nityatā syāt / tādavasthyarūpatvān nityatvasya //294--------- | and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal? As what is meant by ‘eternality’ is that the thing should retain the same form always. |
syānmataṃ viṣayākārā buddhir ādau vivartate / | The following might be urged “first of all the cosmic intellect becomes evolved in the form of the object; |
tayā vyavasitaṃ cārthaṃ puruṣaḥ pratipadyate // | and when this object has been ‘determined upon’ (defined) by cosmic intellect, the spirit attains it. |
pratibibodayadvārā caivam asyopabhoktṛtā / | thus his character of being the ‘enjoyer’ is through the appearance of the reflection; |
na jahāti svarūpaṃ tu puruṣo 'yaṃ kadācana // | and the spirit never renounces his own nature.” (296-297) |
na hi vikārāpattyā bhoktṛtvamasyeṣṭam kiṃ tarhi / | The Spirit is not held to the ‘enjoyer’ in the sense that he becomes modified; |
buddhyavasitasyārthasya pratibimbodayanyāyena / | what is meant is that he becomes so by way of the appearance therein of the object ‘determined’ by Cosmic Intellect. |
tathā hi buddhidarpaṇārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ dvitīyadarpaṇakalpe puṃsi saṃkrāmati tadevāsya bhoktṛtvam na tu vikārāpattiḥ / | That is to say, the object, first of all, enters as a reflected image in the mirror of Cosmic Intellect, this reflected image of the object then becomes transferred into Spirit, which is the second reflecting mirror; |
na ca pratibimbamātrasaṃkrāntāvapi puruṣaḥ svarūpaṃ jahāti darpaṇavat tadavathatvāt / | and not his undergoing modification. By the mere transference of the reflected image, the Spirit does not renounce his own nature, because, like the Mirror he remains just as he was. |
ato yadabhoktavasthānirviśiṣṭaṃ ityatra prayoge 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Thus, in the argument that was urged above (by the Buddhist against the Sāṃkhya) to the effect that ‘what is non-differentiated from the non-enjoyer cannot be the enjoyer etc. etc,’ (under Text, 288) the Reason is found to be ‘inconclusive (296-297) |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to this is supplied in the following [see verse 298 next] |
ucyate pratibimbasya tādātmyena samudbhave / | Our answer to this is as follows: If the reflection appears in the same form (as the reflecting substance), then the same liability to ‘appearance and disappearance’ remains. |
tadevodayayogitvaṃ vibhede tu na bhoktṛtā // | If, on the other hand, it is different, then the spirit cannot be the enjoyer. |
yattadbuddhidarpaṇārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ dvitīyadarpaṇakalpe puṃsi saṃkrāmatītīṣyate tadyadipuruṣādavyatiriktam tadā tadevānantaroktamudayavyayayogitve prasajyate / | You hold that the reflection of the object in Cosmic Intellect becomes transferred to the Spirit, who is like a second mirror; now if this reflection in Spirit is non-different from the Spirit itself, then the Spirit remains liable to ‘appearance and disappearance’ as urged above; |
udayavyayayogipratibimbarūpavat tadavyatirekāt / | for the simple reason that he is non-different from (identified with) the Reflection, which is liable to appearance and disappearance. |
atha vyatiriktam iti pakṣas tadā bhoktṛtā na prāpnoti abhoktravasthāto viśeṣasya kasyacid abhāvāt / | If, on the other hand, the view held is that the Reflection is something different from the Spirit, then he cannot be the ‘enjoyer’, as his condition would not be different in any way from what it was when he was not the ‘enjoyer’. |
na cāpyarthapratibimbena saha puṃsaḥ sambandhād bhoktṛtvaṃ yuktam parasparamanupakārakayoḥ sambandhāsiddheḥ // | Nor can it be right to regard the Spirit’s character of being the ‘Enjoyer’ as being due to his contact with the reflection of the object; as there can be no ‘contact’ between two such entities as do not benefit each other in any way. |
didṛkṣādyānukūlyena pradhānaṃ sampravartate / vicitraracanābhede kathaṃ vācetanātmakam // | If primordial matter operates towards bringing about the diversified creation, in accordance with the (spirit’s) ‘desire to see’ and the rest, then how can it be insentient? (299) |
kiṃ ca yadi pradhānaṃ puruṣasya didṛkṣādi jānīyāt tadānukūlyena tasya puruṣasyārthaṃ prati pravṛttir yuktā yāvatā jaḍarūpatvāt satyapi cetanāvatāsambandhe paṅgvandhavat pravṛttir na yuktā / tathā hi andho yadi nāma mārgaṃ nopalabhate tathāpyasau paṅgor vivakṣāñcetayayeva tasya cetanāvattvāt / | Then again, if Primordial Matter knew of the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ etc, then it might be resonable to regard its activity to be for the sake of the Spirit, and to be in accordance with his ‘desire to see’ etc.; as a matter of fact, however, the said Matter is itself insentient, even when in contact with the Sentient Spirit; it cannot then be right to regard its activity as brought about as by the contact of the Lame and the Blind. Because even though the Blind man does not see the road, yet he knows of the Lame man’s desire, because he is himself sentient. |
na caivaṃ pradhānaṃ puruṣasya didṛkṣādi vetti tasyācetanātmakatvena jaḍarūpatvāt / | Primordial Matter however cannot know the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ etc., because being insentient by its very nature, it is unconscious. |
na cāpi tayoḥ parasparamanupakāriṇoḥ paṅgvandhavat sambandho 'sti // | Nor is it possible for these two Spirit and Primordial Matter to be related like the Lame and the Blind, as there can be no mutual benefit in their case. |
kartuṃ nāma prajānāti pradhānaṃ vyañjanādikam / bhoktuṃ ca na vijānāti kimayuktam ataḥ param // | Primordial matter knows how to produce the soup and other things, and yet does not know how to eat (enjoy) them, what can be more incongruous than this? (300) |
[p.115] atha puruṣasya didṛkṣādi vetti pradhānam itīṣyate / | If it be held that Primordial Matter actually knows of the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ and the rest of it. |
tathā ca sati bhoktṛtvamapyasya prasajyeta / | then it must have to be regarded as being the ‘Enjoyer’ also. |
yo hi nāma kartuṃ vijānāti sa kathaṃ bhoktum api na jānīyāt / tasmāt kartuṃ jānāti na bhoktumityataḥ paraṃ kimayuktam asti naiva kiñcid ity arthaḥ / | How can one who knows how to produce a thing not know how to enjoy it? Hence what can be more incongruous than that Primordial Matter knows how to produce things, but does not know how to enjoy them? The meaning is that nothing can be more incongruous. |
na hi sūpakāro vyañjanādeḥ kartā tadbhoktuṃ na vijānātīti / | The Cook who prepares the soup and other things cannot be regarded as not knowing how to eat (enjoy) them. |
atretiśabdo 'dhyāhāryaḥ // | The particle ‘iti’ should be taken as understood after ‘vijā āti’. |
buddhimattvādityādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate buddhimattvāt pradhānasya sarvamasyāvirodhi cet / buddhimattvena tu prāptaṃ caitanyaṃ puruṣeṣviva // | If it be argued that “inasmuch as primordial matter is equipped with cosmic intellect, all this cannot be incompatible with its nature”, then, on the ground of its being equipped with intellect, it would have to be possessed of sentience also, like the sentience in spirits. |
buddhiradhyavasāyo hi saṃvitsaṃvedanaṃ tathā / saṃvittiścetanā ceti sarvaṃ caitanyavācakam // sarvam iti / | because ‘intellect’, ‘volition’, ‘consciousness’, ‘feeling’, ‘knowing’, all this is expressive of sentience. ‘All this’ i.e. acting in accordance with the Spirit’s ‘desire to see’ and the rest; |
asyeti pradhānasya / | ‘its nature’ its character of Primordial Matter. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi nāma pradhānaṃ cidrūpaṃ na bhavati tathāpi buddhyāvyavasāyalakṣaṇayā yuktatvāt puruṣagataṃ didṛkṣādi parijñāya pravartiṣyata ityataḥ sarvam avirodhīti / | What is meant is this “Even though Primordial Matter is not of the nature of Sentience, yet it is equipped with Cosmic Intellect which is of the nature of ‘determination’, and thus it can know of the Spirit’s ‘desire to know’ etc., and act accordingly; so that there is no incongruity at all”. |
atrottaram āha buddhimattvenetyādi / yadi hi pradhānasya buddhimattvam aṅgīkriyate tadāsya puruṣavaccaitanyavattvaprasaṅgaḥ / | The answer to this is that on the ground of its being equipped with Intellect, etc. etc. That is to say, if it is admitted that Primordial Matter is equipped with Intellect, then it should have to be regarded as endowed with Sentience also, like the Spirit; |
buddhyādīnāṃ caitanyaparyāyatvāt / tathā hi yat prakāśātmatayā svasaṃviditarūpaṃ paranirapekṣam eva prakāśate taccaitanyamucyate tattvaṃ buddher apyastīti kimiti sā cidrūpā na bhavet / na cāpi buddhivyatirekeṇāparaṃ cidrūpam upalakṣyāmaḥ / | as ‘Buddhi’ (Intellect) etc. are only so many synonyms of ‘Sentience’, For instance, that which is of the nature of light and has its form known by itself and shines independently of all else, is ‘Sentience and this character is present in Buddhi (Intellect) also; why then should this latter not be the same as Sentience? specially as apart from Intellect, we do not perceive any other form of Sentience, by virtue of which this distinct nature could be attributed to Spirit. |
atra pariścidrūpād buddher bhedaprasādhanāyāha acetanātmikā buddhir ityādi / | In the following Text, the other party proceeds to show that Buddhi (Intellect) is something different from ‘Sentience’: [see verse 303 above] |
utpattimattvānāśitvahetubhyām iti cen matam // prayogaḥ yadyadutpattimattvanāśitvādidharmayogi tat tadacetanam yathā rasādayaḥ tathā ca buddhir iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The opponent’s argument is formulated thus: “Whatever is characterised, by the character of being produced, being perishable, and the like, must be insentient, e.g. Taste etc.; Cosmic Intellect is so characterised; hence this must be a reason based upon the nature of things (for regarding it as insentient).” (303) |
naitāvityādinā pratividhatte / | The following Text answers this argument: [see verse 304 next] |
naitau hetū dvayoḥ siddhau svatantre sādhane mate / | If the reasons adduced are meant to be self-sufficient, then they are not admitted by both (parties); |
na viparyayabādhāsti prasaṅgo 'pyabhidhitsite // | if the reasons are meant to be indirect, then there is nothing to annul the contrary conclusion. |
kadācid idaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ syāt prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā / yadi svātantryeṇa tadānyatarāsiddho hetuḥ / | The reason that has been put forward, is it meant to prove the conclusion directly or indirectly (per Reductio ad absurdum)? If directly, then the Reason adduced is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties; |
tathā hi yathāvidhamutpattimattvamapūrvotpādalakṣaṇaṃ nāśitvaṃ vātyantasa [p.116] mucchedātmakaṃ bauddhasya prasiddhaṃ na tathāvidhaṃ bhavataḥ sāṅkhyasya / | for instance, the ‘producibility’ of things that the Buddhist admits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before, similarly, the ‘perishability’ of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction, while such is not the ‘producibility’ or ‘perishability’ that is admitted by you, the Sāṃkhya; |
tayoḥ pariṇāmatirodhānarūpatvena bhavadbhir aṅgīkaraṇāt / | as you regard them as being of the nature of ‘appearance’ and ‘disappearance’ respectively; |
yathā ca bhavatas tathā na bauddhasya siddham ityanyatarāsiddho hetuḥ / | and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist; hence the reason comes to be ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other party. |
na ca śabdamātrasya siddhau hetusiddhiḥ vastuno hi vastusiddher vastuta eva hetutvāt / | The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the cause. |
yathoktam tasyaiva vyabhicārādau śabde 'pyavyabhicāriṇi / doṣavat sādhanaṃ jñeyaṃ vastuno vastusiddhitaḥ // | This has been thus declared ‘In the case of such fallacies as Falsity and the like, even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fact.’ |
atha prasaṅgasādhanamitipakṣas tathāpi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanād anaikāntikatā hetvoḥ / ko hyatra pratibandho yaccaitanyasyotpattimattvanāśitvābhyāṃ na bhavitavyam iti / | If it be held that the Reason adduced is meant to prove the conclusion indirectly; even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as ‘inconclusive What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that ‘producibility’ and ‘perishability’ belong to Sentience? |
yāpīyaṃ kalpanā vatsavivṛddhinimittaṃ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya / puruṣavimokṣanimittaṃ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya iti / | As for the assumption of the Sāṃkhya in the following Kārika “As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit” (Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, 57), this is not a sound assumption at all; |
na hi kṣīraṃ svātantryeṇa vatsavivṛddhinimittaṃ pravartate / | because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf’s growth; |
kiṃ tarhi pratiniyatebhyaḥ kādācitkebhyaḥ svahetupratyayebhyaḥ samutpadyate / | what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally; |
taccotpannaṃ saddhatsavivṛddher nimittatāṃ yātītyajñam api pravartata iti nirdiśyate / | and it is in this sense that it is said that ‘even the insentient thing acts No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter; |
na caivaṃ pradhānasya pravṛttir yuktā / tathā hi nityatvāt tadanyahetvabhāvāc ca na tāvat kādācitkāraṇasaṃnidhānāyattā tasya kādācitkī śaktir yuktā / | because, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is eternal, and there can be no other cause except itself, it cannot be right to regard its Potency as only occasionally active, on account of being dependent upon certain causes operating only occasionally. |
nāpi svābhāvikī sadā saṃnihitāvikalakāraṇatvena sarvasyābhyudayaniḥśreyasalakṣaṇasya puruṣārthasya yugapad utpattiprasaṅgāt // | Nor can it be right to regard the said Potency of Primordial Matter to be inherent in it; for, if that were so, then as the Cause in its perfect form would be always present, the entire purpose of all men, in the form ‘prosperity’ and ‘highest good’, would be brought about all at once. |
caitanye cātmaśabdasya niveśe 'pi na naḥ kṣatiḥ / | There is no harm done to us by the mere application of the term ‘spirit’ to sentience; |
nityatvaṃ tasya duḥsādhyamakṣyādeḥ saphalatvataḥ // akṣyārthādyaphalaṃ tu syāc caitanyaṃ śāśvataṃ yadi / | what we assert is that its eternality is difficult to prove; because the eye and other things serve a fruitful purpose. if sentience were everlasting, then all such things as the eye and the rest would be useless; |
na bhaved indhanenārtho yadi syācchāśvato 'nalaḥ // | e.g. there would be no use for the fuel if fire were everlasting. |
na hyātmaśabdaniveśanamātramasmābhiścaitanye pratiṣidhyate kiṃ tarhi yas tatra nityatvalakṣaṇaḥ samāropito dharmaḥ sa niṣidhyate / | even so the fact of its being Spirit remains undenied” The answer to this is given in the following: [see verses 305-306 above] What we deny is not merely the applying of the same ‘Spirit’ to Sentience; what we do deny is the property of ‘eternality’ that is imposed upon it. |
kasmāt akṣyālokamanaskārādeḥ sāphalyāt / | ‘Why?’ Because such things as the Eye, the Light, the Mind and the like serve a fruitful purpose. |
anyathā yadi śāśvataṃ nityaṃ caitanyaṃ syāt tadākṣyādi viphalam eva syāt / | Otherwise, if Sentience were everlasting eternal then the Eye and the rest would be entirely useless; |
tadutpattyarthatvāt teṣām / | as the only purpose served by these is the bringing about of Sentience (Cognition); |
nityasya copattyasambhavāt / | and there can be no bringing about of what is eternal. |
atraiva dṛṣṭāntam āha na bhaved ityādi / | An example is cited. There would be etc.; |
yadi śāśvato vahnir bhavet tadā naiva jano 'nalārtham indhanamupādadīta tasmān na nityaikarūpaṃ caitanyaṃ yuktam // | i.e. if fire were everlasting, then people would not fetch fuel for the lighting of fire. From all this it follows that Sentience cannot be Eternal. |
pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ yat punaḥ pratipādyate / śayyāśanādivattena saṃghātatvena hetunā // | The fact of the eye etc. being for ‘another’s use’ is asserted (by the sāṃkhya), on the ground of their being ‘composite things’, like the bed, seat and such things. |
ādheyātiśayārthatvaṃ yadyeṣām upapādyate / | If it is meant by this to prove that they serve the purpose of something else which is capable of having additional properties produced in it, then what is sought to be proved is already admitted; |
iṣṭasiddhir yadiṣṭās te 'smābhir jñānopakāriṇaḥ // | inasmuch as the said eye etc. are admitted by us to be helpful to cognition. |
avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā / | On the other hand, if it is meant to prove that they are helpful to something that is unmodifiable, then the reasoning is open to the fallacy of the corroborative instance being devoid of the probandum; |
dṛṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktās te 'pyupakāriṇaḥ // | as the things cited as the instance are also helpful only to what is mobile (perishable). |
sāmānyena tu pārārthyaṃ yadyeṣāṃ samprasādhyate / tathāpi sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ siddhāścittopayoginaḥ // | Lastly, if what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of their being helpful to ‘another’, even so, the reason would be superfluous; as they are already admitted to be helpful to the mind. |
ādheyātiśayo vā paro 'bhipreto bhavet yadvānādheyātiśayarūpatvādavikārī atha vā sāmānyena pārārthyamātramavicāritaramaṇīyaṃ sādhyata iti trayo vikalpāḥ / | The ‘another’ that is meant, (a) is it one capable of having additional properties produced in it? or (b) one incapable of having such additional properties produced, and hence unmodifiable? or (c) what is meant to be proved is the mere vague fact of ‘being for another’s purpose’, which is pleasing enough so long as it is not examined? These are the three alternatives possible. |
tatra prathamapakṣe siddhasādhyatā yatas te cakṣurādayo 'smābhir vijñānopakāriṇa iṣṭāḥ / | Under the first alternative (a), the reasoning proves what is already admitted; as we also admit that the Eye etc. are helpful to Cognition; |
cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate taccakṣur vijñānam yāvat kāyaṃ pratītya spraṣṭavyāni{thyo} cotpadyate kāyavijñānam iti vacanāt / | as is clear from the statement that ‘That Cognition which originates from the Eye and the Colours is Visual Perception, and that Cognition which originates from the whole body and the touchable things is Bodily (Tactile) perception? |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viruddhatā hetor ityādarśayann āha avikāryupakāritvetyādi / | Under the second alternative (b), the Reason is’ contradictory’; this is what is shown in the text 309. |
avikāriṇo nityasyopakāritvam avikāryupakāritvam tasya cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhane sati dṛṣṭānte sādhyaviparyayeṇaiva hetor vyāptatvād viruddhatā yatas te śayanādayaścalasyānityasyaivopakāriṇo yuktāḥ avikāriṇyatiśayasyādhātumaśakyatvāt / | If the Eye, etc. are meant to be proved as helpful to something that is unmodifiable (eternal), then as the Reason is found, in the instance cited, to be concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum, it becomes ‘Contradictory’; because the Bed and other things (cited as instances) are actually found to be helpful to what is mobile, i.e., non-eternal; in as much as it is impossible to add to the properties of what is unmodifiable. |
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